Executive Summary

The strategic situation of the Russian Federation for the week ending January 31, 2026, is characterized by a deliberate transition from short-term military surges into a permanent state of strategic continuum, where diplomatic activity and kinetic operations are leveraged as complementary instruments of a single policy objective.¹ Following the high-profile meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump in Florida in late December 2025, the Kremlin has recalibrated its narrative to emphasize its own persistence against what it views as cyclical Western political maneuvers.¹ This week, Russian diplomacy has intensified its focus on the “Great Eurasian Partnership” while simultaneously managing the fallout from unprecedented geopolitical developments in the Western Hemisphere, specifically the U.S.-led intervention in Venezuela.²

On the kinetic front, the Russian military continues a grinding war of attrition in Ukraine, prioritizing incremental gains in the Donetsk and Zaporizhia sectors.⁴ Despite immense casualty rates reaching nearly 1.2 million personnel since the full-scale invasion began, the Russian command maintains a posture of “grinding down” the opposition, betting on the eventual exhaustion of Western support.⁵ A significant development this week is the Kremlin’s acknowledgement of a temporary, week-long moratorium on strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Kyiv, ostensibly at the personal request of President Trump.⁴ However, intelligence suggests this is a tactical pause designed to allow for the replenishment of missile stockpiles and to serve as a cognitive warfare tool rather than a move toward a durable ceasefire.⁶

Economically, the Federation is entering a period of significant contraction. The International Monetary Fund has slashed Russia’s 2026 growth forecast to a mere 0.8 percent, as the “sugar rush” of 2024’s military spending fades.⁸ The private sector has begun adopting “tactical poverty” measures, including wage freezes and bonus cuts, to manage the combined pressure of rising taxes, high interest rates, and a 46 percent projected decline in oil and gas receipts for January 2026.⁸ Domestically, the state has further consolidated control through a new “Digital Sovereignty Doctrine,” which moves beyond cybersecurity into a model of total digital isolation and state oversight of artificial intelligence and personal devices.¹²

Strategic Indicator	Current Metric (Jan 2026)	Historical Context (2025)	Directional Trend
GDP Growth Forecast	0.8%	1.0%	Declining 8
Value-Added Tax (VAT)	22%	20%	Increasing 11
Oil/Gas Revenue Change	-46% (Jan projection)	-24% (Annual 2025)	Sharply Declining 8
Central Bank Interest Rate	16%	21% (Peak)	Stabilizing/High 11
Conscription Target	261,000 (Year-round)	Seasonal Campaigns	Structural Shift 13

Diplomatic and Foreign Affairs Analysis

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), under Sergey Lavrov, has spent the final week of January 2026 attempting to define a post-“rules-based” international order.² The primary theme in Moscow’s rhetoric is the failure of Western efforts to isolate Russia, citing the successful 80th-anniversary celebrations of Victory Day in 2025 and the expanding reach of the BRICS association as evidence of a multipolar reality.²

The Venezuela Crisis and Global Narrative Competition

The capture and removal of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by United States forces in early January 2026 has provided the Kremlin with a powerful rhetorical weapon.² Moscow has characterized this intervention as a “blatant armed intervention” and a return to the “might is right” principle of international relations.² By framing the U.S. actions in Venezuela as a violation of sovereign equality, Russia aims to consolidate its standing among Global South nations that are wary of Western interventionism. The MFA’s emphasis on “universal norms of international law” in the context of Venezuela is a calculated attempt to highlight perceived Western hypocrisy, particularly as Russia continues its own operations in Ukraine.²

Russia’s diplomatic reaction to the Venezuela crisis is not merely about solidarity with a fallen ally; it is a defensive maneuver intended to signal to other partners in the Latin American and Caribbean regions—specifically Cuba—that Moscow remains a vocal, if not physically capable, defender of their sovereignty against “external interference”.¹⁵ This narrative is further bolstered by China’s rejection of U.S. tariffs on Cuba and continued oil shipments from Mexico, suggesting a growing non-Western consensus against U.S. regional policy.¹⁵

Strategic Realignment in the Middle East: The UAE Nexus

The arrival of UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Moscow on January 29, 2026, marks a critical inflection point in Russia’s Middle Eastern strategy.¹⁷ The relationship has evolved into a “multi-vector power broker” dynamic, where the UAE serves as a vital economic and diplomatic conduit for the Russian state.¹⁸

Russia-UAE Economic Cooperation	Metric (Jan 2026 Data)	Strategic Significance
Annual Trade Volume	>$12 Billion	Record growth despite sanctions 19
Registered Russian Companies	~4,000	Hub for sanctions circumvention 20
Russian Capital in UAE Economy	>$30 Billion	Diversification of sovereign assets 20
EAEU-UAE Trade Status	97% Duty-Free	Facilitates non-commodity exports 20

The UAE is now recognized as Russia’s primary “economic lung,” providing the financial infrastructure necessary to bypass G7 sanctions and the Magnitsky Act.¹⁸ The “Iranian track” within this relationship is particularly notable; Moscow and Abu Dhabi are increasingly utilizing Hawala networks and cryptocurrency mixers to facilitate transactions that avoid the SWIFT messaging system, involving actors as varied as the Quds Force and the Central Bank of Russia.¹⁸ Beyond finance, the UAE has institutionalized its role as a mediator in the Ukraine conflict, facilitating high-stakes prisoner exchanges and serving as a “neutral ground” for trilateral dialogues involving the United States.¹⁸

The Sino-Russian Comprehensive Partnership

As 2026 begins, the Russia-China relationship is described by both Moscow and Beijing as having reached “unprecedented” levels of depth.² This year marks the 30th anniversary of their strategic partnership and the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.²² The military-to-military cooperation has become a cornerstone of regional stability from the Kremlin’s perspective, with defense ministers conducting regular high-level video talks to enhance strategic coordination on “core interests”.²²

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s New Year messages to President Putin emphasized a “concrete step” in the partnership, citing reciprocal visa-free policies and the steady progress of the energy corridor.²⁴ For Russia, the alignment with China is not just a secondary option to the West; it is the material base for the “Great Eurasian Partnership,” a project designed to create an “equal and indivisible security” architecture across the continent that excludes NATO influence.²

