1. Executive Summary

As of mid-2026, the bilateral relationship between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines has transitioned from an economic partnership into a formalized military alliance designed to anchor the defense architecture of the First Island Chain. Following the summit between Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in May 2026, bilateral ties were officially elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.¹ This development follows rapid legal, military, and economic integration driven by mutual threat perceptions regarding the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and uncertainties surrounding the United States’ long-term regional security posture.³

This intelligence assessment analyzes the strategic drivers, current operational mechanisms, and future trajectory of the Tokyo-Manila military alignment. Analytical findings indicate that the alliance is operationalized through a triad of mechanisms. First, the two nations have established legal frameworks, including a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and advanced negotiations for a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), facilitating military access and intelligence sharing.⁴ Second, Japan has deployed significant capital via Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework to build the maritime capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).² Third, both militaries have achieved localized tactical integration focused on the Luzon Strait and the broader South China Sea, forming a combined deterrent against regional coercion.⁷

The drivers of this alignment are acute. The Philippines faces persistent gray-zone coercion within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from a numerically and technologically superior China Coast Guard (CCG).² Simultaneously, Japan recognizes that a military contingency in the Taiwan Strait would sever the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) upon which its energy security and industrial economy depend.⁸ Compounding these systemic pressures is a discernible shift in United States policy; early 2026 rhetoric from the Trump administration prioritizing “strategic stability” with Beijing has catalyzed middle-power hedging strategies, prompting Tokyo and Manila to construct an autonomous regional deterrence network.³

Looking forward, the alliance is positioned to deepen defense industrial integration, establish logistics and maintenance hubs within the Philippine archipelago, and pursue persistent sea denial postures in the Bashi Channel.² However, this trajectory faces strategic headwinds. These include domestic political opposition to Japanese remilitarization, complex interoperability challenges between legacy maritime platforms, the financial constraints of the Philippine defense budget, and aggressive diplomatic and economic retaliatory measures executed by Beijing.⁵

2. Structural Drivers of Bilateral Integration

The acceleration of the Japan-Philippines security partnership is a structural response to a deteriorating threat environment within the Indo-Pacific. The core drivers compelling Tokyo and Manila to align their military postures can be categorized into three primary domains: adversarial gray-zone coercion, systemic geographic vulnerabilities, and shifting great-power dynamics.

2.1 Asymmetric Maritime Coercion in the Gray Zone

The immediate operational driver for Manila is the capability and capacity gap between the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG currently operates as the world’s largest coast guard, possessing an inventory of over 157 large patrol vessels.² This represents a near-quadrupling of its force structure over the past decade. In contrast, the PCG fields approximately 25 major vessels, many of which historically struggled with limited surveillance coverage and low operational endurance.²

This maritime asymmetry enables Beijing to maintain a continuous, coercive presence within the Philippine EEZ. The CCG’s daily operations in contested areas such as Sabina (Escoda) Shoal and Scarborough Shoal subject the Philippines to persistent gray-zone pressure.² These tactics—which include aggressive maneuvers, water cannon deployment, and the swarming of maritime militia vessels—are designed to fall just below the threshold of armed conflict, systematically exhausting limited Philippine maritime resources.²

For Tokyo, the dynamic observed in the South China Sea is familiar. The PRC employs similar tactics in the East China Sea, maintaining continuous coast guard patrols around the Senkaku Islands.¹³ These patrols are backed by the PLA Navy and maritime militia forces, straining Japanese coast guard readiness and challenging Tokyo’s administrative control over its territorial waters.¹³ This shared experience of persistent, sub-threshold coercion has established a unified strategic empathy between Tokyo and Manila.

2.2 Geographic Imperatives and Chokepoint Defense

For Japan, the necessity of a military alliance with the Philippines is dictated by maritime geography. The Japanese industrial economy is highly energy-dependent, with roughly 90% of its oil flowing from the Middle East, passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and upward through the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait.⁸ Disruption to these critical maritime chokepoints would imperil Japan’s national security and economic viability.

The most acute geographic vulnerability is the Luzon Strait, particularly the Bashi Channel, a strategic waterway that separates the northernmost Philippine islands from Taiwan.⁷ As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to modernize its forces and intensifies operations that simulate blockades around Taiwan, the Bashi Channel has emerged as a vital gateway between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean.⁷ Japan recognizes that securing the southern flank of the First Island Chain—which requires a capable and integrated Philippine military—is a strict defensive imperative.⁷

2.3 Great-Power Uncertainty and Middle-Power Hedging

While geography and adversarial coercion provide the baseline requirements for defense cooperation, a recent catalyst for the institutionalization of Tokyo-Manila ties is the evolving diplomatic and military posture of the United States. Although the U.S. remains the foundational security guarantor for both nations, early 2026 witnessed a distinct recalibration in Washington’s rhetoric under the Trump administration.³

Intelligence analysis highlights a deliberate U.S. diplomatic pivot toward establishing “strategic stability” with Beijing. This shift was evidenced during President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing in early 2026.³ Concurrently, during the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue security forum, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth omitted any mention of Taiwan from his keynote address.³ Furthermore, the uncertain fate of a $14 billion U.S. military aid package intended for Taiwan has raised anxieties regarding the reliability of extended American deterrence.³

For policymakers in Japan and the Philippines, this perceived U.S. restraint has generated a strategic vacuum. Consequently, both nations are actively hedging against potential U.S. retrenchment. By elevating their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Japan and the Philippines are constructing a localized security architecture capable of independent deterrence and operational coordination.³

3. The Evolution of Bilateral Security Frameworks

To actualize their strategic alignment, Japan and the Philippines have addressed historical and legal barriers. Over the past three years, they have established bilateral agreements that transition their relationship into an operational security framework.

3.1 The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)

The cornerstone of this new legal architecture is the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The RAA was officially signed on December 16, 2024, and was subsequently ratified by the Philippine Senate through Resolution No. 1248.⁴ The agreement was approved by the Japan Diet on June 6, 2025, and formally entered into force on September 11, 2025.¹

The RAA is functionally equivalent to a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). It provides a streamlined legal framework for the deployment of military personnel, equipment, and combat assets into each other’s sovereign territories, bypassing traditional bureaucratic hurdles.² The RAA grants Tokyo and Manila a direct, institutional channel for joint military training independent of U.S.-sponsored frameworks.¹

The operational utility of the RAA was demonstrated in October 2025 during the bilateral Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) exercise designated Doshin-Bayanihan 5-25.¹⁵ This exercise saw the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the Philippine Air Force coordinate earthquake relief efforts and logistics deliveries in Cebu, validating the legal mechanisms of the RAA in a real-world deployment.¹⁵

3.2 The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

To complement the legal access granted by the RAA, the two nations signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in January 2026.¹⁶ The ACSA serves as the logistical backbone of the alliance. It permits the reciprocal, tax-free provision of military supplies, ammunition, fuel, and specialized services between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines during joint exercises and potential operational deployments.¹⁷

3.3 General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)

As of May 2026, the alliance progressed to formal negotiations for a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).¹ Establishing a functional GSOMIA requires stringent requirements regarding the compatibility of intelligence collection, processing, and transmission systems, as well as the construction of secure infrastructure.¹⁸ If fully implemented, the GSOMIA will allow for the real-time exchange of classified defense intelligence regarding maritime domain awareness, adversary naval movements, and cyber threats.¹ Concurrent with GSOMIA discussions, the two nations have also initiated negotiations for the delimitation of their maritime borders, specifically covering strategic areas located east of Taiwan.

3.4 Revisions to Japanese Defense Export Policy

Underpinning material transfers between the two nations is a shift in Japan’s domestic legal posture regarding military hardware. Historically constrained by stringent export laws, Japan reinterpreted its post-WWII limitations in accordance with its 2022 National Security Strategy. The original 2014 “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” prohibited arms exports to countries involved in conflicts.²

In April 2026, the Japanese cabinet executed a sweeping update to these principles, allowing the export of lethal military equipment to allied nations under specific security conditions.⁵ This legal revision was a prerequisite for moving the Tokyo-Manila alliance beyond the transfer of civilian coastal patrol ships and into the realm of exporting armed naval combatants.

4. Capability Enhancement, Material Transfers, and Financial Statecraft

The operationalization of the Japan-Philippines partnership relies on building the maritime, aerial, and radar capabilities of the AFP and the PCG. Japan utilizes a combination of developmental loans, direct security grants, and defense industrial cooperation.

4.1 The Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project (MSCIP) and ODA

Through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo has utilized Official Development Assistance (ODA) to fund maritime security equipment for the Philippines.² The primary component of this effort is the Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project (MSCIP), which has upgraded the PCG’s fleet across three phases.

