1. Executive Summary

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is undertaking a profound structural transition in force design, characterized by rapid, massive investments in scaled autonomous systems. Initiatives such as the Replicator program, which seeks to field thousands of all-domain attritable autonomous (ADA2) systems by late 2025, alongside recent executive directives intended to unleash domestic drone manufacturing, indicate a strategic pivot toward mass and numerical advantage.¹ However, current strategic dialogues and procurement focuses heavily favor the acquisition of physical airframes, payloads, and autonomous navigation software, while the systemic requirements—specifically the invisible architecture of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)—remain critically underexamined.³

Operating thousands of uncrewed systems simultaneously generates extreme bandwidth limitations, heightens the risk of friendly electromagnetic interference (blue-on-blue EMI), and creates severe vulnerabilities to adversarial electronic warfare (EW).³ The historical reliance on clear, centralized communication lines is a fundamental vulnerability in contested environments.⁵ To successfully enable warfighters and employ drones effectively, DoD leadership must shift its conceptual framework from viewing the EMS as a passive, guaranteed utility to recognizing it as a highly contested, primary maneuver space.⁵

This strategic report provides an exhaustive overview of the systemic requirements necessary to design, build, operate, and evolve scaled drone architectures. It outlines the limitations of current bandwidth allocations, details the adversarial electronic warfare threat landscape based on recent combat observations in theaters such as Ukraine, and provides an actionable framework for operational resilience.⁷ The accumulated evidence suggests that operational viability in contested environments requires abandoning centralized “mothership” command structures in favor of decentralized, self-healing mesh networks.¹⁰ Furthermore, forces must push computational processing to the tactical edge to drastically reduce bandwidth dependencies and adopt software-defined, modular open systems architectures (MOSA) to enable real-time frequency agility and stealth communications.¹²

2. The Strategic Imperative: The Electromagnetic Spectrum as a Primary Maneuver Space

For decades, military communications architectures were conceptualized and built around the fundamental assumption that spectrum access could be predicted, allocated, and largely preserved through operational planning.⁵ Frequency plans, static allocations, and pre-mission deconfliction procedures functioned effectively in environments where spectrum access remained orderly and enforceable by allied forces.⁵ That operational context no longer exists. Contemporary military deployments unfold amid dense, unpredictable, and overlapping radio frequency (RF) emissions stemming from military, commercial, and civilian activities.⁵

2.1. The Shift to Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO)

Strategic competitors and adversaries have thoroughly observed the deep reliance of United States forces on EMS-dependent capabilities and have actively structured their forces to exploit this specific vulnerability.¹⁵ Consequently, without control or resilience within the EMS, precision capabilities degrade, joint operations falter, and broader deterrence erodes.¹⁵ Recognizing this paradigm shift, the DoD formalized a new reality in its 2020 Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy. This document marked a transition from the traditional concept of electronic warfare (EW)—often viewed as a secondary or supporting capability—into the broader, unified framework of Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO).¹⁷

Despite this critical doctrinal shift, execution and bureaucratic alignment have historically lagged. Assessments by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have noted that the Department risks failing to achieve its spectrum strategy goals due to a lack of clearly identified processes, reformed governance structures, and assigned leadership for strategy implementation.¹⁸ Accountability mechanisms and oversight processes required to integrate spectrum operations across the joint force must be accelerated to match the pace of physical drone acquisition.¹⁸

2.2. Domestic Spectrum Scarcity and Commercial Contention

Compounding the tactical threat is a broader, systemic issue of spectrum scarcity. Spectrum is a finite national and international resource. Treaties and international agreements govern global allocations, making it exceedingly difficult to acquire new spectrum permanently for military use.³ Domestically, significant portions of the bandwidth previously reserved for the exclusive use of the DoD have been auctioned to private entities over the past decade to form the foundation of commercial 4G and 5G cellular networks.²⁰

This commercial sell-off restricts the DoD’s freedom of action and means that large-scale drone deployments cannot simply be assigned dedicated, pristine frequencies.¹⁷ Furthermore, many systems are acquired as Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products tested using U.S. commercial spectrum; when transitioned to military use, these systems often face priority conflicts or are prohibited from use outside the United States unless transferred to military-use spectrum.³ Future operations therefore demand dynamic spectrum sharing and cognitive technologies that allow military systems to coexist within congested commercial and contested tactical bands.²⁰ The DoD’s Office of the Chief Information Officer and the FutureG office are actively exploring dynamic spectrum-sharing demonstrations to allow the Pentagon and private sector to simultaneously utilize the same spectrum bands without degradation.²¹

3. The Ambition and Reality of Scaled Autonomous Systems

The DoD’s current acquisition trajectory reflects an urgent drive to overcome the numerical advantages of adversaries through the mass deployment of uncrewed systems. However, a significant disconnect exists between the procurement of these physical assets and the maturation of the networks required to sustain them.

3.1. The Replicator Initiative and ADA2

Launched to counter the mass of the Chinese military, the Replicator Initiative represents a high-profile effort to rapidly field thousands of autonomous systems across multiple domains within an aggressive timeline.¹ Managed by the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Replicator bypasses traditional acquisition programs to accelerate the fielding of all-domain attritable autonomy (ADA2).¹ These are low-cost, expendable platforms designed to be lost in combat.¹ Replicator 1 focuses on fielding thousands of uncrewed aerial, ground, maritime, and space-based systems by August 2025, while Replicator 2 targets counter-small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS).¹

While the strategic intent is clear, the initiative faces scrutiny regarding technological integration. Congressional Research Service (CRS) analyses have raised oversight concerns framing Replicator as a test case for future defense innovation, warning that accelerated fielding may pose risks to system reliability, interoperability, and long-term sustainment.¹ Crucially, the initiative’s success relies heavily on unnamed software vendors tasked with enabling swarming, autonomous navigation, and dynamic threat response—all of which require a robust, resilient electromagnetic backbone.¹

3.2. Executive Directives and the Procurement Drive

The push for mass has been further codified by recent executive actions. Executive Order 14307, issued to support the American drone industry and arm warfighters, mandates that the DoD must be able to procure, integrate, and train using low-cost, high-performing drones manufactured domestically.² Follow-on memorandums from DoD leadership have emphasized “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance,” rescinding restrictive policies to power a technological leapfrog.²

This directive acknowledges that adversaries collectively produce millions of cheap drones annually, and U.S. units must be outfitted with lethal small drones.² However, as procurement scales rapidly, the systemic infrastructure must scale concurrently. Building millions of drones yields no tactical advantage if they cannot communicate, coordinate, or survive in a contested electromagnetic environment. The focus must expand from simply acquiring platforms to establishing the network architectures that make those platforms lethal and survivable.⁵

4. Physical and Infrastructural Vulnerabilities of Mass Operations

The ambition to field thousands of autonomous systems introduces immediate physical and infrastructural limitations. Leadership must recognize the nonlinear complexity that arises when scaling from single-drone operations to coordinated swarms. The primary constraints are bandwidth saturation, signal latency, and internal electromagnetic interference.

4.1. Bandwidth Saturation and Latency Constraints

Uncrewed Aircraft Systems rely heavily on datalinks for command and control (C2), telemetry, and the transmission of sensor payloads. As the density of drones increases within a given airspace, the demand for spectrum rapidly outpaces availability.³ High-fidelity sensors designed for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or target acquisition generate massive, continuous data streams.³ In recent tactical counter-UAS exercises, such as Project Flytrap in Germany, single U.S. Army platoons found that 70 percent of their available tactical bandwidth was consumed entirely by sensor data alone.²³

Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations, which are essential for long-range missions and deep strikes, compound this communication challenge.²⁴ Drones operating at extended ranges face severe signal attenuation—often exceeding 120 decibels at distances beyond 50 kilometers.²⁵ To maintain connectivity, systems frequently rely on satellite communications (SATCOM). While SATCOM offers global coverage and bypasses local terrestrial obstacles, it introduces substantial propagation delays, with latency ranging from 500 milliseconds to over a full second.²⁴ In the context of high-speed drone swarms, autonomous coordination, and kinetic fire control, milliseconds matter.²³ High latency can cripple real-time swarm coordination and render rapid targeting impossible.

4.2. Blue-on-Blue Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)

When thousands of electronic devices operate in close proximity, they generate significant RF noise, leading to internal or “blue-on-blue” electromagnetic interference.²⁶ Failure to properly shield and coordinate drones can result in disrupted flight controls, severed communication links, and mid-mission platform failure without any enemy action.²⁸

Internal EMI in swarms stems from multiple sources. Propulsion system electrical noise, the physical overlap of wireless modules, and the proximity of unshielded cables all contribute to a chaotic internal electromagnetic environment.⁴ As the swarm scales, coordination complexity increases non-linearly. Field tests demonstrate that communication latency between drones can spike, and positioning errors can accumulate rapidly—at rates of 2 to 5 centimeters per minute—especially in GPS-denied scenarios.³⁰

To mitigate these physical vulnerabilities, system designs must incorporate rigorous electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards and active coordination techniques.

