1. Executive Summary
This Weekly Situation Report (SITREP) provides an exhaustive, expert-level assessment of the global threat landscape for the reporting period of July 18 to July 24, 2026. Over the course of the week, the international security environment was defined by significant structural reorganizations within the high commands of major conventional militaries, deliberate and violent escalations in maritime grey-zone operations, and pivotal leadership transitions within dominant non-state actor networks. The overarching global trend indicates a persistent erosion of conventional military deterrence, with state and proxy actors increasingly utilizing sub-threshold violence, asymmetric strike capabilities, and complex diplomatic stall tactics to unilaterally alter the operational status quo without triggering overwhelming multilateral military responses.
In the European theater, the Russia-Ukraine War experienced a profound command-and-control paradigm shift. The executive dismissal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief culminated a period of intense civil-military friction regarding tactical doctrines, attrition rates, and the pace of technological integration.1 This internal restructuring occurs simultaneously with an escalation in Ukrainian asymmetric deep-strike campaigns targeting Russian logistics and energy infrastructure, a strategy designed to impose new macroeconomic strains on the Russian state and stretch its domestic air defense networks.4 Despite the high intensity of these operations, the frontlines remain structurally static, underscoring the grueling nature of the war of attrition.6
In the Middle East and North Africa, the strategic horizon for conflict resolution has narrowed considerably. A decisive leadership election within the Hamas political bureau has effectively entrenched the organization’s militant, Gaza-centric faction.7 This development severely degrades the viability of the internationally brokered Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (UN Resolution 2803), as the new leadership views the mandatory decommissioning of its military infrastructure as an existential red line.7 Concurrently, the regional threat matrix widened significantly as the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement executed a strategic pivot in its maritime interdiction campaign. By formally declaring a blockade against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and actively launching kinetic strikes against Saudi commercial assets in the Red Sea, the Houthis have directly imperiled global energy transit networks and introduced a high probability of dragging Riyadh back into direct kinetic confrontation.9 Furthermore, diplomatic efforts in Lebanon show signs of fragile progress, with the Lebanese state apparatus attempting to enforce domestic disarmament to satisfy international ceasefire conditions.12 Additionally, the fragile post-Assad transitional government in Syria faced renewed degradation of its military infrastructure via targeted Israeli airstrikes.
In the Indo-Pacific, the South China Sea witnessed a severe kinetic grey-zone escalation at Second Thomas Shoal. The incident, involving hand-to-hand combat and significant casualties, successfully tested the operational thresholds of the US-Philippines mutual defense architecture.14 Although swiftly followed by a provisional diplomatic arrangement aimed at immediate de-escalation, the tactical brutality of the encounter underscores Beijing’s commitment to physical coercion.14 Concurrently, the Myanmar Armed Forces, struggling with severe manpower and equipment deficits, signaled a dangerous deepening of its reliance on sanctioned states by publicly engaging with North Korean diplomats to expand bilateral cooperation, a likely vector for arms procurement.17
Across Sub-Saharan Africa, the security architecture continues to fragment. In Sudan, the military leadership explicitly rejected international diplomatic overtures, signaling a commitment to a protracted, high-casualty war of attrition against paramilitary forces.18 This entrenched posture guarantees the continuation of what is currently the world’s most severe internal displacement and hunger crisis.19 Simultaneously, persistent conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo escalated dramatically with a deadly massacre executed by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Ituri Province, maintaining severe regional destabilization pressures.
2. Regional Conflict Breakdowns
2.1. Europe/Eurasia
2.1.1. Conflict/Threat Name: Russia-Ukraine War
Weekly Key Events:
The reporting period was dominated by a foundational structural reorganization of the Ukrainian military high command, driven by domestic political pressures and battlefield realities, alongside a highly intensified Ukrainian asymmetric strike campaign deep into Russian sovereign territory.
