1. Executive Summary

This comprehensive intelligence report provides an exhaustive assessment of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) space warfare strategy, counterspace capabilities, and doctrinal evolution as of early 2026. Driven by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ambition to achieve national rejuvenation and global military preeminence, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has fundamentally integrated the space domain into its core warfighting architecture. Space is no longer viewed merely as a supporting theater. Instead, it is the ultimate high ground necessary to enable “intelligentized” warfare and execute system destruction warfare against advanced adversaries.

The period between 2024 and 2026 witnessed profound structural, doctrinal, and operational shifts within the Chinese military space apparatus. In April 2024, the PLA executed a sweeping organizational overhaul, dissolving the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and elevating the Aerospace Force (ASF), Cyberspace Force (CSF), and Information Support Force (ISF) to report directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC).¹ This restructuring aims to streamline command and control, eliminate bureaucratic inefficiencies, and accelerate the integration of space and cyber capabilities into joint warfighting operations.

Concurrently, China’s orbital presence has expanded at an unprecedented rate. As of late 2025, China maintains an operational constellation of over 1,301 satellites, representing a 667 percent growth since 2015.⁴ This includes a highly sophisticated network of over 510 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms capable of providing continuous, persistent targeting data against United States and allied expeditionary forces.³ Furthermore, Beijing is rapidly deploying proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) mega-constellations. Notable among these are the G60 Qianfan and the revolutionary Three-Body Computing Constellation, which introduces orbital edge computing and artificial intelligence directly into the space tier.⁴

In the counterspace realm, the PLA has matured its capabilities across the entire spectrum of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. Ground-based direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missiles, such as the Dong Neng (DN) series, remain operational and continue to undergo testing.⁷ More alarmingly, the PLA has demonstrated highly advanced co-orbital capabilities. Commercial and military intelligence sources confirm that Chinese satellites engaged in coordinated “dogfighting” maneuvers in Low Earth Orbit throughout 2024.⁹ Alongside the recurring secretive missions of the Shenlong reusable spaceplane, these developments confirm that China is actively practicing offensive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for on-orbit engagements.¹¹

The PLA’s risk calculus in the space domain is also shifting. Chinese military doctrine views space deterrence (kongjian weishe) not merely as a defensive posture to protect orbital assets, but as an offensive, compellent tool designed to achieve terrestrial political objectives.¹³ Driven by an inflated perception of the threat posed by Western commercial space integration, the PLA is displaying a growing tolerance for escalatory behavior in space.³ This report details these multifaceted developments, offering a nuanced understanding of China’s strategy to contest, degrade, and dominate the space domain in future conflicts.

2. Strategic Context and the Vision for Space Dominance

To comprehend the nuances of China’s space warfare strategy, analysts must first locate the space domain within the broader ideological and strategic framework of the Chinese Communist Party. For General Secretary Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership, space is inexorably linked to the national narrative of rejuvenation. It serves simultaneously as a source of profound national pride, a vital driver of high-technology economic growth, and an indispensable component of modern military power.⁴ The strategic budget reflects this priority, with China’s official defense spending reaching an estimated $249 billion in 2025, supported by substantial, opaque investments in dual-use aerospace technologies.⁸

2.1 The Transition to “Intelligentized” Warfare

The PLA’s understanding of modern conflict has evolved rapidly over the past two decades. Previously focused on “informatized” warfare, which centers on winning conflicts through information dominance and network-centric operations, the PLA doctrine has now officially transitioned to a focus on “intelligentized” warfare.¹³ Intelligentized warfare envisions a battlefield saturated with artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, autonomous systems, swarming technologies, and advanced cloud computing.¹⁸

In this new paradigm, cognitive overmatch is the ultimate objective. The side that can sense the battlefield, process vast amounts of data, and make accurate decisions faster than the adversary will inevitably secure victory. Space is the foundational layer of this intelligentized architecture. The PLA relies on its orbital assets to provide the high-bandwidth communications, precise timing, and persistent surveillance required to fuel its AI algorithms and command autonomous assets across the terrestrial, maritime, and air domains.³ The PLA is investing heavily in this transition, with annual AI defense investments exceeding $1.6 billion, focusing specifically on Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (C5ISRT) capabilities.¹⁸

2.2 System Destruction Warfare and the Role of Space

Underpinning the PLA’s operational doctrine is the concept of system destruction warfare.²⁰ Chinese military theorists do not view war as a clash of individual units or platforms, but rather as a clash of opposing operational systems. The objective is not necessarily to annihilate the enemy’s forces through attrition, but to paralyze the enemy’s operational system by striking its critical nodes and linkages.³

