1. Executive Summary

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is currently navigating one of the most tumultuous, contradictory, and consequential periods of institutional restructuring and doctrinal evolution in its modern history. Tasked directly by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to achieve the capabilities necessary to win a major regional conflict by the 2027 centennial anniversary of the military, the force finds itself simultaneously accelerating its technological modernization efforts while confronting profound internal friction and structural instability.¹ An exhaustive analysis of military developments, force posture, and doctrinal shifts through early 2026 reveals a fundamental paradox at the heart of China’s martial ambitions: the PLA is rapidly advancing its hardware, joint operations frameworks, and synthetic training ecosystems, yet it remains heavily encumbered by a severe leadership vacuum, deeply entrenched bureaucratic inertia, and an absolute absence of modern combat experience.

Between 2022 and January 2026, an unprecedented anti-corruption and political rectification campaign initiated by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping decimated the PLA’s high command.³ Over 100 senior general officers have been officially dismissed, purged, or have inexplicably disappeared from public view, impacting approximately 52 percent of the military’s senior leadership positions ranging from the Central Military Commission (CMC) down to theater command deputy leader grades.⁴ This sweeping purge has aggressively removed veteran officers who possessed realistic, unvarnished views of the force’s logistical and operational capabilities, replacing them with a generation of newly promoted, potentially inexperienced commanders who must operate in an environment fraught with political peril.⁴ Concurrently, the CCP’s unyielding insistence on absolute political loyalty actively centralizes command and control, inhibiting the systemic adoption of a localized “mission command” structure that PLA theorists acknowledge is required for the complex, multi-domain warfare the military expects to fight.⁶

Compounding these severe structural challenges is the so-called “peace disease” (和平病)—a systemic, recognized institutional malaise born from the fact that the PLA has not engaged in large-scale, kinetic combat operations since its border conflict with Vietnam in 1979.⁷ The CCP explicitly recognizes that its officer corps lacks an intuitive, visceral understanding of the intensity, attrition, friction, and chaos inherent in contemporary battlefields.⁹ To systematically mitigate this crippling vulnerability, the PLA has constructed an expansive, technologically advanced ecosystem of simulated combat environments. This includes the establishment of dedicated, highly lethal opposing forces (OPFOR) capable of replicating advanced Western adversaries, the integration of artificial intelligence and virtual reality into tactical simulations, and the institutionalization of rigorous “Fupan” (after-action review) processes designed to extract maximum educational value from peacetime exercises.¹⁰ Furthermore, the military is heavily studying the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to refine its evolving doctrine on unmanned systems, resilient logistics, and electronic warfare.¹³

However, the absorption and implementation of these critical lessons are often distorted by preexisting doctrinal biases and bureaucratic self-interest.¹³ While the PLA has successfully internalized tactical lessons regarding resilient energy distribution and contested logistics ¹⁵, it has shown a marked institutional resistance to fully embracing the low-cost, attritable drone dynamics witnessed in Eastern Europe, preferring instead to continue funding “exquisite,” highly expensive legacy systems that align with pre-existing modernization benchmarks.¹³

Despite these glaring internal contradictions, the PLA’s baseline capability to project power, enforce regional deterrence, and execute sophisticated joint campaigns is undeniably expanding at a formidable rate. Recent large-scale exercises, such as Justice Mission 2025, demonstrate an increasing, demonstrable proficiency in multidomain coordination, long-range precision fires, and seamless integration with paramilitary forces like the China Coast Guard (CCG) to enforce blockades.¹⁷ The strategic trajectory of the PLA indicates a force that is methodically engineering surrogate experience to overcome its historical deficits. While its command architecture remains brittle and its true resilience in a protracted conflict is entirely untested, the PLA presents a highly capable, asymmetric challenge in the Indo-Pacific theater that is diligently preparing to fight, and win, modern wars.

2. The Scope, Mechanics, and Strategic Fallout of the 2022–2026 Purges

The structural integrity and operational continuity of the PLA’s command hierarchy have been severely tested by a sweeping political and anti-corruption purge that began gaining momentum around 2023 and reached a critical crescendo in early 2026.³ Billed officially by the CCP as a vital anti-corruption drive necessary to clear bureaucratic impediments to the military’s modernization agenda, the campaign also undeniably serves as a mechanism for internal political consolidation, ensuring that the armed forces remain absolutely subservient to the paramount leader.³

2.1 Disruption and Decimation at the Central Military Commission

The Central Military Commission (CMC) represents the supreme, absolute command authority of the PLA. Historically composed of seven elite members, the CMC serves as the vital organizational nexus translating the CCP’s political objectives into the military’s strategic execution.²⁰ By January 2026, the abrupt removal of PLA senior generals Zhang Youxia, who served as the CMC Senior Vice Chairman, and Liu Zhenli, the Chief of the Joint Staff Department, marked an institutional reset of a scale not seen in decades.⁵

The scale of removals within the CMC is staggering and historically unprecedented in the modern era. Over the preceding years, the leadership orchestrated the downfall of six sitting CMC members.³ This list includes former Ministers of Defense Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, and the Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua.³ These high-profile removals have resulted in the highest proportion of vacancies on the CMC since the chaotic era of Mao Zedong.²⁰ Following the Fourth Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee in October 2025, which sets broader strategic policy via the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), the only officer promoted to the supreme body was PLA Rocket Force General Zhang Shengmin.²⁰ Notably, General Zhang possesses a career background deeply rooted in discipline inspection and anti-corruption roles rather than operational, warfighting command.²⁰ Consequently, the CMC has been virtually gutted of its seasoned warfighters. Defense analysts assess that this hollowing out drastically reduces the CMC’s capacity to execute strategic-level leadership tasks, manage complex multi-theater crises, and coordinate the large-scale joint operations necessary for an invasion scenario.⁷

2.2 Cascading Decimation Across Theater Command Echelons

The purge’s destabilizing impact cascades far beyond the localized environment of the CMC in Beijing, severely affecting the entire operational leadership track of the PLA.⁴ Understanding this impact requires examining the PLA’s unique organizational structure, wherein an officer’s “grade” is often more significant than their “rank.” Grade corresponds directly to the level of the unit they command, oversee, or direct.⁴ Below the CMC, the highest operational grade an officer can achieve is the theater command leader grade, which encompasses the commanders and political commissars of the five regional theater commands and the heads of the four distinct military services.⁴ In total, there are approximately 25 theater command leader positions and another 145 theater command deputy leader positions.⁴

According to exhaustive assessments utilizing the 2026 PLA Military Leadership directories and dedicated databases tracking the purges, 101 senior officers who served in CMC, theater command, or theater deputy command grade positions have been officially dismissed, expelled from the CCP, or have simply vanished from public view.³ This staggering figure equates to approximately 52 percent of all positions within the PLA’s senior leadership being directly impacted.⁴ Breaking these figures down further indicates that 36 generals and lieutenant generals have been officially purged through state channels, with an additional 65 missing or presumed purged based on unexplained absences from mandatory high-level procedural meetings.³

