This report provides an exhaustive comparative analysis of the small arms adoption lifecycles of the United States and the Russian Federation, examining the entire process from the identification of a military need to final field deployment. The analysis reveals two fundamentally divergent philosophies rooted in distinct strategic cultures, industrial models, and historical experiences. The United States employs a market-driven, technology-focused model aimed at achieving “technological overmatch”—a decisive qualitative advantage over any potential adversary. This approach is characterized by a complex, lengthy, and expensive procurement process, managed through a competitive commercial industrial base, which yields highly advanced but costly weapon systems. Conversely, the Russian Federation utilizes a state-directed, evolution-based model that prioritizes reliability, simplicity, and mass production. This system, a legacy of its Soviet predecessor, relies on a state-controlled defense-industrial complex to produce robust, cost-effective weapons that are evolutionary upgrades of proven designs, intended to equip a large military force. The recent conflict in Ukraine has stress-tested both philosophies, highlighting the strengths and critical vulnerabilities of each. This report deconstructs the procedural steps, doctrinal underpinnings, and industrial realities of both lifecycles, offering a detailed analysis of their respective pros and cons and concluding with strategic lessons and an outlook on the future of infantry weapons in an era of rapid technological change.
Part I: The American Approach: A Market-Driven Quest for Overmatch
The United States’ approach to small arms adoption is a direct reflection of its broader national defense strategy: to deter and, if necessary, win conflicts through overwhelming technological superiority. This philosophy permeates every stage of the adoption lifecycle, from the initial definition of a requirement to the final fielding of a weapon system. The process is intricate, deliberative, and deeply integrated with a competitive commercial defense industry, creating a system that is simultaneously capable of producing world-leading technology and susceptible to significant bureaucratic and financial challenges.
Section 1. Doctrinal and Industrial Philosophy: The Pursuit of the Decisive Edge
The modern American system for developing and acquiring small arms is built upon three foundational pillars: a strategic doctrine demanding technological superiority, an industrial model reliant on the private sector, and a bureaucratic framework designed to enforce joint-service requirements.
Core Philosophy of “Technological Overmatch”
The central tenet of U.S. military modernization is the pursuit of “technological overmatch”.1 This doctrine posits that American forces must possess a decisive technological advantage to offset potential numerical inferiority and minimize casualties. In the context of small arms, this means new weapon systems are not sought as mere replacements for aging inventory; they are expected to be “leap-ahead” capabilities that provide quantifiable and significant improvements in core performance metrics such as accuracy, effective range, and terminal lethality.3 The objective is not to achieve parity with an adversary’s capabilities but to render them obsolete. This philosophy was the driving force behind the Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program, which was initiated specifically to defeat peer-adversary body armor that the existing 5.56x45mm NATO round could no longer reliably penetrate at desired engagement distances.5 The pursuit of overmatch dictates a high tolerance for complexity and cost in exchange for a decisive edge on the battlefield.
The Post-McNamara Industrial Model
The structure of the U.S. defense industrial base today is a direct legacy of policy decisions made in the mid-20th century, most notably those of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. His administration oversaw the closure of the government-owned and -operated armory system, exemplified by the historic Springfield Armory, which had designed and produced U.S. military small arms for nearly two centuries.6 This pivotal shift transferred the primary responsibility for weapons development and manufacturing to the private commercial sector.6
Consequently, the Department of Defense (DoD) transitioned from being a producer to a customer. The modern process involves the DoD generating detailed specifications and performance requirements, which are then distributed to industry through mechanisms like Requests for Proposal (RFPs) to solicit concepts and bids.6 This created a competitive marketplace where private firms vie for lucrative, long-term government contracts. The intended benefit of this model was to harness the dynamism and innovation of the American commercial sector, fostering a broader range of potential solutions than a state-run system could provide.6
However, this commercialization introduced a complex dynamic. The shift to a private industrial base created a vibrant ecosystem for innovation that the DoD can leverage.8 At the same time, it transformed the adoption process into an intense economic and political competition. The immense financial stakes involved—often hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars over the life of a program—incentivize extensive lobbying and political engagement by major defense contractors.6 This can lead to situations where legislators intervene to “jam up the process” to advocate for a vendor located in their state or district.6 Furthermore, the procurement cycle is notoriously long, formal, and bureaucratic, creating what is known in the industry as the “valley of death”.10 This is the perilous gap between the development of a promising prototype and the securing of a production contract, a period during which many smaller, more agile, and innovative companies often fail because they lack the financial reserves to sustain operations while navigating the protracted and costly procurement system.10 The system, therefore, inherently favors large, established defense contractors who possess the capital, institutional knowledge, and political influence required to endure the multi-year process.7 The very system designed to leverage commercial innovation can, in practice, create formidable barriers that filter for corporate endurance and political acumen as much as for pure technical merit.
Emphasis on Joint-Service Requirements
A third defining characteristic of the modern U.S. approach is the institutionalized emphasis on joint-service requirements. Historically, the different branches of the U.S. military often procured their own distinct weapon systems, leading to a proliferation of incompatible small arms and ammunition types. A congressional investigation in the 1970s, for instance, found that the U.S. Air Force alone had 25 different handguns in its inventory.11 This lack of standardization created significant logistical and interoperability challenges.