Space assets are recognized by the PLA as the most critical vulnerabilities of the United States and allied militaries. The PLA assesses that Western forces are fundamentally dependent on space for navigation, precision targeting, secure communications, and early warning.³ Consequently, degrading, denying, or destroying these space-based nodes is viewed as a highly efficient method to blind and paralyze the adversary’s terrestrial forces. In a conflict scenario, preemptive or early strikes against adversarial space architectures are not viewed by the PLA as escalatory outliers, but rather as doctrinal prerequisites for securing operational success.³

2.3 Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) in the Space Domain

A critical facet of China’s strategy is the implementation of Military-Civil Fusion (MCF).²¹ Unlike Western nations where a relatively clear distinction exists between civilian, commercial, and military space assets, China deliberately blurs these lines.³ The CCP’s strategy dictates that all commercial space entities must align with state objectives and be prepared to support military operations.

This has resulted in an aerospace sector characterized by commercialization with Chinese characteristics.²¹ Commercial satellite constellations, such as those developed for Earth observation or broadband internet, are inherently dual-use. The Chinese government refers to this integration as “one star with many uses,” ensuring that commercial platforms can seamlessly provide ISR or communications bandwidth to the PLA during a crisis.²¹ From an intelligence perspective, this means the PLA’s true orbital capacity is significantly larger than its strictly military-designated fleet. Furthermore, it complicates targeting for adversarial forces, as striking a Chinese commercial satellite could trigger distinct legal and diplomatic ramifications, despite its integration into the PLA kill chain.³

3. Organizational Restructuring: The Dissolution of the SSF and Rise of the Aerospace Force

A defining event in the recent trajectory of China’s space strategy occurred on April 19, 2024, when the PLA abruptly disbanded the Strategic Support Force (SSF).² The SSF had been established in late 2015 as a theater command-level organization intended to centralize space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and psychological operations.¹ Its dissolution less than a decade later signals a critical shift in the PLA’s approach to domain management and joint operations.

3.1 Analyzing the Failure of the Strategic Support Force

The SSF was originally designed to be an incubator for nascent, high-technology warfare domains, bringing them together to create powerful synergies in information warfare.² However, intelligence assessments indicate that the SSF ultimately suffered from severe administrative bloat and failed to adequately integrate its disparate missions.¹ Instead of a cohesive information warfare service, the SSF operated as an administrative umbrella housing deeply siloed departments, specifically the Space Systems Department (SSD) and the Network Systems Department (NSD).²²

Furthermore, the PLA leadership likely grew dissatisfied with the SSF’s inability to seamlessly provide localized, tactical support to the regional Theater Commands.²⁴ The SSF had become a bottleneck. The CMC’s decision to dissolve the SSF reveals compelling concerns over its contribution to joint operational effectiveness, as well as broader issues with inefficient management.¹

3.2 The New Force Structure: Services and Arms

Following the April 2024 restructuring, the PLA established a modernized system comprising four main services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force) and four strategic arms (Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force).²² Crucially, these four arms were established as deputy-theater grade organizations and elevated to report directly to the Central Military Commission.²

To provide clarity on the current command hierarchy, the following table details the post-2024 PLA organizational structure regarding the primary services and newly designated strategic arms.

Organizational Tier	Entity Name	Primary Strategic Function	Leadership / Reporting Structure
Traditional Services	PLA Army (PLAA)	Ground warfare and territorial defense.	Reports to CMC; integrated into Theater Commands.
Traditional Services	PLA Navy (PLAN)	Maritime operations and power projection.	Reports to CMC; integrated into Theater Commands.
Traditional Services	PLA Air Force (PLAAF)	Air superiority, strategic airlift, and strike.	Reports to CMC; integrated into Theater Commands.
Traditional Services	PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)	Strategic nuclear deterrence and conventional precision strike.	Reports directly to CMC.
Strategic Arms	Aerospace Force (ASF)	Military space operations, launch, tracking, and counterspace operations.	Deputy-theater grade; reports directly to CMC.
Strategic Arms	Cyberspace Force (CSF)	Offensive cyber operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations.	Deputy-theater grade; reports directly to CMC.
Strategic Arms	Information Support Force (ISF)	Network defense, data integration, and joint C4ISR architecture maintenance.	Deputy-theater grade; reports directly to CMC.
Strategic Arms	Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF)	Strategic logistics, medical support, and materiel distribution.	Deputy-theater grade; reports directly to CMC.