Mediation and Power Projection in the Levant and Iran

Russian diplomacy in the Levant and the Gulf is characterized by a “conservative force” approach, aiming to contain centrifugal processes and maintain the territorial integrity of established states like Syria and Iraq.¹⁷ In Syria, Russia is performing a delicate balancing act, withdrawing forces from Qamishli airport to build goodwill with the Damascus government while planning the expansion of its Hmeimim air base and Tartous naval facility.¹⁷ This move signals to the Syrian government that Russia will not be drawn into localized fighting with Kurdish forces as Damascus seeks to reassert central authority.²⁷

Regarding Iran, Russia has positioned itself as the only major power capable of mediating between Tehran and Washington.²⁸ The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty signed in January 2025 has granted Moscow significant leverage, including a proposed role in monitoring the Iranian nuclear enrichment cycle.²⁶ By advocating for the temporary removal of enriched uranium to Russian territory, Moscow seeks to prevent a military solution by the U.S. or Israel while securing its own position as an indispensable regional security actor.²⁶

Intelligence and National Security Assessment

The intelligence picture for the week ending January 31, 2026, reveals a Russian military that is structurally committed to a long-war logic, despite clear evidence of tactical stagnation and internal command friction.¹

Frontline Dynamics and Command Investigations

Russian offensive operations during this period have remained focused on the Donetsk and Zaporizhia sectors, with confirmed advances noted near Lyman and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.⁴ However, the pace of these advances remains historically slow, with troops progressing at rates as low as 15 to 70 meters per day.⁵

Combat Sector	Status/Observation	Intelligence Implication
Vovchansk Direction	Investigation into lack of progress	Potential relief of command for Northern Grouping 4
Kupyansk Sector	Exaggerated claims of success	Disconnect between Gerasimov’s reports and ground reality 4
Lyman Axis	Recent geolocated advances	Sustained pressure on Ukrainian logistics 4
Western Zaporizhia	Seizure of Lukyanivske	Attempt to widen the Orikhiv salient 4

The Russian General Staff continues to project an image of confident advancement, with Valery Gerasimov claiming significant successes near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.²⁹ However, field reports indicate a more complicated reality, including the presence of “forgotten” Russian units in northern Kupyansk who are reportedly being misled by their own command about terrain control to prevent their surrender.⁴ In the Vovchansk direction, the appointment of a commission to evaluate the lack of progress suggests that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces is under significant pressure to deliver results after months of static engagement.⁴

Infrastructure Strike Moratorium as Cognitive Warfare

The reported week-long moratorium on strikes against Kyiv’s energy infrastructure is a significant tactical development with deep strategic implications.⁴ While framed by the U.S. administration as a gesture of goodwill following a personal request from President Trump, intelligence analysts view the pause as a “cognitive warfare” maneuver.⁶

The mechanism of this moratorium serves three primary Russian interests:

1. Stockpile Replenishment: The pause allows Russian forces to amass drone and missile inventories for future combined strikes, effectively resetting their operational tempo.⁶
2. Political Signaling: It portrays the Kremlin as a “reasonable” actor capable of honoring requests from the U.S. presidency, thereby driving a wedge between various Western factions regarding the necessity of continued military support.⁶
3. Strategic Denial: By limiting the moratorium to a very short duration (until February 1) and rejecting any long-term ceasefire, the Kremlin ensures it maintains the ability to use energy strikes as a coercive tool during the harshest winter months.⁴

Technological Adaptation: Molniya Drones and Starlink

The Russian military’s rapid adoption of Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones represents a critical technological shift.⁶ These low-cost systems, now being equipped with Starlink satellite terminals, are being used for “battlefield air interdiction” (BAI).⁶ By targeting vehicles on Ukrainian highways at operational depths of 25 to 100 kilometers—specifically the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway—Russia is attempting to paralyze Ukrainian logistics and troop rotations far behind the immediate contact line.⁶

This technological evolution is paired with a strategic recruitment drive. The Ministry of Defense is actively recruiting for its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) at top Russian universities, offering massive salaries of up to 5.5 million rubles per year to students.⁶ This program targets both male and female students, indicating a desperate need to professionalize the drone operator corps and move away from reliance on poorly trained volunteers.⁶

Iskander Deployments and Escalation Capability

Satellite imagery from January 2026 has confirmed the establishment of at least nine new launch sites for Iskander missile systems near the Ukrainian border and in occupied Crimea.³⁰ These locations, including Klintsy and Molykino, feature fortified shelters and camouflaged hardware positions.³⁰

Iskander Launch Site Location	Status (Jan 2026)	Strategic Purpose
Shumakovo (Kursk)	Former base, unverified activity	Proximity to Sumy axis 30
Klintsy (Bryansk)	Fortified shelters identified	Threatening northern Ukrainian corridors 30
Molykino	Extensive permanent shelters	Primary deployment hub 30
Novoselivske (Crimea)	Active launch points	Strikes against southern logistics 30

The intelligence indicates that Russia conducted approximately 492 Iskander launches in 2025, and the current buildup suggests an intention to exceed this rate in 2026.³⁰ The flexibility of the Iskander-M and Iskander-K systems, capable of carrying at least seven different missile types, provides the Kremlin with a persistent “escalation ladder” that can be used to respond to any Western shifts in security guarantees.⁶

Economic Status and Fiscal Sustainability

The Russian economy in 2026 is described by analysts as moving from a “sugar rush” into “outright stagnation”.⁹ The fiscal deficit for 2025 reached $72 billion—five times the original forecast—forcing the Kremlin into a series of unpopular and restrictive economic measures.¹¹

The Emergence of “Tactical Poverty”

In the private sector, the term “tactical poverty” has become a shorthand for the survival strategies of Russian firms.⁸ As the government prioritizes defense spending (allocating 38% of the 2026 budget to security), civilian businesses are facing a severe credit crunch and falling demand.⁸

The primary mechanisms of “tactical poverty” include:

• Wage Indexation Freezes: Companies are no longer adjusting salaries for inflation, which remains high despite Central Bank efforts.⁸
• Bonus Reductions: Performance-based pay has been slashed across most sectors to preserve liquid capital.⁸
• Delayed Public Payments: In regional budgets dependent on federal transfers, wage payments to public sector workers are increasingly being deferred.⁸