On July 21, 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky officially announced the dismissal of General Oleksandr Syrskyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, appointing Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi to the position.1 The formal transfer of authority, overseen by Acting Minister of Defense Yevhen Khmara, occurred on July 24.20 This transition caps a period of intense civil-military friction that manifested in public protests involving over 10,000 demonstrators in Kyiv and other major urban centers.2 The unrest was initially triggered by the removal of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, a prominent advocate for military modernization, which subsequently catalyzed broader demands for Syrskyi’s resignation.2
The transition from Syrskyi to Drapatyi represents a fundamental clash of military doctrines. Syrskyi, despite his successes in the defense of Kyiv, the 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive, and the cross-border Kursk operation, was increasingly criticized by active-duty personnel, veterans, and civilian leadership for adhering to a top-down, centralized command culture characterized as “Soviet-style”.1 His operational approach was heavily scrutinized for generating unsustainable attrition rates, a controversy that peaked following independent investigations into the Skelia assault regiment, a unit closely associated with his command that suffered disproportionately high battlefield fatalities.3
The elevation of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi signals a definitive strategic pivot toward decentralized command, personnel preservation, and rapid technological integration. Born in 1982, Drapatyi is a prominent figure of the post-Soviet military generation, having distinguished himself during the 2014 battles for Mariupol and serving as the commander of the Joint Forces Command.2 His tactical pedigree includes halting the Russian advance toward Kryvyi Rih in 2022, commanding the successful liberation operations in the Kherson region, and leading the Kharkiv Operational Tactical Group in May 2024 to contain a renewed Russian cross-border offensive.21 Drapatyi is highly regarded for his implementation of the “Drone Line” initiative and his willingness to integrate robotic warfare directly into frontline operations.3 His immediate mandate from the executive branch involves presenting an updated defense strategy focusing on asymmetrical strikes, accelerating drone procurement, and preparing for an anticipated Russian force generation effort that aims to mobilize up to 500,000 additional personnel by the autumn of 2026.4 The transition received highly public endorsements from reformist factions, with former Defense Minister Fedorov describing it as a vital step toward robotizing the front and preserving infantry lives.1
Concurrently, Ukrainian forces significantly expanded their asymmetric deep-strike capabilities targeting Russian macroeconomic and logistical infrastructure. On the night of July 17 to July 18, Ukrainian uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) units successfully struck two major logistics facilities owned by Wildberries—Russia’s premier e-commerce and logistics conglomerate—located near St. Petersburg, inflicting severe structural damage.4 This operation was rapidly followed by a massive 400-drone swarm raid on July 20, which targeted extensive logistics networks and fuel storage sites across the broader Moscow region.5
The strategic intent behind the targeting of commercial logistics entities like Wildberries is multifaceted. Operationally, these strikes systematically degrade domestic supply chains that support dual-use agricultural and energy logistics.4 Strategically, they generate acute domestic psychological friction within the Russian civilian populace, manifesting in public displays of distress from business owners reliant on the platform.5 Furthermore, these deep-strike campaigns impose severe secondary requirements on Russian aerospace forces, forcing the redeployment of already-stretched air defense networks away from the primary line of contact to protect interior economic hubs.5 In the maritime domain, continuous Ukrainian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have reportedly compelled the Russian military command to divert elite drone units from frontline offensive operations to provide defensive screening for naval and agricultural logistics assets.4
The regional spillover risk of these intensified aerospace operations remains acute. On July 24, Romanian air defense units intercepted and destroyed an unspecified drone that had violated NATO airspace, while an overnight explosion heavily damaged a civilian cargo vessel bound for Ukraine off the Romanian coast.5 These incidents highlight the persistent, high-probability risk of horizontal escalation and grey-zone miscalculation involving NATO member states contiguous to the Black Sea theater. The strategic implications of Ukraine’s drone campaign are reportedly influencing international diplomatic postures; US intelligence briefings regarding the efficacy of Kyiv’s long-range strikes deep into Russian territory have allegedly prompted a shift in US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric, signaling stronger institutional support for the Ukrainian operational methodology.4
Despite the high operational tempo, geographic alterations on the battlefield remain practically negligible, underscoring the grueling reality of a static war of attrition. Open-source mapping data verified that between June 23 and July 21, 2026, Russian forces achieved a net territorial gain of merely 10 square miles across the entire Ukrainian theater.6 This represents a slight deceleration from the 12 square miles gained in the preceding four-week period (May 26 to June 23, 2026).6 In contrast, Ukrainian forces maintained a stable 4-square-mile territorial foothold within the sovereign Russian border regions of Kursk and Belgorod throughout the same reporting period.6

To provide comprehensive context regarding the scale of the conflict underlying these command changes, an aggregation of verifiable losses and demographic impacts is essential. The following table synthesizes the latest available open-source intelligence regarding casualties, equipment degradation, and civilian displacement since the onset of the full-scale invasion, highlighting the massive human and material costs required to achieve minimal tactical advances.
