Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics

SITREP Iran – Week Ending February 14, 2026

Executive Summary

The reporting period ending February 14, 2026, represents a critical juncture for the Islamic Republic of Iran, characterized by a convergence of extreme domestic volatility, macroeconomic disintegration, and a heightened state of military readiness against a backdrop of intensifying international pressure. The week was punctuated by the 47th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution on February 11, an event the clerical establishment utilized to project an image of national cohesion and revolutionary resilience.1 While state-controlled media reported a massive, unprecedented turnout of up to 26 million participants across 1,400 urban and rural districts, this narrative of unity stands in stark contrast to the ground reality of a nation still reeling from the January 2026 anti-government protests.1 These demonstrations, which were met with a lethal state crackdown resulting in over 3,000 confirmed deaths and 50,000 arrests, have left a fractured social contract and a burgeoning “Lion and Sun” revolutionary movement that continues to manifest through nightly rooftop chants and localized strikes.4

On the international stage, the strategic environment has shifted toward a state of imminent kinetic risk. US President Donald Trump confirmed the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the Middle East, reinforcing the USS Abraham Lincoln already in theater.1 These military movements serve as a coercive backdrop to nascent negotiations in Oman and Qatar, which the US administration has described as a final window for diplomacy before potential military action.8 Concurrently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported a “radically changed” nuclear landscape following the 12-day war in June 2025, noting that while inspections have resumed, the physical infrastructure at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan remains significantly degraded or inaccessible.10

Economically, Iran has entered a phase of hyperinflationary instability. The Iranian Rial breached the symbolic threshold of 1.5 million to the US Dollar in late January, and annual inflation has surged to 60%, with food and beverage prices nearly doubling over the last year.12 The implementation of US Executive Order 14382, which threatens 25% secondary tariffs on countries trading with Iran, has further isolated the regime, forcing its primary economic partner, China, to weigh its energy security against the risk of a trade war with Washington.14 As the week concludes, the “Global Day of Action” on February 14, spearheaded by the exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi, highlights a resurgent opposition movement that is increasingly coordinated with the Iranian diaspora and leveraging the 40-day mourning cycle of the January martyrs to sustain domestic pressure.16

Internal Security and Domestic Stability

The domestic security environment in Iran is currently defined by a high-stakes competition between the regime’s sophisticated apparatus of suppression and a decentralized, multi-ethnic protest movement. The 47th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution served as a forced litmus test for state legitimacy.3 President Masoud Pezeshkian, representing a reformist faction that is increasingly sidelined by the De Facto Leadership Council, utilized his Azadi Square address to acknowledge the “great sorrow” of the recent crackdown while simultaneously framing the state’s survival as synonymous with national territorial integrity.4

The Anniversary Rallies and the Dual Narratives of Power

The state’s orchestration of the February 11 rallies involved a massive institutional mobilization of civil servants, students, and military families. The reported turnout of 23 to 26 million people is viewed by intelligence analysts as an attempt to overwhelm international headlines with images of mass support.3 However, the “split-screen” reality of Iranian life was palpable. On the eve of the anniversary, verified video evidence from Tehran and other major cities documented citizens shouting “Death to the dictator” and “Death to Khamenei” from their rooftops, a tactic that has become a standardized method of defiance during the ongoing internet blackout.4

The presence of long-range missiles on public display at Azadi Square was intended to communicate military readiness to both the domestic population and the lurking US carrier groups.1 Yet, the symbolic burning of “Baal” statues—horned, bull-headed figures identified by organizers as representations of Western-backed “evil”—suggests a regime increasingly reliant on archaic ideological tropes to maintain its base of support.22

Judicial Repression and the January Uprising Legacy

The legacy of the January 2026 uprising continues to haunt the regime’s security calculus. The state-funded Martyrs Foundation has admitted to at least 3,117 deaths, while independent rights groups such as HRANA suggest the true toll may exceed 7,000.7 The judiciary has transitioned into a phase of rapid “legal” retribution, with over 50,000 individuals currently detained.5 Reports indicate that the dragnet has extended beyond street protesters to include university students, doctors who treated the wounded, and reformist political figures close to the president.5