Phase I: Delivered ten 44-meter Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRVs) to the PCG, improving the ability to conduct routine maritime law enforcement.²⁰

Phase II: Delivered two 94-meter MRRVs (the Teresa Magbanua-class).²² Constructed by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. in Shimonoseki, Japan, these ships cost approximately 14.55 billion JPY for the pair.²³ The lead ship, BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701), is powered by two 6,600-kilowatt engines. In late 2025 and 2026, the Teresa Magbanua endured a five-month forward deployment at Sabina (Escoda) Shoal to monitor and deter PRC reclamation attempts.¹² The vessel’s presence forced the CCG into reactionary postures before it was rotated out for maintenance.¹²

Phase III: Initiated via a 64.38 billion JPY loan agreement signed on June 10, 2024, to procure five 97-meter MRRVs.²¹ The procurement is funded via a concessional ODA loan featuring a 40-year repayment period, a 10-year grace period, and a 0.30% annual interest rate.²⁶

4.2 Official Security Assistance (OSA)

Recognizing that traditional ODA is restricted to civilian-use assets, the Japanese government launched the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework in April 2023.⁶ The OSA allows direct grant funding of lethal and non-lethal defense equipment to the armed forces of partner nations.⁶

The Philippines is positioned as the only country to receive support for three consecutive fiscal years.¹⁷

• FY 2023: Japan delivered a coastal radar system package worth 600 million JPY. Five distinct radar units were officially handed over to the Philippine Navy in February 2026 at Camp Aguinaldo.¹⁷ In December 2024, a 1.6 billion JPY grant was executed to provide Air Surveillance Radar System equipment to the Philippine Air Force.²⁹
• FY 2024: Japan allocated 900 million JPY for rapid-interception rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) for the AFP.¹⁷
• FY 2025/2026: Japan initiated the funding and construction of dedicated infrastructure to house the delivered RHIBs, marking the first time infrastructure construction was executed under the OSA framework.¹⁷

In its FY 2026 budget proposal, the Japanese Cabinet requested 18.1 billion JPY (approximately $116 million) for the OSA program, doubling the 2025 allocation.⁶ Japan is also utilizing OSA to arm other regional actors, including providing unmanned aerial vehicles to Tonga (300M JPY), emergency medical equipment to Fiji (400M JPY), and maritime search and rescue assets to Thailand (500M JPY).³¹

4.3 Lethal Exports: The Abukuma-Class Destroyer Escort

A consequential material development in the alliance during 2026 revolves around bilateral discussions regarding the transfer of decommissioned Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippine Navy (PN).¹⁰ Following a defense ministerial meeting in Singapore between Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, a dedicated bilateral working group was established to fast-track this acquisition.³³

The Abukuma-class vessels, originally commissioned into the JMSDF between 1989 and 1993, possess a 2,000-ton standard displacement and a length of 109 meters.¹⁰ Capable of speeds up to 27 knots, these vessels are optimized for littoral anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare. Their weapons suite includes a 76mm main gun, Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), Harpoon anti-ship missiles, ASROC anti-submarine rockets, and lightweight torpedoes.¹⁰ If authorized, this would represent Japan’s first true export of lethal military equipment under its revised April 2026 export principles.¹⁰ In addition to surface combatants, the two nations reached a broad consensus in May 2026 to transfer one TC-90 aircraft to the Philippines within Japan’s FY2027 to further augment maritime surveillance capabilities.³³

While the transfer offers the Philippines a near-term lethality upgrade, intelligence assessments highlight interoperability and logistical friction points. The Philippine Navy’s recent modernizations rely heavily on South Korean platforms, establishing a baseline of standardization in combat management systems and crew training.¹⁰ Integrating legacy Japanese platforms will require the AFP to support divergent supply chains and unique maintenance infrastructure, potentially stressing the PN’s lifecycle budgets.¹⁰ Nevertheless, both defense establishments aim to deliver the first vessels promptly after their JMSDF decommissioning, potentially as early as 2027.¹⁰

4.4 Defense Industrial Cooperation and MRO Hubs

Beyond equipment transfers, Japan is laying the groundwork for defense industrial integration with Manila. Because the Philippine defense budget is capped by limits, acquiring Japanese hardware effectively integrates the AFP into a long-term component demand cycle from Japanese suppliers.²

For example, systems like the Mitsubishi Electric FPS-3ME radar require maintenance, repair, and modular upgrades that must be sourced from the manufacturer.² Consequently, Japan has supported the establishment of regulatory frameworks for the Philippines to serve as a Maintenance, Repair, and Operations (MRO) hub.² This arrangement provides predictable revenue streams for Japanese defense firms while strengthening the Philippines’ domestic defense industrial base through technology transfer.²

5. Operational Integration and Trilateral Coordination

Japan and the Philippines have moved from diplomatic engagements to multi-domain military exercises, frequently anchored in trilateral formats involving the United States.

5.1 The Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA)

Routine operational coordination is executed under the Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA) framework. The MMCA enables integrated planning, intelligence sharing, and multi-domain operations among the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines.⁷

The strategic focus of these joint operations is the Luzon Strait. In late February 2026, the three allied nations conducted naval and aerial drills near the Bashi Channel under the MMCA framework.⁷ This represented the first MMCA explicitly held near Taiwan. By operating combined assets in this chokepoint, the trilateral alliance aims to demonstrate its capability to deny the PLA Navy control of the sea lanes linking the South China Sea to the Western Pacific during a potential conflict.⁷

5.2 Exercise Balikatan and Persistent Deployments

The evolving nature of the alliance is reflected in the recent iterations of Balikatan, the premier U.S.-Philippine military exercise. In 2025, combat troops from the Japan Self-Defense Forces deployed to Philippine soil to participate in the drills—the first such Japanese troop deployment to the archipelago since World War II, facilitated by the RAA.⁹ Observers from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force also joined the Cope Thunder joint air exercises.⁹

The geographical footprint of the Balikatan exercises has shifted northward. Exercises now feature islands such as Fuga, Calayan, and Batan—landmasses adjacent to Taiwan.⁷ During the 2025 iterations, allied forces simulated coastal defense and anti-ship operations in the Batanes Islands, deploying mobile missile launchers and practicing rapid force insertions.⁷

5.3 The Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC)

Recognizing the dependency of military deterrence on logistical depth, the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines launched the Luzon Economic Corridor (LEC).³⁶ Governed by a trilateral steering committee, the LEC is an infrastructure and investment initiative designed to connect Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and Batangas.³⁶

While publicly framed as a mechanism for domestic economic prosperity, intelligence analysis assesses that the LEC serves a dual strategic function.³⁹ Its geopolitical objective is to build supply chain resilience for critical technologies, specifically semiconductors, shielding the allied industrial base from economic coercion.³⁹ By modernizing port infrastructure at Subic Bay, the alliance ensures that the Philippines possesses the dual-use logistical capacity and fuel storage required to sustain operations if regional deterrence fails.³⁸

6. Counter-Strategies and Regional Reactions

The militarization of the Japan-Philippines nexus has triggered a multidomain response from Beijing, while generating domestic political friction within both allied nations.

6.1 Multidomain Retaliation from the PRC

The PRC views the Tokyo-Manila partnership as a containment strategy orchestrated by Washington. The May 2026 announcement of formal GSOMIA negotiations and maritime border discussions immediately east of Taiwan provoked a strong response from the Chinese state apparatus.³

Diplomatically, China has weaponized historical grievances to isolate Japan. During a UN Security Council meeting in early 2026, Chinese representative Fu explicitly condemned Japan’s military maneuvers.¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Lin Jian subsequently labeled Japan a “former aggressor,” condemning it for dispatching military forces overseas during the Balikatan exercises.¹¹ On February 18, 2026, the PRC explicitly warned that Japanese military intervention in the Taiwan issue would constitute an act of aggression against China.¹¹

Operationally, following the Takaichi-Marcos talks, the China Coast Guard intensified patrols and surged vessels into the waters directly east of Taiwan to assert its territorial claims in the Philippine Sea.³

Economically, Beijing has leveraged its position in global supply chains. Escalating the 2025–2026 diplomatic crisis, the PRC restricted the export of dual-use items and rare earth materials to Japan.¹¹ These targeted embargos aim at the foundation of Japan’s semiconductor manufacturing and defense industrial base.