This microeconomic contraction is a direct result of the Kremlin’s decision to maintain high interest rates (16%) to combat inflation, a policy that Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has acknowledged will hinder business activity throughout 2026.¹¹

Oil Revenue Collapse and Sanctions Efficacy

The week ending January 31, 2026, marks a critical low point for Russia’s energy sector. Oil and gas revenues for January are projected to decline by 46 percent year-on-year.⁸ This follows a 24 percent drop across 2025.⁸ The decline is attributed to a combination of falling global crude prices and the increased efficacy of U.S. sanctions targeting major entities like Rosneft and Lukoil.⁸

Energy Sector Metric	2024 Actual	2025 Estimated	Jan 2026 Forecast
Annual Oil/Gas Revenue	–	8.5 – 8.7 Trillion RUB	46% YoY Decline 8
Budget Deficit (% of GDP)	–	2.6%	Increasing 8
Planned Domestic Borrowing	–	–	$70.7 Billion (2026) 11

The widening discount on Russian crude—driven by the fact that nearly 70 percent of Russian exports are now under direct sanction—has severely limited the Kremlin’s ability to refill its “war coffers”.⁸ Consequently, the government has turned to the domestic population, raising the VAT to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026, and increasing minimum prices for alcohol (vodka reaching 409 rubles per bottle) to capture additional revenue from the lower and middle classes.⁹

BRICS Payment Rails and De-dollarization

To counter financial isolation, Russia is spearheading the development of a new BRICS payment system.³¹ The “blockchain-based architecture,” modeled after the BIS mBridge initiative, aims to link the digital ruble, yuan, and rupee.³¹

The strategic objective is to create a multilateral hub where “earned currencies” can circulate freely within the bloc, avoiding the “rupee trap” where Russian exporters were left with unusable balances of Indian currency.³² While legal harmonization and technical standards remain unresolved, the successful implementation of this system would provide a permanent alternative to the dollar-centric SWIFT network, potentially neutralizing one of the West’s most potent economic weapons.³¹

Domestic Policy and Internal Stability

The Kremlin’s domestic policy in late January 2026 is focused on total information control and the institutionalization of the war effort into everyday Russian life.¹²

The Digital Sovereignty Doctrine

The new version of the Information Security Doctrine, discussed at “InfoForum-2026,” represents a move toward total digital autarky.¹² Under this doctrine, Western IT technologies—including Starlink, mobile smartphones, and email services—are classified as instruments of “destructive influence”.¹²

The state now plans to exercise oversight over the creation and operation of all digital systems and AI “at all stages”.¹² This includes:

1. Legalized Preemptive Surveillance: The state can now justify the seizure of devices and data on “information security” grounds before any crime is committed.¹²
2. IT Sector Transformation: Independent IT development is effectively ending, as all code must be overseen by commissions from the FSB or the Security Council.¹² This is expected to accelerate the “brain drain” of Russia’s most talented programmers.¹²
3. Whitelisting the Internet: By 2028, the Kremlin envisions a “white list” system where Russian citizens can only access government-approved websites, mirroring the digital isolation models of North Korea or Turkmenistan.¹²

Mobilization and Social Control

The transition to year-round conscription, which began on January 1, 2026, allows the Russian military to maintain a constant pressure on the manpower pool.¹³ The military plans to conscript 261,000 men this year through a digital system that makes ignoring a summons nearly impossible.¹³ To manage the social fallout of this continuous mobilization, the Kremlin has also scrapped annual asset declarations for officials, a move that prevents the public from seeing how the elite are profiting from the war while the general population faces VAT hikes and rising utility costs.¹³

The Role of the Hawks: Ramzan Kadyrov

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov has emerged as a key signal of domestic pressure on the Kremlin.³⁴ By publicly urging Russia to reject peace talks and “fight to the finish,” Kadyrov serves to narrow the political space for any potential concessions during the high-stakes talks in the UAE.³⁴ His rhetoric reminds both the Russian public and foreign negotiators that any leader attempting to compromise faces resistance from powerful internal constituencies who frame the war as existential.⁶ Kadyrov’s stance is a calculated move to ensure that if negotiations do proceed, they do so under the shadow of a domestic demand for total victory.³⁴

Hybrid Warfare and Regional Destabilization

Russia’s “Phase Zero” operations—informational and psychological condition-setting for future conflict—have intensified across Europe in late January 2026.⁶

Baltic Vulnerabilities and Cyber Sabotage

The Latvian Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) reported that 2025 saw an all-time high in Russian cyber threats, with Moscow now viewing Latvia through a lens “eerily reminiscent” of its attitude toward Ukraine before 2022.³⁵

Baltic Hybrid Threat Profile	Mechanism	Strategic Goal
Election Interference	Propaganda and AI-generated content	Fracturing Western unity during 2026 elections 35
Operational Technology (OT) Attacks	Targeting energy and water systems	Proving vulnerability of NATO infrastructure 35
“Phase Zero” Balloons	Airspace violations in Lithuania/Poland	Testing NATO air defense response times 6
Cognitive Warfare	Discrediting pro-EU referendums	Undermining democratic legitimacy 35

The intelligence identifies a surge in Russian preparations for cyber-attacks targeting Industrial Control Systems (ICS) across Western Europe.³⁵ The Norwegian dam incident in April 2025, where hackers manipulated water pass-through levels, is cited as a template for future Russian-linked sabotage aimed at intimidating populations that support Ukraine.³⁵

The 2026 Winter Olympics Threat Model

As the Milano Cortina Games approach, the exclusion of Russia from the global stage has removed the traditional guardrails that once protected such events.³⁸ Intelligence suggests the Kremlin views the IOC not as a sports regulator, but as a political actor within a wider geopolitical framework.³⁸

Predicted hybrid scenarios for the 2026 Games include:

• Kinetic Cyber Effects: Malware targeting power grids in the Dolomites and snow-making equipment to cause physical disruption.³⁸
• VMS Hijacking: Taking control of variable message signs on transit routes to weaponize traffic patterns and cause gridlock.³⁸
• Weaponized Transparency: Strategic “hack-and-leak” operations targeting the private emails of anti-doping officials and high-profile attendees to manufacture scandals.³⁸