Protest MetricConfirmed ValueEstimated Upper LimitSource
Deaths (Jan 2026)3,1177,0051
Arrests50,00053,0005
Missing PersonsUnknown10,000+5
Executions Pending200+500+23

The use of foreign mercenaries and proxy militias to assist in the January crackdown remains a significant point of contention.24 Credible field reports suggest that the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, authorized the summoning of extraterritorial arms due to fears of noncompliance or defections within the traditional ranks of the Law Enforcement Forces (LEC) and the Basij.24 This reliance on non-national actors indicates a deepening crisis of trust within the domestic security architecture.

The “Global Day of Action” and the 40-Day Mourning Cycle

The week concluded with the “Global Day of Action” on February 14, a coordinated effort by the Iranian diaspora and internal opposition to coincide with the start of 40-day mourning ceremonies for those killed in January.6 Exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi’s call for Iranians to “chant from the rooftops” on February 14 and 15 represents an attempt to synchronize domestic dissent with international rallies in Munich, Los Angeles, and Toronto.16

This 40-day cycle is culturally and religiously significant in Iran, often serving as a catalyst for renewed waves of unrest as mourning rituals provide a legitimate space for public assembly that the state finds difficult to fully suppress without risking further escalation.6 The intelligence community assesses that this cycle, combined with the extreme economic deprivation, creates a “point of no return” for the regime’s social stability.24

Cyber Operations and Information Control

The Iranian regime has implemented what is described as the most sophisticated internet blackout in its history, a month-long operation that has significantly hampered the ability of domestic actors to coordinate and international monitors to verify human rights abuses.21

The Technical Infrastructure of the 2026 Blackout

Initiated on January 8, the blackout transitioned from localized disruptions to a comprehensive shutdown of both mobile and fixed-line connectivity.21 Unlike previous shutdowns in 2019 and 2022, the 2026 operation utilized “whitelisting” protocols, where only approved government, financial, and military traffic is permitted via the National Information Network (NIN).21 This system effectively creates a “two-tier internet” that isolates the general population while maintaining the functionality of the state’s command-and-control apparatus.25

Cyber MetricData PointImpactSource
Start DateJanuary 8, 2026Ongoing (1 month, 5 days)25
Primary MechanismTLS/DNS InterferenceBlocks global routing21
Daily Economic Cost$35.7 Million – $37 Million80% drop in online sales25
Starlink Terminals~6,000 SmuggledRisks 10-year jail/execution25

The regime has increasingly relied on Chinese “Great Firewall” technology and governance models to manage this repression.16 This includes the use of core router manipulation to prevent routing announcements, making Iran’s network effectively “disappear” from the global internet while remaining functional internally.21

State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage and Offensive Activity

Despite the domestic blackout, Iranian state-sponsored cyber actors have resumed operations with high intensity. The threat group known as “Infy” (Prince of Persia) was observed setting up new command-and-control (C2) infrastructure as of late January, introducing the “Tornado version 51” malware.27 This group, which has operated since 2004, focuses on “laser-focused” espionage against dissidents and international targets.27

Simultaneously, the Shin Bet and the Israeli National Cyber Directorate reported a significant rise in targeted phishing campaigns by Iranian intelligence.28 These attacks have targeted private Google, Telegram, and WhatsApp accounts of Israeli defense officials, academics, and journalists, utilizing personalized lures to exfiltrate professional and personal data.28 The timing of these operations suggests a coordinated effort to collect intelligence that could be used for “terrorist activity, espionage, or influence operations” during the current period of high military tension.28

Macroeconomic Crisis and Fiscal Instability

Iran is currently experiencing what economists describe as its deepest and most prolonged economic crisis in modern history, driven by the combined effects of the 2025 war, structural mismanagement, and the “Maximum Pressure 2.0” sanctions regime.12