The command vacuum is particularly acute at the operational levels required to execute complex regional campaigns, such as an amphibious assault, a joint blockade, or an aerospace isolation campaign against Taiwan. A total of 38 officers serving in theater command leader positions have been dismissed, including highly influential figures such as Lin Xiangyang, the commander of the Eastern Theater Command responsible for Taiwan contingencies.¹ Historically, institutional voids at this echelon would be systematically filled by promoting competent officers from the theater deputy leader grade. However, the anti-corruption apparatus has removed 56 officers within that very deputy grade, thereby shrinking the pool of viable, experienced candidates available for promotion by more than one-third.¹

2.3 The Generational Void and the Risk of Miscalculation

The structural consequence of removing such a vast swath of the high command is a profound generational disruption in military experience and institutional memory.⁴ In the PLA, rigid promotion protocols dictate that an officer typically must serve three to five years in a specific grade before becoming eligible for advancement to the next tier.¹ The mass dismissal of the deputy leadership tier means that the PLA faces an impossible bureaucratic choice: it must either accelerate the promotion of highly inexperienced junior officers—violating established advancement timelines and risking incompetence—or leave vital command billets entirely vacant during a period of intense, unprecedented military buildup.⁴

Strategic analysts express profound concern that the loss of veteran, “realistic” commanders heightens the danger of catastrophic military miscalculation.⁵ Combat-experienced peers who might previously have possessed the standing to offer candid, professional military counsel regarding the logistical impossibilities, economic fallout, or operational risks of a near-term invasion are no longer present within the decision-making apparatus.⁵ Instead, the strategic decision-making architecture has recentered entirely upon Xi Jinping’s personal preferences, potentially isolated from unvarnished military reality 5].

While immediate impacts on the day-to-day readiness of tactical line units appear minimal—as operational units have proactively insulated themselves from the political fallout and taken steps to shield their training schedules—the strategic implications for complex, multi-theater warfighting cannot be ignored.⁷ These implications will become unavoidable as the newly promoted, politically compliant, but operationally inexperienced generation of general officers attempts to manage large-scale crises and de-escalation scenarios in the coming years.²¹

3. The Command Paradigm Crisis: Centralization versus Mission Command

As the PLA rapidly modernizes its hardware, its operational doctrine increasingly acknowledges a fundamental truth of 21st-century warfare: emerging technologies, pervasive electronic warfare, and overwhelming floods of battlefield data place mounting, unsustainable cognitive demands on human decision-makers at the top of the command chain.⁶ To remain agile and resilient, PLA theorists and researchers have openly argued for the adoption of “mission command” (任务式指挥)—a decentralized command philosophy that empowers lower-level tactical commanders to make rapid, independent decisions within the bounds of a broader strategic intent.⁶

3.1 Political Rectification Against Professional Military Counsel

The implementation of mission command, however, fundamentally clashes with the CCP’s paramount, non-negotiable objective: maintaining absolute political control over the armed forces.⁶ In April 2026, during an inaugural training program for senior PLA officers held at the National Defense University, Xi Jinping explicitly addressed this tension, demanding that the military greet its 2027 centennial with a “brand-new political outlook”.² He reiterated forcefully that the military must endure deep, ongoing political rectification to maintain ideological “purity” and that unyielding loyalty to the CCP remains the ultimate metric of military success, taking strict precedence over operational ingenuity or localized autonomy.² Xi further stressed that there is “no place in the military for those who are disloyal to the Party,” underscoring that anti-corruption and political oversight mechanisms will systematically monitor the exercise of power down to the lowest echelons.²³

This top-down ideological mandate forces an inherently centralized command structure. Because the CCP fundamentally fears that empowering frontline officers with independent command authority could lead to ideological drift, the formation of independent power bases, or direct insubordination, the PLA’s adoption of mission command remains highly uneven, incomplete, and theoretically stunted across the joint force.⁶ The political environment severely discourages the risk-taking and independent thought required for effective decentralized leadership.⁵

3.2 Forecasting Risks: Paralysis or Unpredictable Escalation

The tension between the operational necessity for mission command and the political demand for centralization generates significant strategic friction, carrying direct implications for adversaries. If the PLA continues to rely on a highly centralized command architecture, coordination and control of frontline forces during a high-intensity conflict will likely degrade rapidly once secure communication links are severed, jammed, or destroyed by enemy action.⁶ This degradation can lead to highly unpredictable crisis behavior. Paralyzed local commanders may fail to act entirely, awaiting orders that will never arrive; conversely, they may act erratically without situational awareness, drastically increasing the chances of unintentional escalation or friendly fire incidents.⁶

Conversely, should the PLA leadership overcome its political paranoia, fully trust its officer corps, and successfully embrace mission command, the result would be a highly adaptable, resilient decision-making apparatus.⁶ Such a doctrinal evolution would severely blunt traditional U.S. concepts of operations that rely heavily on degrading an adversary’s centralized command and control networks to induce operational paralysis.⁶ While a full embrace of mission command could embolden Beijing to utilize military force by increasing their confidence in operational resilience, the current consensus indicates that the environment of political fear generated by the sweeping 2026 purges renders this outcome highly unlikely in the near term.⁵

4. Diagnosing the “Peace Disease”: The Absolute Absence of Combat Experience

Arguably the most debated, studied, and internally lamented vulnerability within the PLA is its lack of real-world combat experience. This institutional deficiency is frequently and officially referred to by Xi Jinping, senior commanders, and PLA commentators as the “peace disease” (和平病).⁸

4.1 Historical Context and the 1979 Benchmark

The PLA has not engaged in sustained, large-scale kinetic combat operations since its brief, bloody, and operationally flawed punitive border conflict with Vietnam in 1979.⁷ While it is true that the PLA has participated extensively in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), sustained counterpiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden for over a decade, and executed successful noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) in regions like Yemen and Sudan, these activities fundamentally do not replicate the kinetic intensity, high-end electronic warfare, or massive casualty rates of modern multidomain warfare against a peer adversary.²⁴

The military’s official daily newspaper, the PLA Daily, has explicitly and repeatedly warned that decades of uninterrupted peace and unprecedented domestic prosperity have inadvertently exacerbated systemic corruption, degraded unit readiness, and fostered a dangerous, false sense of security among the ranks.⁸ In a highly publicized and unusually candid statement before his retirement, Chinese Lieutenant General He Lei remarked that his greatest professional regret was never having fought in a war.⁸ This sentiment reflects deep-seated, pervasive anxieties within the upper echelons of the CCP leadership that the current generation of PLA personnel fundamentally does not possess an intuitive understanding of the psychological trauma and physical intensity of modern combat.⁹ Writing in the PLA Daily, military commentators Chen Yongyi and Liu Yuanyuan argued forcefully that proximity to a lethal enemy is the only true mechanism for personnel to grasp the responsibilities and acute, life-or-death challenges of the modern battlespace.⁹

4.2 Human Capital, Attrition, and Demographic Realities

The systemic lack of combat experience is intrinsically linked to broader, complex questions regarding the PLA’s human capital. The military relies heavily on successive generations of soldiers raised under the stringent “one-child policy”.²⁴ While these recruits are generally better educated and more adept at operating sophisticated technological platforms, there are unverified but persistent internal questions regarding the resilience, morale, and willingness of the force to sustain mass casualties in a protracted, brutal war of attrition.⁸ The CCP worries that the societal fallout from high casualty rates among single-child families could threaten regime stability.²⁴

