Tag Archives: AK-47

I’ve owned and built a number of AK-47 pattern rifles over the years and slowly one of my favorite series are the ones from Zastava when they were part of Yugoslavia partly because they are unique. Now, that opens the door – why were they unique? There is some very interesting history behind that and so let’s dive into this further. This first piece will set the stage by explaining why the Soviets didn’t share their AK-47 rifles or designs with Yugoslavia so let’s dive in.

I. Introduction: A Strained Fraternity and a Strategic Weapon

In the shadow of World War II, a brotherhood forged in shared ideology between the Soviet Union (СССР – Soyuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik) and the newly minted Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (ФНРЈ – Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija) was destined for a dramatic unraveling. What began as a seemingly tight-knit alliance, cemented by the fight against fascism, quickly soured, descending into a bitter schism by 1948. A cautious, often fraught, attempt at reconciliation in the post-Stalin years would follow, but the scars of division ran deep.¹ This turbulent political saga inevitably cast a long shadow over every aspect of their relationship, particularly in the sensitive arena of military cooperation.

At the heart of the Soviet Union’s rapidly expanding military and geopolitical might lay a revolutionary piece of hardware: the Avtomat Kalashnikova obraztsa 1947 goda (Автомат Калашникова образца 1947 года), the AK-47. Officially entering service in 1949, this assault rifle didn’t just arm Soviet soldiers; it became a potent symbol of Moscow’s technological prowess and a key instrument of its foreign policy.³ The Kremlin wielded the AK-47, and especially the rights to produce it, with calculated precision, using its distribution to reward allies and exert influence.⁴ Whether a nation received this coveted weapon, or its blueprints, became a telling barometer of its standing in Moscow’s eyes.

Yugoslavia, by the close of 1959, found itself on the outside looking in, denied both the AK-47 and its designs. This wasn’t a simple oversight. It was the culmination of a complex web of factors, chief among them the deep-seated animosity stemming from the 1948 Tito-Stalin split. That seismic event saw Yugoslavia unceremoniously booted from the Cominform (Информбиро / Informbiro – Информационное бюро коммунистических и рабочих партий / Informatsionnoye byuro kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partiy), the Soviet-led bloc of communist parties, and subjected to a barrage of political and economic pressure.¹ This rupture forced Belgrade to chart a new course.

The plot thickened as Yugoslavia embraced an independent, non-aligned stance on the world stage, a move that saw it increasingly reliant on military aid from the West, particularly the United States. Moscow, meanwhile, maintained a tight grip on its arms exports, prioritizing nations that toed the ideological line. Adding another layer to this complex dynamic was Yugoslavia’s own burgeoning ambition to build its own weapons, a drive that would eventually see the Zastava (Застава Оружје / Zastava Oružje) arms factory successfully reverse-engineer the very AK-47s it couldn’t officially obtain. The story of the unshared rifle is thus a tale of clashing ideologies, geopolitical chess, and one nation’s determined, and ultimately successful, quest for self-reliance in a world divided.

II. From Alliance to Animosity and Uneasy Reconciliation: Soviet-Yugoslav Political Dynamics (1945-1959)

A. Post-War Comradeship and Emerging Fissures (1945-1948)

The early days after World War II painted a picture of camaraderie between Moscow and Belgrade. United by communist ideology and their recent joint struggle against the Axis, the Soviet Union and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia seemed natural partners. A formal Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, inked in Moscow (Москва / Moskva) on April 11, 1945, by delegations headed by Josip Broz Tito (Јосип Броз Тито) himself, appeared to seal this bond.¹ The USSR officially recognized the new Yugoslav state on December 19, 1945, and Belgrade even became the headquarters for the Cominform in 1946, further underscoring the initial closeness.¹

Soviet aid flowed into war-torn Yugoslavia: vital food supplies, assistance in repatriating prisoners of war, and the deployment of Soviet technical and military advisors.⁸ Soviet experts even helped organize Tito’s personal security detail.⁸ On the economic front, joint ventures like the “Juspad” (пароходство «Юспад») shipping company and the “Justa” (ЮСТА – Югославско-советское акционерное общество гражданской авиации / YUSTA) civil aviation firm were launched, aimed at fostering economic growth and integration.⁸ For the Yugoslav leadership, who had largely liberated their nation through their own partisan efforts, the Soviet Union was initially seen as an indispensable ally and a blueprint for building a socialist society.⁹

But beneath this veneer of cooperation, cracks were beginning to show. Tito, a leader with his own strong vision, harbored ambitions for Yugoslavia that didn’t always align with Moscow’s grand strategy. He envisioned Yugoslavia as a dominant force in the Balkans, pursuing plans for a Balkan Federation (Balkanska federacija) that might draw in Bulgaria (Бугарска / Bugarska) and Albania (Албанија / Albanija; Albania – Russian), and he actively backed communist insurgents in the Greek Civil War.² These moves, often made without Moscow’s full blessing, were viewed by Joseph Stalin (Иосиф Сталин) as potentially reckless and disruptive, especially concerning delicate relations with Western powers.¹ Moscow also eyed Yugoslavia’s assertive territorial claims – against Italy over Trieste (Трст / Trst) and Austria (Аустрија / Austrija) regarding Carinthia (Корушка / Koruška; Каринтия / Karantiniya – Russian) – with a degree of apprehension.¹

Stalin expected unwavering loyalty from the Eastern European communist states, seeing them as a vital buffer zone and an extension of Soviet might.² Tito, however, having led a successful indigenous liberation, saw Yugoslavia as an equal partner, not a subordinate.² This fundamental clash of perspectives was starkly illustrated in November 1945 when Tito, speaking to The Times, declared that while Yugoslav friendship with the Soviet peoples was deep, there was “nothing exclusive about it,” firmly asserting his nation’s independence.¹ Even the early Soviet aid, including the presence of advisors, likely served as an intelligence channel for Moscow. As Yugoslavia began to assert its own path, these points of contact may have become sources of friction, with Soviet officials in Belgrade reportedly sending dispatches to Moscow accusing the Yugoslav leadership of ideological straying and “leaderism” (вождизм / vozhdizm).⁸ The initial “comradeship,” it seemed, was built on shaky ground, with Moscow perhaps viewing its assistance as an investment that demanded Yugoslav compliance, making Belgrade’s subsequent divergence all the more galling to the Kremlin.

B. The 1948 Tito-Stalin Split (Raskol Tito—Staljin / Раскол Тито—Стаљин): A Bitter Divorce and the Informbiro Storm

The simmering pot of Soviet-Yugoslav tensions finally boiled over in 1948, erupting into the infamous Tito-Stalin split (Раскол Тито—Стаљин / Raskol Tito—Staljin; Советско-югославский конфликт / Sovetsko-yugoslavskiy konflikt – Russian) – a dramatic and acrimonious divorce that sent shockwaves through the communist world.⁷ The Kremlin’s patience with Yugoslavia’s independent streak had worn thin. Tito’s ambitious plans for a Balkan Federation, his assertive stance on Trieste, and his continued support for Greek communists – all actions Stalin feared might provoke a Western backlash – became intolerable to Moscow.² Stalin’s attempts to tighten his grip on Yugoslav internal affairs, from its economic blueprints to its security forces, met with staunch resistance from Tito, who commanded a loyal and powerful base within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (КПЈ – Komunistička partija Jugoslavije) and the state apparatus.²

The crisis escalated with alarming speed in early 1948. In a clear signal of displeasure, the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew its military and civilian advisors from Yugoslavia in March.⁸ What followed was a volley of increasingly venomous letters exchanged between the Central Committees of the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties. The Soviet missives were laden with accusations, painting the Yugoslav leadership as anti-Soviet, nationalistic, Trotskyite, and guilty of straying from the sacred tenets of Marxism-Leninism.⁸ The Yugoslavs, unbowed, fiercely defended their policies and their sovereign right to forge their own path to socialism.¹⁰

The conflict reached its zenith on June 28, 1948. Meeting in Bucharest (Букурешт / București), Romania (Румунија / Rumunija; Румыния / Rumyniya – Russian) – a gathering from which Yugoslav delegates were notably absent – the Cominform adopted a resolution that formally cast Yugoslavia out. The KPJ leadership was condemned for pursuing policies hostile to the USSR, for abandoning Marxism-Leninism in favor of bourgeois nationalism, and for cultivating a “terroristic regime” within its own party.¹ This act marked the dawn of the “Informbiro period” (Информбиро период), an era of intense political, economic, and psychological warfare waged by the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies against a defiant Yugoslavia.⁷

