Defense 24 Days 2026 conference in stadium, showcasing integrated regional defense synergy.
Analytics and Reports, Military Analytics, Trade Show Analytics

Defence24 Days 2026: Key Highlights from Warsaw

1. Executive Summary

The eighth iteration of the Defence24 Days conference, convened at the PGE Narodowy Stadium in Warsaw from May 6 to 7, 2026, reinforced its position as the premier defense and security forum in Central and Eastern Europe.1 Gathering defense ministers, senior NATO and European Union representatives, military commanders, and defense industry executives, the event functioned as a critical nexus for aligning allied security policies with accelerating technological advancements.3 Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, the 2026 proceedings demonstrated a definitive pivot from theoretical capability planning to the rapid acquisition of battlefield-proven, highly automated combat systems.2

The primary analytical takeaways from the event center on three operational domains: the paradigm shift in frontline logistics and infantry doctrine based on Ukrainian combat data, the introduction of a massive new Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) architecture, and the modernization of infantry small arms.5

Key defense procurement announcements were dominated by the finalization and rollout of Poland’s historic $4.2 billion SAN anti-drone system, developed by a consortium of Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ) and Norway’s Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace.8 This layered defense matrix utilizes over 700 tactical vehicles and a combination of programmable artillery, heavy machine guns, and interceptor drones to seal NATO’s eastern flank against hybrid aerial threats.10

Simultaneously, the Polish domestic small arms industry, led by Fabryka Broni (FB) “Łucznik” Radom, utilized the event to demonstrate the maturity of the MSBS Grot modular rifle ecosystem, announcing significant export milestones and new variants tailored for both military and civilian markets.12 Furthermore, the conference served as a critical platform for analyzing the structural integration of the Polish and Ukrainian defense-industrial bases, highlighting the transition from political rhetoric to actionable joint ventures in artillery and unmanned systems manufacturing.14

This report provides a detailed analysis of the hardware unveiled, the doctrinal lessons assimilated from the Ukrainian theater, the specific mechanics of the newly acquired defense systems, and the strategic procurement shifts reshaping the defense-industrial base of the European continent.

2. Geopolitical and Strategic Context

To contextualize the capability requirements and hardware acquisitions presented at Defence24 Days 2026, it is necessary to examine the threat environment dictating Polish and NATO eastern flank defense spending. The modernization efforts showcased at the event are not occurring in a vacuum; they are a direct response to quantified strategic risks and are enabled by new European financial architectures.15

2.1 The Economic and Societal Imperative for High-Intensity Deterrence

Analyses presented during the conference framework by the Defence Institute and the Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers (ZPP) provided a sobering assessment of the economic cost of a potential full-scale Russian conventional invasion of Poland. The report calculates that such an event could exact a cost exceeding €1 trillion, virtually erasing 40% of the nation’s fixed capital and causing real GDP to collapse by more than half.15 The realization of these catastrophic estimates validates Poland’s current defense expenditure, which reached a record PLN 200 billion (approximately 4.8% of GDP) in the 2026 budget.16

Polish rearmament is driven by the strategic logic that the financial burden of high-intensity deterrence is a fraction of the cost of civilizational degradation.15 The ZPP analysis argues that Poland’s potential losses are proportionally higher than those experienced by Ukraine because Poland ranks among the world’s top 20 economies; the more developed a national infrastructure, the higher the financial and social cost of its destruction.15 Furthermore, the report emphasizes that even low-intensity hybrid attacks—such as regular drone incidents—could undermine Poland’s credibility as a secure destination for foreign direct investment, establishing a requirement for hermetic air defense systems.15

2.2 The Baltic 2035 Concept and Frontline Realities

Discussions at the conference heavily referenced the “Baltic 2035” security paradigm, which reclassifies the Baltic Sea from a quiet northern periphery to a highly contested “frontline sea”.15 Following Sweden’s accession to NATO, the region is now treated as an integrated strategic organism that combines military, economic, technological, and industrial facets.15