To combat the “peace disease” and harden its human capital, the PLA has mandated that training must become hyper-realistic, pushing troops to their physical and psychological limits.⁹ Military theorists acknowledge that while nothing perfectly replaces the crucible of actual war, highly demanding training that closely simulates combat conditions, exhaustion, and friction correlates directly with superior battlefield performance.⁸ The capability of a highly educated, technologically proficient force to operate complex weaponry can, theoretically, offset a lack of historical combat experience, provided that the training ecosystem rigorously and consistently exposes personnel to the systemic failures and chaos expected in a peer conflict.⁸

5. Surrogate Experience: Doctrinal Adaptation from Contemporary Conflicts

Lacking its own modern wars to draw empirical data from, the PLA relies heavily on the meticulous observation and analysis of foreign conflicts to shape its modernization trajectory and doctrinal rewrites. The ongoing, protracted wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are currently serving as real-world laboratories, supplying the PLA with terabytes of data on the rapidly changing character of war.¹³ However, the PLA’s interpretation and institutionalization of these lessons are highly filtered through its preexisting biases, strategic assumptions, and massive, multi-year defense production programs.¹³

5.1 Information Operations, AI, and the Drive for Intelligentization

The absolute core modernization priority for the PLA is the concept of “Intelligentization” (智能化)—a strategic goal formalized by Xi Jinping in 2020 that dictates the deep, systemic integration of artificial intelligence into kill chains, logistics networks, and command systems.¹³ The PLA’s 2020 foundational doctrinal document, The Science of Military Strategy, classifies this AI integration as nothing less than a “new military revolution”.¹³

Observations drawn from the battlefields of Ukraine have heavily reinforced the PLA’s belief in the necessity of autonomous AI. Noting that reliance on space-based communications infrastructure (such as the struggles surrounding the Starlink network) is highly vulnerable to pervasive, localized electronic warfare (EW), PLA researchers have concluded that the next evolution of combat belongs to autonomous AI-driven swarms.¹³ The PLA envisions utilizing AI to enable a single, secure command node to simultaneously direct dozens of autonomous drones that can operate, navigate, and select targets without requiring constant, jam-susceptible pilot contact.¹³ Strategically, the PLA intends to deploy these intelligent swarms to overwhelm advanced air and missile defenses in Taiwan or target U.S. military infrastructure dispersed across the Indo-Pacific, severely complicating the interception of the PLA’s formidable stockpile of precision guided munitions.¹³

5.2 Lessons from Ukraine: Energy Management and Contested Logistics

Beyond the realm of AI and kinetic strike, the PLA is actively rewriting its sustainment doctrine based on the harsh logistical realities exposed by the Ukraine conflict. Dedicated analyses highlight the absolute necessity for integrated air defense covering supply lines, the fragility of railway transport for operational sustainment, and the critical need for resilient, decentralized logistics.¹⁴

A highly specific takeaway currently being institutionalized is the realization that tactical energy delivery must be revolutionized.¹⁶ The PLA recognizes that electricity must now be treated as a consumable class of supply on par with diesel fuel and ammunition.¹⁶ Ukrainian experiences clearly demonstrated that the integration of microgrids, solar arrays, and modular energy storage modules (ESMs) allows frontline units to maintain continuous operation of drones, radios, and mission-critical electronics without relying on loud, heat-generating fuel generators.¹⁶ By adopting these technologies, units significantly reduce their acoustic and thermal signatures, shielding them from adversary reconnaissance-strike complexes while simultaneously reducing their reliance on highly vulnerable fuel resupply convoys.¹⁵ The PLA is actively incorporating these energy management principles into its multidomain and combined-arms coordination manuals.¹⁵

5.3 Institutional Inertia and the Preference for “Exquisite” Systems

Despite these acute and highly accurate observations, the PLA’s learning process suffers from a critical, potentially fatal blind spot driven by its own institutional culture.¹³ A defining feature of the contemporary conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East is the absolute battlefield dominance of low-cost, “attritable” systems, such as First-Person View (FPV) kamikaze drones and improvised one-way attack munitions.¹³

However, the PLA’s pre-existing financial and intellectual investments lean heavily toward sophisticated, highly expensive, and large fixed-wing platforms (such as the Wing Loong-2, GJ-11, and CH-4) that closely mirror American design philosophies intended for high-duration reconnaissance and precision strikes in uncontested airspace.¹³ Defense production inertia, combined with a rigid military culture that severely punishes deviations from high-level CCP modernization directives, creates a climate where it is professionally risky for mid-level officers to advocate for cheap, attritable systems if it contradicts established, multi-billion-dollar procurement programs.¹³

Consequently, prominent PLA academic publications frequently downplay the role of cheap drones, arguing erroneously that unmanned warfare “does not necessarily reduce the material costs of war,” citing multi-million dollar U.S. systems to justify their own expensive acquisitions.¹³ While the PLA is experimenting with FPV technology, its broader procurement priorities suggest that elements of the leadership are downplaying the central role of low-cost mass in favor of purpose-built, survivable platforms.¹³ This severe misalignment suggests the PLA is doctrinally preparing for a highly sterilized, technologically advanced version of unmanned warfare that may not survive the brutal, cost-imposition, attrition-centric dynamics of a real, protracted conflict.¹³

6. Synthetic Warfare: Constructing Artificial Combat Experience

To directly overcome its deficit in combat experience, safely test new doctrinal concepts, and harden its troops against the “peace disease,” the PLA has aggressively expanded its network of combat training centers (CTCs) and invested massively in synthetic, technology-driven simulation systems.¹¹

6.1 The “Whetstone”: Zhurihe and the 195th OPFOR Brigade

The undisputed epicenter of the PLA’s realistic training ecosystem is the Zhurihe Training Base located in the austere deserts of Inner Mongolia. This sprawling facility serves as the direct, modernized analog to the U.S. Army’s National Training Center (NTC).¹¹ Recognizing the need for expanded realism, Zhurihe underwent massive infrastructural expansion between March 2020 and late 2021.²⁷ During this brief timeframe, the PLA more than doubled the size of its urban combat training centers (MOUT facilities), significantly expanded rail depots to test rapid mobilization, and constructed dedicated energy farms to support continuous, uninterrupted joint operations training.²⁷

At the very heart of Zhurihe’s operations is the 195th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, serving as the PLA’s premier, permanent “Blue Force” (OPFOR).⁷ The 195th acts as a dedicated “whetstone” for the rest of the military. It meticulously emulates the current equipment, tactical formations, rules of engagement, and command philosophies of the United States military, providing rotating PLA “Red Forces” with a highly lethal, uncooperative, and technologically advanced adversary.¹⁸ Precedent suggests that approximately ten brigades drawn from across China’s five theater commands cycle through Zhurihe annually, engaging in high-intensity, multidomain exercises set within incredibly complex electromagnetic and information environments.¹¹