The Soviet bloc slapped a comprehensive economic embargo on Yugoslavia, hoping to bring its economy, heavily reliant on trade with these nations, to its knees.⁷ Ominous military maneuvers were conducted along Yugoslavia’s borders with Hungary (Мађарска / Mađarska; Венгрия / Vengriya – Russian), Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, creating a very real threat of invasion.⁷ A ferocious propaganda war was unleashed, with outlets like Radio “Free Yugoslavia” (Радио Слободна Југославија / Radio Slobodna Jugoslavija), broadcasting from Bucharest, and newspapers such as “For Socialist Yugoslavia” (За социјалистичку Југославију / Za socijalističku Jugoslaviju) and “New Struggle” (Нова борба / Nova borba), relentlessly denouncing Tito and his government.⁸ Moscow also threw its weight behind anti-Tito Yugoslav émigrés and allegedly backed plots to topple the Yugoslav leadership from within, including a failed coup attempt linked to high-ranking military officer Arso Jovanović (Арсо Јовановић).¹¹

Yugoslavia’s response was one of unwavering defiance. Tito rallied the nation, framing the struggle as a defense of Yugoslav sovereignty and independence.¹ Internally, the regime unleashed a brutal crackdown on anyone suspected of Soviet sympathies. These individuals, derisively labeled “Cominformists” (информбировци / informbirovci or ибеовци / ibeovci), faced arrest, imprisonment, and horrific conditions in notorious camps like Goli Otok (Голи оток, literally “Bare Island”).⁷ Isolated from the East and staring down the barrel of potential Soviet military action, Yugoslavia had little choice but to turn to the West, primarily the United States, for economic and, critically, military lifelines.¹

The repercussions of the Tito-Stalin split were immense. It cemented Tito’s authority at home and dramatically boosted his international standing as a leader who had dared to defy Stalin.¹ It set Yugoslavia on the unique path of “Titoism” (титоизам / titoizam), a brand of socialism characterized by worker self-management and a non-aligned foreign policy.⁷ The split also triggered purges of suspected “Titoists” in other Eastern Bloc countries as Stalin moved to consolidate his control.⁷ For Yugoslavia, the immediate economic and military fallout was severe, forcing a wholesale reorientation of its foreign and defense strategies.⁷ The failure of the Informbiro campaign to unseat Tito, despite its ferocity, not only hardened Yugoslav resolve but also, ironically, spurred the development of a more self-reliant defense posture and a domestic arms industry. The very real threat of invasion, coupled with the initial uncertainty of finding alternative arms suppliers, drove home the strategic necessity for Yugoslavia to bolster its own defenses – a lesson that would profoundly shape its approach to national security, including its eventual quest to produce its own version of the AK-47, and later leading to its “Total National Defence” (Општенародна одбрана / Opštenarodna odbrana) doctrine.¹⁵

C. Navigating the Thaw: Khrushchev’s Olive Branch and Lingering Shadows (1953-1959)

The death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 signaled a potential sea change in the icy relations between Moscow and Belgrade, ushering in a period of gradual, though decidedly cautious, normalization.¹ The new Soviet leadership, with Nikita Khrushchev (Никита Хрущёв) eventually emerging at the helm, embarked on a broader policy of de-Stalinization and sought to dial down international tensions. Mending fences with Yugoslavia was part of this new playbook.¹⁷ The Kremlin hoped to repair the rift within the socialist world and perhaps coax Yugoslavia back into a closer orbit.

A pivotal moment arrived with Khrushchev’s landmark visit to Belgrade in May-June 1955. The visit culminated in the signing of the Belgrade Declaration (Београдска декларација / Beogradska deklaracija; Белградская декларация / Belgradskaya deklaratsiya – Russian) on June 2, 1955.¹ This document was a diplomatic breakthrough, formally acknowledging the legitimacy of “different paths to socialism” and enshrining principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, and non-interference in internal affairs.⁸ Diplomatic ties were fully restored, and trade agreements were struck, easing the economic vise that had squeezed Yugoslavia since 1948.¹⁷

But this thaw, while welcome, had its limits, and a deep-seated distrust lingered beneath the surface. Tito’s Yugoslavia remained fiercely committed to its non-aligned foreign policy, carefully navigating a path between the Eastern and Western blocs.¹ Tito famously quipped that Yugoslavia would receive Soviet overtures “with a grain of salt,” a clear indication of Belgrade’s enduring skepticism about Moscow’s true intentions.¹⁷ While Khrushchev harbored hopes of bringing Yugoslavia back into the Soviet-led “socialist camp” (often dubbed the “Lager“), Tito was resolute in safeguarding Yugoslavia’s hard-won independence.²² Suspicions cut both ways: Yugoslav leaders feared Moscow’s ultimate aim was to reassert dominance, while the Kremlin remained wary of Tito’s independent spirit.¹⁷

The fragility of this rapprochement became starkly clear by late 1956. The Soviet military crackdown on the Hungarian Uprising (Мађарска револуција 1956. / Mađarska revolucija 1956.) and the events of the Polish October (Пољски октобар / Polski oktobar) drew criticism from Yugoslavia, reigniting ideological clashes and chilling the recently warmed relations.¹³ Soviet accusations of Yugoslav “revisionism” resurfaced, and in a throwback to earlier pressure tactics, the USSR in 1958 postponed previously agreed-upon loans to Yugoslavia.⁸

Military relations during this period of normalization mirrored this complex dance. High-level military delegations were exchanged. Yugoslav State Secretary for National Defence, General Ivan Gošnjak (Иван Гошњак), journeyed to Moscow in June 1957, and Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Georgy Zhukov (Георгиј Жуков / Georgiy Zhukov; Георгий Жуков / Georgiy Zhukov – Russian) paid a return visit to Belgrade in October 1957.²³ These visits saw discussions on potential military cooperation and Soviet offers to showcase their latest military hardware.²³ However, a significant catch remained: the Soviets consistently tied any substantial military-technical assistance, especially the provision of modern weaponry, to Yugoslavia severing its military aid relationship with the West – a price Belgrade was unwilling to pay.²³ Since 1948, Yugoslavia had become a major recipient of US military aid, a lifeline crucial for modernizing the Yugoslav People’s Army (ЈНА – Југословенска народна армија / Jugoslovenska narodna armija).¹³ While Yugoslavia did announce the end of the US grant aid program in 1957, it continued to purchase spare parts and sought to diversify its arms suppliers, signaling no intent to become wholly reliant on Moscow.¹⁴ Adding another twist, Marshal Zhukov’s sudden ouster from his posts in late October 1957, immediately after his Yugoslav trip, further complicated and ultimately derailed the tentative military rapprochement.²³

The post-Stalin normalization, therefore, while politically important in ending the overt hostility of the Informbiro era, failed to forge deep military-technical trust, particularly when it came to advanced offensive weapons like the AK-47. Yugoslavia adeptly used the thaw to cement its non-aligned status and maintain its vital Western military connections. This independent posture, heavily reliant on Western arms, was fundamentally at odds with the Soviet Union’s strategic desire for bloc unity and tight control over its key military technologies. The “thaw,” in essence, remained more of a political maneuver than a genuine strategic military partnership that would have justified Moscow sharing its sensitive arms designs with Belgrade.

III. The Kalashnikov Doctrine: Soviet Arms Export Policy and the AK-47

A. The AK-47: Birth of an Icon (1949) and Early Years (up to 1959)

The Avtomat Kalashnikova obraztsa 1947 goda (АК-47) was born from the harsh lessons of World War II and the Soviet Union’s urgent post-war drive to modernize its infantry. Drawing inspiration from weapons like the German Sturmgewehr 44 (StG 44) and built around the new intermediate 7.62x39mm M43 cartridge, the AK-47 was the brainchild of a design team spearheaded by Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov (Михаил Калашников).³ Early prototypes, dubbed the AK-46, underwent a significant overhaul with input from Aleksandr Zaitsev (Александр Зайцев), leading to the version that would become legendary.⁴ Following successful trials, the rifle was officially adopted by the Soviet Army in 1949, earning the GRAU index 56-А-212.³ The green light for its technical documentation and initial experimental production at the Izhevsk Motozavod (Ижевский мотозавод / Izhevsk Motozavod) came from Minister of Armaments D.F. Ustinov (Д.Ф. Устинов) on January 21, 1948.²⁹

Getting the AK-47 into mass production wasn’t without its headaches. The initial design called for a receiver made from stamped sheet metal – a method ideal for churning out large numbers. However, difficulties in welding crucial components like the guide and ejector rails led to a high number of rejected units.⁴ To overcome these hurdles and speed up production, a heavier, more expensive machined (milled) receiver was temporarily adopted. These milled receiver versions, known as Type 2 (from 1951) and the later, lightened Type 3 (from 1954/55), became the standard for several years.⁴ As a result, the AK-47 didn’t reach Soviet troops in large numbers until around 1956, with the older SKS carbine continuing in production as a stopgap.⁴

The quest for a more efficient and cost-effective design didn’t stop there. By 1959, the Soviet military rolled out the AKM (Автомат Калашникова Модернизированный / Avtomat Kalashnikova Modernizirovanniy), or Modernized Kalashnikov Automatic Rifle.³ The AKM boasted a redesigned stamped sheet metal receiver that was lighter and cheaper to make, a distinctive slanted muzzle brake to counter muzzle climb, and a hammer retarder to boost reliability during automatic fire.⁴ This evolution underscores that the AK-47 platform was a top-priority, constantly developing system for the Soviet military throughout the 1950s. The rifle’s own lengthy development, early production snags, and its significant upgrade to the AKM by decade’s end suggest an intense internal focus. This, coupled with its immense strategic value, naturally meant Moscow would be extremely cautious about exporting it, especially when it came to sharing the latest designs with nations not firmly under its military and political thumb.

