To comprehend the distinct roles and evolutionary trajectories of Iran’s elite special operations forces, one must first understand the unique and deliberately bifurcated structure of its national military apparatus. The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not a monolithic entity but are composed of two powerful, parallel, and often competing institutions: the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (the Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, or IRGC). Both are subordinate to a single commander-in-chief, the Supreme Leader, a structure that bypasses the elected presidency and concentrates ultimate military authority within the clerical establishment.¹ This dual-military system is the foundational context in which the Artesh’s 65th NOHED Airborne Special Forces Brigade and the IRGC’s Quds Force were born and have evolved.

The Artesh is Iran’s conventional military, the inheritor of the legacy of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. Its constitutional mandate is the defense of Iran’s territorial integrity and national borders against external aggression.³ The Artesh comprises traditional ground, naval, air, and air defense forces and operates the majority of Iran’s heavy conventional platforms, including tanks, major surface combatants, and fighter aircraft.¹ However, decades of international sanctions have severely degraded its ability to maintain and modernize this arsenal.¹ Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the new clerical leadership under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini viewed the Artesh, with its Western training and historical loyalty to the Shah, with deep suspicion.²

This distrust was the primary catalyst for the creation of the IRGC in April 1979. Established by Khomeini’s decree, the IRGC was conceived as a deeply ideological “people’s army” and a praetorian guard whose primary function was not to defend the borders, but to protect the Revolution itself from both internal and external threats.¹ Its constitutional role is explicitly the preservation of the revolutionary system.⁴ Over the subsequent decades, the IRGC has evolved from a paramilitary militia into Iran’s dominant military, political, and economic institution, wielding immense influence across all sectors of the state.³ It is geared toward asymmetric warfare and is the primary custodian of Iran’s most critical strategic assets, including its ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) arsenals, and is responsible for managing Iran’s network of regional proxies through its expeditionary arm, the Quds Force.¹

This structure is not an accident of history but a calculated strategy of institutionalized redundancy designed to ensure regime survival. By creating two powerful and parallel military organizations, each with its own command structure reporting directly to the Supreme Leader, the regime engineered a system of internal checks and balances. This arrangement effectively prevents any single military faction from accumulating sufficient power to challenge the clerical government, a lesson drawn from the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored the Shah to power.² This internal dynamic, characterized by competition for resources, influence, and the Supreme Leader’s favor, is a defining feature of Iran’s defense posture. The existence and divergent development of the Artesh’s 65th NOHED Brigade and the IRGC’s Quds Force are the direct manifestation of this dual-pillar strategy at the apex of Iran’s special operations capabilities.

II. The 65th NOHED Airborne Special Forces Brigade: The Artesh’s Elite Tip

The 65th NOHED Brigade represents the pinnacle of the Artesh’s special operations capabilities, a unit forged in the Western mold but tempered by decades of regional conflict and loyalty to the Islamic Republic. Its evolution from an Imperially-sponsored, US-trained commando force to a modern expeditionary unit is a testament to its institutional resilience and tactical adaptability.

Inception and Imperial Legacy: U.S. Special Forces Influence and Early Operations

The origins of the 65th NOHED Brigade are deeply rooted in the Western military tradition, a legacy that distinguishes it from its IRGC counterparts. The genesis of Iranian airborne forces began in 1953, when a contingent of ten Imperial Iranian Army officers was sent to France for parachute training.⁸ This led to the establishment of a formal Parachute Unit in 1955, which expanded into a Parachute Battalion by 1959.⁹

The pivotal year was 1959, with the establishment of the 23rd Special Forces Brigade, the direct parent unit of what would become the 65th.⁹ During the 1960s, this nascent force was shaped profoundly by American mentorship. Under the Shah’s pro-Western alignment, the United States dispatched advisors from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School to train and structure Iran’s special forces.⁸ This American influence was not superficial; it was embedded in the unit’s DNA. The brigade adopted the iconic green beret of its American trainers, and its qualification badge was designed to be nearly identical to the US Army Special Forces’ “De oppresso liber” insignia, a clear visual marker of its doctrinal heritage.⁸

This Western-style training was soon put to the test. In the early 1970s, the brigade, then known as the 23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, received its baptism by fire in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman.⁹ Deployed to assist the Sultan of Oman in combatting Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, the Iranian forces engaged in a classic counter-insurgency campaign, the very type of unconventional warfare for which their American advisors had prepared them.¹¹ This early operational experience cemented the unit’s reputation as a capable and professional fighting force.

Post-Revolutionary Crucible: The Iran-Iraq War and the Forging of a Modern Identity

The 1979 Islamic Revolution placed the Western-trained 23rd Brigade in a precarious position. The new regime was inherently suspicious of any institution associated with the Shah and his American patrons. This distrust culminated in a call by then-parliament-member Hassan Rouhani to disband the unit following the 1980 Nojeh coup plot, in which some military elements were implicated.⁹ However, the unit was saved by the staunch opposition of Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran, who recognized its strategic value.⁹

The crucible that would reforge the unit’s identity and prove its loyalty to the new republic was the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). As part of the 23rd Commando Division, the brigade was deployed extensively across all fronts of the brutal, eight-year conflict.⁸ The war demanded a broad spectrum of skills. The unit participated in large-scale conventional battles, such as the Breaking of the Siege of Abadan and Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, where it functioned as elite light infantry.⁹ Simultaneously, it was tasked with missions that leveraged its specialized training. It engaged in grueling mountain warfare, successfully holding strategic positions like the Dopaza and Laklak mountains against repeated Iraqi assaults, which included the use of chemical weapons.⁹ Furthermore, a select cadre of its personnel was detached to conduct clandestine special operations under the direct command of Defense Minister Chamran’s Irregular Warfare Headquarters, showcasing its dual-capability in both conventional and unconventional domains.⁹

Evolving Missions in the Modern Era: From Counter-Insurgency to Hybrid Warfare

The post-war reorganization of the Iranian military led to the formal establishment of the Artesh’s premier special forces unit. In 1991, the 3rd Brigade was separated from the 23rd Division to form the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, commonly known by its Persian acronym NOHED (Nīrūhāye Vīzheye Havābord, or Airborne Special Forces).⁹

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the 65th NOHED Brigade became the Artesh’s go-to force for complex domestic security challenges. It was consistently deployed for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism missions, primarily in the restive border provinces. It engaged drug trafficking syndicates and insurgent groups in Sistan and Baluchestan province and conducted operations against Kurdish separatist groups like the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) in the country’s northwest.⁹