| Metric / Category | Russian Federation | Ukraine | Source Context |
| Annual Territorial Gain | 1,103 sq miles (Net) | 4 sq miles (in Russia) | Net total from July 2025 to July 2026.6 |
| Civilian Fatalities | 8,012 | 16,431 killed (48,613 injured) | RF Gov claims vs. UN verified data.6 |
| Total Displaced Citizens | ~550,000 – 850,000 (Emigrated) | 9.6 Million | Ukraine displacement includes 3.7M IDPs and 5.9M international refugees (22% of pre-war pop).6 |
| Military Vehicles/Equipment | 23,888 | 11,781 | Total verified losses across all classes.6 |
| Tanks/Armored Vehicles | 14,129 | 5,992 | Documented heavy armor losses.6 |
| Aircraft | 380 | 200 | Verified fixed and rotary-wing losses.6 |
| Naval Vessels | 29 | 42 | Includes brown-water and blue-water assets.6 |
| Military Casualties (Est.) | 400,000 to 700,000+ | 140,000 to 600,000+ | Ranges reflect variance across US, UK, and European intelligence estimates between late 2024 and mid-2026.6 |
The extreme variance in military casualty estimates—ranging from President Zelensky’s conservative acknowledgment of 55,000 Ukrainian fatalities in early 2026, to Western intelligence and journalistic estimates (e.g., FT, CSIS) suggesting total Ukrainian casualties (killed, wounded, missing) between 500,000 and 600,000—illustrates the profound operational security measures surrounding force generation.6 The necessity to mitigate these staggering attrition rates is the primary strategic driver behind the appointment of Major General Drapatyi and the pivot toward technology-centric maneuver warfare.
2.2. Middle East/North Africa
2.2.1. Conflict/Threat Name: Gaza-Israel War
Weekly Key Events:
The tactical environment in the Gaza Strip remained highly volatile, characterized by continuous Israeli military operations and severe humanitarian degradation. However, the most consequential development of the reporting period was a pivotal leadership election within Hamas, an event that fundamentally alters the strategic horizon for ceasefire negotiations and regional stability.
On July 20, 2026, the Hamas General Shura Council formally concluded its internal electoral process, announcing the selection of Khalil al-Hayya as the new Chairman of the Political Bureau.7 Al-Hayya succeeds Yahya al-Sinwar, whose elimination by Israeli forces in October 2024 left a profound leadership vacuum that had been temporarily managed by a five-member joint council (comprising figures such as Muhammad Darwish and Khaled Mashaal).7 The election process was subjected to unprecedented operational security measures and repeated delays due to the ongoing kinetic environment in Gaza.7 An initial round of voting in May 2026 failed to produce a decisive majority, leading to a highly classified runoff in June characterized by the physical transport of secret ballots to evade Israeli signals intelligence.7
The electoral outcome was remarkably close. Intelligence assessments indicate al-Hayya defeated Khaled Mashaal—the prominent leader of the external diaspora faction—by a razor-thin margin, with reported vote counts of either 35 to 34, or 36 to 32 (out of 69 Shura Council members).7 Notably, the process featured the unprecedented casting of blank ballots, a protest mechanism utilized by certain council members expressing a desire for younger leadership or opposition to electing a permanent leader during active hostilities.7
The strategic implications of al-Hayya’s victory are profound. It signifies the absolute institutional dominance of the Hamas military wing and its internal Gaza-based leadership over the external political apparatus.7 Al-Hayya is deeply aligned with the Iranian axis and is mandated to preserve the ideological continuity of the Sinwar doctrine, which centers on armed resistance and the absolute rejection of disarmament.7 Consequently, OSINT assessments indicate that under al-Hayya, Hamas will maintain a hardline, rejectionist posture regarding the implementation of the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”.7
The Comprehensive Plan, formally endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 in November 2025 and brokered by the US, established a transitional governance administration chaired by US President Donald Trump.8 The core tenet of this roadmap is the phased, internationally verified decommissioning of Hamas’ weapons in exchange for a staged withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).8 However, the newly elected Hamas leadership views disarmament as an existential red line, effectively stalling the transition.7 The failure to advance this framework impedes massive recovery efforts; the UN and World Bank assess Gaza’s reconstruction needs at $71.4 billion, against only $17 billion in current pledges.8
| Hamas Leadership Faction | Key Figure | Operational Base | Strategic Posture Post-Election |
| Internal / Military Wing | Khalil al-Hayya (Chairman) | Gaza Strip | Dominant faction; strict adherence to the Sinwar doctrine; rejection of disarmament; strong alignment with Iran.7 |
| External / Diaspora Wing | Khaled Mashaal | Qatar / Turkiye | Subordinate faction; pledged unity post-election; handles external diplomacy and fundraising.7 |
| Shura Council | Muhammad Darwish | Variable | Maintains overarching consultative authority; exhibited internal polarization via blank ballots.7 |
| Judea and Samaria Office | Zaher Jabarin | West Bank | Coordinates auxiliary resistance operations outside of Gaza.7 |
Tactically, the humanitarian situation on the ground continues to deteriorate under sustained military pressure. The IDF continues to conduct localized kinetic strikes and dynamic territorial realignments. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented that between July 13 and July 20, Israeli operations killed at least 57 Palestinians, including targeted drone strikes on a refugee camp in Nuseirat and engagements in Khan Younis.22 UN OCHA reporting indicates that the civilian population of 2.1 million remains trapped behind the “yellow line”—the demarcated edge of Israeli military control.8 The IDF frequently shifts this boundary westward, severely compressing the accessible civilian footprint and increasing the density of internally displaced persons.8
Simultaneously, auxiliary violence in the West Bank has surged to critical levels. UN data confirms that in 2026, 55% of all Palestinian injuries in the West Bank are the direct result of Israeli settler attacks.22 The frequency of these incidents has escalated from one every three days in 2020 to over three per day in 2026, representing a systemic breakdown in localized security governance and displacing hundreds of Palestinians.22
2.2.2. Conflict/Threat Name: Israel-Lebanon / Hezbollah Conflict
Weekly Key Events:
The reporting period saw critical diplomatic maneuvers aimed at solidifying the fragile June 2026 ceasefire framework between Israel and Lebanon, occurring alongside aggressive domestic Lebanese operations to assert state sovereignty over non-state militant infrastructure.