Vulnerabilities in this operational theater have shifted from purely military targets to critical civilian infrastructure, including undersea cables, energy pipelines, liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, and logistics corridors.15 The weaponization of economic interdependence and the persistent activity of Russia’s “shadow fleet” have forced NATO planners to prioritize multi-domain integration, rapid-response capabilities, and resilient supply chains.15 Strategic projects, such as the proposed deep-sea Ro-Ro port in Choczewo (Port Haller), are no longer viewed merely as commercial gateways but as critical national security architecture designed to enable faster allied reinforcement and military logistics.15

2.3 SAFE Funding and Defense Base Expansion

A critical enabler of Poland’s rapid procurement cycle is the European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. Poland has emerged as the largest beneficiary of this program, securing up to €43.7 billion in low-interest loans to finance urgent defense acquisitions and scale its domestic industrial base.16

The SAFE framework is specifically designed to boost industrial production capacity across the European defense technological and industrial base (EDTIB), making sure defense equipment is available when needed and addressing existing capability gaps.18 Polish Deputy Prime Minister Radosław Sikorski emphasized during his panel that procurement financed under SAFE will fundamentally alter the operational readiness of the Polish Armed Forces, allowing the nation to leverage funding to acquire the most advanced gear available to deter adversaries across the eastern border.16 This capital injection directly underpins the massive scale of the SAN anti-drone program and the broader recapitalization of the Polish land forces.17

3. Tactical Infantry Shifts and the WOT 2.0 Doctrine

The most significant intellectual output of Defence24 Days 2026 was the formal assimilation of tactical lessons derived from the war in Ukraine. The conference served to translate ad-hoc battlefield adaptations into formal NATO and Polish military doctrine, heavily scrutinizing the role of light infantry and territorial defense forces.19

3.1 Analyzing the First Decade of Territorial Defense

The role of light infantry was evaluated via a comprehensive report presented by the Eastern Flank Institute (EFI), titled “WOT 2.0: The Return of Light Infantry to the Polish Armed Forces”.19 Presented by EFI experts including Grzegorz Matyasik and Dr. Przemysław Wywiał, the report summarized the first decade of WOT (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej) operations and established guidelines for its future development in the face of deep-strike capabilities and hybrid threats.19

Former Polish Ambassador to NATO Tomasz Szatkowski provided commentary on the study, noting that while WOT remains a vital achievement for national security, its foundational objectives and implementation methods require periodic review to address operational distortions and adapt to the changing character of war.20 The presence of WOT leadership at the conference facilitated a direct, public dialogue between strategic analysts and operational commanders.20

3.2 The Paradigm Shift to Universal Civic Service

A primary consensus emerging from the EFI panels is the pressing need to move beyond traditional concepts of military conscription. General Jarosław Gromadziński argued forcefully that the defense establishment must shift the public narrative from a narrow focus on compulsory military service toward a broader concept of “universal service to the state”.20

This doctrine posits that national security relies on a resilient society where every citizen has an obligation to act for the security of the state, whether through direct military service, the police, fire service, civil defense, or public administration.20 General Gromadziński emphasized that while the military fights the battle, the state as a whole fights the war. This requires the creation of a “system of state resilience” to protect critical infrastructure and the civilian population—duties that are administrative and governmental rather than strictly military.20

3.3 Human Capital versus Equipment Procurement

Furthermore, analysts such as Michał Dworczyk, Chairman of the EFI Program Council, emphasized that the Polish defense strategy must balance its heavy equipment procurement with human capital development. Dworczyk warned that the current state of Polish military reserves requires urgent attention, noting that the national defense posture is excessively focused on hardware acquisitions while neglecting the personnel required to operate it.20

Reiterating the foundational military principle that “reservists win wars, not professional armies,” Dworczyk criticized the disparity between Poland and other NATO Eastern Flank nations, pointing out that Poland remains the last bordering nation with the Russian Federation that has not restored some form of mandatory military training.20 This critique underscores the WOT 2.0 argument: hardware overmatch is insufficient if the demographic and training pipelines are not scaled concurrently to sustain a protracted, high-attrition conflict.