6.2 Virtual Reality and AI-Driven Simulation Systems

The physical, kinetic training conducted at Zhurihe is now heavily augmented by cutting-edge digital simulations that seek to replicate the psychological stress of combat. The PLA is actively deploying and refining advanced systems like the “God of War Simulation Training System” (战神模拟训练系统), which deeply integrates Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) to immerse soldiers in highly realistic, customized battlefield environments, ranging from dense urban street fighting to complex mountain warfare.²⁸

Crucially, these next-generation simulation platforms do not rely on static programming; they utilize advanced machine learning algorithms to generate dynamic, reactive multi-agent models.²⁸ Instead of relying on pre-scripted enemy actions that soldiers can quickly memorize, the AI actively adapts to the trainee’s behavior in real-time, punishing predictable flanking maneuvers, adjusting training difficulty, and forcing soldiers to develop agile operational decision-making skills under immense simulated stress.²⁸ This sophisticated technology, often combined with emerging haptic feedback suits that simulate the physical forces of direct fire and environmental interaction, provides a safer, high-repetition environment designed specifically to build the intuitive combat reflexes that the force historically lacks.²⁸ Furthermore, specialized virtual medical simulation systems, similar to the U.S. VALOR program, are utilized to train personnel in combat casualty care and high-consequence triage scenarios, allowing them to practice clinical decision-making until failure is no longer an option.³²

6.3 The “Fupan” (After-Action Review) Process and the “Problem Show”

The ultimate efficacy of both physical maneuvers and synthetic simulation training hinges entirely on the PLA’s internal evaluation and learning mechanisms. Following every major training event or simulation cycle, participating units are strictly mandated to conduct rigorous “Fupan” (复盘)—comprehensive after-action reviews intended to summarize and reflect on the operation.¹⁰ These structured sessions are designed to systematically detect specific tactical shortcomings, identify capability gaps, highlight successes, and rapidly direct targeted remedial training for the upcoming season.¹⁰

However, the hyper-bureaucratic, politically sensitive nature of the PLA often severely undermines this critical learning process. Because higher headquarters explicitly mandated that units must “discover problems” as a metric of command emphasis, a destructive phenomenon known internally as the “problem show” (问题秀) has become deeply endemic across the force.¹⁰ Units routinely game the evaluation system by intentionally highlighting the exact same minor, easily solvable problems year after year merely to fulfill bureaucratic quotas and demonstrate false compliance to their superiors.¹⁰ In doing so, they actively hide deeper, more systemic combat vulnerabilities to protect their careers.¹⁰ While the PLA has published numerous articles and directives attempting to stamp out this performative practice, the culture of fear instilled by the recent purges ensures that the “problem show” remains a persistent, critical barrier to genuine, force-wide learning and adaptation.¹⁰

7. Reforming Professional Military Education (PME) to Bridge the Gap

Recognizing the widening, dangerous gap between academic military theory and the harsh, evolving realities of operational units, the PLA is attempting to aggressively reform its Professional Military Education (PME) institutions. The focal point of this effort is the prestigious PLA National Defense University (NDU) in Beijing, tasked with developing the joint operations talent required for future conflicts.³⁴

7.1 The Revival of the NDU Operational Instructor Program

In a tacit, institutional admission that its joint officer education system suffers from a severe lack of practical, warfighting grounding, the PLA revived the “Operational Instructor Program” at the NDU in 2022, expanding its scope significantly through 2026.³⁴ The program selectively pulls “outstanding senior and mid-level leaders”—specifically defined as active commanders, political commissars, and senior staff officers serving at the regiment grade or higher (holding the rank of colonel and above)—directly from operational units across all services.³⁴ These officers are assigned to serve as full-time instructors at the NDU for mandatory two-year rotations.³⁴

These experienced field officers are tasked with directly augmenting the NDU’s permanent faculty, which historically consists almost entirely of non-active-duty, uniformed civilian professors who hold PhDs but lack any recent, practical field experience.³⁴ By leading specialized lectures and directing complex simulation exercises in joint operations, these operational instructors ensure that the academic curriculum accurately reflects the current tactical, logistical, and technological realities of the active force, grounding theoretical doctrine in operational truth.³⁴

7.2 Structuring the Joint Operations Talent Pipeline

The historical context of this program is highly revealing. The PLA attempted to implement a nearly identical instructor exchange program in 2003–2004.³⁴ By 2009, approximately 12 percent of the NDU faculty were sourced from operational units.³⁴ However, the experiment was quietly abandoned in subsequent years because the operational officers who served in these vital teaching positions were subsequently passed over for critical command promotions, viewing the academic assignment as a career-ending diversion.³⁴

The aggressive second iteration and revival of this concept in 2026 indicates a top-down mandate from the CMC to permanently alter the incentive structure within the PLA.³⁴ It signals clearly that PME teaching tours must no longer be viewed as bureaucratic dead-ends, but rather as essential, highly valued steps for advancing within the joint operations hierarchy. Balancing theoretical study with practical application is now viewed as an existential requirement for the PLA’s future command cadre.³⁴

8. Analyzing Theater Command Disparities and Joint Operations Readiness

The ultimate, defining metric of the PLA’s decades-long modernization effort is its ability to seamlessly execute complex joint operations—integrating land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains—across its five regional theater commands. Announced by Xi Jinping in November 2020, the PLA’s foundational military training reform follows a highly structured, sequential path: advancing from basic training, to combined-arms training, and finally culminating in joint operations training.³⁵

8.1 The Joint Training Reform: Stuck in an Exploratory Phase

Despite the high-profile nature of recent military exercises, internal PLA assessments and documentation from early 2026 reveal a critical vulnerability: the final, most crucial stage of this sequence—joint operations training—remains decidedly stuck in an “exploratory phase” across much of the force.³⁵ While the PLA successfully completed its exploratory phases and established formalized models for basic training (concluded June 2023) and combined-arms training (concluded October 2024), it has yet to finalize or mandate a force-wide implementation model for true, integrated joint operations.³⁵

8.2 The Vanguard Role of the Southern Theater Command (STC)

According to an authoritative January 2026 report published on the front page of the Liberation Army Daily, the Southern Theater Command (STC) has emerged as the PLA’s undisputed vanguard and “most model-worthy organization” for institutionalizing joint training.³⁵ The STC has recently implemented a unified, deeply integrated management approach that firmly links actual combat requirements to training content, evaluation standard measurement, and task execution across its assigned services.³⁵

Crucially, the STC routinely establishes formal, trackable lists of weaknesses and gaps in system-level capabilities, assigning specific corrective actions and responsibilities directly to units to force sustained, measurable improvements in both horizontal and vertical command relationships.³⁵ By utilizing actual combat scenarios to lead its training cycles, the STC aims to ensure the steady, reliable operation of a joint-centered mechanism.³⁵

8.3 Comparative Analysis of the Five Theater Commands

The purposeful elevation of the STC as the model for joint operations highlights severe capability disparities and uneven development across the broader PLA. Furthermore, the development of highly capable, technologically advanced Intelligence and Reconnaissance Brigades (IRBs) at the theater army level has given operational ground forces unprecedented ability to collect and exploit intelligence for deep targeting, but the integration of these assets varies wildly.³⁶