5. The Adversarial Threat Landscape: Electronic Warfare and Contested Environments

The operating environment defined by current near-peer competitors is actively hostile to traditional RF communications. Insights derived from ongoing conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, demonstrate that numerical mass alone does not guarantee tactical success if the overarching network is highly susceptible to adversarial electronic warfare.³⁵ In modern combat, the drone will only get through if its communication architecture survives.³⁷

5.1. The Russian Electronic Warfare Architecture

Russian military doctrine heavily integrates non-kinetic spectrum operations across all service branches.³⁸ Since 2009, the vertical integration of domestic defense industry companies into entities like the Radio-Electronic Technologies Concern (KRET) has driven intensive lobbying and promotion of EW interests within the Russian military.³⁸ Consequently, the Russian Armed Forces deploy sophisticated, layered EW systems designed specifically to suppress satellite navigation, disrupt tactical communications, and neutralize drone operations.⁷

Key adversarial systems observed in current theaters include:

The lethality of these systems is evident in the severe attrition rates of tactical drones. In highly contested zones, 60 to 80 percent of all first-person view (FPV) drones operated have been neutralized by RF and GNSS signal jamming.⁹ To circumvent this overwhelming electromagnetic pressure, forces have occasionally been forced to revert to physical workarounds. For example, innovations have included deploying FPV drones tethered by kilometers of physical fiber-optic cables, allowing them to penetrate areas of heavy jamming and strike targets without relying on the electromagnetic spectrum at all.⁹ While effective in niche tactical scenarios, tethered systems cannot scale to meet the strategic requirements of ADA2 or broad swarm operations.

5.2. Advanced Adversarial Swarm Capabilities

Strategic competitors are concurrently developing their own uncrewed capabilities and counter-swarm technologies. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has heavily prioritized the “intelligentization” of its forces, accelerating drone warfare research for potential multi-domain conflicts, including specific testing for scenarios involving an invasion of Taiwan.⁴² Analysis indicates that Chinese development in artificial intelligence for drone swarms is rapidly advancing, focusing on utilizing uncrewed systems to overwhelm adversary air defenses.⁴²

However, intelligence assessments also note vulnerabilities in adversary AI development, such as the risk of “model collapse.” As Chinese leaders deploy AI systems trained on strictly controlled domestic information ecosystems, the models become detached from ground truth, functioning merely as mirrors of the state’s information control apparatus rather than objective intelligence processors.⁴³

Concurrently, foreign militaries are closely studying western doctrine to develop automated, AI-driven counter-drone architectures. In response, the U.S. Army is accelerating initiatives like Project Golden Shields, designed to automate the response chain against high-volume aerial threats and drone swarms.⁴⁴ These automated defense systems will undoubtedly become high-priority targets for adversaries, further emphasizing the need for resilient EMS operations.

6. Decentralized Command and Control: Transitioning to Leaderless Swarms

The DoD’s historical reliance on centralized command-and-control (C2) models presents a critical vulnerability in the modern electromagnetic environment. Legacy drone operations typically utilize a “mothership” model or a single ground control station, routing all telemetry, commands, and video feeds through a central node.¹¹

Centralized architectures rely on a single ‘mothership’ or ground station; neutralizing this node incapacitates the entire swarm. In a decentralized mesh network, every drone acts as a router, allowing the swarm to self-heal and maintain operational coherence even if multiple units are jammed or destroyed.¹¹ If an adversary successfully jams, deceives, or physically destroys the mothership, the entire fleet of dependent uncrewed systems is rendered inert, creating an unacceptable single point of failure.⁴⁷

6.1. The Transition to Mesh Networking

To achieve the requisite resilience, communications architectures must shift fundamentally to decentralized, ad-hoc mesh networks.¹⁰ In a true mesh network topology, every drone (or node) functions simultaneously as a transmitter, receiver, and router.⁴⁶ Data packets are not forced through a central hub; instead, they dynamically hop between nodes, automatically evaluating and seeking the most efficient and clear path to their destination based on rules-based criteria.⁴⁶

This architecture provides inherent “self-healing” capabilities. If a drone is shot down, encounters localized jamming, or moves behind physical terrain that blocks line-of-sight, the network instantly re-routes traffic through surviving adjacent nodes.⁴⁶ Technologies such as Kinetic Mesh networking evaluate communication paths in real-time without relying on fixed infrastructure, ensuring that secure communications persist even as platforms move rapidly through highly degraded and dynamic environments.⁴⁹ This is vital for maintaining situational awareness and tracking partner force operations in austere conditions without traditional cellular or SATCOM availability.⁵²

6.2. Leaderless Swarm Autonomy

Software platforms are evolving to manage thousands of assets simultaneously without the need for centralized human control or a single mothership. Systems such as L3Harris’s AMORPHOUS (Autonomous Multi-domain Operations Resiliency Platform for Heterogeneous Unmanned Swarms) are actively demonstrating “leaderless swarm” capabilities.¹¹

In a leaderless swarm, an operator assigns a high-level objective—for example, conducting a search over a specific coordinate grid or executing a coordinated strike. The software distributes the command across the entire fleet.¹¹ The drones intelligently delegate tasks among themselves, deconflict routing to avoid collision and internal EMI, and execute the mission collaboratively.¹¹ This decentralized decision-making allows individual uncrewed assets to perform tasks autonomously inside the network, stripping away the vulnerability of a single, targetable C2 node and enabling rapid scaling across multi-domain operations.⁵³

7. Bandwidth Mitigation through Edge Computing and Sensor Fusion

Solving the bandwidth crisis requires altering not just how data is transmitted, but fundamentally changing what data is transmitted. Traditional architectures stream continuous, raw data—such as high-definition video feeds or unfiltered radar returns—from the drone back to an enterprise cloud or ground station for processing and human analysis. In Denied, Disconnected, Intermittent, and Limited (D-DIL) environments, this reliance on reach-back communications is a fatal flaw.⁵⁵

7.1. Edge Artificial Intelligence

The integration of ruggedized hardware processors—such as Tensor Processing Units (TPUs), Neural Processing Units (NPUs), and Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)—directly onto the drone platform allows for Edge AI.⁵⁵ Edge computing forces the processing of information to occur at the point of collection, far beyond the traditional IT enterprise.⁵⁶

Instead of transmitting gigabytes of high-definition video over a saturated RF link, the drone’s onboard AI processes the video locally. It identifies the target, calculates trajectories, and generates essential metadata.¹² Only this metadata—such as target classification, exact coordinates, and velocity—is transmitted back to the operator or shared with the swarm.¹² This transition from raw data streaming to selective metadata transmission drastically reduces bandwidth requirements, preventing network overload and operator cognitive fatigue.¹²

7.2. Tactical Sensor Fusion

Further network optimization and operational clarity are achieved through advanced sensor fusion. When multiple drones in a swarm detect the same target, legacy systems often transmit separate tracks, clogging the network with redundant data and confusing C2 displays with multiple icons for a single entity.²³

Sensor fusion is the alignment and merging of detections from multiple distributed sensors into a single, highly accurate object track.²³ To achieve this across a swarm, precise temporal alignment is mandatory. All sensors, effectors, and C2 nodes must operate on a strictly synchronized, shared clock.²³ By correlating data at the tactical edge before transmission, the swarm operates as a unified, overcomplete sensory architecture.²³ This ensures that decision-making fidelity is maintained without relying on any single data source and without overwhelming the available tactical spectrum.²³ Precedents for this approach exist in advanced crewed platforms; the F-35, for instance, utilizes a multifunction advanced data link (MADL) to automatically fuse environmental data and distribute a single, unified operational picture across a squadron.⁵⁶

8. Hardware Agility and Stealth Communications

To outmaneuver adversaries in the EMS, the physical hardware of the swarm must be as agile and adaptable as its software. Rigid, single-purpose radio modules are incompatible with the demands of modern electronic warfare.

8.1. Software-Defined Radios (SDR)

Legacy radio modules operate on predetermined frequencies and fixed modulations.⁶⁰ Confronting a new EW threat or adapting to a different spectrum regulatory environment previously required physical hardware replacement, causing severe logistical delays. Software-Defined Radios (SDR) resolve this limitation by shifting the heavy lifting of modulation, demodulation, encoding, and frequency selection from hardware into software.⁶⁰

Cognitive SDRs represent a further leap. These radios can autonomously assess their RF environment, detect interference or jamming, and dynamically adjust frequencies in real-time to optimize performance.⁶⁰ Instead of rigid hardware limitations, SDRs utilize advanced algorithms to instruct the system to hop between frequencies and find innovative pathways to maintain the link.⁶² This flexibility allows a single SDR datalink to support multiple mission profiles, platforms, or even coalition partner networks simply by loading a new software profile, vastly reducing procurement overhead and increasing tactical adaptability.⁶⁰

8.2. Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)

To integrate technologies like SDRs and Edge AI rapidly, the DoD is enforcing a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA).¹⁴ The implementation of MOSA is not merely a best practice; it is a statutory requirement codified under Title 10 U.S.C. 4401(b).¹⁴ This legislation mandates that all major defense acquisition programs employ modular designs featuring standardized, machine-readable interfaces that allow major components to be incrementally added, removed, or upgraded.¹⁴

By decoupling the radio hardware and sensor payloads from the proprietary flight control software of the airframe, the DoD can continuously field upgraded algorithms from varied commercial vendors to counter evolving EW threats, without having to replace the entire drone fleet.¹³ This open business model permits sharing risk, maximizing asset reuse, and spurring competition among defense and intelligence community partners.¹³

8.3. Low Probability of Intercept and Detection (LPI/LPD)

Survival in a contested spectrum requires operating beneath the adversary’s detection threshold. Traditional omnidirectional radios broadcast signals that are easily detected, pinpointed, and jammed by systems like the Russian Borisoglebsk-2.⁶⁴ Advanced autonomous swarms must utilize Low Probability of Detection (LPD) and Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) communications to remain covert.⁶⁴

• LPD (Low Probability of Detection): Focuses on minimizing the chance an adversary detects the signal’s presence at all. This is achieved utilizing directional transmission, low-power emissions, and noise-like waveforms that blend seamlessly into the background electromagnetic radiation.⁶⁴
• LPI (Low Probability of Intercept): Ensures that even if a signal is detected, it is exceedingly difficult to decode, exploit, or jam. LPI techniques include rapid frequency hopping, complex spread-spectrum modulation, and AI-driven adaptive beamforming.⁶⁴

Implementing advanced LPI/LPD protocols, such as those demonstrated in naval exercises like “Silent Swarm,” within autonomous mesh networks ensures that drones can coordinate tasks, route data, and execute complex maneuvers without broadcasting their position to adversary signals intelligence (SIGINT) operators.⁶⁴

9. Doctrinal, Regulatory, and Organizational Realignments

Technological acquisition must be matched by profound doctrinal and organizational shifts. Procurement of advanced drones is insufficient if the force is not structurally organized, trained, and legally authorized to manage the spectrum those platforms rely upon.