4. Small Arms Modernization: FB Radom and Mesko Portfolios

While heavy air defense systems dominated procurement headlines, Defence24 Days 2026 featured an extensive exhibition of modernized infantry small arms. The showcase was predominantly led by state-owned Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) entities, specifically Fabryka Broni (FB) “Łucznik” Radom and Zakłady Mechaniczne Tarnów (ZMT).21 The hardware displayed reflects a total phase-out of legacy post-Soviet equipment in favor of NATO-standard, modular ecosystems.

4.1 The MSBS Grot Modular Ecosystem

The Modułowy System Broni Strzeleckiej (MSBS) Grot assault rifle has matured significantly since its initial fielding. Combat experience gained by Ukrainian forces operating donated Grot rifles has fed directly into the system’s iterative development, validating its performance in austere, mud-heavy, and high-attrition environments.22

The latest iterations of the system emphasize its core design philosophy: absolute modularity. Built around a common upper receiver, the rifle can be rapidly converted between a standard layout (C16) and a bullpup configuration (B16).7 This structural commonality allows infantry armorers to tailor the weapon’s center of gravity and overall length for specific environments. For instance, mechanized infantry operating in the cramped troop compartments of KTO Rosomak vehicles benefit immensely from the reduced overall length of the bullpup configuration, while retaining the ballistic advantages of a full 16-inch barrel.7

Table 1: FB Radom Small Arms Technical Specifications 7

Weapon SystemCaliberOperating PrincipleWeight (Empty)Barrel LengthEffective RangePrimary Role
MSBS Grot C165.56x45mm NATOShort-stroke gas piston3.65 kg406 mm (16 in)500 mStandard Infantry Service Rifle
MSBS Grot B165.56x45mm NATOShort-stroke gas piston3.40 kg406 mm (16 in)500 mMechanized Infantry (Bullpup)
MSBS Grot 762N7.62x51mm NATOShort-stroke gas piston~4.50 kg508 mm (20 in)800 mDesignated Marksman Rifle (DMR)
VIS 1009x19mm NATOShort recoil, locked breech0.69 kg110 mm (4.3 in)50 mStandard Service Sidearm
MPS Pistol9x19mm NATOShort recoil, striker-fired0.65 kg102 mm (4.0 in)50 mTactical / Specialized Sidearm
UKM-2020S7.62x51mm NATOGas-operated, open bolt8.40 kg440 mm (17.3 in)1000 mGeneral Purpose Machine Gun

A major announcement coinciding with the conference period was the successful entry of the MSBS Grot into the United States civilian and law enforcement market, representing a significant export milestone for the Polish defense industry.12 FB Radom successfully secured certification from the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for the MSBS Grot Pistol variant.12

Distributed by Arms of America, the platform will be available in 10.5-inch, 13-inch, and 14.5-inch barrel configurations.12 Within the highly competitive U.S. market, the MSBS Grot is positioned as an advanced, piston-driven alternative to standard direct-impingement AR-15 platforms.12 The short-stroke gas piston operating mechanism provides superior reliability when utilized with sound suppressors, as it vents excess gas at the gas block rather than directing carbon fouling back into the receiver—a tactical advantage increasingly demanded by special operations and tactical law enforcement end-users.7

4.2 Sidearms and Specialist Weaponry

FB Radom also exhibited its modernized sidearm portfolio, specifically designed to phase out legacy equipment such as the WIST-94 and P-83 Wanad.26