3.3 Deep Dive: The Aerospace Force (ASF)

The former Space Systems Department was formally redesignated as the Aerospace Force (ASF).⁸ This elevation recognizes space as a mature, independent warfighting domain on par with the terrestrial services. The ASF commands all of China’s military space assets, including launch facilities, telemetry and tracking networks, satellite operations, and counterspace weapon systems.¹

Current intelligence identifies Lieutenant General Hao Weizhong as the commander of the ASF.²⁶ The ASF manages highly sensitive terrestrial infrastructure, including the Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center located in the Haidian district, which serves as the primary control hub for China’s space program, and the China Maritime Satellite Telemetry and Control Department (Unit 63680) based in Jiangyin City, which operates the Yuan Wang-class tracking ships.²⁶

3.4 Deep Dive: The Cyberspace and Information Support Forces

Evolving from the SSF’s Network Systems Department, the Cyberspace Force (CSF) is responsible for offensive cyber operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations.¹ The separation of the ASF and CSF indicates that the PLA leadership believes space and cyber operations have grown too complex to be managed by a single bureaucratic entity, requiring dedicated, domain-specific command structures.

The most novel addition to the PLA structure is the Information Support Force.²² Commanded by Lieutenant General Bi Yi (formerly a deputy commander of the SSF) and Political Commissar General Li Wei, the ISF is tasked with building, managing, and defending the underlying network information systems that connect all PLA units.²⁰ The ISF directly addresses the PLA’s persistent internal challenges regarding hardware incompatibility and siloed data sharing.²² If the ASF provides the orbital sensors and the terrestrial combatant commands provide the kinetic shooters, the ISF provides the secure digital nervous system that links them together, effectively enabling system destruction warfare.²⁰

4. Leadership Instability and the Anti-Corruption Purges (2022-2026)

The structural reorganization of 2024 must be analyzed alongside the widespread anti-corruption purges sweeping the PLA’s upper echelons through 2025 and early 2026. General Secretary Xi Jinping has initiated a massive campaign to root out graft, which has decimated the senior leadership ranks and introduced significant variables into the PLA’s combat readiness.

While the ASF has seemingly avoided the highest-profile public dismissals compared to other branches, the overarching instability at the CMC level severely impacts joint force cohesion. The following table highlights key personnel changes and dismissals that define the current turbulent environment within the PLA.

Officer Name	Former Position	Service Branch	Status (As of Early 2026)
Zhang Youxia	Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission	CMC Leadership	Removed 28
He Weidong	Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission	CMC Leadership	Removed 28
Miao Hua	Head of Political Work Department	CMC Leadership	Removed (Oct 2025) 28
Liu Zhenli	Head of Joint Staff Department	CMC Leadership	Removed 28
Li Shangfu	Minister of National Defense	Ministry of Defense	Removed (2024) 28
Li Yuchao	Commander	Rocket Force	Removed (2023) 28
Xu Zhongbo	Political Commissar	Rocket Force	Dismissed (2023) 29
Xu Xisheng	Political Commissar	Rocket Force	Missing (2025) 29
Lin Xiangyang	Commander	Eastern Theater Command	Relieved (Oct 2025) 28

The purges within the Rocket Force are of particular concern to ASF operations. The Rocket Force and the ASF share significant technical synergies, specifically regarding ballistic missile development, solid-fuel rocket motors, and launch vehicle procurement. Corruption in these procurement processes, which led to the dismissal of Rocket Force officials, directly impacts the reliability of ASF launch vehicles and ground-based counterspace systems.²⁸

Chinese analysts have publicly criticized design flaws in newly procured platforms across the military, including the sinking of the first Zhou-class nuclear submarine during sea trials and issues with the Fujian aircraft carrier.²⁹ If similar procurement corruption exists within the ASF’s acquisition of satellites or counterspace weapons, the operational reliability of China’s space architecture may be lower than its quantitative metrics suggest. Nevertheless, the rapid restructuring of the space and cyber forces amid these purges indicates that the central leadership views domain modernization as an absolute imperative that cannot be delayed by internal political housecleaning.

5. Doctrinal Frameworks: Space Deterrence (Kongjian Weishe)

The elevation of the Aerospace Force is accompanied by a sophisticated and aggressive military doctrine. Central to China’s strategy is the concept of space deterrence, known in Chinese military literature as kongjian weishe. Western analysts must exercise caution to not mirror-image United States concepts of deterrence onto Chinese doctrine, as the two possess fundamental philosophical differences.

