1. Executive Summary

The character of naval warfare is undergoing a foundational and irreversible transformation, driven by the rapid proliferation of uncrewed systems, artificial intelligence, autonomous navigation, and mesh-networked communications. Traditional naval strategy, which has been dominated for over a century by the deployment of exquisite, high-signature capital ships, is increasingly challenged by the democratization of sea denial capabilities. Small, attritable, and highly lethal uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and extra-large uncrewed undersea vehicles (XLUUVs) are fundamentally altering the calculus of maritime power projection, forcing a paradigm shift away from platform-centric operations toward payload-centric, distributed maritime architectures.

This research report examines the strategic, operational, and tactical implications of military drones on contemporary naval warfare. It analyzes the collapse of traditional cost-exchange ratios, as evidenced by recent high-intensity engagements in the Red Sea and the Black Sea. In these theaters, non-state actors and states operating without traditional blue-water navies have successfully challenged advanced carrier strike groups, disrupted vital sea lines of communication, and sunk high-value, heavily armed warships. The analysis further explores the resurgence of the historical Jeune École naval theory, updated for the twenty-first century, wherein swarms of inexpensive, autonomous systems neutralize the advantages of centralized, multi-billion-dollar maritime platforms.

Furthermore, this document evaluates emerging operational concepts designed to counter peer adversaries, most notably the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) “Hellscape” strategy. This doctrine is designed to leverage massive, multi-domain drone swarms to deter amphibious invasions and complicate adversary decision-making. The report critically assesses the resulting crisis in fleet magazine depth, the severe logistical vulnerabilities of the current fleet architecture regarding at-sea reloading, and the urgent, existential necessity for advanced Counter-UAS (C-UAS) technologies, including Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) and High-Power Microwave (HPM) systems. Strategists must immediately discard outdated assumptions regarding uncontested logistics, the presumed invulnerability of carrier strike groups, and the economic sustainability of kinetic interception. The future of naval warfare requires pivoting urgently toward dispersed, economically viable, and highly attritable force structures capable of operating in saturated, unmanned environments.

2. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Modern Naval Warfare

To understand the magnitude of the disruption caused by uncrewed maritime systems, it is necessary to contextualize the current strategic environment within the historical frameworks of naval theory. The tension between concentrated fleet power and distributed asymmetric threat is not new; however, modern technology has radically altered the balance between the two.

2.1 The Legacy of Mahanian Doctrine and the Capital Ship

For more than a century, global naval strategy has been heavily influenced by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose concept of the concentrated battlefleet shaped the naval arms races of the twentieth century. In the Mahanian paradigm, command of the sea is achieved through the decisive engagement and destruction of the enemy’s main fleet by a concentrated force of capital ships.¹ This doctrine relies on the assumption that platforms requiring massive capital investment, highly trained crews, and sophisticated, overlapping defensive layers can survive in contested environments long enough to project power ashore or secure vital global chokepoints.

Historically, the strategic value of these capital ship forces has constantly been weighed against the vulnerability of the positions they are ordered to occupy.² In modern contested environments, specifically those shaped by advanced Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) networks, the multi-domain threat landscape has expanded exponentially. Precision-guided weapons, hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles, and now, autonomous drone swarms, have made the operating environments of the littorals and constrained seas exceptionally hazardous for high-signature vessels.³ The U.S. Navy and other advanced maritime forces are currently plagued by problems inherent to this model, including the high cost of procuring sufficient numbers of capital ships, the slow reform of legacy fleet structures, and the immense logistical pressures of maintaining complex platforms in forward-deployed postures.³

2.2 The Resurgence and Validation of the Jeune École

In the late nineteenth century, a competing strategic framework emerged in France, known as the Jeune École (Young School), championed by theorists such as Admiral Théophile Aube. This doctrine posited that a weaker naval power could defeat a fleet of superior, heavily armored capital ships by utilizing large numbers of small, fast, and heavily armed vessels—specifically, the newly invented torpedo boats.⁴ The Jeune École sought to deny control of maritime expanses through dispersed, asymmetric attacks, rather than seeking decisive fleet-on-fleet engagements.⁶ It enabled the mobilization of widely dispersed small shipyards along the coasts, appealing to budget decision-makers as a highly cost-effective solution for generating outsized strategic effects.⁴

While the original Jeune École was ultimately limited by the technological constraints of the era—primarily the poor sea-keeping, limited operational range, and lack of over-the-horizon targeting capabilities of early torpedo boats—the core philosophy has been violently validated by the advent of modern drone warfare.⁴ Today’s autonomous systems effectively eliminate the geographical and endurance limitations of their historical predecessors. Uncrewed vessels can now loiter for months at sea, coordinate complex maneuvers via resilient mesh networks, and deliver catastrophic explosive payloads with pinpoint accuracy.⁸

The contemporary iteration of the Jeune École asserts that massed, inexpensive, and autonomous kinetic effectors can overwhelm the sophisticated radar and kinetic defensive systems of legacy platforms.⁵ Wargames and classified defense analyses increasingly describe capital ships, including advanced aircraft carriers, as highly vulnerable to multi-domain attacks that combine cyber operations, electronic warfare, and saturated drone swarms.¹¹ Consequently, strategists must recognize that a strategy reliant solely on exquisite, concentrated assets is fundamentally brittle against an adversary capable of producing and deploying attritable uncrewed systems at a massive industrial scale. The legacy of the Jeune École also deeply influenced Soviet naval thought, which envisioned a three-dimensional, composite war utilizing aircraft, surface ships, and submarines in synergy to negate the advantages of Western capital ships.¹² Today, the drone serves as the ultimate realization of this asymmetric, multi-dimensional threat.

3. The Democratization of Sea Denial and Asymmetric Economics

The proliferation of uncrewed systems has effectively democratized sea denial. Historically, denying an adversary access to the sea required the maintenance of a sophisticated submarine force, extensive naval aviation, and complex mine-laying operations. Today, non-state actors and smaller nations can exert strategic influence over critical maritime chokepoints using commercial off-the-shelf technology adapted for lethal purposes.

3.1 The Collapse of the Cost-Exchange Ratio

The most urgent crisis facing modern naval strategists is the inversion of the cost-exchange ratio in maritime air and surface defense. Historically, the economic burden of an attack rested heavily on the aggressor, who had to risk expensive aircraft, submarines, or surface combatants to threaten a defending fleet. Today, the proliferation of low-cost manufacturing and accessible guidance technologies has shifted this economic burden entirely to the defender.

Events in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb strait provide a stark, ongoing operational laboratory for this dynamic. Since October 2023, Houthi forces have launched hundreds of aerial threats, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and uncrewed surface vessels at commercial shipping and U.S. Navy coalition warships.¹³ Between October 2023 and March 2025 alone, the Houthis targeted U.S. warships more than 170 times and commercial vessels 145 times.¹⁵ While the coalition has achieved remarkable tactical success in thwarting these attacks, protecting both commercial shipping and supporting allied air defense networks, the strategic economics of the engagement are deeply unfavorable.¹³

The Department of Defense revealed that the U.S. military has expended upwards of $1 billion as part of its efforts to protect vessels in the Red Sea.¹⁵ The Navy utilizes advanced kinetic weapons—primarily sophisticated surface-to-air missiles like the Standard Missile 2 (SM-2), the SM-6, and PAC-3 interceptors—to defeat incoming threats.¹³ The procurement costs for these defensive interceptors are immense. Current U.S. weapons systems are designed to be launched from expensive, fragile platforms, with Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) costing approximately $3.4 million each, JASSM-ERs costing $3.3 million, and PAC-3 interceptors costing $3.4 million.¹⁵ The Navy’s broader air defense missiles range from several hundred thousand dollars to a few million dollars per unit.¹³

In stark contrast, the highly capable, mass-produced drones utilized by adversaries operate as consumable munitions with near-zero operating costs. Iranian-made drones deployed by the Houthis can cost as little as $50,000, with some variants estimated at just a few thousand dollars.¹³ This highly asymmetric “cost exchange ratio” lays bare the vulnerability of modern militaries to asymmetric warfare.¹⁵ While defense analysts correctly point out that cost exchange ratios are an insufficient measure of the real cost of operational considerations—given that defensive missiles must provide exceptional maneuverability and precision guidance to protect multi-billion dollar assets and human lives—the current paradigm is mathematically unsustainable.¹³ Firing million-dollar interceptors at mass-produced, expendable drones heavily strains the U.S. defense industrial base, which struggles to replenish the complex interceptor inventory at the pace it is being consumed.

3.2 The Eradication of Maritime Sanctuary

A direct corollary to the democratization of sea denial is the total eradication of maritime sanctuary. Long-range autonomous systems have extended the threat envelope far beyond the traditional contested littorals, transforming formerly secure rear areas and transit lanes into active combat zones. Both Ukraine and Russia have pivoted toward massive reliance on drones for surveillance, electronic warfare, and long-range precision strikes, effectively creating an unmanned “kill zone” extending 15 to 40 kilometers deep where no traditional troops or vehicles can move without facing immediate attack.¹⁵

Furthermore, the range of these autonomous systems continues to expand. Nations are planning to produce millions of drones annually, ranging from small quadcopters to fixed-wing assets boasting operational ranges of up to 3,000 kilometers.¹⁵ China is currently mass-producing long-range drones, such as the Sunflower—an improved, highly capable iteration of the Iranian Shahed-136—which features a 2,000-kilometer range and vertical launch capabilities.¹⁵

Most alarmingly for naval strategists, adversaries have demonstrated the ability to launch long-range drones and cruise missiles directly from standard commercial shipping containers.¹⁵ This containerized strike capability renders traditional threat identification algorithms and visual identification methods obsolete. The systems are virtually indistinguishable from normal maritime cargo until the moment of launch. A hostile state or well-funded non-state actor can thereby transport strategic strike assets globally without the need for specialized, easily tracked naval platforms, effectively turning any commercial cargo vessel into a potential node for strategic sea denial or land attack.¹⁵

4. The Proliferation and Specialization of Uncrewed Maritime Systems (UMS)

The rapid, wartime iteration of uncrewed systems has led to the development of highly distinct classes of maritime drones tailored for specific operational domains. Strategists must possess a nuanced understanding of the technical capabilities, operational histories, and developmental trajectories of these systems to effectively design future fleet architectures.

4.1 Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs): The Vanguard of Asymmetric Strike

The most profound and historically significant impact of Uncrewed Surface Vessels has been demonstrated in the Black Sea theater. Ukraine, a nation operating without a traditional capital-ship navy, has effectively neutralized significant portions of the Russian Black Sea Fleet using domestically produced, highly innovative USVs.⁸ This operational success has driven a rapid, iterative development cycle in USV technology globally.

4.1.1 The Ukrainian USV Ecosystem

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (GUR) and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) have fielded a vast, rapidly evolving array of USVs, transitioning quickly from improvised explosive boats to purpose-built, multi-role platforms capable of carrying air defense missiles and deploying smaller tactical drones.⁸

The evolution of these systems—from the basic Magura V1, which was essentially a cut-down 6-meter fishing boat, to the Katran X1, which functions as a multi-domain drone-carrier—demonstrates a crucial operational shift from single-use kamikaze tactics to reusable, multi-role platforms.⁸ The integration of air-defense missiles into these small surface craft is a particularly disruptive development. Systems equipped with the “Sea Dragon” improvised air-defense setup, carrying R-73 or AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles (such as the Magura W6, V6, V7, and Sea Wolf variants), create a self-defending surface threat that significantly complicates adversary interdiction efforts by rotary-wing aircraft and coastal patrol planes.⁸ Furthermore, Ukraine has pioneered the development of weaponized autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) such as the Toloka family (TLK-150 and TLK-1000) and the Marichka. The Marichka, a 6-meter, metal-hulled AUV with an X-form rudder, boasts a range of 1,000 kilometers and costs roughly $433,000, bringing strategic undersea strike capabilities to non-traditional maritime actors.⁸

4.1.2 Heavy and Medium USVs: The United States and Chinese Approaches

While Ukraine focuses on small, highly attritable systems tailored for the constrained geography of the Black Sea, major naval powers are developing Medium and Large Uncrewed Surface Vessels (MDUSV/LUSV) designed for persistent autonomous presence, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and distributed lethality across vast oceanic expanses.

The U.S. Navy’s Sea Hunter and Seahawk: Developed originally as part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program, the Sea Hunter is a 132-foot (40-meter) trimaran displacing 145 tons at full load.¹⁰ The vessel represents a massive leap in autonomous endurance, capable of operating for 30 to 90 days at sea without human maintenance, resupply, or intervention.¹⁰ Powered by twin diesel engines, it possesses a transoceanic cruising range of 10,000 nautical miles at 12 knots, allowing deployments from San Diego to Guam on a single fueling.¹⁰ Designed primarily for ASW—specifically the persistent, long-duration tracking of quiet diesel-electric submarines—these platforms act as highly capable, distributed sensor nodes for manned ships. By projecting an operational view far beyond the horizon, they support maritime domain awareness while entirely removing human personnel from high-risk environments.²⁰

China’s JARI USV: In contrast to the U.S. focus on sensor-heavy, unarmed prototypes, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has prioritized multi-mission lethality in a compact uncrewed hull. The JARI USV, developed by the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC), is a 58-meter (190.3 ft), 420-500 ton uncrewed warship capable of reaching sprint speeds of 42 knots via waterjet propulsion, with a formidable endurance range of 4,000 nautical miles.²⁴ Unlike the purely sensor-focused baseline Sea Hunter, the JARI is heavily and diversely armed. It features a 4-to-12 cell Vertical Launching System (VLS), lightweight torpedo tubes, a remote weapon station, and air defense missiles such as the HQ-10 point defense system.²⁵ Its sensor suite is equally robust, incorporating an active phased array radar, electro-optic systems, and sonar.²⁵ Crucially, the JARI’s architecture supports autonomous navigation, swarm operations, cooperative target tracking, and coordinated fire missions.²⁴ The integration of comprehensive air defense, ASW, and anti-surface capabilities into a relatively small, autonomous platform signifies China’s strategic intent to mass-produce heavily armed sensor-shooters capable of saturating contested waters and complicating allied targeting algorithms.²⁶

4.2 Extra-Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs)

The undersea domain, historically the exclusive preserve of highly trained crews operating multi-billion-dollar nuclear-powered submarines, is being fundamentally disrupted by the introduction of XLUUVs. These platforms offer extreme endurance, exceptional stealth, and substantial payload capacity without the complex life-support constraints and safety margins required for crewed submarines.

The Boeing Orca XLUUV (U.S. Navy): The Orca is an 85-foot (26-meter), 85-ton autonomous submarine featuring a hybrid diesel-electric power plant.²⁷ Its defining strategic characteristic is its unprecedented undersea autonomy, delivering extreme endurance that enables month-long, long-range missions covering up to 6,500 nautical miles without resupply.⁹ Crucially, the Orca requires minimal human intervention and can be launched, operated, and recovered pier-side without the logistical burden of a dedicated manned mother ship.²⁷

The Orca features a transformative, modular 33-foot (10-meter) payload bay capable of carrying up to 8 tons of mission equipment, allowing for rapid role changes across the undersea battlespace.⁹ The strategic applications for such a vessel are vast:

• Offensive Mining and Mine Countermeasures (MCM): XLUUVs can clandestinely lay complex, smart minefields deep within adversary A2/AD zones, or autonomously locate and neutralize underwater mines, keeping manned vessels far from harm’s way.²⁷
• Seabed Warfare: The endurance and stealth of the Orca make it an ideal, cost-effective platform for manipulating, monitoring, or protecting critical subsea infrastructure, such as vital fiber-optic data cables that transmit global financial and strategic communications.²⁷
• Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): Functioning as a persistent, mobile listening post or a forward-deployed launch platform for ASW weapons, the Orca can track adversary submarines over vast distances without risking human crews.²⁸

4.3 Aerial Maritime Drones (UAVs)

Aerial drones have transitioned from being purely overland Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to becoming integral, networked components of naval strategy, providing persistent overwatch, communications relays, and precision targeting data across the vast maritime domain.

High-Altitude, Long-Endurance (HALE) Systems: The MQ-4C Triton, managed by the Persistent Maritime Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program Office, provides Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) for the U.S. and allied forces.³⁰ Operating at high altitudes with an endurance of over 30 hours and a ferry range exceeding 15,000 kilometers, a single Triton is capable of monitoring 40,000 square kilometers of ocean surface a day.³² It serves as a critical node in tracking surface contacts, seamless surveillance, and providing long-range targeting data for distributed fleets, operating as a ‘family of systems’ alongside crewed aircraft like the P-8A Poseidon.³¹ Similarly, the MQ-9B SeaGuardian offers global reach via satellite communications, carrying advanced maritime sensors and payloads exceeding 2,150 kg to provide real-time search and surveillance of activity both on and below the sea surface.³⁰

Tactical Maritime Rotary UAVs: For localized shipboard deployment, systems like the Schiebel Camcopter S-100 provide immediate, highly flexible tactical ISR. The S-100 is a rotary-wing UAV powered by a 50 HP aviation engine, operating with a 50 kg payload capacity and cruising at 55 knots for over 6 hours (extendable to over 10 hours with external tanks) at ranges up to 130 km.³⁴ These tactical systems integrate directly into a ship’s Combat Management System (CMS), providing real-time data feeds, precise delivery of guided munitions, and target coordinates without the operational footprint or risk associated with manned helicopters.³⁶

5. The “Hellscape” Concept: Swarm Dynamics and Conventional Deterrence

The unprecedented proliferation and maturation of these uncrewed systems have directly informed highly aggressive new operational concepts aimed at deterring peer adversaries in contested theaters. The most prominent and widely discussed among these is the “Hellscape” strategy, articulated extensively by Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and his predecessor, Admiral John Aquilino.³⁸

5.1 Orchestrating the Unmanned Hellscape in the Indo-Pacific

The primary strategic objective of the Hellscape concept is to decisively deny the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the operational ability to execute a short, sharp amphibious invasion of Taiwan, preventing a geopolitical fait accompli before the international community can formulate a coordinated military response.⁴⁰ To achieve this formidable goal, INDOPACOM envisions transforming the Taiwan Strait into a saturated, lethally impassable environment using a massive, coordinated deployment of classified, uncrewed capabilities across the air, surface, and subsurface domains.³⁸

Initially, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Replicator Initiative, announced in 2023, served as the primary acquisition engine for this strategy. However, after struggling with persistent technical issues, integration challenges with existing command-and-control structures, and fielding only hundreds of systems rather than the projected thousands, Replicator was dissolved in late 2025. To rectify these systemic procurement failures, the Pentagon absorbed the initiative into the newly established Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG). Functioning as the central authority for the Hellscape strategy, DAWG represents a monumental shift in institutional priority, receiving an unprecedented $54.6 billion budget request for Fiscal Year 2027. Former CIA Director David Petraeus characterized this 24,000 percent single-year funding surge as the “largest single commitment to autonomous warfare in history”.