• Northern Theater Command (NTC): Despite bearing the responsibility for highly complex, volatile regional contingencies—including securing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the Korean Peninsula, executing massive noncombatant evacuation operations, and managing the Russian border—the NTC is currently assessed as lacking significantly in both equipment modernization and advanced joint training execution.²¹
• Western Theater Command (WTC): Tasked with counterterrorism operations in Central and South Asia, managing cooperation with Pakistan, and overseeing the highly contested border with India, the WTC has demonstrated growing capacity.²¹ However, it remains heavily focused on specialized, high-altitude expeditionary land power rather than holistic joint multidomain operations.²¹
• Central Theater Command (CTC): Focused primarily on the defense of the capital and serving as a strategic reserve force to rapidly reinforce other commands during a crisis, the CTC’s capabilities remain stable and tailored to internal defense.²¹
• Eastern Theater Command (ETC): As the command bearing primary, direct responsibility for executing any operations against Taiwan (including comprehensive blockades and complex small island seizure campaigns), the ETC has seen massive, prioritized improvements in equipment modernization.²¹ However, the stark fact that the STC, rather than the ETC, is currently presented as the PLA’s primary model for joint training exploration strongly indicates that the ETC’s preparations for Taiwan still possess substantial room for improvement.³⁵ The PLA internally recognizes that the ETC has not yet perfected joint operations. Therefore, the existing patterns of military activity around the Taiwan Strait represent ongoing capability development and testing, rather than the PLA’s final, intended operational form for an invasion.³⁵

9. Operationalizing the Threat: Force Posture, Exercises, and Paramilitary Integration

Despite the internal structural friction caused by leadership purges and the ongoing, incomplete exploration of joint doctrine, the PLA continues to rapidly scale the complexity, lethality, and geographic reach of its combat readiness patrols and deterrence exercises, particularly regarding Taiwan and the First Island Chain.¹⁸

9.1 Justice Mission 2025 and High-Fidelity Blockade Simulations

In late December 2025, the PLA launched a massive, highly coordinated joint exercise code-named “Justice Mission 2025” (正义使命—2025).¹⁷ Far from a routine patrol, this drill served as a comprehensive, high-fidelity rehearsal for a multi-domain campaign specifically designed to isolate Taiwan from external support. The exercise focused explicitly on testing sea-air combat readiness patrols, achieving rapid multidomain superiority, and executing tight blockades of key Taiwanese ports to interdict energy imports.¹¹

The operational scale and aggressive nature of Justice Mission 2025 were unprecedented. Over the course of the opening day, regional defense ministries detected 89 PLA aircraft and 28 naval vessels operating in a highly coordinated, multi-axis encirclement.³⁹ During the critical second phase of the exercise, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) demonstrated its integration into maritime interdiction by launching a barrage of long-range rocket artillery from coastal batteries located in Pingtan and Shishi in Fujian Province.⁴⁰ Likely utilizing the advanced PHL-16/PCL-191 Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems—which are capable of firing guided rockets up to 280 kilometers—the PLAGF fired a total of 27 rockets into defined exclusion zones directly north (targeting the approaches to the port of Keelung) and southwest (targeting the port of Kaohsiung).⁴⁰ Most notably, 10 of these guided rockets landed deliberately within Taiwan’s contiguous zone (12–24 nautical miles from the coast), marking the closest PLA projectiles to impact near the island to date and signaling a dramatic escalation in risk tolerance.⁴⁰ The exercise also featured a formation of four amphibious assault ships deployed east of Taiwan, indicating a rehearsal for counter-intervention operations against U.S. forces.⁴⁰

9.2 China Coast Guard (CCG) Integration as a Strategic Multiplier

A critical, deeply concerning evolution demonstrated during Justice Mission 2025 and subsequent regional operations is the deep, seamless integration of the China Coast Guard (CCG) into PLA military planning and operational execution. Of the 28 vessels deployed during the highly aggressive opening phase of Justice Mission 2025, nearly half—13 vessels—belonged to the CCG, operating in direct coordination with PLAN warships.¹⁷

This deployment pattern indicates a solidified doctrinal shift within Beijing’s strategic calculus: in the event of a Taiwan contingency or South China Sea escalation, the PLA will rely heavily on the heavily armed CCG to enforce quarantines, conduct hostile board-and-search operations, and forcefully manage civilian maritime traffic.¹⁷ This paramilitary integration acts as a strategic multiplier, freeing heavier PLA Navy (PLAN) combatants to focus entirely on high-end counter-intervention operations against U.S. or allied naval strike groups operating east of Taiwan.¹⁷ Throughout 2024 and 2025—originating with the Joint Sword exercises—CCG coordination with the Eastern Theater Command advanced significantly, evolving from disparate, localized patrols to fully integrated, theater-wide law enforcement drills that effectively encircle target islands in concert with PLA naval aviation.¹⁸

10. Conclusion: Evaluating True Preparedness for Major Armed Conflict

Evaluating whether the People’s Liberation Army is “truly prepared” for a major, protracted war requires decoupling its impressive, verifiable acquisition metrics from its underlying, highly opaque institutional health. From a purely material, geographic, and kinetic standpoint, the PLA is vastly more capable today than at any point in its history. It possesses a navy that is rapidly gaining blue-water proficiency, an expanding, highly lethal arsenal of long-range precision fires, and a sprawling, highly sophisticated synthetic training infrastructure designed specifically and intentionally to offset its historical lack of combat experience.⁸ The routine, successful execution of massive, deeply coordinated multidomain exercises like Justice Mission 2025 unequivocally proves that the PLA can reliably project overwhelming force into the First Island Chain and severely challenge U.S. regional hegemony.¹⁸

However, the military apparatus is simultaneously hollowed out by severe, self-inflicted political wounds. The massive 2022–2026 political purges have systematically stripped the high command of its most experienced, realistic, and operationally competent leaders.¹ This action has created a profound experience vacuum at the exact moment the force is attempting to operationalize highly complex, untried joint doctrine. Furthermore, the CCP’s unyielding demand for absolute political loyalty and highly centralized control fundamentally contradicts the agile, decentralized mission command structure required to survive and adapt in the heavily contested, electronic warfare-saturated environments the PLA fully expects to face.²

While the PLA’s hardware, its advanced AI integrations, and its meticulously designed synthetic training environments suggest a high state of technical readiness, its brittle command architecture, its heavily scripted bureaucratic evaluation processes (such as the “problem show”), and the strategic isolation of its paramount leader dramatically increase the risk of operational paralysis and catastrophic miscalculation in the event of an actual conflict.⁵ The PLA is diligently, aggressively preparing for war, constructing artificial battlefields to cure its “peace disease.” Yet, its ability to dynamically adapt to the lethal chaos, friction, and staggering attrition of the first shot remains profoundly, dangerously untested.