B. Moscow’s Armory: The Politics of Soviet Arms Transfers

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s arms export strategy was less about profit and almost entirely about politics and power.⁵ The Kremlin’s main goals were to bolster the socialist bloc, support nations taking an “anti-imperialist” line, cultivate allies in international arenas like the United Nations, and, crucially, to foster dependencies that would tie recipient countries closer to Moscow.⁵ This was clear in the preferential treatment given to Warsaw Pact members, who got first dibs on Soviet weaponry and were pushed to standardize their arsenals along Soviet lines to improve coalition fighting capabilities.⁵

But this didn’t mean an open tap for all military technology. The Soviets were careful, keeping a tight rein on what went where. They generally avoided sending arms to countries that might use them aggressively, destabilize a region, or whose political loyalty was shaky.⁵ Secrecy often shrouded the technical details of exported weapons, especially newer systems, to protect Soviet security and prevent sensitive information from falling into enemy hands.⁵ Notably, the export of nuclear weapons, strategic missiles, and the most cutting-edge military technologies was severely limited or outright banned for most countries, even many socialist allies.⁵ Often, arms packages included a mix of modern gear and updated, but essentially older, systems.⁵

Licensing weapon designs, like that of the AK-47, was a meticulously controlled affair, typically reserved for the most trusted allies within the Warsaw Pact or key strategic partners who showed unwavering political devotion. China, for example, received a license to produce its AK-47 variant, the Type 56, in 1956 ³, and other Warsaw Pact nations also set up their own production lines.⁶

The Khrushchev era (1953-1964) saw Moscow extend its reach to newly independent and non-aligned nations in the developing world, courting countries like India, Egypt, and Indonesia.³⁴ This was a pragmatic move to chip away at Western influence, gain Cold War allies, and project Soviet power globally. Aid, including military assistance and arms, was a key tool in this game.³⁴ However, this didn’t translate into freely sharing the most advanced Soviet military tech or production licenses with every non-aligned state. Even under Khrushchev’s more flexible foreign policy, Soviet arms exports operated on a tiered system of trust. Full licensing and transfer of top-tier infantry weapons like the AK-47 were likely kept for nations deeply embedded in the Soviet security sphere (i.e., Warsaw Pact members) or those, unlike Yugoslavia, that weren’t simultaneously cozying up to Western powers for military hardware, training, and political backing. Yugoslavia’s unique tightrope walk – a socialist state outside the Soviet bloc, actively cultivating ties with the West, and a major recipient of Western military aid – put it in a distinctly less trusted category when it came to accessing Moscow’s sensitive military technology.

C. The AK-47: A Crown Jewel in the Soviet Arsenal

The AK-47 wasn’t just another rifle for the Soviets; it was a game-changer in infantry firepower. Renowned for its straightforward design, ruggedness, reliability in the toughest conditions, and suitability for mass production, it was a weapon perfectly adapted for both conventional armies and revolutionary fighters.³ These qualities made it an incredibly valuable military asset, and Moscow was understandably careful about who got their hands on it.

The early spread of the AK-47 illustrates this cautious approach. Even a close ally like the People’s Republic of China was initially supplied with the older SKS semi-automatic carbine before eventually receiving the license to manufacture its own AK-47 version, the Type 56, in 1956.³ This points to a deliberate, phased rollout of this critical technology, even with ideologically aligned partners. The introduction of the modernized and more cost-effective AKM in 1959 only increased the strategic value of the Kalashnikov system, and the Soviets would have been keen to control the dissemination of this improved design.³

Ideologically, the AK-47 was often portrayed as the weapon for the “liberation of the proletariat” and the arming of “socialist workers and peasants.”⁶ This framing implied that any nation receiving such a weapon, particularly the know-how to make it, needed to be deemed ideologically pure and politically reliable by Moscow. Yugoslavia, after the 1948 split, was seen by the Kremlin as an ideological traitor, guilty of “revisionism” and nationalism.⁸ Despite the later political thaw under Khrushchev, this deep-seated ideological mistrust never fully evaporated.¹⁷ To provide the AK-47 or its designs to a nation that had so publicly defied Soviet authority, was charting its own “path to socialism,” and was actively building ties with the West would have flown in the face of core Soviet principles of ideological conformity and strategic control. The AK-47’s status as both a revolutionary icon and a vital military tool meant its export, especially licensing, was a decision freighted with significance. For Yugoslavia – a nation that had not only broken from the Soviet orbit but had also become a major recipient of Western military aid – the chances of getting this premier Soviet rifle or its blueprints were slim to none.

IV. Yugoslavia’s Armament Dilemma: Between Western Aid and Indigenous Ambition

A. Rearming the JNA Post-1948: A Lifeline from the West

The 1948 Tito-Stalin split threw the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA – Југословенска народна армија / Jugoslovenska narodna armija) into a perilous situation. Suddenly facing open hostility and the looming threat of invasion from the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies, Yugoslavia was in desperate need of modernizing its armed forces.¹⁵ The JNA’s arsenal at the time was a patchwork of captured World War II weapons (German and Italian), some pre-war domestic models, and the limited Soviet aid received before the bitter divorce – hardly enough to deter a potential Soviet-led onslaught.¹

Out of necessity, Yugoslavia turned its gaze westward, primarily to the United States, for military assistance. Beginning in late 1951, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), Washington began to supply substantial quantities of military hardware and provide crucial training to the JNA.¹³ This aid was a game-changer, transforming the JNA’s inventory. By 1957, when Yugoslavia requested an end to US grant aid (which officially ceased in 1959, though some purchases continued), it had received a massive infusion of military support.¹⁴

Table: Major US Military Equipment Deliveries to Yugoslavia (approx. 1951-1959)

Equipment Type	Model(s)	Approximate Quantity	Delivery Period (approx.)	Sources
Jet Fighters	F-86D Sabre, F-86E Sabre, F-84G Thunderjet	405 (total US jets)	1950s	¹⁴
Tanks	M4A3 Sherman, M-47 Patton	860 (US models)	1950s	¹⁴
Self-Propelled Guns	M7 Priest, M18 Hellcat, M36 Jackson	715	1950s	²⁵
Armored/Scout Cars	M3A1 Scout Car, M8 Greyhound	565	1950s	²⁵
Artillery Pieces	105mm, 155mm, 203mm howitzers	760	1950s	²⁵
Trainers	T-33 Shooting Star (TV-2)	70	1950s	⁴⁶
Transport Aircraft	C-47 Skytrain, DC-6	27 (C-47), 2 (DC-6)	1950s	⁴⁶
Helicopters	H-5, S-55 Whirlwind, H-23	Small numbers	1950s	⁴⁶
Naval Vessels	Minesweepers, Patrol Boats	Some	1950s	¹⁴
Small Arms & Other GFE	Various (e.g., M20 recoilless rifles)	Large quantities	1950s	⁴⁶

Note: Quantities are approximate and reflect data available for the period. “GFE” refers to Ground Forces Equipment.