To address this, the DoD established the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), a formal process managed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to validate military requirements from a joint-force perspective.12 The goal of JCIDS is to ensure that new systems are interoperable, non-redundant, and meet the needs of the entire force, not just a single service.13 This philosophy is further embodied in organizations like the Joint Service Small Arms Program (JSSAP), which was created to coordinate and standardize weapons procurement across the armed services, as exemplified by the XM9 program that led to the adoption of the Beretta M9 pistol.11 While often criticized for its bureaucracy, this joint-centric approach is a core element of the U.S. lifecycle, intended to maximize efficiency and operational effectiveness across the entire Department of Defense.
Section 2. The Lifecycle Framework: From Capability Gap to Fielded System
The U.S. small arms adoption lifecycle is a highly structured, multi-phase process governed by a dense framework of regulations and managed by specialized organizations. It is designed to be deliberative and exhaustive, moving a concept from an identified operational need through development, rigorous testing, and ultimately to production and fielding.
Phase 1: Requirements Generation (The JCIDS Process)
The journey of a new weapon system begins long before any hardware is built. It starts with the formal identification of a need, which is then codified and validated through the JCIDS process.
- Triggering the Process: An adoption cycle is typically initiated by one of two primary drivers. The first is the simple aging of existing systems; firearms have a finite service life, and periodic replacement is necessary to prevent the force from fielding worn-out equipment.6 The more strategic driver, however, is the identification of an “emergent threat” or a “capability gap” where existing systems are deemed insufficient to meet future battlefield challenges.6 The NGSW program, for example, was a direct response to intelligence indicating that potential adversaries were fielding body armor capable of defeating the standard 5.56mm M4 carbine.5 This threat assessment triggers a formal requirements generation process.
- Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA): The sponsoring military service, such as the U.S. Army, initiates the process by conducting a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA).15 This is a formal, analytical study that identifies the operational tasks the force must be able to perform, assesses the ability of current and programmed systems to accomplish those tasks against a projected threat, and identifies any shortfalls or “gaps”.16 The CBA is the foundational document that provides the analytical justification for pursuing a new materiel solution.15
- JCIDS Documentation and Validation: If the CBA determines that a new system is required, the sponsoring service develops an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). The ICD formally documents the capability gap and proposes a range of potential solutions, both materiel and non-materiel (such as changes in doctrine or training).13 This document is then submitted into the JCIDS process for review and validation. It is scrutinized by the Joint Staff and various Functional Capability Boards (FCBs) before being presented to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.12 The JROC’s role is to validate the requirement from a joint-force perspective, ensuring it aligns with broader defense strategy and does not create redundancies.12 A validated ICD provides the authority for a program to proceed to a Milestone A decision, officially initiating the acquisition process.13
- Critique of JCIDS: While well-intentioned, the JCIDS process is widely criticized within the defense community as a major source of delay and inefficiency. Critics argue that it is a “time-consuming, ‘low-value-added’ bureaucratic mess” that can add a minimum of two years to the development timeline.17 The process is seen as overly rigid, forcing programs to lock into technical specifications years before prototyping, which stifles innovation and makes it difficult to adapt to evolving technology or threats.17 Reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have highlighted that programs rarely, if ever, complete the JCIDS validation process within the notional 103-day timeline established by the Joint Staff.18
Phase 2: Acquisition and Development (The PEO Soldier Model)
Once a requirement is validated, the program moves into the acquisition phase, managed by a dedicated Program Executive Office (PEO). For the U.S. Army, this responsibility falls to PEO Soldier.
- Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier: PEO Soldier is the Army’s central organization responsible for the rapid prototyping, procurement, and fielding of all equipment a soldier wears, carries, or consumes.19 Within this organization, specific small arms programs are managed by Project Manager Soldier Lethality (PM SL) and its subordinate offices, such as Product Manager, Individual Weapons (PdM IW) and Product Manager, Next Generation Weapons (PdM NGW).19 These offices are responsible for the entire lifecycle management of their assigned weapon systems, from development to divestiture.19
- Industry Engagement and Solicitation: PM SL translates the validated requirements from the ICD into a formal solicitation for industry. This can take the form of a traditional Request for Proposal (RFP) or a more flexible instrument like a Prototype Project Opportunity Notice (PPON) issued under Other Transaction Authority (OTA).6 OTAs, in particular, have become a favored tool for accelerating development, as they are less constrained by traditional federal acquisition regulations and allow for more agile, collaborative prototyping efforts with industry.21 The solicitation will detail the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs)—the mandatory, non-negotiable performance thresholds the system must meet—as well as other desired attributes.6
- Competitive Prototyping: A hallmark of the U.S. system is its reliance on competition to drive innovation and ensure value. For major programs, the government typically awards development contracts to multiple vendors, funding them to produce and submit prototype systems for evaluation.6 In the NGSW program, the Army down-selected three industry teams (SIG Sauer; General Dynamics/True Velocity; and Textron Systems) to participate in the final 27-month phase of prototyping and testing.3 Each team was required to deliver a complete system, including a rifle, an automatic rifle, and their unique ammunition solution.3 This competitive approach allows the government to evaluate multiple design philosophies side-by-side before committing to a single solution.
Phase 3: Testing, Evaluation, and Refinement
This phase is arguably the most critical and resource-intensive part of the U.S. lifecycle. It is a comprehensive and data-driven effort to ensure that a proposed system is not only technically sound but also operationally effective, reliable, and suitable for the soldier who will use it.