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1. Executive Summary

Exercise Balikatan 2026, executed between April 20 and May 8, 2026, represents a fundamental shift in the operational dynamics and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.¹ Constituting the 41st iteration of the annual military drills between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the United States military, the exercise intentionally coincides with the 75th anniversary of the 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.³ However, the 2026 iteration diverges significantly from its historical precedents. It has transformed from a localized, bilateral training event focused on internal security into an expansive, multilateral power-projection mechanism designed for high-intensity, multi-domain operations against peer adversaries.²

Involving more than 17,000 personnel, Balikatan 2026 integrates forces from the Philippines, the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, France, and New Zealand.² Furthermore, it incorporates an international observer program featuring 17 additional nations, including European partners such as Czechia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom.² This deliberate expansion reflects a strategic transition toward “alliance density,” wherein Manila and Washington seek to internationalize the defense of the First Island Chain to complicate adversary strategic calculus.

Operationally, the center of gravity for the exercise is distributed across the Philippine archipelago, with a pronounced focus on the northernmost extremities—specifically the Batanes and Babuyan Island Groups adjacent to the Luzon Strait—and the contested West Philippine Sea.⁵ The training regimen spans air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, validating complex capabilities such as expeditionary advanced base operations, distributed maritime logistics, integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), and joint combined fires.²

At the doctrinal level, the exercise serves as a primary testing environment for the AFP’s newly operationalized Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC), a framework dictating a pivot toward forward and seaward territorial defense.¹⁰ Through the deployment of advanced kinetic systems—including the U.S. Typhon system, Naval Strike Missiles, Japanese Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles, and Philippine BrahMos cruise missiles—the coalition is actively demonstrating lethal sea-denial capabilities.⁵ The strategic messaging directed at the People’s Republic of China is unambiguous, emphasizing collective deterrence and a resolute defense of sovereign maritime domains despite warnings from Beijing that the coalition is risking regional stability.¹³

2. Geopolitical Context and the Evolution of the Alliance

Understanding the scale and scope of Balikatan 2026 requires an analysis of the geopolitical environment that necessitated its expansion. For decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines focused the majority of its resources and training on internal security operations, primarily combating insurgencies in the southern islands. Early iterations of Exercise Balikatan reflected this orientation, focusing heavily on counter-terrorism, light infantry tactics, and civil-military operations.

However, escalating tensions in the South China Sea—characterized by repeated physical confrontations, gray-zone coercion, and the rapid militarization of artificial island features by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Chinese Coast Guard—have forced a rapid structural realignment within the Philippine defense establishment. The alliance with the United States, anchored by the Mutual Defense Treaty, has been revitalized to address these external, conventional threats.³

The 75th anniversary of the treaty in 2026 provides a symbolic backdrop for a highly practical modernization effort.⁴ The United States and the Philippines are utilizing Balikatan 2026 to operationalize agreements made under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which grants U.S. forces access to strategic Philippine bases. The exercise is no longer merely a demonstration of friendship; it is a critical mechanism for ensuring tactical proficiency, interoperability, and the development of a combined force capable of sustaining a credible defense posture in a highly contested environment.² The shift signifies an acknowledgment that regional stability can no longer be maintained solely through diplomatic protest, but requires the physical demonstration of integrated, lethal combat capabilities.

3. Force Generation and the Multilateral Architecture

The defining structural characteristic of Balikatan 2026 is its multilateral force architecture. The Philippines has actively pursued what strategic analysts describe as a “looking for a crowd” strategy.⁵ By bringing a broad coalition of partner nations into its territorial waters and airspace, the Philippines seeks to deter aggression through the promise of a collective, international response.

3.1 United States and Philippine Contributions

The United States has committed roughly 10,000 service personnel to the exercise, representing a massive deployment of forward-based power into the theater.⁵ This deployment, executed concurrently with significant U.S. military commitments in the Middle East and Europe, underscores the prioritization of the Indo-Pacific in Washington’s global strategy.⁵ The U.S. contingent is heavily weighted toward expeditionary and advanced strike capabilities, led by the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 7.⁴

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, acting as the host and primary partner, integrates its personnel across all exercise phases. The Philippine contribution is focused on validating its ongoing modernization programs, particularly the integration of new command-and-control architectures and coastal defense assets managed by the AFP Education and Training Command.²

3.2 The Integration of Partner Nations

The 2026 iteration features the unprecedented integration of allied forces into active combat scenarios, moving far beyond traditional observer status.

Japan’s participation is a historically significant milestone. For the first time since the end of World War II, Japan has deployed “combat-capable” troops—totaling 1,400 personnel—as active partners in the Philippines.¹² Empowered by a recently activated reciprocal access agreement, Japan’s involvement operationalizes Tokyo’s strategic intent to build a secure “southern barrier” along the First Island Chain, linking the defense of its Ryukyu Islands directly to the northern Philippines.⁵

Australia, a long-standing strategic partner to the Philippines, deployed approximately 400 personnel from the Australian Defence Force (ADF).⁷ This contingent includes land maneuver forces, tactical air elements, specialized medical teams, and the Anzac-class frigate HMAS Toowoomba.⁷ Australian participation is explicitly tied to upholding international law, ensuring freedom of navigation, and demonstrating the depth of the bilateral defense relationship in securing a prosperous Indo-Pacific.⁷

France has similarly solidified its role as a consistent Indo-Pacific security partner. Participating as part of its five-month Jeanne D’Arc mission, the French Navy has integrated amphibious warships and frigates into the exercise.¹⁶ This deployment is designed to acclimate French naval officers to long-term operations in the region and to manage the complexities of modern naval warfare, including the integration of drones and advanced data networks.¹⁶ France’s involvement in Balikatan complements its broader regional engagement, which includes the provision of maritime security assistance and the construction of patrol vessels for the Philippine Coast Guard.¹⁶

Canada and New Zealand, entering the exercise as full participants, reflect the expanding geographic scope of nations invested in Indo-Pacific stability. Canada’s involvement follows recently finalized defense agreements with Manila, further solidifying the presence of Western and NATO-aligned forces operating in the Philippine Sea.⁵

4. Geographic Optimization and Strategic Choke Points

Geography dictates strategy in the maritime domains of the Indo-Pacific. Balikatan 2026 distinguishes itself by fully utilizing the strategic depth of the Philippine archipelago, positioning forces in direct proximity to the region’s most critical maritime transit routes.² The exercise is geographically distributed to rehearse defense mechanisms for two primary operational theaters: the northern approaches toward Taiwan and the western maritime domains in the South China Sea.

4.1 The Northern Flank: Batanes, the Babuyan Islands, and the Luzon Strait

A central focus of the exercise involves operations in the northernmost Philippine province of Batanes and the adjacent Babuyan Island Group.⁸ This territory borders the Luzon Strait and the Bashi Channel, which serve as critical maritime conduits connecting the Philippine Sea to the South China Sea. Control of these waterways is essential for projecting naval power, maintaining commercial shipping lanes, and facilitating military transit in the event of a regional contingency.