Yugoslavia also procured limited military equipment from other Western nations, such as the United Kingdom, which supplied items like Anson aircraft, destroyers, and jet engines for Yugoslav-made aircraft.¹⁴ This massive influx of US military aid, while indispensable for Yugoslavia’s defense in the early 1950s, simultaneously widened the gulf with Moscow regarding sensitive military technology. The aid cemented a Western orientation in much of the JNA’s equipment, training, and operational thinking.¹³ Such strong Western military ties made the idea of integrating a key Soviet system like the AK-47 not only politically thorny for the USSR but also practically challenging for the JNA. Handing over AK-47s to an army largely equipped and trained by the West would have been counterproductive to Soviet goals of bloc unity and risked their top small arms technology being compromised. Yugoslavia’s termination of US grant aid in 1957 was a nod to Moscow during the normalization period, but it didn’t signal a complete break from Western military ties or a wholesale embrace of Soviet arms.¹⁴

B. Zastava Arms (Zastava Oružje / Застава Оружје): Forging an Independent Path to the AK

The Yugoslav People’s Army’s approach to small arms in the post-war era was deeply influenced by its partisan roots and the changing face of infantry warfare. Initially, the JNA fielded a diverse collection of weapons, including captured German Mauser Kar98k rifles. The Zastava factory in Kragujevac (Крагујевац / Kragujevac) began reworking these and producing its own version, the M48 bolt-action rifle.⁴⁴ Soviet-designed small arms, like the SKS carbine (later made domestically as the Zastava M59) and various submachine guns, also filled the JNA’s racks.⁴³ However, the world was moving on. The limitations of bolt-action rifles in terms of sheer firepower and the shorter reach of submachine guns were becoming increasingly obvious with the rise of intermediate-cartridge assault rifles.⁵⁵ Having witnessed the effectiveness of weapons like the German StG 44 during the war, the JNA knew it needed a modern automatic rifle.⁵⁶

As early as 1952, Zastava Arms began experimenting with automatic rifle designs, often drawing inspiration from the StG 44.⁵⁶ This early interest signaled Yugoslavia’s intent to keep pace with global military advancements.

The year 1959 became a pivotal moment in Yugoslavia’s quest for the AK-47. Shut out from official Soviet designs or licensed production due to the chilly political climate, Belgrade turned to unconventional methods. In a stroke of luck, or perhaps shrewd opportunism, two Albanian soldiers defected to Yugoslavia in 1959, carrying their Soviet-made AK-47s. These rifles were swiftly delivered to Zastava’s engineers for meticulous inspection.⁵⁶ While these initial samples provided a crucial first look and even allowed for metal castings, they weren’t enough to unlock all the secrets of the rifle’s precise technical data and manufacturing tolerances needed for full-scale reproduction.⁵⁶

Later that year, or soon after, Yugoslavia managed a more significant acquisition, secretly purchasing a batch of reportedly around 2,000 early-pattern AK-47s. Legend has it this deal was struck during one of President Tito’s visits to an unnamed African nation that was a recipient of Soviet military aid.⁵⁷ With a larger pool of rifles to dissect and study, Zastava’s engineers finally had what they needed to effectively reverse-engineer the prized weapon.

This clandestine effort culminated in the Zastava M64, Yugoslavia’s first domestically produced, unlicensed version of the AK-47.³⁰ Based on the milled receiver design of the Soviet AK Type 3, the M64 incorporated several distinctly Yugoslav features. These included modifications for launching rifle grenades – a key element of JNA doctrine – different handguard designs (often with three cooling slots instead of the Soviet two), and, on some early prototypes, a mechanism to hold the bolt open after the last round was fired.⁵⁶ The Zastava design team, featuring engineers like Božidar Blagojević (Божидар Благојевић) and Major Miloš Ostojić (Милош Остојић), worked under the “FAZ” (Фамилија Аутоматика Застава / Familija Automatika Zastava – Family of Automatic Weapons Zastava) concept, aiming to create a whole family of weapons based on the Kalashnikov system.⁵⁷

Yugoslavia’s success in acquiring AK-47s through these back channels in 1959 and then launching its own reverse-engineering program was a testament not only to its ingenuity but also to its unwavering commitment to an independent defense. This proactive stance was a direct result of the post-1948 reality, where relying on former allies had proven a dangerous game. It sent a clear message: if denied critical military technology by one bloc, Yugoslavia was ready and able to get it elsewhere, reinforcing its non-aligned position and diminishing any leverage Moscow might have hoped to exert through arms denial. This bold move set a precedent for Yugoslav technological autonomy and significantly boosted the capabilities of its burgeoning domestic arms industry.

V. The Withheld Design: Why Moscow Said No

The Soviet Union’s refusal to hand over AK-47s or their blueprints to Yugoslavia by 1959 wasn’t a simple “no.” It was a decision born from a complex cocktail of deep-seated political mistrust, cold geopolitical calculations, established arms export policies, Yugoslavia’s own determined push for military self-reliance, and the AK-47’s own development and rollout schedule.

A. The Ghost of ’48: A Chasm of Mistrust

The 1948 Tito-Stalin split wasn’t just a diplomatic disagreement; it was a seismic ideological and political earthquake that shattered the foundations of trust between Moscow and Belgrade.¹ In the Kremlin’s eyes, Tito’s defiance was nothing short of a betrayal of the socialist cause. Stalin himself reportedly harbored such intense animosity towards the Yugoslav leader that he even sanctioned assassination attempts.¹ This profound bitterness didn’t simply vanish with time. Even after Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s attempts at reconciliation, a thick fog of suspicion hung heavy in the air between the two nations.¹⁶ Yugoslav leaders remained deeply skeptical of Soviet intentions, fearing a renewed push for dominance, while the Soviets doubted Tito’s commitment to any form of socialist solidarity that didn’t place Moscow at the top.¹⁷ The Soviet Union had, after all, publicly and vehemently denounced the Yugoslav leadership for “anti-Soviet” policies and dangerous “revisionism.”⁸ In such a poisoned atmosphere, the idea of transferring a premier military technology like the AK-47 design – a weapon that embodied Soviet military might – to a nation seen as ideologically wayward and politically untrustworthy was almost unthinkable. The essential ingredient for such a sensitive deal – mutual confidence – was conspicuously absent. Moscow simply couldn’t be sure that Yugoslavia wouldn’t share the technology with its newfound Western friends or use it in ways that undermined Soviet interests.

B. Geopolitical Chess: Yugoslavia’s Western Embrace as a Deal-Breaker

Yugoslavia’s strategic pivot to the West for military support after the 1948 schism was a game-changer in Soviet calculations. The substantial military aid flowing from the United States and other Western countries from 1951 onwards forged undeniable links – both in terms of hardware and doctrine – between the JNA and Western militaries.¹³ This wasn’t just a trickle; it was a flood of modern tanks, jet aircraft, artillery, and extensive training programs.¹⁴ Adding to Moscow’s alarm was the formation of the Balkan Pact (Balkanski pakt) in 1953-1954, a mutual defense treaty that brought Yugoslavia together with Greece and Turkey – both NATO members.¹⁰ Although Tito tried to downplay its military significance to Khrushchev, the Soviets saw it as a move that, at least indirectly, pulled Yugoslavia into a Western-aligned military orbit.²²

A fundamental rule in the Soviet arms export playbook was to prevent its advanced military technology from falling into Western hands or bolstering countries with strong Western military ties.⁵ During military discussions in 1956-1957, any Soviet offer of significant military aid, including modern weaponry, came with strings attached: Yugoslavia had to cut its military ties with the West and send the US military mission in Belgrade packing.²³ Tito, however, wasn’t willing to pay that price, as Western support remained crucial for Yugoslavia’s security and economic stability. Consequently, from Moscow’s perspective, providing AK-47s to a Yugoslav military heavily equipped, trained, and influenced by the United States would have been akin to indirectly arming a Western-leaning force. Worse, it risked the rifle’s technology being dissected, exploited, and potentially countered by NATO. The potential for technological leakage or strategic misuse far outweighed any slim chance of wooing Tito with this particular weapon, especially while Yugoslavia kept its Western military lifelines open.

C. Moscow’s Prudence: Guarding Key Tech from an Independent Outsider

The AK-47 was more than just an effective rifle; it was a cutting-edge piece of Soviet military innovation, a prized technological asset.³ Soviet policy on licensing and exporting such critical military designs was notoriously tight-fisted, generally reserved for its most loyal Warsaw Pact brethren or exceptionally close, ideologically pure states, like China in the early days of their alliance.³ Yugoslavia, an independent, non-aligned nation that had openly thumbed its nose at Moscow’s authority and carved out its own distinct foreign policy, simply didn’t fit the bill as a trusted recipient for such a crucial weapon system.¹

A general principle of Soviet arms export strategy was caution, especially with its most advanced systems. Moscow aimed to prevent uncontrolled proliferation, avoid unnecessarily inflaming regional conflicts, and maintain a degree of control over the capabilities of recipient nations.⁵ The Cold War was, in many ways, a technological arms race, and both superpowers were intensely wary of their key military innovations falling into the hands of, or being exploited by, states they couldn’t fully control. Yugoslavia, with its unique geopolitical balancing act and proven independence, was a textbook example of such a nation. Handing over AK-47 designs or large quantities of the rifle would have meant relinquishing control over a vital military technology to a state operating outside its direct sphere of influence, risking its adaptation or spread in ways that didn’t serve Soviet strategic interests.