On July 21, 2026, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun conducted a high-level state visit to the White House, engaging in direct bilateral talks with US President Donald Trump.12 The summit focused explicitly on enforcing the 14-point framework agreement signed in Washington on June 26, 2026, which formally ended the state of war and established conditions for a comprehensive peace.12 A focal point of the current enforcement strategy is the establishment of internationally monitored “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon.12 Following preliminary negotiations in Rome (July 14–15), an implementation mechanism was tentatively agreed upon whereby the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will assume full security control of these designated zones subsequent to a verified withdrawal of Israeli forces.12 During the Washington summit, President Aoun publicly reiterated demands that Israel be pressured to immediately withdraw from occupied Lebanese territories to facilitate the LAF deployment and guarantee the permanence of the ceasefire.24
Domestically, the Lebanese state apparatus executed significant counter-militia operations, a prerequisite for maintaining international support. Operating under a strict mandate to enforce a state monopoly on armed force, President Aoun’s administration—leveraging his previous experience as the Commander of the LAF—directed the confiscation of over 500 rocket launchers, dismantled numerous subterranean arms depots, and assumed control of approximately 200 former Hezbollah tunnel networks throughout the year.13 Furthermore, following a negotiated agreement with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Mahmoud Abbas, the LAF initiated the phased disarmament of proxy militias operating within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.13 These internal security operations are critical to satisfying the stipulations of UN Resolution 1701 and securing necessary international defense assistance to rebuild the Lebanese state infrastructure.
2.2.3. Conflict/Threat Name: Red Sea / Houthi Maritime Campaign
Weekly Key Events:
The Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement executed a severe and highly disruptive escalation in its maritime interdiction campaign, officially expanding its targeting parameters beyond Israel-linked shipping to explicitly include sovereign and commercial assets belonging to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The escalation transitioned into kinetic action on July 22, 2026, when Houthi forces launched a coordinated drone, ballistic, and cruise missile attack against commercial shipping in the Red Sea.9 The Saudi-flagged oil tanker Encelia was struck by an unidentified projectile on its starboard side.9 The impact occurred approximately 70 nautical miles southwest of Al Shuqaiq, placing the vessel near the outer limits of the Saudi port of Jizan.9 The strike ignited a fire on the vessel’s bow, prompting immediate VHF distress calls to regional maritime authorities.9 Saudi state agencies successfully secured the vessel, reporting no crew casualties, but officially classified the strike as a severe violation of international law.9 The Houthis claimed a secondary strike on a second tanker, the Layla, though this attack remains unconfirmed by independent maritime risk agencies such as the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) and Vanguard.9
Concurrently with the kinetic strikes, Houthi military spokespersons formally declared the imposition of a total naval blockade on Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea.9 The group claims this blockade is retaliation for unspecified Saudi “escalations” and explicitly warned all international vessels against calling at Saudi ports.9 To physically enforce this mandate, Houthi naval units reportedly intercepted and compelled up to ten commercial vessels to abort their transits and reverse course during the reporting period.9

The strategic implications of this blockade are profound. Following the maritime strikes, the Houthis claimed a subsequent ballistic missile attack against the southern Saudi mainland city of Jizan on July 25, an action that triggered civil defense warnings across Jizan and Yanbu and demonstrated a willingness to target sovereign mainland territory.11 This multi-domain escalation has severely disrupted regional energy logistics. Tanker owners have initiated mass rerouting protocols; vessels carrying Saudi crude and petrochemicals destined for Asian markets are actively avoiding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.9 Instead, these vessels are being forced to utilize the northern route through the Suez Canal or undertake the significantly longer circumnavigation of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope.9 This logistical pivot has resulted in a doubling of maritime insurance premiums for the southern Red Sea and adds weeks of transit time to global energy deliveries.9
Diplomatically, the targeted attacks on Saudi infrastructure represent a dangerous brinkmanship strategy by Ansar Allah. The strikes threaten to unravel the fragile detente negotiated between Riyadh and Sana’a, potentially forcing Saudi Arabia to abandon its diplomatic restraint and rejoin active combat operations alongside US and UK coalition forces to secure its export routes.11
2.2.4. Conflict/Threat Name: Syrian Transitional Conflict and Israeli Strikes
Weekly Key Events:
The security landscape in Syria remains highly fragmented following the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024. The country continues its fragile transition under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa (former emir of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), struggling to consolidate central authority amid competing insurgency groups, Kurdish integration negotiations, and foreign military operations.