This massive screen of autonomous drone swarms is explicitly designed to fulfill multiple overlapping tactical and strategic functions:

1. Persistent Targeting and Intelligence: Networked drones fill the critical operational gap between high-altitude satellite imagery and vulnerable crewed overflights, providing persistent, real-time targeting data and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions to allied long-range missile batteries.³⁹
2. Saturation and Exhaustion of Adversary Defenses: By deploying tens of thousands of platforms simultaneously, the autonomous swarm intentionally exhausts Chinese air defenses and rapidly depletes their limited, expensive interceptor missile stocks, effectively flipping the asymmetric cost curve against the PRC.⁴¹
3. Direct Kinetic Interdiction: Armed autonomous drones act as short-range interceptors and direct-strike platforms, physically interdicting surface warships, troop transports, and amphibious landing craft as they attempt to transit the strait.³⁹

The anticipated scale of this strategy is unprecedented in modern military planning. Previous INDOPACOM leadership established a staggering metric of prosecuting “1,000 targets for 24 hours” to successfully blunt an invasion force of this magnitude.³⁹

5.2 Wargaming the Swarm: Validation Across Theaters

The theoretical efficacy of autonomous swarm defense has been repeatedly validated in advanced, classified, and unclassified wargames. A seminal report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), authored by defense experts Stacie Pettyjohn and Molly Campbell, analyzed the defense of Taiwan by layering drone defenses across the entirety of the maritime battlespace.⁴² The simulation utilized a specialized reconnaissance swarm, networked via mesh communications, for wide-area ISR, passing high-fidelity coordinates to deep-strike Joint force capabilities.⁴⁴ In the final 5-kilometer run to the contested landing beaches, dense layers of short-range drones directly attacked amphibious ships within visual range, creating a practically impassable kinetic barrier that inflicted severe attrition on the invasion force.⁴²

This paradigm is not limited to the maritime confines of the Indo-Pacific; it is equally applicable to land-based and littoral deterrence in Europe. In the European theater, the German defense software company Helsing conducted wargames focused on the defense of the Baltics. In a baseline scenario lacking allied rapid engagement, simulated Russian forces overran the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius within five days. However, when the defending forces deployed a coordinated swarm of roughly 12,000 HX-2 autonomous attack drones, the dynamic was entirely reversed. The swarm halted the offensive, inflicted massive armor and personnel losses, and delayed the advance by one to two weeks—providing sufficient operational time for NATO’s main forces to mobilize and arrive.¹¹

These rigorous simulations confirm a fundamental shift: massed, AI-enabled drones, operating via resilient mesh networks and decentralized control algorithms, are no longer mere auxiliary assets for reconnaissance or targeted strikes; they represent the primary mechanism for conventional deterrence and area denial in the twenty-first century.⁴¹

6. The Crisis of Magazine Depth and Logistical Contestation

While the Hellscape strategy relies enthusiastically on offensive drone swarms to deter adversaries, the U.S. Navy and its allies face a severe, reciprocal threat. If adversaries adopt similar swarm tactics—which China, possessing the world’s largest industrial manufacturing base and fielding advanced systems like the JARI USV, is uniquely positioned to do—defending fleets will confront an immediate and critical crisis in “magazine depth”.¹³

6.1 The VLS Limitation and the Economics of Exhaustion

Modern naval combatants, particularly cruisers and destroyers, rely almost exclusively on Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) for both offensive strike and layered air defense. A standard U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer carries 90 to 96 VLS cells, representing a finite, hard-capped inventory of interceptors.⁴⁵ In a high-intensity conflict involving massed, coordinated drone swarms and anti-ship cruise missiles, a destroyer could feasibly empty its entire defensive magazine in a matter of hours or even minutes.¹³

The strategic implications of this are dire. Once perfected, a saturation attack need not physically strike or sink a multi-billion-dollar aircraft carrier to achieve strategic victory; it merely needs to force the group’s escort vessels to deplete their VLS cells in self-defense. A modern warship without interceptors is effectively a mission kill—a defenseless liability that must immediately withdraw from the theater of operations to rearm, thereby ceding sea control to the adversary.¹³ This vulnerability is especially troubling given the so-called “Davidson Window,” the deadline by which PRC leadership has charged the People’s Liberation Army to be prepared for military action against Taiwan.⁴⁶

6.2 The Tyranny of At-Sea Reloading

Historically, reloading depleted VLS cells required a warship to abandon its station and return to a secure, deep-water port equipped with specialized crane facilities.¹³ Given the vast, tyrannical distances of the Pacific theater, this process effectively removes the vessel from the fight for weeks at a time.¹³ The Navy has correctly recognized this logistical vulnerability as a critical, single point of failure in its Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept.⁴⁶

To mitigate this existential shortfall, the U.S. Navy has drastically accelerated efforts to develop and deploy at-sea reloading capabilities. In October 2024, the Navy achieved a significant milestone by demonstrating the Transferrable Reload At-sea Method (TRAM) aboard the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Chosin.⁴⁸ Using a hydraulically-powered, articulating device, sailors successfully loaded an empty missile canister into the ship’s MK 41 VLS while underway alongside the dry cargo ship USNS Washington Chambers in the open ocean off the coast of San Diego.⁴⁸

Despite this highly publicized breakthrough, at-sea reloading remains a deeply cumbersome, slow, and hazardous process heavily restricted by sea state, adverse weather, and operational risk.⁴⁶ Handling multi-ton, highly explosive ordnance via cranes or hydraulic transfer systems between two moving ships requires relatively calm waters, often forcing vessels to retreat far away from contested zones to rearm safely.⁴⁶ Therefore, while TRAM is a vital logistical capability, it cannot entirely solve the magazine depth crisis generated by cheap, attritable drone swarms in a protracted conflict. The mathematics of kinetic interception remain fundamentally misaligned with the economics of drone mass.

7. Next-Generation Counter-UAS (C-UAS) and Directed Energy Integration

To permanently resolve both the magazine depth limitation and the economically unsustainable cost-exchange ratio, naval strategists must look beyond traditional kinetic interceptors. The rapid integration and operational fielding of Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)—specifically High-Energy Lasers (HEL) and High-Power Microwave (HPM) systems—constitutes the absolute strategic imperative for future fleet survival in a drone-saturated environment.⁴⁵

7.1 High-Energy Lasers (HEL): The Infinite Magazine

Laser weapons offer a profoundly disruptive advantage: a virtually infinite magazine depth, limited only by the electrical power generation capacity of the host vessel.⁵¹ Crucially, the cost per engagement is reduced from millions of dollars (the cost of an SM-2 or PAC-3) to the marginal cost of the diesel fuel required to generate the electricity for the laser burst—often calculated in single or double digits per shot.¹⁴

The U.S. Navy has actively tested and deployed these systems, most notably installing the HELIOS (High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance) system aboard the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Preble.⁵² Known formally as the Counter-Unmanned Air Systems High Energy Laser Weapon System (C-UAS HELWS), it provides highly precise point defense against small aerial drones and fast-attack surface craft.⁵⁵ While successful in intercepting targets during testing, these systems are largely classified by the Navy as “Non-Program of Record (POR) Research & Development (R&D) assets” rather than being slated for immediate, widespread fleet integration.⁵² Expanding their deployment is critical, as DEWs represent the only economically viable method for systematically destroying low-end, attritable drones in a protracted, high-intensity conflict, preserving expensive kinetic interceptors for high-end threats like hypersonic glide vehicles.¹⁴

7.2 High-Power Microwave (HPM) Defenses: Defeating the Swarm

While High-Energy Lasers burn through targets individually, requiring precise tracking and “dwell time” on a single target, they can still be overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Therefore, High-Power Microwave (HPM) weapons are vital for defeating dense, synchronized swarms. HPM systems project a wide cone of intense electromagnetic energy that disrupts, scrambles, or permanently destroys the unshielded electronics, guidance systems, and flight controllers of multiple drones simultaneously, regardless of their evasive maneuvers.⁴⁷

Programs such as the Tactical High Power Microwave Operational Responder (Mjölnir), THOR, and the Expeditionary Directed Energy Counter-Swarm (ExDECS) system recently received by the U.S. Marine Corps are currently under rapid development and dynamic testing.⁵³ HPM provides a wide-area, non-kinetic defense capability that both traditional missiles and single-target lasers fundamentally lack, serving as the ultimate, indispensable fail-safe against the mass saturation tactics envisioned in Hellscape-style offensive scenarios.⁵³

7.3 The Strategic Warning: Vulnerability in the First Island Chain

The urgency for integrating these systems is highlighted in a recent CNAS report, which starkly concludes that the United States is fundamentally unprepared to defend against present and future drone threats, having decisively lost its decades-long monopoly on precision strike.⁵⁷

In a simulated wargame focusing on a U.S.-China conflict, Chinese drone swarms were deployed to systematically suppress and destroy U.S. forces operating inside the highly contested First Island Chain.⁵⁸ The report warned that without deep magazines of substantially enhanced C-UAS capabilities, distributed warfighting strategies would be easily overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, potentially resulting in the catastrophic loss of a war over Taiwan.⁵⁷ Consequently, counter-drone capabilities can no longer be siloed solely to dedicated, specialized air defense units; every vessel, logistical transport, and distributed unit must possess autonomous, deep-magazine self-protection capabilities to survive.⁶⁰

8. Strategic Imperatives for the Future Fleet

The integration of military drones into naval warfare requires a total recalibration of strategic thinking at the highest levels of command. What was true in the twentieth century is often highly dangerous and operationally fatal in the twenty-first.

8.1 Outdated and Dangerous Paradigms

1. The Invulnerability of the Concentrated Fleet: The deeply entrenched belief that a Carrier Strike Group can operate with impunity inside an adversary’s A2/AD bubble is outdated. The proliferation of stealthy XLUUVs, armed LUSVs like the JARI, and long-range containerized UAVs means that highly concentrated, expensive platforms are lucrative, easily locatable targets that can be continuously tracked and relentlessly harassed by autonomous swarms.³
2. The Sufficiency of Kinetic Defense: Relying solely on sophisticated, multi-million-dollar interceptors to defend against massed, attritable threats is economic suicide. The fundamental math dictates that an adversary can bankrupt a defending fleet’s budget and exhaust its industrial base long before it successfully destroys the fleet kinetically.¹⁴
3. Assuming Uncontested Logistics: Naval planners can no longer assume that deep-water ports, logistical supply ships, and at-sea reloading facilities will remain secure sanctuaries. The massive expansion of drone ranges and the inherent physical vulnerabilities of at-sea reloading methods (like TRAM) mean that logistics chains will be continuously and violently contested.¹⁵ The traditional dichotomy between the front line and the safe rear echelon has been erased.

8.2 What Strategists Must Think About Now

To survive and project power, naval strategists must pivot decisively toward a framework of distributed lethality, payload-centric design, and massed autonomy.

• Embracing the Economics of Attrition: The fleet must deliberately integrate systems designed specifically to be lost in combat. If a $50,000 uncrewed vessel forces an adversary to reveal a hidden radar position, or expend a $3 million interceptor missile to destroy it, the loss of the drone represents a massive strategic and economic victory for the attacker. The DoD’s Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) is a vital entity driving this mindset, moving away from exquisite, irreplaceable platforms toward massed, consumable combat power. The potential elevation of DAWG to a “sub-unified command”—placing autonomous warfare in the same institutional category as the defense of the Korean Peninsula or the conduct of special operations—indicates that the Pentagon is no longer treating attritable mass as a pilot project, but as a durable, permanent branch of military doctrine with a sustained demand signal.
• Mesh Networks and Autonomous Sensor Webs: Uncrewed systems like the Sea Hunter and MQ-4C Triton must be utilized continuously to create an impenetrable, autonomous sensor web across vast oceanic expanses. This allows manned, high-value vessels to operate in strict “emission control” (EMCON) silence, relying entirely on forward-deployed, expendable drones for targeting data while remaining virtually undetected by adversary sensors.²⁰
• Accelerating DEW Integration: The notorious “Valley of Death” in defense procurement—the bureaucratic gap between successful research and development and widespread operational fielding—must be bridged immediately for Directed Energy Weapons.¹⁴ Without high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves integrated across every surface combatant in the fleet, the magazine depth crisis cannot be mathematically resolved.
• Asymmetric Mining and Chokepoint Control: XLUUVs like the Orca completely change the calculus of sea denial. Strategists must plan for scenarios where critical maritime chokepoints (e.g., the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait, the Bab al-Mandeb) are contested not by visible surface fleets, but by autonomous, silent submarines laying smart, self-activating minefields. This severely restricts freedom of navigation without crossing the political escalation threshold of sinking ships with crewed vessels.²⁹

9. Conclusion

Military drones across the aerial, surface, and subsurface domains have irrevocably altered the fundamental character of naval warfare. They have decisively shifted the balance of maritime power away from the concentration of exquisite, highly vulnerable capital ships and toward the massed dispersion of attritable, autonomous systems. The modern realization of the Jeune École is no longer a theoretical wargaming exercise; it is a brutal operational reality currently being demonstrated in the constrained waters of the Black and Red Seas. The collapse of the traditional cost-exchange ratio mathematically dictates that traditional, kinetic-heavy defensive postures are economically and logistically unsustainable against massed swarms.

To maintain maritime superiority in this new era, naval strategists must urgently and permanently discard outdated assumptions regarding uncontested logistical sanctuary and the supremacy of kinetic dominance. The future of naval warfare belongs exclusively to forces that can effectively integrate uncrewed systems into resilient distributed mesh networks, project overwhelming power via autonomous swarm strike, and defend against reciprocal adversary swarms using deep-magazine directed energy weapons. A failure to rapidly adapt to this drone-centric reality risks overwhelming strategic defeat at the hands of adversaries who have already mastered the brutal economics of asymmetric mass.

Appendix: Research Approach and Data Sources

This report was compiled through a rigorous qualitative synthesis and strategic analysis of defense intelligence, open-source military reporting, and peer-reviewed think-tank policy papers. The analytical framework involved categorizing raw intelligence data into core vectors of change: platform technical evolution (USV, UAV, XLUUV capabilities), macroeconomic cost-exchange ratios, logistical constraints (magazine depth and at-sea reloading), and broad doctrinal shifts (the Hellscape strategy and the modern Jeune École). Data points regarding specific system specifications, unit costs, and operational combat histories were extracted, verified, and cross-referenced to identify broader causal relationships and strategic vulnerabilities. The analysis systematically projected these contemporary findings against traditional Mahanian naval theory to isolate outdated paradigms and formulate actionable future strategic imperatives.

Primary Data Sources:

• Operational Capability and Technical Data: Detailed specifications for advanced Uncrewed Surface Vessels (Magura V5, Sea Baby, Sea Hunter, JARI USV), Extra-Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles (Boeing Orca, Marichka), and Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (MQ-4C Triton, Camcopter S-100) were drawn directly from defense technology trackers, manufacturer data sheets (Boeing, Schiebel, CSIC), and specialized maritime intelligence reports.⁸
• Strategic & Policy Reports: In-depth analyses of swarm warfare dynamics, cost-exchange ratios, and defense readiness were synthesized from leading policy institutes, including the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the Stimson Center, the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).¹³
• Doctrinal Statements and Wargaming: Critical information regarding INDOPACOM’s “Hellscape” strategy, the transition from the Replicator Initiative to the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), and specific European and Pacific wargame outcomes (CNAS and Helsing) was sourced from official Department of Defense statements and defense journalism.
• Counter-UAS & Logistics: Technical and operational data on Directed Energy Weapons (HELIOS, HPM, ExDECS) and at-sea reloading methodologies (TRAM) were gathered from U.S. Navy press releases, NAVSEA documentation, and the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA).⁴⁸

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

1. The Future Faces of Irregular Warfare: Great Power Competition in the 21st Century – GovInfo, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-D-PURL-gpo240226/pdf/GOVPUB-D-PURL-gpo240226.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org
2. Spring 2023 Full Issue | Naval War College Review, accessed July 5, 2026, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/context/nwc-review/article/8342/viewcontent/NWC_Review_Spring_2023_web.pdf
3. An Analysis of the United States’ Deterrence by Denial Strategy Against China, accessed July 5, 2026, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-02/230306_China_Event_Materials.pdf?VersionId=0t.VI41g8tcPtU0X.RbOOyyualaOQzjz
4. What does the French ‘Jeune Ecole’ theory teach us to help set up a winning Hybrid Navy?, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.naval-review.com/news-views/what-does-the-french-jeune-ecole-theory-teach-us-to-help-set-up-a-winning-hybrid-navy/
5. The Drone Revolution? – Naval Gazing, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navalgazing.net/The-Drone-Revolution
6. Sea Control and Foreign Policy – U.S. Naval War College, accessed July 5, 2026, https://usnwc.edu/_images/portals/0/News-and-Events/EMC-Workshops/Sea-Control-and-Foreign-Policy/2017_EMC_working_papers.pdf
7. UK to buy drone command warships instead of new destroyers – Reddit, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/unitedkingdom/comments/1uilfib/uk_to_buy_drone_command_warships_instead_of_new/
8. Overview Of Ukrainian Maritime Drones (USVs) Of The Russo …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.hisutton.com/Ukrainian-USVs-Russo-Ukraine-War.html
9. XLUUV – Boeing, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-and-unmanned-systems/xluuv
10. Sea Hunter – Wikipedia, accessed July 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Hunter
11. The HX‑2 drone could prevent the fall of Vilnius, according to conclusions of a wargame organised by Helsing – Meta-Defense, accessed July 5, 2026, https://meta-defense.fr/en/2026/05/29/hx2-drones-vilnius-wargame/
12. Naval War College Review. Volume 68, Number 3, Summer 2015 – DTIC, accessed July 5, 2026, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA616727.pdf
13. Red Sea’s asymmetrical naval cost | The Australian Naval Institute, accessed July 5, 2026, https://navalinstitute.com.au/red-seas-asymmetrical-naval-cost/
14. The Coming of Age of Directed Energy Weapons and the Red Sea Crisis, accessed July 5, 2026, https://cimsec.org/the-coming-of-age-of-directed-energy-weapons-and-the-red-sea-crisis/
15. We Can’t Buy Our Way Out: It’s Time to Think Differently • Stimson …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2025/we-cant-buy-our-way-out-drones-portable-missiles/
16. Why the Drone Math Is Broken | Scaling Reliable Drone … – Vislink, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.vislink.com/blog/the-drone-math-is-broken/
17. MAGURA V5 – Wikipedia, accessed July 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAGURA_V5
18. MAGURA V5 – Grokipedia, accessed July 5, 2026, https://grokipedia.com/page/magura_v5
19. New variants of Ukraine’s SEA BABY Unmanned Surface Vessel – Future Warfare Magazine, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.fw-mag.com/shownews/777/new-variants-of-ukraine-rsquo-s-sea-baby-unmanned-surface-vessel
20. Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV) > United States Navy > Display-FactFiles, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/4288073/medium-unmanned-surface-vessel-musv/
21. Tales For the Silent Service – The USN Anti-Submarine Class II Unmanned Surface Vessel USV – Long Island Boating World, accessed July 5, 2026, https://liboatingworld.com/tales-for-the-silent-service-the-usn-anti-submarine-class-ii-unmanned-surface-vessel-usv/
22. Sea Hunter – Grokipedia, accessed July 5, 2026, https://grokipedia.com/page/Sea_Hunter
23. World’s Largest Naval Drone, The US Navy’s Sea Hunter sets world record, accessed July 5, 2026, http://www.worldrecordacademy.org/2025/6/worlds-largest-naval-drone-the-us-navy-s-sea-hunter-sets-world-record-425197
24. JARI USV (Orca) – Janus Marine and Defense, accessed July 5, 2026, https://janusdefense.com/product/jari-usv-orca/
25. JARI USV – Wikipedia, accessed July 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JARI_USV
26. China Builds World’s Largest Uncrewed Warship | Covert Shores, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.hisutton.com/Chinese-JARI-USV-A.html
27. Boeing Christens Second Extra-Large Orca Submarine Drone – Naval News, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/03/boeing-christens-second-extra-large-orca-submarine-drone/
28. Orca XLUUV, United States of America – Naval Technology, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/orca-xluuv/
29. Large unmanned undersea vehicle – Wikipedia, accessed July 5, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_unmanned_undersea_vehicle
30. Naval Projects A-Z – Latest Developments & Innovations, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.naval-technology.com/projects-a-z/
31. Running head: FUTURE UTILIZATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL – ScholarWorks, accessed July 5, 2026, https://scholarworks.calstate.edu/downloads/m039kb782
32. Attack & Multirole Drones (UAVs) | TheDefenseWatch.com, accessed July 5, 2026, https://thedefensewatch.com/product-cat/attack-multirole-drones-uavs/
33. Waves and Wings: A Deeper Look at Maritime UAVs, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.nationshield.ae/index.php/home/details/research/waveswingsadeeperlookmaritimeuavs/en
34. CAMCOPTER® S-100 UAS Brochure | Unmanned Systems Technology, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CAMCOPTER-S-100-UAS-Brochure.pdf
35. UAS Schiebel Camcopter S-100 (unregistered) No & Type of Engines – GOV.UK, accessed July 5, 2026, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/591c3891ed915d20fb000028/UAS_Schiebel_Camcopter_S-100_UAS_232_06-17.pdf
36. Camcopter S-100, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.deagel.com/Aerospace%20Forces/Camcopter/a002201
37. CAMCOPTER® S-100 – Schiebel Elektronische Geräte, accessed July 5, 2026, https://schiebel.net/camcopter-s-100/
38. Exploiting Offensive Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS): Learning from Our Adversaries > Air University (AU) > Wild Blue Yonder, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/3836715/exploiting-offensive-use-of-small-unmanned-aerial-systems-suas-learning-from-ou/
39. NATO needs a ‘hellscape’ defense at ‘Replicator’ speed – Atlantic Council, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/nato-needs-a-hellscape-defense-at-replicator-speed/
40. Swarming drone ‘hellscape’ to deter PRC use of force against Taiwan, accessed July 5, 2026, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2024/07/swarming-drone-hellscape-to-deter-prc-use-of-force-against-taiwan/
41. Rethinking Denial: The People’s Liberation Army’s Laser Systems and the Future Challenges, accessed July 5, 2026, https://innovation.army.mil/News/Article-View/Article/4029077/rethinking-denial-the-peoples-liberation-armys-laser-systems-and-the-future-cha/
42. Hellscape for Taiwan | CNAS, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/hellscape-for-taiwan
43. Countering the Drone Swarm – Oct 7, 2025 – SOF News, accessed July 5, 2026, https://sof.news/drones/20251007/
44. Achtung Swarm – Marine Corps University, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-16-no-2/Achtung-Swarm/
45. Light speed weapons? Directed energy and the future of the Australian Defence Force – AWS, accessed July 5, 2026, https://aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/13120842/Light-speed-weapons.pdf
46. Driving Toward Distributed Maritime Operations: Getting the Navy Out of Its VLS Hole, accessed July 5, 2026, https://cimsec.org/driving-toward-distributed-maritime-operations-getting-the-navy-out-of-its-vls-hole/
47. The Enduring Role of Fires on the Modern Battlefield – CSIS, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-6-enduring-role-fires
48. Navy Demonstrates First At-sea Reloading of Vertical Launching System, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Media/News/Article/3935575/navy-demonstrates-first-at-sea-reloading-of-vertical-launching-system/
49. Navy’s Unwanted Sea Base Ship Will Test At-Sea Rearming Of Warships – TWZ, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-unwanted-sea-base-ship-will-test-at-sea-rearming-of-destroyer
50. 25.4 SBIR Release 1 – NAVSEA Catapult Challenge: At-Sea Reload Technologies – Navy, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navysbir.com/n25_41/N254-C02.htm
51. The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again – NDU Press, accessed July 5, 2026, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2807244/the-tactical-defense-becomes-dominant-again/
52. Containerized Variant Of Navy’s Drone-Swatting HELIOS Laser Being Pushed By Congress, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/news-features/containerized-variant-of-navys-drone-swatting-helios-laser-being-pushed-by-congress
53. Navy HELIOS Laser Aboard USS Preble Zaps Drone In Latest Test – TWZ, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/news-features/navy-helios-laser-aboard-uss-preble-zaps-drone-in-latest-test
54. Navy Shipboard Laser Development Issues | PDF | United States Navy | Missile – Scribd, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.scribd.com/document/808679778/Navy-Shipboard-Lasers-Background-and-Issues-for-Congress-12-19-2024
55. DEPS Newsletter 2021, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.deps.org/DEPSpages/DEnews21.html
56. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON SUPPLY CHAINS – National Defense Industrial Association, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.ndia.org/-/media/ndia-eti/reports/directed-energy-weapon-supply-chains/directedenergyweaponsreportdeeti.pdf
57. CNAS Report Finds U.S. Military Unprepared for Drone Threat, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.cnas.org/press/press-release/cnas-report-finds-u-s-military-unprepared-for-drone-threat
58. COUNTERING THE SWARM – Amazon S3, accessed July 5, 2026, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Report_CUAS_Defense_Sep-2025_final.pdf
59. Eyes in the Sky | CNAS, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/eyes-in-the-sky
60. Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age | CNAS, accessed July 5, 2026, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/27/countering-drone-swarm-joint-force-drone-age/
61. Countering Drone Threats in Warfare | PDF | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle | Radar – Scribd, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.scribd.com/document/918973965/Report-CUAS-Defense-Sep-2025-Final
62. War game exposed U.S. vulnerability to low-tech warfare | Hacker News, accessed July 5, 2026, https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48188506
63. Aquatic Tiger: How long-range submarine drones could play a role in a Taiwan conflict, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/aquatic-tiger-how-long-range-submarine-drones-could-play-a-role-in-a-taiwan-conflict/