D. Yugoslav Autonomy: Belgrade’s Go-It-Alone Spirit

The shock of the 1948 split and the subsequent Soviet-led blockade left an indelible mark on Yugoslavia’s approach to national security. It drove home the harsh lesson about the dangers of relying too heavily on a single foreign power for essential military gear.¹⁵ As a result, building a strong domestic arms industry became a top strategic priority for Belgrade. Zastava Arms in Kragujevac already had a history of arms manufacturing, churning out Mauser-pattern M48 rifles and other small arms in the post-war years.⁵¹ This existing industrial foundation provided a springboard for more ambitious endeavors.

The clandestine acquisition of AK-47 samples in 1959, followed by Zastava’s dedicated efforts to reverse-engineer the weapon and develop the M64 prototype, stands as a powerful testament to Yugoslavia’s proactive and determined pursuit of modern military technology, even without Moscow’s blessing or a license.⁵⁶ This independent streak demonstrated a clear commitment to achieving a degree of self-sufficiency in critical defense areas. It’s plausible that even if the Soviets under Khrushchev had offered the AK-47 designs or a license, the political strings or economic terms attached might have been unacceptable to a Yugoslavia fiercely protective of its sovereignty. Having already embarked on a path of diversifying its arms sources (thanks to Western aid) and nurturing its own capabilities, Belgrade might have preferred the longer, more challenging road of independent development over a Soviet deal that could have entailed unwelcome dependencies. The Soviet refusal to provide the AK-47, therefore, met a Yugoslav determination to acquire the capability one way or another. This, in turn, ultimately strengthened its military-industrial complex and reinforced its non-aligned defense posture, making Yugoslavia less vulnerable to future political pressure through arms supplies from any bloc.

E. The AK-47/AKM Timeline: A Premier System, Sparingly Shared

The AK-47’s own development and deployment timeline also played a role. Though officially adopted in 1949, getting the rifle into the hands of Soviet troops in large numbers took several years due to initial production hiccups, especially with the stamped receiver.⁴ The significantly improved and modernized AKM version, featuring a more easily mass-produced stamped receiver, only made its debut in 1959.³ This means that throughout the entire period of Yugoslav-Soviet normalization (1955-1959), the AK-47 was the USSR’s primary, relatively new assault rifle, and its definitive mass-production iteration, the AKM, was just appearing on the scene as the decade closed.

The transfer of such cutting-edge military technology, particularly its production license, typically followed a strict pecking order: first, equip your own forces, then provide it to your most trusted and strategically vital allies. Even a major communist power like China only began licensed production of its AK-47 variant, the Type 56, in 1956 – several years after the AK-47’s formal adoption by the Soviet Army.³ This points to a deliberate and controlled process for sharing AK-47 technology. Given this internal Soviet timeline for the AK-47’s own development, production refinement, and initial dissemination, Yugoslavia – with its complicated and often strained political relationship with Moscow – was simply not high enough on the priority list to receive such a sensitive and relatively new technology transfer by 1959. Even if political relations had been significantly warmer and free of the deep-seated mistrust, it’s likely that widespread licensing or export of the AK-47, let alone the just-emerging AKM, to a non-Warsaw Pact country like Yugoslavia would have been deemed premature from the Soviet strategic viewpoint, which naturally prioritized its own forces and its closest, most reliable allies. The profound political issues merely sealed a fate already influenced by the weapon’s own lifecycle and Soviet dissemination practices.

VI. Conclusion: Forging Arms and Independence

The Soviet Union’s decision to keep its AK-47 rifles and their designs out of Yugoslav hands by the end of 1959 was not a simple “no.” It was a complex verdict shaped by a potent mix of factors. The deep, lingering mistrust from the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, which painted Yugoslavia as an ideological maverick in Moscow’s eyes, set the stage.¹ This fundamental distrust was amplified by Yugoslavia’s determinedly non-aligned stance and its significant reliance on Western military aid, particularly from the United States, making any transfer of sensitive Soviet military technology to Belgrade a geopolitical non-starter for the Kremlin.¹³

Moreover, Soviet arms export policies during the early Cold War were notoriously restrictive when it came to advanced weaponry. Moscow prioritized its Warsaw Pact allies and ideologically compliant states, exercising extreme caution with nations like Yugoslavia that charted an independent foreign policy course and maintained strong Western ties.⁵ The AK-47, and its successor the AKM (which arrived in 1959), were crown jewels of Soviet military technology, and their dissemination was tightly controlled.³ The AK-47’s own development and deployment timeline meant it was still a relatively new and evolving system within the Soviet military itself, making widespread export or licensing to a country outside its immediate security bloc highly unlikely by 1959.⁴

Meanwhile, Yugoslavia, steeled by the hard lessons of the Informbiro period and driven by a powerful imperative for self-reliance, was actively building its own domestic arms industry.⁵¹ The clandestine acquisition of AK-47 samples in 1959, followed by the impressive reverse-engineering efforts at Zastava Arms that led to the M64 prototype, showcased Belgrade’s resolve to obtain modern assault rifle technology, with or without Soviet approval.⁵⁶ This bold initiative not only highlighted Yugoslav ingenuity but also underscored a deep commitment to an autonomous defense posture.

In the end, the Soviet refusal to share the AK-47 did not stop Yugoslavia from arming itself with Kalashnikov-pattern rifles. Instead, it spurred the nation’s engineers and defense industry to develop their own versions, most notably the Zastava M70 series. These rifles became a mainstay of the Yugoslav People’s Army and a significant export success in their own right. This outcome fostered a crucial degree of self-sufficiency in small arms production for Yugoslavia, a cornerstone of its independent defense doctrine and its distinctive non-aligned identity on the turbulent stage of the Cold War.

The story of the Soviet-Yugoslav AK-47 dynamic is a vivid illustration of how the intricate dance of Cold War power politics, ideological clashes, national interests, and technological ambitions shaped military relationships. It underscores that the transfer – or denial – of arms and military technology was a powerful tool of statecraft, with far-reaching consequences for industrial development, strategic autonomy, and the geopolitical paths nations chose to tread in a bipolar world. For Yugoslavia, the rifle Moscow withheld ultimately became a catalyst, driving it to forge not only its own weapons but also a more independent destiny.

The next post will explore more about the early phases of the Zastava AK program because then it gets really interesting. Click here to open a new browser tab and read about how Zastava developed the first “Yugo” AK – the M64 – that preceded the M70 series.

Image Sources

The Map of Yugoslavia was obtained from Wikimedia. Image source was “The Cartographic Section of the United Nations (CSUN) Date=2007-03-10” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Former_Yugoslavia_Map.png

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Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, accessed May 11, 2025, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Watching-the-Bear-Essays-on-CIAs-Analysis-of-the-Soviet-Union-1.pdf

Reviews / For Sale

Are You Looking For A Lubricant That Performs Better Than CLP? Check Out Kentuckiana Gun Works – Enhanced Reliability Oil

August 28, 2022 RoninsGrips

So I stopped in to talk to Scott Igert, my good friend who owns Michigan Gun Exchange, a few weeks back. Scott told me about a new gun oil that he had samples of that the maker had handed him directly and that I ought to take a look at it. I kind of groaned because everyone and their brother claims to have the best gun oil. Some have ok oil and some don’t (remember the canola oil mess some years back?) but nobody has THE best oil.

Many times the oils they are selling you are an existing product that has been put into tiny containers with some really splashy marketing and packaging. For example, if you find a red colored weapon oil that feels, smells and is colored red like ATF, then it is probably some variant of automatic transmission fluid – Dexron, ATF, etc. If it’s colored blue and smells and feels like hydraulic fluid then that might well be what it is. Now I am not saying all products are that way but a lot are.

So, somewhat warily, I took the sample bottle home with me. It had to wait a bit until I could get around to focusing on it. The product is “Enhanced Reliability Oil” From Kentuckiana Gun Works (KGW).

In looking at the oil, it was yellow-ish with a hint of red. It’s a blend of something – but not something right out of a bottle. I felt it and it had a nice 30 weight-ish feel to it. It wasn’t really thin but it was slippery.

The smell was that of a petroleum oil but nothing uniquely stood out.