A fundamental strategic shift occurred in April 2016, marking a new chapter in the brigade’s history. The Iranian government officially announced that “advisors” from the 65th NOHED Brigade were being deployed to Syria to support the government of Bashar al-Assad.⁸ This was a landmark event, representing the first official deployment of Artesh combat troops outside Iran’s borders since the 1979 revolution. For decades, extraterritorial operations had been the exclusive domain of the IRGC and its Quds Force. The deployment of NOHED to the Syrian battlefield was a clear signal from the Artesh leadership. Facing years of receiving less funding and political favor than the IRGC, the Artesh seized the opportunity to demonstrate its own expeditionary capabilities and relevance in modern hybrid conflicts.¹³ By proving its utility in a complex foreign theater, the Artesh could argue for a greater share of the defense budget and a more prominent role in national security strategy, directly challenging the IRGC’s monopoly. Furthermore, leveraging the more popular and less politicized national army for a controversial foreign intervention could provide a “patriotic” veneer to the policy, potentially bolstering domestic support.¹¹

In Syria, NOHED personnel fulfilled “advisory” and intelligence-gathering roles, primarily around Aleppo, and sustained casualties in direct combat with jihadist factions, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.¹¹

Current Doctrine, Training, and Capabilities

Today, the 65th NOHED Brigade is widely regarded as the most elite, best-trained, and best-equipped special forces unit within the Artesh.⁸ It is an all-professional, volunteer force, a rarity in Iran’s conscript-heavy military.¹³ Its unique background and continuous operational tempo have produced a force with a distinct set of capabilities.

The unit’s Western-style professional ethos and skillset, a direct legacy of its American training, remain a key differentiator. This “Western SOF DNA” provides the Iranian regime with a unique strategic tool. Unlike the Quds Force, which specializes in organizing and leading irregular militias, NOHED brings a high-level tactical and training capability geared towards professional military standards. This allows Iran to engage in different forms of military assistance simultaneously, tailoring its support to the specific needs of its allies, whether they are state or non-state actors.

Training for the brigade, nicknamed “Powerful Ghosts” within the Iranian military, is exceptionally demanding.⁸ Operators must master parachute operations and demonstrate proficiency in a wide array of environments. Specialized training camps are maintained for this purpose: jungle warfare in the forests of Kelardasht, snow and mountain warfare at the Emamzadeh Hashem ski resort, desert warfare near Qom, and amphibious operations at the Karaj Dam.⁸ The curriculum also includes espionage, reconnaissance, telecommunications, and irregular warfare, providing a robust guerrilla warfare capability.⁸

The brigade’s structure mirrors that of many Western special operations forces, with specialized sub-units dedicated to specific mission sets. These include a Hostage Rescue Unit (Unit-110), a psychological operations company, a support battalion, and irregular warfare teams.⁸ This organization grants the 65th NOHED Brigade a comprehensive skill set spanning direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and unconventional warfare.⁹

III. The IRGC-Quds Force: Instrument of Extraterritorial Influence

The IRGC-Quds Force is a fundamentally different entity from the 65th NOHED Brigade. It is not a conventional special forces unit but a unique hybrid organization that blends intelligence, covert action, and unconventional warfare to function as the primary instrument of Iranian foreign policy and power projection. Its evolution has been driven by the ideological imperative to export the 1979 revolution and to build a regional security architecture favorable to Tehran’s interests.

Origins in Irregular Warfare and Formal Establishment

The Quds Force is a specialized branch of the IRGC, focused on extraterritorial operations, military intelligence, and unconventional warfare.¹³ It is often mischaracterized as a “commando” unit; its role is far more strategic and intelligence-driven.¹³ Its genesis lies in the irregular warfare directorates established during the Iran-Iraq War. Precursors included a special intelligence unit known as ‘Department 900’ and a headquarters dedicated to managing irregular operations with allied Iraqi Kurdish and Shia Arab militias fighting against Saddam Hussein’s regime.¹³

Following the end of the war in 1988, the IRGC underwent a significant reorganization. The various external operations and intelligence bodies were consolidated and formally established as an independent service branch: the Quds Force.¹³ Its name, which translates to “Jerusalem Force,” reflects its official, ideologically charged mission: the “liberation of Muslim land,” with a particular focus on Jerusalem.¹⁶ Its personnel, estimated to number between 5,000 and 20,000, are handpicked from the broader IRGC for their skill and ideological commitment.¹³

The Doctrine of Proxy Warfare: Cultivating the “Axis of Resistance”

The central pillar of Quds Force doctrine and strategy is the cultivation and command of a network of non-state partners and proxy forces across the Middle East. This network, which Tehran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance,” is the primary vehicle through which Iran projects power.¹ The Quds Force’s core mission is to organize, train, fund, arm, and provide operational guidance to these groups.²

This strategy of proxy warfare offers several key advantages to Iran. It allows Tehran to challenge and bog down more powerful adversaries, such as the United States and Israel, in costly asymmetric conflicts. It creates a strategic buffer, enabling Iran to engage in hostilities far from its own borders. Crucially, it provides a layer of plausible deniability, allowing Iran to advance its interests while shielding the homeland from direct retaliation.¹⁸ Under the command of the late Major General Qassem Soleimani, who led the force from 1998 until his death in 2020, this doctrine was refined and perfected. Soleimani’s vision was to create a transnational movement of Shia militancy and to build proxy “deep states” in allied countries—paramilitary forces that would eventually become better armed and more organized than the host nation’s official military, while remaining loyal to Tehran.¹⁷

Operational Evolution Across Key Theaters

The Quds Force has systematically applied and evolved its proxy warfare model across numerous conflict zones over four decades.