A primary external threat vector driving instability is the continued military intervention by the State of Israel, which views the new Syrian administration as a strategic threat. Israel, which launched a ground invasion into southern Syria concurrent with the fall of Damascus in late 2024, continues to execute deep air operations to degrade Syrian military infrastructure. On July 23, 2026, the Israeli Air Force conducted a series of targeted kinetic strikes against multiple Syrian military facilities. The strikes successfully hit runways, oil depots, and radar installations at the Hama airfield and the T-4 airbase, while also targeting military infrastructure in the vicinity of Damascus. These operations underscore Israel’s commitment to maintaining a permissive airspace and preventing the reconstitution of advanced Syrian military capabilities during the transitional period.
2.3. Indo-Pacific
2.3.1. Conflict/Threat Name: South China Sea Maritime Disputes
Weekly Key Events:
The strategic environment in the South China Sea degraded sharply due to a highly violent kinetic grey-zone confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal, an event that briefly undermined years of diplomatic de-escalation before a rapid, highly conditional provisional agreement was forged.
On July 20, 2026, a severe physical altercation occurred between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and Philippine naval personnel attempting to execute a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded World War II-era landing ship serving as an outpost at Second Thomas Shoal.14 CCG cutter 21560 intercepted the Philippine mission, deploying a rigid inflatable boat (RHIB) carrying eight personnel that sailed in extremely close proximity to the outpost.14 When the Philippine Navy dispatched escort RHIBs to intercept, the CCG vessel rammed the Philippine boat, sparking a melee.14 Verified video evidence and statements from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) confirmed that Chinese personnel utilized blunt instruments, specifically wooden batons and oars, to strike Philippine sailors.14 This resulted in a severe head injury requiring medical evacuation for at least one AFP servicemember.14
This incident is highly notable for its calculated brutality. Since the signing of a bilateral de-escalation agreement in July 2024, Second Thomas Shoal had experienced a period of relative calm, with coercive maritime activities largely shifting to other features such as Scarborough Shoal.14 The intentional use of hand-to-hand combat represents a highly sophisticated grey-zone tactic by Beijing: maximizing physical coercion, inflicting casualties, and demonstrating absolute local dominance while deliberately remaining below the threshold of lethal firearms that would automatically trigger the mutual defense obligations under the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.14 Past incidents have seen similar thresholds tested, such as a June 2024 encounter where a Philippine Navy SEAL lost a thumb during a ramming incident, but the intentional use of melee weapons marks a distinct escalation in operational aggression.14
The clash triggered an immediate diplomatic crisis, occurring concurrently with the arrival of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Manila for the 59th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.14 The US State Department issued a harsh condemnation of Beijing’s “destabilizing conduct,” explicitly reaffirming Washington’s defense commitments and the validity of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling.14 Despite mutual recriminations and the summoning of respective ambassadors, the severe risk of unmanaged escalation prompted rapid back-channel diplomacy.14 On July 21, the Philippines and China concluded a new “provisional arrangement” specifically governing the daily resupply of personnel stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre.16 While Manila categorizes the agreement as a vital stabilization measure, Beijing’s Foreign Ministry heavily conditioned the arrangement, emphasizing its temporary nature and reiterating uncompromising demands that the grounded vessel be permanently towed away.16
The incident underscores broader US diplomatic challenges in the region. Despite strong treaty alliances, Washington struggles to build a unified Southeast Asian coalition against Chinese maritime expansionism.14 Regional states remain highly reliant on crucial economic ties with Beijing and are generally unwilling to risk these relationships by publicly aligning with US-led condemnations, preferring to manage disputes through independent, multilateral channels.14
2.3.2. Conflict/Threat Name: Myanmar Civil War
Weekly Key Events: The strategic landscape in Myanmar remains bogged down in a grueling war of attrition. Following the return of Lashio City to junta control in April 2025 under Chinese-brokered agreements 29, large-scale territorial shifts in northern Shan State have stalled, though localized fighting and urban criminality remain pervasive.29 Facing critical manpower and equipment shortages—exacerbated by a shrinking force size that had dropped to an estimated 120,000 combat-capable troops before recent crash conscription drives 30—the State Administration Council (SAC) is increasingly relying on heavily sanctioned external partners for military sustenance.
