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Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics, Military Analytics, Russian & Soviet Analytics

SITREP: Russian Offensive Campaign and Ukrainian Asymmetric Operations (July 25 – July 31, 2026)

1. Executive Summary

During the reporting period of July 25 through July 31, 2026, the operational environment in the Russia-Ukraine conflict was defined by a notable divergence between a stagnant, highly attritional Russian ground offensive and an increasingly expansive Ukrainian asymmetric deep-strike campaign. The Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive has effectively culminated operationally, achieving marginal tactical gains at historically unprecedented costs in personnel and equipment. The casualty-to-territory ratio has degraded severely for Russian forces, indicating structural limitations in mechanized maneuver capabilities and a reliance on glide bomb-enabled infantry infiltrations, particularly along the Kostyantynivka axis.

Diplomatically and politically, the theater experienced a significant doctrinal shift with the appointment of Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, replacing General Oleksandr Syrskyi. This transition, precipitated by public protests and internal defense ministry disputes regarding the pacing of reform, signals a Ukrainian pivot away from attritional paradigms toward decentralized command, advanced unmanned systems integration, and maneuver warfare.

Concurrently, Ukraine expanded its ongoing 40-Day Deep-Strike Campaign beyond the immediate border regions, targeting strategic depths up to 3,000 kilometers utilizing the newly deployed FP-5 “Flamingo” ground-launched cruise missile. This campaign severely degraded major Russian internal logistics networks, most notably the Wildberries commercial infrastructure, and extended into the Caspian Sea, successfully interdicting Iranian maritime arms supply routes. In retaliation, the Russian Federation intensified its ballistic missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian civilian and port infrastructure, marked by the reintroduction of North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles for the first time since mid-2025. Furthermore, Russian airspace incursions into NATO territory (Poland and Romania) reflect a continued Kremlin willingness to test alliance air defense integration under its ongoing “Phase Zero” cognitive warfare strategy.

2. Detailed Operational and Diplomatic Developments

Bilateral Interactions & Diplomatic Posture

The diplomatic and political landscape during this period was characterized by internal Ukrainian restructuring aimed at modernizing command frameworks, alongside high-level international engagements focused on securing long-term strategic commitments.

The most consequential development was the comprehensive overhaul of the Ukrainian military high command. On July 21 and finalized over the subsequent week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed General Oleksandr Syrskyi and appointed Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces1. This personnel shift occurred against a backdrop of domestic political friction, including the mid-July dismissal of reformist Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, which sparked protests drawing upwards of 10,000 people in Kyiv demanding structural military reforms2. Fedorov had accused General Syrskyi of deliberately stalling modernization efforts and undermining the defense ministry’s technological integration initiatives4.

The elevation of the 43-year-old Drapatyi represents a generational and doctrinal transition. Drapatyi built his reputation on the frontline, notably commanding the 2nd Mechanized Battalion in Mariupol in 2014, stabilizing the Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group in May 2024, and launching anti-corruption recruitment reforms as Commander of the Ground Forces1. Drapatyi is highly regarded for his early adoption of drone warfare, his insistence on pushing authority down to junior officers, and his open rejection of the Soviet-style micromanagement and frontal-assault tactics heavily associated with his predecessor3. To consolidate this new command philosophy, Major General Ihor Skybyuk was appointed Chief of the General Staff, and the military initiated a systemic review of unit staffing to ensure equitable personnel distribution across frontline brigades4.

Internationally, Ukrainian diplomatic efforts focused on fortifying air defense networks and maintaining Western coalition cohesion. President Zelensky met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., on July 28 to negotiate the strengthening of Ukrainian air defenses in response to intensified Russian ballistic barrages7. Concurrently, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on July 24. Tokayev publicly urged a freeze to the conflict and a return to the revised Istanbul peace negotiations8. Putin utilized this dialogue to explicitly justify his refusal to freeze the frontline, reiterating his intent to pursue maximalist war aims despite substantial domestic economic and military costs8.