• Lebanon (1982-Present): The Quds Force’s first and most successful application of its doctrine came in Lebanon. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion, Quds Force operatives were deployed to the Bekaa Valley, where they were instrumental in organizing, training, and funding the nascent Shia militia that would become Hezbollah.⁵ Hezbollah became the template for the Quds Force’s proxy model: a highly capable, ideologically aligned force that serves as a powerful deterrent against Israel and a key node in Iran’s regional network.
• Afghanistan (1990s): Demonstrating strategic pragmatism, the Quds Force shifted its attention to Iran’s eastern border in the 1990s. It provided support to the predominantly Sunni Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban, who were backed by Iran’s regional rivals, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.⁵ This operation showed the Quds Force’s willingness to partner with non-Shia groups to counter a more immediate strategic threat.
• Iraq (2003-Present): The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a fertile environment for Quds Force operations. It moved quickly to organize, arm, and direct a multitude of Shia militias to wage an insurgency against Coalition forces.⁵ The Quds Force is widely credited by US military intelligence with flooding the Iraqi theater with sophisticated weaponry, most notably Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs). These advanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were capable of penetrating armored vehicles and were responsible for a significant percentage of American combat fatalities in Iraq.²
• Syria (2011-Present): The Syrian Civil War represents the largest and most complex intervention in the Quds Force’s history. To prevent the collapse of its key regional ally, Bashar al-Assad, the Quds Force executed a massive and multifaceted campaign. It deployed its own officers as frontline advisors and commanders, but its main effort was to build a local proxy army from the ground up.² By one estimate from a senior Iranian general, the IRGC created 82 distinct fighting units in Syria, totaling some 70,000 armed combatants.²² These forces, along with deployed Hezbollah militants and Shia fighters recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan, fought alongside the Syrian Arab Army to turn the tide of the war.²

A Multi-faceted Approach: Integrating Hard and Soft Power

The operational methodology of the Quds Force demonstrates that it is far more than a simple military unit; it is a comprehensive instrument of statecraft. Its structure is divided into functional branches covering not only special operations and sabotage but also intelligence, finance, politics, and foreign languages.¹⁶ This allows it to pursue a holistic strategy that integrates hard military power with sophisticated “soft power” initiatives designed to win the “hearts and minds” of local populations and embed Iranian influence deep within the social fabric of target nations.²²

This approach has been on full display in Syria. In the aftermath of the devastating February 2023 earthquake, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani personally visited Aleppo to oversee the delivery of Iranian humanitarian aid.²⁴ Simultaneously, these aid convoys were reportedly used as cover to move military reinforcements into the area.²⁴ The Quds Force has funded the restoration of hundreds of Syrian schools, established networks of Islamic libraries, and provided digital training, all aimed at cultivating a new generation with a pro-Iranian, Shia-centric worldview.²⁴ Following a model inspired by Iran’s own Basij militia, Quds Force operatives organize the purchase of houses, shops, and farmland, which are then given to pro-Iranian fighters and their families. This tactic embeds them within the local community rather than isolating them in barracks, fostering human links and long-term loyalty.²² This fusion of military, economic, social, and ideological tools makes the Quds Force a uniquely effective—and uniquely challenging—actor on the international stage.

IV. Comparative Analysis: Divergent Paths to Special Operations

The 65th NOHED Brigade and the IRGC-Quds Force, while both representing the elite of Iran’s military, are fundamentally dissimilar organizations. They are products of their parent institutions—the conventional Artesh and the ideological IRGC—and their differences in mission, methods, and strategic purpose are stark. They are parallel spears in Iran’s arsenal, but they are designed for entirely different targets.

Mission Sets: Tactical Direct Action vs. Strategic Covert Influence

The core distinction lies in their respective mission sets. The 65th NOHED Brigade is a tactical and operational asset. Its purpose is to execute discrete military missions with clear objectives: conducting special reconnaissance behind enemy lines, rescuing hostages, eliminating specific high-value targets, or training allied military forces.⁹ Its focus is on direct action and the application of specialized combat skills to achieve a battlefield effect.

The Quds Force, in contrast, is a strategic asset. Its missions are not typically single, time-bound operations but rather long-term, open-ended political-military campaigns. Its purpose is to alter the geopolitical landscape of a region by building, managing, and directing a network of foreign proxy forces.² Its success is measured not in hills taken or targets destroyed, but in the degree of political influence and military control its proxies can exert within their host countries.

Operational Methods: The Commando vs. The Operative

This difference in mission dictates their operational methods. The 65th NOHED Brigade operates as a uniformed military unit. Its members are commandos, trained for direct combat and leveraging their superior training and equipment to overwhelm an enemy. Their value lies in their direct proficiency as warfighters and trainers.⁸

The Quds Force operates primarily in the shadows. Its members are operatives, working covertly, often under diplomatic or non-official cover. They function as advisors, intelligence officers, logisticians, and political organizers. Their primary method is not to fight battles themselves, but to enable others to fight on Iran’s behalf. Their value lies in their ability to act as a force multiplier, creating armies out of local militias and providing the strategic guidance and material support necessary for them to succeed, all while maintaining plausible deniability for Tehran.¹³

Relationship and Deconfliction in Shared Battlefields (e.g., Syria)

The deployment of both units to the Syrian theater highlights this functional divergence. They operate under separate command structures, one answering to the Artesh and the other to the IRGC.¹ While they share the overarching national objective of preserving the Assad regime, their roles on the ground appear to be complementary rather than integrated. The Quds Force’s mission was to create and lead the vast network of local and foreign militias that formed the backbone of the pro-regime ground forces.²² The 65th NOHED Brigade’s official role was “advisory,” suggesting they were likely tasked with a different mission: training and mentoring conventional units of the Syrian Arab Army, a foreign internal defense role for which their professional military background is uniquely suited.⁸ This indicates a deliberate division of labor, allowing Iran to support both the state and non-state pillars of Assad’s military power simultaneously.

V. Small Arms and Equipment Assessment

The small arms and individual equipment of Iran’s special operations capable forces reflect the divergent doctrines, supply chains, and operational philosophies of the Artesh and the IRGC. The 65th NOHED Brigade shows a clear trend toward modernization and alignment with international SOF standards, while the Quds Force prioritizes robust, reliable, and easily proliferated weapon systems suitable for its own operators and its vast network of proxies.