- Rigorous Test and Evaluation (T&E) Protocol: Candidate systems are subjected to an exhaustive battery of tests designed to verify their performance against the KPPs and other requirements. This includes technical testing for accuracy, reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) under a wide range of environmental and operational conditions.6 For the NGSW program, this phase was immense in scale, involving the firing of over 1.5 million rounds of the new 6.8mm ammunition and the accumulation of over 20,000 hours of direct soldier testing and feedback.22 These tests are conducted at specialized facilities like the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) Armaments Center.23
- Soldier-Centric Feedback and Iterative Design: A significant evolution in the modern U.S. T&E process is the deep integration of soldier feedback throughout development. Programs now incorporate multiple “Soldier Touch Points” (STPs), where active-duty soldiers are given prototype weapons and asked to evaluate their ergonomics, handling, and usability in realistic scenarios.22 This is augmented by more formal Expeditionary Operational Assessments (EOAs), where units test the systems in field training environments to provide data-driven analysis and direct user feedback.24 This iterative process is crucial; it allows program managers and industry designers to make “simple design changes” based on real-world input, ensuring the final product is not just a marvel of engineering but a practical and effective combat tool that has the confidence of the end-user.22 This approach directly addresses historical failures where technically impressive weapons were fielded that soldiers found difficult to use or maintain.
- Materiel Release: Before a weapon can be officially fielded, it must receive a formal Materiel Release. This is a certification process managed by organizations like DEVCOM and the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), which confirms that the system has met all safety, performance, and supportability requirements.23 It is the final technical gate before production and deployment.
Phase 4: Production and Fielding
Following a successful T&E phase and a “down-select” decision, the program transitions to producing and delivering the new system to the force.
- Contract Award and Production: The winning vendor is awarded a production contract, which is often structured to begin with Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP).3 LRIP allows the manufacturer to establish and refine their production lines and quality control processes while producing a limited number of systems for further operational testing. Once these processes are proven, the DoD grants a Milestone C approval for Full-Rate Production, authorizing the manufacture of the weapon system in large quantities.
- Phased Deployment: New small arms systems are rarely, if ever, fielded to the entire military simultaneously. The process is phased and prioritized. The first units to receive new equipment are typically high-priority, “first-to-fight” formations, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division, or other elements of the “close combat force”.9 From there, the system is gradually rolled out to other combat units, followed by combat support and service support units. This process can take many years, sometimes a decade or more, to complete. As a result, it is common for different units within the same service to be equipped with different generations of weapons long after a new system has been officially adopted.9
- Full Life-Cycle Management: The adoption lifecycle does not conclude with fielding. It is a “cradle-to-grave” process that includes long-term sustainment, periodic modernization and upgrades, and eventual divestiture.25 Sustainment is managed by organizations like the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM).23 When a weapon is finally deemed obsolete or unserviceable, it is turned in to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for demilitarization and disposal, completing the lifecycle.26
Section 3. Case Study: The Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) Program
The NGSW program serves as the quintessential example of the modern U.S. small arms adoption lifecycle in action, embodying its philosophies, processes, and complexities.
- The Need: The program was formally initiated in 2017, directly stemming from a congressional mandate and a series of Army studies, including the Small Arms Ammunition Configuration (SAAC) Study.3 These analyses identified a critical capability gap: the standard 5.56x45mm NATO cartridge fired by the M4 carbine and M249 SAW could not reliably defeat the advanced ceramic body armor being fielded by peer adversaries like Russia and China, particularly at ranges beyond 300 meters.5 This gap represented an unacceptable risk to the principle of technological overmatch, necessitating a revolutionary leap in infantry weapon performance.
- The Process: The Army established ambitious requirements for a new, common system chambered in a government-specified 6.8mm projectile, intended to replace the M4, M249, and eventually the M240 machine gun.3
- To accelerate the process, the Army utilized flexible OTA contracting, issuing a PPON that invited industry to propose integrated solutions encompassing a rifle (NGSW-R), an automatic rifle (NGSW-AR), and a novel ammunition design that could achieve the required high velocities and pressures.21
- This competitive process resulted in the down-selection of three distinct technological approaches: SIG Sauer’s hybrid metallic-cased cartridge, True Velocity’s polymer-cased cartridge (paired with a General Dynamics/Beretta bullpup weapon), and Textron Systems’ cased-telescoped ammunition.3 This allowed the Army to test and evaluate fundamentally different solutions to the same problem.
- Crucially, the Army ran a separate competition for the fire control system (NGSW-FC), recognizing that the optic was as important to achieving overmatch as the weapon itself. This competition was won by Vortex Optics with their XM157, a highly advanced optic integrating a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, and environmental sensors.3 This demonstrates the modern “system-of-systems” approach, where the weapon is just one component of an integrated lethality package.
- Over a 27-month period, the three competing systems underwent exhaustive testing and a series of Soldier Touch Points. This iterative feedback loop was critical, allowing for refinements to ergonomics, weight distribution, and user interfaces based on direct soldier input.3
- In April 2022, after the comprehensive evaluation, the Army announced that SIG Sauer had been awarded the 10-year production contract.3
- The Outcome: The selection of SIG Sauer’s platform resulted in the designation of the XM7 Rifle and the XM250 Automatic Rifle, firing the 6.8x51mm Common Cartridge. Paired with the XM157 Fire Control system, the NGSW represents a generational leap in the range, accuracy, and lethality of the individual soldier’s weapon.3 It is the physical embodiment of the “technological overmatch” philosophy, providing the close combat force with a capability that no other military currently possesses.