On July 22, 2026, SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing hosted the outgoing North Korean Ambassador, Jong Ho Bom, in Naypyidaw.17 The discussions officially focused on expanding “bilateral cooperation” and diplomatic alignment.17 Given the documented history of UN-sanctioned military technology transfers between Pyongyang and the Tatmadaw, this high-level engagement strongly indicates the junta is actively seeking emergency material and technical defense support to offset its massive equipment degradation and sustain its war effort.17
2.4. Sub-Saharan Africa
2.4.1. Conflict/Threat Name: Sudan Civil War
Weekly Key Events:
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has entered a phase of deeply entrenched attrition, with the SAF leadership explicitly rejecting international diplomatic mediation in favor of pursuing a total military solution.
On July 24, 2026, SAF Commander-in-Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan delivered a highly combative public address at the Al-Hadrab Mosque in Khartoum North.18 Burhan explicitly vowed to eradicate the RSF and completely ruled out any return to pre-war political arrangements, ceasefires, or power-sharing agreements with the paramilitary group.18 This declaration effectively deadlocks ongoing international efforts to broker a humanitarian truce. The geographic division of the country remains stark: the SAF controls the eastern half of the nation, having recently reclaimed momentum by recapturing the capital, Khartoum, and Al Jazirah state, while the RSF maintains dominant control over the western regions, including the entirety of the Darfur region.19
The human toll of the conflict continues to mount exponentially amid indiscriminate warfare tactics. On July 20, a drone strike struck the Ar Rahad market in RSF-contested North Kordofan, resulting in the deaths of two children and four adults, with over 20 additional civilian casualties reported.34 Markets, hospitals, and civilian infrastructure remain prime targets in the ongoing artillery and drone exchanges.34 This localized violence compounds a broader humanitarian catastrophe, with UN agencies continuously highlighting the systematic use of starvation, siege tactics, and widespread sexual violence as deliberate weapons of war.19
The recent total capture of El Fasher (North Darfur) by the RSF late last year continues to cast a long shadow over the conflict. The RSF siege and subsequent capture resulted in over 6,000 immediate fatalities in just three days, leading UN investigators to officially classify the RSF operations in the region as bearing the “hallmarks of genocide”.19 Overall fatality estimates for the conflict vary wildly due to severe access restrictions for independent monitors. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) has documented between 52,904 and 58,000 verified fatalities as of June 2026, though intelligence assessments suggest total mortality likely exceeds 150,000 due to unrecorded violence, starvation, and disease.19
| Conflict Metric | Data Point | Context |
| Duration | Entered 4th Year | Conflict began April 15, 2023.19 |
| Verified Fatalities | 52,904 – 58,000+ | ACLED documented baseline; total mortality likely >150,000.19 |
| El Fasher Casualties | >6,000 | Fatalities during the first three days of the RSF offensive.19 |
| Displacement | ~13 Million | Represents the world’s largest displacement crisis.19 |
| Territorial Control | East (SAF) / West (RSF) | SAF holds Khartoum/Red Sea; RSF holds Darfur/Kordofan.19 |
2.4.2. Conflict/Threat Name: Eastern DRC Instability
Weekly Key Events: Low-intensity kinetic engagements and persistent instability continued to plague the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While M23 maintains stringent control over significant swaths of the Rutshuru and Masisi territories in North Kivu 35, the reporting period was marked by a severe escalation in violence perpetrated by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).
On July 22, 2026, suspected ADF militants launched a deadly assault on the villages of Mandeite and Ndiapanda in the Mambasa territory of Ituri Province. The attack resulted in the deaths of at least 16 civilians, many of whom were local gold miners. This kinetic escalation forced widespread civilian displacement toward the city of Beni in neighboring North Kivu and brought local economic activities to a halt. The incident underscores the persistent lethality of the ADF—an affiliate of the Islamic State in Central Africa—despite ongoing joint military operations by the FARDC and the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) designed to neutralize the group.