1. Executive Summary

Since the conclusion of the Second World War, the aircraft carrier has served as the primary instrument of American global power projection. For decades, the carrier strike group operated with relative impunity, serving as a sovereign, mobile airfield capable of delivering overwhelming kinetic force across the globe. However, the maturation of precision long-range fires, artificial intelligence, and autonomous unmanned systems has fundamentally altered the maritime strategic environment. Adversarial anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architectures, combined with the proliferation of low-cost, attritable drone swarms, have introduced unprecedented vulnerabilities to large surface combatants. This paradigm shift has prompted vigorous debate regarding the potential obsolescence of the carrier strike group, forcing military planners to reevaluate the mechanisms of naval deterrence.

A rigorous analysis of current threat vectors, wargame simulations, and evolving defensive technologies indicates that while the traditional conception of the aircraft carrier as an invulnerable, independent striking force is outdated and strategically dangerous, the hull form itself is not obsolete. Instead, the projection of American maritime power is undergoing a necessary structural evolution. The cost-exchange crisis observed in recent littoral conflicts demonstrates the mathematical impossibility of defeating high-volume, low-cost drone swarms with finite, multi-million-dollar kinetic interceptors. Consequently, the aircraft carrier must transition from operating as a standalone offensive spearhead into a highly defended, mobile command-and-control node deeply integrated within a distributed network, often referred to as a “kill web.”

To ensure survivability and lethality, naval force design is rapidly pivoting toward hybrid architectures. This involves deepening the defensive magazine through the deployment of ship-powered directed energy weapons and reusable interceptors, while simultaneously projecting “affordable mass” through the deployment of thousands of attritable autonomous systems. This report provides an in-depth analysis of the specific threats rendering legacy carrier operations highly vulnerable, the integration of airborne and subsea drone warfare into maritime strategy, and the critical strategic recalibration required to maintain maritime dominance in the coming decades.

2. The Deteriorating Survivability of the Carrier Strike Group and A2/AD Architectures

The strategic calculus governing carrier deployment has been severely disrupted by the democratization of precision strike capabilities and the sheer scale of adversarial missile production. The foundational vulnerability of the aircraft carrier lies in its massive physical, thermal, and electromagnetic signature, making it susceptible to detection and targeting over vast geographic distances.

The Carrier Killer Missile Architecture

Peer competitors have constructed a multi-layered, overlapping anti-ship missile architecture specifically engineered to push American carrier strike groups beyond their effective operational ranges.¹ This network is defined by land-based and sea-based ballistic and hypersonic systems capable of penetrating advanced Aegis air and missile defense systems.

The DF-21D represents the world’s first land-based anti-ship ballistic missile explicitly designed to target moving naval assets.¹ Utilizing inertial navigation updated by satellite and terminal radar or electro-optical guidance, the DF-21D integrates over-the-horizon targeting cued by a multi-source network of satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and surface vessel radar tracks.¹ Its conventional maneuvering reentry vehicle allows for terminal trajectory corrections against targets moving at speeds up to thirty knots, posing a severe threat to maneuvering aircraft carriers.¹

The DF-26 extends this sea-denial capability even further, introducing intermediate-range threats that can reach as far as Guam, the Philippine Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean.¹ Capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear payloads, the DF-26 utilizes multi-warhead capabilities to saturate shipborne point defenses.¹ Furthermore, the YJ-21 represents a particularly acute threat due to its integration directly into the surface fleet, specifically on the Type 055 cruiser.¹ Its ship-launched capability and hypersonic terminal velocity compress the defensive intercept window from minutes to mere seconds, forcing carriers to operate at extreme standoff distances that degrade the unrefueled combat radius of their embarked air wings.¹

Wargaming Outcomes and Industrial Attrition

The vulnerability of large surface combatants to these precision fires is starkly outlined in simulation data. In a series of twenty-four wargame iterations conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) simulating a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the outcomes for legacy naval platforms were highly attritional.² The simulations consistently projected the loss of two American aircraft carriers and between nine to twenty major surface ships, alongside the loss of 200 to 500 combat aircraft, within the opening weeks of the conflict.²

The strategic shock of these projected losses is magnified by a stark asymmetry in industrial reconstitution capabilities. While the wargames anticipate severe losses for adversarial forces—including the loss of ninety percent of the opposing amphibious fleet and fifty-two other major warships—the capacity to recover differs dramatically.² The opposing force benefits from a vastly more productive commercial shipbuilding program, operating thirteen primary naval shipyards that provide a robust foundation for rapid wartime recovery.²

Conversely, the timeline to rebuild a lost American supercarrier is estimated to be “essentially never” due to severe industrial base atrophy, and the replacement of other major surface combatants would require decades.² The U.S. Navy’s current fleet model struggles to scale; as of May 2026, the fleet sits at 291 ships, with the Congressional Budget Office estimating a drop to 283 ships by 2027.³ Relying on exquisite, capital-intensive platforms that cannot be rapidly replaced constitutes a critical strategic vulnerability.

3. The Magazine Depth Dilemma and the Cost-Exchange Crisis

While hypersonic and ballistic missiles represent the high-end threat to carrier strike groups, the proliferation of cheap unmanned aerial systems introduces the secondary, highly attritional threat of swarm saturation. A mathematical reality known as “magazine depth” strictly governs modern naval defense.⁴ The defensive capability of a surface action group is ultimately finite, constrained by the physical number of launch cells available.

The Limitations of the Vertical Launch System

An Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, which serves as the primary escort vessel of the carrier strike group, typically fields 90 to 96 Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, while Ticonderoga-class cruisers field 122 cells.⁴ Because these cells must be divided among offensive land-attack cruise missiles, anti-submarine rockets, and layered air defense interceptors, a ship facing a massive, coordinated drone swarm risks running out of ammunition before it runs out of targets.⁴ Even close-in weapon systems, such as defensive cannons capable of firing thousands of rounds per minute, can run dry in a matter of seconds when engaged in sustained defensive operations.⁵

This dynamic creates a deeply unsustainable cost-exchange ratio. During the defense of commercial shipping in the Red Sea, naval forces utilized highly advanced interceptors to neutralize one-way attack drones.⁶ Aegis destroyers successfully intercepted threats, but they relied on multi-million-dollar interceptors to shoot down drones costing as little as $2,000.⁶

The Economics of the Linear Kill Chain

The operational architecture of early Red Sea defense was a ship-centric, linear defensive kill chain. Due to the uncertainty of the threat environment and the immediate need to protect human lives and capital assets, commanders often defaulted to the most capable interceptors available. The specific interceptors fired by the Navy included the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) at approximately $2 million per unit, the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) at $3.9 million per unit, and the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), which costs between $9.7 million and $27.9 million per variant.⁶

While tactically successful in defending the fleet in the short term, this linear kill chain threatens to rapidly bankrupt finite munitions stockpiles, exposing the carrier to follow-on attacks from heavier anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles.⁶ Because high-end interceptors require years to manufacture due to complex supply chains and limited solid rocket motor production capacity, the military found itself tactically winning individual engagements but strategically losing depth.⁶

4. The Autonomous Swarm and Algorithmic Warfare

The threat to the aircraft carrier increasingly features the integration of autonomous swarming logic. The rapid commercialization of drone technology has erased the historical barrier to entry for precision strike capabilities, allowing both peer competitors and non-state actors to challenge naval supremacy.⁷

Algorithmic Swarm Coordination and AI Integration

Adversarial strategists are explicitly developing tactics designed to saturate carrier strike groups with swarms of multi-mission unmanned aerial vehicles. Recent publications from Chinese military researchers detail the development of artificial intelligence algorithms—such as the HG-STR system—designed to allow fixed-wing drone swarms to operate autonomously in highly jammed, communication-denied environments.⁸ In simulations, these advanced swarms construct dynamic battlefield graphs that treat jamming sources, terrain features, and targets as interconnected nodes, allowing the swarm to adapt its tactics and make inferences without human intervention, reportedly achieving a 100 percent kill rate in simulation environments.⁸

While simulation success does not guarantee real-world battlefield performance, the strategic implication is profound. Future operators may only need to set broad mission objectives, while AI systems execute the specific tactical maneuvers.⁸ This shifts the burden of defense onto the carrier strike group, forcing defenders to counter hundreds of independently reasoning drones.

Leader-Follower Swarm Architectures

Detailed attack profiles propose utilizing sophisticated “leader-follower” swarming modes to maximize the probability of penetrating Aegis defenses.⁹ In this architecture, a designated scout missile or high-altitude drone relays targeting data to a massive, low-flying swarm of subsonic stealth missiles and cheap decoy drones.⁹ The swarm operates collaboratively, dynamically adjusting its flight paths based on the data provided by the leader.⁹

If the leader is intercepted by the carrier’s combat air patrol or the escorting destroyers, the swarm is programmed to dynamically reassign the leader role to another surviving node, ensuring the continuous saturation of radar tracking systems.⁹ The objective is to deplete defense ammunition and overwhelm the combat system’s processing capabilities, thereby leaving the carrier exposed to subsequent salvos.⁹

5. Subsea Drone Warfare and the Loss of Sanctuary

The maritime domain is concurrently undergoing a revolution beneath the waves through the deployment of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs). These autonomous systems have fundamentally altered the geography of naval risk, erasing the traditional distinction between contested blue water and safe littoral harbors.

Shattering the Safe Harbor Assumption

Historically, naval doctrine assumed that ports and highly defended coastal waters offered sanctuary for major surface combatants to rearm and undergo maintenance. The development of subsea drones has shattered this assumption. In a paradigm-shifting operation on December 15, 2025, Ukrainian forces utilized a “Sub Sea Baby” underwater drone to bypass port defenses and strike an Improved Kilo-class submarine at the Russian naval base in Novorossiysk.¹⁰

The ability of a low-cost, semi-autonomous underwater vehicle to navigate harbor defenses and inflict a constructive total loss on a $400 million stealth submarine underscores a severe, persistent threat to American carriers during littoral transits.¹² Subsea drones possess a naturally low acoustic and visual signature, making them inherently difficult to detect, forcing naval forces to maintain continuous anti-submarine warfare screening even in ostensibly secure waters.¹³

The Rise of Unmanned Surface Vessels as Strike Platforms

Lessons derived from the Black Sea demonstrate that smaller surface drones can also effectively execute deep strikes.¹⁴ Unmanned surface vessels initially deployed as simple one-way kamikaze boats have rapidly evolved. For example, Ukraine has modified USVs to carry and launch aerial drones, effectively creating autonomous micro-carriers that extend the reach of aerial strikes.¹⁰

Furthermore, these platforms have been integrated with anti-aircraft missiles to counter airborne threats. Ukrainian forces utilized Magura V5 vessels to destroy Russian helicopters at sea, proving that relatively inexpensive unmanned boats can successfully threaten much more valuable manned aircraft.¹⁰ Due to constant advancements in operational range and satellite communications, USVs can launch payloads entirely out of the reach of shore-based surveillance systems, denying sea control to traditional naval fleets.¹⁰

6. Revolutionizing Carrier Defense: Deepening the Magazine

To ensure survival against swarm saturation and hypersonic threats, naval architecture is shifting away from an exclusive reliance on expensive, limited-quantity kinetic interceptors. The defensive evolution focuses on creating an “infinite magazine” through the integration of directed energy weapons and fielding lower-cost, reusable interception systems.

Directed Energy Weapons: The Infinite Magazine

The most significant advancement in carrier point defense is the operational fielding of high-energy laser systems. While earlier naval lasers required permanent integration into a ship’s hull, modern systems have achieved modularity.¹⁵

The AeroVironment LOCUST Laser Weapon System represents a critical breakthrough. Tested aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush in October 2025, the LOCUST is a palletized, 20 to 35-kilowatt-class High Energy Laser.¹⁶ The system’s roll-on, roll-off capability allows the Navy to quickly load the system onto a ship via forklift and initiate operations immediately, without complex ship modifications.¹⁷

Crucially, when deployed on a ship, the LOCUST system can draw directly from the nuclear carrier’s electrical grid, marrying an essentially unlimited power source with an infinite directed energy magazine.¹⁷ The cost per engagement is reduced from millions of dollars to the mere cost of the electricity required to generate the beam.¹⁸ During its deployment on the USS George H.W. Bush, the system demonstrated a 100 percent kill rate, neutralizing 17 consecutive target drones.¹⁶ By deploying systems like LOCUST and the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS), carriers and escorts can neutralize Group 1 to 3 drones efficiently.¹⁹

Next-Generation Kinetic Interceptors

To bridge the gap between directed energy and multi-million-dollar Standard Missiles, the Navy is procuring advanced, low-cost kinetic interceptors.

The Anduril Roadrunner-M is a jet-powered, loitering interceptor drone costing in the low hundreds of thousands of dollars.²⁰ If a threat is identified, the Roadrunner-M engages; if no threat materializes, it can return to its base station for reuse.²⁰ Similarly, Raytheon’s Coyote interceptors provide persistent counter-swarm capabilities. In a major milestone, the USS Bainbridge became the first U.S. Navy destroyer to operationally deploy Coyote interceptor launchers during NATO’s Neptune Strike exercise in July 2025.²¹

To handle advanced ballistic threats more efficiently, the Navy is integrating the Army’s Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) into the Mk 41 VLS.²² Valued at approximately $5.3 million per unit, the PAC-3 MSE’s highly agile hit-to-kill capability provides an optimized defense against maneuvering ballistic targets in the terminal phase.²³ The Navy has requested 405 PAC-3 MSE missiles in its fiscal year 2027 budget, signaling a major commitment to diversifying its defensive arsenal.²²

Non-Kinetic Electronic Warfare

Defensive architectures are also being hardened through advanced electronic warfare. The Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) Block 3 equips Aegis destroyers with active electronic attack capabilities across a wide frequency range.²⁵ Utilizing an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), SEWIP Block 3 can disrupt the guidance systems of incoming missiles, spoof targeting radars, and sever the command links of drone swarms.²⁵

7. The Offensive Evolution: Precise Mass and the Kill Web

The ultimate defense of the aircraft carrier lies in a robust, distributed offense. Legacy naval strategy relied on a linear kill chain wherein a single expensive platform was responsible for sensing, tracking, and prosecuting targets.⁶ The new paradigm relies on a highly distributed “kill web” and the doctrine of “affordable mass”—the ability to replace combat losses as fast as they are likely to occur.³

The Weaponization of Asymmetry and the LUCAS Drone

Precise mass is defined as the intersection of commercial manufacturing, advancements in artificial intelligence, and precision guidance technology, enabling actors to generate strike capabilities at lower costs and overwhelming scale.³

This adaptation culminated in the development of the Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS). Developed by SpektreWorks and reverse-engineered from the Iranian Shahed-136, the military leveraged rapid prototyping tools to field the system in months. The resulting LUCAS drone costs approximately $35,000—a fraction of the cost of traditional cruise missiles like the $2.5 million Tomahawk—while maintaining a 500-mile range and modular payload capacity.

Flipping the Cost Equation: Operation Epic Fury

The strategic value of affordable mass was validated during Operation Epic Fury, a campaign initiated on February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian military infrastructure. Central Command deployed waves of LUCAS drones launched from various platforms, fundamentally inverting the cost equation that plagued earlier Red Sea operations.

Rather than using multi-million-dollar interceptors to shoot down cheap drones, the U.S. launched swarms of $35,000 LUCAS drones to force the adversary to activate their air defense networks and expend highly expensive surface-to-air missiles. Once the adversary’s defense nodes were exposed and depleted of ammunition by the attritable drone wave, high-end U.S. stealth aircraft and cruise missiles exploited the gaps to destroy the infrastructure.⁶

Scaling Affordable Mass: The Drone Dominance Initiative

To sustain this strategy long-term, the Department of Defense is scaling up its domestic industrial ecosystem. Under the Drone Dominance Initiative, the Pentagon is issuing massive demand signals to non-traditional manufacturers, placing initial orders for 30,000 small, one-way attack drones at an expected initial cost of $5,000 per unit, with the goal of reducing the unit price to $2,000.⁶ The objective is to scale production to hundreds of thousands of units by 2027, establishing an industrial base capable of sustaining affordable mass.⁶

8. Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) and the Future Air Wing

If the aircraft carrier is to remain relevant in heavily contested environments, its embarked air wing must undergo a radical transformation. The integration of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) is the cornerstone of this evolution.²⁶

The MQ-25 Stingray and Range Extension

The primary limitation of modern carrier strike fighters is their relatively short unrefueled combat radius, which forces the carrier to operate perilously close to A2/AD threat rings. The MQ-25 Stingray is explicitly designed to address this vulnerability. As the world’s first operational, carrier-based unmanned aircraft, its primary mission is aerial refueling.²⁶

By offloading the tanking mission from crewed Super Hornets, the MQ-25 frees up fighter inventory for dedicated strike missions and significantly extends the effective operational range of the air wing.²⁶ Operating seamlessly with state-of-the-art sensors, the Stingray serves as the critical pathfinder for integrating autonomous systems into the carrier deck, laying the foundation for the Navy’s goal of achieving a sixty percent or more uncrewed carrier air wing.²⁷

Collaborative Combat Aircraft

Building upon the MQ-25, future carrier air wings will incorporate Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs).³ These uncrewed drones are designed to operate alongside crewed fighter jets at a significantly lower cost. CCAs will launch from the carrier to act as loyal wingmen, flying ahead of crewed fighters to provide early warning sensing, conduct electronic warfare, and deliver weapons deep within contested airspace.³ By substituting expensive manned platforms with attritable CCAs for the most dangerous missions, the carrier can project power without risking irreplaceable human capital.

9. Force Structure, Shipbuilding, and Fleet Design Strategies

The transition to a fleet architecture defined by affordable mass requires a fundamental overhaul of defense procurement and maritime force structure.