Section 4. Analysis of the U.S. Model: Strengths and Systemic Hurdles
The American small arms adoption lifecycle is a double-edged sword. Its meticulous, competitive, and soldier-focused nature produces exceptional weapon systems, but these strengths are counterbalanced by significant systemic weaknesses.
Pros:
- Fosters Technological Innovation: The competitive, market-based model incentivizes private industry to invest heavily in research and development to gain a technological edge and win lucrative, multi-billion dollar contracts. This dynamic pushes the boundaries of what is possible in small arms design.6
- Thoroughness and Rigor: The exhaustive T&E process, combined with the iterative feedback from Soldier Touch Points, ensures that the final product is not only technically compliant but also highly capable, reliable, and accepted by the end-user. This minimizes the risk of fielding a flawed or unpopular system.22
- High-Performance End Product: The unwavering focus on achieving technological overmatch consistently results in weapon systems that are among the most advanced and capable in the world, providing U.S. forces with a tangible battlefield advantage.2
- Enhanced Interoperability: Despite its bureaucratic nature, the JCIDS process enforces a joint-force perspective, promoting standardization of systems and ammunition across the DoD. This simplifies logistics, reduces training burdens, and enhances operational effectiveness in joint environments.11
Cons:
- Bureaucratic Slowness and Protracted Timelines: The multi-layered review and approval process, particularly the JCIDS framework, is incredibly slow and cumbersome. Major acquisition programs frequently take a decade or more to move from initial concept to first unit equipped, a timeline that struggles to keep pace with the rapid evolution of threats and technology.9
- Immense Cost: The combination of funding multiple competitive prototypes, conducting extensive and lengthy testing, and pursuing cutting-edge, often unproven, technologies makes U.S. small arms programs exceptionally expensive. These high costs can limit the total number of systems procured and place significant strain on defense budgets.29
- Inherent Risk Aversion: The enormous cost, long timelines, and high public and political visibility of major defense acquisition programs can foster a culture of profound risk aversion within the procurement bureaucracy. This can lead to a preference for incremental improvements over truly revolutionary (but potentially higher-risk) concepts, and can stifle the adoption of innovative solutions from non-traditional defense contractors.10
- Program Instability and Political Interference: U.S. acquisition programs are highly vulnerable to the annual congressional budget cycle. Shifting political priorities, partisan budget disputes, and the frequent use of stopgap funding measures known as Continuing Resolutions (CRs) create significant instability. This uncertainty makes long-term planning difficult for both the DoD and industry, and can lead to program delays, cancellations, or “death by a thousand cuts” as funding is slowly reduced over time.6
Part II: The Russian Approach: State-Directed Evolution of a Legacy
The Russian Federation’s methodology for small arms adoption stands in stark contrast to the American model. It is a system forged in the crucible of Soviet industrial planning and the doctrinal necessity of equipping a massive, conscript-based military. This legacy informs a philosophy that prioritizes unwavering reliability, operational simplicity, and the capacity for mass production over the pursuit of the absolute technological cutting edge. The process is centralized, top-down, and executed through a state-controlled defense industry, resulting in a lifecycle that is more direct but also more insular and path-dependent than its U.S. counterpart.
Section 1. Doctrinal and Industrial Philosophy: Reliability, Simplicity, and Mass
The Russian approach is guided by a pragmatic philosophy shaped by its unique military history and industrial structure. It is a system designed for resilience and scale, where the individual weapon is viewed as a robust tool for a vast army rather than a high-tech solution for a specialized force.
Core Philosophy of “Good Enough”
The foundational principle of Russian small arms doctrine is the production of weapons that are supremely reliable, simple to operate and maintain, and cost-effective enough to be manufactured in vast quantities.31 This “good enough” philosophy is a direct inheritance from the Soviet era, which required weapons that could be effectively used by minimally trained conscripts and could function flawlessly in the harshest environmental conditions, from the arctic cold to desert dust. While Western design often seeks to maximize performance, Russian design seeks to minimize failure. This results in a preference for proven mechanisms, generous operating tolerances, and evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, design changes. The weapon is expected to work every time, for everyone, everywhere, and this doctrinal imperative takes precedence over achieving marginal gains in accuracy or ergonomics through complex or delicate mechanisms.32
The State-Controlled Industrial Model (OPK)
Unlike the competitive commercial marketplace in the U.S., the Russian defense-industrial complex (known by the Russian acronym OPK) is dominated by large, state-owned or state-controlled corporations.33 The most prominent of these is Rostec, a state corporation that acts as a holding company for hundreds of defense and high-tech enterprises. Key small arms developers fall under this umbrella, including the iconic Kalashnikov Concern (the primary producer of assault rifles), TsNIITochMash (a central research institute specializing in ammunition and special-purpose weapons), and the KBP Instrument Design Bureau (a developer of high-precision weapons and pistols).33
These entities are not independent commercial competitors in the Western sense; they are instruments of state policy. They operate within a managed economy, often heavily subsidized by the government, with a mandate to fulfill state requirements rather than to maximize shareholder profit.33 This structure allows the Kremlin to direct industrial priorities, ramp up production to a “war economy” footing during conflicts, and sustain production lines for strategically important systems even when they are not profitable.33
The relationship between the state and these design bureaus is deeply intertwined. The success of a design bureau is measured by its ability to secure state orders and have its designs officially adopted by the military. This creates a form of competition, but it is a competition for state favor and resources within a closed system, not a competition for market share in an open one.