Defense Diplomacy and the Sarma MLRS

In a calculated geopolitical signaling maneuver, the Kremlin and Rostec have scheduled the debut of the Sarma MLRS at the World Defense Show in Riyadh in February 2026.³⁹ The Sarma is a high-mobility, precision-guided system designed specifically for the “transparent battlefields” of the 21st century.³⁹

The debut in Saudi Arabia serves multiple Russian interests:

1. Commercial Lifeline: Capturing a portion of the $12.3 billion global MLRS market to fund the defense industrial base.³⁹
2. Sanctions Bypass: Establishing new procurement fronts that avoid SWIFT by operating on “neutral ground”.³⁹
3. Technological Signaling: Demonstrating the integration of drone swarms via encrypted mesh networks for real-time targeting, challenging current NATO hybrid response frameworks.³⁹

Conclusion and Strategic Forecast

The Russian Federation at the end of January 2026 is a state fully reoriented toward a permanent state of high-intensity competition with the West. The “strategic continuum” identified in the Florida talks suggests that the Kremlin no longer expects a quick resolution to the war, but rather a long-term grinding down of Western resolve through a combination of military attrition, economic diversification via the UAE and China, and aggressive hybrid warfare.¹

The economic stressors—specifically the 46 percent collapse in energy revenue and the emergence of “tactical poverty”—are significant but currently insufficient to force a change in the Kremlin’s fundamental strategic logic.⁸ Instead, these pressures are being managed through increased domestic repression, year-round mobilization, and the creation of a “digital iron curtain”.¹²

In the coming weeks, the most critical indicators will be:

• The Termination of the Energy Strike Moratorium: On February 1, the resumption or extension of strikes against Kyiv will signal the Kremlin’s current assessment of its relationship with the U.S. administration.⁴
• The Vovchansk Command Investigation: Any relief of commanders in the Northern Grouping will provide insight into the level of internal desperation for a battlefield breakthrough.⁴
• The Evolution of the BRICS Payment System: Any concrete progress in the digital ruble-yuan settlement infrastructure will represent a major strategic victory for Moscow’s long-term financial resilience.³¹

For the professional peer group, the analytical priority remains the distinction between Russian diplomatic “theatre” and structural strategic change. While meetings in Florida, the UAE, and Riyadh proliferate, the underlying structure of the conflict remains stubbornly fixed on Moscow’s maximalist objectives.¹

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As the Russian Federation navigates the mid-2020s, the regime of Vladimir Putin has defied initial Western prognostications of imminent collapse. Through a combination of institutional re-engineering, economic adaptation, and intensified repression, the Kremlin has successfully transitioned the state from a hybrid authoritarian model into a fully consolidated personalist dictatorship, specifically calibrated for the demands of a “long war.” This report provides an exhaustive foreign affairs analysis of the machinery of this survival. It argues that Putin’s grip on power is maintained not by a single pillar, but by a complex, interlocking system of “Military Keynesianism,” elite management through predation (“deprivatization”), the construction of a hermetic “sovereign information space,” and the forging of a new, grim social contract with the periphery based on the monetization of war.

The analysis draws upon extensive data from 2024 and 2025 to illustrate that while the regime faces severe long-term structural entropy—manifesting in demographic collapse, economic overheating, and technological degradation—its short-to-medium-term stability is secured. The 2020 constitutional amendments provided the legal scaffolding for an indefinite presidency; the 2024–2025 purges of the Ministry of Defense disciplined the coercive apparatus; and the pivot to a war economy has paradoxically raised living standards for the regime’s core base in the poorer regions. However, this stability is brittle, reliant on the continuous cannibalization of the civilian future to feed the military present.

I. The Institutional Architecture of the “Long State”

The longevity of Vladimir Putin’s tenure is not merely a result of ad-hoc political maneuvering but has been systematically codified into the supreme law of the Russian Federation. The transition to the current configuration of power, often referred to by Kremlin ideologues as the “Long State,” began with the 2020 Constitutional Amendments. These reforms were not cosmetic; they fundamentally dismantled the remaining checks and balances of the post-Soviet system and formalized the “President Writ Large” system, creating a legal bedrock that allows for the indefinite perpetuation of the current leadership.¹

1.1 The Nullification of Time: The “Zeroing” Mechanism

The cornerstone of Putin’s current legitimacy is the “zeroing out” (obnuleniye) of his presidential terms, a legal maneuver executed during the 2020 constitutional reform. While Article 81 of the 1993 Constitution previously limited the presidency to two consecutive terms, the amendment championed by Valentina Tereshkova reset the clock, allowing Putin to contest the 2024 and 2030 elections, theoretically remaining in power until 2036.²

This legalistic sleight of hand served a dual strategic purpose essential for regime stability. First, it resolved the “2024 problem”—the risk of Putin becoming a lame duck as his term approached its end. In authoritarian systems, a known end-date for a leader creates a horizon of uncertainty that encourages elites to look for successors, fostering instability and factionalism. By creating the legal possibility of an indefinite presidency, the Kremlin forced the elite to abandon succession planning and refocus their loyalty entirely on the incumbent.³ Second, it signaled to the bureaucracy and the broader population that the current course was not a temporary deviation but a permanent state of affairs. The reforms were immediately followed by a crackdown on the opposition, most notably the Alexei Navalny affair, which signaled that the era of “systemic” tolerance was definitively over.²

The implications of this move extend beyond the person of the president. It effectively suspended the operation of political time in Russia, replacing the cyclical nature of electoral politics with a linear trajectory of “stability” defined solely by the physical longevity of the ruler. This “forever regime” logic now permeates all levels of governance, where long-term planning is substituted by immediate regime preservation.

1.2 The “President Writ Large”: The Destruction of Separation of Powers

The 2020 amendments did more than extend Putin’s tenure; they fundamentally restructured the executive branch to concentrate management power directly in the hands of the President, effectively creating a “super-presidency.” The reforms constitutionalized the President’s dominance over the government, granting him the unilateral authority to remove the Prime Minister and any other ministers.⁵ This clause is critical: historically, the Prime Minister could act as a potential alternative center of gravity or a designated successor. By making the Premier firing-proof only to the Parliament but instantly dismissible by the President, the constitution reduced the head of government to a high-level administrator.