5.1 The Compellent Nature of Chinese Deterrence

In Western military thought, deterrence is typically defined defensively. It centers on preventing an adversary from taking a hostile action by threatening unacceptable retaliation. In Chinese doctrine, kongjian weishe encompasses both deterrent and compellent elements.³

The PLA views space deterrence as a form of political activity and psychological warfare designed to induce doubt, fear, and paralysis in an opponent.¹⁴ The objective is not merely to deter an attack on Chinese space assets, but to leverage China’s space capabilities to achieve broader strategic and terrestrial goals. These goals could include compelling Taiwan to abandon independence initiatives or coercing regional neighbors into accepting Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.¹⁴

By overtly demonstrating advanced counterspace capabilities or rapidly deploying overwhelming orbital infrastructure, the PLA aims to convince adversaries that contesting China’s political objectives is futile. Chinese literature clearly states that deterrence is the primary means of space struggle, while actual war is an auxiliary measure.¹³ However, this deterrence requires the active, visible, and sometimes provocative demonstration of military capability in peacetime.

5.2 Inflated Threat Perceptions and Risk Tolerance

Research into internal PLA literature reveals a high degree of risk tolerance regarding space operations. Chinese leaders perceive themselves to be in a direct, zero-sum competition with the United States for space preeminence.³ Furthermore, PLA analysts possess an inflated and highly catastrophized perception of United States capabilities and intentions. They frequently assume that United States commercial developments, such as the rapid deployment of SpaceX’s Starlink, are flawlessly coordinated with Pentagon offensive doctrines.³

This inflated threat perception drives a proactive and aggressive posture. Because Chinese strategists prioritize securing political objectives over avoiding conflict, they are increasingly willing to authorize provocative maneuvers in space if they believe inaction carries a higher political risk.³ This dynamic severely complicates crisis stability.

The PLA demonstrates a marked resistance to establishing bilateral crisis communication mechanisms, viewing United States attempts to create norms of behavior as hegemony-maintaining tools designed to control and limit China’s strategic options.³ Consequently, United States and allied forces must anticipate compressed decision cycles and a baseline of continuous, provocative operations by the ASF as the new normal in orbital operations.

6. Expanding the Orbital Architecture and Resilience

To execute its doctrine of space deterrence and system destruction warfare, China has aggressively expanded its physical presence in space. The sheer volume and capability of the Chinese orbital fleet represent a profound shift in the global balance of space power.

6.1 Quantitative Growth and Launch Infrastructure

By November 2025, China’s on-orbit presence reached approximately 1,301 active satellites.⁴ This expansion is the result of a relentless launch cadence. In 2025 alone, China conducted 70 orbital launches, placing 319 payloads into orbit.⁴ This tempo reflects a 667 percent growth in orbital assets since the end of 2015, effectively flooding the domain with dual-use capabilities.⁴

Sustaining this massive architecture requires robust access to space. Beyond heavy-lift liquid-fueled rockets launched from legacy facilities like Jiuquan and Xichang, Beijing has heavily prioritized Tactically Responsive Space Launch (TRSL).³ The PLA recognizes that in a high-intensity conflict, satellites will inevitably be degraded or destroyed. The ability to rapidly reconstitute lost assets is critical. China has developed a suite of mobile, solid-fueled launch vehicles, such as the Kuaizhou-1 series, which require minimal ground support infrastructure and can be launched on short notice from austere locations.³ This TRSL capability ensures that the ASF can rapidly replace destroyed nodes, maintaining the integrity of the PLA’s operational system under fire.

6.2 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Overmatch

The core of the PLA’s warfighting support architecture is its vast ISR network. The ASF currently benefits from a constellation of over 510 ISR-capable satellites.⁴ Over the past eight years, China has increased its military and commercial ISR satellite fleet by a factor of six, and its purely commercial ISR platforms by a factor of 17.³

This constellation features a diverse array of sensors, including high-resolution optical, multispectral, radiofrequency (RF) signals intelligence, and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).⁴ Notably, China operates the world’s only known SAR satellite in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), which provides persistent, all-weather, day-and-night tracking capabilities over the Indo-Pacific region.³