9.1. Decentralized Training and Field Integration

The DoD is currently overhauling its operational doctrine to integrate lessons learned from recent conflicts, shifting aggressively toward a “learn-by-doing” approach.⁶⁷ Initiatives like the Army’s Transformation in Contact (TiC) prioritize deploying new systems directly to operational units rather than waiting years for perfect technological maturity.⁶⁷ This iterative fielding allows real-world user feedback to drive rapid updates to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).⁶⁷ For instance, recent updates to Field Manual 3-0 include new operational imperatives specifically designed to address persistent drone threats and the necessity of making contact with the smallest element possible.⁶⁷

Furthermore, training regimens must evolve. Operating within the spectrum requires specialized, highly technical knowledge.⁶ Expanding the presence and training of Spectrum Management Officers (SMO) at lower tactical echelons is critical.⁶⁹ These officers are required to deconflict frequencies, navigate highly restrictive Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations, and ensure operational compliance without stifling combat agility.⁶⁹ For example, recent FCC orders enabling limited access to the 5030-5091 MHz band for drone operations require complex registration and deconfliction processes that tactical units must be trained to navigate seamlessly.⁷⁰

9.2. Operationalizing Production at the Tactical Edge

The demands of rapid-reaction warfare expose the inherent limitations of centralized, bureaucratic procurement models. The ability to innovate inside the adversary’s decision cycle requires Fabrication at the Tactical Edge (FATE).⁷² By leveraging additive manufacturing (3D printing) and AI directly in the field, joint forces can design, produce, and modify expendable drone components—such as specific antenna mounts, aerodynamic modifications, or shielding adaptations—in response to immediate EW threats.⁷² This paradigm decentralizes production, effectively allowing forces to execute an acquisition and deployment cycle within 24 hours, rapidly countering localized adversarial spectrum tactics.⁷²

9.3. The Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) Paradigm

The lessons of spectrum resilience being learned in small drone swarms are actively scaling to the highest tiers of air dominance. The U.S. Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program represents the maturation of these concepts.⁷³ Designed to fly alongside crewed fighters as autonomous wingmen, the CCA relies heavily on secure, semi-autonomous communication architectures.⁷³ Recent successful flights utilizing integrated third-party mission autonomy software (such as Sidekick) integrated via the Autonomy Government Reference Architecture (A-GRA) underscore the viability of decentralized decision-making at higher speeds and larger scales.⁷⁵ However, the ultimate success of programs like the CCA, which may scale to thousands of aircraft, hinges entirely on the exact same principles of EMS resilience, MOSA adherence, and LPI/LPD stealth networking discussed throughout this report.⁷⁴

10. Strategic Conclusions

The Department of Defense’s intense focus on massive drone acquisition signals a necessary and urgent adaptation to the realities of modern warfare. However, the physical hardware of these platforms represents only the visible surface of the capability. The true center of gravity for scaled autonomous operations is the electromagnetic spectrum.

Adversaries are actively fielding sophisticated electronic warfare systems designed specifically to sever the critical links upon which uncrewed systems depend. To secure the operational viability of initiatives like Replicator and broader drone dominance strategies, DoD leadership must prioritize investments in the unseen architecture of the swarm.

This requires an immediate and sustained commitment to moving away from fragile, centralized command structures and embracing self-healing, leaderless mesh networks. It demands the integration of edge computing and sensor fusion to drastically reduce bandwidth dependency and prevent network collapse. Furthermore, the mandatory adoption of software-defined radios and open systems architectures is essential to ensure that U.S. forces can dynamically maneuver within the spectrum faster than adversaries can jam it. Ultimately, success in future conflicts will not be measured solely by the sheer number of drones procured, but by the resilience, agility, and covertness of the networks that connect them.

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1. Executive Summary

The United States Department of Defense is currently undertaking a generational shift in force structure, pivoting aggressively toward the procurement and deployment of thousands of attritable, autonomous unmanned aerial systems. Initiatives such as the Replicator program and the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program reflect a strategic urgency to generate affordable combat mass and offset the quantitative advantages of pacing threats in the Indo-Pacific theater.¹ However, current acquisition and operational frameworks heavily prioritize the technological capabilities and domestic industrial base capacity required to build these systems, frequently overlooking the systemic, forward-edge logistical requirements necessary to sustain them in highly contested environments.¹

This report provides a strategic evaluation of the sustainment vulnerabilities inherent in the deployment of highly expendable drone fleets. The central thesis indicates that treating attritable systems with legacy, slow-moving depot-level maintenance frameworks will result in operational failure when supply lines are severed. In environments characterized by Agile Combat Employment and persistent multi-domain threats, combat units cannot afford the extended turnaround times typical of traditional aviation maintenance.⁵ The margin for error in combat has narrowed significantly, and generating continuous combat power relies entirely on the ability to repair, adapt, and relaunch unmanned systems from austere locations under active threat.⁸

To maintain operational tempo, leadership must institutionalize a decentralized sustainment paradigm built upon three pillars. The first requires the rigorous enforcement of a Modular Open Systems Approach across all new acquisitions, mandating standardized interfaces to enable rapid, field-level component swapping and mitigate proprietary vendor lock-in.¹⁰ The second pillar demands the operationalization of Fabrication at the Tactical Edge, deploying additive manufacturing capabilities to produce replacement parts on demand, thereby replacing fragile supply chains of physical spares with ruggedized spools of composite filament.¹² The third pillar necessitates the decentralization of operator-maintainer training, transitioning ad-hoc repair skills away from specialized aviation technicians and directly into the hands of the standard infantry maneuver force.¹⁴ By synthesizing lessons from the Ukrainian theater with emerging military pilot programs, this report outlines the critical steps required to build a resilient, self-healing logistical network capable of sustaining drone operations in the modern battlespace.

2. The Strategic Imperative of Autonomous Mass and Contested Logistics

The National Defense Strategy identifies the People’s Republic of China as the primary pacing challenge. In a potential Indo-Pacific conflict, forward air bases and logistical nodes will face sustained, complex attacks from ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, and armed drones.² The capacity and accuracy of adversary long-range strikes have altered combat paradigms, threatening to drive combat aircraft to rear-area bases that are too distant from the operational battlespace to enable combat-relevant operations.⁹ This reality has forced the adoption of dispersed operations through Agile Combat Employment, which drastically complicates the sustainment of combat aircraft and exposes the vulnerabilities of standard, centralized supply chains.⁵

The Logistics of Mass and Attrition

The response to this threat landscape includes the rapid fielding of all-domain, attritable autonomous systems.¹⁸ Unveiled in August 2023, the Replicator initiative aims to field multiple thousands of autonomous systems across multiple domains to counter rapid armed forces buildups.¹ The first iteration of the initiative focuses on fielding these systems by August 2025, while the second tranche, known as Replicator 2, tackles the warfighter priority of countering the threat posed by small unmanned aerial systems to critical installations and force concentrations.¹⁸

Concurrently, the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program is designed to deliver an operational capability before the end of the decade, with plans to produce more than 100 aircraft across the first five years.³ These autonomous platforms will operate alongside crewed fighters, serving as force multipliers that disrupt adversary campaigns and impose crippling costs.¹⁶ The Navy and Marine Corps have similarly launched autonomous wingman programs, reflecting a joint commitment to integrating autonomous systems at scale.²⁰

However, the term “attritable” does not mean entirely disposable after a single use. The strategic value of these systems lies in their ability to maintain a high tempo of operations.²¹ As long as unmanned systems are flying, they impose a cost on the adversary, forcing the expenditure of surface-to-air effectors, interceptors, and electronic warfare resources.²¹ Maintaining this continuous presence requires robust logistics. Combat air forces require personnel, fuel, munitions, ground handling equipment, and replacement materials to generate sorties at scale.¹⁶ The assumption that inexpensive drones can simply be replaced by new units shipped from the continental United States ignores the reality of contested logistics, where adversaries will actively target supply ships, airlift capabilities, and port infrastructure.¹²

The Vulnerability of Class IX Supply Chains

The legacy supply chain for military aviation heavily relies on Class IX supplies, defined as repair parts and components required for the maintenance support of all equipment.⁷ The management of Class IX supplies involves requirements determination, procurement, repair, storage, and long-distance transportation.⁷ In peacetime, readiness-based sparing models calculate the most cost-effective allowances to ensure readiness objectives.⁷ However, wartime usage patterns vary drastically from peacetime forecasting.⁷

In a high-intensity conflict, the demand for specific replacement parts—such as electronic speed controllers, propellers, or specialized sensors—will surge unpredictably.²³ The traditional Logistics Package methodology, which relies on large, off-road capable trucks and trailers to distribute commodities from centralized depots to forward units, presents a massive, slow-moving target.¹⁷ Relying on this outdated system to deliver critical components to dispersed Agile Combat Employment nodes or isolated marine expeditionary units ensures that operational tempo will stall. When supply lines are severed or delayed, units dependent on external resupply for physical spare parts will find their attritable fleets grounded, neutralizing the combat mass these systems were designed to provide.²⁴

3. The Failure of Legacy Depot Maintenance in the Attritable Era

The existing maintenance infrastructure within the Department of Defense is optimized for exquisite, multi-million-dollar platforms. Programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft require highly controlled environments, specialized tooling, and extensive diagnostic testing for repairs.²⁵