Armament of the 65th NOHED Brigade: A Blend of Legacy and Modernization

The individual kit of the 65th NOHED Brigade operator is undergoing a visible transformation. Recent imagery shows the increasing adoption of modern, Western-style personal protective equipment, including MOLLE-compatible plate carriers and FAST-type ballistic helmets, indicating a focus on operator survivability and modularity.⁹

Their service weapons have evolved similarly. Historically, the unit was equipped with the Iranian-made Tondar (a clone of the Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine gun) and its predecessor, the Uzi.⁹ The East German Mpi Kms 72, a side-folding stock variant of the AKM, was also a primary weapon for Artesh commandos.²⁵

Today, the brigade’s arsenal is more diverse and modern. The Russian-designed AK-103, chambered in 7.62x39mm, is now in common use.⁹ More significantly, the unit has embraced domestically produced AR-15 pattern rifles. This includes platforms like the Masaf, a direct clone of the Heckler & Koch HK416, which utilizes a short-stroke gas piston system.²⁵ The adoption of these modular, optics-ready 5.56x45mm platforms represents a significant leap in capability, bringing the brigade’s primary weapon systems in line with those used by many NATO special operations forces. The standard issue sidearm is reported to be the Czech-designed CZ 75 pistol.⁹

The brigade has also demonstrated a capacity for battlefield acquisition. Following the collapse of the Afghan National Army in 2021, NOHED units were photographed with captured US-made small arms, including M4 carbines, M16A3/A4 rifles, and M249 light machine guns, which were evidently brought into Iran by fleeing Afghan soldiers.²⁷

The Quds Force Arsenal: Equipping the Vanguard and its Proxies

The Quds Force arsenal is a reflection of its dual role as both an elite operational unit and the primary arms supplier for the Axis of Resistance. The weapons its operators carry are often the same ones it distributes to its partners, prioritizing ruggedness, reliability, and compatibility with regional supply chains.

The backbone of the IRGC’s, and by extension the Quds Force’s, long arms inventory is the Kalashnikov platform. This includes Iranian-produced versions of the AKM (designated KLS/KLF/KLT) and licensed or reverse-engineered copies of the more modern AK-103 (designated AK-133 or KL-133).²⁵ These 7.62x39mm rifles are ubiquitous across Middle Eastern conflict zones, making them simple to supply and maintain.

For specialized applications, particularly for its proxy forces, the Quds Force makes extensive use of the Iranian-made AM-50 Sayyad anti-materiel rifle.²⁵ This is an unlicensed copy of the Austrian Steyr HS.50 rifle, chambered in the powerful 12.7x99mm (.50 BMG) cartridge.²⁸ The Sayyad provides a devastating capability against light armored vehicles, fortified positions, and enemy personnel at extended ranges. It has been widely proliferated by the Quds Force and has been documented in the hands of proxy militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories.²⁸

Beyond small arms, the Quds Force is responsible for facilitating the transfer of a wide spectrum of advanced weaponry to its allies. This includes rockets, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), advanced IED components like EFPs, anti-aircraft weapons, and a growing arsenal of sophisticated unmanned aerial systems.⁷

The Role of Iran’s Domestic Defense Industry

Iran’s domestic Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is the critical enabler for arming its forces under a decades-long international sanctions regime. Unable to procure modern weapon systems from abroad, Iran has developed a robust capability for reverse-engineering and producing unlicensed copies of proven foreign designs.²⁶

This strategy is evident across the entire small arms catalog. The PC-9 Zoaf pistol is a clone of the SIG Sauer P226.²⁵ The Tondar SMG is a copy of the H&K MP5.²⁵ The S-5.56 assault rifle is a copy of the Chinese Norinco CQ, which itself is a copy of the American M16A1.²⁹ The Masaf rifle is a copy of the H&K HK416.²⁵ This approach provides self-sufficiency but can result in inconsistent quality. The AM-50 Sayyad, for example, is noted to have a significantly worse fit and finish than the original Austrian rifle it copies.²⁸

Not all domestic designs have been successful. The KH-2002 Khaybar, an ambitious bullpup assault rifle intended to replace the G3, proved to be a failure. During field trials in Syria, the rifle suffered from numerous jamming malfunctions and was ultimately rejected by potential foreign buyers. Production was reportedly discontinued in 2012.³⁰ Similarly, the Fateh assault rifle, another AR-15-style platform developed by the IRGC, was introduced in 2014 but discontinued by 2016, failing to enter widespread service.³² These failures underscore the challenges Iran’s defense industry faces in moving from simple reverse-engineering to reliable, original design and mass production.

Table: Current Small Arms of Iranian Special Operations Capable Forces

VI. Future Trajectory: Speculative Analysis

Based on established trends in doctrine, procurement, and operational employment, a speculative analysis of the future trajectories of both the 65th NOHED Brigade and the IRGC-Quds Force can be projected. Their paths will likely continue to diverge, shaped by the institutional priorities of the Artesh and the IRGC, even as they adapt to an evolving regional security landscape.

Projected Evolution of the 65th NOHED Brigade

The 65th NOHED Brigade is poised to continue its trajectory of professionalization and modernization, aiming to achieve tactical and equipment parity with other Tier 1 and Tier 2 international special operations forces. This will involve the continued adoption of modular small arms, advanced optics, encrypted communications systems, and night vision technology. The goal will be to solidify its status as a high-end direct-action and special reconnaissance force.

The experience gained in Syria is likely to have a lasting impact on the Artesh’s strategic thinking. The leadership will probably leverage NOHED’s successful deployment to advocate for a more permanent and institutionalized expeditionary role. This could see the brigade formally tasked with foreign internal defense (FID) missions, carving out a distinct niche for the Artesh in training and advising the conventional militaries of allied nations. This would complement, rather than compete with, the Quds Force’s focus on non-state actors and allow Iran to project influence through both conventional and unconventional military partnerships.

The Future of the Quds Force

The Quds Force will remain the centerpiece of Iran’s “forward defense” doctrine, which seeks to confront perceived threats far from Iran’s borders through a network of proxies.³³ Its core mission of managing the Axis of Resistance will not change. However, its methods will continue to evolve. The future of Quds Force operations will see a deeper integration of technology into its proxy warfare model. This will include the continued proliferation of more advanced and precise UAVs and loitering munitions, the provision of cyber warfare capabilities to its partners, and the potential distribution of guided rockets and short-range ballistic missiles to key allies like Hezbollah.⁷

The primary challenge facing the Quds Force will be one of command and control. As its proxy groups mature and gain significant political and military power in their own right, they may begin to pursue local agendas that diverge from Tehran’s strategic interests.²¹ The long-term success of the Quds Force’s model will depend on its ability to maintain ideological alignment and operational control over an increasingly complex and geographically dispersed network of powerful non-state actors.

Potential for Inter-Service Cooperation, Competition, and Doctrinal Convergence

The future relationship between the 65th NOHED Brigade and the Quds Force will be a key barometer of the broader Artesh-IRGC dynamic. While the Supreme Leader could mandate closer cooperation in a future crisis, the more probable trajectory is one of continued institutional competition. The IRGC will likely view any expansion of the Artesh’s expeditionary role as an encroachment on its traditional domain and a threat to its primacy in foreign operations. This competition for missions, resources, and influence will continue to define their relationship.