The MUSV Marketplace and Distributed Lethality

To distribute lethality away from the carrier deck and overcome shipyard backlogs, the Navy is fielding Medium Unmanned Surface Vessels (MUSVs) as collaborative combat nodes.³ By eliminating human accommodations, these autonomous ships drastically reduce construction costs.³

Because autonomous ships lack human support infrastructure, their simplified hulls can be constructed using modular techniques at smaller shipyards and commercial yacht builders.³ For example, the DARPA-developed Defiant (USX-1) MUSV, measuring 180 feet and weighing 240 metric tons, costs approximately $25 million for the core hull and is designed for extended voyages without any crew.³ Expanding naval construction into the 86 active smaller shipyards bypasses the severe delays plaguing major shipyards.³

The Hedge Strategy and Unmanned Undersea Vehicles

The rigid structure of the Carrier Strike Group is yielding to a more flexible organizational doctrine. The Chief of Naval Operations’ “Hedge Strategy” recognizes that finite carrier inventories cannot meet all global demands simultaneously.²⁸

By scaling up the use of MUSVs and Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs), combatant commanders can assemble customized formations to execute specific missions without requiring the presence of a supercarrier.²⁸ In June 2026, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group deployed alongside the Seahawk MUSV, transitioning these platforms from experimental prototypes into active, operational fleet assets.²⁸

Furthermore, the undersea domain is being bolstered by platforms like the Boeing Orca Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV).²⁹ The Orca, operating with a diesel-electric hybrid propulsion system, boasts a 12,000-kilometer range and enables months-long missions, providing unprecedented undersea autonomy.²⁹

10. Strategic Conclusions

Have military drones rendered America’s aircraft carriers obsolete? The empirical evidence suggests that they have not rendered the hull form obsolete, but they have permanently invalidated the traditional doctrinal mindset that views the carrier as an independent, invulnerable fortress. Traditional thinking that relies exclusively on finite, multi-million-dollar interceptors to defend against saturation attacks, or expects carriers to operate unmolested inside established anti-access/area-denial threat rings, is now entirely outdated.

The projection of American maritime power with a carrier is not an illusion; it is undergoing a metamorphosis. To survive, the aircraft carrier must evolve from a frontline brawler into the central nervous system of a highly distributed kill web. By offloading risk to attritable autonomous systems, utilizing collaborative combat vessels to distribute missile magazines, and protecting the carrier deck with ship-powered directed energy weapons, the carrier strike group can maintain its strategic relevance. Future naval dominance will rely on “affordable mass” and the sheer volume, speed, and connectivity of the uncrewed swarm it commands.

11. Appendix: Methodology and Data Sources

The analysis provided in this report synthesizes a broad spectrum of open-source intelligence, strategic defense directives, wargame data, and procurement documents to assess the survivability and evolution of the U.S. aircraft carrier in the modern threat environment.

The evaluation of adversarial Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities relied on technical specifications regarding the ranges, terminal velocities, and launch platforms of the DF-21D, DF-26, and YJ-21 missile systems.¹ The strategic implications of these capabilities were contextualized using the outcomes of wargame iterations conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which provided vital data on projected asset attrition and the severe industrial constraints surrounding the reconstitution of major surface combatants.²

The assessment of the “cost-exchange” crisis and the shift toward “affordable mass” was informed by operational data from recent combat deployments. This included the financial disparities observed during Red Sea defensive operations and the subsequent offensive deployment of the Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) during Operation Epic Fury. Advancements in directed energy weapons and non-kinetic defenses were evaluated based on the live-fire testing of the AeroVironment LOCUST system aboard the USS George H.W. Bush, the outfitting of the USS Bainbridge with Coyote interceptors, and the integration parameters of the SEWIP Block 3 and PAC-3 MSE.¹⁵ The structural shift in naval procurement toward attritable, autonomous systems was analyzed through current initiatives, including the Drone Dominance Initiative and the operational deployment of the Seahawk MUSV.⁶

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

1. China’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles: DF-21D, DF-26 & YJ-21 Carrier …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://thedefensewatch.com/naval-maritime/naval-strategy-maritime-security/chinas-carrier-killer-arsenal/
2. So What? Reassessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://tnsr.org/2025/06/so-what-reassessing-the-military-implications-of-chinese-control-of-taiwan/
3. The Navy Needs Precise Mass and Here Is How to Get There, accessed July 5, 2026, https://warontherocks.com/the-navy-needs-precise-mass-and-here-is-how-to-get-there/
4. How Aircraft Carriers Are Defended – Military Machine, accessed July 5, 2026, https://militarymachine.com/how-aircraft-carriers-are-defended
5. Can a single destroyer really handle thousands of drones attacking at once, or would it stand no chance against such a swarm? – Quora, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.quora.com/Can-a-single-destroyer-really-handle-thousands-of-drones-attacking-at-once-or-would-it-stand-no-chance-against-such-a-swarm
6. From Red Sea Defense to Epic Fury: How the U.S. Flipped the …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://defense.info/re-shaping-defense-security/2026/03/from-red-sea-defense-to-epic-fury-how-the-u-s-flipped-the-drone-cost-equation/
7. The Navy and Marine Corps Need to Prepare for the Swarm of the Future – War on the Rocks, accessed July 5, 2026, https://warontherocks.com/the-navy-and-marine-corps-must-plan-for-the-swarm-of-the-future/
8. Chinese Scientists Unveil Drone Swarm Algorithm Claiming 100% Kill Rate – Ground News, accessed July 5, 2026, https://ground.news/daily-briefing/chinese-scientists-unveil-drone-swarm-algorithm-claiming-100-kill-rate
9. China’s plan to swarm US carriers from 3,000km away – Asia Times, accessed July 5, 2026, https://asiatimes.com/2026/06/chinas-plan-to-swarm-us-carriers-from-3000km-away/
10. Ukraine is launching strike-drones from everything – including Black Sea robo-boats, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/07/01/ukraine-is-launching-strike-drones-from-everything-including-black-sea-robo-boats/
11. Ukraine strikes Russian submarine with ‘Sub Sea Baby’ drone – Naval News, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/12/ukraine-strikes-russian-submarine-with-sub-sea-baby-drone/
12. Ukraine’s ‘Sub Sea Baby’ Drones Burn Russia’s $400 Million Submarine: How SBU Flipped Naval Warfare? – YouTube, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cq6tFpwUN-I
13. Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval Operations (2005) – National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/11379/chapter/7
14. Maritime Domain Lessons from Russia-Ukraine | Conflict in Focus – CSIS, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/maritime-domain-lessons-russia-ukraine-conflict-focus
15. LOCUST laser weapon scores 100% kill rate in US Navy trials – New Atlas, accessed July 5, 2026, https://newatlas.com/military/aerovironment-locust-laser-weapon-us-navy-trials/
16. Why aircraft carriers are the best (and worst) place for laser weapons – Military Times, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/industry/techwatch/2026/04/28/why-aircraft-carriers-are-the-best-and-worst-place-for-laser-weapons/
17. AV Successfully Demonstrates LOCUST Laser Weapon System …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.avinc.com/2026/04/21/av-successfully-demonstrates-locust-laser-weapon-system-aboard-uss-george-h-w-bush/
18. GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE: Directed Energy in Air Base Defense Can Save the Arsenal, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2025/8/11/government-perspective-directed-energy-in-air-base-defense-can-save-the-arsenal
19. US Navy Deploys Its HELIOS High-Energy Laser System In Operation Fury Against Iran | News18 – YouTube, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tYuAFf0pAKY
20. Roadrunner Reusable Anti-Air Interceptor Breaks Cover – TWZ, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/roadrunner-reusable-anti-air-interceptor-breaks-cover
21. Naval Defense Revolution: USS Bainbridge Becomes First Destroyer Armed with Advanced Counter-Drone Systems – Americans for a Stronger Navy, accessed July 5, 2026, https://strongernavy.org/naval-defense-revolution-uss-bainbridge-becomes-first-destroyer-armed-with-advanced-counter-drone-systems/
22. Patriot PAC-3 Missiles To Arm Navy Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers – TWZ, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/land/patriot-pac-3-missiles-to-arm-navy-arleigh-burke-class-destroyers
23. ‘Cheap’ Patriot Interceptor Costing Under $1 Million Now Being Sought By Army – TWZ, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/land/cheap-patriot-interceptor-costing-under-1-million-now-being-sought-by-army
24. U.S. Navy Orders 405 Patriot Missiles for Ships, accessed July 5, 2026, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/u-s-navy-orders-405-patriot-missiles-for-ships/
25. American Destroyer Packed New Electronic Warfare System During Black Sea Mission, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/19012/american-destroyer-packed-new-electronic-warfare-system-during-black-sea-mission
26. Unmanned Carrier Aviation – MQ-25 – NAVAIR, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/Unmanned-Carrier-Aviation
27. MQ-25 Stingray Demonstrator Goes Aboard USS Nimitz For 250th U.S. Anniversary Celebrations – TWZ, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.twz.com/air/mq-25-stingray-demonstrator-goes-aboard-uss-nimitz-for-250th-u-s-anniversary-celebrations
28. A Navy carrier is about to deploy with a robot ship. Could it change …, accessed July 5, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/06/navy-carrier-theodore-roosevelt-drone-seahawk-deployment/
29. XLUUV – Boeing, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-and-unmanned-systems/xluuv
30. US Navy’s 12,000km Autonomous Submarine Drone: The Orca XLUUV – YouTube, accessed July 5, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UPf9VAZBADQ

1. Executive Summary

During the reporting period of June 27 through July 4, 2026, global military doctrine regarding unmanned and autonomous systems (UxS) crossed a critical, irreversible threshold. The global posture has definitively transitioned from the ad-hoc, experimental procurement of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) platforms into the permanent, industrialized structuring of autonomous forces. Across all major operational theaters—encompassing the air, land, sea, and space domains—the integration of artificial intelligence into the kinetic “kill chain,” the fielding of autonomous contested logistics, and the establishment of dedicated autonomous command structures demonstrate that algorithmic warfare is no longer an emerging concept. It is now the baseline reality of multi-domain operations. This reporting period reveals a synchronized, global realization that conventional symmetric warfare, relying on small fleets of exquisite, highly expensive crewed platforms, is mathematically unsustainable against the attritable mass generated by autonomous systems.

The most consequential institutional shift occurred within the United States Department of War (DoW). Following the issuance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 11 (NSPM-11) earlier in the month, which mandated the accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence to overcome bureaucratic delays, the formal establishment of a Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) and a proposed $54.6 billion budget surge for the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG) signaled the end of iterative pilot programs.¹ By explicitly absorbing the Replicator initiative into a permanently funded, high-level bureaucratic structure, the Pentagon is executing a hyper-scaled acquisition pipeline intended to override traditional service-level bottlenecks.⁴ Concurrently, legislative efforts by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) to create a Robotic and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command (RASCOM) reflect a profound doctrinal realization: autonomy is increasingly viewed not merely as a tool operating within physical domains, but as a cross-domain maneuver space requiring specialized operational command and joint integration.⁶

In the European theater, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine continues to serve as the primary incubator and testing ground for autonomous warfare technologies, heavily supported by international financial mechanisms such as the European Commission’s €3.9 billion disbursement for advanced drone procurement.⁸ The operationalization of Ukraine’s Defense AI Center A1 marks a definitive shift toward “machine-speed warfare.” Specifically, the implementation of AI-driven terminal guidance systems removes the human pilot from the final seconds of engagement, countering the pervasive electronic warfare (EW) environments that have traditionally severed command-and-control (C2) links.⁹ Concurrently, the maritime domain is witnessing a revolution in asymmetric denial. Ukraine’s unveiling of the 10-ton Sea Trident underwater drone and the multi-role Mobidik surface vessel platform illustrates the maturation of naval drones from improvised explosive boats into serialized, multi-mission combatant craft capable of deep-strike, air defense, and autonomous interception.¹¹

Strategically, allied nations are aggressively restructuring their command hierarchies and operational doctrines to accommodate these technologies and counter peer adversaries. The United Kingdom’s £5 billion Defence Investment Plan and the activation of Taiwan’s Littoral Combat Command (LCC) both reflect a doctrinal embrace of “attritable mass”.¹⁴ By pairing expendable, autonomous platforms—such as the Royal Air Force’s StormShroud electronic warfare drones or Taiwan’s decentralized USV strike nodes—with exquisite, crewed assets, militaries are expanding their sensor and strike ranges while deliberately complicating adversary targeting algorithms.¹⁶ This “kill web” approach ensures that even under severe communications degradation or pre-emptive strikes, distributed autonomous nodes can maintain operational resilience. Furthermore, space-based architectures are advancing rapidly; the domain is shifting from passive satellite constellations to active, autonomous orbital maneuvering, highlighted by missions like VICTUS HAZE, which demonstrated AI-driven interception and imaging of uncooperative satellites.

Finally, the tactical utility of low-cost drones for geopolitical coercion was starkly demonstrated in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. State-sponsored drone attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and the subsequent US retaliatory strikes against Iranian drone infrastructure, underscore a persistent strategic vulnerability.¹⁸ The asymmetric cost-exchange ratio—where inexpensive one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) can paralyze global maritime trade and force the expenditure of multi-million-dollar interceptors—remains a dominant operational challenge.²⁰ This dynamic is driving urgent investments in directed energy, such as the LOCUST laser system, and automated counter-UAS (C-UAS) networks to rebalance the economic calculus of defense.

2. Global Situation Log

2.1 North American Theater: United States Department of War (DoW)

Event & Development: Establishment of DRPM-UxS and the Escalation of DAWG

On June 29, 2026, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth issued an official memorandum establishing the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Offensive and Defensive Systems (DRPM-UxS).¹ Reporting directly to Deputy Secretary Stephen Feinberg, this newly created office serves as the single joint integrator for the Pentagon’s autonomous assets. It effectively subsumes the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG)—a division under Special Operations Command that absorbed the Replicator 1 initiative in August 2025—and the Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401), which managed Replicator 2.⁴ Concurrently, the administration’s FY27 budget request allocated an unprecedented $54.6 billion for DAWG, representing a 24,000% increase over its initial FY26 allocation. To further support these efforts, Congress is advancing a $350 billion mandatory budget request that includes $20.6 billion dedicated to cUAS and $16.9 billion for the procurement of uncrewed systems across all physical domains.²¹ This funding surge officially absorbs the highly publicized but struggling Replicator initiative into a permanently funded, institutionalized structure.²² The DRPM-UxS is granted directive authority over Group 1-3 UAS, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), counter-unmanned systems, and AI swarming software, allowing it to bypass traditional service-level acquisition processes.²

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The consolidation of autonomous warfare programs under the DRPM-UxS resolves the persistent “integration friction” that severely hampered earlier rapid-acquisition initiatives like Replicator. Engineering analysis of the Replicator program’s initial phases reveals that while the military successfully procured massive quantities of attritable commercial airframes, it failed to anticipate the systems engineering challenges of integrating these disparate platforms with existing joint command-and-control (C2) software architectures.⁵ Many of the commercial systems selected were technically immature, possessed closed-source proprietary software, or lacked the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) necessary to communicate with military battle management systems.⁵ Consequently, operators were forced to use distinct, non-interoperable control stations for different drone models, severely degrading operational tempo and preventing multi-domain swarming.

By centralizing both the hardware procurement pipeline (the physical airframes and chassis) and the software procurement pipeline (autonomy stacks, swarming logic, and AI targeting) under a single, supreme authority, the DRPM-UxS ensures strict adherence to open architecture standards across the joint force.² Tactically, this guarantees that a Marine Corps autonomous ground vehicle, an Air Force Group 3 ISR drone, and a Navy unmanned surface vessel can operate simultaneously on a shared mesh network. This allows target telemetry acquired by a drone to be passed seamlessly and autonomously to a ground-based effector without requiring human operators to manually translate data formats between disparate, service-specific C2 systems. The directive authority of the DRPM-UxS allows it to mandate common data links, standardized encryption protocols, and universal swarming algorithms, effectively transforming heterogeneous fleets of cheap drones into a unified, lethal hive-mind capable of overwhelming localized defenses.

Strategic Lessons

This bureaucratic reorganization represents a fundamental, generational shift in how the United States military calculates the value of combat mass versus exquisite capability. The unprecedented $54.6 billion requested for the DAWG clearly indicates that the Pentagon has stopped treating autonomous warfare as an experimental, adjunct capability and is now funding it as a permanent, central pillar of American force generation.²² This is arguably the largest single commitment to autonomous warfare in history. The DRPM-UxS’s ability to supersede traditional Service-level acquisition authorities ensures that the US defense industrial base can scale production to match the massive manufacturing output of peer adversaries.

For decades, US strategic doctrine relied on maintaining a technological edge through small fleets of highly advanced, extremely expensive, and difficult-to-replace platforms (e.g., fifth-generation fighters, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and complex armored vehicles). However, wargaming simulations of Indo-Pacific conflicts have consistently demonstrated that exquisite platforms are highly vulnerable to saturation attacks by thousands of cheap, autonomous munitions. By institutionalizing the DAWG and empowering the DRPM-UxS, the Pentagon is officially pivoting toward a strategy of “attritable mass.” The strategic objective is no longer solely to build the most survivable individual platform, but to field autonomous systems in such overwhelming numbers that the loss of hundreds, or even thousands, of units in a single engagement becomes operationally and economically insignificant. This paradigm shift forces adversaries to expend their finite, expensive interceptors against inexpensive drones, thereby inverting the cost-exchange ratio in favor of the United States and creating a more robust, resilient deterrent posture.

Event & Development: Legislative Push for Robotic and Autonomous Systems Command (RASCOM)

Complementing the executive actions within the Pentagon, the legislative branch has initiated parallel structural reforms. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) advanced the FY27 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which includes explicit provisions encouraging the Defense Department to establish a Robotic and Autonomous Systems Combatant Command (RASCOM).⁶ If authorized and signed into law, this four-star combatant command would be the first entirely new COCOM established since the re-formation of SPACECOM in 2019.⁷ According to committee summaries, RASCOM would be granted special test and evaluation authorities, as well as limited, streamlined acquisition authorities designed specifically to procure commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drone technologies from global marketplaces at an accelerated pace.⁶

Tactical & Operational Lessons

Structurally, the United States military divides responsibilities between the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines), which “organize, train, and equip” forces, and the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), which “fight” the force in designated geographic or functional areas. By proposing a functional COCOM dedicated entirely to robotics and autonomy, legislators are aiming to centralize the operational doctrine and battlefield integration of these systems at the highest tactical level.⁶

Currently, tactical deployment of autonomous systems is highly fragmented. Each service branch develops and employs its own drones using bespoke tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), often resulting in overlapping efforts, inefficient resource allocation, and interoperability failures during joint operations. A dedicated RASCOM would function as the supreme tactical authority for integrating uncrewed systems into complex, multi-domain battle plans. Tactically, this means standardizing the deployment playbook. For example, a joint-force commander planning an amphibious assault would rely on RASCOM to orchestrate the initial wave of autonomous systems—coordinating Air Force SEAD drones, Navy unmanned mine-clearing vessels, and Marine Corps autonomous ground reconnaissance vehicles—ensuring they operate synergistically to degrade enemy anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks before human personnel enter the battlespace.

Strategic Lessons

The legislative push to create RASCOM signifies a profound doctrinal realization among US policymakers: autonomy and robotics are no longer merely tools or platforms operating within existing physical domains (air, land, sea), but are increasingly viewed as a discrete, cross-domain maneuver space requiring specialized operational command.⁷ Just as the establishment of Cyber Command recognized the unique physics and strategic imperatives of the digital domain, the proposed RASCOM acknowledges that algorithmic combat requires a unique command philosophy.

Strategically, the centralization of command under a four-star general ensures that autonomous warfare is institutionalized at the highest levels of military strategy, effectively forcing the Department of War to treat robotic combat as a core competency. This centralization prevents autonomous systems from being marginalized by legacy service cultures that naturally favor traditional crewed platforms (e.g., the Air Force’s historical preference for piloted fighters or the Navy’s preference for crewed ships). By establishing RASCOM, the US signals to adversaries that it is preparing for a future where wars are initiated, fought, and potentially concluded by autonomous systems long before crewed elements engage in direct kinetic conflict.

Event & Development: CCA Increment 1 and Advanced Counter-UAS Procurements

In the aviation domain, the US Air Force announced engineering-and-manufacturing development and production contracts for Increment 1 of the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.²³ The Air Force selected Anduril and General Atomics for the physical airframes, bypassing several legacy defense contractors. This accelerated timeline aims to field at least 150 CCA systems by the end of the decade.²³ Crucially, the Air Force explicitly separated the hardware and software procurement tracks, selecting Anduril, Shield AI, and Collins Aerospace to compete for the CCA primary mission autonomy software provider contract.²³ Concurrently, addressing the defensive side of autonomous warfare, the DoD awarded a $500 million firm-fixed-price contract to AeroVironment to procure commercial counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) over the next three years.[⁴⁴]

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The CCA program represents the operational zenith of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) in modern aviation.²³ Tactically, these autonomous, jet-powered drones will act as force multipliers and loyal wingmen for crewed fifth-generation fighters like the F-35, or the future Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform. A single crewed fighter will control a “flight” of multiple CCAs. These drones can be pushed far ahead of the human pilot into highly contested airspace to conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), extend radar and infrared sensor ranges, and act as remote weapon bays. If a CCA detects an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) site, it can instantly relay the targeting data back to the crewed fighter, or it can be authorized to engage the target autonomously using its own payload.