The Incompatibility of DoDM 4151.23 Frameworks

Traditional organic depot maintenance operations are governed by extensive regulations designed to ensure cost comparability and standard cost accounting. Procedures such as those outlined in DoD Manual 4151.23 require maintenance managers to conduct detailed cost analyses, comparing the cost of organic depot maintenance for similar workloads between different facilities.⁶ This process supports decision-making regarding workload consolidations and make-versus-buy determinations.⁶

Applying this bureaucratic, time-intensive framework to a highly expendable, low-cost drone creates an unworkable logistical bottleneck. Small unmanned aerial systems and the forthcoming Collaborative Combat Aircraft are intended to operate in highly dynamic, time-compressed operational environments where waiting weeks for a cost-benefit analysis or a depot-level repair authorization is tactically fatal.²⁶ When a unit purchases commercial off-the-shelf platforms or fields rapidly acquired systems through the Defense Innovation Unit’s pathways, the traditional requirement to route damaged assets back to stateside depots negates the operational agility of the platform.¹⁹

The Friction of Proprietary Lock-In

Another significant failure point of legacy maintenance models is the reliance on original equipment manufacturers for repairs and upgrades. Historically, defense contractors have utilized proprietary hardware interfaces, encrypted software, and closed architectures to protect intellectual property.¹⁵ In the context of drone warfare, this means that a failure in a specific flight controller or a damaged motor mount might require the entire unit to be returned to the manufacturer, or necessitate the purchase of an expensive, proprietary replacement part that must traverse a vulnerable global supply chain.¹⁴

This dynamic is incompatible with the realities of modern conflict. Combat troops require the flexibility to substitute components from different vendors, adapt payloads to emerging threats, and iterate designs based on immediate battlefield feedback.¹⁵ Treating an attritable drone fleet with the same rigid maintenance protocols as a legacy fighter jet guarantees that the fleet will suffer rapid, unrecoverable attrition, not from enemy action, but from logistical starvation.

4. Operational Realities and Insights from the Ukrainian Theater

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine serves as an unprecedented, real-time laboratory for the integration, employment, and sustainment of autonomous systems at scale. The operational realities observed in this theater invalidate several pre-war assumptions, particularly the notion that drones would deliver decisive effects purely through pristine technological superiority or that they would be rapidly neutralized by traditional air defenses.³⁰ Instead, drone warfare has emerged as a domain characterized by mass, extreme attrition, and continuous adaptation.³⁰

Decentralized Frontline Drone Workshops

To sustain millions of unmanned aerial vehicles on the front lines, Ukrainian forces have abandoned centralized sustainment models in favor of decentralized, highly agile maintenance networks. The operational effectiveness of top Ukrainian drone units is deeply linked to the efficient maintenance functionality of frontline engineering workshops and electronic laboratories.³¹ These facilities are integrated directly within the organizational structure of unmanned aerial vehicle battalions operating under combat brigades, providing emergency repair and modernization in hours rather than days or weeks.³¹

The success of these workshops relies on several critical structural adaptations. First, the workshops are staffed by specialized personnel, typically teams of ten to twelve soldiers who possess engineering or technical backgrounds.³¹ By handling diagnostics, repairs, and the integration of new components, these engineering teams eliminate the technical burden on the drone operators, allowing the pilots to focus entirely on executing daily flight missions.³¹

Second, to counter vulnerabilities from artillery and missile attacks, these technical teams frequently operate from highly mobile repair units.³¹ High-mobility vehicles are equipped with workstations, routers, welding equipment, assembly areas, and soldering stations.³¹ These mobile platforms can operate independently of external power grids for extended periods, ensuring that maintenance operations continue even in austere, heavily targeted environments.³¹

Rapid Adaptation and the Software Lifeline

The integration of engineering teams directly with frontline operators creates an immediate feedback loop that is vital for survival. In a conflict defined by an intense electromagnetic spectrum struggle, static capabilities rapidly become obsolete. When adversary electronic warfare units deploy new jamming techniques, frontline engineers collaborate with operators to devise in-house solutions.³¹ This allows them to change operating frequencies, implement software updates, adjust flight altitudes, and remove identification features that might transmit location data to the enemy in a matter of hours, bypassing lengthy bureaucratic acquisition processes.³¹

Furthermore, these workshops provide critical expertise in explosive ordnance disposal and munition adaptation.³¹ Engineers routinely adapt existing infantry munitions for drone delivery, developing specialized mechanisms to boost the combat capabilities of commercial off-the-shelf platforms.²⁷ The lesson for advanced militaries is that artificial intelligence and automation are most effective as tools for speeding up analysis and coordination, but resilience lies in hybrid, software-defined architectures that push processing, decision-making, and repair capabilities to the tactical edge.³²

Global Observations and Strategic Implications

The innovations emerging from the Ukrainian battlefield are not going unnoticed by global adversaries. Internal military journals and research emerging from Iranian defense institutions demonstrate a concentrated effort to analyze the war in Ukraine to refine their own battlefield doctrine.³³ Senior commanders have studied how forces adapted to stronger adversaries, noting the immense value of small drones, artificial intelligence, and the use of 3D printing for low-cost manufacturing.³³ Analysts are urging leadership to invest heavily in unmanned systems, adopt more mobile combat units, and address gaps in forward planning.³³

For the United States military, the implication is clear. The diffusion of tactical creativity and the institutionalization of rapid adaptation are strategic imperatives. While procuring large quantities of drones is necessary, the true test lies in logistics: the ability to sustain, supply, and regenerate combat power under fire.⁸ Modern high-intensity conflict dictates that frontline workshops and localized maintenance capabilities are not operational luxuries; they are fundamental combat necessities.³⁴

5. The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) as the Sustainment Foundation

To enable ad-hoc, tactical-edge repairs and rapid capability insertion, unmanned systems must be structurally designed for modularity from their inception. The Department of Defense has recognized this imperative, codifying the Modular Open Systems Approach as a legal requirement for major defense acquisition programs under Title 10 U.S.C. 4401(b) and Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act.¹⁰

MOSA constitutes an acquisition and design strategy that utilizes technical architectures conforming to widely supported, consensus-based open standards.¹⁰ It mandates the separation of systems into major functions and elements that are loosely coupled and highly cohesive.¹⁰ A key enabler for this strategy is the adoption of an open business model, which permits sharing risk, maximizing the reuse of assets, and incrementally acquiring warfighting capabilities with enhanced flexibility and competition.³⁵

The Strategic Value of Severable Modules

In traditional, proprietary acquisitions, a failure in a specific subsystem might render an entire platform non-mission capable until original equipment manufacturer support can be secured. Under the MOSA framework, systems employ a modular design that uses defined system interfaces between major components.¹¹ This allows severable major system components to be incrementally added, removed, or replaced throughout the life cycle of the platform.¹¹

For drone fleets, this means that a failure in a flight controller, an electronic speed controller, or a navigation module does not condemn the entire airframe.²³ A combat unit can physically swap the damaged module with a replacement component.¹⁰ Furthermore, this interoperability allows for continuous adaptation. If an adversary develops a countermeasure to a specific electro-optical sensor, forces can remove the outdated payload and integrate a new sensor from a completely different vendor, provided both adhere to the same interface standards.¹⁰

The defense industry relies on several foundational open standards to enforce this interoperability across mechanical, electrical, and software domains.

Component Commonality in Collaborative Combat Aircraft

The principles of the Modular Open Systems Approach extend far beyond small, hand-launched quadcopters; they are an absolute necessity for sustaining the Air Force’s larger Collaborative Combat Aircraft. Research and wargames conducted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies indicate that sustaining large-scale operations in a Pacific conflict is only feasible if the logistics footprint of the future fleet is strictly minimized.¹⁶

A primary recommendation for force design is to maximize the commonality of components and munitions across different variants.¹⁶ The first increment of these drones currently comprises test articles from multiple vendors, including General Atomics and Anduril Industries.³ If these distinct platforms require entirely unique logistics trains, proprietary ground handling equipment, and specialized testing software, the logistical burden will collapse under the strain of distributed operations.²¹

Senior leadership has stressed that these aircraft must share fundamental components to ease the logistics burden. This includes sharing refueling equipment, weapons loading equipment, motors, actuators, and tires.²¹ Achieving high levels of commonality significantly reduces the volume of bulk consumables and replacement parts that must be transported to dispersed forward operating sites.¹⁶ While the airframes themselves may differ to provide a mission-tailorable mix of capabilities, the underlying architecture must support interchangeable components and plugins based on open application programming interfaces.¹⁶ Logistics and component commonality cannot be treated as an afterthought; they must be defined as core Key Performance Parameters that inform the acquisition strategy from day one.¹⁶

6. Fabrication at the Tactical Edge and Additive Manufacturing

While the Modular Open Systems Approach provides the architectural foundation necessary for field repairs, additive manufacturing provides the physical capability to execute them. The Department of Defense is undergoing a paradigm shift termed Fabrication at the Tactical Edge, a concept designed to decentralize production by leveraging 3D printing and artificial intelligence to enable manufacturing directly on the battlefield.¹²

This approach allows the joint force to design, produce, and deploy equipment as an integral part of operations, effectively closing the acquisition loop within a 24-hour timeframe.¹² By generating mass locally, U.S. forces become highly unpredictable, complicating adversary targeting and counteracting anti-access/area-denial strategies designed to sever long-range supply lines.²⁷

The Logistical Superiority of Filament Over Physical Spares

The traditional sustainment model requires military logistics networks to forecast, procure, transport, and warehouse thousands of distinct physical spare parts. In contested or disconnected environments, these traditional supply lines are slow, vulnerable, and often unavailable.¹³ Additive manufacturing fundamentally alters this logistical equation.