The strategic implication of this ISR network is profound. The PLA now possesses the capacity to continuously monitor, track, and target United States aircraft carrier strike groups, expeditionary forces, and forward-deployed air wings.⁴ When coupled with the PLA Rocket Force’s growing arsenal of anti-ship ballistic missiles and the new YJ-21 air-launched ballistic missiles showcased in the 2025 military parades, this space-based sensor grid completes a highly lethal long-range precision strike kill chain.⁴

6.3 Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) and Space Situational Awareness (SSA)

The completion of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System in 2020 eliminated the PLA’s reliance on the United States Global Positioning System (GPS). BeiDou provides high-precision PNT data essential for troop movements, autonomous vehicle navigation, and weapons guidance.³ To further increase resilience against potential electronic warfare or jamming efforts, China is actively developing proliferated LEO PNT constellations through commercial entities like GeeSpace. These LEO PNT networks offer centimeter-level accuracy and serve as a redundant military alternative should the primary Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) BeiDou constellation be compromised.³

Additionally, the ASF operates a dedicated Space Situational Awareness (SSA) architecture. China uses a minimum of 10 dedicated satellites to conduct on-orbit SSA, complementing its extensive ground-based network of space object surveillance and identification (SOSI) radars and telescopes.⁴ This orbital SSA capability allows the ASF to monitor adversary satellite movements in real-time, facilitating both defensive evasion and offensive targeting.

7. Proliferated LEO Mega-Constellations and Orbital Artificial Intelligence

The most significant evolution in China’s space architecture between 2024 and 2026 is the aggressive pursuit of proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) mega-constellations. Observing the critical role that commercial pLEO systems played in providing resilient communications and targeting data for Ukrainian forces during the Russia-Ukraine war, the PLA recognized an immediate operational vulnerability and a technological imperative.³

7.1 Project SatNet (GuoWang) and G60 Qianfan

To challenge Western dominance in pLEO broadband and ensure robust military communications, the Chinese state authorized the development of massive communication constellations. Project SatNet, also known as GuoWang, is managed directly by state-owned enterprises and intends to launch up to 13,000 satellites.³

Concurrently, the commercial sector, heavily backed by provincial governments, initiated the G60 Qianfan project. Operating in the Ku, Q, and V frequency bands, Qianfan aims to deploy an initial 1,296 satellites organized into 36 orbital planes, with plans to scale up to 14,000 satellites if successful.⁶ By the end of 2025, China had successfully deployed over 108 G60 satellites and dozens of SatNet platforms.⁴

These constellations are explicitly designed to compete with Starlink, ensuring that China commands significant bandwidth and orbital real estate. Militarily, they provide a highly resilient, redundant communications architecture. Because the network relies on thousands of distributed nodes, traditional anti-satellite weapons are rendered economically and practically ineffective against the network as a whole. The PLA views these constellations as foundational for enabling the decentralized command and control required for dispersed joint operations and special operations forces operating in contested environments.³²

7.2 The Three-Body Computing Constellation: The Shift to Orbital Edge AI

While GuoWang and G60 represent advances in resilient communications, the deployment of the Three-Body Computing Constellation represents a paradigm shift in space-based intelligence processing. In May 2025, China successfully launched the first 12 satellites of this revolutionary project, following a successful nine-month orbital testing phase.⁴

Led by Zhejiang Lab in partnership with ADA Space and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the Three-Body project is designed as humanity’s first space-based AI supercomputer network.⁵ When fully completed by 2030, the network will comprise roughly 2,800 satellites capable of a combined 1,000 peta operations per second, equivalent to one quintillion operations.³³

Traditionally, military ISR satellites operate as data pipes. They capture massive volumes of raw imagery or RF data and transmit it to ground stations for processing and analysis.⁵ This creates a severe bandwidth bottleneck and introduces latency into the kill chain. The Three-Body Constellation shifts the architecture to Orbital Edge AI.⁵

Equipped with advanced processing hardware, these satellites analyze data directly in orbit. Instead of downlinking gigabytes of raw optical imagery, the satellite’s onboard AI identifies the target, calculates its coordinates, and downlinks only the specific tactical answer, often just a few kilobytes of data.⁵ This reduces the volume of transmitted data by a factor of 1,000, virtually eliminating the downlink bottleneck.⁵

Furthermore, this enables autonomous tipping and cueing. If a wide-area surveillance satellite detects an anomaly, it can autonomously task a high-resolution or infrared satellite to interrogate the target without waiting for ground command intervention.⁵ For United States and allied forces, the Three-Body constellation drastically compresses the PLA’s sensor-to-shooter timeline. It severely limits the time window available for naval vessels to employ mobility, deception, or electronic countermeasures before a targeting solution is generated and transferred to PLA Rocket Force firing units.