Furthermore, the reform marginalized the legislative and judicial branches to a degree unseen since the Soviet era. The Constitutional Court, previously a theoretically independent arbiter capable of striking down laws, was reformed to reduce its autonomy. The number of judges was reduced, and the President gained the power to initiate their dismissal, effectively ending judicial independence.⁶

Perhaps most significantly for the internal structure of the Russian Federation, the concept of a “United System of Public Power” was introduced. This provision effectively abolished the autonomy of local self-government—a right previously guaranteed by the constitution—and integrated municipal authorities directly into the vertical of federal power.⁶ This centralization ensured that no alternative center of power—regional, municipal, or institutional—could emerge to challenge the Kremlin from below. The mayors of major cities, historically potential independent political figures, were transformed into lower-tier appointees within the presidential vertical.

1.3 The State Council: A Parallel Structure of Control

Another innovation of the constitutional reform was the elevation of the State Council (Gossovet) to a constitutional body.² Initially, observers speculated this might be a retirement vehicle for Putin, allowing him to rule “from behind the scenes” like Kazakhstan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev. However, with the “zeroing” option exercised, the State Council has instead evolved into a mechanism for enforcing the federal will upon regional governors.

The State Council, which includes regional governors and top federal officials, serves as a forum where collective responsibility is enforced. By implicating all regional leaders in federal decision-making, the Kremlin ensures that blame for unpopular policies can be dispersed, while credit for stability is concentrated at the top. It serves as a mechanism of “mutual hostage-taking,” where regional elites are bound to the federal center not just by budget transfers, but by direct constitutional subordination in decision-making processes regarding “unified public power.” This structure is pivotal in managing the 85+ regions of Russia, preventing the centrifugal forces that tore apart the Soviet Union from re-emerging during the stress of the current war.

II. The Praetorian Guard and the Management of Violence

If the Constitution provides the legal framework, the Siloviki—the “people of force”—provide the tangible muscle that keeps the regime intact. The Russian Federation has evolved into a “hard” authoritarian system shading toward a “soft” dictatorship, where the security services dominate all branches of power.⁷ However, maintaining control over the men with guns requires a delicate balance of empowerment and repression to prevent any single faction from becoming a threat—a lesson painfully learned during the Prigozhin mutiny of 2023. The events of 2024 and 2025 demonstrate a sophisticated strategy of “purging the loyal” to ensure “super-loyalty.”

2.1 The Ascendancy of the Security State and the FSB

The Siloviki network, comprising alumni of the KGB and its successors (FSB, SVR, FSO), controls virtually all key positions in the Russian government and economy.⁸ This group, historically led by figures like Nikolai Patrushev, dominates the President’s agenda, fueling anxieties about Western threats and justifying internal repression.⁹ The Federal Security Service (FSB) has effectively become a “state within a state,” responsible for monitoring the elite as much as the opposition.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the influence of the Siloviki has expanded into every crevice of Russian life. The FSB has adopted an “all-hands-on-deck” approach, shifting resources from counter-terrorism to counter-intelligence and regime security.¹⁰ This shift has transformed the agency into the primary arbiter of political reliability. The FSB’s Second Service (Service for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism) has been instrumental in crushing domestic dissent, while its economic security departments oversee the redistribution of assets, ensuring that the “new nobility” remains dependent on the chekists for their wealth.

By mid-2025, the intensity of this repression was quantifiable: treason prosecutions soared to 760 verdicts, and the national “List of Terrorists and Extremists” surged to over 18,000 names, including more than 150 children. This statistical explosion reflects a system where “national security” laws are weaponized to criminalize any form of dissent, effectively creating a dragnet that ensnares not just activists but ordinary citizens.

Furthermore, the creation of the National Guard (Rosgvardia), a praetorian force answerable directly to Putin, has insulated the President from potential disloyalty within the regular military or police. By taking over functions previously held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Rosgvardia serves as the ultimate guarantee against a palace coup or mass unrest.¹¹ This diversification of the coercive apparatus—balancing the FSB against the MVD, and the Army against Rosgvardia—is a classic autocratic survival strategy to prevent any single security chief from becoming a “kingmaker.”

2.2 The 2024–2025 Ministry of Defense Purge: Disciplinary Terror

A critical mechanism of Putin’s control is the periodic rotation and purging of the elite to prevent the accumulation of independent power bases. This was most visible in the dramatic restructuring of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) starting in April 2024 and continuing into 2025.

Following the dismissal of long-time Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, the Kremlin launched a sweeping anti-corruption purge against the MoD’s top brass. This was not merely a reaction to the failures in Ukraine, but a calculated political decapitation. High-ranking officials, including Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Popov and others associated with the “Shoigu clan,” were arrested on fraud charges.¹ The purge extended deep into the ministry, with six of Shoigu’s deputies fired and three taken into custody.¹

This move served multiple strategic ends:

1. Disruption of Patronage Networks: By dismantling the “Shoigu clan,” Putin prevented the military leadership from becoming an autonomous political force. The legacy of the Prigozhin mutiny was the realization that a charismatic or autonomous military leader poses an existential threat.¹³ The purge effectively atomized the military elite, reminding them that their positions are revocable at any moment.
2. Efficiency for the “Long War”: The appointment of Andrei Belousov, an economist and statist technocrat, as Defense Minister signaled a paradigm shift toward “Military Keynesianism” (discussed in Section III). The Kremlin recognized that the rampant corruption of the Shoigu era, while useful for buying loyalty in peace, was a liability in a protracted war of attrition. Belousov’s mandate was to optimize the war economy, ensuring that the trillions of rubles poured into defense actually resulted in hardware rather than yachts.¹²
3. Elite Discipline: The arrests shattered the unspoken rule of the Putin era that high-ranking federal ministers were “untouchable” as long as they remained loyal. By targeting the very top of the military hierarchy, the Kremlin sent a chilling message to all elite groups: loyalty alone is no longer sufficient protection; absolute competence and subservience are required. No one is safe, and every official is potentially “on the hook” for past transgressions.¹

2.3 Post-Prigozhin Fragmentation of Violence

The aftermath of the Wagner Group rebellion in 2023 necessitated a fundamental restructuring of Russia’s irregular forces. The Kremlin moved to ensure that no private army could ever again challenge the state’s monopoly on violence. The Wagner Group’s assets were fragmented and absorbed by loyalist structures: the National Guard (Rosgvardia), the GRU (military intelligence), and the “Akhmat” special forces loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov.¹⁴