Furthermore, Russian strikes repeatedly violated NATO airspace, indicating a high-risk operational tolerance by the Russian Ministry of Defense designed to test Western deterrence. A suspected Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland on the night of July 29-30, approximately 50 kilometers from Lublin, prompting the immediate scrambling of Polish air defenses9. Polish Deputy Defense Minister Cezary Tomczyk characterized the event as an intentional “alliance test” and a deliberate provocation9. Earlier in the week, Romanian F-16 fighter jets intercepted unidentified Shahed-type drones in Romanian airspace on three consecutive days (July 24-26), resulting in the expulsion of a Russian diplomat from Bucharest8. Polish and Baltic intelligence authorities assess these incursions as part of an active Russian “Phase Zero” campaign designed to surveil NATO air defense integration exercises and set psychological conditions for future escalation13.

Frontline Combat Updates

The tactical environment on the ground remains largely static, characterized by a grinding war of attrition wherein Russian forces are unable to translate localized manpower and aviation advantages into operational-level breakthroughs. Russian force generation is currently insufficient to conduct theater-wide mechanized offensives, resulting in a systemic reliance on slow, costly infantry infiltrations supported by heavy, unguided aviation assets.

  • Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka Axis (Main Russian Effort): Russian forces maintain this sector as the primary locus of their spring-summer offensive effort but have failed to seize the highly fortified city of Kostyantynivka. Russian and proxy officials have engaged in unverified claims of victory for domestic consumption, but geospatial intelligence indicates Russian elements maintain a tenuous presence in only 36.98% of the city, largely through un-consolidated infiltrations rather than secure occupational control15. The Russian advance in this sector is fundamentally dependent on superior aviation capabilities. Russian Aerospace Forces are systematically deploying FAB-500 and D-30SN guided glide bombs to degrade Ukrainian defensive fortifications, high-rise observation posts, and pontoon crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River prior to launching dismounted infantry assaults13.
  • Northern Kharkiv and Sumy Axis: The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces has effectively culminated in this sector following its initial cross-border incursions earlier in the year. The Russian military command is actively deceiving the Kremlin and the domestic populace regarding the extent of territorial gains in this region to project a false narrative of theater-wide advancement18. Battlefield evidence confirms that Ukrainian forces have stabilized this sector and are currently conducting successful counterattacks, refuting the Russian Ministry of Defense’s narrative of unchallenged supremacy18.
  • Borova and Oleksandrivka Directions: Ukrainian forces have successfully seized the localized tactical initiative in several eastern pockets. Utilizing intermediate-range strikes to severely degrade Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), Ukrainian units have disrupted Russian reinforcement nodes. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction confirmed the liberation of six settlements (Ternove, Zaporizke, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Maliivka), encompassing roughly 120 square kilometers and penetrating 25 kilometers into previously held Russian depth19. Ukrainian forces also registered confirmed tactical advances in the Borova direction18.
Territorial Metric / SourceUkrainian Territory Gained by RussiaRussian Territory Held by UkraineStrategic Context & Annual Trends
ISW Assessment (Trailing 4 Weeks)Net loss of 1 sq mile202 sq miles (Kursk/Belgorod regions)20Deep strikes are severely inhibiting forward Russian supply, halting momentum.
DeepState OSINT (Trailing 4 Weeks)Net gain of 10 sq miles20N/AMinor Russian gains are entirely constrained to the Kostyantynivka urban environs.
Annualized Rate (ISW Data)Jan-June 2026: 622 sq km seized/infiltratedN/AA 71.5% decrease in territorial acquisition compared to Jan-June 2025 (2189 sq km)15.

The 40-Day Deep-Strike Campaign & Maritime Security

Ukraine has dramatically escalated its strategic interdiction efforts under an operation designated as the “40-Day Deep-Strike Campaign.” This initiative is explicitly designed to systematically dismantle Russian energy infrastructure, military logistics nodes, and commercial supply chains deep within the Russian interior, projecting power far beyond the immediate line of contact.