Centralized, Top-Down Requirements
The requirements generation process in Russia is a direct, top-down affair. The Ministry of Defence, guided by the national military doctrine, identifies a need and issues a requirement directly to one or more of the state design bureaus.37 There is no equivalent to the complex, bottom-up, consensus-building JCIDS process. The state is the sole customer and the ultimate arbiter of what is needed. These requirements are formalized within long-term State Armament Programmes (GPV), which outline modernization priorities over a decade, and are funded through annual State Defence Orders (GOZ).39 This centralized system can, in theory, be much faster and more decisive than the American process, as it bypasses inter-service debate and lengthy bureaucratic validation cycles.
This state-centric model is profoundly shaped by the legacy of its most successful product. The global success and ubiquity of the Kalashnikov rifle platform have created a powerful institutional inertia that both enables and constrains the Russian adoption system. The entire military apparatus—from training manuals and maintenance depots to the muscle memory of generations of soldiers—is built around the AK. Consequently, while Russian design bureaus have produced technologically advanced and innovative concepts over the years, such as the hyper-burst AN-94 or the balanced-recoil AEK-971, these systems have consistently failed to achieve widespread adoption.41 They have been relegated to niche roles within special forces units primarily because their increased complexity and cost were deemed unjustifiable for a mass-issue service rifle, especially when vast stockpiles of perfectly functional older AK-variants remained in reserve.42 The most recent standard-issue rifle, the AK-12, is not a revolutionary departure but a modernized AK-74, featuring ergonomic and modularity upgrades like Picatinny rails, an improved safety, and an adjustable stock.41 This path demonstrates that the Russian adoption lifecycle is less about discovering the next revolutionary rifle and more about perfecting the current one. This path-dependency ensures logistical simplicity and leverages existing industrial infrastructure, but it also risks technological stagnation when faced with an adversary willing to make a revolutionary leap, such as the U.S. adoption of an entirely new intermediate caliber with the NGSW program.
Section 2. The Lifecycle Framework: The Centrality of Design Bureaus and State Trials
The Russian adoption lifecycle is a more linear and state-controlled process than its American counterpart. It is centered on the technical expertise of the design bureaus and culminates in a rigorous, state-administered final examination known as State Trials.
Phase 1: Requirement and Design
The process begins when the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) identifies a need, based on its analysis of future threats and the performance of existing equipment, and issues a formal requirement.45 This requirement is then passed to the state’s primary design bureaus. Often, multiple bureaus are tasked with developing competing prototypes, fostering a degree of internal competition within the state-controlled system. For example, the competition to select a new service rifle for the Ratnik future soldier program pitted the Kalashnikov Concern’s AK-12 against the A-545, a design originating from the Degtyarev Plant.44 These bureaus have specialized areas of expertise; Kalashnikov is the leader in standard assault rifles, while TsNIITochMash focuses on specialized systems, such as silenced weapons like the VSS Vintorez and AS Val, and the development of new ammunition types.35
Phase 2: Prototyping and Internal Evaluation
Once tasked, the design bureaus begin an internal process of design, prototyping, and refinement. This is an iterative process where initial concepts are built, tested, and improved based on the results. As seen in the development of the Lebedev series of pistols, a design may go through several iterations (e.g., from PL-14 to PL-15) as flaws are identified and enhancements are made.48 During this phase, the bureaus may solicit limited feedback from elite end-users, such as Spetsnaz (special forces) or units of the Rosgvardiya (National Guard).48 A recent and prominent example of this is the testing of the new AM-17 compact assault rifle within the “special military operation zone” in Ukraine. Feedback from military personnel in an active combat environment led to direct modifications of the design, demonstrating a pragmatic approach to leveraging real-world experience to refine a weapon before it enters formal trials.50
Phase 3: State Trials and Formal Adoption
This phase is the pivotal gateway to service adoption. Once a design bureau is confident in its prototype, it is submitted for formal State Trials.
- State Trials: These are not internal company tests but a rigorous, comprehensive evaluation conducted by the state to verify that the weapon meets all of the MoD’s established tactical and technical specifications.50 The trials are designed to push the weapon to its limits under a variety of stressful conditions, such as extreme temperatures, heavy contamination with dirt and sand, and sustained high rates of fire, to ensure it meets the Russian military’s stringent standards for durability and reliability.51 The successful completion of State Trials is the single most important milestone in the adoption process.50
- Formal Adoption and Designation: If a weapon successfully passes State Trials, a recommendation for adoption is made to the government. The final step is the issuance of a formal government decree officially adopting the weapon into service with the Armed Forces.43 Upon adoption, the weapon is assigned an official designation by the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU). This GRAU index (e.g., 6P70 for the AK-12) becomes its formal military identifier, distinct from its factory or design name.53
Phase 4: Production and Fielding
With the weapon officially adopted, the lifecycle moves to mass production and distribution to the armed forces.
- Production: Production is carried out at state-owned manufacturing plants, such as the Kalashnikov facilities in Izhevsk, based on quantities and timelines specified in the annual State Defence Orders (GOZ).34 The state-controlled nature of the industry allows the government to directly manage production priorities and output volume.