6.2 Domestic Political Constraints

The alliance faces internal vulnerabilities. In Japan, the executive-led revision of the pacifist constitution and the export of lethal weapons have polarized the electorate. Following the Takaichi-Marcos summit, demonstrations erupted across Tokyo. Protesters gathered outside the State Guest Palace and the House of Councillors to condemn the transfer of Abukuma-class destroyers, viewing it as an abandonment of Japan’s post-war anti-militarism.⁵

Elements of the Philippine public and civil society have voiced concerns regarding the strategic risk of entrapment.⁵ Critics argue that allowing Japanese combat troops and U.S. missile systems into the northern archipelago turns the Philippines into a primary battlefield in a superpower conflict.⁵ Furthermore, activists question whether securing hardware to counter the PRC is inadvertently facilitating the normalization of Japanese neo-militarism at the expense of regional stability.¹⁹

7. Internal Defense Posture: The Mechanics of Re-Horizon 3

The integration of Japanese military assets will interface directly with the Philippines’ internal military evolution. In January 2024, President Marcos approved the “Re-Horizon 3” military modernization initiative, an ambitious $35 billion (approximately PHP 2 Trillion) procurement plan spanning a decade.²

Re-Horizon 3 marks a doctrinal shift for the AFP, transitioning from internal counter-insurgency operations toward external archipelagic defense. The focus is maritime domain awareness, anti-ship systems, and integrated air defense.⁴¹ The influx of Japanese coastal radar systems and OSA grants subsidizes this transition. By relying on Japanese aid for foundational maritime security, the AFP can allocate its sovereign capital toward strategic acquisitions, such as diesel-electric attack submarines and supersonic anti-ship missiles.⁴³

7.1 Financial Constraints and Budget Utilization

The success of Re-Horizon 3 remains contingent on the mitigation of bureaucratic inefficiencies within the Department of National Defense (DND). While the overall obligations-to-appropriations ratio (OAR) for the DND was 95.4% between 2022 and 2024, the department’s total unused appropriations have increased from PHP 8.4 billion in 2022 to PHP 32.4 billion in 2024.⁴¹

This metric is driven by unobligated allotments—funds released by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) that the military failed to contract or spend within the fiscal year.⁴¹ In 2024, the General Headquarters (GHQ/AFP) accounted for PHP 15.4 billion in unused funds, the Philippine Army (PA) left PHP 10.2 billion unused, and the Philippine Navy (PN) left PHP 2.6 billion untouched.⁴¹ Addressing these unused appropriations is essential for the AFP to absorb complex Japanese hardware and advance its security posture.⁴¹

8. Strategic Outlook and Future Force Posture

As the Japan-Philippines Comprehensive Strategic Partnership matures, intelligence projections indicate a shift from capacity building toward a posture of persistent operational deployment.

8.1 Towards a Persistent Sea Denial Architecture

Strategists in Tokyo, Manila, and Washington increasingly assess that episodic military exercises are insufficient to reliably deter the PLA in Taiwan or the South China Sea. Consequently, the trilateral alliance is expected to transition toward a persistent sea denial posture across the First Island Chain.⁹

This deterrence posture relies on exploiting geography. While the United States seeks to permanently deploy ground-based medium- and long-range precision fires at established Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in northern Luzon, Japan is executing a build-out of coastal anti-ship missiles, early warning radar installations, hardened ammunition sites, and electronic warfare units across the Ryukyu and Kyushu Islands.⁹

Together, these synchronized deployments create an overlapping area of effect over the Bashi Channel and the Miyako Strait, enabling allied partners to hold PLA naval surface combatants and amphibious assault assets at risk.⁹

Furthermore, the alliance will focus resources on fortifying sub-threshold vulnerabilities, such as the subsea cable infrastructure that routes global military communications. Joint trilateral initiatives to lease dedicated cable repair ships, streamline regulatory processes for redundant cables, and diversify cable landing stations toward the safer eastern coast of the Philippines are anticipated.⁹

9. Conclusion

The operationalization of the military alliance between Japan and the Philippines represents a consequential geopolitical realignment in the Indo-Pacific. Driven by geographic realities and the pressure of Chinese maritime coercion, Tokyo and Manila have constructed a defense architecture that alters the regional balance of power.

Through agreements such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement and the proposed GSOMIA, the two nations have bypassed historical barriers to achieve expanded military access, logistical interoperability, and intelligence integration. Simultaneously, Japan’s pivot to deploying direct Official Security Assistance—evidenced by the provision of radar systems and negotiations for Abukuma-class destroyers—demonstrates Tokyo’s willingness to arm the front lines of the First Island Chain.

The endurance of this alliance will be tested in the coming years. Beijing will continue to apply economic, diplomatic, and military pressure to fracture the partnership. Concurrently, Tokyo and Manila must navigate domestic political landscapes, managing public anxieties regarding remilitarization and the risk of strategic entrapment in a conflict over Taiwan. Nevertheless, as long as the strategic calculus remains dominated by the threat of disruption to vital sea lines of communication, the Japan-Philippines Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will serve as the bedrock of allied deterrence in the region.

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

1. Middle Power Politics: Tokyo-Manila Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/middle-power-politics-tokyo-manila-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
2. Japan-Philippines Defense Industrial Cooperation | New … – CSIS, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/japan-philippines-defense-industrial-cooperation
3. Japan and the Philippines strengthen cooperation regarding Taiwan …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://unn.ua/en/news/japan-and-the-philippines-strengthen-cooperation-regarding-taiwan-amid-a-more-cautious-us-stance
4. Reciprocal access agreement – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reciprocal_access_agreement
5. Japan-Philippines Military Agreement: Tokyo and Manila deepen defense alignment, public concern grows over rising regional risks – CGTN, accessed June 5, 2026, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-05-29/VHJhbnNjcmlwdDkwODY1/index.html
6. Japan’s OSA: A Quiet Bet on Security Partnerships – Observer Research Foundation, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/japan-s-osa-a-quiet-bet-on-security-partnerships
7. Philippines’ trilateral partnership with Japan, U.S. enhances …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2026/04/philippines-trilateral-partnership-with-japan-u-s-enhances-deterrence/
8. East Asia’s Double Bind: Contradictions and Possibilities in the New Cold War, accessed June 5, 2026, https://thetricontinental.org/dossier-east-asia-double-bind/
9. U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Cooperation | CNAS, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/u-s-japan-philippines-trilateral-cooperation
10. Japan, Philippines Launch Working Group on Transfer of Abukuma …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/05/japan-philippines-launch-working-group-on-transfer-of-abukuma-class-destroyer-escorts/
11. 2025–2026 China–Japan diplomatic crisis – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_China%E2%80%93Japan_diplomatic_crisis
12. PCG pulls out vessel from Escoda Shoal – Inquirer.net, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.inquirer.net/413386/pcg-pulls-out-vessel-from-escoda-shoal/
13. Building a U.S.-Japan-Philippines Triad – CSIS, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-us-japan-philippines-triad
14. Balikatan 2026 Showcases the Philippines’ Defence Network, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/balikatan-2026-showcases-the-philippines-defence-network
15. First application of Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2025/10/ef2b6890705aa76c4aa9109aabf8b938b0b2c98d.html
16. Between talks and tensions: why the South China Sea won’t stabilise in 2026, accessed June 5, 2026, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/diplomacy/insights/between-talks-and-tensions-why-south-china-sea-wont-stabilise-2026/
17. Japan hands over 5 coastal radar systems to Philippines – Naval News, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/02/japan-hands-over-5-coastal-radar-systems-to-philippines/
18. Japan-Philippines military collusion undermines regional peace and stability, accessed June 5, 2026, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/O_251451/16465704.html
19. Is Manila becoming a stepping stone for Tokyo’s neo-militarism? – CGTN, accessed June 5, 2026, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2026-06-05/Is-Manila-becoming-a-stepping-stone-for-Tokyo-s-neo-militarism–1NIWmKaCUSs/p.html
20. Acquisition of Japanese boats to better guard PHL seas against Abu Sayyaf, pirates and drug smugglers—Dominguez | Department of Finance, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.dof.gov.ph/acquisition-of-japanese-boats-to-better-guard-phl-seas-against-abu-sayyaf-pirates-and-drug-smugglers-dominguez/
21. JICA inks new agreement with the Philippine Government for Maritime Safety Capability Improvement ｜ Where We Work, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/overseas/philippine/information/press/2024/1542369_53492.html
22. Philippines launches first 94-meter Multi-Role Response Vessel to boost maritime security, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/overseas/philippine/information/press/2021/210806_02.html
23. BRP Teresa Magbanua – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRP_Teresa_Magbanua
24. Teresa Magbanua-class patrol vessel – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teresa_Magbanua-class_patrol_vessel
25. PH ship in Escoda Shoal to protect sovereignty, go after poachers | Philippine News Agency, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1231442?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1h5vUUBSf8KubkJdH8iHOFL7y6oPmFSh3eO86GUdxA_6HaVqAFBbyDNYk_aem_kRHynza8N44xauMnLmHxIg
26. Signing of Japanese ODA Loan Agreement with the Republic of the Philippines: Further strengthening the maritime safety capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard ｜ News＆Publication – JICA, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/information/press/2024/20240611_10.html
27. Signing of the Exchange of Notes for the Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project for the Philippine Coast Guard (Phase III), accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.ph.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/11_000001_01483.html
28. Japan’s foreign assistance to the Philippines: supporting regional security, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/12/japans-foreign-assistance-to-the-philippines-supporting-regional-security/
29. Official Security Assistance (OSA) Programme in implementation FY2024 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/pagewe_001067_00001.html
30. Expert warns Japan’s proposed record OSA funding to provide military equipment to allies a move threatens regional peace – Global Times, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202512/1351385.shtml
31. Official Security Assistance (OSA) Programme in implementation FY2025 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/pagewe_000001_00268.html
32. ‘Abukuma’ transfer highlights PH-Japan strategic relationship, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1276134
33. Japan- Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Joint Press …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2026/05/45c008f13e32cdb63ef16520e4337fe3fd601788.html
34. Abukuma-class destroyer escort – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abukuma-class_destroyer_escort
35. U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Cooperation – YouTube, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tCQqcPfzn5s
36. PH, Japan vow to develop ‘world-class’ Luzon Economic Corridor, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1276090
37. The United States, the Philippines, and Japan Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Luzon Economic Corridor, accessed June 5, 2026, https://2021-2025.state.gov/the-united-states-the-philippines-and-japan-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-luzon-economic-corridor/
38. US deepens Luzon corridor partnership, accessed June 5, 2026, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/323148/us-deepens-luzon-corridor-partnership
39. Fact Sheet: Luzon Economic Corridor – U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, accessed June 5, 2026, https://ph.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-luzon-economic-corridor/
40. AFP Modernization Act – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AFP_Modernization_Act
41. DND+ABN+FY+2026+FIN_v3_1.pdf, accessed June 5, 2026, https://docs.congress.hrep.online/download/CSO/DND+ABN+FY+2026+FIN_v3_1.pdf
42. Security sector modernization makes PH stronger, self-reliant – Philippine News Agency, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1245495
43. The Philippines’ Horizon 3 Military Modernisation Programme – MP-IDSA, accessed June 5, 2026, https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/the-philippines-horizon-3-military-modernisation-programme
44. Philippines military modernisation: revamped but not resolved, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/062/philippines-military-modernisation-revamped-but-not-resolved/