The systems engineering decision to decouple the airframe procurement from the autonomy software procurement is tactically brilliant. It allows the Air Force to continually upgrade the cognitive capabilities, threat libraries, and swarming logic of the drone fleet via over-the-air software updates, without needing to modify or replace the physical jet chassis.²³ On the defensive spectrum, the AeroVironment C-UAS contract highlights the urgent tactical necessity of layered defense. Modern drone swarms require a multi-tiered defeat mechanism. AeroVironment’s portfolio, which includes systems like the LOCUST directed energy laser, provides tactical commanders with scalable response options. Lasers provide a practically infinite magazine depth and a low cost-per-shot to burn through the optical sensors or flight control surfaces of incoming Group 1 and 2 drones, preserving expensive kinetic interceptors for larger, more heavily armored Group 3 threats.

Strategic Lessons

The dual emphasis on offensive autonomous swarms (represented by the CCA program) and comprehensive, scalable defense (represented by the C-UAS procurements) illustrates the strategic imperative of rebalancing the cost-exchange ratio of modern warfare. The proliferation of cheap, precision-guided drones has democratized air power, allowing non-state actors and smaller nations to challenge the airspace dominance of major powers. Traditional air defense systems, such as Patriot missile batteries firing interceptors that cost millions of dollars each, are economically unsustainable against swarms of $20,000 asymmetric drone threats. By investing heavily in attritable autonomous fighters and high-capacity C-UAS technologies, the United States is fundamentally restructuring its defense industrial base to win long-term battles of industrial attrition. The strategic goal is to ensure that the economic cost of defending friendly airspace never exceeds the economic cost the adversary pays to launch the offensive threat.

Event & Development: Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) and Autonomous Orbital Maneuvering

The space domain is rapidly evolving from a passive communications relay to an active maneuver space for autonomous platforms. On July 2, 2026, True Anomaly announced that its Jackal spacecraft successfully approached, circled, and imaged a Rocket Lab spacecraft as part of the Space Systems Command (SSC) VICTUS HAZE mission. This milestone demonstrated tactically responsive space (TacRS) capabilities, with Rocket Lab launching just 17 hours after receiving orders, and True Anomaly tracking the non-cooperative target in orbit within hours. Simultaneously, the US launched the LINK robotic spacecraft on July 3, developed by Katalyst Space Technologies, designed to autonomously dock with and relocate the aging SWIFT observatory—a historic first for US in-orbit servicing. In parallel, the US Naval Research Laboratory is advancing its “Autosat” prototype, a fully autonomous satellite capable of recognizing objects on Earth without ground control.

Tactical & Operational Lessons

From a systems engineering perspective, the VICTUS HAZE mission radically accelerates the space kill chain. Historically, tracking uncooperative or adversarial satellites required painstaking analysis and coordination with ground-based radar and optical telescopes. By deploying autonomous “inspector” satellites capable of independently navigating toward, circling, and visually identifying target spacecraft, the US military gains real-time intelligence on adversarial space assets. The ability to launch and rendezvous within 24 hours drastically reduces an adversary’s window to deploy surprise orbital weapons. Furthermore, the LINK mission’s success in autonomous docking proves that robotic spacecraft can actively physically interact with other objects in orbit, paving the way for autonomous refueling, repair, or kinetic de-orbiting of enemy platforms.

Strategic Lessons

These developments indicate a shift to active orbital defense, driven by rapid advancements from peer adversaries. China is actively deploying its Three-Body Computing Constellation, a network designed to process data on orbit using AI models, effectively turning space into an autonomous cloud network. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) already benefits from an expanding architecture of over 1,353 satellites, including more than 510 ISR-capable platforms. The absolute reliance of modern autonomous military doctrine on space architecture establishes space as the ultimate strategic center of gravity. If an adversary can deny access to space-based communications, the operational capability of terrestrial drone swarms would be catastrophically degraded. As AI integrates into satellite operations, the race for space superiority is transitioning from building the most complex sensor to fielding the fastest, most autonomous orbital cognitive network.

2.2 Global Contested Logistics and Autonomous Resupply

Event & Development: TRANSCOM MASS CRADA and Ground Resupply via Overland AI

Addressing the severe vulnerabilities inherent in moving supplies across contested environments, US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) issued a solicitation for Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) to evaluate Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS).²⁴ With a submission deadline of July 6, 2026, TRANSCOM aims to partner with industry to integrate autonomous cargo-moving drone boats into global military supply chains.²⁶ Concurrently, in the land domain, Overland AI secured a $19.7 million production contract spurred by the APFIT initiative, marking a historic milestone as the first ground autonomy company to serve as the prime contractor on a military production deal. Overland AI will deliver “more than a dozen” autonomous ground vehicles (AGVs) to the Marine Corps. These AGVs will utilize the company’s proprietary OverDrive autonomy stack and OverWatch C2 system to provide autonomous resupply for the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS).²⁷

Tactical & Operational Lessons

Both developments address the critical vulnerability of “contested logistics”—the reality that adversaries will target supply lines long before they target combat forces. In the land domain, Overland AI’s AGVs are engineered to operate with full autonomy, complementing rather than replacing the existing Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs) in the MADIS architecture.²⁷ Tactically, the MADIS system utilizes mobile platforms to detect and defeat hostile drones and aircraft using 30mm cannons and Stinger missiles. Supplying these frontline air defense units under fire is extremely hazardous. Overland AI’s vehicles solve this by processing all perception, environmental representation, and path-planning computations entirely on-board the vehicle’s edge processors.²⁷ This allows the AGVs to navigate treacherous terrain and deliver ammunition or power supplies even under severe electronic warfare (EW) conditions where GPS is jammed and communications networks are denied.²⁷

In the maritime domain, MASS systems fulfill a parallel tactical role. Large sealift vessels are slow, highly visible targets easily tracked by enemy satellites and vulnerable to long-range anti-ship missiles. By shifting cargo to fleets of smaller, autonomous surface ships, TRANSCOM can disaggregate the logistical footprint.²⁵ MASS systems utilize AI-enabled navigation and sensor fusion to autonomously ferry cargo through complex littoral environments and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zones without putting human crews at risk.²⁵

Strategic Lessons

The “tyranny of distance,” particularly in vast theaters like the Indo-Pacific, necessitates a logistical architecture that is highly resilient and highly distributed. Large, crewed logistics ships and vulnerable ground supply convoys represent high-value targets; an adversary can effectively neutralize a forward-deployed combat force simply by starving it of fuel, ammunition, and parts. By integrating MASS and AGVs into the mobility network, the DoD is transitioning from a vulnerable, centralized logistical chain to a resilient, attritable logistics web.

If an autonomous resupply drone—whether on land or at sea—is destroyed by enemy fire, the strategic loss is limited strictly to the immediate cargo and the relatively low cost of the autonomous hull. No human lives are lost, and the political fallout of casualties is avoided. This ensures that a high volume of distributed logistics can continuously penetrate contested zones to sustain high-intensity combat operations, vastly complicating the adversary’s targeting calculus and rendering attempts to blockade allied forces economically inefficient.

2.3 European Theater: Ukraine, Russia, and NATO’s Autonomous Crucible

Event & Development: Defense AI Center A1 and Terminal Kill Chain Autonomy

The conflict in Ukraine continues to accelerate the evolution of autonomous warfare at an unprecedented rate. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense has formalized the operationalization of its Defense AI Center A1, led by Danylo Tsvok, explicitly established to integrate artificial intelligence directly into the military “kill chain”.⁹ The center is actively deploying computer vision models for “last-mile guidance.” This technology enables First-Person View (FPV) and strike drones to autonomously steer onto targets in their final moments of flight, even if the connection to the human pilot is severed.⁹ Demonstrating the tactical maturation of these systems, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) conducted a deep-strike drone operation against the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal on July 4, 2026, showcasing the expanding strategic reach of their autonomous platforms. Furthermore, these computer vision algorithms are being deployed on interceptor drones programmed to autonomously lock onto and destroy incoming Shahed kamikaze drones in mid-air.⁹ This technological push is heavily subsidized by the European Commission, which disbursed the first €3.9 billion tranche of a larger €6 billion fund specifically dedicated to advancing Ukraine’s drone procurement and defense industrial capacity.⁸ Concurrently, Russian forces are deploying their own AI adaptations, such as the V2U strike drone equipped with Chinese Leetop A203 minicomputers and NVIDIA Jetson Orin modules for autonomous target recognition.²⁸

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The implementation of AI in the terminal phase of the kill chain is a direct, hard-engineered countermeasure to pervasive electronic warfare (EW).⁹ Throughout the conflict, traditional FPV drones have relied on a continuous, high-bandwidth radio frequency (RF) link between the human operator and the drone to transmit video feeds and receive steering commands. Russian tactical EW systems project intense electromagnetic jamming “bubbles” around high-value targets like tanks and artillery pieces. As the traditional FPV drone enters the final hundred meters of its attack run, it penetrates this jamming bubble, the RF link is severed, the video feed turns to static, and the drone inevitably misses the target or crashes harmlessly into the dirt.¹⁰

The Defense AI Center A1 circumvents this physics problem entirely. By equipping the drone with advanced edge-computing processors and lightweight optical neural networks, the human operator is only required to fly the drone near the target and designate the target profile on their screen from a safe distance outside the jamming range. Once the operator issues the “lock” command, the drone’s operational state transitions to “fire-and-forget.” As the drone plunges into the EW bubble and loses its RF connection to the operator, the onboard AI assumes complete control of the flight surfaces, utilizing purely optical data from the camera sensor to dynamically track the target and execute the terminal strike with devastating precision.⁹ This fundamentally alters the tactical geometry of the battlefield, rendering localized jamming systems largely obsolete against terminal-phase munitions and transitioning the operator’s role from “human-in-the-loop” (actively manually flying) to “human-on-the-loop” (authorizing the machine to kill).¹⁰

Strategic Lessons

This development heralds the permanent arrival of “machine-speed warfare”.²⁸ As both sides rapidly scale their drone production—with Ukraine deploying tens of thousands of drones monthly—and enhance their EW capabilities, the cognitive limits and reaction times of human operators have become the primary bottleneck in combat effectiveness. Automating the kill chain not only bypasses technological defenses but allows a single human operator to manage multiple, simultaneous engagements, drastically increasing operational tempo and overall force lethality.²⁸

However, this algorithmic acceleration carries profound consequences for the civilian populace and the post-war recovery of the region. As noted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the proliferation of autonomous sensors and drones has made the battlespace vastly deeper, wider, and exponentially more lethal.³⁰ Unlike early static trench warfare, drones now continuously monitor vast areas, identifying movement and authorizing strikes with terrifying efficiency. This pervasive surveillance and automated lethality create highly complex dangers for civilians, threatening long-term agricultural recovery and global food security long after active kinetic fighting concludes.³⁰ Furthermore, the introduction of systems like the “digital twin of the front”—an AI operating system being developed by Center A1 that analyzes aggregate, multi-modal battlefield data to synthesize optimal theater-level deployment strategies—demonstrates that AI is rapidly migrating from individual platform guidance up the chain of command into the realm of strategic theater planning.⁹

Event & Development: Industrialization of Asymmetric Naval Warfare (Sea Trident & Mobidik)

At the Eurosatory 2026 exhibition in Paris, the Ukrainian defense industry formally unveiled highly advanced, serialized maritime autonomous platforms, signaling a shift from improvised prototypes to mature, industrial-scale naval systems. Foremost among these is the Sea Trident ST-1000, developed by the defense company Global Mark.³¹ It is a massive 10-meter, 10-ton heavy unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) boasting a 2,000 nautical mile range, a 60-meter operating depth, and a devastating 1,000 kg payload capacity.¹³ The Sea Trident is engineered not only for offensive strikes against surface vessels and infrastructure but is specifically designed to intercept and neutralize other UUVs, creating a new paradigm of underwater drone-on-drone combat.¹³ Concurrently, details emerged regarding the Mobidik deep-strike Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV). Developed by Avarid, the Mobidik features an impressive 1,400 km range, 120 hours of autonomy, and is built around six distinct, modular configurations (MD-1 through MD-6) capable of executing air defense, medium strike, and armed assault profiles.¹²

Table 1: Operational Configurations of the Ukrainian Mobidik Deep-Strike USV ¹²

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The engineering specifications of the Sea Trident ST-1000 represent a masterclass in low-observability maritime operations.¹³ By operating at a sustained depth of 60 meters, the UUV can navigate effectively below the upper thermal layers and sonic channels of the Black Sea. This depth profile severely degrades the effectiveness of surface-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) sonar systems and renders the drone entirely invisible to visual or infrared detection by maritime patrol aircraft.³² The massive 1,000 kg payload is not merely an explosive charge; it is specifically calibrated to detonate directly beneath a target’s keel, inducing a catastrophic bubble pulse effect that breaks the back of major combatant ships, ensuring total destruction rather than mere superficial damage.¹³

The Mobidik USV, conversely, demonstrates the immense tactical value of platform modularity.¹² Historically, the primary vulnerability of USVs has been their inability to defend themselves against rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft hunting them from above. By deploying configurations actively armed with R-73 or AIM-9 heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles (Configuration MD-5), Ukraine is neutralizing this threat.¹² A Russian Ka-52 attack helicopter attempting to strafe a Mobidik swarm now faces the immediate, lethal threat of return fire from autonomous surface-to-air missiles. This capability forces enemy aviation to operate at higher altitudes, reducing their effectiveness and granting the USV fleets greater freedom of maneuver across the Black Sea.

Strategic Lessons

These platforms signal a decisive strategic transition for Kyiv. The Ukrainian military has moved beyond utilizing ad-hoc, intelligence-service-operated explosive boats for sensational, isolated attacks; they are now fielding a commercialized, serialized, and highly diversified autonomous navy.¹² This industrialization ensures long-term sea denial against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, pushing Russian naval assets completely out of operational relevance and securing vital commercial shipping lanes without Ukraine possessing a single traditional, crewed frigate or destroyer. Furthermore, by debuting platforms like Sea Trident and Mobidik at international defense exhibitions like Eurosatory, Ukraine is positioning itself as a premier global exporter of battle-tested autonomous maritime systems, fundamentally altering the dynamics of the global naval arms market for decades to come.

Event & Development: UK & NATO Hybrid Force Structures and SEAD Drones

Recognizing the shifting character of warfare, the United Kingdom published its long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP), allocating a massive £5 billion surge dedicated to acquiring and fielding autonomous systems across all physical domains.¹⁴ A centerpiece of this investment is the deployment of the StormShroud Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP), utilizing the Tekever AR3 airframe equipped with Leonardo’s highly advanced BriteStorm electronic warfare payload.¹⁷ Additionally, £220 million is earmarked for Project NYX, an initiative to build armed autonomous drones designed to fly in close tactical tandem with AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.¹⁴ In a parallel development within NATO, the German Navy announced plans to pair its newly procured P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft with MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones to monitor and counter rising Russian submarine activity in northern European waters.³³

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The integration of the Leonardo BriteStorm EW payload onto the StormShroud drone is a highly sophisticated evolution of SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) tactics.¹⁷ The BriteStorm system utilizes advanced Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology.¹⁷ Mechanically, DRFM works by capturing the specific incoming radio frequency pulse from an enemy air defense radar system, storing it digitally, and instantly modifying the phase, timing, and Doppler shift characteristics of that pulse before transmitting it back to the enemy receiver. This technique creates incredibly convincing “ghost” targets on the enemy’s radar screens, generating false range data, erroneous velocity readings, and complete cognitive overload for the radar operators.

By placing this exquisite electronic warfare capability onto a small, low-cost, attritable Tekever AR3 drone, the Royal Air Force can deploy “stand-in jammers” deep within an enemy’s A2/AD bubble. Operating with a maximum range of 100km, these drones are deployed from the ground, with their arrival precisely timed to coincide with the overhead transit of high-value, crewed 5th-generation assets like the F-35B Lightning or Typhoon.³⁴ This ground-launched synchronization blinds and confuses enemy radar networks without risking a £100 million fighter aircraft or the life of its highly trained pilot.¹⁷ Similarly, the German Navy’s MUM-T pairing leverages the unique strengths of both platforms for submarine hunting. The MQ-9B SeaGuardian can remain on station for over 30 hours, autonomously deploying sonobuoys and using surface search radar to detect subtle anomalies like periscopes or snorkel masts.³³ When the drone detects a potential threat, it instantly data-links the precise coordinates to the crewed P-8A Poseidon. The P-8A can then rapidly maneuver to the location, deploy advanced acoustic analysis algorithms, and prosecute the target with high-speed torpedoes, vastly expanding the sensor net without exhausting the limited flight hours of the crewed aircraft fleet.

Strategic Lessons

The UK’s £5 billion pivot toward autonomy and Germany’s embrace of MUM-T reflect a stark, unavoidable geopolitical reality: Western militaries lack the conventional industrial mass and personnel reserves to sustain prolonged, symmetric, high-attrition conflicts against near-peer adversaries. By investing heavily in “hybrid” force structures—pairing a small core of expensive, exquisite platforms with massive swarms of autonomous collaborative platforms—NATO forces are rapidly regenerating their combat mass.¹⁴ This hybrid doctrine ensures that allied forces can continue to penetrate highly contested, lethal airspace and maritime environments while preserving their most critical human capital and strategic assets.

2.4 Indo-Pacific Theater: Asymmetric Deterrence & Kill Webs

Event & Development: Activation of Taiwan’s Littoral Combat Command (LCC)

In direct response to increasing maritime coercion from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan officially commissioned its new Littoral Combat Command (LCC) on July 1, 2026.¹⁶ The LCC fundamentally restructures the island’s naval architecture by unifying coastal radar systems, mobile anti-ship missile batteries (such as the Harpoon and domestic Hsiung Feng II/III systems managed by the Hai Feng Group), drone formations, and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) into a single, highly integrated maritime defense command. Notably, despite earlier reporting, the LCC will explicitly exclude the integration of the ROCN’s 131st Fleet and its fast-attack missile boats.¹⁵ The LCC is commanded by newly promoted Lieutenant General Chien Shih-yuan, chosen for his hands-on experience countering PRC maritime coercion.³⁶ The command’s primary mandate is to secure the contested maritime space within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan’s coast.³⁶ In parallel, US Envoy and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Director Raymond Greene publicly emphasized the necessity of this approach, stating that Taiwan must rapidly transform itself into a “hornet’s nest” of air, surface, and subsurface drones to deter a Chinese invasion effectively.³⁷ Meanwhile, intelligence reports indicate that China has deployed over 200 outdated J-6 fighter jets, heavily modified and converted into supersonic attack drones, at airbases near the Taiwan Strait to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defenses.³⁹

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The engineering and tactical core of the newly established LCC is the implementation of a distributed “littoral kill web”.¹⁶ Traditional military C2 architecture relies on linear kill chains, where sensor data flows vertically up to centralized command nodes, is processed, and firing orders flow back down to shooters. This linear model is highly vulnerable; if a centralized C2 node is destroyed by a preemptive PRC ballistic missile strike, the chain is broken, rendering surviving missile batteries useless.