Over time, a degree of doctrinal convergence is possible. The 65th NOHED Brigade, having been exposed to the realities of hybrid warfare in Syria, will undoubtedly incorporate lessons on operating in ambiguous, multi-actor environments into its training and doctrine. Conversely, the Quds Force may seek to instill greater professionalism and more conventional combined-arms capabilities into its most mature proxy forces, like Hezbollah, blurring the lines between irregular and conventional forces.

VII. Concluding Assessment

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s special operations capabilities are embodied by two distinct, parallel, and highly evolved instruments of national power: the Artesh’s 65th NOHED Airborne Special Forces Brigade and the IRGC’s Quds Force. They are the products of vastly different institutional cultures and historical circumstances. NOHED was born from a Western-mentored, professional military tradition and was re-forged as a loyal and capable tactical force in the fires of the Iran-Iraq War. The Quds Force was born from the ideological fervor of the 1979 revolution and the brutal necessities of irregular warfare, becoming the master of a unique and highly effective doctrine of political-military influence.

The 65th NOHED Brigade has evolved from its origins as a conventional commando unit into a modern, multi-role special operations force capable of direct action, counter-terrorism, and, as demonstrated in Syria, expeditionary advisory missions. It represents a tactical and operational spear, sharp and precise. The Quds Force has perfected a strategic methodology of proxy warfare, leveraging a network of allies and integrating the full spectrum of hard and soft power to achieve long-term geopolitical objectives far beyond Iran’s borders. It represents a strategic spear, long-reaching and patient.

Their separate evolutionary paths, distinct equipment philosophies, and divergent operational methods are a direct reflection of Iran’s dual-military structure. This system provides the Iranian regime with a flexible, resilient, and multi-layered toolkit for projecting power and ensuring its own security. Whether a mission requires the surgical precision of a commando raid or the patient cultivation of a foreign insurgency, Tehran possesses a specialized spear for the task.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sourcs Used

1. Explainer: The Iranian Armed Forces | American Enterprise Institute …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/
2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards
3. Strait of Hormuz – Iranian Military – The Strauss Center, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-iranian-military/
4. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps
5. Quds Force | Iran, IRGC, Meaning, History, & Israel-Hamas War …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Quds-Force
6. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – Critical Threats, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/imce-imagesIRGC_CommandNetwork_context-1.pdf
7. The 15 Deadly Weapons Of Iran – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lu2t4APKFYQ
8. NOHED Brigade: Iran’s Special Forces – Grey Dynamics, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/nohed-irans-special-forces/
9. 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade
10. 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade – Wikiwand, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade
11. Iran’s Army Suffers Its First Casualties in Syria | The Washington Institute, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-army-suffers-its-first-casualties-syria
12. About: 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade – DBpedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://dbpedia.org/page/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade
13. Iranian Special Forces – Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, accessed September 6, 2025, http://cast.ru/products/articles/iranian-special-forces.html
14. en.wikipedia.org, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade#:~:text=After%20the%201979%20Revolution%20in,the%20Sistan%20and%20Baluchestan%20insurgency.
15. Iran Military Power – Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
16. Quds Force – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quds_Force
17. The Quds Force – United Against Nuclear Iran | UANI, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/report/quds-force
18. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – National Counterterrorism Center | Terrorist Groups, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/irgc.html
19. What is Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Why is it Designated a Terror Group by the United States? – American Jewish Committee, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps
20. Iran’s Regional Armed Network – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-regional-armed-network
21. The Limits of Iran’s Proxy Strategy: How Soleimani’s Vision Failed in Recent Conflicts, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/the-limits-of-irans-proxy-strategy-how-soleimanis-vision-failed-in-recent-conflicts
22. The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, Units, and Actions, accessed September 6, 2025, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/
23. Saberin Unit – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saberin_Unit
24. The Quds Force in Syria – Combating Terrorism Center, accessed September 6, 2025, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062023.pdf
25. List of equipment of the Iranian Army – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Iranian_Army
26. The new Iranian standard issue chambered in 7.62×51 nato of all things – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/ForgottenWeapons/comments/1n8pd2h/the_new_iranian_standard_issue_chambered_in/
27. Iranian 65th NOHED Rapid Reaction Brigade armed with US made M4,M16A3/A4 and M249 LMG which was confiscated from fleeing/surrendered Afghan National Army soldiers who fled to Iran after the fall of Kabul in 2021 : r/ForgottenWeapons – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/ForgottenWeapons/comments/1i77o1j/iranian_65th_nohed_rapid_reaction_brigade_armed/
28. Steyr HS .50 / HS .460 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steyr_HS_.50_/_HS_.460
29. Khaybar: Iran’s 5.56mm Assault Rifle – Guns and Ammo, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/khaybar-irans-5-56mm-assault-rifle/248021
30. KH-2002 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KH-2002
31. KH2002 – IOP Wiki, accessed September 6, 2025, https://iopwiki.com/index.php?title=KH2002&mobileaction=toggle_view_desktop
32. Fateh rifle – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fateh_rifle
33. Iran’s Forward Defense Doctrine and the Evolution of Its “Long Arm Strategy – İRAM Center, accessed September 6, 2025, https://iramcenter.org/en/irans-forward-defense-doctrine-and-the-evolution-of-its-long-arm-strategy_en-2600
34. Iran’s Evolving Military: Complementing Asymmetric Doctrine with Conventional Capabilities, accessed September 6, 2025, https://bisi.org.uk/reports/irans-evolving-military-complementing-asymmetric-doctrine-with-conventional-capabilities

Directorate ‘V’ of the Special Purpose Center (TsSN) of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), commonly known as Vympel Group, stands as one of the Russian Federation’s most elite and secretive special operations forces. Its history represents a unique and compelling evolution, tracing a path from its origins as a clandestine instrument of Soviet foreign policy, designed for sabotage and direct action deep within enemy territory, to its current role as a key component of the modern Russian security state’s counter-terrorism and special tasks apparatus. The trajectory of Vympel is one of radical adaptation, driven by the seismic geopolitical shifts of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Initially forged for a potential global conflict with NATO, the unit was forced to redefine its purpose after the Soviet collapse, transforming into a domestic counter-terror force. Today, it appears to be evolving once more, blending its Cold War-era clandestine skills with hard-won counter-terrorism experience to become a hybrid force adept at operating across the spectrum of conflict, from domestic security to the grey-zone battlefields of the contemporary era.