1. Executive Summary

The national security apparatus of the Republic of the Philippines is currently navigating the most significant structural, doctrinal, and physical transformation in its modern institutional history. Driven by an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific theater—specifically characterized by escalating territorial friction in the West Philippine Sea and broader strategic competition along the First Island Chain—the Philippine defense establishment is deliberately transitioning from a decades-long focus on internal counter-insurgency toward a resolute posture of external territorial and maritime defense.¹ This strategic pivot is operationalized at the highest levels of government through the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) and is physically manifested in the newly overhauled “Re-Horizon 3” phase of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program (RAFPMP).²

To achieve a minimum credible deterrence posture against highly capable regional adversaries, the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has cultivated a complex latticework of alliances and strategic partnerships, systematically moving away from a singular reliance on domestic funding or exclusive bilateral arrangements.¹ Foreign defense investments, foreign military financing (FMF), and direct capability transfers from the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Israel, and Turkey serve as the lifeblood of this modernization effort. These diverse partnerships have resulted in the accelerated acquisition of multi-role offshore patrol vessels, supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced air defense systems, and modernized light armor.

However, the efficacy of this massive capital outlay is subject to intense domestic scrutiny and auditing. The central analytical question remains whether the Philippine government is allocating these funds wisely to build a resilient, future-proof defense infrastructure, or if capital is being systematically degraded by historical corruption, bureaucratic friction, and procurement inefficiencies. An analysis of recent Philippine government’s Commission on Audit) ², historical procurement controversies, and current institutional obligation rates indicates a highly nuanced reality. While overt, systemic graft—such as the historical black-market sale of state munitions to threat groups or the maintenance of “ghost” personnel—has been largely curtailed by stringent institutional reforms and strict leadership directives ⁴, the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is currently severely hampered by administrative lethargy, rigid public procurement laws, and significant delays in budget utilization.⁶The defense capital is not necessarily being stolen in the traditional sense, but its strategic impact is being diluted by institutional inefficiencies that leave billions of pesos unobligated and critical capability gaps temporarily unfilled across the archipelago.

2. The Geopolitical and Domestic Imperative for Modernization

For nearly six decades, the primary operational focus of the AFP was directed inward, combatting the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA) and various separatist and extremist factions operating primarily in the southern island of Mindanao.¹ As the domestic threat landscape has steadily stabilized—bolstered by the successful creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and the general operational decline of insurgent capacities—Manila has been afforded the strategic bandwidth and political capital to reorient its military toward the maritime domain.¹

This strategic shift is not merely a top-down executive directive; it possesses profound democratic legitimacy and widespread public backing. According to a PhilStar Survey conducted in early 2026, 69 percent of adult Filipinos support the expansion of naval patrols and troop presence to assert the country’s territorial rights in the West Philippine Sea.⁷Furthermore, 64 percent of respondents specifically selected AFP modernization as a priority measure for the Marcos administration, while 66 percent favored the continuation of diplomacy and peaceful dispute resolution.⁷Analysts note that these findings point to a public that is acutely aware of the geopolitical challenges in the region and highly supportive of a balanced policy framework that simultaneously upholds sovereign rights while actively strengthening national defense capabilities.⁷This domestic consensus provides the Marcos administration with the mandate necessary to pursue historically large defense budgets and to deepen military entanglements with foreign partners.

The Philippine strategy in the South China Sea has been characterized by defense analysts as one of “assertive transparency”.³ By consistently and publicly exposing coercive maritime tactics to a global audience, Manila has not only rallied domestic political support in the battle to preserve its maritime sovereignty but has also successfully garnered international backing.³ This strategic transparency has directly paved the way for an expansion in the scope and breadth of foreign security partnerships, transforming the Philippines into a forefront actor for multidomain deterrence, maritime security governance, and defense against hybrid warfare.³

3. The Doctrinal Shift: The Horizon Modernization Framework

The overarching legislative and strategic framework for the physical transformation of the military is the Revised AFP Modernization Program (RAFPMP). Originally legislated as a 15-year initiative, the program was meticulously divided into three discrete five-year phases known as Horizons.²

Horizon 1 (2013–2017) and Horizon 2 (2018–2022) were primarily geared toward establishing foundational internal security capabilities while simultaneously building a nascent territorial defense posture in the West Philippine Sea.² Historical assessments of the early stages of this program reveal mixed results regarding execution speed and budget utilization. During the Horizon 1 phase, the AFP managed to complete only 68 percent of its 53 planned modernization programs.⁸ Despite this incomplete execution, the military spent PHP 96 billion (approximately $1.82 billion USD), which represented a 28 percent increase from its initial budgetary outlay of PHP 75 billion for that specific phase.⁸ This historical data highlights a persistent challenge within the Philippine defense establishment: cost overruns and procurement delays frequently hamper the timely delivery of critical combat assets.

However, rapidly changing regional dynamics and increased pressure in the maritime domain necessitated a fundamental recalibration of the final phase of the program. In January 2024, President Marcos Jr. officially approved the overhauled “Re-Horizon 3” project list.² Unlike its predecessors, which focused on minimum credible defense, Re-Horizon 3 is explicitly designed to operationalize the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC).² This doctrinal framework aims to extend the Philippines’ power projection capabilities outward to its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), securing vital national interests in the Luzon Strait, the Benham Rise, and the contested waters of the West Philippine Sea.⁹

The Re-Horizon 3 program outlines a highly ambitious 10-year procurement plan with an estimated funding allocation of P1.89 trillion (approximately $35 billion USD).² To achieve the objectives of the CADC, priority acquisitions under this phase include multi-role fighters, advanced land-based radar and airborne surveillance systems, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missile systems, and the country’s first submarine force.²

Despite the strategic clarity and bold ambitions of Re-Horizon 3, the execution of the program faces profound structural and fiscal limitations. As of late 2024, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) reported that the RAFPMP carried a massive unfunded mandate of P2.138 trillion, underscoring a severe gap between the military’s strategic ambitions and the national treasury’s actual liquidity.² Furthermore, current Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has publicly criticized the rigid 15-year statutory framework of the modernization program, describing it as “too long and impracticable”.² Teodoro has advocated for a more flexible, agile procurement strategy that would allow the AFP to rapidly retool and adjust its acquisition priorities in response to immediate, evolving geopolitical threats, rather than being bound by rigid decade-old planning documents.²

4. The Financial Architecture of the Department of National Defense

To comprehend the necessity of foreign defense investments, one must first analyze the internal financial architecture of the Department of National Defense (DND). The domestic defense budget is large by Philippine historical standards, yet it remains fundamentally constrained by the structural costs of maintaining a large standing military force. Historically, Philippine defense spending has averaged roughly 1.25 percent of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), peaking in 2021 at 1.41 percent.¹ Despite these increases, this remains the lowest defense spending as a percentage of GDP among U.S. treaty allies in the Asian theater.¹

The proposed fiscal year 2026 expenditure program for the DND further illustrates these financial constraints. The total proposed budget stands at P299.3 billion (or P299,300.1 million), representing an 8.5 percent increase from the approved spending of P275.9 billion in 2025.² Within this budget, new appropriations account for P295.18 billion, while automatic appropriations cover P4.12 billion.²

Crucially, the Personnel Services (PS) requirement—which encompasses salaries, benefits, and pensions for active and retired military personnel—consumes a staggering 56 percent of the entire DND budget, amounting to P167.7 billion.² This structural reality means that the majority of the domestic defense budget is inherently dedicated to sustainment rather than physical modernization and capital outlay.