The LCC’s kill web is explicitly designed to be highly decentralized, resilient, and mesh-networked.¹⁶ Persistent unmanned aerial systems provide real-time, high-fidelity tracking data of approaching People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious fleets.¹⁶ Because of the mesh network, this targeting telemetry can be passed laterally to any surviving mobile anti-ship missile battery hidden along Taiwan’s jagged coastline, bypassing the need for a central command node.¹⁶ This network design radically compresses the “sensor-to-shooter” timeline, allowing for near-instantaneous, coordinated salvos against incoming ships.¹⁶ Furthermore, the integration of USVs allows Taiwan to project sensor nodes further out into the Strait, providing early warning and targeting data without risking crewed naval vessels to China’s overwhelming numerical superiority. Conversely, China’s deployment of J-6 supersonic drones demonstrates a brutal tactical application of mass; by launching hundreds of these unmanned jets simultaneously, the PLAN aims to rapidly deplete Taiwan’s finite stockpile of Patriot and Tien Kung interceptor missiles, clearing the airspace for crewed bombers and amphibious landing craft.³⁹

Strategic Lessons

The establishment of the LCC is arguably the most significant organizational restructuring in Taiwan’s modern naval history.¹⁶ It codifies a complete and final doctrinal shift away from traditional, symmetric territorial defense—which relied on large, vulnerable frigates and destroyers engaging in Mahanian fleet battles—toward a survivable, asymmetric denial strategy, frequently referred to in strategic circles as the “porcupine” or “hornet’s nest” strategy.³⁷ By dispersing thousands of mobile, independent strike nodes and integrating persistent autonomous sensors, Taiwan intends to impose mathematically unsustainable attrition on any invading fleet. For Chinese military planners, neutralizing this decentralized kill web is exponentially more difficult than sinking a conventional navy. It requires locating and destroying thousands of small, camouflaged, highly mobile targets across varied terrain, vastly increasing the operational risk, time requirements, and friction of a cross-strait invasion, thereby enhancing overall deterrence.¹⁶

Event & Development: US Naval Drone Proliferation and Fleet Re-Architecture

To counter the massive shipbuilding capacity of the PRC in the Indo-Pacific, the United States Navy and its defense contractors have accelerated the testing and delivery of diverse unmanned naval platforms. Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) announced the delivery of its newest REMUS 130 unmanned underwater vehicle to a US ally and commenced sea trials for the ROMULUS medium unmanned surface vessel.⁴⁰ Concurrently, Blue Water Autonomy unveiled the Liberty-class, a 190-foot steel autonomous ship designed in partnership with Damen, boasting a 10,000 nautical mile range and over 150 metric tons of payload capacity.⁴² Furthermore, Saildrone and Lockheed Martin announced a partnership to equip the 20-meter Surveyor high-endurance USV with the proven JAGM (Joint Air-to-Ground Missile) launcher, bringing lethal strike capabilities to autonomous ocean-mapping vessels.⁴³

Tactical & Operational Lessons

These developments highlight a deliberate diversification of the US Navy’s autonomous portfolio across different size, weight, and power (SWaP) categories. The Blue Water Autonomy Liberty-class represents heavy logistical and sensor transport.⁴² By utilizing the proven Damen Stan Patrol 6009 hull design, which features a distinctive vertical “Axe Bow” that slices through waves to minimize slamming, the vessel ensures structural integrity and payload safety during months-long autonomous deployments across the rough waters of the Pacific.⁴² This allows the Navy to autonomously pre-position massive sensor arrays or missile magazines (up to 150 tons) far forward of the main fleet.

Conversely, the arming of the Saildrone Surveyor with the JAGM launcher represents the operationalization of “distributed lethality”.⁴³ Traditionally, Saildrones were purely passive ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and oceanographic mapping platforms, capable of remaining at sea for months utilizing wind and solar power. By integrating a lethal kinetic effector like the JAGM, the Navy transforms a passive sensor node into an active threat. If a Saildrone detects an enemy fast-attack craft or a surfacing submarine periscope, it no longer needs to wait for a crewed destroyer to arrive; it can prosecute the target autonomously.

Strategic Lessons

The rapid maturation and armament of vessels like the Liberty-class and the Saildrone Surveyor demonstrate a strategic imperative to re-architect US Navy fleet capacity. Facing acute shortages in domestic shipbuilding capacity and an inability to match the sheer tonnage output of Chinese shipyards, the US Navy is pivoting toward a hybrid fleet model. By rapidly iterating and serially producing autonomous vessels using existing commercial supply chains (such as Damen hulls), the Navy can quickly generate forward presence, expand its sensor networks, and distribute its missile magazines across thousands of miles of ocean, complicating adversary targeting without requiring decades to build complex, crewed warships.

2.5 Central Command (CENTCOM): Middle East Coercion and Sea Control

Event & Development: OWA-UAV Coercion in the Strait of Hormuz and US Retaliation

Following the breakdown of a brief and fragile ceasefire agreement, high-intensity hostilities resumed in the strategic chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz. On June 25, 2026, an Iranian one-way attack drone (OWA-UAV) struck the Singapore-flagged cargo ship M/V Ever Lovely as it transited the waterway.¹⁸ In direct retaliation, US Central Command (CENTCOM) launched precise airstrikes on June 26 against Iranian missile and drone storage locations and coastal radar sites.²⁰ Uneterred, Iran launched another drone attack early on June 27 against the Panama-flagged oil tanker M/T Kiku.¹⁹ US forces immediately conducted additional punitive strikes targeting a broader array of Iran’s military surveillance infrastructure, communication systems, air defense sites, and drone storage facilities.¹⁹ On June 28, 2026, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) subsequently launched a retaliatory joint missile and drone operation targeting US military sites in Kuwait and Bahrain, resulting in severe regional destabilization.

Tactical & Operational Lessons

The events in the Strait of Hormuz underscore the extreme tactical difficulty of defending commercial maritime traffic against low-flying OWA-UAVs in confined littoral spaces.¹⁹ The Strait is an incredibly narrow geographical chokepoint, providing large, slow-moving commercial vessels with virtually zero maneuverability to evade incoming threats. Furthermore, the surrounding mountainous terrain and the proximity to the shoreline grant US and allied air defense destroyers extremely short reaction windows to detect, track, and intercept sea-skimming drones utilizing the radar horizon to mask their approach.

The specific target selection of the US retaliatory strikes provides deep insight into the systems engineering of Iranian drone operations. By explicitly targeting coastal radar sites and surveillance infrastructure, CENTCOM executed a localized “blinding” operation against the Iranian kill chain. While OWA-UAVs (like the Shahed variants) possess onboard autonomous guidance systems, they rely heavily on accurate initial targeting coordinates and mid-course updates provided by powerful ground-based or coastal radar stations to hit moving targets like ships at sea. Without the highly accurate surface tracking data provided by these destroyed coastal radars, Iran’s ability to vector OWA-UAVs into the precise flight paths of moving commercial vessels is severely degraded. The drones are forced to rely entirely on less sophisticated, onboard autonomous terminal seekers, which possess narrow fields of view and are significantly easier for allied ships to spoof, jam, or physically evade.

Strategic Lessons

These intense kinetic engagements highlight the profound strategic leverage that cheap, mass-produced autonomous systems provide to state and non-state actors operating in strategic chokepoints. Simple, propeller-driven drones costing tens of thousands of dollars are capable of paralyzing global energy shipping routes, inflicting massive, disproportionate economic damage on global markets, and forcing global superpowers into costly, escalatory military engagements.

The repeated failure of military deterrence in this theater—evidenced by Iran’s willingness to launch the M/T Kiku strike immediately following the first round of severe US retaliation—suggests a deeply troubling strategic reality: the current cost-exchange ratio heavily favors the asymmetric aggressor.¹⁹ Defending against these strikes requires the US to keep multi-billion-dollar aircraft carriers on station and expend millions of dollars in interceptor missiles and precision-guided munitions to destroy drone storage sheds and radar arrays. Until the US and allied navies can field ubiquitous, low-cost defensive capabilities (such as megawatt-class directed energy weapons or highly advanced ship-board EW systems) that make drone intercepts economically negligible, adversaries will continue to use OWA-UAVs as a primary, highly effective tool of geopolitical and economic coercion. The democratization of autonomous lethality means that control of the sea is no longer the exclusive purview of nations with large, blue-water navies.

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

1. EXCLUSIVE: Hegseth creates autonomy czar to manage almost all …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/07/hehegseth-memo-drone-czar-autonomy-exclusive/
2. Hegseth realigning DOD’s scattered unmanned and autonomy work …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/07/01/hegseth-realigning-unmanned-systems-programs-under-new-drone-boss/
3. Hegseth creates powerful new drone office, pulling authority from the military services, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/07/02/hegseth-creates-powerful-new-drone-office-pulling-authority-from-the-military-services/
4. Move Fast and Scale: A Brief Insiders’ History of the Replicator Initiative – Belfer Center, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/move-fast-and-scale-brief-insiders-history-replicator-initiative
5. DoD promised a ‘swarm’ of attack drones. We’re still waiting. – Responsible Statecraft, accessed July 4, 2026, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/replicator/
6. Senate pushes DOD to create new combatant command for unmanned systems, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/06/11/senate-pushes-dod-to-create-new-combatant-command-for-unmanned-systems/
7. ICYMI: SASC Pushes for New Drone Combatant Command, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.tectonicdefense.com/icymi-sasc-pushes-for-new-drone-combatant-command/
8. Commission disburses €3.9 billion for drones under the €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/commission-disburses-eur39-billion-drones-under-eur90-billion-ukraine-support-loan-2026-06-30_en
9. Ukraine wants an AI-driven army. Its new defense center is already …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/25/ukraine-wants-an-ai-driven-army-its-new-defense-center-is-already-putting-ai-inside-kill-chain-steering-drones-onto-target-in-final-seconds/
10. The $3,500 Drone That Kills Shaheds Without a Pilot, accessed July 4, 2026, https://migflug.com/jetflights/autonomous-drone-on-drone-interception-ukraine-maxon/
11. Video: Ukraine’s Massive New Underwater Drone – Sea Trident ST …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/video-ukraines-massive-new-underwater-drone-sea-trident-st-1000/
12. 1,400 kilometers of range, six configurations, one armed with …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/06/30/1400-kilometers-of-range-six-configurations-one-armed-with-missiles-ukraines-mobidik-covers-entire-black-sea/
13. Ukraine Developed Sea Trident Heavy Underwater Drone to Destroy Strategic Targets, accessed July 4, 2026, https://militarnyi.com/en/news/ukraine-sea-trident-drone-strategic-targets/
14. Drones, fighters, armored vehicles: Highlights from the UK’s Defence …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/06/drones-fighters-armored-vehicles-highlights-from-the-uks-defence-investment-plan/
15. Author: Chris Dayton – Taiwan Security Monitor – George Mason University, accessed July 4, 2026, https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/author/cdayton2/
16. Taiwan’s 1,800-Missile “Kill Zone” Could Turn the Taiwan Strait Into …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/taiwan-1800-missile-kill-zone-china-invasion-fleet-taiwan-strait/
17. Royal Air Force StormShroud equipped with Leonardo BriteStorm …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://uk.leonardo.com/en/news-and-stories-detail/-/detail/raf-stormshroud-equipped-with-leonardo-britestorm-ew-payload
18. U.S. Strikes Iran in Response to Attack on Commercial Vessel, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4528341/us-strikes-iran-in-response-to-attack-on-commercial-vessel/
19. U.S. Forces Conduct Additional Strikes After Iran’s Latest Commercial Ship Attack, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PUBLIC-RELEASES/Article/4528488/us-forces-conduct-additional-strikes-after-irans-latest-commercial-ship-attack/
20. US and Iran trade strikes as both sides accuse the other of …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jun/27/us-iran-strikes
21. Drones and National Security: What to Expect from Congress and Federal Agencies | Insights | Holland & Knight, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2026/07/drones-and-national-security-what-to-expect-from-congress
22. The Pentagon’s $54 billion bet on autonomous warfare – Defense One, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2026/05/pentagons-54-billion-bet-autonomous-warfare/413735/
23. Air Force picks Anduril, General Atomics to build first operational CCA drones, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/06/17/air-force-picks-anduril-general-atomics-to-build-first-operational-cca-drones/
24. Transcom seeks partners to study autonomous, cargo-moving drone boats for future ops, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/06/29/autonomous-cargo-moving-drone-boats-us-transportation-command/
25. TRANSCOM Seeks Maritime Autonomous Surface Ship Studies – ExecutiveGov, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.executivegov.com/articles/maritime-autonomous-surface-ships-transcom-unmanned-uxs-rfi-crada
26. Transcom Seeks Partners for Autonomous Drone Boats | Govly, accessed July 4, 2026, https://app.govly.com/public/signals/126041
27. Overland AI lands Pentagon contract to produce autonomous …, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/06/29/autonomous-ground-vehicle-marine-corps-overland-ai-contract/
28. Ukraine’s Drone War: The Rise Of Machine-Speed Adaptive Hyperwar – Analysis, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.eurasiareview.com/03072026-ukraines-drone-war-the-rise-of-machine-speed-adaptive-hyperwar-analysis/
29. Ukraine’s Drone War: The Rise of Machine-Speed Adaptive Hyperwar, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.hudson.org/technology/ukraines-drone-war-rise-machine-speed-adaptive-hyperwar-can-kasapoglu
30. Civilian dangers multiply as drones transform Ukraine’s battlefield – UN News, accessed July 4, 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/07/1167854
31. Ukraine Unveils Sea Trident Underwater Drone at Eurosatory 2026 – YouTube, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/R-s8v2Pj1oU
32. Sea Trident SL-1000: New Ukrainian Underwater Drone (UUV) | Covert Shores, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.hisutton.com/Ukraine-UUV-Sea-Trident-SL1000.html
33. ‘The threat is there’: Germany to pair P-8s with MQ-9 drones to keep an eye on Russian subs, accessed July 4, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/06/the-threat-is-there-germany-to-pair-p-8s-with-mq-9-drones-to-keep-an-eye-on-russian-subs/
34. An overview of Britain’s military drones and drone development projects, accessed July 4, 2026, https://dronewars.net/british-drones-an-overview/
35. UK Unveils ‘StormShroud’ Combat Drones in Major Defence Tech Leap, accessed July 4, 2026, https://botsanddrones.uk/best-commercial-drones-1/f/uk-unveils-stormshroud-combat-drones-in-major-defence-tech-leap
36. China & Taiwan Update, July 2, 2026 | ISW, accessed July 4, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-july-2-2026/
37. Taiwan needs a ‘hornet’s nest’ of drones: US envoy, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/07/03/2003860149
38. US Envoy Urges Taiwan to Build ‘Hornet’s Nest’ of Drones to Deter China, accessed July 4, 2026, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/02/us-envoy-urges-taiwan-to-build-hornets-nest-of-drones-to-deter-china/
39. China’s truck drone launcher hides airpower in civilian traffic, accessed July 4, 2026, https://asiatimes.com/2026/07/chinas-truck-drone-launcher-hides-airpower-in-civilian-traffic/
40. HII Delivers First of the Newest REMUS Variant: 130 – Naval News, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/hii-delivers-first-of-the-newest-remus-variant-130/
41. HII’s ROMULUS USV Advances to U.S. Navy Medium USV At-Sea Testing Phase, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/06/hiis-romulus-usv-advances-to-u-s-navy-medium-usv-at-sea-testing-phase/
42. Video: Blue Water Autonomy Introduces Liberty-class Autonomous Ship – Naval News, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/02/video-blue-water-autonomy-introduces-liberty-class-autonomous-ship/
43. Video: Saildrone, Lockheed Martin to Integrate Proven Surveyor USV with JAGM, accessed July 4, 2026, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/video-saildrone-lockheed-martin-to-integrate-proven-surveyor-usv-with-jagm/
44. Pentagon awards $500M contract for counter-drone tech to AeroVironment, accessed July 4, 2026, https://defensescoop.com/2026/07/02/pentagon-awards-500m-contract-aerovironment-counter-drone-technology/

1. Executive Summary

The modernization of ground combat forces through tactical autonomy represents one of the most complex engineering mandates currently pursued by the United States Department of Defense. In August 2025, the U.S. Army awarded Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements totaling approximately $15.5 million to three commercial autonomy developers—Forterra, Overland AI, and Scout AI.¹ Originally structured to integrate proprietary commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) self-driving stacks onto the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) platform, the Unmanned Systems (UxS) Autonomy program underwent a strategic and structural recalibration. Acknowledging the mechanical and safety limitations of the ISV as a surrogate for uncrewed operations, the Army initially altered the program parameters to allow the awarded vendors to deploy their software on preferred surrogate robotic platforms.³ However, as of April 2026, the UxS program has been officially paused, placing the upcoming prototype evaluations originally scheduled for May 2026 into a holding pattern.³

This highly technical analysis examines the rigorous engineering demands of the UxS program.⁵ Off-road military autonomy introduces operational complexities that are entirely absent from commercial on-road Operational Design Domains (ODDs). Specifically, this report analyzes the unique sensor fusion architectures required for unstructured environments, emphasizing the integration of 4D Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) LiDAR, passive optical sensors, and Localizing Ground Penetrating Radar (LGPR) for resilient navigation in GPS-denied and contested electromagnetic spectrums.⁷

Furthermore, the analysis investigates the algorithmic breakthroughs necessary for obstacle classification in heavy foliage and soft, deformable terrain such as mud. It focuses on the deployment of self-supervised costmap learning, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) foundation models, and real-time terramechanics.¹⁰ These intense computational workloads must be processed instantaneously on the tactical edge, constrained by strict Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) limitations in MIL-STD-810H environments.¹³ Finally, the report contrasts these extreme military requirements with commercial autonomous driving standards, illustrating why civilian functional safety frameworks, such as SAE J3016 and ISO 26262, are inherently insufficient for defining, testing, and validating combat-ready ground autonomy.¹⁵ Whether executed in May 2026 or at a later date, the successful deployment of these systems will require a fundamental departure from commercial paradigms, demanding platforms that prioritize mission execution and attritability over zero-risk navigation.

2. Evolution of the U.S. Army Unmanned Systems (UxS) Autonomy Program

The U.S. Army has historically encountered significant engineering and programmatic friction when attempting to field fully autonomous ground vehicles. This difficulty arises primarily from the extreme unpredictability of the modern battlefield—an environment devoid of lane markings, traffic signals, predictable obstacle behavior, and stable communications infrastructure.⁶ The UxS Autonomy program was initiated by the Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS) to bypass legacy defense procurement timelines and fast-track the integration of advanced commercial autonomy software into active Army formations.⁶

2.1 The Initial Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) Integration Mandate

In its original conception, the UxS program required the three selected vendors—Forterra, Overland AI, and Scout AI—to retrofit the existing Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV).¹ The ISV is a lightweight, high-speed tactical transport vehicle based on the commercial Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 chassis, heavily modified to provide tactical mobility for a nine-Soldier infantry squad. Crucially, the ISV is designed for rapid airborne deployment, featuring specific structural rigging points for airdrops.⁵ The Army’s initial mandate was to transform this crewed, mechanical platform into a drive-by-wire autonomous vehicle by overlaying commercial perception stacks, compute nodes, and actuation kits.¹⁸

Under the original $15.5 million OTA, the resulting ISV prototypes were scheduled to be delivered to the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Polk, Louisiana. There, the vehicles were to undergo a stringent six-month operational testing period, culminating in a rigorous Combat Training Center rotation to assess their viability in simulated combat environments.²

2.2 The Strategic Pivot to Surrogate Robotic Platforms

As the engineering integration phases progressed through late 2025, both the Army and its industry partners recognized significant mechanical and programmatic hurdles associated with utilizing the ISV as the universal surrogate for uncrewed autonomy testing.³ Industry sources cited “underlying deficiencies” in the ISV’s architecture that made it suboptimal for autonomous conversion.³ For example, the structural modifications required for airborne rigging, combined with the power demands of multi-modal sensor suites and heavy edge-compute modules, introduced substantial engineering bottlenecks that threatened to distract from the program’s core objective: evaluating the autonomy software itself.³ Additionally, the sheer kinetic mass of a fully loaded, autonomous ISV operating in close proximity to dismounted infantry presented elevated safety risks during the rapid prototyping phase.³

Consequently, the Army authorized a major strategic pivot just weeks after the initial contract awards. Acknowledging the rapidly changing technology environment, PEO GCS altered the program rules to allow the UxS vendors to select and provide their own preferred surrogate mobility platforms, rather than forcing integration onto the ISV.³ This programmatic shift decoupled the evaluation of the autonomy software from the mechanical limitations of a specific chassis.²⁰ The Army’s stated objective was to assess the autonomous command and control directly against mission parameters—such as logistics resupply, casualty evacuation, and target identification—rather than assessing the vendors’ ability to engineer custom drive-by-wire connections to the ISV’s proprietary middleware.³ However, shortly after this strategic pivot, the program was paused pending new acquisition guidance.³

2.3 The Planned Evaluation Framework and Program Pause

The originally scheduled May 2026 evaluations were intended to serve as the critical milestone for the UxS program.⁵ The focus had shifted toward demonstrating how the autonomous systems integrate into the broader Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) architecture.³ However, industry reports in late 2025 and April 2026 confirmed that the UxS program has been placed in a holding pattern and is currently paused pending new acquisition guidance.³³ If resumed, evaluations will likely test specific mission alignments, utilizing the vendor-supplied surrogate platforms to execute complex tactical behaviors. These behaviors include “Hunter-Killer” operations, electronic warfare surveillance, reconnaissance screening, and navigating the “last tactical mile”—the highly dangerous, unstructured terrain separating support units from the forward line of troops (FLOT) where human resupply convoys are most vulnerable.²¹

3. Competitor Analysis: Divergent Autonomy Architectures

The development generated under the UxS program serves as a comparative crucible for three highly distinct architectural approaches to off-road autonomy. Forterra, Overland AI, and Scout AI each bring a unique engineering philosophy regarding sensor reliance, computational modeling, hardware integration, and command-and-control (C2) orchestration.