Did I taste it … no, I have standards to uphold at least while I am sober.

Okay, those quick observations may sound ridiculous to you – well, the taste part was a joke – but many products you can kind of group by color, feel and smell. This one I couldn’t because the color was unique plus it felt like a decent lubricant so I decided to dig a bit more.

I took a few drops of some common lubricants and put them on a piece of white printer paper. Left is the KGW product, then Super Lube, them CLP, followed by Mobile 1 5w-30 synthetic engine oil and finally Pennzoil Platinum Full Synthetic 5w-30. Super lube is clear – it just turned the paper black. KGW has a slight red hue and then the others are different yellows. The CLP soaked in the fastest by the way reflecting how thin it is.

Did Some Digging

I visited their website and also did some searching. KGW is a new firm so there really isn’t much info out there which meant I needed to reach out to Kohl Oettle, the owner of KGW who developed the oil. Scott had his contact info so we traded some emails.

Kohl was a tanker in the Marine Corp Reserve for six years and had developed a dislike for CLP as a lubricant – CLP stands for Cleaner Lubricant Protector just in case you didn’t know. Kohl pointed out, “We used CLP on everything, m4, m16, 240, m2, m48 etc, and in every application it burned off and ran off so quickly that I developed a real hate for all types of CLP. I wanted something that was thicker, handled heat better, and just lasted longer. “

That resonated with me because CLP is just way too thin for me. When I have big clunking parts, I need a thicker lubricant such as as oil or a grease to have reliable lubrication especially during break in. I still use CLP as a cleaner once in a while but I haven’t used it as a lubricant for probably 16 years — tt dawned on me that I started working on AKs around 2006 and CLP was just too thin to use as an assembly lube on those rifles so it’s been more like 16 years.

So I asked Kohl what set his oil apart from the tons of other products on the market. He responded, “It’s not trying to do everything. It wasn’t designed to be a cleaner. It’s a damn good oil and protector, without all the cleaners that make so many others thin, and less heat tolerant. I do have a very small amount of carbon deposit reducers in my oil, but just enough help control the carbon buildup and thus make the bolt reciprocate much easier. It’s not nearly enough to be used as a cleaner, and that’s on purpose. “

For the last seven years, Kohl has worked in industrial maintenance working on a variety of machines ranging from food processing to automotive parts manufacturing. As part of this, he learned that one of the most effective means of keeping a machine running reliably was to use the proper oil and grease.

What I found especially interesting was that Kohl tinkered with the the blend until he achieved the viscosity and lubrication he wanted through trial and error. He primarily had the AR-15 and similar rifles in mind when he was designing it but it will work on other pistols, rifles and shotguns as well. By the way, I mentioned earlier I thought it was about 30 weight – Kohl told me it’s a tad thicker than that.

When he was ready, he took to shooting classes and and shot thousands of rounds through a variety of weapons. He also sent out samples to people and a local gun store helped him sell his oil and collect feedback for 18 months. He took this feedback and further refined his product.

I respected what he did. Both Scott and I started our respective businesses and learned over time the same way Kohl has done.

Assembly Lube Testing

I used the KGW Enhanced Reliability Oil as an assembly lube for the fire control group, bolt catch, bolt, and bolt carrier. I grease the takedown pins so not there.

I ensured there was a thin film on both the top/front of the hammer as well as the bolt carrier.

My testing has been limited so far but I will update this post after my first range trip. I recently built two AR rifles and used Kohl’s oil as an assembly lube. I could tell everything was moving very easily. In this regard it worked great. Time is a challenge these days and I hope to get these rifles to the range in the next 3-4 weeks but didn’t want to hold up getting the word out there.

You can buy the oil direct from KGW’s website or you may find it at your local gun store as their business expands.

By the way, I don’t make any money off this post and Kohl didn’t ask me to. I just know what it’s like to be an entrepreneur trying to start a small business – I figured helping Kohl was the least I could do after all the folks who helped me.

Note, I have to buy all of my parts – nothing here was paid for by sponsors, etc. I do make a small amount if you click on an ad and buy something but that is it. You’re getting my real opinion on stuff.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, I may be paid via an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay.

Uncategorized

PSA Has Evolved Their AK Offerings Considerably – Taking A Close Look At A GF5

August 3, 2022 RoninsGrips

When I first started buying from Palmetto State Armory (PSA) maybe 10+ years ago, they were a source for cheap but decent AR parts plus other brands of parts, like Magpul, and ammunition. If you compare what PSA is today to way back when, they have achieved a lot – most folks don’t know that PSA is part of a large portfolio of companies under JJE Capital.

Palmetto State Armory (PSA) has a stunning array of Kalashnikov firearms now. AK-47s, AK74s, 100 series, rifles, pistols … it’s impressive. Click here to go to their main AK menu.

Early PSA AK’s were rough. I bought an AK-E a number of years back and then an AK-V and I could see the quality was improving. They have continued to evolve their offerings. The GF3 was even better and with the GF5 series I think they are getting a lot of things right — I should add their versions of the 100 series of Russian rifles to that list as well.

PSA will tell you

The barrel is cold hammer forged chrome moly vanadium steel with a chrome lining and made by Fabrique Nationale Herstal (FN for short) – these are top notch barrels.
Hammer forged front trunnion – US makers tried to do castings originally and they just do not hold up
Hammer forged bolt and carrier – not everyone forges their carriers and you see photos online of them cracking/snapping where the gas piston goes into the body of the carrier.
The trigger is an ALG AKT enhanced model – these are excellent AK triggers and I really think it was a good idea that PSA went with them
They have a lifetime warranty.

Now PSA says they have torture tested the rifles to 10,000 rounds with no problem. A number of folks on the Internet have posted videos blowing through tons of ammo, in the case of JMAC they did it at full auto and the rifles have held up admirably.

Yeah, I ordered one

The fit and finish of parts was excellent. Rivets were formed very nicely and the tooling marks were reduced in my opinion. In short, it looked pretty good.

Now let’s get into some photos – click on one to see it full size or to then move around and look:

Conclusion

The rifle looked really good and everyone who I know who has shout one speaks highly of them. PSA sure is selling a ton of them.

AKBuilds

Super Secret AK Furniture Fitting Tool

January 26, 2022 RoninsGrips

Ok, now that I have your attention with that title, I often get asked how to fit the various furniture parts of an AK to a given rifle – the gas tube cover / upper hand guard cover, the lower handguard and the buttstock. Most of the work can be done with a secret tool – a slightly modified single cut file and patience.

For example, this is Palmetto State Armory’s Redwood furniture set on a Romy G kit I built.

Most of the time with new furniture, you need to remove material and a single cut file works great for that. With the pictured PSA Redwood furniture set, I needed to think the half circle ends of the gas tube cover and I also had to fit the lower hand guard just a tad.

This is an 8″ single cut Nicholson Handy File that I bought many years ago and modified. I prefer a single cut file so I can go slow and not remove material too fast. Just remember an old saying – *“it’s easier to take more material off than it is to put it back on.”*

Now here’s the trick to really make this tool work for fitting furniture – grind one thin side smooth – literally get rid of the file’s teeth. This will allow you to quickly and easy run the file right against a raised edge, such as the lips of the gas tube cover, and remove material that you want while leaving the raised edge untouched.

I find an 8″ file just the right size. 8″ is the measurement from the front edge, or “point” of the file, to the base of the heel – the bottom of the main body before the tang starts. The file shown is an 8″ Nicholson Handy File but any 8″ single cut or a file with single cut on one size and double-cut on another would work.

Any brand of file ought to work. Some come with a “safe” edge meaning no teeth. Just test it first to see if any of the teeth from the perpendicular surfaces protrude enough to cut – if they do then knock them down so the smooth surface can ride on the material you are working on with zero cutting happening from that side.

I used my big belt sander and removed all the teeth from this one edge and ensure it was smooth. I purposefully left the teeth on the other thin edge.

Just be patient – look at where the furniture is binding, remove a small amount and test the fit. In general, you want AK furniture to fit snug vs. rattling around. Patience is the key though – don’t rush things. Just keep inspecting, filing off a bit and testing over and over.

So everything is installed, nothing broke because I rushed and the end result is nice snug fitting furniture.

Summary

A single cut file with one thin edge ground is the secret tool but you need to be patient when using it. I can’t even begin to guess how many lower and upper handguards I have adjusted with this file over the years plus I have learned a bit more patience as well.

I hope this helps you out.