  • VIS 100: A 9x19mm semi-automatic pistol utilizing a traditional hammer-fired double-action/single-action (DA/SA) mechanism. It is currently entering widespread service with the Polish Land Forces, with tens of thousands of units already delivered.26
  • MPS (Modular Semi-Automatic Pistol): Unveiled for specialized tactical use, this 9x19mm striker-fired pistol represents a shift toward modern duty handgun designs. It functions on the principle of short barrel recoil with a locked breech and features a semi-DAO (Double Action Only) trigger system with initial tension.7 Equipped with automatic trigger and firing pin fuses, the MPS is fully ambidextrous with symmetrical controls, catering to the ergonomic demands of modern close-quarters engagements.7

Furthermore, Zakłady Mechaniczne Tarnów (ZMT) displayed the UKM-2020S machine gun.21 This weapon represents the latest iteration of the Polish effort to adapt the highly reliable, PK-pattern belt-fed machine gun to the NATO 7.62x51mm cartridge. The UKM-2020S features reduced weight, improved ergonomics, and integrated Picatinny rails for modern optical sights, ensuring Polish infantry retain heavy volume-of-fire capabilities while streamlining ammunition logistics within the NATO alliance.21

4.3 Ammunition Logistics and Remote Weapon Stations

The deployment of new small arms requires a concurrent scaling of ammunition production and logistics. Mesko S.A., Poland’s premier munitions manufacturer, confirmed extensive contracts to supply vast quantities of dedicated 5.56x45mm and 9x19mm ammunition specifically tailored to the ballistic profiles of the MSBS Grot and VIS 100 platforms.27

Beyond small arms ammunition, Mesko’s systems integration capabilities were highlighted through their partnership with Kongsberg. Mesko-produced armaments are being integrated directly into Kongsberg’s RS4 and RS6 remote weapon stations (RWS).28 This interoperability allows Polish-manufactured weapons to be mounted on advanced targeting gimbals, providing armored vehicle crews with stabilized, high-precision fire capabilities while remaining under armor—a critical survivability factor observed in the Ukrainian theater.28

5. The SAN Counter-UAS Architecture: Scale and Capabilities

The most strategically significant hardware development discussed at Defence24 Days 2026 was the formalization of the SAN anti-drone system. Prompted by Russian drone incursions into NATO airspace in late 2025, the Polish Armaments Agency finalized a PLN 15-16 billion (approximately $4.2 billion) contract with a PGZ-Kongsberg consortium in January 2026.10

The SAN system represents a paradigm shift in air defense doctrine. Traditional surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, such as the Patriot (Wisła program) or CAMM (Narew program), possess highly unfavorable cost-exchange ratios when utilized against low-cost loitering munitions like the Shahed-136.30 The SAN program rectifies this imbalance by prioritizing cost-per-kill efficiency through high-volume kinetic effectors and localized electronic warfare, filling a critical gap in Poland’s multi-layered air defense network.31

5.1 System Structure and Network Deployment

The SAN program is not a single vehicle or weapon, but an interconnected, decentralized defensive shield. The acquisition constitutes the largest counter-drone program in Polish military history, with initial deployments expected to begin in 2026 and final batteries entering service by January 2028.6

The organizational structure of the SAN deployment is massive in scale, consisting of 32:

  • 18 Battery Modules
  • 18 Command Platoons (Housing communication nodes and data processing centers)
  • 52 Fire Platoons (Capable of autonomous detection, classification, and kinetic engagement)

The system’s modularity allows each of the 52 fire platoons to operate independently if communication with higher echelon command nodes is severed or degraded by hostile electronic warfare. This distributed lethality ensures that the air defense shield cannot be collapsed by striking a single centralized command post.34

5.2 Sensor Integration and Command Control

The backbone of the SAN system relies heavily on domestic Polish technology, integrated with Kongsberg’s proven command architecture. Advanced Protection Systems (APS), a Polish technology firm, serves as the primary subcontractor responsible for the sensor suite and local command framework.10