- Fielding: Similar to the U.S. model, new Russian weapon systems are typically fielded in a phased manner. The first recipients are almost always elite, high-readiness units such as the VDV (Airborne Troops), Naval Infantry, and Spetsnaz formations.9 The distribution of the Ratnik combat system followed this pattern, with these premier units being equipped first.54 However, the process of equipping the broader ground forces is often extremely slow and incomplete. Due to the immense size of the Russian military, budgetary constraints, and the existence of vast stockpiles of older but still serviceable weapons, it can take many years for a new rifle to see widespread use. It is common to see regular motorized rifle units still equipped with older AK-74s, or even mobilized personnel with obsolete weapons like the Mosin-Nagant, long after a new system like the AK-12 has been adopted.41
Section 3. Case Study: The Ratnik Combat System and the AK-12
The Ratnik (“Warrior”) program and the associated adoption of the AK-12 rifle provide a clear illustration of the modern Russian adoption lifecycle, highlighting its priorities, competitive dynamics, and ultimate preference for evolutionary pragmatism.
- The Need: The Ratnik program was Russia’s comprehensive effort to modernize the individual soldier, analogous to Western “future soldier” programs. It was conceived as a holistic system integrating advanced body armor (6B45), helmets (6B47), and modern communication and navigation equipment (“Strelets” system).54 A critical component of this system was a new, modernized service rifle to replace the aging AK-74M.55
- The Process: The rifle competition for the Ratnik program saw two main contenders: the Kalashnikov Concern’s AK-12, a project to thoroughly modernize the AK platform, and the A-545 from the Degtyarev Plant, which was a refined version of the earlier AEK-971 featuring a sophisticated balanced-recoil system designed to significantly reduce felt recoil and improve controllability in automatic fire.44
- The trials were protracted. The initial version of the AK-12 was heavily criticized by the military for its cost and perceived lack of significant improvement over the AK-74M, forcing Kalashnikov to go back and extensively redesign the rifle into a more practical and cost-effective form.
- Ultimately, the Russian MoD made a pragmatic choice that perfectly encapsulates its underlying philosophy. The redesigned AK-12, which was simpler, more familiar to the troops, and less expensive to produce, was selected as the new standard-issue rifle for general-purpose forces. In a telling compromise, the more complex and expensive A-545 was also adopted, but only in limited numbers for issuance to special forces units who could better leverage its performance advantages and manage its increased complexity.41 This dual-track adoption demonstrates a clear prioritization of cost and simplicity for the mass army, while still providing advanced capabilities to elite units.
- The Outcome: The Ratnik system as a whole represents a significant and necessary modernization of the Russian soldier’s individual equipment. However, its small arms component, the AK-12, is a clear example of evolutionary, not revolutionary, development. It enhances the proven AK platform with modern features but does not fundamentally change its operation or capabilities in the way a new caliber would. Furthermore, the fielding of both the Ratnik gear and the AK-12 has been inconsistent. While elite units have been largely equipped, many regular and mobilized units deployed in Ukraine continue to be seen with older AK-74s, highlighting the logistical and financial challenges of modernizing such a large force.41
Section 4. Analysis of the Russian Model: Strengths and Endemic Weaknesses
The Russian state-directed adoption lifecycle possesses a unique set of advantages and disadvantages that are a direct result of its centralized structure and doctrinal priorities.
Pros:
- Simplicity and Potential for Speed: When the state deems a program a high priority, the top-down, centralized process can be significantly faster and less bureaucratically encumbered than the multi-layered U.S. system. It eliminates the need for inter-service consensus and lengthy public contracting procedures.
- Cost-Effectiveness and Mass Production: The focus on evolutionary upgrades of proven designs, combined with state control over pricing and production, keeps manufacturing costs relatively low. This enables the procurement of weapons in large quantities, consistent with the doctrine of equipping a mass army.52
- Rapid Production Scaling: The state-managed “war economy” model allows the government to direct the OPK to rapidly increase production during a conflict, retooling factories and running them 24/7, unconstrained by the profit motives or market limitations that affect Western commercial firms.33
- Exceptional Reliability: The doctrinal emphasis on simplicity and the rigorous nature of State Trials ensure that the weapons that are ultimately fielded are exceptionally durable, tolerant of abuse and neglect, and reliable in the most extreme conditions.31
Cons:
- Stifled Innovation: The lack of genuine market competition, combined with the powerful institutional inertia of the Kalashnikov platform, creates a system that is resistant to radical innovation. The path of least resistance is to incrementally improve the existing design rather than to invest in high-risk, potentially revolutionary new concepts.42
- Systemic Corruption: The opaque nature of the Russian defense budget and the GOZ procurement process creates significant opportunities for corruption. This can lead to the misallocation of funds, inflated costs, and compromises in the quality of materials and manufacturing, ultimately impacting the performance of the final product.39
- Inconsistent Quality Control: While the underlying designs are famously robust, the pressures of meeting state-ordered production quotas, especially during wartime, combined with supply chain disruptions and a less-skilled workforce, can lead to significant inconsistencies in manufacturing quality and final assembly.40
- Vulnerability to Sanctions: The Russian OPK, despite its legacy, has a critical dependence on foreign-made components, particularly in high-tech areas like microelectronics for optics and precision machine tools for advanced manufacturing. International sanctions can sever these supply chains, forcing Russian industry to simplify designs, find lower-quality domestic or third-party substitutes, or halt production of its most advanced systems altogether.40
Part III: Comparative Analysis and Future Outlook
The small arms adoption lifecycles of the United States and the Russian Federation are not merely different sets of procedures; they are reflections of fundamentally divergent approaches to warfare, industrial organization, and technological development. The U.S. system is an expensive, slow, but innovative engine designed to produce a decisive technological edge. The Russian system is a pragmatic, state-controlled machine designed to equip a massive force with reliable, familiar tools. The realities of modern, high-intensity conflict and the rapid pace of technological change are now challenging the core assumptions of both models.