The strategic relevance of this geography is closely tied to the defense of Taiwan. The island of Itbayat in the Batanes group lies less than 100 miles from Taiwan’s southern coast.⁵ By conducting Maritime Key Terrain Security Operations (MKTSO) in this sector, U.S. and Philippine forces are rehearsing the rapid deployment, securement, and defense of strategically vital islands that could serve as choke points or staging areas.⁸ The MKTSO curriculum focuses on the rapid insertion of troops into remote environments, securing beachheads and ports, establishing temporary defensive fortifications, and coordinating surveillance across the strait.⁸

Furthermore, the deployment of the U.S. 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment to the Cagayan North International Airport (also known as Lal-lo Airport) highlights the utility of EDCA sites.¹⁵ Operating from this airfield in Northern Luzon, American forces can utilize long-range anti-ship missile systems to establish a sea-denial zone extending up to 185 kilometers into the waters separating the Philippines and Taiwan.¹⁵ This positioning signals a readiness to contest adversary naval movements through one of the primary passages into the First Island Chain.

4.2 The Western Flank: The West Philippine Sea

Simultaneously, Balikatan 2026 dedicates significant resources to operations along the western coast of the archipelago, focusing on the West Philippine Sea.² This area remains a highly volatile flashpoint, characterized by competing territorial claims and the persistent presence of foreign maritime militias. The drills conducted in this theater—ranging from multilateral maritime patrols to integrated air and missile defense scenarios—are designed to assert sovereignty, enforce UNCLOS provisions, and demonstrate the coalition’s capability to operate effectively within an adversary’s perceived sphere of influence.⁷

5. Multinational Maritime Operations and the Capstone SINKEX

The maritime domain serves as the primary theater for validating joint interoperability during the exercise. The operational activities are designed to stress-test the command-and-control linkages required to coordinate complex tactical maneuvers among navies utilizing different communication protocols and operational doctrines.

5.1 Multinational Maritime Exercise (MME)

The maritime component is structured around the Multinational Maritime Exercise (MME), directed by the U.S. Navy’s Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 7 and Task Force Ashland.⁴ DESRON 7, acting as the primary tactical and operational commander for deployed ships in Southeast Asia, oversees a combined task group comprising ten surface vessels from the United States, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. Coast Guard.⁴

The MME involves high-intensity training evolutions conducted off the west coast of the Philippines over multiple days.² The curriculum includes coordinated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tracking, live-fire gunnery engagements, deck-landing qualifications for cross-deck aviation operations, and complex search-and-rescue and medical evacuation procedures.⁴ By executing these maneuvers as a unified surface action group, the coalition ensures that in a crisis scenario, diverse naval assets can aggregate rapidly and operate under a centralized command structure.

5.2 The Joint Sinking Exercise (SINKEX)

The tactical culmination of the maritime phase is the sinking exercise (SINKEX). This event moves beyond simulated targeting to involve live kinetic strikes against a physical vessel. The target designated for the 2026 exercise is a decommissioned Philippine Navy logistics ship, the BRP Lake Caliraya (PS-70).²⁰ (Note: Subsidiary exercise reports also reference the decommissioned BRP Quezon as a potential target in surrounding drills).²¹

The SINKEX is designed as a joint maritime strike scenario. According to exercise spokespersons, the objective is not simply to sink the vessel, but to orchestrate a highly synchronized convergence of fires utilizing air, land, and sea-based assets simultaneously.²⁰ This requires aircraft, surface ships, and land-based missile batteries to share targeting telemetry in real-time, effectively creating a unified kill web. The successful execution of the SINKEX serves as the ultimate validation of the coalition’s ability to locate, track, and destroy adversary surface combatants in a contested maritime environment.

6. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)

As modern warfare becomes increasingly reliant on advanced aerospace threats—including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (UAS)—the ability to defend critical infrastructure and troop concentrations is paramount. Balikatan 2026 addresses this requirement through dedicated Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) operations.⁸

Conducted primarily at Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in Zambales, the IAMD drills test the coalition’s capacity to detect and neutralize complex aerial threats.⁸ The training involves linking disparate radar sensor networks, command centers, and ground-based air defense platforms into a cohesive architecture.⁸ This integration is critical; the Philippine military currently possesses limited organic air defense capabilities and must rely on allied systems to protect high-value assets and precision strike batteries during the initial phases of a conflict.²³

The scenarios are designed to minimize the sensor-to-shooter timeline, allowing allied forces to rapidly process tracking data and assign interception tasks to the optimal defensive platform.⁸ By rehearsing these protocols, the coalition enhances its defensive posture against preemptive strikes designed to degrade command nodes or logistics hubs.

7. Advanced Kinetic Assets and Sea Denial Architecture

The operational geography of the Philippines makes it uniquely suited for anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. During Balikatan 2026, the allied coalition deployed and tested a suite of advanced kinetic weapons designed explicitly for coastal defense and sea denial, altering the tactical calculus within the First Island Chain.

7.1 The Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS)

The U.S. 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment deployed the NMESIS platform to the northern Philippines.¹⁵ This system consists of an unmanned, remote-controlled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) chassis equipped with the Naval Strike Missile (NSM).¹⁵ Staged at austere locations like the Cagayan North International Airport, NMESIS exemplifies the doctrine of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). The system provides a highly mobile, low-signature anti-ship capability that can threaten maritime targets up to 185 kilometers away before rapidly relocating to avoid counter-battery fire.¹⁵

7.2 The Typhon Missile System

The exercise also featured the deployment of the U.S. Typhon Missile System. This ground-based launcher represents a significant escalation in regional strike capabilities, as it is capable of firing Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) interceptors—which possess secondary land-attack and anti-ship modes—as well as Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles.⁵ The integration of the Typhon system introduces a long-range, deep-strike capability into the theater, providing the coalition with the means to target adversary infrastructure and naval assets at strategic distances.

7.3 Japanese Type 88 and Philippine BrahMos Systems

Allied kinetic contributions further compound the sea-denial architecture. For the first time, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force executed live-fire operations with the Type 88 surface-to-ship missile outside of Japanese sovereign territory.¹² This deployment directly supports the SINKEX and demonstrates Japan’s technical and political readiness to engage in integrated combat operations alongside its partners.¹²

Simultaneously, the Armed Forces of the Philippines simulated the deployment of its newly acquired BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles.⁵ Procured from India, the BrahMos system provides the Philippine military with a highly lethal, organic coastal defense capability. Operating at speeds approaching Mach 3, the missile drastically compresses the reaction time available to adversary point-defense systems, creating a formidable deterrent against hostile surface action groups operating within the Philippine exclusive economic zone.

8. Expeditionary Logistics and Distributed Sustainment

Military strategy is ultimately constrained by logistics. In archipelagic warfare, the ability to sustain dispersed forces over vast expanses of water—while under the constant threat of interdiction—is the primary determinant of operational endurance. Balikatan 2026 places an unprecedented emphasis on validating dynamic maritime sustainment and distributed logistics.²

Prior to the formal commencement of kinetic drills, U.S. and Philippine forces executed complex rehearsals involving the offload of heavy equipment and supplies from maritime prepositioning force shipping at the Port of Cagayan de Oro.² Once ashore, this materiel was rapidly transported and distributed across logistical nodes throughout Luzon to support the ensuing training events.²

This emphasis on distribution is critical because traditional, static logistics hubs are highly vulnerable to precision missile strikes. By practicing the rapid offload and dispersed routing of supplies, the coalition is building the resilient supply chains necessary to sustain combat operations in a contested environment. The U.S. Air Force also played a vital role in this phase, with units such as the 317th Airlift Wing arriving in the Philippines to conduct Maximum Endurance Operations (MEO) and provide tactical airlift support across the theater.²⁵ The ability to continuously move munitions, fuel, and provisions to remote island outposts dictates the tempo and survivability of the forward-deployed forces.