  • Sensor Matrices: APS provides the FIELDctrl Ultra and Follow radars, augmented by high-resolution electro-optical tracking stations.10 These sensors provide 3D track data on targets featuring exceptionally low radar cross-sections (RCS), such as commercial quadcopters or composite-built fixed-wing attack drones.35
  • SanView C2: The proprietary command-and-control software, SanView, serves as the digital brain of the system. It fuses data from multiple radar tracks, classifies the target using advanced algorithms, and automatically cues the most appropriate effector based on the target’s vector, speed, and the engagement cost.10 This reduces the cognitive load on operators and drastically decreases the sensor-to-shooter latency.

5.3 Platform Mobility: The Vehicle Fleet

The physical hardware of the SAN system will be mounted on a fleet of 703 tactical vehicles. This high degree of mobility is crucial; static air defense sites in Ukraine have proven highly vulnerable to suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations and loitering munition strikes.10

The fleet is divided into two primary domestic chassis types:

  1. Jelcz Platforms (approx. 400 units): These heavy-duty military trucks will carry the larger, more power-intensive systems, including the primary search radars, SanView command posts, and the heavier 35mm artillery modules.9
  2. Igwan Platforms (approx. 300 units): The Igwan is a lighter, highly mobile 4×4 tactical vehicle. Within the SAN architecture, the Igwan chassis functions as a rapid-response effector platform. It is specifically utilized to mount the Kongsberg PROTECTOR remote weapon stations paired with the 12.7mm WLKM rotary machine guns, allowing these units to quickly reposition and saturate localized threat vectors.10

6. Kinetic and Electronic Effectors within the SAN Matrix

The SAN system’s lethality is derived from a diversified portfolio of effectors, allowing commanders to match the weapon to the target precisely, thereby preserving high-end munitions for complex threats.6

6.1 Programmable Artillery and Rotary Machine Guns

  • SA-35 Cannon: Developed by PIT-RADWAR, this 35mm self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system forms the heavy kinetic core of the SAN platoons.10 The critical technological advantage of the SA-35 is its use of programmable “smart” ammunition. As the projectile leaves the barrel, the fire control system magnetically programs a fuse within the shell to detonate at a precise point in space immediately in front of the target.6 This generates a dense cloud of tungsten sub-projectiles that shreds the drone, eliminating the need for a direct hit and drastically increasing the probability of kill (Pk) against small, evasive targets.6
  • WLKM 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun: Designed by Zakłady Mechaniczne Tarnów (ZMT), this multi-barrel rotary weapon system provides intense localized point defense. The WLKM features a block of four 900mm barrels capable of firing up to 3,600 rounds per minute.10 Crucially, barrel rotation is driven by electric motors rather than gas operation.10 This ensures a consistent, highly reliable rate of fire that is unaffected by gas port fouling or ammunition inconsistencies. Weighing only 50 kilograms and measuring 130 cm in length, the weapon is compact enough to be easily integrated onto the Kongsberg PROTECTOR turrets mounted on the light Igwan vehicles, creating a dense stream of 12.7mm fire effective up to 2,200 meters.10

6.2 Precision Missiles and Drone Interceptors

  • APKWS II: The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System converts standard unguided 70mm Hydra rockets into laser-guided precision munitions.6 By integrating a mid-body guidance section, the APKWS provides a low-cost, highly accurate intercept capability for engaging larger Group 3 drones, loitering munitions, and certain subsonic cruise missiles at ranges exceeding the reach of the 35mm cannons.6
  • Interceptor UAVs: Acknowledging that drone-on-drone combat is becoming a standard tactical reality, the SAN system integrates proprietary hunter-killer drones, such as the MEROPS system.10 These interceptors are launched from ground nodes and steered toward incoming threats by the system’s radar, physically colliding with or detonating near hostile UAVs to destroy them in mid-air.10