3.1 Forterra: AutoDrive and Active Sensor Prominence

Forterra operates as a prime contractor specializing in hardware-agnostic autonomy stacks and secure communications for heavy military platforms.¹⁹ Forterra’s core product, AutoDrive, is a deterministic, modular perception and planning system designed to manage dynamic driving tasks across complex tactical environments.²⁴ The company has demonstrated significant traction within the Department of Defense, having successfully integrated AutoDrive into Marine-owned Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs) for the Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires program, as well as BAE Systems’ Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV).⁴

Following the Army’s pivot away from the ISV, Forterra unveiled its MESA platform in April 2026.⁴ Developed in direct partnership with Polaris, the MESA integrates AutoDrive onto a modified Polaris Ranger XD 1500 chassis.⁴ Because the autonomy hardware is integrated on the OEM production line, it avoids the mechanical compromises typical of aftermarket retrofits.⁴ The MESA is specifically designed to execute logistics and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) missions in the last tactical mile, featuring a flat deck and an L-track mounting system capable of accommodating up to 2,000 pounds of interchangeable payloads.⁴ With the UxS program paused, Forterra intends to bid the MESA as either a prime or a partner for future Army autonomous CASEVAC and logistics operations.⁴

A critical differentiator in Forterra’s architecture is its reliance on high-fidelity active sensing. In January 2026, Forterra officially selected Aeva to provide 4D LiDAR technology for the AutoDrive system.⁷⁷⁸ AutoDrive utilizes Aeva’s sensors to map the environment simultaneously in three spatial dimensions plus a fourth dimension of velocity.²⁵ This is supported by Forterra’s TerraLink autonomous vehicle management platform and Vektor software-defined communications, which ensure resilient C2 interoperability across disconnected, intermittent, and low-bandwidth (DIL) tactical mesh networks.⁴

3.2 Overland AI: OverDrive and Self-Supervised Adaptive Learning

Overland AI, spun out of an autonomous robotics laboratory at the University of Washington and heavily involved in DARPA’s Robotic Autonomy in Complex Environments with Resiliency (RACER) program, approaches off-road navigation through advanced machine learning and stochastic modeling.²⁷ The company’s architecture is divided into three core technologies: the OverDrive autonomy stack, the OverWatch C2 fleet orchestration platform, and the SPARK hardware upfit kit.²⁸ Demonstrating the versatility of this stack, Overland AI successfully integrated OverDrive onto the U.S. Marine Corps’ ROGUE Fires prototype in April 2026, operating without human intervention over mixed terrain for several hours.⁷⁸

Overland AI explicitly designs its systems to operate in unmapped, unpredictable terrain without continuous communication links or GPS.²⁹ The perception system utilizes a combination of 3D LiDAR, stereo cameras, radar, IMUs, and speed encoders to generate a real-time digital twin of the environment.²⁷ Rather than relying on rigid geometric rules, OverDrive runs dynamic simulations to test all possible trajectories, choosing the safest route based on continuously updated environmental data.²⁷ To execute this on surrogate platforms, Overland AI utilizes the SPARK kit—an ultra-compact, modular compute node that attaches via drive-by-wire interfaces to rapidly convert existing vehicles into autonomous assets.³¹ Overland AI also offers its own fully autonomous tactical vehicle, the ULTRA, which is capable of carrying 1,000-pound payloads and conducting counter-UAS and reconnaissance missions.²⁷

The defining characteristic of Overland AI’s software is its use of self-supervised adaptive learning.¹⁰ Instead of requiring massive datasets of hand-labeled semantic images (which fail when the vehicle encounters novel environments), OverDrive utilizes proprioceptive feedback from the vehicle’s chassis to dynamically learn the physical cost of traversing specific terrains in real-time, instantly adjusting its navigational behavior.¹⁰

3.3 Scout AI: Fury and Vision-Language-Action (VLA) Foundation Models

Scout AI presents a radically different paradigm for ground autonomy, rejecting the multi-modal, active-sensor architectures favored by Forterra and Overland AI. Instead, Scout AI deploys Fury, a fully learned, camera-only autonomy system driven by Vision-Language-Action (VLA) reasoning.¹¹ Fury functions as a multi-domain foundation model that maps raw optical pixel inputs and verbal or textual mission commands directly to vehicle control actions, entirely bypassing traditional hand-engineered geometric autonomy stacks.³³

The technical and tactical rationale behind Scout AI’s camera-only approach is grounded in signature management and cost reduction.¹¹ Active sensors like LiDAR and radar emit significant radio frequency (RF) and optical signatures, making the host vehicle highly susceptible to detection and targeting by adversarial electronic warfare (EW) systems.¹¹ By relying exclusively on passive optical sensing, Fury maintains a minimal electronic signature.³³ Furthermore, eliminating LiDAR significantly reduces the unit cost and physical footprint of the hardware stack. Scout’s second-generation Fury hardware is reportedly 90% smaller and vastly more power-efficient than previous iterations.¹¹

To demonstrate this capability for the UxS program, Scout AI partnered exclusively with Textron Systems for vehicle integration and with Edge Case Research for independent safety validation.³³ Additionally, the company partnered with Hendrick Motorsports Technical Solutions to deploy Fury on the NOMAD, a next-generation lightweight unmanned ground vehicle.³⁶ To further scale this foundation model, Scout AI recently secured a $100 million Series A funding round in April 2026.³⁷ The NOMAD platform is designed to act as an attritable asset—cheap enough to be deployed in high numbers and lost in combat without significant financial degradation to the unit.³⁶

4. Sensor Fusion in Unstructured, GPS-Denied Environments

Commercial autonomous vehicles operate within highly structured Operational Design Domains (ODDs) featuring painted lane markings, predictable traffic rules, and continuous access to Real-Time Kinematic (RTK) GPS for centimeter-level localization.¹⁶ In stark contrast, the tactical environments targeted by military ground autonomy are characterized by hostile electronic warfare, GPS spoofing, signal jamming, and terrain completely devoid of geometric regularity.⁴⁰ Relying on a single sensing modality or satellite-based navigation in these conditions leads to catastrophic system failure.

4.1 Vulnerabilities of Traditional Exteroceptive Sensing

Standard exteroceptive sensors—specifically optical cameras and traditional 3D Time-of-Flight (ToF) LiDAR—possess critical operational vulnerabilities in tactical environments.⁴⁰ Optical cameras suffer from inherent dynamic range limitations; they fail in total darkness, heavy precipitation, and the dense dust clouds (brownouts) frequently generated by military convoys navigating unpaved terrain.²⁷

While traditional ToF LiDAR can provide high-resolution geometric maps in total darkness, its near-infrared laser pulses are heavily attenuated by rain, fog, and suspended dust particulate, causing the sensor to register false positives close to the vehicle.⁷ Furthermore, ToF LiDAR generates dense geometric point clouds but lacks inherent semantic understanding. A traditional LiDAR system cannot distinguish between a physically impenetrable concrete pillar and a highly compliant visual obstruction, such as a thick cloud of smoke or a patch of tall grass.¹⁰

4.2 Advanced Mechanics of 4D FMCW LiDAR

To overcome the limitations of ToF LiDAR, architectures like Forterra’s AutoDrive utilize 4D Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) LiDAR.⁸ Unlike ToF systems, which measure distance based on the round-trip time of discrete laser pulses, FMCW LiDAR continuously transmits a laser beam whose frequency is modulated over time.⁸

When the transmitted FMCW beam reflects off a moving object, it experiences a Doppler shift—a proportional change in frequency based on the object’s velocity relative to the sensor.⁸ By measuring this shift alongside the time delay, 4D LiDAR instantaneously captures both the precise 3D spatial position and the exact radial and axial velocity of the object.²⁵ This allows the autonomy stack to immediately distinguish between static geometric obstacles (e.g., a rock formation) and dynamic clutter (e.g., blowing vegetation, falling rain, or shifting dust), which is vital for navigating heavy foliage without triggering false emergency stops.⁴³ Additionally, FMCW sensors like the Aeva Atlas can detect low-reflectivity targets at ranges up to 500 meters and are completely immune to interference from direct sunlight or the blinding lasers of adversarial optical countermeasures.⁴²

4.3 Localizing Ground-Penetrating Radar (LGPR)

To maintain absolute, centimeter-level localization in GPS-denied environments without relying on fragile above-ground optical features, autonomous military systems are increasingly integrating Localizing Ground Penetrating Radar (LGPR).⁹

Unlike high-frequency automotive radar (which operates around 77 GHz to detect surface-level objects), LGPR utilizes very high frequency (VHF) radio waves, typically in the 100 to 400 MHz range.⁷ An array of antennas mounted beneath the vehicle chassis uses an RF switch matrix to send these wide-beam radio waves downward, penetrating up to 10 feet into the earth.⁷ As the waves encounter subterranean anomalies—such as variations in soil strata, bedrock formations, buried utility lines, or dense root systems—they reflect back to the receiver.⁷

Because subterranean geology remains extremely stable over time and is entirely unaffected by surface weather, time of day, or atmospheric obscurants, LGPR creates a highly reliable electromagnetic “fingerprint” of the subsurface.⁴⁵ During an initial mapping pass, these subterranean B-scan fingerprints are correlated with baseline geographic coordinates.⁷ During subsequent autonomous operations in a GPS-denied zone, the UGV scans the subsurface in real-time. The system utilizes deep convolutional neural networks, such as NetVLAD, to extract features from the incoming A-scans and matches them against the pre-recorded LGPR map.⁴⁷ This technique enables continuous, highly accurate relative pose estimation and true orthogonal redundancy for navigation, independent of satellite constellations.⁴⁸

4.4 Advanced Multi-Modal Fusion Algorithms

The prototypes evaluated under the UxS mandate must execute a continuous, fault-tolerant sensor fusion loop. A robust architecture processes the 4D FMCW LiDAR point clouds, the high-resolution semantic data from passive optical sensors, and the absolute localization data from the LGPR array.⁵⁰

To integrate this diverse data mathematically, advanced non-linear regression techniques are employed, such as Gaussian Process Regression (GPR).⁵² A Gaussian Process is defined mathematically as a distribution over functions, allowing the autonomy system to define the covariance of the incoming data dynamically.⁵² If the optical camera is suddenly blinded by a laser dazzler or covered by mud splatter, the fusion algorithm detects the spike in error rates and dynamically adjusts the covariance weights. The system mathematically deprioritizes the optical stream and shifts the navigational reliance to the LiDAR and LGPR streams, sustaining the autonomy loop without critical interruption.⁵²

5. Algorithmic Approaches to Obstacle Classification in Heavy Foliage and Mud

The transition from improved, structured roads to chaotic, unstructured off-road environments introduces profound algorithmic challenges. These challenges are primarily driven by the high intra-class variance of natural environments and the complex physical interactions between the vehicle’s tires and the terrain, known as terramechanics.¹⁰

5.1 Intra-Class Variance and the Problem of Compliant Obstacles

In structured civilian environments, obstacle detection is largely a binary calculation: an object is either a traversable surface (asphalt) or a non-traversable hazard (pedestrian, vehicle, concrete wall).¹⁰ Off-road environments destroy this simplistic binary logic. A purely geometric occupancy grid generated by a traditional LiDAR system will register a three-foot-tall rigid boulder and a three-foot-tall patch of compliant switchgrass as identical geometric anomalies.¹⁰ Lacking semantic context, a standard path planner will halt the vehicle in front of both, resulting in “frozen robot syndrome,” where the UGV refuses to navigate through entirely traversable foliage.¹⁰

Furthermore, off-road terrain types exhibit extreme intra-class variance. A visual sensor may successfully segment a section of a trail as “mud,” but human operators intuitively understand that dark, pooling mud in a deep depression is likely a mobility trap, while lighter, drier mud on a slight incline is safely traversable.¹⁰ Attempting to hand-code rigid heuristic cost values for every possible physical state of mud, sand, gravel, or grass is mathematically impossible.¹⁰

5.2 Self-Supervised Costmap Learning and Maximum Entropy IRL

To overcome the limitations of rigid geometry and heuristic coding, advanced military autonomy systems rely on complex machine learning paradigms, specifically Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (MaxEnt IRL) and self-supervised costmap generation.¹⁰

Rather than relying on human labelers to annotate millions of images—which scales poorly and fails when the UGV enters a novel ecosystem—these systems learn a continuous traversability cost function directly from human expert demonstrations and proprioceptive feedback.¹⁰ During training, as a human operator drives the vehicle through a forested area, the algorithm captures exteroceptive data (how the terrain looks via cameras and LiDAR) and mathematically correlates it with proprioceptive data (how the terrain feels via IMU linear acceleration, suspension deflection, and wheel slip).¹⁰

The algorithms train an ensemble of Fully Convolutional Networks (FCNs) to predict these physical interaction costs from visual inputs.¹⁰ To manage the inherent statistical uncertainty of deep neural networks in off-road feature spaces, the system utilizes Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) as its primary risk metric.¹⁰ By adjusting a defined risk-tolerance parameter mathematically represented as , military commanders can directly dictate the UGV’s navigational behavior.¹⁰ In a low-risk, peacetime logistical mission, the CVaR threshold is set conservatively, and the UGV will path around tall grass, treating it as an unknown threat. In a high-risk combat scenario ( adjusted closer to 1), the CVaR threshold shifts, and the algorithm will command the vehicle to aggressively push through the compliant foliage to maintain tactical speed and avoid open-ground exposure.¹⁰The algorithms train an ensemble of Fully Convolutional Networks (FCNs) to predict these physical interaction costs from visual inputs.¹⁰ To manage the inherent statistical uncertainty of deep neural networks in off-road feature spaces, the system utilizes Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) as its primary risk metric.¹⁰ By adjusting a defined risk-tolerance parameter mathematically represented as , military commanders can directly dictate the UGV’s navigational behavior.¹⁰ In a low-risk, peacetime logistical mission, the CVaR threshold is set conservatively, and the UGV will path around tall grass, treating it as an unknown threat. In a high-risk combat scenario ( adjusted closer to 1), the CVaR threshold shifts, and the algorithm will command the vehicle to aggressively push through the compliant foliage to maintain tactical speed and avoid open-ground exposure.¹⁰The algorithms train an ensemble of Fully Convolutional Networks (FCNs) to predict these physical interaction costs from visual inputs.¹⁰ To manage the inherent statistical uncertainty of deep neural networks in off-road feature spaces, the system utilizes Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) as its primary risk metric.¹⁰ By adjusting a defined risk-tolerance parameter mathematically represented as , military commanders can directly dictate the UGV’s navigational behavior.¹⁰ In a low-risk, peacetime logistical mission, the CVaR threshold is set conservatively, and the UGV will path around tall grass, treating it as an unknown threat. In a high-risk combat scenario ( adjusted closer to 1), the CVaR threshold shifts, and the algorithm will command the vehicle to aggressively push through the compliant foliage to maintain tactical speed and avoid open-ground exposure.¹⁰

5.3 Dynamic Adaptation: SALON and ALTER Algorithms

To ensure UGVs can rapidly adapt to entirely novel environments without prior human labeling, developers utilize real-time, online adaptive frameworks. The Self-supervised Adaptive Learning for Off-road Navigation (SALON) framework leverages Visual Foundation Models (VFMs), such as DINOv2, to extract generalizable visual features from the terrain.¹⁰ SALON grounds these visual features using the robot’s immediate proprioceptive experience.¹⁰ Within seconds of encountering a new terrain type, the system associates the incoming visual representation with the physical roughness experienced by the chassis, instantly generating accurate, risk-aware costmaps and speedmaps.¹⁰

Similar VFM-driven approaches, such as the Velociraptor system, leverage models like SAM and DINOv2 to project visual and geometric features into a Bird’s Eye View (BEV) space.¹⁰ This allows the system to produce risk-aware costmaps, speedmaps, and uncertainty maps from just forty minutes of expert driving data, entirely without manual human annotation.¹⁰

To provide long-range visibility, systems utilize the Adaptive Long-range Traversibility EstimatoR (ALTER).¹⁰ Because LiDAR is highly accurate at short ranges but degrades over distance, ALTER uses the near-range LiDAR data to continuously train the visual camera models online.¹⁰ The algorithm extracts specific geometric features from the accumulated LiDAR voxel map, such as object height () and surface planarity (), calculated via singular value decomposition (SVD).¹⁰ These near-range, 3D geometric labels are projected onto the 2D camera image plane, creating dense, pixel-wise training labels.¹⁰ This self-supervised loop allows the neural network to learn the visual appearance of distant forest trails and dry grassy hills in real-time, effectively predicting traversability at distances far beyond the effective range of the LiDAR sensor.¹⁰To provide long-range visibility, systems utilize the Adaptive Long-range Traversibility EstimatoR (ALTER).¹⁰ Because LiDAR is highly accurate at short ranges but degrades over distance, ALTER uses the near-range LiDAR data to continuously train the visual camera models online.¹⁰ The algorithm extracts specific geometric features from the accumulated LiDAR voxel map, such as object height () and surface planarity (), calculated via singular value decomposition (SVD).¹⁰ These near-range, 3D geometric labels are projected onto the 2D camera image plane, creating dense, pixel-wise training labels.¹⁰ This self-supervised loop allows the neural network to learn the visual appearance of distant forest trails and dry grassy hills in real-time, effectively predicting traversability at distances far beyond the effective range of the LiDAR sensor.¹⁰To provide long-range visibility, systems utilize the Adaptive Long-range Traversibility EstimatoR (ALTER).¹⁰ Because LiDAR is highly accurate at short ranges but degrades over distance, ALTER uses the near-range LiDAR data to continuously train the visual camera models online.¹⁰ The algorithm extracts specific geometric features from the accumulated LiDAR voxel map, such as object height () and surface planarity (), calculated via singular value decomposition (SVD).¹⁰ These near-range, 3D geometric labels are projected onto the 2D camera image plane, creating dense, pixel-wise training labels.¹⁰ This self-supervised loop allows the neural network to learn the visual appearance of distant forest trails and dry grassy hills in real-time, effectively predicting traversability at distances far beyond the effective range of the LiDAR sensor.¹⁰

5.4 Terramechanics, Sinkage, and Slip Prediction

Accurately classifying deformable terrains like mud and soft sand requires the integration of visual perception with classical terramechanics—the scientific study of soil-vehicle interaction.¹² When navigating soft terrain, the UGV must avoid areas with low bearing capacity to prevent catastrophic wheel sinkage, slippage, and ultimate immobility.¹²

Classical terramechanics relies heavily on semi-empirical models, such as Bekker’s equations, which relate the applied wheel load to soil sinkage and shear stress.⁵⁹ However, these equations traditionally require physical soil parameters that a UGV cannot measure until it is already driving on the surface.¹² To predict vehicle mobility before physical contact, modern off-road autonomy stacks fuse 3D multi-modal semantic mapping with visual data.¹⁰

Algorithms analyze the terrain’s planarity and elevation using Markov Random Fields (MRF) applied to the LiDAR point clouds.¹⁰ Simultaneously, the system processes RGB and near-infrared optical data to assess soil moisture content and texture.⁶² The neural network utilizes this fused data to estimate the friction coefficient and deformability of the terrain ahead, proactively predicting potential wheel slip and sinkage rates.⁶⁰ If the predicted slip parameter exceeds a safe operational threshold relative to the vehicle’s current velocity, mass, and center of gravity, the path planner dynamically generates an alternative route or modulates torque to avoid rollover or deep soil entrapment.⁶¹

6. Edge Compute (SWaP-C) Requirements for Tactical AI Inference

The immense computational load generated by processing 4D FMCW LiDAR point clouds, 100Hz LGPR scans, VLA foundation models, and real-time terramechanic slip predictions must occur locally on the vehicle. Relying on cloud-based processing or off-board data centers—standard practice for commercial AI and civilian autonomous vehicles—is impossible in military scenarios. Tactical environments are characterized by adversarial electronic warfare, persistent signal jamming, and the strict operational requirement for acoustic and electronic stealth.¹³ Consequently, the prototypes must feature highly ruggedized edge-compute architectures that adhere to stringent Size, Weight, Power, and Cooling (SWaP-C) constraints.