The distribution of the budget among the major service branches also highlights a lingering doctrinal inertia. Despite the explicit strategic shift toward archipelagic and maritime defense, the Philippine Army (Land Forces) remains the dominant recipient of DND funding. For 2026, the Land Forces Defense program is allocated P116.31 billion (46.5 percent of the operations budget), while the Air Forces Defense and Naval Forces Defense programs receive P54.06 billion (21.6 percent) and P53.73 billion (21.5 percent), respectively.²

In addition to the core operational expenditure program, the government allocates a separate Special Purpose Fund (SPF) specifically for the RAFPMP capital acquisitions. For 2026, this SPF is proposed at P40.0 billion.² However, historical budget execution metrics for this fund indicate persistent difficulties in capital deployment. In 2024, while the RAFPMP was also allocated P40.0 billion, only P38.8 billion was successfully transferred to the DND, leaving P1.2 billion recorded as an unreleased appropriation.² Furthermore, the modernization program recorded a low obligation rate of 71.7 percent and a highly concerning disbursement rate of only 52.8 percent in 2024, largely due to unreleased funds and unobligated unprogrammed appropriations.²

Given these structural budgetary realities—where domestic funds are overwhelmingly consumed by personnel costs and capital outlay funds suffer from severe disbursement delays—the AFP is inherently reliant on external support. To offset domestic budget constraints, the Philippines has diversified its defense acquisitions and established a complex, multi-polar supply chain. The United States and Japan provide critical strategic funding and maritime domain awareness tools, while South Korea, India, Israel, and Turkey function as the primary industrial suppliers for naval combatants, missile systems, and armored assets.

5. The United States: Treaty Alliance and Foundational Security Assistance

The United States remains the Philippines’ oldest, most integrated, and most consequential treaty ally, bound by the mutual defense obligations outlined in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).¹ While the alliance experienced a period of diplomatic volatility and strategic distancing during the administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte, President Marcos Jr. has aggressively revitalized the partnership, realigning Manila closely with Washington.¹

Historically, the United States has served as the foundational contributor to the enhancement of Philippine military capabilities through frameworks established under the 1947 Military Assistance Agreement (MAA). This support was traditionally channeled through mechanisms such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the transfer of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).¹¹ However, the modern iteration of the U.S.-Philippine defense relationship has evolved significantly beyond the transfer of surplus Cold War-era equipment, moving toward highly integrated, multidomain operations and the deployment of advanced asymmetric systems.

5.1 Enhanced Defense Cooperation and Infrastructure Investment

The core physical mechanism for current U.S. investment in Philippine domestic resilience is the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Initially signed in 2014 to grant U.S. troops rotational access to five Philippine military bases, the agreement was critically expanded in 2023.¹ The U.S. military was granted access to four additional strategic locations in northern Luzon and Palawan, directly facing the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.¹

To support this expanded footprint, the United States has committed significant financial resources toward upgrading shared infrastructure. The U.S. has pledged an ongoing $500 million commitment to Philippine military modernization, which includes the construction of a Combined Coordination Center and investments in intelligence fusion centers designed to directly support U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) objectives.³Furthermore, during the Philippine & US strategic talks held in Manila in February 2026, the U.S. confirmed the appropriation of an additional $144 million in Fiscal Year 2026 specifically for the Department of Defense to invest in EDCA sites.¹²This funding is directed toward upgrading airfields, logistics hubs, and joint exercise facilities, which not only serve U.S. rotational forces but directly enhance the operational readiness, disaster response capabilities, and domestic resilience of the AFP.¹²

5.2 The Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA) and Advanced Capabilities

Recognizing the escalating threat environment, the U.S. legislative branch has initiated efforts to provide long-term, structural financial support to Manila. The U.S. Senate recently advanced the Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act (PERA), a bipartisan bill designed to authorize a massive $2.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant assistance specifically allocated for the Philippines spanning the years 2026 to 2030.¹⁴ If enacted, this legislation would earmark up to $500 million annually to systematically develop the country’s defense capabilities over a five-year horizon, marking a critical shift from ad-hoc, year-to-year assistance toward sustained, long-term capability planning.¹⁴

Beyond direct grants, the U.S. remains a primary source for high-end Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The US State Deparment’s FY 2025 Foreign Military Sales Report reveals substantial pending transactions, including a highly significant $5.58 billion notification for F-16 aircraft for the Philippines.¹⁵While the final execution of this specific massive contract remains contingent on Philippine domestic financing, it illustrates the high ceiling of U.S.-Philippine defense trade.

Operationally, the U.S. and the Philippines have drastically scaled up their joint training engagements. The annual Exercise Balikatan has transformed into an increasingly complex, multinational training event.³ During Balikatan 2025, U.S. and Philippine personnel rehearsed multidomain defense operations at an unprecedented scale, incorporating live air and missile defense drills utilizing systems such as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System.³ To further enhance deterrence, the 2026 Bilateral Strategic Dialogue confirmed commitments to increase the deployment of cutting-edge U.S. systems to the Philippines, explicitly including the uncrewed Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) anti-ship missile capability, uncrewed surface vessels, and strategic midrange fires systems.³

Finally, to legally facilitate the secure exchange of classified military intelligence regarding regional threats, the two nations successfully signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2024, deepening the institutional integration of their respective defense intelligence networks.³

6. Japan: Official Security Assistance and Strategic Realignment

Japan’s emerging role in the physical modernization of the Philippine military represents a watershed moment in the security dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. Breaking decisively from decades of strict post-World War II pacifist constraints on defense exports and foreign military aid, Tokyo has adopted a highly proactive deterrence posture.¹⁶ This shift is legally supported by the easing of constitutional export limitations in 2023 and 2026, allowing Japan to transfer noncombat equipment, as well as fighter jets, missiles, and warships, to strategic partners like the Philippines with whom it maintains technology transfer agreements.¹⁶

6.1 The Official Security Assistance (OSA) Framework

The primary mechanism for Japan’s physical investment in the Philippines is the newly established Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework.¹⁸ Implemented in 2023, the OSA operates entirely separately from Japan’s traditional Official Development Assistance (ODA) program, which is strictly dedicated to civilian economic development.¹⁸ Instead, the OSA provides direct financial grants for defense capacity-building and security-related infrastructure to “like-minded” nations to enhance deterrence and prevent unilateral changes to the regional status quo by force.¹⁷

The Philippines has rapidly become a premier beneficiary of this initiative. In December 2024, Japan and the Philippines formally exchanged notes on a 1.6 billion JPY (approximately $11.5 million USD) OSA grant program dedicated to the provision of essential monitoring and surveillance equipment.²⁰ Under this specific grant, the Philippine Navy is receiving Coastal Radar Systems and Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boats (RHIBs), while the Philippine Air Force is receiving equipment related to the Air Surveillance Radar System.²⁰ This targeted investment directly addresses one of the AFP’s most critical vulnerabilities: persistent maritime domain awareness across its vast archipelago and EEZ. Furthermore, Japan has provided massive loan agreements to supply the Philippine Coast Guard with large multirole response vessels, such as the 2,265-ton BRP Teresa Magbanua, serving as the frontline physical presence in the West Philippine Sea.³

6.2 Institutional Integration: RAA and GSOMIA

Beyond the transfer of physical hardware, the bilateral security relationship has been deeply institutionalized over the past two years. The Philippines-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) officially entered into force on September 11, 2025.¹⁸ This landmark agreement establishes a streamlined legal framework that provides mutual military access between the two nations, mirroring the access agreements Japan maintains with the United Kingdom and Australia.¹⁸ Crucially, the RAA grants Tokyo and Manila a direct, independent channel to conduct enhanced joint military training, disaster response, and interoperability exercises outside of the traditional, United States-sponsored frameworks.³

Furthermore, building upon their enhanced strategic alignment, Japan and the Philippines have officially launched formal negotiations to conclude their own General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).¹⁸ If successfully implemented, this GSOMIA will represent only the second bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement for the Philippines, following the 2024 pact with the United States.¹⁸ This development has drawn sharp criticism from the People’s Republic of China, with Chinese military analysts asserting that Manila intends to use Japan as a platform to expand intelligence cooperation and reduce its “information disadvantage” in the region, thereby strengthening the trilateral U.S.-Japan-Philippines security architecture.²¹

7. The Republic of Korea: The Industrial Backbone of the Naval Fleet

While the United States and Japan provide indispensable strategic financing, high-end asymmetric systems, and domain awareness tools, the Republic of Korea (ROK) functions as the primary industrial architect for the Philippine Navy’s physical surface fleet. South Korean shipbuilders, most notably Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), have effectively secured a monopoly on the AFP’s major naval combatant modernization over the past decade.²²

The Philippine Navy is undergoing a painful but necessary transition from operating an antiquated fleet of legacy World War II and Cold War-era vessels—often reliant on decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard cutters—to deploying a modern, standardized, and interoperable naval force.¹ South Korea’s highly competitive pricing, expedited delivery schedules, and willingness to engage in government-to-government technology transfers have made it the ideal partner for a nation operating under severe domestic budget constraints.