Section 1: Genesis – The KGB’s Clandestine Sword (1981-1991)

1.1. Forging the Pennant: Lineage and Establishment

The Special Operations Task Group Vympel (meaning “pennant”) was officially established on August 19, 1981, following a joint top-secret decision by the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.¹ From its inception, Vympel was an entity of the intelligence services, not the military. It was formed within the KGB’s First Chief Directorate (PGU), the arm responsible for all foreign intelligence and operations.³ Specifically, it was placed under the command of Department “S,” which managed the KGB’s overseas clandestine service, or “illegals” program, underscoring its intended role in deniable, deep-cover operations.²

The creation of Vympel was not a spontaneous decision but the culmination of lessons learned from the crucible of irregular warfare in Afghanistan. The unit was deliberately built upon the combat-experienced cadres of its precursor KGB special task groups: Zenyth, Kaskad, and Omega.¹ These ad-hoc units had been active in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, with Kaskad making four operational tours between July 1980 and April 1983.¹ Their experience, particularly in operations like “Storm-333″—the successful 1979 assault on the Tajbeg Palace and assassination of Afghan President Hafizullah Amin, in which KGB operators participated—demonstrated the need for a permanent, institutionalized force capable of executing such complex intelligence-led special operations.¹ The formation of Vympel was a direct effort to retain the unique proficiency and tactical lessons acquired by these operators.²

The initiative was championed by Major General Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, a senior figure in the PGU, and its founding commander was Captain 1st Rank Ewald Kozlov, a naval officer with service in the Northern and Caspian Fleets who had transferred to the KGB’s Department “S”.² This leadership profile further distinguished Vympel from its army counterparts in the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate).

1.2. Cold War Doctrine and Mandate: The “Special Period”

Vympel’s primary doctrine was tailored for the “special period” (особыйпериод)—the critical, pre-conflict phase when war between the Soviet Union and NATO was deemed unavoidable.² Its mandate was unequivocally offensive and foreign-focused, designed to act as a strategic tool of state power to cripple an adversary’s ability to wage war before conventional hostilities had even begun.

The unit’s core tasks were a blend of special operations and clandestine intelligence work ¹:

• Deep Penetration and Special Reconnaissance: Infiltrating far behind enemy lines to gather critical intelligence on strategic targets.⁶
• Sabotage: The destruction of strategic enemy infrastructure, with a unique and specific focus on nuclear facilities, power plants, command-and-control centers, and transportation hubs.²
• Direct Action: Conducting assassinations of top enemy political and military leadership to decapitate the adversary’s command structure.²
• Intelligence Operations: Conducting human intelligence (HUMINT) operations and activating pre-placed espionage cells in wartime.²
• Ancillary Missions: Included the protection of Soviet embassies and institutions abroad and seizing enemy naval assets like surface vessels and submarines.¹

This mission set placed Vympel in a distinct category from the GRU’s Spetsnaz. While GRU units were an instrument of military intelligence focused on tactical and operational disruption of enemy armed forces, Vympel was an asset of the KGB’s foreign intelligence arm, aimed at achieving strategic political and military effects by destabilizing the enemy state itself.⁹

1.3. The “Universal Soldier”: Selection and Training

To meet the demands of its complex mission, Vympel developed a training program of unparalleled rigor and breadth, designed to create a “universal soldier” (универсальныйсолдат).⁸ The process to fully train a single operative was exceptionally long and expensive, taking approximately five years and costing hundreds of thousands of dollars annually per candidate.⁸

The curriculum was exhaustive, intended to produce an operator who was simultaneously an elite commando, an intelligence officer, and a combat engineer. Training included ²:

• Advanced Combat Skills: Intensive training in hand-to-hand combat, expert marksmanship with a wide array of both Soviet and foreign weapon systems, parachute training (including high-altitude techniques), diving and underwater combat, and alpine mountaineering and rope techniques.²
• Intelligence Tradecraft: Operatives were schooled in clandestine operations, HUMINT collection, and were required to master two to three foreign languages to facilitate deep-cover operations in foreign countries.²
• Specialized Technical Skills: A key differentiator was the advanced technical training in mining and blasting, the construction and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and, most notably, the detailed study of the structure and vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure.²

This comprehensive skill set made Vympel operatives uniquely capable of operating autonomously for extended periods deep inside hostile territory, executing missions of the highest strategic importance.

1.4. Arsenal of the Era: Tools for Clandestine Warfare

During the 1980s, Vympel’s arsenal was composed of the best available Soviet special-purpose weaponry, tailored for its clandestine mission set.

• Primary Rifles: The standard-issue assault rifle was the AKS-74, chambered in 5.45x39mm. Its side-folding stock made it suitable for airborne operations and concealed carry.¹² For extreme close-quarters work and vehicle-borne roles, the compact AKS-74U carbine was employed.¹³
• Suppressed Weapon Systems: Given the emphasis on stealth, silenced weapons were critical. This included the PB suppressed pistol, based on the Makarov PM, and the PSS “Vul” silent pistol, which used a special captive-piston cartridge for nearly silent operation.¹³ The development of the AS Val integrally suppressed assault rifle and the VSS Vintorez suppressed sniper rifle in the late 1980s was a direct technological response to the operational needs of units like Vympel. Both platforms fired the heavy, subsonic 9x39mm armor-piercing cartridge, providing quiet lethality against protected targets.¹⁶
• Support and Precision Weapons: The SVD Dragunov semi-automatic rifle provided designated marksman capability out to intermediate ranges.¹³ For squad-level fire support, the PKM general-purpose machine gun was utilized.¹³ Rifles were often fitted with under-barrel grenade launchers such as the BG-15.¹⁸

1.5. Global Operations: The Soviet Union’s Covert Hand

While the full operational record of Vympel during the Cold War remains highly classified, it is known that its operatives were deployed to key proxy battlegrounds around the globe. They continued the work of their predecessors in Afghanistan, conducting intelligence-reconnaissance-sabotage missions throughout the 1980s.⁶ Beyond Afghanistan, Vympel operators were active in advisory and potentially direct action roles in Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and other Cold War hotspots, supporting Soviet-backed governments and revolutionary movements.⁸ In these theaters, their role was likely to train local special forces and execute sensitive operations that were beyond the capabilities of their allies.