Instead of stocking vast physical inventories of replacement parts for various models, organizations can maintain a digital catalog of parts that can be printed locally, on demand.¹³ When a specific part breaks, it is fabricated on-site. This approach substitutes the transport of fragile, specific spares with the transport of raw materials—specifically, spools of polymer filament and composite resins.¹²

Raw filament is highly space-efficient, durable during transport, and entirely agnostic. A single spool of material can be transformed into a propeller guard, an aerodynamic fairing, an internal bracket, or a customized payload enclosure as the tactical situation demands.¹³ This capability drastically reduces the logistical burden by printing parts instead of transporting spares, allowing units to repair or replace damaged components without waiting on resupply from the rear.¹³ Furthermore, it allows forces to rapidly iterate designs based on field feedback, modifying systems to better suit current mission profiles without relying on a factory production run.¹³

Advanced Materials and Production Methodologies

The viability of 3D-printed parts has surged due to critical advancements in materials science. Historically, manufacturers balanced strength, weight, and cost by relying on a mix of aluminum, steel, titanium, and standard plastics.¹³ As endurance and payload requirements increased, these materials revealed their limitations.¹³ Today, advanced composite materials and structural designs enable performance characteristics that conventional manufacturing cannot easily deliver.²⁹

The industry utilizes several distinct printing technologies to meet operational requirements. PolyJet is effective for high-fidelity prototyping and multimaterial capabilities, while Stereolithography provides high-resolution, smooth aerodynamic surfaces.⁴⁰ For strong, structural components, high-speed Fused Filament Fabrication is the preferred method.⁴⁰ Advanced materials include carbon-fiber-infused Polylactic Acid, Polyethylene Terephthalate Glycol, and Nylon.⁴¹

Carbon-fiber-reinforced composites represent the pinnacle of aerospace-grade additive manufacturing. These filaments merge polymer matrices with carbon fibers to create components with exceptional mechanical properties.²⁹ Carbon-fiber-reinforced components can demonstrate up to a 1243% improvement in Young’s modulus and a 1344% increase in tensile strength compared to standard materials.²⁹ In many applications, these continuous fiber-reinforced composites match or exceed the strength of aluminum at a fraction of the weight, enabling longer flight times and greater payload capacity without sacrificing the durability required for flight.¹³

Mobile Fabrication Nodes and Expeditionary Deployment

To deploy this capability effectively, the military is investing heavily in mobile fabrication nodes designed to withstand harsh field conditions.¹² The Marine Corps has established the Expeditionary Fabrication system, housing polymer and metal printers, alongside milling and grinding tools, inside a standard 8-by-8-by-20-foot container.¹² The Army is pursuing similar capabilities through its Rapid Fabrication via Additive Manufacturing program and has established the Additive Makerspace at Picatinny Arsenal, which houses over 50 advanced printers to drive rapid prototyping.¹²

The versatility of these systems extends to active combat platforms. The Indiana Army National Guard recently achieved a technological milestone by successfully demonstrating 3D printing aboard a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter mid-flight.⁴⁶ Utilizing a printer designed to withstand air turbulence and physical flight stresses, powered by a portable tactical energy source, the system produced components for unmanned aerial systems while performing tactical maneuvers.⁴⁶ The ability to fabricate precise components on demand directly translates to reduced downtime, boosted readiness, and unmatched flexibility, ensuring that troops can adapt to shifting needs without waiting for external supply chains to catch up.⁴⁶

7. Decentralized Maintenance and Retraining the Maneuver Force

The integration of attritable assets into the tactical edge requires a fundamental paradigm shift in how the military conceptualizes both the operator and the maintainer. Currently, drone maintenance is heavily concentrated within specific Military Occupational Specialties, such as the Army’s 15E (Unmanned Aircraft Systems Repairer) and 15X (Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System Specialist).⁴⁷ These roles require extensive, specialized instruction, encompassing up to 24 weeks of Advanced Individual Training focused on electrical theory, advanced troubleshooting, and payload integration.⁴⁷

While highly specialized technicians remain absolutely essential for maintaining larger, complex Group 3 and Group 4 systems, the stated objective to proliferate small unmanned aerial systems down to every infantry squad renders the specialized-maintainer model unsustainable for lower-tier platforms.¹⁴ The sheer volume of platforms dictates that basic operation, system troubleshooting, and ad-hoc repair must become universal infantry skills, integrating into basic training as seamlessly as traditional marksmanship or rifle maintenance.⁵²

The Cultural Shift: The “Right to Repair”

A critical hurdle to this transition is found in military culture and rigid regulatory constraints. Strict airworthiness releases, intellectual property restrictions tightly held by vendors, and inflexible safety protocols have historically prevented frontline soldiers from modifying their own equipment.¹⁵ However, guided by new drone dominance directives, military leadership is beginning to advocate strongly for the “right to repair”.¹⁵

This cultural shift empowers soldiers to fabricate components, splice wiring, replace electronic speed controllers, and modify system firmware directly in the field. By altering the way contracts are written to secure intellectual property rights from vendors, the military ensures that soldiers have the legal and technical authority to make modifications that suit immediate mission demands without waiting for manufacturer intervention.¹⁴ This is increasingly built into training courses, teaching soldiers how to 3D print, design, code, and rebuild their own systems.¹⁵

Rise of the “Drone Sergeant” and Tiered Frameworks

To bridge the gap between complex aviation engineering and basic infantry skills, the Army is developing tiered maintenance frameworks. A central concept is the formalization of the Company small Unmanned Aircraft System Master Trainer, informally known as the “Drone Sergeant”.¹⁴

This role is designed to be MOS-agnostic, meaning it can be filled by an infantryman rather than a specialized aviation technician. Credentialed via an Additional Skill Identifier, the Drone Sergeant serves as the primary trainer for squad-level operators and the focal point for localized maintenance.¹⁴ Responsibilities include managing localized “bench stocks” of high-use components, executing functional test flights, and conducting intermediate repairs such as soldering and component replacement.¹⁴ This decentralized model frees brigade-level aviation elements from micromanaging squad-level assets, allowing subordinate units to run organic training and currency flights autonomously.¹⁴

At the squad level, individual operators are trained to conduct pre-flight and post-flight checks, perform simple part exchanges such as swapping batteries or propellers, execute firmware updates, and manage lithium polymer battery safety.¹⁴ This tiered approach ensures responsiveness at the point of need while maintaining integration with the broader sustainment enterprise.¹⁴

Specialized Curricula and Standardized Training

The Marine Corps is aggressively operationalizing this decentralized training model to support the mandate of equipping all infantry, reconnaissance battalions, and littoral combat teams with attack drones by mid-2026.⁵⁷ The Marine Corps Training and Education Command has launched a comprehensive suite of six standardized, MOS-agnostic pilot courses designed to rapidly certify operators and maintainers.⁵⁷

These courses address the urgent need for standardized training, doctrine, and force-wide capacity building.²⁸ By teaching payload integration, structural chassis inspection, and component troubleshooting to standard combat troops, the military ensures that damage sustained in combat does not result in permanently degraded unit capability.⁵⁹

8. Predictive Logistics and Data-Driven Sustainment Operations

While decentralization, open architectures, and additive manufacturing provide the physical means to sustain attritable fleets at the tactical edge, data architecture provides the necessary operational direction. Managing thousands of autonomous systems requires a fundamental shift from reactive reporting to anticipatory sustainment.

Current logistics models focus heavily on demand forecasting where units report consumption via enterprise systems, which then feed into automated logistics forecasting during 24 to 72-hour planning cycles.¹⁷ However, the Army’s updated Field Manual 4-0 identifies predictive logistics as a doctrinal imperative, demanding that commanders anticipate equipment failures and optimize resupply before shortfalls actually occur.⁶³ The digital architecture supporting this transition is the Next Generation Command and Control system.⁶³

By integrating real-time data, artificial intelligence, and resilient communications, this system creates a common operating picture for logisticians that is timely, accurate, and actionable.⁶³ At the tactical edge, predictive maintenance utilizes connected sensors and flight maintenance logs to identify wear patterns, such as unusual vibrations in motors or impending battery degradation.⁶²

As Edge artificial intelligence matures, these systems will move beyond simply alerting maintainers to potential hardware failures. They will enable autonomous logistics that request specific filament types or automatically pre-position standardized open-architecture components based on real-time consumption rates and anticipated combat intensity.⁶³ This data-driven approach is absolutely critical to ensuring that the distributed nodes of expeditionary fabrication and localized unit bench stocks are adequately supplied, maximizing readiness without overwhelming the fragile “last tactical mile” with unnecessary or obsolete inventory.¹⁷

9. Strategic Recommendations for Command Leadership

The procurement of thousands of attritable autonomous systems represents a hollow force structure investment if those systems cannot be sustained during high-intensity, multi-domain conflict. To ensure operational readiness when traditional supply lines are severed and depots are compromised, leadership must operationalize the following strategic recommendations:

1. Mandate Open Architecture Compliance in all Future UAS Procurement: Acquisition pathways for all rapid fielding initiatives and Collaborative Combat Aircraft increments must strictly enforce open architectures. Vendors utilizing proprietary physical connectors, encrypted battery interfaces, or closed software ecosystems that prevent tactical-edge component swapping must be disqualified from future tranches. System severability and interface standardization must be codified as primary Key Performance Parameters in all capability development documents.
2. Scale and Fund Fabrication Infrastructure at Echelon: The deployment of 3D printing capabilities must transition from experimental pilot programs to standard Table of Organization and Equipment authorizations. Expedited funding should be directed toward fielding ruggedized expeditionary fabrication units down to the battalion level. Logistics planning must pivot away from forecasting individual drone spares toward calculating the required burn rates of engineering-grade composite filaments, treating raw material as a primary Class IX asset.
3. Formalize Decentralized Sustainment and the “Drone Sergeant”: Service branches must codify roles equivalent to the Company small Unmanned Aircraft System Master Trainer. Personnel policy must be updated to formally sever the requirement for aviation-specific occupational specialties to conduct routine maintenance on lower-tier systems. Furthermore, unit supply chains must establish dedicated lines of accounting to procure commercial components and maintain organic bench stocks directly at the company level.
4. Revise Airworthiness and Safety Doctrine: Current regulations prioritize peacetime safety and bureaucratic oversight over wartime adaptability. The Department must issue broad waivers or revise doctrine to establish the definitive “Right to Repair” for combat units. Soldiers and Marines must be legally, doctrinally, and technically empowered to splice wires, fabricate structural airframes, and integrate ad-hoc payloads without triggering lengthy airworthiness reviews that throttle operational tempo.