8. Kinetic and Directed Energy Counterspace Capabilities

While China expands its own orbital infrastructure, the ASF has simultaneously matured a diverse and highly lethal arsenal of counterspace weapons designed to deny adversaries the use of the space domain. The PLA approaches counterspace operations with a multi-layered methodology, employing both kinetic and non-kinetic effects to achieve system destruction.

The following table summarizes the known operational and developmental counterspace capabilities deployed by the PLA as of 2026.

Weapon Classification	System Designation	Domain/Orbit Targeted	Primary Mechanism of Action	Operational Status
Direct-Ascent ASAT	SC-19	Low Earth Orbit (LEO)	Kinetic Hit-to-Kill	Operational 7
Direct-Ascent ASAT	Dong Neng-2 (DN-2)	High Earth Orbit (MEO/GEO)	Kinetic Hit-to-Kill	Operational / Testing 7
Direct-Ascent ASAT	Dong Neng-3 (DN-3)	LEO / Mid-course BMD	Kinetic Hit-to-Kill	Operational (Tested 2023) 7
Directed Energy (DEW)	Ground-based Lasers	LEO / MEO	Dazzling / Sensor Blinding	Operational 3
Electronic Warfare	Terrestrial Jammers	All Orbits	RF Uplink/Downlink Jamming	Operational 3
Electronic Warfare	Experimental GEO Sats	Geostationary (GEO)	On-orbit Proximity Jamming	Testing 37
Co-Orbital / OSAM	Shijian Series (SJ-21, SJ-25)	GEO	Grappling, Towing, Refueling	Operational 3
Spaceplane	Shenlong	LEO	Payload deployment, EW	Testing (4th Mission 2024) 11

8.1 Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite (DA-ASAT) Systems

China remains one of the few nations to possess and actively test operational ground-based kinetic kill vehicles. The PLA has fielded a robust inventory of Direct-Ascent ASAT missiles designed to target satellites in LEO and higher orbits.

The legacy SC-19 system, reportedly a modified version of the DF-21 launched from a mobile transporter erector launcher, has been operational for years, providing a reliable capability against LEO targets.⁷ More recently, the PLA has focused on the Dong Neng (DN) series of interceptors. The DN-2 is assessed to be capable of reaching high Earth orbits, including MEO and potentially GEO, threatening critical adversary PNT and early warning constellations.⁷

The latest iteration, the DN-3, is a highly advanced hit-to-kill interceptor. The DN-3 has undergone multiple successful tests in 2018, 2021, and 2023.⁷ While tested primarily as a mid-course ballistic missile defense interceptor against intermediate-range targets, the technology is inherently dual-use. A mid-course BMD interceptor possesses the precise altitude and terminal guidance required to strike satellites traversing LEO.⁷

However, kinetic operations generate massive amounts of trackable orbital debris, which would threaten China’s own growing pLEO constellations. Historical Chinese kinetic tests have resulted in thousands of pieces of debris, with nearly 3,000 pieces remaining in orbit as of 2025.³⁷ Consequently, while the ASF maintains these weapons as a credible deterrent and high-end warfighting tool, PLA strategists increasingly prefer non-kinetic and reversible effects for lower thresholds of conflict.³

8.2 Electronic Warfare and Directed Energy

The ASF operates a sophisticated terrestrial network of electronic warfare (EW) and directed energy weapons (DEW) aimed at blinding or severing the communication links to adversary space assets.

The PLA maintains dedicated ground-based jammers designed to disrupt satellite uplinks and downlinks. Recent intelligence indicates that China has deployed experimental satellites to Geostationary Orbit specifically to practice on-orbit signal jamming operations.³⁷ Furthermore, Chinese strategists have openly discussed the tactical deployment of thousands of drone-mounted or balloon-mounted jammers to blanket areas like Taiwan, specifically targeting the frequencies used by Western commercial pLEO broadband networks.³⁹

In the realm of Directed Energy Weapons, China has invested heavily in laser technology capable of dazzling or permanently damaging the delicate electro-optical sensors on Western reconnaissance satellites.³ During the 2025 military parades in Beijing, the PLA unveiled several new directed energy systems, including the LY-1 shipborne laser-based air defense system, indicating the rapid maturation and miniaturization of Chinese DEW technology.³¹ The underlying technology of the LY-1 translates directly to the scaling of their ground-based counterspace laser arrays, increasing the geographic distribution of their dazzling capabilities.