Section 1. A Juxtaposition of Lifecycles: Process, Pace, and Priorities
The fundamental differences between the two systems can be most clearly understood through a direct, side-by-side comparison of their key characteristics. The following table distills the detailed analysis from the preceding sections into a concise framework, highlighting the stark contrasts in philosophy and execution that define each nation’s approach. This allows for a rapid, at-a-glance understanding of the core dichotomies that drive the two systems, such as the tension between market competition and state directive, or the pursuit of technological overmatch versus the necessity of mass production.
Feature Category | United States | Russian Federation |
Primary Driver | Addressing a “Capability Gap” against a peer adversary.6 | Fulfilling a state-defined need, often an incremental modernization of existing systems.37 |
Governing Philosophy | Technological Overmatch: Seeking a decisive, qualitative edge.1 | Mass & Reliability: Equipping a large force with simple, robust, “good enough” weapons.31 |
Requirements Process | Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS): Bottom-up, consensus-driven, bureaucratic.12 | Ministry of Defence Directive: Top-down, centralized, and direct.38 |
Industry Model | Competitive Free Market: Multiple private companies bid on government contracts.6 | State-Directed Economy: State-owned design bureaus fulfill government orders.33 |
Key Decision Authority | Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for requirements; Program Executive Office (PEO) for acquisition.12 | Ministry of Defence, culminating in a government decree for adoption.43 |
Testing Philosophy | Iterative & User-Focused: Extensive lab tests plus continuous “Soldier Touch Points”.22 | Culminating & Verificational: Rigorous, state-controlled “State Trials” as a final exam.50 |
Pace & Timeline | Extremely slow and protracted; often 10+ years from concept to fielding.9 | Can be rapid when prioritized by the state, but often slow due to funding/bureaucracy. |
Typical Cost | Extremely high, driven by R&D, competition, and advanced technology.29 | Relatively low, focused on leveraging existing designs and economies of scale.52 |
End Result | A technologically advanced, often complex “system of systems” for select forces.3 | An evolutionary, robust, and familiar weapon intended for mass fielding.41 |
Section 2. The Impact of Modern Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine and Beyond
The ongoing war in Ukraine has served as a brutal, real-world laboratory for modern conventional warfare, providing invaluable lessons that are forcing both the U.S. and Russia to re-evaluate their doctrines, technologies, and procurement priorities.
- The Transparent Battlefield: Perhaps the most profound lesson is the emergence of the “transparent battlefield.” The unprecedented proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS)—ranging from inexpensive, commercially-derived first-person view (FPV) drones used as precision munitions to sophisticated, long-endurance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms—has made it exceedingly difficult for ground forces to achieve surprise or to mass without being detected and targeted.60 This reality has immediate implications for small arms and infantry tactics. It elevates the importance of signature reduction, making effective suppressors an essential piece of equipment rather than an optional accessory, as their ability to mask a soldier’s position from acoustic detection is critical for survival.28 It also creates a new requirement for individual soldiers to be able to engage and defeat small, fast-moving aerial threats, a task for which traditional iron sights are wholly inadequate.
- U.S. Lessons Learned: For the United States and its allies, the conflict has been a sobering reminder of the realities of industrial-scale warfare. Observers note that the U.S. military’s emphasis on maneuver warfare is being challenged by the Russian model of attritional, artillery-centric combat.60 The conflict has underscored the immense consumption rates of ammunition and equipment in a peer-level fight, calling into question the sustainability of the Western model, which often favors small quantities of expensive, “exquisite” systems over large stockpiles of more basic munitions.62 The war validates the U.S. pursuit of networked warfare and precision fires, but it also highlights a critical need for a more agile and responsive acquisition system that can rapidly field countermeasures to new threats, like the swarms of FPV drones, and for an industrial base capable of surging production to meet the demands of a protracted conflict.60
- Russian Lessons Learned: Russia has been forced to learn and adapt under the extreme pressures of combat and international sanctions. The war has starkly exposed the endemic weaknesses in its logistics, the inconsistent quality of its mass-produced equipment, and the shortcomings of its rigid, centralized command structure.40 However, it has also demonstrated Russia’s considerable capacity for adaptation and resilience. The Russian military-industrial complex has shifted to a war footing, retooling civilian factories to mass-produce drones and simplifying weapon designs to accelerate output.60 Russian forces on the ground have adapted their tactics, learning to integrate drones directly into their artillery kill chains and adopting a brutal but effective attritional model that leverages their advantage in mass over Ukraine’s qualitative edge.60 This real-world combat experience is already feeding back into their development cycle, as evidenced by the field-testing of new systems like the AM-17 rifle in Ukraine, allowing for rapid, data-driven design refinements.50
Section 3. The Future Battlefield: Networked Lethality and Systemic Adaptation
The infantry weapon of the future will be defined less by its mechanical properties and more by its integration into a wider digital network. The trends in fire control, connectivity, and materials science are poised to trigger the most significant shift in small arms capability since the advent of the assault rifle.
- The Rise of the Smart Weapon and Networked Sights: The future of small arms is not the rifle itself, but the rifle as a node in a networked system. The U.S. Army’s XM157 NGSW-Fire Control is the vanguard of this transformation.28 It is not merely an optic; it is an integrated combat solution. By combining a variable-power magnified optic with a laser rangefinder, a ballistic calculator, a suite of atmospheric sensors, and a digital overlay, the XM157 automatically generates a disturbed reticle that gives the soldier a precise, corrected aiming point for a target at any range.28 This technology dramatically increases the first-round hit probability for the average soldier, effectively extending their lethal range and compensating for errors in range estimation and environmental factors.