The Collapse of the Rial and Hyperinflation

The Iranian Rial’s decline beyond the symbolic 1.5 million threshold against the US dollar in late January has triggered a psychological and practical collapse of the domestic currency market.12 By mid-February, the open market rate fluctuated near 1,627,000, reflecting a de-facto dollarization of the economy where businesses and households exclusively seek assets in foreign currency, gold, or tangible goods to avoid the 60% annual inflation.12

The impact on purchasing power has been catastrophic. Food and beverage inflation reached 89.9% in January 2026, largely due to the removal of the preferential exchange rate for essential imports.13 This has resulted in a national malnourishment rate of 57%, as reported by the Ministry of Social Welfare.29

Economic IndicatorCurrent Value (Feb 2026)TrendSource
USD/IRR Exchange Rate1,627,000Record Low13
Annual Inflation60%Increasing13
Food Inflation89.9%Critical13
Unemployment Rate7.2% (Dec 2024)Rising (est)30
Stock Market Index-450,000 pointsCrashing25

US Executive Order 14382 and the War on Sanctioned Oil

A pivotal development for Iran’s fiscal outlook is US Executive Order 14382, signed on February 6, 2026.31 This order establishes a mechanism for 25% secondary tariffs on any country that acquires goods or services from Iran.31 This is a direct strike at the “Ghost Fleet” and China’s energy imports, which accounted for 77% of Iran’s oil exports in 2024.15

The US administration has already demonstrated the bite of this policy by removing a 25% secondary tariff on India only after New Delhi signaled a reduction in its intake of Russian and Iranian oil.33 China’s response has been one of public defiance, with the Foreign Ministry vowing to “protect its legitimate interests,” but analysts suggest that the risk of a 25% tariff on all Chinese exports to the US (on top of existing trade war rates) may force Beijing to significantly curtail its Iranian energy purchases.14

The International Energy Agency (IEA) reports that sanctioned oil accounted for 72% of the 248 million barrels currently “on water” globally.34 Any significant seizure of these tankers—a move the US administration is reportedly considering—would add a massive risk premium to the oil market and could serve as the trigger for Iranian military retaliation in the Strait of Hormuz.35

Nuclear Landscape and International Monitoring

The status of Iran’s nuclear program as of February 2026 is one of technical degradation paired with intense defensive fortification. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi’s assessment at the Munich Security Conference on February 13 underscored the extreme difficulty of establishing a new inspection regime following the kinetic strikes of June 2025.10

The “Radical Shift” in Infrastructure

Grossi reported that the physical infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear program—specifically at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan—is “basically no longer there or badly damaged”.11 This has fundamentally altered the nuclear landscape from one of an active fuel cycle to one of residual capabilities and damaged facilities.11 While IAEA inspectors have returned and are monitoring undamaged sites, they are still denied access to the bombed facilities, making a full inventory of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile impossible.10

Defensive Engineering at Isfahan and Beyond

In response to the threat of further strikes, Iranian forces have been observed using “soil and dirt” to fortify the Isfahan Nuclear Complex.8 Satellite imagery shows tunnel entrances being buried to dampen the impact of explosive attacks and complicate any potential ground operations aimed at securing nuclear material.8 This “defensive layering” is a clear indication that Tehran expects further military confrontation and is prioritizing the preservation of its remaining nuclear assets over diplomatic optics.8

The Diplomatic Stalemate

Despite the physical damage, the Iranian regime’s negotiating position remains inflexible. Senior lawmaker Alaeddin Boroujerdi reaffirmed that “peaceful nuclear knowledge” is a non-negotiable red line.38 President Pezeshkian’s public insistence that Iran is “not seeking nuclear weapons” and is “ready for any kind of verification” is largely viewed as a strategic messaging effort aimed at regional audiences, as the state continues to obstruct IAEA access to critical sites.8

Military Posture and Deterrence

The Iranian military, specifically the IRGC Aerospace Division, has shifted to an “active war room” status during the reporting week.38 This posture is designed to project a credible threat of regional escalation to deter a US or Israeli strike.