This fragmentation ensures that while the state retains the capabilities of irregular warfare—crucial for operations in the “Grey Zone” in Africa or the Sahel—the command and control are firmly reintegrated into the state hierarchy. The “Africa Corps,” formed to replace Wagner in the Sahel, operates under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Defense.¹⁵ The GRU, despite suffering significant setbacks and expulsions of spies in Europe, has reasserted control over these foreign operations, replacing the charismatic but dangerous leadership of Prigozhin with faceless bureaucratic oversight.¹⁰

This restructuring highlights the regime’s adaptability. It identified a systemic vulnerability—the autonomy of proxy forces—and ruthlessly eliminated it, even at the cost of some operational effectiveness. The priority remains regime security over military efficiency; a loyal, fragmented military is preferable to a highly effective but autonomous one.

III. The Political Economy of Total War: “Military Keynesianism”

Perhaps the most surprising factor in Putin’s survival has been the resilience of the Russian economy. Despite unprecedented Western sanctions, the regime has maintained stability through a specific economic model that analysts have termed “Military Keynesianism.” By flooding the economy with defense spending, the Kremlin has generated artificial growth, reduced unemployment to record lows, and bought social peace, albeit at the cost of long-term overheating and structural imbalance.

3.1 The Stimulus of War

The Russian economy in 2025 is characterized by a massive, government-led wartime spending spree. Government demand, driven by the existential need to produce tanks, shells, drones, and equipment, has pushed economic activity to an unsustainable rate.¹⁶ This spending has had a massive multiplier effect across the entire economy:

• Defense Sector Boom: The defense industry has become the engine of the economy, now employing approximately 3.8 million people. Between 2023 and mid-2024 alone, the sector absorbed 600,000 workers, sucking talent and labor from the civilian economy.¹⁶
• The “Wage Race”: To attract workers to 24/7 defense plants, salaries in the sector have spiked by 20–60%. This has forced civilian sectors—retail, construction, logistics—to drastically raise wages to compete for the dwindling pool of workers. This “wage race” has increased the nominal disposable income of the population, effectively shielding many Russians from the inflation caused by sanctions.¹⁷ For the average worker, the war has paradoxically led to a period of financial abundance, creating a “war bonus” that secures their support for the regime.
• Regional Redistribution: The war has acted as a mechanism for redistributing wealth from the center (Moscow/St. Petersburg) to the poorer industrial periphery. Regions with heavy military-industrial facilities, such as the Urals and the Volga region, have seen explosive growth in retail turnover and investment.¹⁶

3.2 The Costs of Overheating: Inflation and Labor Shortages

This economic model faces severe, perhaps terminal, constraints. The economy is “overheating,” meaning demand vastly outstrips the capacity to produce. The primary bottleneck is labor. With an unemployment rate near a record low of 2.4%, Russia faces a “perfect storm” of worker deficits caused by demographic decline (the small generation of the 1990s entering the workforce), the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of men, and the emigration of skilled professionals.¹⁶

To combat the resulting inflation (which reached 9% by late 2024 and remains high in 2025), the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), led by the technocratic Elvira Nabiullina, was forced to raise interest rates to a punishing 21% in 2025.¹⁶ This creates a classic “guns vs. butter” tension: the high interest rates crush the civilian economy and private business, which cannot afford to borrow at such rates, while the defense sector, subsidized by the state budget and preferential loans, continues to consume resources. The regime is effectively cannibalizing its future civil economy—investment, innovation, small business—to feed the current war effort.¹⁶

3.3 Dependence on China and the “Renminbi-zation”

Western sanctions, while failing to collapse the Russian economy, have fundamentally altered its geopolitical orientation. By 2025, sanctions have driven Russia out of the dollar-dominated financial system and into the arms of Beijing. China has become Russia’s largest trading partner and economic lifeline. The two nations now settle the vast majority of their trade in renminbi.¹⁶

This relationship is structurally asymmetrical: Russia provides discounted energy and raw materials to China, while China supplies the machinery, electronics, semiconductors, and vehicles necessary to keep the Russian economy running. Chinese brands now hold over 60% of the Russian auto market, replacing Western manufacturers.¹⁶ This dependence secures the regime against Western economic strangulation but subordinates Russia’s long-term economic sovereignty to Chinese interests. Russia is becoming a resource appendage of the Chinese economy, but for Putin, this is an acceptable price for survival. The “Pivot to the East” has provided the necessary inputs to keep the factories running and the shops stocked, preventing the shortages that could trigger social unrest.¹⁶

3.4 The Digital Leash: The Digital Ruble

To further cement control over the economy and its citizens, the Kremlin is preparing the full government rollout of the Digital Ruble in 2026. Unlike standard currency, this central bank digital currency (CBDC) introduces the concept of “programmable” money. State employees and welfare recipients will receive payments in digital rubles that can be tracked in real-time. This system grants the state unprecedented surveillance capabilities and the power to restrict spending based on “behavioral loyalty,” potentially blocking accounts without a court order if a citizen is deemed “unreliable”. This transition represents a shift from a purely economic survival strategy to a tool of totalitarian social control.

IV. The Redefinition of the Social Contract: “Deathonomics” and Regional Buying Power

The regime’s stability relies not just on the elite, but on the acquiescence of the broader population. The war has reshaped the social contract, particularly for Russia’s poorer regions, transforming the conflict from a burden into a perverse economic opportunity.

4.1 “Deathonomics”: The Monetization of Casualties

In the poorest and most remote regions of Russia, such as the Republic of Tyva and Buryatia, the war has become a primary economic driver. The combination of high federal and regional sign-on bonuses (often exceeding 1 million rubles in some regions) and massive insurance payouts for injuries or death (“KIA payouts”) has led to an explosion in household bank deposits and consumption.¹⁶

This phenomenon, grimly termed “Deathonomics,” creates a perverse incentive structure where the war effectively mitigates deep-seated poverty. In Tyva, despite having the highest war death rate per capita in the entire country, the region has experienced a 190% growth in fixed investment and a 74% growth in retail turnover.¹⁶ Families of the fallen receive sums equivalent to decades of peacetime earnings, allowing them to buy apartments, cars, and pay off debts.