2.5. Western Hemisphere
2.5.1. Conflict/Threat Name: Haiti Security Crisis
Weekly Key Events: No material updates this period.36
2.5.2. Conflict/Threat Name: Colombia / Venezuela Border Tensions
Weekly Key Events: No material updates this period.36
3. Appendix: Methodology
3.1. Analytical Framework and OSINT Collection
This Situation Report (SITREP) is compiled utilizing a rigorous Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) collection and processing framework designed to provide strategic foresight and tactical clarity. The methodology relies on the continuous, systematic aggregation, translation, and cross-verification of publicly available information streams from across the globe. Primary data streams integrated into this analysis include:
- Official state broadcasts, military press releases, and executive branch declarations.
- Verified telemetry and geolocated visual data, including satellite imagery and localized combat footage.
- Reports and statistical data from authoritative multinational organizations (e.g., UN OCHA, OHCHR, DPPA, World Bank).
- Assessments from globally recognized defense research institutes and conflict monitors, specifically the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).
The analytical process adheres to the intelligence community standards of evaluating competing hypotheses, ensuring that isolated data points, state-sponsored narratives, or unverified claims are not treated as fact without robust corroboration from independent or adversary sources.
3.2. Source Credibility and Materiality Verification
To mitigate the inherent risks of state-sponsored disinformation, cognitive domain manipulation, and wartime propaganda, source credibility is evaluated using a weighted matrix. Direct photographic or video evidence that has been geolocated and chronolocated by independent entities carries the highest weight in determining the factual baseline. Statements emanating from belligerent ministries of defense or state-owned media are treated analytically as statements of intent, narrative posture, or domestic signaling rather than objective truth, unless independently corroborated by neutral observers on the ground.
The Materiality Rule: To maintain analytical density and focus strictly on developments that alter the geopolitical landscape, an event is deemed “material” for inclusion in this report only if it meets one of the following strict criteria:
- It involves verified kinetic action resulting in significant casualties or the destruction of strategic military, economic, or logistical assets.
- It results in a verifiable transfer of territorial control between belligerents.
- It constitutes a significant diplomatic, political, or command-level shift that directly and demonstrably impacts the operational environment or strategic outlook.
If an ongoing or frozen conflict exhibits only routine, low-level friction that fails to alter the tactical or strategic status quo, it is excluded to preserve focus. In such instances, the conflict is denoted by the mandated phrase: “No material updates this period.”
3.3. Distinction of Grey-Zone Operations
Grey-zone operations are analytically distinguished from routine diplomatic friction or conventional military maneuvers based on the threshold of applied violence and the principle of plausible deniability.
For the purposes of this SITREP, a grey-zone maneuver is defined as a coercive action orchestrated by a state or non-state actor intended to alter the status quo, secure territorial advantage, or test adversary redlines. Crucially, these actions are deliberately calibrated to remain below the legal or physical threshold that would trigger a conventional military response or invoke mutual defense treaties (such as NATO Article 5 or the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty).
- Routine Military Maneuver: A publicly declared Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP), scheduled joint military exercises, or standard diplomatic protests.
- Grey-Zone Operation: The deliberate use of civilian, militia, or coast guard vessels to physically ram adversary ships; the use of sub-lethal weaponry (e.g., water cannons, sonic devices, high-powered lasers, or blunt instruments such as the batons utilized at Second Thomas Shoal); unacknowledged cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure; or the deployment of unflagged proxy militias. These asymmetric actions maximize coercive leverage while obfuscating legal attribution and stalling international escalation mechanisms.
Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.