Table 2: SAN System Primary Kinetic Effectors 6

Effector SystemTypeEngagement MethodPrimary Target Profile
SA-35 Cannon35mm AutocannonProgrammable Airburst MunitionSwarms, Fixed-wing UAVs
WLKM 12.7mmRotary Machine GunKinetic Saturation (3600 rpm)Low-altitude Quadcopters, Loitering Munitions
APKWS II70mm Guided RocketLaser-guided Kinetic ImpactGroup 3 UAVs, Cruise Missiles
MEROPS / VertexInterceptor DronePhysical Ramming / Proximity DetonationEvasive, High-altitude UAVs

6.3 Non-Kinetic Systems and Analytical Critique

Beyond kinetic weapons, the SAN architecture incorporates electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. The system features the SKYstrl EW complex and directional microwave jammers designed to disrupt command data links, spoof GPS navigation signals, and fry drone circuitry via directed energy before kinetic engagement becomes necessary.6

Despite the impressive technical specifications, the SAN program was subject to analytical critique during the conference panels. Michał Dworczyk noted that while the program is a vital step, the current expenditure model may be inefficient based on empirical data from the Ukrainian conflict.20 Dworczyk highlighted that combat statistics show less than 10% of hostile drones in Ukraine are successfully destroyed by barrel-based anti-aircraft artillery.20 Despite this, three out of the five primary effector types in the Polish SAN program (the 35mm, 30mm, and 12.7mm systems) are barrel-based.20 He argued that a larger proportion of the $4.2 billion budget should be allocated to electronic warfare and automated interceptor drones, which have demonstrated a higher cost-to-kill ratio in actual combat operations.20

7. Unmanned Systems: Ground Logistics and Maritime Autonomy

The exhibition halls at PGE Narodowy Stadium provided a physical showcase of the unmanned systems expected to fulfill the doctrinal requirements established by the war in Ukraine.2 The focus has shifted from simple reconnaissance to heavy logistics, explosive ordnance disposal, and maritime intelligence.

7.1 Automating the Supply Chain: Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)

Ukrainian officials at the conference detailed an aggressive push to remove human soldiers from the most dangerous logistical routes. Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s stated goal is that 100% of frontline logistics and medical evacuations should be performed by robotic systems.36 To achieve this, Ukraine is procuring 25,000 Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) in the first half of 2026, more than double the acquisitions of the previous year.36

A prime example of this capability is the Bizon-L, recently codified under NATO cataloging standards. This UGV possesses a 300-kilogram payload capacity and a 50-kilometer operational range, allowing it to resupply entrenched infantry under heavy artillery fire without risking logistical convoys.36

In parallel, Polish domestic industry focused heavily on specialized UGVs for combat engineering. The Łukasiewicz PIAP Institute displayed its combat-proven pyrotechnic robots, notably the PIAP GRYF and PIAP PATROL.15 These tracked, modular systems feature highly articulate manipulator arms and are designed to detect, remove, and neutralize improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO).15 Deploying these platforms allows combat engineers to clear contested routes and breach minefields remotely.

7.2 The Proliferation of Drone Interceptors

A notable trend in the exhibition was the rapid evolution of dedicated “interceptor” drones. The Polish distributor UMO showcased the Vertex interceptor drone, a platform emblematic of this new class of weaponry.37

Designed to counter the proliferation of cheap commercial drones utilized for artillery spotting, the Vertex is constructed from a carbon filament reinforced with fine carbon fibers, providing the structural rigidity necessary to execute high-G maneuvers without airframe deformation.37 It features a 500-gram warhead, a 15-minute flight endurance, and a functional engagement range of 7 to 10 kilometers.37 The widespread deployment of platforms like Vertex and MEROPS indicates a tactical evolution where airspace denial at the squad and platoon level is achieved via drone-on-drone combat, augmenting the larger SAN umbrella.