Reconstitution of the Ballistic Missile Stockpile

A primary concern for regional intelligence agencies is the rapid restoration of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. Israeli sources reported to CNN on February 10 that Iran could possess between 1,800 and 2,000 missiles within “weeks or months,” nearly returning to pre-2025 levels.36 Iran’s production capacity is estimated at approximately 300 ballistic missiles per month, a rate that could overwhelm regional air defenses if production continues unabated for another year.36

Military AssetStatus/QuantityOperational NoteSource
Ballistic Missiles1,800 – 2,000Rapidly reconstituting36
Monthly Production~300 MissilesFocus on quantity36
Penetration Rate>50% (claimed)Target: Israel/US Bases38
Drone StrategyMass InductionScalable and hard to preempt39

The IRGC’s military doctrine has increasingly favored “numbers, dispersal, and attrition tolerance”.39 The mass induction of drones is intended to force adversaries to invest heavily in layered counter-UAS architectures while Iran maintains the ability to strike distributed US assets and personnel.38

US Carrier Deployments and “Maximum Pressure 2.0”

The deployment of a second aircraft carrier group, the USS Gerald R. Ford, to join the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East, marks a significant escalation in US military pressure.1 President Trump has explicitly stated that the carrier group is leverage for negotiations: “In case we don’t make a deal, we’ll need it”.7 The Ford, which had been operating in the Caribbean for missions related to Venezuela, brings an expanded strike capability to the Persian Gulf, directly threatening Iranian infrastructure and the IRGC’s naval assets.6

Foreign Policy and Regional Proxy Dynamics

Tehran is pursuing a dual-track strategy of “backchannel diplomacy” to stall for time while continuing to fund its regional proxy network.

The Larijani Diplomatic Mission

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani has been the regime’s primary envoy this week, traveling to Oman and Qatar.8

  • In Oman: Larijani indicated that Iran might be willing to discuss its ballistic missile program “in the future,” but only after a successful nuclear agreement is reached and sanctions are lifted.36 Intelligence assessments view this as a delaying tactic intended to extract immediate concessions while providing a window for stockpile reconstitution.36
  • In Qatar: The focus has been on managing regional tensions and utilizing Qatar’s role as a mediator with Washington.8
  • Russia’s Role: Moscow remains a key supporter, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in “constant contact” with Iranian officials to head off a US strike.40 Russia seeks a “broadly acceptable agreement” that preserves Iran’s regional influence and missile program, which aligns with the Kremlin’s interests in maintaining a counter-balance to US power in the Middle East.40

Proxy Network Reconstitution

Despite the domestic economic crisis, the regime continues to prioritize the funding of the “Axis of Resistance.” Reports suggest that senior diplomats have used diplomatic immunity to smuggle hundreds of millions of dollars in cash to Hezbollah in Beirut to support its reconstitution after the 2025 conflict.36 In Yemen, the Houthis continue to hold UN personnel and civil society workers, while the US Navy has successfully intercepted multiple shipments of Iranian-made missile parts bound for the group, confirming that the “Red Sea Crisis” remains an active front in the broader proxy war.41

Strategic Assessment and Outlook

The collective analysis of national security, foreign affairs, and intelligence teams suggests that the Islamic Republic of Iran is entering a “survival situation” characterized by extreme fragility and a high risk of miscalculation.