Sources Used
- Ukraine’s new commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi draws reactions from Kyiv, Moscow, and the West — including visible concern from Russian war bloggers – Meduza, accessed July 25, 2026, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/07/22/ukraine-s-new-commander-in-chief-mykhailo-drapatyi-draws-reactions-from-kyiv-moscow-and-the-west-including-visible-concern-from-russian-war-bloggers
- Change of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – OSW, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-07-22/change-commander-chief-armed-forces-ukraine
- Zelenskyy replaces Syrskyi with Drapatyi after protests shake Ukraine army, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/ukraine-army-chief-change-zelenskyy-replaces-syrskyi-with-drapatyi-after-protests-ptag-2953313-2026-07-22
- ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2026 – Kyiv Post, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/80595
- ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2026 – Kyiv Post, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/81031
- The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, July 22, 2026, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-22-2026
- Khalil al-Hayya Elected to Chair Hamas political bureau – Insights …, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/khalil-al-hayya-elected-to-chair-hamas-political-bureau-insights-and-reactions/
- The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question, July 2026 Monthly Forecast – Security Council Report, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-07/the-middle-east-including-the-palestinian-question-25.php
- Houthis say they attacked two Saudi tankers; Saudi Arabia says one …, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/houthis-say-they-attacked-two-saudi-tankers-saudi-arabia-says-one-ablaze-red-sea
- Yemen’s Houthis say they targeted two Saudi tankers; source says Encelia hit by missile, accessed July 25, 2026, https://boereport.com/2026/07/22/yemens-houthis-say-they-targeted-two-saudi-tankers-source-says-encelia-hit-by-missile/
- Houthi blockade of Saudi trade threatens wider Middle East conflict …, accessed July 25, 2026, https://amp.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3361822/houthi-blockade-saudi-trade-threatens-wider-middle-east-conflict
- Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s Visit to Washington (2026) | KÜRE Encyclopedia, accessed July 25, 2026, https://kureansiklopedi.com/en/detay/lebanese-president-joseph-aouns-visit-to-washingto
- Joseph Aoun | Lebanon, President, Army, & Hezbollah and Israel – Britannica, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Joseph-Aoun
- Rubio arrives in Manila as China-Philippines tensions spike …, accessed July 25, 2026, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/china-philippines-second-thomas-shoal/
- China Clashes with Philippine Navy at Second Thomas Shoal …, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.miragenews.com/china-clashes-with-philippine-navy-at-second-1713190/
- Navigating Turbulence at Second Thomas Shoal | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed July 25, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/08/navigating-turbulence-at-second-thomas-shoal
- Myanmar’s Min Aung Hlaing Discusses Expanding Cooperation With North Korea, accessed July 25, 2026, https://newdaymyanmar.com/myanmars-min-aung-hlaing-discusses-expanding-cooperation-with-north-korea/
- Sudan’s Burhan Vows to Eradicate RSF as Peace Talks Stall – Sudan Tribune, accessed July 25, 2026, https://sudantribune.com/article/316566
- The Sudan War in 10 Charts – CSIS, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/sudan-war-10-charts
- Oleksandr Syrskyi Officially Transferred the Powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Mykhailo Drapatyi – sud.ua, accessed July 25, 2026, https://sud.ua/en/news/ukraine/367490-oleksandr-syrskyi-ofitsiino-peredav-povnovazhennia-holovnokomanduvacha-zsu-mykhailu-drapatomu
- Who Is Mykhailo Drapatyi? Ukraine’s New Commander-in-Chief – UNITED24 Media, accessed July 25, 2026, https://united24media.com/life-in-ukraine/who-is-mykhailo-drapatyi-ukraines-new-commander-in-chief-20964
- Israeli attacks on Gaza intensify amid surge of West Bank settler violence | UN News, accessed July 25, 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/07/1167991
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.ochaopt.org/
- Lebanese president says time has come to end war permanently after ‘fruitful’ Trump meeting – Middle East Monitor, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260724-lebanese-president-says-time-has-come-to-end-war-permanently-after-fruitful-trump-meeting/
- IDF Press Releases: Israel at War, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/idf-press-releases-israel-at-war/
- Joseph Aoun – Wikipedia, accessed July 25, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Aoun
- Houthis claim missile attack on southern Saudi Arabia – The Times of Israel, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/houthis-claim-missile-attack-on-southern-saudi-arabia/
- Houthi tanker attacks lift oil prices, widen Red Sea risk – Nation Thailand, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/world/40068981
- Crimewave in Lashio City as Junta Takes Back Control | Burma News International, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/crimewave-lashio-city-junta-takes-back-control
- Myanmar’s war headed for a tipping point in 2026 – Asia Times, accessed July 25, 2026, https://asiatimes.com/2026/01/myanmars-war-headed-for-a-tipping-point-in-2026/
- Sudan army vows to press offensive as civilian returns increase – Daily Sabah, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/sudan-army-vows-to-press-offensive-as-civilian-returns-increase
- Civil War in Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan
- Country policy and information note: security situation, Sudan, July 2026 (accessible), accessed July 25, 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sudan-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-security-situation-sudan-july-2026-accessible
- Drone attack on Ar Rahad market, North Kordofan, kills and injures children – ReliefWeb, accessed July 25, 2026, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/drone-attack-ar-rahad-market-north-kordofan-kills-and-injures-children
- Crisis Analysis – DR Congo: Monthly Displacement Report, July 2025 – ReliefWeb, accessed July 25, 2026, https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/crisis-analysis-dr-congo-monthly-displacement-report-july-2025
- This Week in DPPA: 18 – 24 July 2026, accessed July 25, 2026, https://dppa.un.org/en/news/this-week-in-dppa-18-24-july-2026