6.1 Hardware Architecture: GPUs, SoMs, and FPGAs

Defense engineers must meticulously balance the requirement for massive Tera Operations Per Second (TOPS) against fixed, often highly restrictive vehicle power budgets.¹⁴

In lightweight surrogate platforms or attritable logistical UGVs, where the total platform power budget allocated for compute is below 100 watts, System-on-Module (SoM) architectures are mandatory.¹⁴ Technologies such as the NVIDIA Jetson Orin AGX consolidate the Central Processing Unit (CPU), Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), and Deep Learning Accelerator (DLA) onto a single, highly efficient circuit board, providing sufficient inference capability at ultra-low wattages.¹³

For larger surrogate platforms—such as the Polaris MESA or heavily armored vehicles where power budgets can exceed 150 watts—discrete GPU cards based on advanced architectures (such as NVIDIA Ada Lovelace or Ampere) are utilized.¹⁴ These discrete GPUs, often housed in modular, ruggedized enclosures like the PacStar 431 or DuraCOR 9010, provide the massive parallel processing power required to ingest and fuse dense, multi-modal sensor streams simultaneously.¹⁴ Furthermore, Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), such as the AMD/Xilinx Versal, are frequently integrated via PCIe or VPX standards to handle deterministic, ultra-low-latency signal processing (such as raw LGPR radar returns) before passing the sanitized, structured data to the GPU for semantic classification.¹⁴

6.2 Thermal Mitigation in MIL-STD-810H Environments

Continuous GPU acceleration and AI inference generate massive thermal output.⁶⁷ Standard commercial computers rely on active cooling mechanisms (mechanical fans) to ingest ambient air and dissipate heat. In off-road combat environments characterized by severe dust, mud, sandstorms, and water ingress, mechanical fans act as immediate and catastrophic failure points, ingesting debris that destroys the internal circuitry.¹³

To achieve MIL-STD-810H certification and ensure survivability, edge compute nodes designed for the UxS program utilize patented fanless, conduction-cooled chassis architectures.¹³ In these systems, heat generated by the CPU, GPU, and memory modules is transferred via internal heat spreaders and copper heat pipes directly to the heavy, ridged aluminum exterior of the computer housing.¹³ The chassis itself acts as a massive heatsink, dissipating the thermal load passively into the surrounding environment.¹³ This thermal architecture prevents thermal throttling, ensuring zero-latency decision-making even when the vehicle is operating under peak processing loads in high-ambient-temperature desert environments.⁶⁷ Additionally, eliminating cooling fans provides vital acoustic stealth, removing a prominent noise signature that could compromise the vehicle’s position during clandestine operations.¹³

7. Divergence of Military Off-Road Autonomy from Commercial Standards

The fundamental operational requirements and environmental realities of the U.S. Army render traditional commercial autonomous driving standards entirely obsolete. The prototypes evaluated for off-road military deployment must be measured against criteria that acknowledge the chaotic, hostile reality of warfare, departing significantly from civilian regulatory frameworks designed for paved highways.

7.1 The Inadequacy of SAE J3016 Automation Levels

The commercial automotive industry relies heavily on the SAE J3016 standard, which categorizes driving automation into six distinct levels, ranging from Level 0 (No Automation) to Level 5 (Full Automation).¹⁶ This taxonomy is fundamentally dependent on the concept of a defined Operational Design Domain (ODD)—the specific, bounded conditions under which the automated system is designed to operate (e.g., geofenced urban centers, mapped interstate highways, clear weather conditions, and speeds under 65 mph).¹⁶

Military off-road autonomy operates in an essentially unbounded and undefined ODD. There are no mapped lanes, weather constraints are routinely disregarded by mission necessity, and the physical environment may actively change during the operation (e.g., artillery strikes creating massive craters, or engineers intentionally breaching berms).⁶ Therefore, attempting to classify a military UGV using SAE levels is analytically flawed and practically useless. An autonomy stack might possess the technical sophistication of a commercial Level 4 system, yet operate in an environment so chaotic that it requires frequent remote human intervention or teleoperation simply to navigate a completely destroyed route.¹⁷ This intervention is not indicative of a system failure (as it would be under SAE guidelines), but rather a tactical necessity dictated by the extreme environment.¹⁷

7.2 ISO 26262, SOTIF (ISO 21448), and Military Risk Tolerance

Commercially, autonomous vehicle safety is governed by ISO 26262 (Functional Safety), which mandates a rigorous V-model development process to identify and prevent hazards caused by hardware or software malfunctions (e.g., an electrical short causing unintended steering actuation).¹⁵ As the complexity of machine learning in autonomous systems evolved, the industry adopted ISO 21448, known as the Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF).⁷¹ SOTIF addresses hazards that occur without a system failure—situations where the sensors and algorithms work exactly as designed, but fail to interpret a complex edge case safely (e.g., a neural network misclassifying the broad side of a white tractor-trailer against a bright sky, leading to a collision).⁷³

While ISO 26262 and SOTIF are designed to reduce operational risk to near zero to protect civilian occupants and pedestrians, military applications demand a fundamentally different risk calculus.¹⁷ A commercial vehicle’s primary, overriding goal is safety. A military surrogate UGV’s primary, overriding goal is mission execution.³

In tactical scenarios, a UGV may be required by the commander to intentionally execute a high-risk maneuver—such as aggressively traversing a suspected minefield to clear a path, or accelerating blindly through heavy smoke and hostile fire to deliver critical ammunition to a pinned-down squad.¹⁰ Therefore, military autonomy evaluation criteria do not merely ask, “Is the system safe?” They ask, “Can the human commander dynamically tune the system’s risk tolerance to match the strategic objectives?”.¹⁰ The software must be capable of overriding its inherent, commercially derived safety preservations if a higher-level command dictates attritable behavior to ensure the overall survival and success of the human force.⁷⁵

8. Conclusion

The U.S. Army’s Unmanned Systems (UxS) Autonomy program represents a vital, paradigm-shifting transition from traditional hardware-centric procurement to software-defined lethality and logistics. By executing a strategic pivot away from the rigid structural confines of the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) toward vendor-selected surrogate mobility platforms, the Army correctly prioritized the evaluation of the underlying neural networks, sensor fusion architectures, and command-and-control interfaces over chassis-specific mechanical integration.

The prototypes developed by Forterra, Overland AI, and Scout AI demonstrate divergent engineering approaches to solving the exact same extreme challenges. Whether utilizing Forterra’s heavily fused 4D FMCW LiDAR architectures, Overland AI’s proprioceptive self-supervised adaptive learning costmaps, or Scout AI’s passive Vision-Language-Action (VLA) foundation models, all systems must overcome the fundamental physical realities of the off-road battlefield. They must parse highly compliant foliage from rigid obstacles, predict soil terramechanics and sinkage rates in real-time, and execute these computationally massive tasks on ruggedized, conduction-cooled edge-compute nodes completely devoid of cloud connectivity or reliable GPS.

Ultimately, the successful deployment and scaling of these autonomous systems will necessitate a complete philosophical departure from civilian safety standards and regulatory frameworks. It will require the establishment of a new military framework of tactical risk-awareness—one that allows robotic platforms to maneuver, survive, absorb risk on behalf of human operators, and dominate in the most unpredictable and hostile environments on Earth.

9. Appendix: Methodology and Data Sources

This research report was compiled through a rigorous synthesis of technical documentation, defense procurement announcements, and academic robotics literature. The analysis prioritizes direct primary sources regarding the U.S. Army’s Unmanned Systems (UxS) Autonomy program, specifically leveraging official Department of Defense press releases, Other Transaction Authority (OTA) contract details, commercial vendor specifications, and specialized defense journalism.³

Technical data regarding advanced sensor modalities—specifically 4D FMCW LiDAR, Localizing Ground Penetrating Radar (LGPR), and passive optical sensors—was extracted from engineering whitepapers, patent descriptions, and academic journals focusing on field robotics and autonomous navigation.⁷ Information regarding algorithmic approaches to off-road traversability, including Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning (MaxEnt IRL), Self-supervised Adaptive Learning for Off-road Navigation (SALON), and Vision-Language-Action (VLA) foundation models, was sourced from recent publications originating from leading robotics institutions, including Carnegie Mellon University’s AirLab and the IEEE Robotics and Automation Society.¹⁰

Hardware specifications and SWaP-C constraints were evaluated using product documentation from ruggedized edge-compute manufacturers supplying the defense sector.¹³ Finally, the comparative analysis of commercial versus military standards utilized official frameworks defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), contrasted against military operational doctrines.¹⁶

Please share the link on Facebook, Forums, with colleagues, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email us in**@*********ps.com. If you’d like to request a report or order a reprint, please click here for the corresponding page to open in new tab.

Sources Used

1. Army awards three OTA agreements for UxS Autonomy | Article, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/288155/army_awards_three_ota_agreements_for_uxs_autonomy
2. US Army Awards Contract for Development of Autonomous Ground Vehicles – SOFX Report, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.sofx.com/us-army-awards-contract-for-development-of-autonomous-ground-vehicles/
3. Army shaking up new autonomy initiative, pivoting away from ISVs …, accessed July 1, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/army-shaking-up-new-autonomy-initiative-pivoting-away-from-isvs-sources/
4. Forterra, Polaris tout new autonomous vehicle for CASEVAC, logistics – Breaking Defense, accessed July 1, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2026/04/forterra-polaris-tout-new-autonomous-vehicle-for-casevac-logistics/
5. Army taps three companies to take ISVs unmanned – Breaking Defense, accessed July 1, 2026, https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/army-taps-three-companies-to-take-isvs-unmanned/
6. Army picks 3 startups to fast-track self-driving squad vehicle – Defense News, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/09/02/army-picks-3-startups-to-fast-track-self-driving-squad-vehicle/
7. WaveSense Uses GPR for Autonomous Vehicle Location – Lidar News, accessed July 1, 2026, https://lidarnews.com/wavesense-gpr-autonomous-vehicles/
8. What is 4D LiDAR? – LTS Global Digital Services, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.gdsonline.tech/what-is-4d-lidar/
9. Localizing Ground-Penetrating Radar – Tech Notes, accessed July 1, 2026, https://archive.ll.mit.edu/publications/technotes/LGPR.html
10. Autonomous Off-road driving | Learning-Based Navigation – AirLab, accessed July 1, 2026, https://theairlab.org/offroad/
11. Scout AI, Hendrick Motorsports Unveil NOMAD UGV – Self Drive News, accessed July 1, 2026, https://selfdrivenews.com/scout-ai-hendrick-motorsports-unveil-nomad-ugv/
12. The Prediction Method and Application of Off-Road Mobility for Ground Vehicles: A Review, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.mdpi.com/2032-6653/16/1/47
13. Rugged Military & Defense Computing Solutions | Fanless Edge AI | SINTRONES, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.sintrones.com/solution/military-defense/
14. Edge AI in Military Platforms | GOMA Technical Guides, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.gomarugged.com/guides/edge-ai-military-platforms
15. What ISO 26262 Expects from Your AV Safety Case | Edge Case, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.ecr.ai/resource/what-iso-26262-expects-from-your-av-safety-case
16. SAE Levels of Driving Automation™ Refined for Clarity and International Audience, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.sae.org/news/blog/sae-levels-driving-automation-clarity-refinements
17. Regulatory Policy for Autonomous Vehicle Safety & Deployment – Electrical and Computer Engineering, accessed July 1, 2026, https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~koopman/lectures/L132_2022-RegulatoryPolicy.pdf
18. Army Selects 3 Firms to Develop Infantry Support Vehicles Under OTA Contracts, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.executivegov.com/articles/army-ota-infantry-support-vehicles-contracts-autonomy
19. Forterra Business Breakdown & Founding Story – Contrary Research, accessed July 1, 2026, https://research.contrary.com/company/forterra
20. Defense News Digest: September 2025 Update – IDGA, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.idga.org/command-and-control/articles/defense-news-digest-september-2025
21. CPE Mission Autonomy Overview, accessed July 1, 2026, https://home.army.mil/rucker/6117/7332/4430/12_CPE_Mission_Autonomy_Overview_24_Feb_2026_FDO_Approved.pdf
22. The Army wants an unmanned ground vehicle to evacuate wounded and resupply the front line – Task & Purpose, accessed July 1, 2026, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-ground-drone-casevac/
23. Budget Activity 5A – Justification Book, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2027/Discretionary%20Budget/rdte/RDTE%20-%20Vol%203%20-%20Budget%20Activity%205A.pdf
24. AutoDrive – Forterra, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.forterra.com/autodrive
25. Aeva Selected by Forterra to Power Next-Generation Autonomous Defense Vehicles with 4D LiDAR – Stock Titan, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.stocktitan.net/news/AEVA/aeva-selected-by-forterra-to-power-next-generation-autonomous-1rm028d76kjb.html
26. Forterra | Drive the Mission, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.forterra.com/
27. Overland AI Business Breakdown & Founding Story – Contrary Research, accessed July 1, 2026, https://research.contrary.com/company/overland-ai
28. Overland AI, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.overland.ai/
29. OverDrive – Overland AI, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.overland.ai/overdrive
30. Tectonic Exclusive: Overland AI Wants to Take Your Vehicles and Make Them Autonomous, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.overland.ai/news/tectonic-exclusive-overland-ai-wants-to-take-your-vehicles-and-make-them-autonomous
31. Overland AI Launches SPARK to Deliver Instant Vehicle Autonomy to Military Fleets, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.overland.ai/news/overland-ai-launches-spark-to-deliver-instant-vehicle-autonomy-to-military-fleets
32. Semantic Scene Completion Based 3D Traversability Estimation for Off-Road Terrains, accessed July 1, 2026, https://arxiv.org/html/2412.08195v1
33. Scout AI Awarded Army UxS Autonomy Contract – PR Newswire, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/scout-ai-awarded-army-uxs-autonomy-contract-302542164.html
34. Scout AI secures major U.S. Army contract for autonomous vehicle tech By Investing.com, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.investing.com/news/company-news/scout-ai-secures-major-us-army-contract-for-autonomous-vehicle-tech-93CH-4216980
35. Watch: Fury platform brings agentic AI to battlefield drones – New Atlas, accessed July 1, 2026, https://newatlas.com/military/video-fury-ai-platform-battlefield-drones/
36. Scout AI Partners with Hendrick Motorsports Technical Solutions on NOMAD – Defense UGV Automated by Fury – PR Newswire, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/scout-ai-partners-with-hendrick-motorsports-technical-solutions-on-nomad–defense-ugv-automated-by-fury-302543619.html
37. Scout AI funding, news & analysis | Sacra, accessed July 1, 2026, https://sacra.com/c/scout-ai/
38. Scout AI Expands With AI Military Contracts Surge – AI CERTs News, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.aicerts.ai/news/scout-ai-expands-with-ai-military-contracts-surge/
39. The Localizing Ground Penetrating Radar Evaluation Dataset – Robotics, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.roboticsproceedings.org/rss17/p080.pdf
40. A Systematic Review of Cutting-Edge Radar Technologies: Applications for Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) – PMC, accessed July 1, 2026, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11644924/
41. Field Report on Ground Penetrating Radar for Localization at the Mars Desert Research Station – arXiv, accessed July 1, 2026, https://arxiv.org/html/2504.15455v2
42. (PDF) Sensor system for development of perception systems for ATO – ResearchGate, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371425949_Sensor_system_for_development_of_perception_systems_for_ATO
43. Aeva Introduces Atlas – The First Automotive-Grade 4D LiDAR Sensor for Mass Production Automotive Applications : r/MVIS – Reddit, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/MVIS/comments/191lkki/aeva_introduces_atlas_the_first_automotivegrade/
44. US12399279B1 – Enhanced hybrid LIDAR with high-speed scanning – Google Patents, accessed July 1, 2026, https://patents.google.com/patent/US12399279B1/en
45. Ground Penetrating Radar: The Unlikely New Hero of Autonomous Vehicles – GSSI Geophysical Survey Systems, Inc., accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.geophysical.com/ground-penetrating-radar-the-unlikely-new-hero-of-autonomous-vehicles
46. Automation of Armored Four-Wheel-Counter- Steer Vehicles – MIT Lincoln Laboratory, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.ll.mit.edu/media/6866
47. Underground Mapping and Localization Based on Ground-Penetrating Radar – CVF Open Access, accessed July 1, 2026, https://openaccess.thecvf.com/content/ACCV2024/papers/Zhang_Underground_Mapping_and_Localization_Based_on_Ground-Penetrating_Radar_ACCV_2024_paper.pdf
48. GPR, Inc.: Ground Positioning Radar for Automated Driving, accessed July 1, 2026, https://gpr.com/
49. MarsLGPR: Mars Rover Localization with Ground Penetrating Radar – arXiv, accessed July 1, 2026, https://arxiv.org/html/2503.04944v2
50. Integration of Drones in Landscape Research: Technological Approaches and Applications, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.mdpi.com/2504-446X/9/9/603
51. Understanding Localization and Positioning – GPR, Inc., accessed July 1, 2026, https://gpr.com/blog/why-autonomy-relies-on-location-accuracy-understanding-localization-and-positioning/
52. Robust Fusion of LiDAR and Wide-Angle Camera Data for Autonomous Mobile Robots, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/8/2730
53. Autonomous Driving in Unstructured Environments: How Far Have We Come? – arXiv, accessed July 1, 2026, https://arxiv.org/html/2410.07701v3
54. Classification of Off-road Terrains – University of Pretoria, accessed July 1, 2026, https://repository.up.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/f637e3c9-abad-4b7d-ab25-f2b46fec2425/content
55. Enhancing Indoors Robotic Traversability Estimation with Sensor Fusion – MavMatrix, accessed July 1, 2026, https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1389&context=cse_dissertations
56. Terrain classification for terrain parameter estimation based on a dynamic testing system, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.emerald.com/sr/article-split/35/4/329/347236/Terrain-classification-for-terrain-parameter
57. Geometric and visual terrain classification for autonomous mobile navigation | Request PDF, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321811282_Geometric_and_visual_terrain_classification_for_autonomous_mobile_navigation
58. Abstracts | 55th Conference of the International Society for Terrain-Vehicle Systems – ISTVS 2025, accessed July 1, 2026, https://2025.istvs.org/submissions/abstracts
59. Hybrid Terrain-Aware Path Planning: Integrating VD–RRT … – arXiv, accessed July 1, 2026, https://arxiv.org/html/2510.12169v1
60. Visual Prediction of Rover Slip: Learning Algorithms and Field Experiments – DTIC, accessed July 1, 2026, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA593494.pdf
61. Verti-Bench: A General and Scalable Off-Road Mobility Benchmark for Vertically Challenging Terrain – Robotics, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.roboticsproceedings.org/rss21/p138.pdf
62. Obstacle Detection and Safely Navigate the Autonomous Vehicle from Unexpected Obstacles on the Driving Lane – PMC, accessed July 1, 2026, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7506726/
63. 1 Abstract – arXiv, accessed July 1, 2026, https://arxiv.org/html/2510.21006v1
64. AI at the Edge: Comparing NVIDIA Blackwell, Ada Lovelace and Ampere for Rugged GPU Defence Systems – Metromatics, accessed July 1, 2026, https://metromatics.com.au/ai-at-the-edge-rugged-gpu/
65. When Seconds Matter Duracor 9010 Rugged Mission Computer Edge Computing | Defense Solutions | Curtiss-Wright, accessed July 1, 2026, https://defense-solutions.curtisswright.com/media-center/blog/when-seconds-matter-duracor-9010-rugged-mission-computer-edge-computing
66. The Hard Problems No One Talks About in Edge AI – Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions, accessed July 1, 2026, https://defense-solutions.curtisswright.com/media-center/blog/hard-problems-no-one-talks-about-edge-ai
67. Tactical Autonomy: Edge AI for Unmanned Defense Robotics – sintrones, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.sintrones.com/application/unmanned-defense-robotics-edge-ai/
68. Let’s Finally Get Rid of the SAE Levels for Autonomous Driving, accessed July 1, 2026, https://thelastdriverlicenseholder.com/2026/02/04/lets-finally-get-rid-of-the-sae-levels-for-autonomous-driving/
69. SAE J3016_202104.pdf – UNECE Wiki, accessed July 1, 2026, https://wiki.unece.org/download/attachments/128418539/SAE%20J3016_202104.pdf
70. Test & Evaluation for Autonomous Military Vehicles: Challenges (Part 1) – Applied Intuition, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.appliedintuition.com/blog/test-evaluation-for-autonomous-military-vehicles-challenges-part-1
71. ISO 26262 vs. SOTIF (ISO/PAS 21448): What’s the Difference? | PTC, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.ptc.com/en/blogs/alm/iso-26262-vs-sotif-iso-pas-21448-whats-the-difference
72. Auto Mobility: The Future of Autonomous Vehicles and ISO 26262 – Nemko, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.nemko.com/blog/auto-mobility-the-future-of-autonomous-vehicles-and-iso-26262
73. Rethinking Autonomous Vehicle Functional Safety Standards: An Analysis of SOTIF and ISO 26262 – Automotive IQ, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.automotive-iq.com/autonomous-drive/articles/rethinking-autonomous-vehicle-functional-safety-standards-an-analysis-of-sotif-and-iso-26262
74. Overland AI: The Autonomous War Machine That Actually Works — For Now – Medium, accessed July 1, 2026, https://medium.com/@azha.khan.6/overland-ai-the-autonomous-war-machine-that-actually-works-for-now-69dc77bb0a8f
75. Overland AI Is the First Ground Autonomy Company to Prime a Production Contract for the U.S. Military, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.overland.ai/news/overland-ai-is-the-first-ground-autonomy-company-to-prime-a-production-contract-for-the-u-s-military
76. Saab innovation Emerging technologies, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.saab.com/about/innovation/emerging-technologies
77. Aeva Selected by Forterra to Power Next-Generation Autonomous Defense Vehicles with 4D LiDAR, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.forterra.com/posts/aeva-selected-by-forterra-to-power-next-generation-autonomous-defense-vehicles-with-4d-lidar
78. Overland AI Demonstrates Autonomous Ground Capability for USMC ROGUE Fires, accessed July 1, 2026, https://www.overland.ai/news/overland-ai-demonstrates-autonomous-ground-capability-for-usmc-rogue-fires