By aligning acquisition strategies with the harsh realities of contested logistics, standardizing hardware interfaces, and trusting the maneuver force to adapt and repair their own technology, the military can guarantee that its massive investments in autonomous mass translate directly into enduring, resilient battlefield dominance.

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1. Executive Summary

The modernization of the United States military is increasingly defined by a pivot toward unmanned systems, autonomy, and the algorithmic orchestration of forces. As peer competitors accelerate their own investments in asymmetric and autonomous capabilities, the United States has initiated historic funding measures to field attritable, autonomous platforms at scale. However, strategic analysis indicates a critical vulnerability in this modernization trajectory: a systemic fixation on the acquisition of the physical platforms themselves, often at the expense of the digital, regulatory, and cryptographic connective tissue required to operate them within a multi-national coalition.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is actively pursuing an operational doctrine that relies on Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) to network sensors and shooters across all domains. Yet, warfare is inherently a coalition endeavor. If United States unmanned aerial systems (UAS) cannot seamlessly share targeting data, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeds, and command-and-control (C2) directives with allied partner networks, the sheer mass of deployed platforms will yield diminishing tactical returns. Operating an isolated fleet of drones, regardless of their individual technological sophistication, creates dangerous operational blind spots and fundamentally fractures the coalition battlefield.

This report analyzes the systemic hurdles to allied interoperability in unmanned systems operations. It identifies that acquiring physical capabilities frequently ignores profound integration barriers, specifically within cryptographic standards, cross-domain data sharing, and export control regulations like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). To successfully enable unified warfighter operations, leadership must mandate integration frameworks that prioritize data-centric security architectures, Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) encryption over legacy paradigms, and strict adherence to the Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA). Failing to address these systemic requirements will result in a fragmented coalition battlefield, negating the strategic advantage of the DoD’s massive investments in drone technology and ceding decision dominance to adversaries capable of faster, multi-national data synthesis.

2. The Strategic Pivot Toward Autonomous Mass and “Commercial-First” Acquisition

The current fiscal and strategic environment reflects an unprecedented prioritization of unmanned systems and counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS). The budgetary proposals for the coming fiscal cycles illustrate a paradigm shift from exquisite, easily targeted legacy platforms toward distributed, attritable mass.

Recent budgetary requests for fiscal year 2027 seek to allocate more than $70 billion toward military drones and counter-drone weapon systems, representing the largest investment in drone warfare in United States history.¹ Within this framework, approximately $53.6 billion is specifically requested for autonomy, drone platforms, collaborative combat aircraft, and contested logistics, while $21 billion is designated for munitions and counter-drone technologies.¹ This marks an exponential increase from prior years, such as the fiscal year 2026 allocation, which sought $13.4 billion for autonomous systems and $3.1 billion for C-UAS capabilities.¹

Complementing this baseline funding are rapid acquisition initiatives designed to circumvent traditional bureaucratic procurement delays. The Drone Dominance Program, launched by the War Department with a projected $1.1 billion investment across four phases, aims to rapidly field low-cost, weaponized one-way attack drones across combat units.² Announced in February 2026, this program initiates “The Gauntlet” at Fort Benning, wherein military operators directly assess 25 competing vendors in operational conditions.² By prioritizing battlefield-driven evaluation over traditional acquisition models, the Department expects to issue $150 million in prototype delivery orders rapidly, projecting the fielding of hundreds of thousands of combat-ready systems by 2027.²

This operationalizes priorities outlined in Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s July 2025 memorandum, signaling a pivot toward attritable mass production.² It echoes lessons drawn from the rapid defense technology ecosystem cultivated by Ukraine following the 2022 Russian invasion.³ Ukraine’s wartime transformation demonstrated that legacy military-industrial complexes, riddled with institutional inertia, are insufficient for modern survival.³ Instead, radical decentralization, bottom-up innovation, and the integration of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies through dedicated, parallel commercial-first budgets are vital.³

Concurrently, the Defense Innovation Unit’s (DIU) Replicator initiative serves as the strategic response to adversarial quantitative advantages, specifically Chinese military mass.⁴ Launched in August 2023, Replicator 1 targets the fielding of multiple thousands of all-domain attritable autonomous (ADA2) systems by August 2025.⁴ Selected systems include AeroVironment’s Switchblade 600, Anduril’s Altius-600 and Ghost-X, alongside software vendors tasked with enabling swarming navigation.⁴ The subsequent phase, Replicator 2, shifts focus to counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) systems for the protection of critical installations and force concentrations.⁴

However, the rapid acquisition of these platforms obscures deeper systemic vulnerabilities. As operationalized through initiatives like Replicator, autonomy solves the challenge of controlling mass numbers of systems simultaneously in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) contested environments without relying on vulnerable operator control links.⁷ Yet, the network backbone required to support hundreds of thousands of sensors transmitting data, and the interoperability necessary to fight jointly with allies, remains a critical work in progress.⁸ The logistical considerations for fueling, maintaining, mapping, and networking thousands of unmanned vehicles across distributed theaters like INDOPACOM will severely test the limits of current architectures.⁸ Procuring the hardware is ultimately the simplest phase; integrating these diverse assets into a cohesive, secure, multi-national network represents the actual operational bottleneck.

3. The Baseline of Coalition Interoperability

Interoperability within a multi-national alliance is not merely a technical specification; it is a multi-layered strategic imperative. The expansion of NATO to 32 nations, coupled with the commitment of allied leaders to invest 5% of GDP annually on defense by June 2025, amplifies the need for seamless integration.⁹ The Defence Production Action Plan, agreed upon at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, and the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge from the 2024 Washington Summit, underscore the commitment to harmonizing defense procurement.⁹

However, defining and measuring this interoperability remains complex. Andreas Tolk’s model of Coalition Interoperability outlines nine distinct layers required for success: (1) Physical Interoperability, (2) Protocol Interoperability, (3) Data/Object Model Interoperability, (4) Information Interoperability, (5) Knowledge/Awareness, (6) Aligned Procedures, (7) Aligned Operations, (8) Harmonized Strategy/Doctrines, and (9) Political Objectives.¹¹ The technological challenges (layers 1-4) frequently yield to political and cultural hurdles, but without a unified technical foundation, the higher strategic layers cannot function.¹¹

In the context of drone warfare, this means that a US-manufactured UAS must not only physically fly in allied airspace but must utilize compatible cryptographic protocols, share a standardized data object model for targeting, and feed information into an aligned operational picture. The lack of agreed formats for collection, management, and the communication of findings prevents allies from developing common interoperability measurement tools, often forcing ad-hoc procedural agility that increases mission risk.¹⁰ A core obstacle to overcoming these layers lies in the rigid cryptographic standards currently employed by the US military.

4. Cryptographic Standards and the Security-Interoperability Paradox

A foundational hurdle to allied interoperability in unmanned systems is the strict regime of cryptographic standards enforced by the United States. Achieving seamless data sharing with coalition partners presents a paradox: the systems must be secure enough to protect highly classified National Security Systems (NSS) data from advanced persistent cyber threats, yet accessible and agile enough to allow foreign partners to plug into the network at the tactical edge.

4.1 The Logistical Burden of Legacy NSA Type 1 Encryption

Historically, the DoD has relied heavily on National Security Agency (NSA) Type 1 encryption to protect data at rest and data in transit.¹³ Type 1 products are highly restricted, classified hardware devices (often referred to as HAIPE devices) designed to encrypt and decrypt sensitive national security information using Suite A algorithms.¹⁴ While they offer unparalleled security assurance, their integration into multi-national, distributed unmanned operations imposes massive logistical and operational burdens.

The deployment of Type 1 encryption on autonomous platforms or in distributed multi-national teams creates severe friction. These devices require stringent continuous physical control, specialized handling procedures, and extensive user training that cannot be rapidly imparted to coalition partners or integrated into their distinct C2 networks.¹⁵ Furthermore, Type 1 devices are expensive, bespoke, and often subject to rigid export restrictions, inherently limiting their distribution to foreign allies.¹⁷ In a highly dynamic, distributed drone swarming environment—where nodes are explicitly designed to be “attritable” and are therefore likely to be lost, jammed, or captured—embedding classified hardware creates an unacceptable operational risk.¹⁴ If a drone carrying a Type 1 device is compromised, the incident triggers catastrophic security protocols.