By monetizing the bodies of its citizens, the Kremlin has transformed the war from a tragedy into an economic lifeline for the most marginalized segments of society. This secures their loyalty—or at least their silence—through financial dependency. The “coffin money” circulating in these regions acts as a potent stimulus, buying complicity from the very populations that are suffering the highest losses. This strategy cynically exploits the economic desperation of the periphery to fuel the imperial ambitions of the center.

4.2 Federal Debt Relief as a Subsidization of War

To sustain this regional spending, the federal government implemented a program in late 2024 allowing lower-income regional governments to write off up to two-thirds of their debt. In exchange, regions must direct the freed-up funds toward social expenditures and “national projects”—which in practice often means funding the war effort, including recruitment bonuses and social support for veterans.¹⁶

This creates a fiscal mechanism where Moscow effectively subsidizes the regions’ participation in the war without directly bearing the entire upfront cost on the federal balance sheet. It allows governors to offer competitive bonuses to volunteers without bankrupting their regional budgets immediately. It creates a unified financial front where every level of government is fiscally invested in the continuation of the war.

4.3 The “New Elite”: Veterans and the “Time of Heroes” Program

Putin has explicitly declared the participants of the “Special Military Operation” (SVO) to be the country’s “new elite,” stating they should replace the “so-called elites” of the 1990s whom he views as insufficiently patriotic.²⁰ To operationalize this, the Kremlin launched the “Time of Heroes” program, designed to train and insert war veterans into positions of power within the public administration.²¹

However, the implementation of this program reveals the limits of Putin’s social engineering. While the rhetoric is soaring, the actual number of veterans appointed to high office remains relatively low compared to the scale of the war—only about 60 had been appointed to federal or regional positions by late 2025, and only 168 were admitted to the program out of 65,000 applicants.²¹ Most appointees are placed in symbolic roles or middle-management positions where they can serve as “political commissars” rather than effective administrators.

Nevertheless, the political symbolism is potent. United Russia nominated over 1,600 war participants in regional elections, integrating the “war party” directly into the political fabric.²³ This militarization of the civil service aims to create a cadre of officials whose primary loyalty is forged in blood and shared complicity in the war, acting as a buffer against the more liberal or technocratic elements of the bureaucracy. It signals to the ambitious youth that the path to upward mobility now runs through the trenches of Ukraine, further militarizing Russian society.

V. The Predatory State: Asset Redistribution and Elite Discipline

To maintain power, an autocrat must constantly reward loyalty and punish dissent. In 2024–2025, Putin fundamentally altered the unwritten social contract with the Russian elite, moving from a model of “enrichment through stability” to “enrichment through predation and redistribution.”

5.1 “Deprivatization”: The Nationalization of Assets

A major trend in 2025 has been the “deprivatization” or nationalization of private assets. The state has actively seized private companies, citing “privatization violations” from the 1990s, corruption, or “ties to unfriendly countries”.²⁴ In 2025 alone, the value of assets transferred to state ownership exceeded 3 trillion rubles, a 4.5-fold increase from the previous year.²⁴

Targeted assets include strategic enterprises in ports, fishing, and mining. Specific cases include the seizure of Metafrax, Russia’s largest methanol producer, from Forbes listee Seyfeddin Rustamov, under the pretext that the original privatization was illegal and the owner had foreign ties.²⁶ Other targets have included major pasta producers (Makfa), automotive dealerships (Rolf), and ferroalloy plants.²⁶

Crucially, these assets rarely remain in state hands. They are quickly resold or transferred to “investors loyal to the Kremlin,” effectively redistributing wealth from the old oligarchs (or those who tried to remain neutral) to a new class of state-aligned cronies and “state-preneurs”.²⁴ This process serves as a powerful disciplinary tool: any asset can be seized if the owner wavers in their support for the war, and immense wealth awaits those who serve the regime’s new priorities. The “statute of limitations” on privatization deals has been effectively abolished by the Constitutional Court, meaning no property right is secure.²⁴

5.2 The End of the Oligarchic Pact

This redistribution marks the end of the post-Soviet oligarchic pact, where wealth was tolerated as long as it did not interfere in politics. Now, wealth is conditional on active participation in the war effort. Oligarchs are forced to walk a “wartime tightrope”: they must contribute to the war effort (through taxes, “voluntary” contributions, or direct support) to avoid nationalization at home, while trying to avoid Western sanctions abroad—a nearly impossible task that traps them in Russia.²⁷ The result is the consolidation of a nationalized elite that has no exit strategy and is therefore inextricably tied to the regime’s survival.

VI. The Cognitive Fortress: Information Sovereignty and Ideology

Control over the information space has shifted from “management” to “isolation” and “indoctrination.” The Kremlin is actively building a “Sovereign Internet” and a new state ideology to immunize the population against Western narratives and create a hermetically sealed cognitive environment.

6.1 The Sovereign Internet and TSPU

Russia is moving toward full digital isolation, building what analysts call a “Digital Iron Curtain.” The legal and technical framework for this is the “Sovereign Internet” law, implemented via “Technical Solutions for Threat Countermeasures” (TSPU)—Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment installed directly on the networks of all telecom operators.²⁸

Key developments in 2024–2025 include:

• Throttling and Blocking: The TSPU infrastructure allows Roskomnadzor (the federal censor) to throttle or block traffic centrally, bypassing local providers. This capability was demonstrated in July 2024 when the state artificially degraded YouTube speeds to near-unusable levels to push users toward domestic alternatives like VK Video and Rutube.²⁸
• VPN War: The state has engaged in a game of “whack-a-mole” with VPN services, blocking protocols (like OpenVPN and WireGuard) to prevent citizens from accessing independent information. By 2025, users faced increasing difficulties with encrypted calls on WhatsApp and Telegram, signaling a move toward controlling even private communications.²⁹
• Cost of Access: The requirements to install data storage (Yarovaya Law) and surveillance equipment have driven up the cost of internet access, further centralizing control in the hands of a few compliant state-linked operators.¹⁹