Section 2: The Tumultuous Decade – Survival and Rebirth (1991-1999)

2.1. A Unit Adrift: Post-Soviet Chaos

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was a cataclysmic event for Vympel. Its primary mission—waging clandestine war against NATO in the “special period”—became obsolete overnight. The unit was plunged into a period of profound uncertainty, subjected to “endless re-organisation and re-definition” as the monolithic KGB was fractured into competing successor agencies.² Vympel was passed between these new entities, first subordinated to the short-lived Security Ministry and then transferred to the GUO (Main Protection Directorate), reflecting the chaotic and often politically motivated restructuring of the Russian security services under President Boris Yeltsin.¹

2.2. The 1993 Constitutional Crisis and the “Vega” Period

The unit’s existential crisis came to a head in October 1993 during the Russian constitutional crisis. A violent political standoff erupted between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament, which had barricaded itself inside the Supreme Council building, colloquially known as the “White House.” Vympel, along with its sister unit Alpha, received direct orders to storm the building.²

In a defining moment of principle, the commanders of both units refused to carry out the assault. This refusal was not an act of simple insubordination but a manifestation of the unit’s core ethos. Trained as elite intelligence operators for clandestine warfare against foreign adversaries, the men of Vympel did not see themselves as internal troops to be used against their own countrymen in a political dispute. The order represented a fundamental violation of their professional identity, and they feared the massive civilian casualties that a full-scale assault would inevitably cause.

This act of defiance had severe repercussions. As a punitive measure, Yeltsin summarily transferred Vympel from the GUO to the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).¹ For the elite operatives, subordination to the

militsiya (police) was a profound humiliation.² The result was a mass exodus that nearly destroyed the unit. Of the 278 officers in Vympel at the time, only 57 consented to serve under the MVD.¹ The decimated unit was stripped of its prestigious name and rebranded as “Vega”.¹

2.3. Return to the Fold: Integration into the FSB TsSN

The near-destruction of Vympel was recognized as the loss of a critical national security asset. In August 1995, a presidential decree officially reinstated the unit.¹ Later that year, it was removed from the MVD and integrated into the Federal Security Service (FSB), the primary domestic successor to the KGB. The FSB established a new overarching command, the Center of Special Purpose (TsSN), to house its elite special operations capabilities. Vympel was placed within the TsSN as Directorate ‘V’, alongside its sister unit, Directorate ‘A’ (Alpha).²

This move was a lifeline for the unit. The FSB provided a stable command structure, a clear (if altered) mission set, and the prestige of serving within the state’s principal security organ. For the FSB, the integration of Vympel and Alpha consolidated Russia’s premier special operations forces under a single roof, preventing their further degradation and ensuring their capabilities were available to the new security service. This symbiotic relationship secured Vympel’s survival and set the stage for its transformation into a 21st-century special operations force.

Section 3: A New Paradigm – Counter-Terrorism and Special Tasks (2000-Present)

3.1. Mission Reforged: From Sabotage to Counter-Terrorism

Under the command of the FSB TsSN, Vympel’s official mandate underwent a radical transformation. The primary mission shifted from foreign sabotage to domestic special operations, driven by the pressing security challenges facing the new Russian Federation, particularly the rise of terrorism and separatism emanating from the North Caucasus.¹

The unit’s new core missions became ¹:

• Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Hostage Rescue: Becoming a primary national-level response force for high-stakes terrorist incidents.
• Protection of Strategic Sites: Safeguarding critical national infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on nuclear power plants and related facilities. This mission was a logical evolution of their original Cold War training in nuclear sabotage, repurposing offensive knowledge for defensive ends.
• Suppression of Terrorist Acts: Conducting proactive operations to disrupt and neutralize terrorist plots targeting Russian citizens, both domestically and abroad.

This fundamental shift in purpose is reflected in the unit’s modern motto, ‘Служить и защищать’ (Sluzhit’ i zashchishchat’), meaning “Serve and Protect”—a clear departure from its aggressive, foreign-oriented origins.¹ Accordingly, the unit’s training regimen was adapted, placing a much greater emphasis on Close-Quarters Battle (CQB), advanced hostage rescue tactics, and specialized skills in dealing with the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).¹

3.2. Trial by Fire: The Nord-Ost and Beslan Sieges

Two horrific mass-hostage crises in the early 2000s became the defining operations of Vympel’s new counter-terrorism role. While demonstrating the unit’s capabilities, they also exposed a brutal learning curve and tactical approaches that resulted in catastrophic loss of life among the hostages.

Nord-Ost Theater Siege (October 2002): Vympel, alongside Alpha and MVD SOBR, formed the assault force tasked with resolving the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, where 40 Chechen terrorists held over 850 hostages.⁷ The tactical challenge was immense: a complex building filled with civilians and rigged with numerous IEDs by attackers who included female suicide bombers.²³ The chosen tactical solution was to pump an incapacitating chemical agent—a powerful fentanyl derivative such as carfentanil mixed with remifentanil—into the theater’s ventilation system to neutralize the terrorists before the assault began.²³ While the subsequent storming of the building was tactically successful, resulting in the death of all 40 terrorists, the operation was a medical disaster. A catastrophic failure to coordinate with medical services, provide the necessary antidote (naloxone), or properly manage the evacuation of hundreds of unconscious hostages led to the deaths of at least 130 civilians, who succumbed to respiratory depression caused by the opioid agent.²³

Beslan School Siege (September 2004): Vympel and Alpha were again the primary response units at the seizure of School Number One in Beslan, North Ossetia. A group of over 30 terrorists held more than 1,100 hostages, including 777 children, inside the school’s gymnasium, which they had heavily mined with IEDs.²⁹ The three-day siege ended in chaos when a series of explosions in the gym—the cause of which remains disputed—triggered a spontaneous and poorly coordinated assault by security forces.³⁰ The operation was marked by a near-total breakdown of incident command, with armed local civilians joining the firefight.³¹ In the ensuing battle, security forces employed a level of firepower unprecedented in a hostage rescue scenario, including tank cannons, RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launchers, and heavy machine guns, against the school building.³⁰ The outcome was horrific, with 334 hostages killed, 186 of them children.²⁹ The event exposed profound failures in intelligence, negotiation strategy, and tactical discipline.³¹

These two events, while tragic, were formative. The willingness to employ indiscriminate, area-effect weapons like chemical agents and thermobaric rockets suggests a tactical mindset that prioritized the elimination of the terrorist threat above all else, a possible holdover from the unit’s more kinetic military and sabotage origins. These operations served as a brutal lesson in the unique requirements of domestic mass-hostage rescue, where the preservation of hostage life is the paramount objective.