On July 25, Ukrainian forces executed a highly complex, multi-vector strike operation extending into the Caspian Sea basin. Utilizing long-range maritime and aerial drones, Ukrainian forces struck the Filanovsky offshore oil platform, operated by Lukoil12. More critically, the strikes successfully hit the Port Olya 2 and the Begey, two sanctioned cargo vessels explicitly utilized for transporting military hardware, including Shahed drone components and ballistic missiles, between Iran and the Russian Federation21. The operation also resulted in damage to a Russian Project 12418 Molniya missile boat protecting the harbor21. This unprecedented projection of maritime strike capability severely compromises the safety of the Caspian transport corridor, which had previously operated as a secure, unmolested logistical lifeline for the Russian military-industrial complex24.

Domestically within Russia, the Ukrainian campaign aggressively targeted vital commercial logistics, focusing heavily on facilities operated by Wildberries, widely considered Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and the equivalent of Amazon. Drone strikes against major Wildberries distribution hubs in Yekaterinburg and near St. Petersburg resulted in widespread structural fires, destroying significant commercial inventories12. Russian economic analysts estimate the total economic damage caused by these strikes at up to 100 billion rubles (approximately $1.3 billion USD), making it one of the costliest disruptions to Russia’s commercial infrastructure since the invasion began25. The strikes effectively bankrupted thousands of small-to-medium Russian merchants whose uninsured inventories were destroyed, while simultaneously disrupting the shadow distribution of dual-use goods to the front lines25. The Kremlin and Wildberries CEO Tatyana Kim have framed the strikes as “terrorism,” yet Russian authorities appear focused on mitigating civilian economic panic rather than implementing effective military countermeasures to protect the deep rear25.

In the energy sector, ongoing Ukrainian intermediate and long-range drone strikes have degraded the Russian refining industry. Commodities data firm Kpler reports that Russian oil refining volumes have plummeted to 3.8 million barrels per day, a 21-year low13. As of mid-July, approximately 4.3 million barrels per day of potential output (representing roughly 58% of Russia’s total installed refining capacity) is completely offline due to strike damage and emergency maintenance13. The strikes have specifically targeted highly complex, difficult-to-replace components such as crude distillation units, catalytic reformers, and hydrocrackers at facilities like the Salavat petrochemical complex and the Tyumen oil refinery12. This has resulted in a contained but acute domestic fuel crisis, forcing Russia to expand its gasoline export ban until the end of 2026 and initiate emergency imports of up to 400,000 tons of gasoline per month from Belarus and India8.

In retaliation for the Caspian and deep-rear strikes, Russian forces have resumed a deliberate, punitive strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure along the Black Sea coast. Utilizing Iskander ballistic missiles, Russia targeted port facilities in Odesa and Mykolaiv, destroying vast quantities of grain and sunflower oil meant for export, and striking Tanzanian and Liberian-flagged merchant vessels12. This campaign effectively halted deep-water grain exports, forcing major international grain traders to suspend operations and causing shipping insurance rates to spike as shipowners increasingly declare force majeure and refuse to dock in Ukrainian waters13.

Role of Third-Party Countries

The globalization of the conflict’s logistics network continued to deepen, with both combatants relying heavily on external state actors for material sustainment and technological integration.

State ActorSupport Mechanism / Material RenderedStrategic Operational Impact
North Korea (DPRK)KN-23 Ballistic Missiles; Troop DeploymentsAllowed Russia to resume KN-23 strikes (July 29) to exploit Ukrainian interceptor shortages9. Current preparation of 30,000 DPRK troops in Voronezh for frontline deployment to offset Russian infantry losses9.
IranMaritime Logistics & Drone Tech TransferFacilitation of military cargo (drones/munitions) via the Caspian Sea using vessels like Port Olya 2 and Begey. Vessels disabled by Ukrainian strikes on July 2521.
IndiaRefined Petroleum ExportsSupplying at least 60,000 metric tons of gasoline to Russia to offset critical domestic fuel shortages caused by the systematic destruction of Russian refineries by Ukrainian drones14.
United StatesDefense Procurement & “Drone Dominance”Integration of 2,000 Ukrainian-manufactured F-Drones (FPV systems) into the U.S. DoD arsenal, demonstrating a reverse technology transfer resulting from Ukrainian battlefield innovation18.