7.3 Strategic Maritime Autonomy

Reflecting the “Baltic 2035” frontline sea concept, the maritime domain is also experiencing rapid automation. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) exhibited the BlueWhale uncrewed submarine.38 This autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) is designed for persistent intelligence gathering, maritime domain awareness, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations.38 The integration of long-endurance AUVs allows navies to continuously monitor critical undersea infrastructure, such as the Baltic Pipe and communication cables, without risking manned submarine crews in the shallow, highly contested littoral zones of the Baltic Sea.38

8. Cross-Border Polish-Ukrainian Defense Integration

Defence24 Days 2026 dedicated significant bandwidth to the structural integration of the Polish and Ukrainian defense-industrial bases. Discussions highlighted a transition from political rhetoric to actionable joint ventures, though critical bottlenecks continue to impede rapid scaling.14

8.1 Joint Production and Technology Transfer

Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Olexandr Mischenko stated that Ukraine is ready to share its tactical experience from the ongoing war to assist partners in developing more effective combat systems.14 This openness to technology transfer has facilitated several high-profile joint projects:

  • Bohdana Howitzer Production: A joint venture was announced to manufacture the Ukrainian-designed 155mm Bohdana wheeled self-propelled howitzer directly on Polish territory, combining a battlefield-proven design with Polish manufacturing capacity.14
  • Drone Fleet Initiative: A collaborative project has been launched to create a massive “drone fleet,” combining Polish state financing and industrial infrastructure with Ukrainian technical engineering and combat software.14

To accommodate this rapid integration, the Polish Ministry of National Defense issued Decision No. 123/MON, which significantly simplified the testing and procurement regulations for autonomous systems, allowing prototypes to reach the field faster.14

8.2 Overcoming Systemic Bottlenecks

Despite these advancements, defense executives warned that the primary barriers to scaling production are no longer political, but regulatory and administrative.14

A significant hurdle is the absence of a centralized framework for cross-border defense collaboration. Ukrainian defense firms struggle to identify appropriate industrial partners within Poland due to the lack of a unified state liaison or “centralized point of cooperation”.14 Furthermore, structural legal divergences actively impede rapid contracting. Polish procurement law requires strict documentation confirming the “non-criminal status” of corporate partners before contracts can be awarded. However, this legal concept does not exist for collective entities under Ukrainian law, leading to severe administrative paralysis during joint venture formations.14

To resolve these systemic frictions, industry leaders, such as Dmytro Shymkiv of AeroDrone, proposed adopting a framework analogous to the U.S.-Canada Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA) to harmonize supply chains and procurement standards.14 Additionally, stakeholders advocated for the creation of a dedicated cross-border mobility scheme to allow engineers, soldiers, and defense specialists to move fluidly between the two nations, bypassing standard visa and immigration delays that currently throttle collaborative research and development.14

9. Future Trajectories and Strategic Mitigation

Defence24 Days 2026 underscored a stark reality for NATO’s eastern flank: deterrence can no longer rely solely on the promise of eventual allied reinforcement. Frontline nations must possess the immediate, decentralized, and highly automated capability to absorb and repel initial hybrid and conventional strikes.15

The procurement of the $4.2 billion SAN anti-drone shield, the aggressive modernization of basic infantry systems like the MSBS Grot and VIS 100, and the push toward autonomous ground logistics reflect a unified strategy to build this systemic resilience.8 Furthermore, the conceptual shift toward “universal service to the state” and the WOT 2.0 doctrine indicates a fundamental acknowledgment that future high-intensity conflicts will require the mobilization of the entire societal and industrial apparatus, not merely the professional military.20

As Poland continues to deploy the €43.7 billion in SAFE funding, its defense-industrial base is transitioning from a regional supplier to a primary pillar of European security architecture.16 The technologies, procurement strategies, and doctrinal lessons formalized in Warsaw in May 2026 will dictate the operational tempo, logistics networks, and survival metrics for NATO forces operating in contested environments for the next decade.

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