Internal Stability Forecast

The convergence of the 40-day mourning cycle of the January martyrs and the devastating economic reality (1.5M Rial/USD) creates a volatile environment for the remainder of February.6 While the state’s security apparatus remains loyal and no defections have been reported, the “fear wall” is increasingly porous, as evidenced by the persistence of rooftop chanting and localized industrial strikes.4 The regime’s reliance on foreign mercenaries and the internet blackout are short-term tactical successes that may accelerate long-term delegitimization, potentially leading to a “slow collapse” or a sudden, second revolutionary wave.23

Geopolitical and Military Forecast

The US deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford and President Trump’s rhetoric regarding “regime change” suggest a narrowing window for diplomatic resolution.6 If talks in Oman fail to produce substantive concessions from Tehran—specifically regarding missile limits and proxy support—the likelihood of a limited US kinetic strike against missile production facilities or the “Ghost Fleet” increases significantly.7

Iran’s most likely course of action (MLCOA) is to continue its “strategic defiance,” using backchannel talks to delay military action while accelerating the fortification of its remaining nuclear sites and the production of its ballistic missile stockpile.8 The critical variable remains the response of China to US secondary tariffs; a significant reduction in Chinese oil purchases would force the De Facto Leadership Council into a desperate choice between total economic collapse or a high-stakes military escalation in the Strait of Hormuz to force a global energy crisis and compel international intervention.12

The situation remains fluid, with the February 14 Global Day of Action serving as a key indicator of the opposition’s ability to mobilize in the face of sustained state repression.17 Monitoring of IRGC communications and satellite imagery of the Isfahan complex will remain priority intelligence requirements (PIR) for the next reporting period.