3. Drone Warfare and Unmanned Systems

Tactical & Strategic Deployments

The reporting period witnessed a notable tactical shift in Russian aerial bombardment packages. Russian forces have demonstrably increased the ratio of highly expensive ballistic and cruise missiles while simultaneously decreasing the volume of low-cost Shahed-type one-way attack (OWA) drones in their overnight strike packages29. This adjustment is specifically engineered to exploit Ukraine’s acute shortage of high-tier ballistic missile interceptors (such as the U.S.-supplied Patriot PAC-3), recognizing that Ukraine’s interception rate against slower, low-altitude unmanned systems remains exceptionally high, routinely exceeding 90% (aided by the growing integration of mobile fire groups and evolving air defense strategies32), while ballistic missile interception rates fluctuate based on munition availability29.

This shift was evidenced during the massive July 29-30 strike, where Russia reintroduced North Korean KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles for the first time since August 20259. The KN-23 strikes, while lethal to civilian areas such as Radushne, demonstrated significant accuracy issues. Ukrainian sanctions officials reported finding two KN-23 impact craters from the attack separated by 3.5 kilometers, with no viable military targets within a 5-kilometer radius, highlighting the erratic terminal guidance of the Pyongyang-supplied munitions despite their incorporation of smuggled Western microelectronics35.

Conversely, Ukraine has fundamentally altered the strategic balance of long-range strike capabilities with the mass deployment of the FP-5 “Flamingo” ground-launched cruise missile. Developed by the Ukrainian defense firm Fire Point, the FP-5 embodies the doctrine of “affordable mass.” Operating on repurposed Soviet-era Ivchenko AI-25TL turbofan engines and utilizing radar-transparent composite materials, the FP-5 extends Ukraine’s reach to 3,000 kilometers, placing strategic targets as far east as Novosibirsk within range37.

The deployment of the FP-5 marks a critical threshold in the war’s technological progression. By eschewing expensive terrain-following radar (TERCOM) for standard GNSS/INS guidance, Fire Point has achieved a unit cost of approximately $500,000, allowing for rapid production scaling of up to 210 units per month38.

Technical Profile of Systems

Platform NameOriginRangePayload / WarheadStrategic Operational Role
FP-5 “Flamingo”Ukraine (Fire Point)Up to 3,000 km1,150 kg (FAB-1000/Mark 84 equivalent)Strategic deep strike against fixed logistics/infrastructure. Jet-launched with composite fuselage to minimize RCS. CEP of 14m via GNSS/INS37.
North Korean KN-23DPRK~900 km~500 kgShort-range ballistic missile utilized by Russia to exploit Ukrainian interceptor deficits. Features Western-made components; accuracy remains highly erratic (3.5km offset observed)9.
D-30SN Glide BombRussia~90 km250 kg explosiveAviation-launched guided munition utilized heavily to degrade urban terrain (e.g., Kostyantynivka) prior to infantry infiltration, neutralizing defensive strongpoints16.

Targeting Priorities & Countermeasures

Counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) and electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures continue to rapidly evolve as both sides race to secure their logistical depths. In response to Ukraine’s deep-strike capabilities against critical energy nodes, the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec introduced “Spiderweb.” This physical anti-drone defense system consists of modular kinetic netting designed to withstand direct impacts from 200 kg drones traveling at 250 km/h, specifically aimed at shielding oil storage tanks and electrical substations over 25 meters tall13. Furthermore, the Russian Navy is actively forming dedicated unmanned systems regiments to protect its remaining Black Sea and Azov Sea vessels from swarming Ukrainian maritime surface drones11.