The cornerstone investments in this naval partnership include:

• Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs): In 2022, the Philippine DND signed a massive P30 billion ($573 million USD) contract with HHI for the construction of six 2,450-tonne multi-mission offshore patrol vessels.²³ These vessels, which are expected to be fully delivered and commissioned by 2028, represent a monumental leap in the Navy’s physical endurance and patrol capabilities.²⁵ The OPVs are equipped with acoustic detection suites for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations and feature modular mission bays allowing for maximum flexibility across a range of potential taskings in the West Philippine Sea.²⁵
• Corvettes: In late 2021, a P28 billion ($547 million USD) contract was secured with HHI for the delivery of two 3,200-ton corvettes.²² These highly capable warships are designed with robust anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft warfare capabilities, armed with 76mm naval guns, remote-controlled weapon stations, and helidecks capable of supporting both rotary-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.²⁶
• Guided-Missile Frigates: These recent acquisitions build upon the foundational 2016 contract with HHI worth P16 billion, which successfully delivered the two Jose Rizal-class multi-mission guided-missile frigates that currently serve as the vanguard of the Philippine surface fleet.²²

Beyond maritime acquisitions, the Philippines and South Korea have upgraded their diplomatic relations to a “strategic partnership” as of late 2024, engaging in active discussions regarding logistics collaboration, joint air force exercises, and the long-term maintenance of the Philippine Air Force’s FA-50 light fighter jets.¹

8. India: Asymmetric Deterrence via the BrahMos System

The Philippines’ strategic procurement of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile system from India marks a pivotal maturation in its national defense planning and its transition toward asymmetric deterrence capabilities. In 2022, the Philippines became the very first foreign buyer of the highly touted BrahMos system—a joint technological product of India and Russia—signing a landmark contract valued at nearly $375 million.²⁷

Under this agreement, the Philippine Marine Corps is receiving three shore-based, anti-ship variants of the missile system, with the initial batteries arriving in 2024.²⁸ The strategic implications of this specific investment are profound. Historically lacking any credible means to project lethal force outward from its coastlines, the introduction of the BrahMos provides the AFP with a highly effective anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability.

With a recognized operational range that can cover significant portions of the contested maritime domain, these shore-based batteries effectively project a “threat envelope” over the West Philippine Sea. Consequently, most of the island features claimed by the Philippines but currently occupied or contested by the Chinese military fall within the strike range of a BrahMos battery positioned on Filipino-controlled territory.²⁹ This capability significantly alters the operational calculus for adversary naval vessels operating within the Philippines’ EEZ, moving Manila’s defense strategy away from merely maintaining a symbolic patrol presence toward deploying systems capable of imposing severe, unacceptable costs on larger, more technologically advanced maritime adversaries.²⁹ This strategic logic is gaining traction regionally, as evidenced by India’s subsequent negotiations to export the same BrahMos system to Vietnam and Indonesia under similar defense alignments.³⁰

9. Israel and Turkey: Specialized Ground and Aerial Capabilities

To fulfill the highly specific tactical requirements of the Horizon 2 and Re-Horizon 3 phases, the Philippine DND has increasingly looked beyond its traditional treaty allies and Asian neighbors, turning to Middle Eastern and Mediterranean defense contractors for specialized ground combat, air defense, and aerial attack assets.

9.1 Israel: Armored Reconstitution and Air Defense

Israel has emerged as a critical supplier of advanced ground combat and integrated air defense systems, providing capabilities that the AFP had completely lacked for decades. Under a $172 million contract signed with Israeli defense firm Elbit Systems in 2022, the Philippine Army acquired a modernized fleet of armored vehicles, specifically the Sabrah ASCOD 2 light tanks and wheeled Pandur II tanks, alongside armored recovery and command vehicles.³² This acquisition effectively reintroduces mechanized armored firepower into the Philippine ground combat doctrine, which had relied almost entirely on light infantry for decades.³⁴

Furthermore, the AFP procured the SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) air defense system from Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.³⁵ This system provides the AFP with its first modern, integrated protective shield designed to counter a wide spectrum of aerial threats, including hostile aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and precision-guided munitions.³⁴

However, defense intelligence assessments indicate that deep reliance on Israeli systems currently carries significant latent geopolitical and supply chain risks. Independent defense observers and social media reports note that the Philippines has experienced difficulties relying on defense imports from Israel due to serious delivery delays.³² These delays are largely attributed to the ongoing active conflicts involving the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which have forced Israeli defense industries to prioritize their domestic military supply chains over export commitments, leaving international customers like the Philippines facing unexpected operational shortfalls.³²

9.2 Turkey: Dedicated Aerial Attack Platforms

To address severe tactical vulnerabilities identified during internal security operations—most notably the devastating 2017 Siege of Marawi where the military lacked precision close air support—the Philippines turned to Turkey to supply dedicated rotary-wing attack capabilities.

Through a $269 million government-to-government contract signed in 2020, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) was contracted to deliver six T129 ATAK advanced attack and tactical reconnaissance helicopters to the Philippine Air Force.³⁷ The final two units of this initial order were delivered and commissioned in May 2024 at Major Danilo Atienza Air Base, albeit roughly a year behind the originally anticipated schedule.³⁷ Designed for both day and night missions in hot, high, and maritime conditions, the T129 is equipped with advanced observation, precision targeting systems, and lethal fire support technology that directly addresses the capability gaps identified in complex urban warfare scenarios.³⁹ Recognizing the success of the platform, defense industry sources indicate that active negotiations are underway between Manila and Ankara for a follow-on acquisition of a second batch of T129s to further sustain and expand the Air Force’s dedicated attack fleet.⁴⁰

10. Domestic Resilience: The Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP)

While massive foreign investment and capability transfers are currently vital for the AFP’s immediate revitalization, national intelligence and defense planners recognize that long-term strategic autonomy requires the establishment of a robust domestic defense industrial base. The over-reliance on foreign suppliers—starkly evidenced by the aforementioned delivery delays in Israeli armor and Turkish helicopters—exposes the Philippine military to external geopolitical shocks, foreign domestic crises, and supply chain disruptions over which Manila has zero control.³²

To systematically mitigate this strategic vulnerability, President Marcos Jr. signed the “Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Revitalization Act” (Republic Act No. 12024) into law in October 2024.⁸ Historically, the previous SRDP framework and the nation’s stringent general procurement laws contained highly restrictive provisions that effectively marginalized local manufacturers, preventing them from competing for military contracts or supplying the armed forces with indigenous technology.⁴²

The newly enacted legislation fundamentally alters this paradigm by lifting these restrictions. The SRDP Revitalization Act aims to aggressively incentivize the local production of defense materiel, promote research into dual-use technologies, and facilitate international technology transfers through joint ventures.⁴² By actively cultivating local defense industries capable of producing naval vessels, aircraft components, small arms, and advanced surveillance systems domestically, the DND hopes to create a sustainable pipeline for force sustainment that does not rely exclusively on foreign capital or the fluctuating goodwill of allied nations.⁴¹ However, establishing a mature, technologically advanced defense industrial base from the ground up will require decades of sustained capital investment and institutional patience, meaning the AFP will undoubtedly remain heavily dependent on its foreign partners through the entirety of the Re-Horizon 3 timeline and likely beyond.

11. Fiscal Integrity: Assessing Waste, Bureaucratic Friction, and Corruption

The influx of billions of dollars in both foreign and domestic capital into the AFP inevitably raises critical oversight questions regarding fiscal integrity. The core query is whether this unprecedented funding is being spent wisely to build national resilience, or if it is being actively wasted and lost to the systemic corruption that has historically plagued Philippine government institutions. An objective, comprehensive analysis of recent(https://www.coa.gov.ph/reports/annual-audit-reports/), historical procurement controversies, and the structural realities of the Philippine bureaucratic system suggests that while the era of blatant, systemic embezzlement is demonstrably waning, severe administrative inefficiencies continue to silently bleed the impact of defense spending.