AKBuilds

How To Locate And Drill AK Front and Rear Trunnion Rivet Holes

January 2, 2022 RoninsGrips

Building an AK takes a fair amount of drilling, fitting and riveting that can intimidate someone thinking about building their first rifle. Lucky for them, the industry has evolved a lot of really cool tools exist to enable faster higher quality results. A good example of evolution is the location and drilling of the the rivet holes in the receiver for the front and rear trunnions.

Back around 2006 or so when I got started, you either measured the location of the trunnion holes and marked them or you could take a post it note, push it on the trunnion to get an outline of the holes and then transfer it to the receiver, again marking where to drill. You learned quick to start with a small drill bit so you could adjust a bit if you were off with either method – I got pretty good with the post it note method actually.

One of the AK-parts and tool vendors that has been around the longest is AK-Builder and he was always bringing new offerings to the market, I slowly added one of all of his tools as funds permitted. I had his rivet jig, flat bending jig, the top rail layout jig (if you remember those) and so forth. At some point he added a really, really cool jig for locating and drilling the holes for the trunnions. I bought it and swear by it to this day.

The jig is extremely well made and durable. When you buy it, you have options for the sizes of mandrels to fit different barrel channel holes. The red one you see works on 7.62 AKs and they also have one for 5.45 and the unique MAK90. The rounded rectangle on the right holds the rear trunnion.

Using It For The Front Trunnion Holes

Using this fixture is about as easy as it gets but you must have a drill press. I’d recommend an X-Y table on your drill if you plan to do this much but at least have a drill press.

Securely mount the fixture to your drill press.
Insert the trunnion and tighten the knob so it can’t move.
Move your drill table around to line the drill bit up with the hole in the trunnion.
Slide the receiver over the trunnion.
Lower the drill and it will go in the exact same location as the trunnion hole you lined up on.

The front trunnion is being held securely by the fixture. I am sliding the receiver forward and when I bring the drill down, it will make the hole in the exact same spot as what was in the trunnion.

This fixture is the best means I have found to quickly and accurately locate and drill the trunnion holes in the receiver. I prefer undrilled receivers because with this jig I can put the holes exactly where I want them. By the way, these are AK-Builder rivets also.

Tips For The Front Trunnion Holes

Confirm the drill bit sizes you need before you start. For most AKMs, the front rivet holes are 4mm so you can use either a 4mm or 5/32″ (3.868mm) bit. Note, that dimension can be different so just confirm is my point. Also, I’d recommend good cobalt bits personally.
Use cutting fluid – I like Tap Magic personally.
You will drill a hole at a time – do not try to go all the way through. Small alignment errors become big problems when you do that. Avoid the grief – do a hole per rivet.
Make sure the table can’t move, that the fixture is secure and that the trunnion is being held firmly. If anything moves, you are hosed.
Line up on the hole, slide the receiver all the way on, pull it back just enough to verify nothing moved one last time.
After I drill the first rivet hole I carefully inspect everything is lined up. I then move to the second rivet hole and repeat the above but before I drill, I insert temporary rivets in the holes to make sure nothing moves. DO NOT SQUISH THEM – I literally am just using their bodies to keep everything lined up. It really helps avoid small movement errors.
If you mess up real bad for some reason, weld the hole shut and start over.

If you go to the AK-Builder product page for this jig [click here] you should note the link in their description to a page with a lot of photos and detailed instructions.

Doing The Rear Trunnion

Doing the rear rivet holes uses the other side of the drilling jig. The little rectangular tab goes into the top of the rear trunnion where the recoil spring rod normally sits and you can then crank it down tight to hold it in place while drilling.

Notice the receiver will be parallel to the jig during these operations. Again, make sure everything is secure and you need to make sure the back of the receiver is true to the rear of the trunnion.

The end result will be accurately located holes. Before you set the rivets, this is when you should be thinking about a side rail for optics if you want one. I like the AKM side rail mount from AK-Builder. Those holes you will need to manually locate and drill. Use a caliper and true the top of the rail to the top of the receiver if you do install one.

Tips For the Rear

First, read all the tips I wrote for the front trunnion if you skipped them.
The key to all of this is a solid setup and nothing moving.
Confirm the size drill bit you need. It will probably be 4.5mm which you can do with that size drill or be close with 11/64″ (4.365mm).
DO NOT DRILL STRAIGHT THROUGH. I’d recommend you take your time and do a hole at a time.
Once you get a hole drilled and are ready to do the next, stick a rivet in it to prevent movement.

Summary

The AK-Builder drilling jig is the best tool I know to help you quickly and accurately locate and drill the front and rear trunnion holes in your receiver. I definitely recommend it.

AKBuilds

How To Quickly Remove AK Receiver Rivets

December 29, 2021 RoninsGrips

Okay, there are a ton of ways to remove rivets and I’ve posted some details both about removing the trigger guard and side rail rivets (if your AK has a side rail). This post is going to get straight to the point.

I use a 4.5″ cordless Ryobi angle grinder and take all the rivet heads down flush. Unless I plan to reuse the receiver, I don’t care how the receiver looks when I’m done. If I do care, then I will be much more careful and stop just before I get to the surface.

I then center punch all of the holes to make drilling easier. I like to use an automatic center punch so I can focus on where I want to make the divot for drilling vs. trying to keep everything aligned. If you’ve never used one, they are worth their weight in gold.

I drill an 1/8″ hold in each one use quality cobalt drill bits and cutting oil. I like to buy Tap Magic in bigger containers and then transfer the fluid as needed into smaller squeeze bottles with long metal tubular “needle” tips so I can precisely put it right where I need it.

From the top – 1/8″ drill bit, roll pin punch and an automatic center punch on the bottom.

I then use a roll pin punch where the rounded tip can fit in the 1/8″ hole and the shoulder properly engage the remaining rivet. Folks, this makes removing the remaining rivets super easy except for the long trunnion rivets.

For the short rivets, I like to drill them out with an 1/8″ bit to both create a hole and relieve stress. I then use a roll pin punch to easily knock them out because the ball end of the punch keeps it centered on the rivet. If you’ve ever fought with keeping a normal punch centered while hammering, a roll pin punch centered in a hole makes a night and day difference.

Long Rear Trunnion Rivets

Okay, these take more work so we’ll make a section just for these little headaches. They’re not horrible – they just take additional time to remove but I will tell you a HUGE time saver in a moment.

In general, it’s easier to remove the rivets with the trunnion out of the receiver. If you need to save the receiver, be gentle and use successively larger drill bits to remove the rivet heads so you can then pry the sheet metal receiver open and pull it out. The balancing act is that if you make the receiver holes too big then you will need to weld them shut and drill new ones. It’s not the end of the world. I prefer welding and redrilling compared to using even bigger rivets with heads that cover the holes but are mismatched to everything else.

If you don’t care about the receiver or are removing stubs, grind those heads down and use an air hammer chisel to easily bend the receiver sheet metal away from the receiver.

With the rivet heads ground off you can clearly see the rivet body outline and thus you can mark the center.

Traditional Method – drill in from each side about 1/2 way and then punch the rivet out. Guys will use 5/32″ (3.969mm) or even 11/64″ (4.366mm) drill bits. If you are spot on the center and you have access to quality cobalt metric bits, this is usually a 4.5mm rivet so you could use that. You will read about guys suggesting 3/16″ drills but this route is problematic because 3/16″ is 4.762mm and thus too large. You’d need to use a 3/16″ rivet to properly secure the trunnion and the heads will look noticeably different from the others.

Old school – drill the rivet out most of the way and then punch it out the rest. You can see the pin exiting to the left. Note, do this on a hard surface that isn’t going to flex and absorb some of your blows. Here I am literally beating the crap out of the punch on the concrete floor. I’ve since moved on to a method using an air hammer that I will describe next.

The impatient Ronin method – drill 1/8″ centered holes in one side of the rivets left in the trunnion. Make or buy an 1/8″ air hammer drift pin and chase each long rivet out in a matter of seconds. It’s amazingly fast. I don’t know who invented the air hammer but it is seriously magical when it comes to tasks like this.

I can pop out a rivet in seconds using an air hammer and my rivet fixture. I took two old .401 shank air tools and drilled center holes. One is 1/8″ and the other is 5/32″. I then have a variety of lengths of 1/8″ and 5/32 dowel pins to do the job. I built both diameters but really I just use the 1/8″ punch now. I put the trunnion in a heavy metal working vise and start with a short pin to start the push and then a longer pin to chase it all of the way out. It works like a dream. If you do this, please, please, please wear safety glasses. A hardened dowel pin can brake in these situations. For an air hammer, I am using an IR 116 – a 4x air riveter ought to work also, I have a 3x ATS but have never tried it for this.