4.2 The Shift to Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC)

To overcome this paradox, a pivotal shift toward the NSA’s Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program is required.¹⁴ CSfC allows organizations to protect classified NSS data using layered Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technologies, moving away from exclusively developed, classified hardware.¹⁹ By mandating at least two independent, approved layers of encryption (such as MACsec and IPsec protocols), CSfC achieves robust security without the administrative paralyzation of Type 1 devices.¹⁷ If one layer is found to be vulnerable, the secondary layer maintains the integrity of the data.²⁰

The adoption of CSfC fundamentally alters the interoperability landscape. It replaces bespoke hardware with software-driven, commercial standards that can be fielded in months rather than years.¹⁹ For example, commercial tactical networking devices—such as those utilizing Wave Relay mobile ad hoc networks (MANET)—have secured NSA CSfC approval, allowing non-ITAR networking solutions to handle classified data.¹³ This enables warfighters to maintain secure access to classified data even when operating alongside foreign partners on host-nation cellular (5G) or commercial satellite (Starlink) infrastructures, which are otherwise highly exposed domains.¹³ The encryption resides on software within handheld MANET devices or drone payloads, vastly reducing the size, weight, power, and cost constraints.¹⁷

For DoD leadership, the imperative is clear: the integration of unmanned platforms into a multi-national network dictates that acquisition programs explicitly favor CSfC architectures over legacy Type 1 mandates. Without this cryptographic agility, allied forces will remain technologically locked out of the United States’ operational picture, forced to operate through slow, manual liaison channels.

5. Architectural Frameworks: CJADC2 and Cross-Domain Data Sharing

The modern battlefield is inherently multi-domain. Unmanned systems no longer operate in siloed environments; maritime surface drone operations interact with aerial ISR feeds, which are supported by space-based surveillance and ground-based tactical units.²¹ Operating across these spaces requires complex, cross-domain interoperability, which presents significant technical challenges regarding latency, data integrity, and cyber resilience.²¹

5.1 The Evolution of CJADC2

The DoD’s strategic approach to orchestrating this complexity is Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control (CJADC2). Initiated in 2019, CJADC2 is not a single platform but a warfighting concept and a fusion of technologies, policies, tools, and talent designed to connect sensors and shooters across space, air, land, sea, and cyberspace via a unified network.²⁴ The primary operational goal is to move away from the highly inefficient “swivel chair” model of analysis—where human operators must manually receive data from one isolated system, interpret it, and enter it into another—toward a fully integrated, automated data ecosystem that provides decision advantage.²⁶

Recent milestones demonstrate tangible progress. Following a series of Global Information Dominance Experiments (GIDE), the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) successfully delivered a Minimum Viable Capability (MVC) for CJADC2.²⁶ This iteration combines software applications, data integration, and cross-domain operational concepts that are characterized as low latency and highly reliable.²⁵ Furthermore, initiatives like Project Olympus, led by the Joint Staff J-6, are actively forging digital pathways to implement mission partner environment architectures on live networks, supporting multi-national operations spanning multiple combatant commands.²⁸

However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that the DoD has historically struggled to build a comprehensive framework to guide CJADC2 investments enterprise-wide.²⁴ In the absence of strict, centralized direction, military departments continue to pursue C2 projects in isolation, risking duplication of effort and the creation of new, incompatible data silos.²⁴

5.2 Transitioning to Data-Centric Security

A primary barrier to realizing CJADC2 with international partners is overly restrictive data classification.²⁴ Historically, security was approached through network-centric models: building high, secure walls around specific, isolated networks (e.g., SIPRNet) and strictly controlling access to the network itself.²⁸ This model fails catastrophically in a coalition environment where partners utilize disparate national networks and custom infrastructures that take weeks or months to specially bridge and configure.²⁹

To achieve multi-national interoperability, the DoD is fundamentally transitioning to data-centric security.²⁸ Rather than relying solely on network boundaries, data-centricity manages access at the individual data object level.²⁸ Intelligence and ISR data are tagged with specific metadata that determines releaseability based on the attributes, nationality, and clearance of the end-user.²⁸ This paradigm allows for agile and targeted access to critical information on an integrated network, effectively enabling greater information sharing by applying more granular, rather than broader, security controls.²⁸

5.3 Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) as the Mission Enabler

Safely moving this data between domains, classification levels, and coalition networks requires robust Cross Domain Solutions (CDS). A CDS is far more than a simple firewall; it is a specialized device or collection of devices that mediate controlled access and the transfer of information across varying security boundaries.³² In the context of unmanned operations, a CDS enforces defined security policies to automatically and meticulously inspect, sanitize, and validate every single transaction.³²

This allows vital information—such as real-time drone video feeds, cursor-on-target data, command and control instructions, and sensor cueing messages—to flow securely between highly classified networks (like a US Navy combat information center) and unclassified or coalition systems.³² Without integrated CDS, the vast streams of data generated by multi-national ISR platforms would remain trapped in isolated enclaves, creating dangerous operational blind spots and delaying the decision-making kill chain in highly contested environments.³³ Tactical CDS variants (TACDS) guarantee the integrity of mission-critical data when transferred between US networks, Five Eyes (FVEY) coalition networks, and broader NATO partners, stimulating opportunities for real-time data convergence in multi-domain operations.³²

6. The Material Solution: SABRE and the Mission Partner Environment

The conceptual shift toward data-centricity and CJADC2 requires a concrete material solution. The DoD is operationalizing this through the Mission Partner Environment (MPE), which acts as the United States’ primary contribution to federated mission networking.²⁹ The MPE is designed to provide a connected operating environment for US forces and coalition partners, allowing them to exchange information seamlessly.²⁹

The core software tool enabling the MPE is the Secret and Below Releasable Environment (SABRE).³⁰ SABRE provides a globally connected, continuous collaboration environment that allows US Combatant Commands, select allies, and interagency partners to share tactical data using their own disparate networks.³¹ Hosted across geographically dispersed, government-owned/contractor-operated classified cloud production environments, SABRE liberates data from incompatible silos.²⁹

SABRE leverages strict data-centric protocols, incorporating standards like ADatP-4774 (Confidentiality Metadata Label Syntax) and ADatP-4778 (Metadata Binding Mechanism) to ensure that information shared within chat environments or C2 applications is accurately tagged for releaseability.³⁷ This ensures that when a US drone identifies a target, the intelligence can be instantly routed through SABRE to a partnered artillery unit whose network is authorized to view that specific classification of data, cutting the decision-making kill chain drastically.³¹

Recent tests, such as the Capstone 2025 event conducted by the US Air Force’s Battle Lab (ShOC-N), demonstrate SABRE’s potential. By integrating joint forces alongside Five Eyes partners (the UK and Canada), the experiment successfully assessed the interoperability of AI and machine learning tools, advancing cross-national technological collaboration in dynamic targeting scenarios.³⁸

7. Navigating the Regulatory Labyrinth: Export Controls and Technology Transfer

While cryptographic architecture and data-centric software provide the technical means for interoperability, the policy frameworks governing the export and transfer of military technology frequently create profound procedural delays. The goal of integrating allied capabilities is consistently undermined by outdated export control systems originally designed to contain Cold War proliferation.

7.1 Reinterpreting the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary multilateral arrangement established in 1987 to limit the proliferation of delivery systems capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.³⁹ Under the MTCR Guidelines, “Category I” items are subject to a strong presumption of denial for export.³⁹ Historically, the regime categorized complete unmanned aerial vehicle systems capable of a 300-kilometer range and a 500-kilogram payload directly alongside ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.³⁹ Furthermore, “range” under these regulations is rigidly defined as the maximum distance an aircraft can travel in one direction under perfect, fuel-efficient flight conditions, completely independent of operational reality, payloads, or telemetry limits.⁴²

This categorization severely hindered the United States’ ability to export capable, long-endurance drones to allied nations. By enforcing an even higher bar than the MTCR Guidelines required, the US unintentionally ceded global drone market share to nations operating outside the regime’s strict interpretations, such as China and Turkey, fracturing the technological baseline of the broader NATO alliance.⁴⁰

Recognizing this strategic failure, the US Department of State implemented a crucial policy shift in September 2025.⁴³ The update explicitly reinterprets MTCR rules, directing that requests to export military UAS will now be reviewed under policies similar to those for crewed fighter aircraft, rather than as missile systems.⁴¹ This fast-track framework reduces bureaucratic friction, streamlines Foreign Military Sales (FMS) approval, and signals a shift toward faster capability adoption by trusted allies.⁴¹ Faster exports open the door for adjacent innovations—secure communications, counter-UAS systems, and swarming software—which are prerequisites for achieving platform interoperability across NATO and the Indo-Pacific.⁴⁴

7.2 ITAR Constraints and the Algorithmic Classification Trap

The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) similarly governs the export of defense-related technologies.⁴⁵ Drone technologies intended for military use reliably fall under the US Munitions List (USML) Categories IV, VIII, or XII, depending on their capability.⁴² While exporting the physical airframe presents known regulatory challenges, a unique and severe bottleneck emerges regarding artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous software.

As the DoD aggressively pursues collaborative combat aircraft and autonomous swarming logic to fulfill Replicator’s mandate, the algorithms driving these systems are heavily scrutinized. If an AI layer provides capabilities such as target identification, weapons guidance, electronic-warfare countermeasure optimization, or autonomous strike authorization, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) views the algorithm as fundamentally inseparable from the defense article itself.⁴⁶ Thus, the software—even if derived from commercial origins—becomes ITAR-controlled technical data.

Furnishing assistance to foreign persons in designing or optimizing these targeting algorithms triggers severe defense-service exposure.⁴⁶ This creates an intractable bottleneck in multi-national drone operations. If an allied nation purchases an American drone platform but cannot access, update, or integrate its underlying autonomy software with their indigenous C2 systems due to ITAR technical data constraints, the platform remains functionally isolated. Prototyping and program calendars shrink significantly when engineers must treat ITAR as a design constraint rather than a post-design hurdle, requiring secure data flows and centralized U.S. fabrication footprints.⁴⁷

7.3 The AUKUS Exemption Framework

To mitigate these regulatory choke points among the closest allies, the US implementation of the ITAR § 126.7 Exemption for the AUKUS partnership (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) represents a landmark legislative shift.⁴⁸ Effective September 1, 2025, this exemption grants the UK and Australia a privileged status comparable to Canada, officially recognizing their export control systems as comparable to those of the United States.⁵⁰

This significantly reduces the requirement to obtain individual DDTC licenses for defense trade among Authorized Users.⁴⁸ By removing restrictions on transfers, the exemption theoretically allows for deep defense industrial integration and co-development of advanced UAS capabilities.⁵⁰ However, aerospace industry analysis warns that the operational success of this exemption depends entirely on its administrative implementation.⁵¹ Current treaty exemptions are often ignored by industry due to disproportionate administrative burdens; if the scope of Congress’s intent is unnecessarily narrowed by legacy bureaucratic reflexes, the friction will persist.⁵¹ Expanding such streamlined, reciprocal regulatory models beyond AUKUS to the broader NATO alliance is critical to meet the operational timelines demanded by the Drone Dominance Program.