9. Space and Cyber Domain Operations

Balikatan 2026 acknowledges that modern multi-domain operations are entirely dependent on the continuous availability of space and cyber assets. The domains of space and cyberspace are no longer viewed as benign support environments; they are congested, contested battlefields critical for navigation, communication, and intelligence gathering.²⁶

U.S. Space Force leadership, including Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman, emphasized during the exercise period that the U.S. military is undergoing sweeping changes to reoptimize its forces for Great Power Competition in the space domain.²⁶ During Balikatan, specialized units, supported by leaders like USSF Brig. Gen. Denaro, engaged with forces on the ground to ensure that satellite communications and orbital surveillance architectures could withstand jamming or degradation attempts.²⁷

Concurrently, the exercise incorporated rigorous cyber defense operations.⁷ Joint cyber units from allied nations trained shoulder-to-shoulder to identify, isolate, and neutralize simulated digital intrusions.²⁷ The objective of these drills is to protect critical military networks and civilian infrastructure from sophisticated electronic warfare and cyber-attacks, ensuring that the command-and-control linkages governing the kinetic weapons systems remain intact during combat operations.

10. Operationalizing the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC)

Beyond the tactical integration of allied forces, Balikatan 2026 functions as the primary operational proving ground for the Philippine government’s Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC).¹⁰ Operationalized by the Marcos Jr. administration in early 2024, the CADC represents a paradigm shift in Philippine military strategy.

For the majority of its history, the AFP was structured and trained for internal security, focusing on counter-insurgency and domestic policing. The CADC reorients the military toward external territorial defense, dictating a posture that projects defensive power outward from the landmass to secure the entirety of the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone and extended continental shelf.¹⁰ As Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. articulated, the CADC is designed to allow the AFP to guarantee the unimpeded exploration and exploitation of natural resources by Philippine nationals within their sovereign jurisdiction.¹¹

Implementing the CADC requires a transition from conventional, unfocused military build-ups to a strategy defined by basing dispersion, the use of archipelagic geography for concealment, and the deployment of ranged strike capabilities.¹⁰ The scenarios executed during Balikatan 2026—particularly the remote deployments in Batanes and the integration of BrahMos missiles—are direct physical manifestations of the CADC doctrine.

However, military analysts assess that operationalizing the CADC presents both internal and external challenges. Internally, the Philippine military must overcome historical inter-service rivalries that can hamper the joint cooperation necessary for complex, multi-domain defense.¹⁰ Externally, the CADC functions effectively as a “counter” A2/AD strategy directed against China’s maritime posture.¹⁰ As Manila expands its military positions along strategic border areas and integrates foreign military partnerships, it inadvertently fosters security dilemma dynamics.¹⁰ The hardening of Philippine defense capabilities, while intended for protection, is perceived by adversaries as a threat, thereby increasing the likelihood of sharper military confrontations in the near term.¹⁰

11. Strategic Signaling and the Diplomatic Battleground

Military exercises of the magnitude of Balikatan 2026 are inherently political instruments. They serve as a massive signaling apparatus, projecting resolve to allies while issuing a stark deterrent warning to potential adversaries. The diplomatic exchanges surrounding the 2026 drills highlight a deeply polarized regional environment.

11.1 The Rhetoric of the People’s Republic of China

Unsurprisingly, the commencement of the expansive multilateral drills drew immediate and severe condemnation from Beijing. The Chinese Foreign Ministry characterized the involvement of external forces—specifically the United States, Japan, and European nations—as a deliberate attempt to “sow division and confrontation” within the Asia-Pacific region.¹³ A foreign ministry spokesperson warned that the participating countries were “blindly binding themselves together” and were akin to “playing with fire,” asserting that such actions would ultimately backfire and destabilize the region.¹⁴

11.2 The Philippine Posture of Resolve

In stark contrast to the strategic ambivalence that characterized previous administrations, the Philippine defense establishment responded to Beijing’s warnings with resolute defiance. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Department of National Defense systematically dismissed the Chinese rhetoric.

Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad, the AFP spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea, stated unequivocally that the military remains “unfazed” by the threats, characterizing China’s statements as predictable “deceptive messaging”.¹⁴ Trinidad emphasized that the joint drills are lawful actions of an independent sovereign state and are purely defensive in nature, designed solely to protect what is legally Philippine territory.¹⁴ He further clarified that the CADC and the exercises are not designed against any specific country, but rather to give the AFP the capability to secure its maritime domain.¹¹

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. delivered an even sharper critique, stating that Beijing’s intentions have always been “sinister and non-transparent” and that there is “no trust at all” in China’s diplomatic overtures.²⁸ Teodoro framed Balikatan as an essential exercise in collective deterrence, arguing that China’s negative reaction is proof that the deterrent effect is working.²⁸ He accused Beijing of utilizing a strategy of “guilt avoidance,” attempting to shift the blame for regional instability onto the Philippines and its allies while ignoring its own aggressive actions in the South China Sea.²⁸

AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. reinforced this unified stance, stating during the opening ceremonies that the presence of the multinational coalition sends an “unmistakable message that security is shared and that partnership remains our strongest advantage”.¹³

12. Long-Term Trajectories and Regional Stability

Exercise Balikatan 2026 establishes a set of operational realities that will profoundly influence the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific moving forward. The exercise confirms that the bilateral U.S.-Philippine alliance has effectively evolved into a multilateral security hub, capable of integrating forces from across the globe into a cohesive combat architecture.

The institutionalization of Japanese combat participation, alongside the formalized integration of forces from Australia, France, Canada, and New Zealand, guarantees that any future regional contingency will not be confined to a bilateral dispute. The “alliance density” demonstrated during the exercise ensures that aggression within the Philippine EEZ or the broader First Island Chain will immediately internationalize, fundamentally altering the risk calculations for any adversary contemplating offensive action.⁵

Furthermore, the exercise serves as a practical rehearsal for Taiwan contingencies. By developing pre-set logistical channels, testing advanced kinetic systems near the Bashi Channel, and validating the rapid deployment of expeditionary forces, Washington and Manila are laying the necessary groundwork to sustain prolonged combat operations in the region.⁵

Ultimately, Balikatan 2026 solidifies the irreversible trajectory of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Through the rigorous testing of the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, the Philippines is transitioning from a state reliant on diplomatic protest into an active, capable node within the regional deterrence network. The success of the exercise lies in its ability to seamlessly weave advanced technology, multinational logistics, and aggressive strategic messaging into a unified posture that secures the maritime domains of the Indo-Pacific against territorial coercion.

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