Summary

Use an angle grinder to knock off the rivet heads, drill and punch out the short rivets. For the longer rivet, decide which of the two methods you want to use. I hope this helps you out!

AKBuilds

You can Easily Remove A Side Rail Scope Mount But The Receiver Is Going To Look Butt Ugly

December 28, 2021 RoninsGrips

The Kalashnikov design team took an interesting approach to mounting scopes on AK-Rifles. Rather than centering the optic over the bore they placed a mounting rail on the side of the receiver. There are different types depending on the model of rifle in question but one thing that pops up from time to time is whether one can be removed.

The short answer is yes. Now I add in the “but” – it is going to leave you with a receiver that not only has holes in it but receiver material that was forced into a countersink so you will have at least the center rivet area on the sheet metal receiver that will probably stick out like a little volcano taunting you.

Center punch and drill out the rivets. The rear rivet is an it depends – it may either be short like you see with the AK-74 or attached via the long rear trunnion rivet. You may want to start with an 1/8″ drill and go up to 5/32″. The rear trunnion if it has a large rear trunnion rivet in it will be 4.5mm and I actually use a 4.5mm cobalt bit on that one to free up the side rail. Some guys who don’t have a 4.5mm bit will use an 11/64″ drill bit instead – it’s 4.366mm. I’ll do another post about trunnions but unless you are running a drill or mill that you know is true to the table and work piece, do not try and drill the rivet out entirely from one side, I go about half way in from each side and punch out the remainder or use an air hammer to chase out the rivet with an 1/8″ drift pin but that’s a topic for another day.

You can see the receiver material that was forced into the center hole. It really shows how secure riveting can be with countersunk rivets and holes.

So, yes, you can drill out the rivets and use the scope mount on other rifles. The question becomes what to do with the source receiver. If it is getting destroyed then this is a non issue – follow whatever your procedures are to file a destroyed receiver/firearm record with the ATF provided it was serialized and registered to begin with unlike rifles built from a blank, etc.

Now if you want to keep the receiver, the recommeendation would give is to put a thick copper backing plate behind the holes, weld them shut and then sand the result flush. For the holes with the cones, if you have any, grind/mill them down flush first and then do the same – copper backing plate, weld the holes shut and then sand flush.

You’ll need to refinish at least the receiver and the bluing on the steel welds typically doesn’t blend with bluing on the receiver so you may want to just refinish the whole thing if you care about it looking good.

Looking at the back of the side rail is fascinating. The whole indexing of the scope rail starts with the front rivet of the rear trunnion. and then having an equal distance from the top of the receiver to the top of the side rail. Now this one is flopped 180 degrees compared to the receiver under it but look at the accomodations they have for thee selector lever and center support pin of the receiver. This is off a WASR-10 and is an AKM style plate but interestingly the rear trunnion was a split AK-74 style with two small short rivets in front on the two legs of the trunnion and a long rear trunnion vs. the ccommon AKM approach of two long rivets securing the rear trunnion. The machining is crude but it did the job. The AK-Builder plates are virtually identical but far better machined and finished. If I needed to use an AKM side rail, that’s what I would get.

Summary

Yeah, you can remove the side rail but if you plan to continue to use the receiver, you’ll need to weld the holes closed, sand, and refinish the weapon. I’m very impressed by the design they came up with – it spreads forces across the sheet metal receiver and allows ready access to the dust cover and internals if required.

Gunsmithing

How To Quickly And Easily Remove An AK Trigger Guard

December 28, 2021 RoninsGrips

So, let’s review how to remove a riveted AK trigger guard assembly. For those of you building from virgin kits or complete demilled (“demilitarized”) kits, you don’t need to do this but for many folks they do. In my case, I needed to remove the trigger guard from a beat to heck donor rifle that someone had butchered.

You have three options to remove the trigger guard rivets:

Drill them out by center punching each rivet or using a rivet drill jig and remove them.
Mill the heads off, drill a hole and punch out the remainer of the bodies.
Grind the heads off, drill a hole and punch out the remainder

All of the above methods work. It really comes down to what you are most comfortable with. As for myself, I use option three. The reason I just don’t drill them out is that rivet head shapes can vary considerably. The AK-Builder drilling jig is fantastic but it can’t guarantee you are centered on every rivet.

With this in mind, I simply take a 4″ grinder and take off the rivet heads flush to the surface of the trigger guard itself. This lets me see the outline of the rivet bodies so I can then drill and 1/8″ hole and I’ll explain why after a couple of photos.

This is my 4.5″ Ryobi 18 volt grinder. To be honest, the tool pleasantly surprised me. I really wondered how much torque and battery life it would have. Over the last six months I have ground down quite a few bolts and metal parts with this tool. Before I had it, I had a 4″ Makita corded grinder that I still have — it’s just that cordless is so convenient. The Ryobi made short work of the five rivets that hold on the trigger guard.

Definitely practice with your angle grinder until you are able to control it. What you want to do is to remove the rivet head with out doing major damage to the trigger guard. Can you see the outline of the rivet bodies? That is what we want to get all of the way around.

The next steps you will do are to center punch each rivet, drill an 1/8″ hole through the rivet and then use a roll pin punch to knock the rivet out. This was a bit of an epiphany for me one day – I was trying to keep the punch on the rivet and I thought to myself – “Man, what if I drill a hole and use the right sized roll pin punch? The little ball on the end of the roll pin punch ought to keep it centered.” I tried it and it worked great. No more punches slipping around.

At the bottom is an automatic center punch. I love these things. You push down on the handle until the action cycles inside and the hardened tip makes a dimple in the surface without a hammer. Above it is my roll pin punch. Tons of companies make these and you can barely see the little ball at the end that will center the punch on the drill hole. Above it is an 1/8″ drill bit. I’d recommend you go with good cobalt bits when demilling. They last longer and will go through just about anything. Note, if you buy a cheap cobalt drill bit it can be worse than plain high speed steel from a quality manufacturer. Go with a brand name – Norseman is my favorite but you can go with stuff from big box stores too like Bosch, Dewalt, etc. If you are getting a set off Amazon, be sure to check reviews.

Here’s the finished result – a nicely separated receiver, selector stop plate and trigger guard. Be careful not to lose that stop plate – you will need to and the trigger guard for your next build.

One perk of only using an 1/8″ drill bit is that you have some margin for not being exactly centered on the rivet. 1/8″ is 3.127mm and a 5/32″ drill bit comes in at 3.969mm so real close to the actual 4mm holes drilled in the parts and if you are off a tad then you wind up with an “egged” or misshapen holes. Of course you can use other size drill bits – just figure out what you like.

Even though rivets are relatively soft steel, I still recommend you use cutting fluid. I keep some Tap Magic in a little squeeze bottle with a needle tip and it makes it super easy to add it when working.

Summary

Removing the trigger guard is all about getting rid of the five rivets that hold it in place. Whether you drill, sand, mill, grind or otherwise cut off the tops, then drill out the remainder – using a roll pin punch really makes it easy to punch them out the rest of the way.

Ronin's Grips

Tag Archives: AK-47

Yugoslavia’s AK Path: The USSR Would Not Share Their AK-47 Rifles or Designs With Yugoslavia

Works cited

Like this:

Are You Looking For A Lubricant That Performs Better Than CLP? Check Out Kentuckiana Gun Works – Enhanced Reliability Oil

Did Some Digging

Assembly Lube Testing

Like this:

PSA Has Evolved Their AK Offerings Considerably – Taking A Close Look At A GF5

PSA will tell you

Yeah, I ordered one

Conclusion

Like this:

Super Secret AK Furniture Fitting Tool

Summary

Like this:

How To Locate And Drill AK Front and Rear Trunnion Rivet Holes

Using It For The Front Trunnion Holes

Tips For The Front Trunnion Holes

Doing The Rear Trunnion

Tips For the Rear

Summary

Like this:

How To Quickly Remove AK Receiver Rivets

Long Rear Trunnion Rivets

Summary

Like this:

You can Easily Remove A Side Rail Scope Mount But The Receiver Is Going To Look Butt Ugly

Summary

Like this:

How To Quickly And Easily Remove An AK Trigger Guard

Summary

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When Strength and Quality Matter Most

Blog.RoninsGrips.Com

Works cited

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Did Some Digging

Assembly Lube Testing

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PSA will tell you

Yeah, I ordered one

Conclusion

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Summary

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Using It For The Front Trunnion Holes

Tips For The Front Trunnion Holes

Doing The Rear Trunnion

Tips For the Rear

Summary

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Long Rear Trunnion Rivets

Summary

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Summary

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Summary

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When Strength and Quality Matter Most