In the cyber and EW domain, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) executed a major counter-intelligence operation dismantling a highly effective Russian technological procurement network. SBU operatives detained multiple agents, including a 36-year-old and 28-year-old in Izmail, an AWOL soldier in Kyiv, and individuals in Dnipro and Irpin, who were responsible for illegally registering and activating over 1,000 Starlink satellite terminals on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)41. Utilizing Telegram channels to recruit desperate civilians and military deserters for “easy money,” Russian handlers directed the registration of these terminals using forged Ukrainian civilian identities and proxy post office drop-offs41. These terminals were intended to provide Russian frontline units with resilient command-and-control capabilities, counteract Ukrainian EW jamming, and provide high-bandwidth guidance for Russian strike drones44. The SBU successfully blocked all 1,000 compromised terminals, significantly degrading Russian frontline communications and halting assaults in several sectors due to immediate command paralysis41.

4. Resource Utilization, Constraints, and Sustainability

Manpower Dynamics, Logistics, and Industrial Capacity

The macro-attritional arithmetic of the conflict has shifted sharply against the Russian Federation, highlighting the severe long-term costs of the Kremlin’s current strategic posture. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates place total Russian casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) at approximately 1.4 million personnel since February 2022, with upwards of 450,000 killed in action47. By comparison, Ukrainian casualties are estimated between 525,000 and 625,000 (including 125,000 to 150,000 fatalities)47. The casualty ratio, which hovered between 2:1 and 3:1 for much of the war, widened to nearly 8:1 in the first half of 2026, driven largely by Ukraine’s mass integration of FPV drones and precision artillery strikes against massed Russian infantry47.

The Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive is notable for its marked inefficiency and the operational strain on mechanized maneuver warfare. In June 2026, Russian forces suffered 39,490 casualties to advance or infiltrate a mere 30.42 square kilometers of territory15. This translates to approximately 1,298 casualties per square kilometer gained15. When compared to June 2025, where Russia suffered an average of 68 casualties per square kilometer taken, Russian forces are now suffering over 19 times more casualties per kilometer gained15.

Equipment attrition is equally unsustainable, reflecting the success of Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics hubs. The destruction of specialized support equipment highlights the fragility of the Russian supply chain.

Asset ClassJune 2025 LossesJune 2026 LossesYear-Over-Year MultiplierOperational Indicator
Fuel Vehicles / Tanks3,39512,8673.8x IncreaseValidates the success of Ukrainian deep strikes in severing forward fuel supply lines15.
Artillery Systems1,2432,0531.65x IncreaseIndicates superior Ukrainian counter-battery fire and deep FPV targeting15.
Unmanned Systems (UAVs)4,58160,84913.3x IncreaseReflects the complete saturation of the airspace and exceptionally high interception rates by Ukrainian EW and air defense15.

Strategic Sustainability Projection

The Russian Federation is currently facing acute force generation and macroeconomic crises that threaten long-term strategic sustainability. The Kremlin has officially denied preparations for a compulsory military mobilization, signaling President Putin’s reluctance to incur the domestic political risks and social instability associated with involuntary reserve call-ups51. However, Russian Ministry of Defense volunteer recruitment programs, despite significant sign-on bonuses, are fundamentally failing to meet the 2026 annual targets required to compensate for sustained casualty rates exceeding 30,000 per month51. The Kremlin’s heavy reliance on an anticipated 30,000 North Korean troops, currently preparing in the Voronezh region, is a direct symptom of this domestic force generation deficit9.