9. Co-Orbital Operations, Tactical Maneuvering, and Spaceplanes

The most alarming development in China’s counterspace strategy is the rapid advancement of co-orbital weapons and tactical maneuvering capabilities. The ASF is no longer restricted to attacking space from the ground; it is actively preparing to fight space-to-space engagements.

9.1 On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM) as Dual-Use Technology

China has launched a series of Shijian (Practice) satellites nominally designed for space debris mitigation and On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM). However, these platforms inherently possess the capability to act as co-orbital anti-satellite weapons.

The Shijian-21 (SJ-21), launched in late 2021, successfully navigated to GEO and utilized a robotic arm to grapple a defunct Chinese satellite, towing it into a graveyard orbit.³⁸ In early 2025, the Shijian-25 successfully rendezvoused with and refueled a BeiDou satellite in GEO.³ While these are impressive engineering feats for space sustainability, military analysts categorize these grappling arms and towing capabilities as hostage-taking capabilities.¹² A satellite capable of docking with a cooperative target to refuel it possesses the exact velocity adjustments and precision guidance capabilities required to rendezvous with an uncooperative adversary early warning satellite, grapple it, and physically disable it, alter its orbit, or snap its communication antennas.³

9.2 Orbital Dogfighting and Tactical Formations

The theoretical threat of co-orbital engagement became an operational reality in 2024. According to assessments from senior United States Space Force leadership, commercial space situational awareness sensors observed a highly complex, multi-satellite exercise conducted by the PLA in Low Earth Orbit.⁹

The operation involved at least five Chinese satellites, specifically three Shiyan-24C experimental satellites and two Shijian-605 platforms, which are believed to carry signals intelligence payloads.¹⁰ These five objects engaged in synchronized, controlled maneuvers, weaving in and out of formation around one another.¹⁰ Military analysts explicitly termed these maneuvers as dogfighting in space.⁹

This incident confirms that the Aerospace Force is actively practicing the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for close-quarters space combat.¹⁰ Mastering Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPO) allows the ASF to deploy stalker satellites that can shadow high-value United States assets, remaining within striking distance to execute rapid kinetic or electronic attacks with zero warning time.¹⁰

9.3 The Shenlong Reusable Spaceplane

Adding to the complexity of the co-orbital threat is China’s highly secretive experimental spaceplane, the Shenlong (Divine Dragon). Broadly analogous to the United States Space Force’s X-37B, the Shenlong is an autonomous, reusable orbital vehicle designed to launch atop a conventional rocket and glide back to a runway landing.¹¹

The Shenlong launched its fourth orbital mission in early February 2024.¹¹ Over its various missions, which have lasted up to 276 days in orbit, the spaceplane has exhibited behaviors that are of deep concern to intelligence analysts.¹¹ During its flights, Shenlong has repeatedly deployed unidentified objects into orbit.⁴ Some of these objects have demonstrated anomalous behaviors, including transmitting unexplained signals, vanishing from tracking networks only to reappear months later in altered orbits, and operating in close proximity to the spaceplane itself.¹²

While Chinese state media claims the vehicle is for the peaceful use of space, military assessments suggest it serves as a testbed for advanced counterspace payloads.¹¹ Technologies tested likely include sub-satellite deployment for inspection or attack, space-based electronic warfare packages, and components of a broader orbital kill mesh.¹² The spaceplane’s ability to remain in orbit for hundreds of days, alter its trajectory, and return to Earth makes it a highly unpredictable and versatile platform for the Aerospace Force.⁴²

10. Strategic Implications and Escalation Dynamics

While the PLA’s capabilities are formidable, China’s space strategy creates complex deterrence and escalation dynamics that present both risks and opportunities for Western planners.

10.1 Mutual Vulnerability and Deterrence

The sheer scale of China’s reliance on space creates a paradigm of mutual vulnerability.¹⁶ Just as the United States relies on space for global power projection, the PLA now requires space to defend its periphery and project power in the Indo-Pacific. This parallel dependence mirrors the Cold War concept of Mutually Assured Destruction.¹⁶

Chinese leadership is acutely aware that the United States possesses its own robust kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace capabilities, including deployed communication jammers.¹⁶ Consequently, PLA strategists recognize that a preemptive kinetic strike against United States space assets would undoubtedly trigger severe in-kind retaliation against China’s critical ISR and communication nodes.¹⁶ This mutual vulnerability theoretically reduces the incentive for a kinetic first strike in space by either party. Because of this, intelligence wargaming suggests that in the early phases of a conflict, both the ASF and United States forces would likely prioritize reversible, non-destructive effects, such as electronic jamming and laser dazzling, over debris-generating kinetic intercepts.³