- Connectivity, AI, and the Squad as a Sensor Network: The next logical step, already in development, is to network these smart sights. Through systems like the U.S. Army’s Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS), data from an individual soldier’s sight—such as the location of a lased target—can be instantly shared across the squad and pushed to higher echelons or other assets, such as loitering munitions or artillery.28 This transforms the infantry squad into a distributed sensor-shooter network, drastically compressing the kill chain. Artificial intelligence will play an increasing role in this ecosystem, assisting with automated target detection and identification, prioritizing threats, and deconflicting engagements to prevent fratricide.63
- Advanced Materials and Manufacturing: Concurrent advances in materials science and manufacturing will further revolutionize small arms design. The development of new alloys, polymers, and composites will enable the creation of lighter, stronger, and more durable weapons.64 Additive manufacturing, or 3D printing, holds the potential to disrupt the traditional logistics chain by allowing for the on-demand fabrication of spare parts, specialized components, or even entire weapon receivers in forward-deployed locations, significantly enhancing operational readiness and enabling rapid design iteration.6
Implications for Future Adoption Lifecycles:
- For the United States: The “system-of-systems” approach pioneered by the NGSW program is the clear path forward. Future U.S. small arms adoptions will be less about selecting a firearm in isolation and more about acquiring a fully integrated package of weapon, ammunition, fire control, and network connectivity. The primary challenge for the U.S. will be to reform its slow, risk-averse procurement process to make it agile enough to keep pace with the rapid, software-driven evolution of electronics and AI, which have much shorter development cycles than traditional hardware.8
- For the Russian Federation: Russia faces the significant risk of being left behind in this technological arms race. While it continues to produce excellent mechanical firearms and is developing integrated soldier systems like Ratnik, its small arms remain fundamentally analog devices. The primary challenge for Russia will be to develop and integrate advanced electro-optics and networking capabilities into its platforms without compromising its core doctrinal tenets of simplicity and reliability. This challenge is magnified by international sanctions that severely restrict its access to the Western-made high-end microelectronics and processors that are essential for developing advanced fire control systems.57
Conclusion and Strategic Recommendations
The analysis of the United States and Russian small arms adoption lifecycles reveals two systems that are logical products of their distinct strategic cultures, industrial capacities, and geopolitical realities. Neither system is inherently superior; each is optimized to achieve different objectives and possesses a unique profile of strengths and weaknesses.
The U.S. system is a complex, market-driven engine designed to produce revolutionary technological breakthroughs. Its slow, deliberative, and costly nature is a direct consequence of its ambition to achieve and maintain “technological overmatch.” The result, exemplified by the NGSW program, is a weapon system that can redefine battlefield dynamics by providing individual soldiers with an unprecedented leap in lethality. However, this system’s ponderous pace and immense expense make it vulnerable to rapidly emerging, low-cost threats and the attritional demands of high-intensity warfare.
The Russian system is a state-directed apparatus designed to sustain a massive military force with reliable, cost-effective, and familiar equipment. Its philosophy of evolutionary design, centered on the proven Kalashnikov platform, ensures logistical simplicity and the ability to produce weapons at scale. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the resilience of this mass-based approach, showing that quantity has a quality all its own. However, this same system suffers from a path-dependent inertia that stifles innovation, leaving it at a growing disadvantage in a technological competition and vulnerable to supply chain disruptions for critical components.
The conflict in Ukraine offers a stark preview of future warfare, where the technological sophistication of Western-backed systems collides with the attritional resilience of Russian mass. The lessons are clear: future success will require a synthesis of both quality and quantity, of technological superiority and industrial endurance.
Based on this analysis, the following strategic recommendations are offered for the United States and its allies:
- Accelerate Procurement Reform for Agility: The DoD must aggressively continue efforts to streamline the acquisition process, particularly for rapidly evolving technologies like software, AI, and counter-UAS systems. Expanding the use of flexible authorities like OTAs and creating pathways for non-traditional innovators to bridge the “valley of death” are critical to ensuring that the U.S. can field new capabilities at the speed of relevance, not at the pace of bureaucracy.
- Invest in Scalable Industrial Capacity: The pursuit of “exquisite” overmatch capabilities must be balanced with a realistic assessment of the logistical demands of a peer-level conflict. The U.S. and its allies must invest in modernizing and expanding the industrial base to ensure it can surge production of key munitions, small arms, and spare parts. This includes securing supply chains for critical materials and re-evaluating the trade-offs between a few highly advanced systems and larger quantities of “good enough” platforms.
- Prioritize the Networked Soldier: The future of infantry lethality lies in the network. Investment should continue to prioritize the development and fielding of integrated systems like the NGSW and IVAS, which transform the individual soldier from an isolated shooter into a networked sensor and effector. Doctrine, training, and leader development must evolve to fully exploit the capabilities of these new systems.
- Maintain Vigilant Intelligence of Adversary Adaptation: Russia’s ability to adapt its industrial base and tactics under the extreme pressure of war should not be underestimated. The U.S. and its partners must maintain a continuous and detailed intelligence effort to monitor Russian technological developments, industrial adaptations, and the lessons they are incorporating from the battlefield. Understanding how an adversary leverages “good enough” technology at scale is crucial for developing effective countermeasures and avoiding strategic surprise.
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