Economically, the localized fuel crises generated by Ukraine’s refinery strikes are cascading into broader industrial friction. Furthermore, Russian elites are reportedly accelerating the offshore transfer of personal wealth to insulate themselves from the Kremlin’s creeping nationalization of private assets and the systemic risk of a contracting wartime economy14. The combination of a stagnating economy (projected at merely 1.1% GDP growth in 2025), localized inflation, targeted Western sanctions on the “shadow fleet,” and an inability to replace lost mechanized and human assets at the rate of destruction suggests that the Russian military is facing profound structural challenges to its offensive posture, exacerbated by broader global ammunition and energetics supply chain constraints affecting both sides47.

5. Chronological Timeline of Key Events

  • Saturday, July 25, 2026: Ukrainian long-range drones strike deep into the Caspian Sea, hitting the Filanovsky offshore oil platform, the Port Olya 2 and Begey Iranian transport ships, and a Project 12418 Molniya missile boat, severely disrupting the Iran-Russia arms corridor12. Concurrently, Ukrainian forces strike the Tyumen oil refinery and Wildberries logistics hubs in Yekaterinburg, sparking massive fires and commercial disruptions12. A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepts an unidentified Shahed-type drone in Romanian airspace for the second time in two days8. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) detains suspects in Dnipro responsible for illegally registering over 1,000 Starlink terminals for Russian forces41.
  • Sunday, July 26, 2026: Russian President Vladimir Putin uses his Navy Day address to project strength and reinforce expansive territorial claims beyond Ukraine11. The Russian Navy announces the formation of new unmanned systems regiments to protect vulnerable Black Sea and Azov Sea assets11. Romanian airspace is violated for a third consecutive day, resulting in another F-16 interception11. Overnight, Russia launches one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, seven Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 136 drones against Ukraine11.
  • Monday, July 27, 2026: The Kremlin escalates domestic messaging, with Putin attempting to shift responsibility for the ongoing war onto the Russian State Duma and the general population to insulate himself from public dissatisfaction56. Putin intensifies efforts to coerce personnel mobilized in 2022 into signing permanent contracts with the Ministry of Defense56. Russia launches 147 drones against Ukraine overnight; no confirmed territorial advances are made by either side56.
  • Tuesday, July 28, 2026: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky meets with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., to secure further commitments for air defense enhancements7. Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and industrial infrastructure, maintaining pressure on the Russian deep rear51.
  • Wednesday, July 29, 2026: The Kremlin officially denies preparations for a compulsory military mobilization, attempting to assuage public anxiety amid severe recruitment deficits51. Russian aviation heavily bombs Kostyantynivka with guided glide bombs to enable slow infantry infiltrations17. The Ukrainian General Staff officially launches a comprehensive review of military unit staffing and personnel distribution under the direction of new Commander-in-Chief Drapatyi6.
  • Thursday, July 30, 2026: During the overnight barrage, Russia utilizes a North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile to strike a residential area in Radushne, Kryvyi Rih, killing a family of six; this marks the first confirmed use of the KN-23 since August 20259. A suspected Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashes in eastern Poland, 50 kilometers from Lublin, triggering NATO air defense alerts and diplomatic rebukes9.
  • Friday, July 31, 2026: ISW intelligence confirms that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces is intentionally deceiving the Kremlin regarding the extent of territorial gains in northern Ukraine to support cognitive warfare narratives18. Ukrainian forces successfully counterattack and advance in the Borova direction18. Ukrainian defense contractor F-Drones successfully delivers its first batch of 2,000 FPV drones to the U.S. military under the DoD Drone Dominance Program18. Wildberries CEO Tatyana Kim publicly declares the Ukrainian deep strikes as “terrorism,” confirming catastrophic supply chain disruptions affecting 10 countries and significant merchant bankruptcies25.

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Sources Used

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  44. SBU arrests two suspected FSB agents over 76 Starlink terminals, https://english.nv.ua/russian-war/sbu-arrests-two-suspected-fsb-agents-over-76-starlink-terminals-50627020.html
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  46. SBU detains agent in Kyiv Oblast accused of registering Starlink terminals for Russia, https://english.nv.ua/nation/sbu-detains-man-over-starlink-setup-for-russia-50596815.html
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