10.2 The New Normal of Peacetime Provocation

Despite the restraining effect of mutual vulnerability in a total war scenario, the PLA’s behavior in peacetime operations is becoming significantly more aggressive. RAND Corporation assessments indicate that the PLA’s thinking regarding escalation dynamics has grown highly risk-tolerant.³ Driven by the overarching political directive from Xi Jinping to shape the international environment proactively, ASF commanders are willing to accept calibrated risks of unintended escalation.³

This manifests in the physical domain through aggressive RPO and dogfighting maneuvers, and in the political domain through a steadfast refusal to engage in meaningful crisis communication protocols.³ Chinese military leaders view Western attempts to establish norms of behavior in space as hypocritical mechanisms designed to lock in United States hegemony and limit China’s strategic options.³

Therefore, United States and allied space operators must prepare for a persistent environment of sub-threshold conflict.⁴⁴ The ASF will likely continue to probe United States space defenses, dazzle imaging satellites, jam commercial communications, and stalk critical assets in GEO.³ This bellicose posture is not an anomaly but a deliberate implementation of the kongjian weishe doctrine, designed to test red lines and fatigue adversary operators.

10.3 Asymmetries in Civil-Military Fusion

A critical friction point in potential escalation is the asymmetric application of Civil-Military Fusion. As noted, the PLA does not recognize a legal or operational distinction between commercial, civilian, and military space assets.³ In the eyes of Chinese strategists, a United States commercial Earth observation satellite or a commercial broadband satellite providing data to the Pentagon is a legitimate military target under international law.³

Conversely, Western rules of engagement heavily prioritize the protection of civilian and commercial infrastructure. In a conflict scenario, the ASF will undoubtedly leverage its state-aligned commercial mega-constellations, like G60 Qianfan, for military logistics, PNT, and command and control.⁶ If United States forces attempt to degrade this capability by targeting these ostensibly commercial platforms, China will likely use this as geopolitical leverage to claim unwarranted Western aggression against civilian infrastructure, complicating the informational dimension of the conflict. This asymmetry presents a distinct legal and operational challenge for allied planners.

11. Conclusion

The restructuring of the People’s Liberation Army and the rapid expansion of its space-based capabilities between 2024 and 2026 indicate that the People’s Republic of China is actively preparing for high-intensity, intelligentized warfare against a peer adversary.

The dissolution of the Strategic Support Force and the creation of the independent Aerospace Force and Information Support Force demonstrates the CMC’s commitment to eliminating bureaucratic inefficiencies and optimizing command and control for rapid, multi-domain operations. The ASF is no longer a developing branch. It is a mature, combat-ready arm of the PLA equipped with a staggering array of orbital and terrestrial assets.

The technological trajectory is clear. China is shifting from a paradigm of terrestrial dependence to one of orbital supremacy. The deployment of the Three-Body Computing Constellation signifies a leap forward in reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines, utilizing space-based AI to bypass traditional ground-station bottlenecks and achieve cognitive overmatch. Coupled with the robust ISR tracking networks and the deployment of proliferated LEO communication architectures, the PLA is building an operational system designed to see first, decide first, and strike first.

Simultaneously, the maturity of China’s counterspace arsenal, ranging from the DN-3 hit-to-kill interceptor to the sophisticated orbital maneuvers of the Shijian satellites and the Shenlong spaceplane, confirms that space will be a contested warfighting domain from the opening minutes of any future conflict. The demonstration of co-orbital dogfighting indicates that the capability gap between the United States and China in space operations is not just shrinking; in specific tactical areas, it is nearly closed.

To maintain deterrence and ensure operational success, allied forces must adapt to a reality where space dominance is no longer guaranteed. The traditional reliance on a small number of exquisite, highly expensive satellite platforms is a critical vulnerability against an adversary trained in system destruction warfare. Western planners must match the PLA’s pace in deploying proliferated, resilient architectures, enhance their own tactically responsive launch capabilities, and develop comprehensive defensive tactics against both kinetic intercepts and localized electronic warfare. Ultimately, China’s space warfare strategy is an extension of its grand strategy: to exert dominance through presence, to deter through the overt display of lethal capability, and to secure the ultimate high ground as the foundational enabler of modern military hegemony.

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