11.1 The Historical Baseline of Military Malfeasance

To accurately evaluate the current trajectory of the AFP’s fiscal integrity, one must first establish the historical baseline of corruption within the organization. In the early 2000s, the military was plagued by widespread, structural malfeasance that directly undermined national security. Investigative reports from organizations like the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) documented horrific instances of graft, including military personnel actively selling munitions and firearms at heavy discounts to hostile rebel groups like the NPA and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).⁴ Furthermore, past COA audits identified massive systemic anomalies, such as the AFP continuing to pay millions in pensions to “ghost soldiers” or pensioners aged between 95 and 110 years old.⁴

Even more recently, major capital outlays have been tainted by allegations of high-level political interference. The 2018 Frigate Acquisition Project (FAP) sparked a massive national controversy when it was alleged that high-ranking political officials within the Office of the President intervened to favor a specific South Korean subcontractor to supply the Combat Management System (CMS) for the Jose Rizal-class frigates.⁴⁵ This bitter dispute ultimately led to the controversial relief of the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, generating significant friction and distrust between the military brass and the civilian political leadership.⁴⁵

11.2 The Shift to Administrative Inefficiency and Bureaucratic Waste

Current military leadership has adopted a highly stringent, public stance against financial malfeasance. The AFP Chief of Staff has instituted a zero-tolerance policy against kickbacks, famously declaring in a published column that “no soldier, officer, or unit under my watch will collect a single peso from any contractor,” emphasizing servant leadership and claiming a clean COA opinion for the Philippine Army’s property records.⁵ While the “tone at the top” has undoubtedly improved, the 2024 COA Annual Audit Reports highlight persistent, deeply rooted issues. Crucially, however, these modern findings point less toward overt, intentional theft and more toward severe administrative inefficiency, poor financial management, and a failure to rapidly deploy capital.

The Underutilization of the NTF-ELCAC Budget In a stark example of bureaucratic failure, the COA flagged the DND in December 2025 for its exceptionally low utilization of the budget allocated for the controversial National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC).⁶ Between 2020 and 2024, the DND was allotted P14.34 million for NTF-ELCAC peace and development programs, yet it only managed to obligate P4.56 million.⁶ This resulted in an abysmal overall utilization rate of just 31.80 percent, ultimately forcing the return of a “significant portion” totaling P7.64 million back to the national treasury.⁶ The COA accurately described this as a “missed opportunity” to execute vital development projects intended to foster peace in conflict-affected areas.⁶ The failure here was not one of embezzlement, but of the institutional inability to effectively administer and deploy allocated capital—a severe organizational weakness when the DND is simultaneously attempting to execute a multi-billion dollar modernization program.

Unliquidated Cash Advances and Unauthorized Accounts The 2024 COA report also generated significant public controversy when it flagged P201.86 million in unliquidated cash advances across the AFP, with state auditors noting some advances had remained unsettled for extensive periods, leading to potential misstatements in expense accounts.⁴⁸ Narratives on social media quickly, and erroneously, framed this specific finding as definitive proof of massive corruption.⁴⁹ However, the AFP’s detailed rebuttal provides vital context. The military clarified that these cash advances were utilized for legitimate, time-sensitive, mission-essential operations—such as remote field support, transportation, and humanitarian assistance—where traditional check-based banking mechanisms are practically impossible to utilize.⁴⁸

Following the 2024 COA audit which flagged P201.86 million in unliquidated cash advances, the AFP demonstrated that these funds were utilized for legitimate field operations. As of late 2025, over 82% of the flagged advances (amounting to P178.72 million) had been successfully liquidated and reconciled with accounting records, leaving an outstanding balance of P23.13 million.

The AFP is continuing to pursue the recovery of the remaining balance, or is seeking administrative write-offs for personnel who are deceased, resigned, or Absent Without Leave (AWOL).⁵⁰ This demonstrates that the funds were actively tracked within the accounting system, not stolen. Similarly, the COA flagged P72.86 million stored in “unauthorized” bank accounts in 2024.⁵⁰ To provide historical perspective, in 2020, this exact same metric stood at an egregious P1.813 billion across 20 unauthorized accounts.⁵¹ The 2024 flag pertained to accounts opened to manage legitimate welfare initiatives, such as the PCSO Endowment Fund and PhilHealth payments required to retain continuous medical services for troops.⁴⁹ The violation was purely procedural—a failure to secure formal approval from the Permanent Committee—rather than a diversion of funds for personal gain.⁴⁹ In compliance with directives, the AFP promptly closed five of the six cited accounts and remitted the balances.⁵⁰

11.3 Procurement Friction as Capital Waste

Ultimately, the most significant area of “waste” in the Philippine modernization program is the loss of time, strategic momentum, and purchasing power due to structural procurement delays. The Government Procurement Reform Act (Republic Act No. 9184) is notoriously rigid, heavily favoring the “lowest calculated responsive bid” and imposing strict bureaucratic timelines that are often highly incompatible with the complexities of international defense acquisitions and specialized military technology.⁵²

In a prior audit, the COA flagged the AFP for failing to complete 22 active modernization projects, valued at an aggregate cost of P6.8 billion, within their specified contractual timeframes.⁵³ The military attributed these extensive delays not to malfeasance, but to unforeseeable circumstances, systemic issues with securing licenses and clearances, site possession disputes, and manufacturing constraints imposed by the foreign contractors themselves.⁵⁴ While the AFP legally penalized underperforming contractors by confiscating performance bonds, imposing liquidated damages, and terminating contracts in strict compliance with RA 9184, the tactical result remains identical: the military is deprived of the critical equipment it paid for when it needs it most.⁵² Until the legislative mechanisms governing defense acquisitions are streamlined, billions of pesos will continue to languish as “unobligated funds,” effectively wasting capital through inflation and delayed operationalization.

12. Conclusion

The Armed Forces of the Philippines is navigating a perilous strategic transition characterized by commendable ambition but constrained by profound structural fragility. To address the core analytical query: the Republic of the Philippines is, by and large, spending its modernization capital wisely on the strategic level. The procurement of highly lethal asymmetric systems like the BrahMos cruise missile, the expansion of maritime domain awareness tools through Japanese OSA grants, and the establishment of a modern, standardized OPV and corvette fleet from South Korea represent highly rational, cost-effective investments. These assets are specifically designed to maximize credible deterrence in the West Philippine Sea while operating within the confines of a limited national budget. Furthermore, the deliberate diversification of suppliers—drawing from the U.S., Japan, South Korea, India, Israel, and Turkey—effectively mitigates the strategic risk of the AFP becoming overly dependent on a single geopolitical bloc or falling victim to a single point of supply chain failure.

Moreover, the fundamental character of fiscal mismanagement within the Philippine defense establishment has evolved significantly. The historical narrative that modernization funds are currently being brazenly siphoned off into the private accounts of corrupt generals is largely unsupported by recent empirical data. The increasingly stringent oversight of the Commission on Audit, coupled with genuine, enforced institutional reform efforts within the AFP command structure, has forced a level of transparency that makes overt, systemic theft exceedingly difficult to execute and conceal.

However, defense value is undeniably being lost to systemic bureaucratic friction. The institutional inability to fully utilize allocated budgets—as starkly evidenced by the NTF-ELCAC funding failures—and the protracted delays in contract execution under rigid procurement laws represent a non-malicious but equally damaging form of capital “waste.” A modern military cannot effectively deter agile, highly capable adversaries if its modernization capital is perpetually tied up in unliquidated cash advances, delayed foreign contractor deliveries, and inflexible public bidding procedures. Moving forward, the ultimate success of the Re-Horizon 3 phase will depend less on securing additional pledges of foreign military financing, and more on Manila’s political will to aggressively reform its internal defense procurement architecture and rapidly execute the capital it has already acquired.