6.2 The “Pentabase” and Engineered Ideology

The regime has moved beyond non-ideological pragmatism to construct a “scientific conservatism” designed to indoctrinate the next generation. This effort is spearheaded by Sergei Kiriyenko, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration. The new ideological framework, often referred to as the “Pentabase,” is taught in universities through the mandatory “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” course.³¹

The ideology is defined by:

• Civilizational Distinctness: Russia is framed not as a nation-state but as a unique “State-Civilization” distinct from, superior to, and historically hostile to the “decaying” West.³² This concept allows the regime to reject universal human rights as Western constructs inapplicable to Russia.
• The DNA of Russia: A project overseen by Kremlin political technologists produces content to reinforce these themes. The “Pentabase” of values consists of: Patriotism, Trust (in the state), Tradition, Solidarity, and Creativity.³⁴ These values are presented as the “genetic code” of Russian society, with the implicit message that opposition to the state is a violation of one’s own nature.
• Narrative Control: The “DNA of Russia” project has produced over 79 videos framing the war as a defensive struggle against a “satanic” or “corrupt” West.³³

This ideological conditioning is not limited to classrooms. The “Movement of the First,” a state-run youth organization, has begun integrating Russian youth into the geopolitical bloc of autocracies. In a grim signal of this alignment, the movement facilitated exchanges with North Korea in 2024–2025, sending Russian schoolchildren to the Songdowon camp to serve as “ambassadors” of the new order. This project aims to create a “new intelligentsia” loyal to the regime, replacing the liberal-leaning educated class that has largely emigrated or been silenced.³⁵

VII. The Rituals of Legitimacy: Elections and the Systemic Opposition

While Russia is a personalist dictatorship, it retains the external rituals of democracy to generate legitimacy and demonstrate the “unity” of the nation. However, the function of these institutions has changed from contestation to acclamation.

7.1 The Neutering of Systemic Opposition

The traditional “systemic opposition”—the Communist Party (CPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR)—has been completely co-opted and neutralized. In the 2024 presidential elections and subsequent 2025 regional votes, these parties offered no real challenge to Putin or United Russia.³⁶

The death of LDPR founder Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 2022 removed a key charismatic figure who, while loyal, could occasionally channel populist anger. His successor, Leonid Slutsky, is a grey functionary who lacks any independent base. Similarly, the CPRF, under the aging Gennady Zyuganov, has been forced to fully endorse the war, stripping it of its traditional role as a venue for protest votes. The crackdown on any deviation from the “patriotic consensus” has turned these parties into mere appendages of the Kremlin, useful only for channeling harmless grievances and signaling a veneer of pluralism.³⁷

Looking ahead to the 2026 State Duma elections, the Kremlin is already tightening electoral legislation to ensure no systemic shocks occur, treating the upcoming vote as a logistical stress test for the regime’s administrative machine rather than a political contest. The authorities are preparing for a scenario where lack of competition is absolute, even at the lowest levels.

7.2 Elections as Administrative Stress Tests

Elections in 2024 and 2025 served not as contests for power but as administrative stress tests for the regional bureaucracy. The “referendum-style” voting confirms the ability of the regional governors to deliver the required numbers and turnout.

United Russia’s dominance in the 2025 regional elections, securing 81% of seats in regional capitals and creating “monoparliaments” in cities like Magadan, demonstrates the total mobilization of administrative resources.³⁸ The extensive use of Remote Electronic Voting (DEG) has made the falsification of results easier and harder to detect, allowing the Kremlin to dial in the exact margins of victory it desires. These “elections” serve to demonstrate the futility of resistance to the population and the efficacy of the administrative machine to the Kremlin.

VIII. Strategic Horizons and Structural Entropy

As of 2026, Vladimir Putin remains in power not through inertia, but through a highly active, multi-layered strategy of regime preservation. He has constructed a “Fortress Russia” designed to withstand a long war. However, this stability is purchased at the cost of the country’s future.

8.1 The Paradox of Stability

The analysis indicates that the immediate threats to Putin’s power—elite coup, popular uprising, or economic collapse—have been effectively neutralized for the near term.

• Legally, he is secure until 2036.
• Militarily, the “Siloviki” are disciplined and fragmented.
• Economically, “Military Keynesianism” has bought social peace.
• Socially, the “long war” has been normalized.

8.2 Structural Fragilities

However, the system faces deep structural entropy that threatens its medium-to-long-term viability:

• Economic Exhaustion: The “overheating” of the economy cannot be sustained indefinitely. The depletion of the National Welfare Fund (NWF) and the cannibalization of the civilian sector will eventually lead to stagflation or a collapse in living standards once the war spending inevitably slows.¹⁶
• Demographic Collapse: The war has accelerated Russia’s demographic decline, removing hundreds of thousands of young men from the workforce and discouraging family formation. This creates a labor shortage that no amount of Chinese technology can fix.¹⁶
• Elite Fatigue: While currently repressed, the elite is acutely aware that their wealth and safety are contingent on the whim of one man. The “deprivatization” campaign has destroyed property rights, creating a latent demand for the rule of law that may resurface during a transition crisis.

In conclusion, Putin remains in power by transforming Russia into a machine solely dedicated to regime preservation and total war. The system is stable only as long as the war continues to justify the repression and fuel the economy; it has likely lost the ability to function in peacetime. Thus, the “long war” is not just a foreign policy goal but a domestic necessity for the regime’s survival. The Kremlin has burned the bridges back to the pre-2022 world, leaving it with only one direction: forward, into a deepening authoritarianism and reliance on the conflict to sustain its legitimacy.

Statistical Appendix: Key Indicators of Regime Stability (2025)

Indicator	Value/Status	Implication	Source
Presidential Term Limit	Reset to Zero	Putin eligible until 2036	2
Key Interest Rate	16.5% – 21%	Combatting high inflation/overheating	16
Unemployment Rate	~2.4%	Severe labor shortage; full employment	16
Defense Sector Employment	3.8 Million	High dependency on war spending	16
Asset Seizures (2025)	>3 Trillion Rubles	Redistribution to loyalists	24
Treason Prosecutions	760 Verdicts	Intense repression of dissent
Terrorist List Size	18,000+ Names	Broad criminalization of opposition
United Russia Regional Share	81% of seats	Total political monopoly	38
Internet Status	YouTube throttled, VPNs blocked	“Sovereign Internet” operational	30

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