8. Tactical Integration Frameworks: Bridging the “Day Zero” Gap

The strategic alignment of cryptographic policies and export control reform must eventually translate into tangible, tactical capability at the edge. “Day Zero” interoperability refers to the capability of multi-national systems to function seamlessly in a coalition operation from the very first moment of deployment, without requiring extensive in-theater retrofitting.⁵³ Achieving this requires robust, pre-established integration frameworks.

8.1 Federated Mission Networking (FMN)

NATO’s broad approach to Day Zero interoperability is rooted in Federated Mission Networking (FMN).⁵⁴ Evolving from the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN)—which was initially built to unify disparate national communication systems into a single operational picture within a specific theater—FMN establishes standardized operating procedures and capability baselines for future coalition warfare.⁵⁴

FMN dictates that participating nations confirm their communication systems comply with NATO security and interoperability principles prior to allocation.⁵⁶ It relies heavily on standardization across modelling and simulation, utilizing protocols like the High Level Architecture (HLA) and Command and Control Systems – Simulation Systems Interoperation (C2SIM).⁵³ However, the adoption of FMN faces severe technical, logistical, and bureaucratic challenges.⁵⁷ The slow pace of allied defense procurement often prevents the rapid adoption of innovative technology required to meet FMN baselines.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the continuous need for rigorous Federated Service Management and Control (FSMC) to align IT components across borders means that FMN is often too cumbersome for rapid, tactical deployments involving newly acquired commercial drone tech.⁵⁸

8.2 The Mission Partner Kit (MPK) Paradigm

While strategic networks like FMN mature at the enterprise level, tactical units require immediate solutions. The development of the Mission Partner Kit (MPK) by the US Army’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment (2CR) provides a highly effective blueprint for rapid, tactical-level interoperability.⁵⁹ Informed directly by the rapid assimilation of commercial technologies in the Ukraine conflict, the MPK addresses the severe delays and operational risks caused by the fundamental incompatibility of partner radio networks and C2 systems.⁵⁹

The MPK is entirely software-centric and platform-agnostic, leveraging COTS applications built upon the Army’s Nett Warrior foundation.⁵⁹ Hosted in government-approved commercial clouds and secured via zero-trust cybersecurity principles and software-based encryption, it completely circumvents the need for specialized, ITAR-restricted hardware encryption devices.⁵⁹

By allowing multinational partners to access applications via simple quick response (QR) codes on any mobile device—or by allowing US units to issue pre-loaded commercial smartphones to allies lacking compatible tech—the MPK instantly brings allied forces onto a synchronized Common Operating Picture (COP).⁵⁹ Tested successfully during major NATO exercises like Griffin Shock 23 and Saber Strike 24, the MPK allowed German battalion leaders to report operational data and checkpoint crossings to US headquarters in real-time, completely bypassing traditional technical and cryptographic barriers that historically plagued joint exercises.⁵⁹

9. Platform Standardization: STANAG 4586 and the Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)

To ensure that the physical drone platforms acquired by the DoD can integrate into these tactical and strategic networks, strict adherence to engineering standards is required. The aerospace market’s gradual transition from closed, proprietary, monolithic systems to open architectures is vital for multi-domain operations.⁶¹

9.1 NATO STANAG 4586

For unmanned aerial vehicles specifically, interoperability relies heavily on standardization agreements. STANAG 4586 establishes the standard interfaces for UAV Control Systems (UCS) within NATO.⁶¹ It defines critical architectural elements, specifically the Vehicle Specific Module (VSM) and the Data Link Interface (DLI).⁶² The DLI provides a common set of messages and formats to enable communication between a variety of air vehicles and compliant control systems.⁶⁴ Ensuring compliance with STANAG 4586 means that a control station operated by one NATO nation can effectively communicate with, task, and operate a drone manufactured by another, breaking down the siloed procurement models of the past.⁶¹

9.2 The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)

This philosophy of open architecture is broadly encapsulated in the DoD’s mandate for a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA).⁶⁵ Mandated by Title 10 U.S.C. 4401(b) for all major defense acquisition programs, MOSA dictates that systems be designed using modular interfaces between major components.⁶⁶ By adhering to widely supported, consensus-based standards—such as Open Mission Systems (OMS) for aviation, the Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACE) for software, and the C5ISR/EW Modular Open Suite of Standards (CMOSS)—MOSA ensures that sensors, communications payloads, and flight control software are severable.⁶⁶

Embracing MOSA prevents vendor lock-in, reduces total lifecycle costs, and facilitates continuous technology refresh.⁶⁵ Crucially for interoperability, a MOSA-compliant drone allows the Department of Defense to strip out a proprietary US communications module and replace it with an allied nation’s sovereign radio system, or upgrade a targeting sensor without requiring a total system redesign.⁶⁸ The operational flexibility to configure available assets to meet rapidly changing, multi-national operational requirements is a direct result of strict MOSA enforcement.⁶⁸

10. Strategic Directives for Department of Defense Leadership

The tendency of American defense planning to fixate on the technological specifications of the platform itself—speed, payload capacity, and autonomous swarming capability—ignores the stark reality that a drone is only as lethal and effective as the network it inhabits. The Department of Defense cannot achieve unified warfighter operations within a multi-national coalition through raw procurement scale alone; it requires deliberate, mandated integration frameworks established and enforced from the highest levels of leadership.

The planned expenditure of over $70 billion on drone warfare, alongside rapid procurement mechanisms like the Drone Dominance Program and Replicator, represents a decisive commitment to modernizing the force.¹ However, as the logistical and procedural friction of previous INDOPACOM experiments demonstrates, pushing programs rapidly through the acquisition system is vastly easier than employing them effectively alongside allies in combat.⁸

To overcome the systemic hurdles of cryptographic standards, cross-domain data sharing, and export control friction, DoD leadership must aggressively pursue the following strategic directives:

1. Mandate Data-Centric Security Across All Acquisitions: The era of network-centric “high castle wall” security is incompatible with coalition warfare. Leadership must ensure that all newly acquired unmanned systems and C2 software integrate natively with data-centric models like SABRE and the Mission Partner Environment (MPE).²⁸ The ability to apply zero-trust authentication and tag individual ISR data objects for releaseability must be written into the base requirements of the Replicator initiative.⁴ Without this, the United States will field hundreds of thousands of drones that are technically incapable of sharing sensor data with the allies fighting alongside them.

2. Default to Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC): To ensure allied forces can plug into the tactical network, leadership must shift away from the reflexive use of highly restrictive, bespoke Type 1 encryption hardware for attritable edge devices.¹⁴ Embracing CSfC frameworks that utilize dual-layered software encryption (such as MACsec and IPsec) allows for the deployment of advanced MANET networks on commercial hardware.¹³ This provides the agility required to securely connect disparate forces in contested environments without the untenable logistical burdens and export restrictions of legacy classified equipment.¹⁴

3. Standardize Joint Interoperability Frameworks: Agreements such as the US/UK Joint Declaration of Intent to establish common data standards for C-UAS technologies, driven by Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401), must become the default operational standard rather than exceptional milestones.⁷⁰ The integration of diverse capabilities is heavily hindered by incompatible data formats; by mandating that vendors comply with joint data standards to participate in defense marketplaces, the DoD forces the industry to build interoperability natively.⁷⁰ Furthermore, compliance with NATO STANAG 4586 for control system interfaces must be rigorously enforced to prevent closed, proprietary ecosystems from fracturing the alliance.⁶¹

4. Fully Operationalize MOSA Requirements: The Modular Open Systems Approach must transition from a theoretical preference to an absolute contractual necessity in all drone procurements.⁶⁶ Leadership must utilize legal frameworks and acquisition strategies to ensure that all drone platforms utilize severable, modular architectures with open interfaces like FACE and CMOSS.⁶⁵ This allows for the rapid integration of third-party software—including allied targeting algorithms or sovereign communications protocols—without requiring total system redesigns by the original manufacturer.⁶⁸

5. Aggressively Pursue Export Control Modernization: While the recent MTCR reinterpretation and the AUKUS ITAR exemptions are vital steps forward, they must be rigorously implemented and expanded.⁴⁰ Leadership must work closely with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) to establish clearer guidelines for the export of AI-driven autonomy software.⁴⁶ If the algorithmic layers of drones remain trapped behind impenetrable ITAR defense-service firewalls, true collaborative swarming and co-development with coalition partners will remain impossible.⁴⁶

The defining metric of success for the United States’ unmanned systems strategy will not be the raw number of attritable platforms fielded by 2027. Rather, success will be measured by the speed, security, and interoperability of the network connecting them. It will be defined by the latency with which a US autonomous sensor can detect a threat, process the targeting data through a Cross Domain Solution, navigate ITAR releaseability protocols via SABRE, and securely transmit firing coordinates to an allied strike asset. By pivoting strategic focus from the platform to the network—enforcing data-centric architectures, prioritizing CSfC and MOSA frameworks, and dismantling antiquated export constraints—the Department of Defense can ensure that its massive investments yield a truly unified, interoperable, and overwhelmingly lethal coalition force.

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