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

1. Riding Unruly Waves: The Philippines’ Military Modernisation Effort …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/asia-pacific/south-east-asia/philippines-china-united-states/349-riding-unruly-waves-philippines-military-modernisation-effort
2. DND+ABN+FY+2026+FIN_v3_1.pdf, accessed June 5, 2026, https://docs.congress.hrep.online/download/CSO/DND+ABN+FY+2026+FIN_v3_1.pdf
3. Manila’s Strongest Security Advantage – Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM, accessed June 5, 2026, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2026/02/manilas-strongest-security-advantage/
4. Petty, big, routine graft a lucrative trade at AFP – PCIJ.org, accessed June 5, 2026, https://pcij.org/2011/02/23/petty-big-routine-graft-bra-lucrative-trade-at-afp-2/
5. Trust earned and guarded: The uncompromising integrity of the AFP – Inquirer Opinion, accessed June 5, 2026, https://opinion.inquirer.net/185483/brawner-column
6. COA flags DND over ‘low utilization’ of P14-M NTF-Elcac budgets, accessed June 5, 2026, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2153100/coa-flags-dnd-over-low-utilization-of-p14-m-ntf-elcac-budgets
7. Pinoys back stronger naval presence, diplomacy in West Philippine Sea – poll | Philstar.com, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2026/06/04/2532685/pinoys-back-stronger-naval-presence-diplomacy-west-philippine-sea-poll
8. Philippines military modernisation: revamped but not resolved, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/062/philippines-military-modernisation-revamped-but-not-resolved/
9. Bongbong Marcos – Wikipedia, accessed June 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bongbong_Marcos
10. Special Report on the West Philippine Sea Maritime Dispute (Part 1): Deciphering the Fourth US – Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue and the Underlying Challenges to the Security Treaty Alliance – NATO Association of Canada, accessed June 5, 2026, https://natoassociation.ca/special-report-on-the-west-philippine-sea-maritime-dispute-part-1-deciphering-the-fourth-us-philippines-22-ministerial-dialogue-and-the-underlying-challenges-to-the-security-treaty-allia/
11. Redesigning the United States–Philippines Security Partnership: A Nodal Defense Approach to the Indo-Pacific – Air University, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3532941/redesigning-the-united-statesphilippines-security-partnership-a-nodal-defense-a/
12. Joint Statement on the Philippines-United States Bilateral Strategic …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://ph.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-on-the-philippines-united-states-bilateral-strategic-dialogue-2/
13. U.S. Commits $144M to Strengthen Military Facilities in the Philippines to Deter China, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7K2qvGzluY
14. US Senate passes bill allocating $2.5-B security aid for PH …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1265547
15. Fiscal Year 2025 U.S. Arms Transfers and Defense Trade – State Department, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/03/fiscal-year-2025-u-s-arms-transfers-and-defense-trade
16. Japan arms exports to strengthen Indo-Pacific deterrence, accessed June 5, 2026, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2026/05/japan-arms-exports-to-strengthen-indo-pacific-deterrence/
17. IP25005 | Japan’s Official Security Assistance to Southeast Asia: Limited Scope, but Real Impact – RSIS, accessed June 5, 2026, https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip25005-japans-official-security-assistance-to-southeast-asia-limited-scope-but-real-impact/
18. Middle Power Politics: Tokyo-Manila Comprehensive Strategic …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/middle-power-politics-tokyo-manila-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/
19. Outstanding Issues for Official Security Assistance (OSA) and its Strategic Utilization | List of Articles | International Information Network Analysis | SPF, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/nishida_03.html
20. Official Security Assistance (OSA) Programme in implementation …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/pagewe_001067_00001.html
21. Japan-Philippines military collusion undermines regional peace and stability, accessed June 5, 2026, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/O_251451/16465704.html
22. HHI secures $547m order to deliver two corvettes for Philippine Navy – Naval Technology, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.naval-technology.com/news/hhi-philippine-navy-corvettes/
23. Navy to order 6 more patrol vessels from South Korea | Cebu Daily News, accessed June 5, 2026, https://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/442806/navy-to-order-6-more-patrol-vessels-from-south-korea
24. S Korea-Philippines draw closer in big patrol boat deal – Asia Times, accessed June 5, 2026, https://asiatimes.com/2022/06/s-korea-philippines-draw-closer-in-big-patrol-boat-deal/
25. Hyundai Heavy Industries Aces Philippine Navy OPV Deadline, accessed June 5, 2026, https://navyleaders.com/news/hyundai-heavy-industries-aces-philippine-navy-opv-deadline/
26. Philippine Navy to take delivery in April of first of 2 South Korean-made corvettes, accessed June 5, 2026, https://asianews.network/philippine-navy-to-take-delivery-in-april-of-first-of-2-south-korean-made-corvettes/
27. India signs BrahMos missile deal with Vietnam, accessed June 5, 2026, https://dailynews.lk/2026/06/03/world/1004890/india-signs-brahmos-missile-deal-with-vietnam/
28. Philippines inks deal worth $375 million for BrahMos missiles – The Hindu, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/philippines-inks-deal-worth-375-million-for-brahmos-missiles/article38338340.ece
29. Vietnam Procures BrahMos Anti-Ship Missiles: Regional Implications in 2026 – News and Statistics, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.indexbox.io/blog/vietnam-signs-629-million-brahmos-missile-deal-with-india/
30. India says BrahMos deal signed with Vietnam, Indonesia next in line, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/brahmos-missile-deal-vietnam-already-signed-with-india-indonesia-pact-in-final-stages-2919650-2026-05-30
31. Vietnam signs $629 mn BrahMos missile deal; Indonesia pact in final stages: Defence Secretary, accessed June 5, 2026, https://manufacturing.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/aerospace-defence/vietnam-signs-629-mn-brahmos-missile-deal-indonesia-pact-in-final-stages-defence-secretary/131419225
32. Do you think the Procurement of Israeli tech is dead? : r/PhilippineMilitary – Reddit, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/PhilippineMilitary/comments/1tasjot/do_you_think_the_procurement_of_israeli_tech_is/
33. Elbit Systems Delivers Third Batch of Sabrah Light Tanks to Philippine Army | Israel Defense, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/65161
34. Sabrah & SPYDER: Philippines’ First Real Fist and Shield Against China – YouTube, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0WpeBtgsNqM
35. Philippines to buy SPYDER air defense missile system from Israel | The Jerusalem Post, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/philippines-to-buy-spyder-air-defense-missile-system-from-israel-575825
36. The Philippines will Acquire more SPYDER ER Missile Defense Systems from Israel, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-8XE6HDINvQ
37. Philippine Air Force Receives Last Two of Six Turkish T129 Attack Helicopters, accessed June 5, 2026, https://theaviationist.com/2024/05/23/philippine-air-force-last-t129-helicopters/
38. Turkey’s homegrown ATAK helicopter on way to Philippine Air Force inventory | Daily Sabah, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.dailysabah.com/defense/2018/12/19/turkeys-homegrown-atak-helicopter-on-way-to-philippine-air-force-inventory
39. Philippines receives two delayed T129 combat helicopters – Defense News, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/05/24/philippines-receives-two-delayed-t129-combat-helicopters/
40. Second Batch of T129 ATAK? PH Negotiates More Attack Helicopters – YouTube, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gK6T9C_MHVk
41. Hegseth’s Burden-Sharing And Manila’s Balancing Act With Washington And Beijing – OpEd – Eurasia Review, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.eurasiareview.com/01062026-hegseths-burden-sharing-and-manilas-balancing-act-with-washington-and-beijing-oped/
42. PH eyes stronger local defense industry under revitalized SRDP law …, accessed June 5, 2026, https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/2122424/ph-eyes-stronger-local-defense-industry-under-revitalized-srdp-law
43. Marcos signs self-reliant defense posture law | Philippine News Agency, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1234986
44. Youth Solon Hits Military Anew with More Corruption Cases (PR) – Bulatlat, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.bulatlat.com/2011/02/02/youth-solon-hits-military-anew-with-more-corruption-cases-pr/
45. No meddling in Navy frigate deal – Bong Go – Philstar.com, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/20/1789592/no-meddling-navy-frigate-deal-bong-go
46. Trillanes to file new complaint vs Duterte, Go over frigate deal | ABS-CBN News, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.abs-cbn.com/news/2024/7/7/trillanes-to-file-new-complaint-vs-duterte-go-over-frigate-deal-1533
47. COA flags DND for barely tapping millions of NTF-ELCAC funds | Philstar.com, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2025/12/02/2491413/coa-flags-dnd-barely-tapping-millions-ntf-elcac-funds
48. AFP debunks corruption claims based on COA report – Manila Bulletin, accessed June 5, 2026, https://mb.com.ph/2026/01/30/afp-debunks-corruption-claims-based-on-coa-report
49. AFP dismisses ‘misleading’ online claims on COA observations – GMA Network, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/974595/afp-dismisses-misleading-online-claims-on-coa-observations/story/
50. AFP rebuts COA audit narratives, clarifies 2024 observations, accessed June 5, 2026, https://tribune.net.ph/2026/01/29/afp-rebuts-coa-audit-narratives-clarifies-2024-observations
51. COA flags AFP over P1.8 billion in ‘unauthorized’ bank accounts – Philstar.com, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.philstar.com/nation/2021/07/10/2111478/coa-flags-afp-over-p18-billion-unauthorized-bank-accounts
52. ‘Unforeseen situations’ delayed some modernization projects: AFP, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1146972
53. Military explains delays in modernization projects – SunStar, accessed June 5, 2026, https://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/military-explains-delays-in-modernization-projects
54. AFP rues P6.8 billion worth of delayed modernization projects – Manila Bulletin, accessed June 5, 2026, https://mb.com.ph/2021/07/14/afp-rues-p6-8-billion-worth-of-delayed-modernization-projects/