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

  1. Iran marks revolution anniversary with rallies amid U.S. threats – The …, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/iran-marks-revolution-anniversary-with-rallies-amid-us-threats/article70620108.ece
  2. Mideast in Pictures: Iran marks 47th anniversary of Islamic Revolution with nationwide celebrations, accessed February 14, 2026, https://english.news.cn/20260213/99ee93c4073b435ca73333fd04ea23e0/c.html
  3. 47TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAN – WANA, accessed February 14, 2026, https://wanaen.com/47th-anniversary-of-the-victory-of-the-islamic-revolution-of-iran/
  4. Iran Commemorates Revolution, With US Warships Lurking Off the Coast – GV Wire, accessed February 14, 2026, https://gvwire.com/2026/02/11/iran-commemorates-revolution-with-us-warships-lurking-off-the-coast/
  5. Widespread arrests roil Iran weeks after security forces crushed protests, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/widespread-arrests-roil-iran-weeks-after-security-forces-crushed-protests/
  6. US President Donald Trump says change in power in Iran would be …, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.newsonair.gov.in/us-president-donald-trump-says-change-in-power-in-iran-would-be-best-thing-that-could-happen/
  7. Best thing that could happen: Trump floats Iran regime change amid tensions, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/very-bad-day-for-iran-trump-sends-second-us-carrier-to-middle-east-2868072-2026-02-14
  8. Why Iran is using dirt at nuclear facilities on Islamic Revolution anniversary, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/iran-news-tehran-celebrates-1979-islamic-revolution-fortifies-isfahan-nuclear-facility-us-strike-donald-trump-2866660-2026-02-11
  9. Trump says change in power in Iran ‘would be best thing that could happen’, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-says-change-in-power-in-iran-would-be-best-thing-that-could-happen/article70630332.ece
  10. In Munich, IAEA Chief Says Nuclear Inspection Regime With Iran ‘Technically Possible’, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.rferl.org/a/grossi-iran-nuclear-deal-munich-security/33677208.html
  11. IAEA chief says Iran inspections deal ‘possible but terribly difficult …, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/iaea-chief-says-iran-inspections-deal-possible-but-terribly-difficult-after-12-day-war/3829539
  12. Iran Currency Crisis: What’s Driving the Rial Down, accessed February 14, 2026, https://caspianpost.com/analytics/iran-currency-crisis-what-s-driving-the-rial-down
  13. Iranian rial gains against foreign currencies – Shafaq News, accessed February 14, 2026, https://shafaq.com/en/Economy/Iranian-rial-gains-against-foreign-currencies
  14. China responds to US tariff threat against Iran’s partners: “We will protect our interests.”, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/China-responds-to-US-tariff-threat-against-Iran%27s-partners–we-will-protect-our-interests/
  15. China threatens to retaliate over Trump’s 25% tariff on countries trading with Iran, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/12/trump-tariffs-iran
  16. Prince Pahlavi urges unity ahead of February 14 protests | Iran International, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602115811
  17. 2026 Iranian diaspora protests – Wikipedia, accessed February 14, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_diaspora_protests
  18. Pezeshkian tells victims families protests provoked from ‘abroad’ | Iran International, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602127805
  19. Iran Protest Wave 2026: Pressure, Possibilities and Future Outlook – Canvas, accessed February 14, 2026, https://canvasopedia.org/2026/02/09/iran-protest-wave-2026-pressure-possibilities-and-future-outlook/
  20. Iran’s president denies it seeks nuclear weapon and admits ‘shame’ after mass protests, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/11/iran-president-denies-it-seeks-nuclear-weapon-admits-shame-after-protests
  21. Iran’s Internet Blackout Hits Phones, Starlink – Mirage News, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.miragenews.com/irans-internet-blackout-hits-phones-starlink-1603356/
  22. Iranians challenge Islamic Republic’s show of unity, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602128484
  23. Iran protests 2026: UK and international response – House of Commons Library, accessed February 14, 2026, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10462/
  24. Iran News in Brief – February 8, 2026 – NCRI, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-news-in-brief-news/iran-news-in-brief-february-8-2026/
  25. 2026 Internet blackout in Iran – Wikipedia, accessed February 14, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Internet_blackout_in_Iran
  26. Iran Update, February 10, 2026, accessed February 14, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-10-2026/
  27. Infy Hackers Resume Operations with New C2 Servers After Iran Internet Blackout Ends, accessed February 14, 2026, https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/infy-hackers-resume-operations-with-new.html
  28. Defense officials say hundreds of Iranian cyberattacks foiled in past months, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-officials-say-hundreds-of-iranian-cyberattacks-foiled-in-past-months/
  29. Iranian economic crisis – Wikipedia, accessed February 14, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_economic_crisis
  30. Iran Indicators – Trading Economics, accessed February 14, 2026, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/indicators
  31. Trump 2.0 tariff tracker, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.tradecomplianceresourcehub.com/2026/02/12/trump-2-0-tariff-tracker/
  32. President Trump Issues Executive Order to Address Continuing Threats by Iran | SmarTrade, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.thompsonhinesmartrade.com/2026/02/president-trump-issues-executive-order-to-address-continuing-threats-by-iran/
  33. The BR International Trade Report: February 2026, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.blankrome.com/publications/br-international-trade-report-february-2026
  34. Oil Market Report – February 2026 – Analysis, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-february-2026
  35. The Commodities Feed: Lingering Iranian uncertainty supports the oil market, accessed February 14, 2026, https://think.ing.com/articles/the-commodities-feed-lingering-iranian-uncertainty-supports-the-oil-market110226/
  36. Iran Update, February 11, 2026 | ISW, accessed February 14, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-11-2026/
  37. IAEA chief says peaceful nuclear program Iran’s right, accessed February 14, 2026, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/241772/IAEA-chief-says-peaceful-nuclear-program-Iran-s-right
  38. Iran war room active, ready for conflict, IRGC aerospace chiefs tell …, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602027098
  39. GRYPHON GROWL, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.wpafb.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fmpMmpTByPY%3D&tabid=13680&portalid=60
  40. Iran Update, February 9, 2026, accessed February 14, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-9-2026/
  41. Yemen, February 2026 Monthly Forecast – Security Council Report, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-02/yemen-87.php
  42. U.S. conducts another attack against Houthis, hitting anti-ship missiles | PBS News, accessed February 14, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-conducts-another-attack-against-houthis-hitting-anti-ship-missiles
  43. Red Sea crisis – Wikipedia, accessed February 14, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis