Remembering the 9/11 Boatlift: Heroism on Water

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the catastrophic attacks on the World Trade Center transformed the physical, logistical, and psychological landscape of New York City. Lower Manhattan, a densely populated maritime peninsula bounded by the Hudson River, East River, and New York Harbor, suddenly lost its land transportation network. Within minutes of the strikes and the subsequent collapse of the towers, officials halted subway operations, closed vehicular tunnels to prevent secondary attacks, and shut down bridges to civilian traffic. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people fled south and west toward the water, finding themselves trapped at the edge of the southern waterfront.

Between mid-morning and dusk, an improvised fleet of commuter ferries, commercial tugboats, sightseeing vessels, private yachts, and municipal boats gathered at the burning tip of the island. Coordinated through the joint initiative of the United States Coast Guard and civilian harbor pilots, and guided by a long-standing maritime tradition of mutual aid, this spontaneous armada carried out the largest waterborne evacuation in recorded history. Known as the 9/11 Boatlift, or the “American Dunkirk”, the operation safely moved between 300,000 and 500,000 civilians away from Lower Manhattan in under nine hours. It remains a singular event in maritime history, showcasing an extraordinary combination of skilled seamanship, civilian volunteerism, and flexible crisis leadership.

US Army Corps of Engineers boat HOCKING navigates choppy water with NYC skyline and smoke in background. — Patrol Boat Hocking heads toward lower Manhattan on 9/11 to provide assistance following the attacks on the World Trade Center. PB Hocking was one of many U.S. Army Corps of Engineers vessels from various Districts that were on the waters of the New York and New Jersey Harbor that day helping to ferry evacuees from lower Manhattan and bringing in emergency responders on return trips. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers file photo) Obtained from Wikimedia on 9/9/2026.

The Maritime Crucible: Terrestrial Severance and the Stranded Seawalls

Manhattan’s identity has always been rooted in its island geography. Yet after a century of engineering, through subway tunnels, highway tubes, and suspension bridges, most people considered the city to be part of the mainland. That changed at 8:46 AM when American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center, followed at 9:03 AM by United Airlines Flight 175 hitting the South Tower. Instantly, the land routes out of the financial district were severed.

Immediately after the second strike, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, together with municipal agencies and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, shut down the regional transport system. All vehicular crossings, including the Holland, Lincoln, and Brooklyn-Battery Tunnels, as well as major bridges, were closed to outbound traffic to clear lanes for emergency vehicles and protect key infrastructure. Subterranean PATH trains under the World Trade Center were destroyed and rendered impassable, while the New York City subway suspended all service. The Federal Aviation Administration grounded civil aviation nationwide, and the U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port placed New York Harbor under immediate security restrictions.

Conditions worsened dramatically when the South Tower collapsed at 9:59 AM, followed by the North Tower at 10:28 AM. The failure of the 110-story structures sent a massive cloud of pulverized concrete, gypsum, asbestos, and burning jet fuel surging through the street canyons. An estimated one million workers, residents, and students were in Lower Manhattan during the attacks. Those fleeing the area spread out in large numbers: many walked north toward Midtown, while another large group headed across the pedestrian walkways of the Brooklyn and Manhattan Bridges.

U.S. Coast Guard member on boat observes hazy New York City skyline. — NEW YORK, New York (Sept. 11, 2001)–Coast Guard crewmembers patrol the harbor after the collapse of the World Trade Center. Terrorist hijacked four commercial jets and then crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania countryside. USCG photo by PA3 Tom Sperduto. By Coast Guard News – https://www.flickr.com/photos/coastguardnews/2846885031/, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=93918413

For hundreds of thousands of others, thick dust storms, intense heat, and falling debris blocked their escape to the north. Driven by survival instincts, crowds moved downhill toward the open air of the waterfront. People gathered in massive numbers along Battery Park, the North Cove Yacht Harbor, South Cove, Pier 11 at Wall Street, and the bulkheads along the West Side Highway.

At the water’s edge, people ran into a natural barrier: the deep tidal waters of New York Harbor. Covered in grey ash, struggling to breathe, blinded by dust, and terrified of further collapses or air strikes, the crowds pressed against the seawall. For the first time since the consolidation of Greater New York in the late nineteenth century, the only way off the southern tip of the island was by water.

Decentralized Command and the Summons: The Operational Pivot

The rescue effort did not begin as a formal plan from an emergency playbook. As disaster researchers James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf of the Disaster Research Center noted, standard emergency plans had no provisions for a full waterborne evacuation of Manhattan. Instead, the response grew out of a spontaneous effort by individual commercial mariners acting on professional instinct, which federal maritime authorities then organized into a coordinated rescue system.

Even before the towers collapsed, commuter ferry captains approaching Manhattan saw the fires and realized their morning runs were turning into a life-or-death emergency. Crews unloaded inbound passengers, turned their boats around in the slips, and began boarding anyone who reached the gangways.

As the crowds along the shore grew into the hundreds of thousands, the U.S. Coast Guard took operational control. Captain Richard E. Bennis (later promoted to Rear Admiral) was the commander of Coast Guard Activities New York. That morning, Bennis was driving south through Virginia on planned retirement leave with his wife. He was recovering from metastatic melanoma, having had surgical staples removed from his scalp just the day before following brain surgery. Near Quantico, he learned of the attacks, saw smoke rising from the Pentagon, and immediately turned around to race back to New York. That morning, while he was absent, Commander Patrick J. Harris, his deputy, served as Acting Captain of the Port from Fort Wadsworth on Staten Island. Following Bennis’s philosophy of delegating trust and empowering initiative, field commanders were authorized to take immediate action to save lives without waiting for approval from headquarters.

At the waterfront, Lieutenant Michael Day, Chief of the Waterways Oversight Branch, watched the crisis deepen as the towers fell. Massive clouds of debris swept across the Upper Bay, blocking visual sightlines and radar sensors on Governors Island, which blinded Coast Guard tracking screens. With land-based communications down and marine radio channels jammed, Day saw that a major humanitarian emergency was unfolding along the seawalls.

Day teamed up with Captain Andrew McGovern of the Sandy Hook Pilots Association. The Sandy Hook pilots knew the harbor’s currents, slips, depths, and docks intimately, and they maintained strong relationships with local tug and ferry crews. Day, McGovern, and a Coast Guard team boarded the Sandy Hook Pilot Boat New York and steered through thick dust with zero visibility directly toward Lower Manhattan. Lacking an official disaster plan for an urban evacuation, Day brought along the manual from Operation Sail 2000, a tall-ships festival hosted in the harbor the year before. The guidebook contained detailed technical data on harbor infrastructure, water depths, mooring posts, fuel locations, and medical staging areas along the shore.

Hoisting the Coast Guard Ensign on the Pilot Boat New York to establish federal command on scene, Day and McGovern positioned the vessel off the Battery as a floating command center. Day took the radio microphone and issued an urgent call over marine emergency frequencies, and the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service echoed it:

“All available boats… This is the United States Coast Guard. Anyone wanting to help with the evacuation of Lower Manhattan, report to Governors Island.”

The call rallied every available boat in the area. Operational traffic was shifted to VHF Channel 73 to keep emergency hailing channels clear. Captains arriving on scene radioed their vessel dimensions, water draft, and passenger capacities. At the same time, Coast Guard personnel landed at Battery Park in life vests with flags to set up staging zones on shore. This hub-and-spoke system transformed a chaotic gathering of boats into an organized evacuation network.

Operational Harbor Map: Evacuation Corridors and Sector Topography

To understand the scale, movement, and logistics of the boatlift, maritime historians look at five primary water corridors radiating out from the tip of Manhattan into New York and New Jersey waterways¹. The harbor operated like a giant transit wheel, with Lower Manhattan as the center, Governors Island and the Battery as the floating command hub, and piers in New Jersey, Brooklyn, Staten Island, and Midtown serving as reception points¹.

Cartographic Schematic of Harbor Evacuation Sectors

The following section details the location of shore reception terminals, transit routes, and embarkation points across the harbor grid:

Regional Latitude / Sector	West Shore: New Jersey Reception Terminals	Central Waterway: Hudson River Corridor	Crisis Hub: Lower Manhattan Seawalls & Slips	Eastern Waterway: East River Corridor	East Shore: Brooklyn & Long Island Terminals
Northern Harbor Reach (~40°45′N)¹	Port Imperial Ferry Terminal (Weehawken)⁴	Corridor Bravo (Northbound): Circle Line shuttles & private craft heading north	Pier 83 (W 42nd St), Pier 63 (Chelsea), & Pier 40 (Houston St) Staging	Upper East River navigation lanes	Brooklyn Navy Yard medical triage & emergency vehicle staging²
Central Reach (World Trade Center Axis) (~40°43′N)¹	Erie Lackawanna Terminal (Hoboken) & Newport Marina (Jersey City)¹	Corridor Alpha (Westbound): Continuous NY Waterway catamaran shuttles; tugs pushing across¹	Sector West: North Cove Yacht Harbor (WFC) & South Cove Promenade bulkheads¹	Mid-East River shipping channel	Fulton Ferry Landing reception station (DUMBO / Brooklyn Heights)²
Lower Financial Reach (Wall Street Axis) (~40°42′N)¹	Colgate Esplanade & Exchange Place Pier (Jersey City)¹	Lower Hudson River mouth / Upper Bay confluence	Sector East: Pier 11 (Wall Street) & South Street commercial ferry slips¹	Corridor Delta (Eastbound): SeaStreak catamarans, industrial tugs, fishing fleet	Brooklyn Navy Yard & Atlantic Avenue landing slips²
Harbor Core & Afloat Command Axis (~40°41′N)¹	Liberty State Park reception, triage & decontamination fields¹	Anchorage 20 / Lower Hudson entrance waters	Sector South: Battery Park granite seawall & Whitehall Ferry Terminal¹	On-Scene Command: Pilot Boat New York anchored off Battery (USCG / Ch. 73)²	Red Hook waterfront & Buttermilk Channel approach⁴
Upper New York Bay (South) (~40°40′N)¹	Port Liberte & Bayonne industrial docks; fuel barges	Open navigation channel for military and rescue operations	Harbor mouth / Upper Bay open water	Governors Island: USCG VTS station & initial vessel staging rendezvous¹	Brooklyn Army Terminal (Sunset Park): Mass bus and subway dispersion hub²
Southern Maritime Approach (~40°38′N)¹	Kill Van Kull tug stations (Moran, McAllister, Reinauer fleet bases)⁴	Corridor Charlie (Southbound): Staten Island municipal ferries (Samuel I. Newhouse)¹	Open water southward passage through Upper Bay	The Narrows / entrance to Lower New York Bay	Fort Wadsworth (USCG Activities New York Command Headquarters)⁴

Map of the Great 9/11 Manhattan Boatlift, showing evacuation corridors and terminals.

Harbor Sector Geographic Directory

Command & Afloat Staging Center:
- Governors Island Anchorage & North Battery Shoals serve as the USCG on-scene command platform aboard the Sandy Hook Pilot Boat New York, positioned directly at the mouth of Upper New York Bay to triage inbound volunteer craft and vector them into designated embarkation sectors².
Embarkation Perimeter (Lower Manhattan Waterfront):
- Sector West (Lower Hudson River): North Cove Yacht Harbor (World Financial Center) and South Cove. The dense overflow of evacuees fleeing westward from the World Trade Center site across the West Side Highway was handled. Sector South (Upper New York Bay): Battery Park seawall and the Whitehall Ferry Terminal. Primary loading zones for heavy harbor tugs, excursion craft, and the municipal Staten Island ferries.
- Sector East (East River): Pier 11 at Wall Street and slip bulkheads along South Street. Primary gateway for fast commuter catamarans and private auxiliary launches.
Debarkation & Reception Perimeter (Outer Harbor Shorelines):
- West Shore (New Jersey Waterfront): Exchange Place and Colgate Esplanade (Jersey City), Erie Lackawanna Marine Terminal (Hoboken), Port Imperial (Weehawken), and Liberty State Park (Jersey City)¹. East Shore (Brooklyn Waterfront): Fulton Ferry Landing / Brooklyn Heights, Brooklyn Navy Yard, and Brooklyn Army Terminal (Sunset Park)². South Shore (Staten Island): St. George Ferry Terminal.
- North River Corridor (Midtown Manhattan): Pier 40 (West Houston Street), Pier 63 (Chelsea), and Pier 83 (West 42nd Street).

Geographic Matrix of Operational Evacuation Corridors

Evacuation Corridor & Waterway	Embarkation Points (Lower Manhattan)	Debarkation Terminals (Reception Shores)	Predominant Vessel Types	Tactical Function & Operations
Corridor Alpha: Hudson River Westbound Crossing (~0.8 to 1.5 nautical miles)¹	North Cove Yacht Harbor; South Cove Promenade	Exchange Place & Colgate Esplanade (Jersey City); Erie Lackawanna Terminal (Hoboken)	NY Waterway fast catamarans, shallow-draft utility craft, and harbor tugs	Primary evacuation pipeline for corporate evacuees fleeing west; rapid continuous turnaround shuttles; mass decontamination and triage in NJ.
Corridor Bravo: Hudson River Northbound Shuttles (~1.5 to 3.5 nautical miles)	North Cove; riverfront bulkheads at West Side Highway	Pier 40 (Houston St); Pier 63 (Chelsea); Pier 83 (Circle Line, W 42nd St)	Circle Line Sightseeing vessels; historic fireboat John J. Harvey; private yachts	Long-range northward shuttles bypass severed Midtown road corridors and evacuate respiratory trauma casualties to Midtown hospitals.
Corridor Charlie: Upper Bay Southbound Transit (~5.0 nautical miles)	Whitehall Ferry Terminal; Battery Park Seawall	St. George Terminal (Staten Island); Liberty State Park Triage (NJ)¹	Staten Island Ferry municipal vessels (Samuel I. Newhouse); USCG patrol cutters	Mass-volume evacuation; high passenger displacement per crossing under heavy falling ash; casualty transfers directly to waiting ambulances.
Corridor Delta: East River Eastbound Crossing (~0.5 to 1.2 nautical miles)	Pier 11 (Wall Street); South Street bulkheads	Fulton Ferry Landing; Brooklyn Navy Yard; Brooklyn Army Terminal	SeaStreak catamarans; NY Waterway ferries; industrial tugs; private fishing vessels	Evacuation of Wall Street financial district workers toward Long Island; auxiliary transport of search-and-rescue teams into Brooklyn staging bases.
Corridor Echo: Logistics & Pumping Bridge (Inbound) (Harbor-wide access)	Staging bases in New Jersey, Brooklyn Navy Yard, and Governors Island	North Cove bulkhead; Pier 11; Ground Zero perimeter	Heavy harbor tugs, deck barges, and FDNY fireboats (Fire Fighter, McKean, Harvey)	Counter-flow logistics: ferrying ironworkers, search dogs, medical supplies, and fuel to Ground Zero; continuous seawater supply lines to FDNY apparatus.

The Responding Fleet: Technical Adaptation and the Mariners

The fleet that gathered at Lower Manhattan was one of the most varied collections of watercraft in North American history. More than 150 vessels and around 800 professional mariners took direct part in the evacuation and initial rescue efforts.

Vessel Classification	Primary Operators and Key Vessels	Technical and Operational Adaptations	Estimated Evacuee Volume
Commuter Passenger Ferries	NY Waterway (24 vessels including Christopher Columbus, George Washington, and Garden State), Staten Island Ferry (Samuel I. Newhouse), SeaStreak	They utilized high-capacity passenger decks and rapid turnaround cycles, operating at full throttle using bow-loading slips and commercial piers.	~150,000–200,000 (NY Waterway); ~100,000+ (Staten Island & others)
Commercial Tugboats	Moran Towing (11 tugs, including Turecamo Boys, Marie J. Turecamo), McAllister Towing, K-Sea Transportation, Reinauer, Weeks Marine, DonJon Marine	Nosed bow fendering directly against raw stone bulkheads; high engine torque used to hold station in currents; cut waterfront security fences.	Tens of thousands across multi-vessel shuttles; up to 100 passengers per tug per trip
Excursion and Dinner Boats	Circle Line Sightseeing (6 vessels), Spirit Cruises, World Yacht	They capitalized on wide-open observation decks and shallow drafts to access recreational park bulkheads, accommodating high civilian density.	~30,000 (Circle Line alone)
Municipal & Historic Fireboats	Historic Fireboat John J. Harvey, FDNY Fire Fighter, FDNY John D. McKean	Initial civilian evacuation; subsequent tactical conversion into seawater pumping platforms supporting land lines after mains ruptured.	~150 evacuees (Harvey); millions of gallons of firefighting water delivered
Private & Auxiliary Craft	Amberjack V (Capt. Vincent Ardolino), USMMA Kings Point utility craft (Growler, Blue Thunder), private motor yachts	Accessed shallow, debris-choked water; transported specialized search teams, medical personnel, and canine rescue units.	Thousands distributed across dozens of small craft

Commercial passenger ferries carried out the bulk of the evacuation. NY Waterway, led by founder Arthur E. Imperatore, deployed 24 swift catamarans and ferries. Vessels such as the Christopher Columbus, George Washington, Garden State, and Giovanni Da Verrazano ran continuous shuttles between Lower Manhattan and reception sites in New Jersey. Captains like Richard Thornton steered repeatedly into smoke-filled slips at North Cove and Pier 11, relying entirely on surface radar to avoid unseen hazards in the water. In total, NY Waterway alone evacuated between 150,000 and 200,000 people and transported more than 2,000 injured individuals across the Hudson.

At the same time, the large Staten Island Ferries continued operating between St. George and Whitehall Terminal under captains such as James Parese aboard the Samuel I. Newhouse, loading thousands of passengers on every run under falling ash.

While commuter ferries were designed for rapid passenger loading, bringing industrial tugboats into the rescue required quick physical improvisation. Tugs from Moran Towing, McAllister Towing, K-Sea, and Reinauer headed toward Manhattan as soon as the towers fell. Moran Towing sent 11 tugs, including the Turecamo Boys, Marie J. Turecamo, Brendan Turecamo, and Margaret Moran.

Because the stone seawalls at Battery Park lacked docking fenders or boarding ramps, tug captains used their rubber bow bumpers and engine power to hold their bows directly against the stone walls. The height difference between the promenade and the steel decks created dangerous drops; deckhands reached over the sides to catch frightened passengers as they jumped down onto the boats.

Where metal railings along the park blocked escape routes, tug crews grabbed cutting torches, went ashore, and sliced away the fences to clear paths to the water. Lacking standard mooring posts along the park walkways, deckhands tied heavy mooring lines around park lampposts and trees.

Despite the dangers of boarding hundreds of thousands of untrained passengers onto working industrial craft in near-zero visibility, disaster scholars James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf found that the primary evacuation was completed without a single passenger fatality or major maritime accident. Although later stories claimed a tug captain died of a heart attack during the operation, official maritime records and post-disaster studies confirm a remarkably clean safety record during the daylight evacuation.

Excursion boats and private operators also joined the rescue effort. Circle Line Sightseeing committed six large vessels, evacuating roughly 30,000 people to Midtown piers.

From Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, Captain Vincent Ardolino saw news coverage of the attacks, boarded his 92-foot party fishing boat Amberjack V, and headed toward Manhattan against outbound traffic. Ardolino brought his bow to the seawall, loaded hundreds of passengers per run, and ferried them across the harbor.

Small powerboats and utility craft crewed by midshipmen and officers from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point also ran back and forth, bringing medical supplies, trauma kits, and search equipment straight into the area.

The Anatomy of Evacuation and the Dual Lifeline

The evacuation changed how the harbor waterfront operated. Evacuees boarding at North Cove Marina, South Cove, Battery Park, and Pier 11 were taken across three major bodies of water: the Hudson River, the East River, and Upper New York Bay. To guide disoriented crowds, boat crews spray-painted cardboard boxes and bedsheets with destination names like “HOBOKEN”, “JERSEY CITY”, “BROOKLYN”, or “STATEN ISLAND” and hung them on their pilothouses.

Along the New Jersey shoreline, local authorities turned ferry terminals at Exchange Place and the Colgate Esplanade in Jersey City, the Erie Lackawanna Terminal in Hoboken, and Port Imperial in Weehawken into reception centers. Local authorities, medical teams, and bus companies set up decontamination lines, treated breathing problems, washed dust from eyes, and helped hundreds of thousands of displaced office workers move farther inland. Along the Brooklyn waterfront, the Brooklyn Army Terminal and Brooklyn Navy Yard processed tens of thousands trying to reach Long Island.

Time of Day	Operational Phase	Specific Tactical Actions and Maritime Developments
08:46 – 09:03 EDT	Impact and Initial Awareness	American Airlines 11 and United Airlines 175 strike the Twin Towers; harbor vessels observe explosions and monitor emergency radio traffic.
09:15 – 09:50 EDT	Regional Closure and Spontaneous Inversion	Port Authority and MTA shut down bridges, tunnels, and subways; inbound ferries reverse course and begin spontaneous civilian loadings.
09:59 – 10:28 EDT	Catastrophic Collapse and Land Isolation	The South and North Towers collapsed, massive particulate clouds engulfed Lower Manhattan, thousands fled to the seawalls, and the VTS radar is blinded.
10:45 – 11:15 EDT	Mobilization and Operational Anchor	LT Day broadcasts a call for “all available boats” from Pilot Boat New York; on-scene staging is established off the Battery.
11:30 – 16:00 EDT	Peak Evacuation Operations	A flotilla of over 150 vessels operates continuous shuttle cycles; coordination shifted to Channel 73; bulkheads cleared systematically.
16:00 – 17:30 EDT	Primary Evacuation Conclusion	The waterfront was cleared of stranded civilians; between 300,000 and 500,000 people moved to New Jersey, Brooklyn, and Staten Island in under nine hours.
18:00 EDT and Onward	Tactical Resupply and Hydraulic Pumping	Fleet transitions to heavy logistics, ferrying urban search teams, ironworkers, and gear; fireboats pump seawater for 80 continuous hours.

Historical Assessment: Comparison to Operation Dynamo

The Manhattan Boatlift is frequently compared to Operation Dynamo, the British rescue of Allied troops from Dunkirk, France, in May and June 1940. While Dunkirk took nine days across the open English Channel under air and artillery attacks, the Manhattan evacuation moved more people in a much shorter timeframe.

Operational Metric	Operation Dynamo (Dunkirk, 1940)	The Manhattan Boatlift (September 11, 2001)
Primary Operational Duration	9 Days (May 26 – June 4, 1940)	Less than 9 hours (morning to late afternoon)
Total Rescued Individuals	338,226 Allied soldiers	300,000 to 500,000 civilians
Vessels Engaged	~800 to 861 naval, merchant, and civilian craft	~150 to 200 commercial, public, and private crafts
Operational Geography	English Channel; open sea conditions; ~20 to 40 nautical miles	New York Harbor and river channels; ~0.5 to 5 nautical miles
Operational Threat Profile	Direct naval bombardment, aerial strafing, torpedoes, and sea mines	Dense dust clouds, zero visibility, falling structural debris, toxic air
Command and Control Structure	Military command via Royal Navy (Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay)	Collaborative distributed command: USCG and civilian maritime community

In less than nine hours, the boat crews in New York Harbor moved more people across the water than the British Navy and “little ships” rescued over nine days at Dunkirk.

The Reverse Resupply and Seawater Suppression

The fleet’s work did not end when the waterfront was cleared. By late afternoon on September 11, Lower Manhattan was cut off from normal land transit, with access roads blocked by damaged emergency vehicles, debris, and police lines. The harbor became the main supply route, turning the boatlift from an evacuation effort into a floating logistics pipeline.

Tugs, barges, and ferries carried thousands of emergency responders back across the bay. These included FEMA Urban Search and Rescue teams, structural engineers, search dog handlers, and ironworkers equipped with cutting torches to cut through the fallen steel. The boats returned loaded with medical supplies, burn treatments, bottled water, generators, and diesel fuel to support operations at Ground Zero.

At the same time, an emergency firefighting effort was underway along the Hudson River. The impact of the tower collapses broke city water mains under Lower Manhattan, dropping water pressure to zero and leaving fire hydrants dry. Without city water, the FDNY faced spreading fires in surrounding buildings.

The FDNY deployed its active fireboats, the Fire Fighter and John D. McKean, to draw water directly from the Hudson River and pump it to trucks on land. However, more pumping capacity was needed. Tied up at Pier 63 was the John J. Harvey, a historic 130-foot fireboat built in 1931 and retired by the FDNY in 1994. Maintained by a volunteer group of preservationists and engineers, including Chase Welles, Chief Engineer Tim Ivory, Tomas Cavallaro, Andrew Furber, and Huntley Gill, the historic vessel had headed south on Tuesday morning and evacuated 150 people to Pier 40.

As the Harvey dropped off passengers, the FDNY issued an emergency radio request for water pumping support. The department reactivated the 70-year-old boat, designated her Marine Company 2, and assigned an officer to her. Docking at the North Cove seawall, the crew connected large hoses from the boat’s valves directly to FDNY fire engines, including Engine 7. Joined on Wednesday by retired FDNY pilot Bob Lenney and assistant engineer Jessica DuLong, the crew worked continuously for 80 hours over four days. Working alongside the Fire Fighter and McKean, the Harvey pumped millions of gallons of river water into the site, helping hold back the fires until city water mains were repaired.

Operational Culture: Distributed Sensemaking and “Rule Breaking with Vigilance”

From an organizational standpoint, the boatlift is a striking example of flexible, local action succeeding when top-down systems fail. Traditional emergency plans assume that crisis operations require strict central control. On September 11, however, the collapse of the towers crippled normal municipal command centers.

In studying the response, Kendra and Wachtendorf noted that the harbor effort succeeded because it relied on shared maritime traditions. Captains operate within a professional culture shaped by long-standing customs and international agreements, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). These principles create a clear duty to assist anyone in danger on the water. On September 11, mariners extended that duty from individual boats in distress to an entire city shoreline in crisis.

Carrying out the rescue required an approach scholars describe as “rule breaking with vigilance.” In normal times, Coast Guard and Port Authority rules strictly limit passenger counts, stability limits, and designated docking locations. Following peacetime regulations to the letter would have stalled the rescue: boats would have waited offshore for official clearance while thousands inhaled toxic dust on the shores.

Instead, captains intentionally loaded beyond official passenger limits to save lives. One tour boat captain took on 300 passengers, well over normal capacity, reasoning that calm water, favorable weather, and short trips would keep the boat stable. Tug captains pushed against stone walls without proper fenders, while crew members removed physical barriers to help people reach the water.

A key factor in the rescue’s success was that Coast Guard leadership, including Captain Bennis, Commander Harris, Lieutenant Day, and the Sandy Hook Pilots, did not try to stop these independent civilian efforts. Instead of closing waterways or enforcing standard rules, the Coast Guard supported and organized the volunteer response. The Coast Guard and harbor pilots provided structure by establishing travel corridors, managing radio traffic, organizing landing points, and preventing collisions, while leaving individual choices to the vessel captains. Business competition between private boat operators faded into the background, as tugs and ferries gave way to vessels carrying injured passengers.

Recognition, Historiography, and Maritime Memory

Despite its giant scale, the 9/11 boatlift was initially overshadowed in public memory by the tragic loss of life at Ground Zero, the sacrifices of first responders, and the global events that followed. For several years, the rescue remained mostly an oral history known mainly among harbor workers and waterfront communities. Over the past two decades, historical research, official honors, and documentary films have brought the boatlift wider national recognition.

The 9/11 Maritime Medal Awards

Formal federal recognition came in September 2002, when the U.S. Department of Transportation hosted the official “9/11 Maritime Medal Awards” ceremony at the World Financial Center, next to North Cove Marina, where thousands had boarded rescue boats. Led by U.S. Coast Guard Captain Glenn A. Wiltshire and featuring remarks by U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Y. Mineta, the ceremony presented medals and citations to roughly 800 mariners, port managers, and maritime union representatives. Crew members from 11 Moran tugs, along with teams from NY Waterway, Circle Line, McAllister Towing, and independent boat owners, were formally recognized for their bravery and service.

Historiographical and Cultural Commemoration

Academic and historical books documented detailed accounts of the rescue. Professors James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf published American Dunkirk: The Waterborne Evacuation of Manhattan on 9/11 (Temple University Press, 2016), examining how civilian volunteers and government agencies worked together during a major disaster.

Jessica DuLong, who was an engineer on the John J. Harvey during the crisis, wrote Saved at the Seawall: Stories from the September 11 Boat Lift (Cornell University Press, 2021; first published in 2017 as Dust to Deliverance). The book is a collection of first-hand accounts from captains, deckhands, and evacuees.

For the general public, the short documentary Boatlift: An Untold Tale of 9/11 Resilience (2011), directed by Eddie Rosenstein and narrated by Tom Hanks, helped share the story widely around the tenth anniversary of the attacks.

Nonprofit maritime groups, particularly PortSide New York, based on the historic oil tanker Mary A. Whalen, created an oral history archive titled Mariners’ Response to 9/11, organizing educational programs, harbor tours, and memorial boat parades to honor the mariners.

The National September 11 Memorial & Museum includes the boatlift story in its permanent educational work through public panel discussions like “All Available Boats,” which bring together mariners, Coast Guard officers, and survivors.

Commemorating Port Leadership

Rear Admiral Richard E. Bennis did not live to see the full historical recognition of the harbor rescue. After serving as Captain of the Port, Bennis became Associate Under Secretary of Transportation for Maritime and Land Security at the newly formed Transportation Security Administration, applying lessons from September 11 to national port defense. He passed away from cancer in August 2003 at age 52. In his honor, the Coast Guard created the Rear Admiral Richard E. Bennis Award for Maritime Security, presented every two years to maritime facilities and operators that excel in port safety and emergency preparedness.

His field commander on the water, Lieutenant Michael Day, went on to a long career in the Coast Guard, eventually reaching the rank of Rear Admiral and serving as Commander of Coast Guard Sector New York from 2015 to 2018, where he frequently spoke about the importance of empowering local leadership and trusting civilian expertise during emergencies.

Historical Significance and Enduring Legacy

The 9/11 boatlift carries lasting lessons for urban planning, emergency preparedness, and maritime culture.

First, it highlighted the vital importance of an active, working city waterfront. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, many coastal cities re-zoned commercial waterfronts for residential buildings, parks, and retail space, moving tug docks, repair yards, and working barges out of central harbor areas.

The rescue proved that a working harbor, manned by experienced mariners and equipped with diverse vessels and accessible piers, is an essential asset for public safety and disaster response. If New York Harbor had lacked a strong network of tugboats, commercial pilots, and ferry services on September 11, hundreds of thousands of people stranded at the water’s edge would have faced prolonged danger and severe hardship.

Second, the boatlift reshaped how people understand disaster response. It showed that during severe citywide emergencies, rigid top-down structures need to make room for flexible, local initiative. When standard communications failed, the success of the rescue relied on the quick, decentralized decisions of mariners who knew their vessels and the harbor, supported by a flexible Coast Guard command.

Finally, the boatlift shows the dedication of the maritime community. In a moment of intense crisis, when land transit failed and fear gripped the city, the mariners of New York Harbor did not turn away. Answering the call for help and upholding seamanship traditions, they steered their boats into thick smoke and ash. Through their courage and initiative, they turned an everyday fleet into a lifeline, writing a proud chapter in maritime history.

The author and his family would like to send prayers to everyone who was involved. If there is a way you can help the survivors and remember the victims, please do.

Sources Used

Maritime response following the September 11 attacks – Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maritime_response_following_the_September_11_attacks
9/11 Remembrance and Survivor Tree Planting Ceremony, https://www.cbp.gov/medialibrary/assets/video/27398
‘We went into a tunnel off Manhattan Island and when we came out, https://www.facebook.com/7NEWSAdelaide/posts/we-went-into-a-tunnel-off-manhattan-island-and-when-we-came-out-the-other-end-th/1413462934263402/
9/11 maritime response , PortSide NewYork, https://portsidenewyork.org/911-maritime-response

Ronin's Grips

Remembering the 9/11 Boatlift: Heroism on Water

The Maritime Crucible: Terrestrial Severance and the Stranded Seawalls

Decentralized Command and the Summons: The Operational Pivot

Operational Harbor Map: Evacuation Corridors and Sector Topography