3.3. Modern Operations: A Return to Hybridity

Throughout the 2000s, Vympel was heavily engaged in the Second Chechen War and the long-running counter-insurgency that followed across the North Caucasus. The unit specialized in high-risk direct action missions, such as the successful capture of Chechen militant leader Salman Raduyev in March 2000.²

More recently, Vympel’s operational scope has expanded significantly, indicating a return to a more hybrid role. The unit has been documented participating in the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, engaged in high-intensity urban combat in locations such as Mariupol.³⁴ This marks a significant deployment in a conventional military conflict. Furthermore, investigative reporting has linked operatives from the FSB’s “Department V” to clandestine foreign operations, including the 2019 assassination of a Georgian national in Berlin.¹¹ This suggests that Vympel has not simply replaced its original mission but has added the domestic CT role to its broader repertoire. The Russian state appears to be leveraging the unit’s original PGU lineage and clandestine skillset for deniable foreign special activities, creating a dual-purpose force for both internal security and external power projection.

Section 4: The Modern Vympel Arsenal – A Fusion of Domestic and Foreign Systems

The contemporary small arms inventory of Directorate ‘V’ reflects a pragmatic, performance-driven procurement strategy. While heavily reliant on advanced Russian-made systems, the unit does not hesitate to adopt foreign materiel when it offers a distinct capability advantage. This results in a hybridized arsenal tailored for a wide spectrum of special operations.

4.1. Primary Weapon Systems (Assault Rifles & Carbines)

• AK-105: This 5.45x39mm carbine is a favored primary weapon. As a shortened variant of the full-size AK-74M, its 314 mm barrel provides a superior balance of compactness for CQB and vehicle operations while retaining better ballistic performance than the older, shorter AKS-74U.¹ It is frequently seen heavily customized with modern accessories.
• AK-74M: The modernized, full-length 5.45x39mm assault rifle remains a standard-issue weapon. Its reliability is legendary, and Vympel operators typically outfit them with advanced optics, lasers, and furniture to meet modern operational standards.³⁶
• AK-12 / AK-15: As part of the Russian military’s “Ratnik” future soldier program, the newest generation of Kalashnikov rifles are being adopted. The AK-12 (5.45x39mm) and its 7.62x39mm counterpart, the AK-15, feature significantly improved ergonomics, adjustable stocks, and integrated Picatinny rails, finally bringing the Kalashnikov platform into the 21st century in its factory configuration.¹

4.2. Specialized Small Arms (Suppressed & CQB)

• AS Val & VSS Vintorez: These iconic, integrally suppressed weapon systems remain indispensable for stealth operations. Chambered for the heavy, subsonic 9x39mm cartridge, they offer quiet operation combined with excellent performance against body armor at typical engagement ranges. The AS Val serves as the compact assault rifle, while the VSS Vintorez is employed as a suppressed designated marksman rifle.¹
• PP-19-01 Vityaz-SN: This 9x19mm Parabellum submachine gun is the unit’s standard SMG. Based on the Kalashnikov operating system, it offers familiar handling, reliability, and a high degree of parts commonality with the unit’s primary rifles. It is effective, compact, and easily suppressed for CQB environments.¹
• ShAK-12: A more recent and highly specialized addition, the ShAK-12 is a bullpup assault rifle chambered in the massive 12.7x55mm subsonic cartridge. It is designed for maximum stopping power in CQB, capable of neutralizing targets behind cover or wearing heavy body armor with a single shot.³⁶

4.3. Sidearms

• Glock 17: The adoption of the Austrian Glock 17 is one of the most significant indicators of the unit’s pragmatic approach to equipment. It is highly valued for its exceptional reliability, ergonomic design, and the wide availability of aftermarket accessories. Russian special forces are known to use both Austrian-manufactured models and unlicensed copies produced domestically by the Orsis arms company.³⁶
• MP-443 Grach: The standard-issue Russian military pistol in 9x19mm, the Grach serves as a common sidearm, replacing the venerable Makarov PM.¹⁵
• SR-1M Vektor: A powerful domestic pistol chambered in the potent 9x21mm Gyurza cartridge. It is favored by Russian special forces for its ability to fire specialized armor-piercing ammunition, offering greater penetration than standard 9x19mm rounds.¹

4.4. Sniper and Designated Marksman Systems

• SV-98: A Russian-made, bolt-action sniper rifle that provides a significant leap in precision over the older SVD. Typically chambered in 7.62x54mmR, it is based on a successful sporting rifle design and serves as the unit’s standard precision bolt-action platform.¹⁵
• Orsis T-5000: Representing the pinnacle of modern Russian sniper rifle technology, the T-5000 has been adopted by the FSB under the designation “Tochnost” (Precision). Chambered in high-performance, long-range calibers like.338 Lapua Magnum, its accuracy and performance are competitive with top-tier Western sniper systems.⁴⁶
• Heckler & Koch MR308 (HK417): The use of this German-made 7.62x51mm NATO semi-automatic rifle as a designated marksman rifle is a clear example of procuring the best tool for the job. The MR308/HK417 platform is renowned for its accuracy, reliability, and superior ergonomics compared to domestic counterparts.³⁶

4.5. Foreign Materiel Adoption

The composition of Vympel’s arsenal reveals two critical realities about the unit and the Russian defense industry. First, there is a clear and persistent gap in Russia’s ability to produce high-performance optics, aiming devices, and ergonomic accessories. The near-universal presence of Western-made sights (such as EOTech and Aimpoint), laser modules (like the AN/PEQ-15), and advanced furniture on Russian-made rifles is a tacit admission that domestic products do not meet the standards required by a Tier 1 special operations unit.¹ This reliance on foreign electronics and accessories creates a potential supply chain vulnerability that can be exploited by international sanctions.

Second, the unit’s procurement philosophy is driven by pragmatism over dogma. The willingness to field Austrian pistols, German rifles, and potentially American carbines (as used by its sister unit, Alpha) demonstrates that operational effectiveness is the primary consideration.³⁶ If a foreign weapon offers a tangible advantage—be it the Glock’s legendary reliability, the H&K’s precision, or the ergonomics of a Western accessory—the unit has the autonomy and budget to acquire and field it. This creates a hybridized and highly capable arsenal specifically tailored to the demands of its missions.

4.6. Ancillary Equipment

Beyond small arms, Vympel employs a range of specialized equipment. This includes heavy ballistic shields like the Vant-VM, often equipped with powerful strobing lights to disorient targets during entry.¹ For breaching and delivering specialized munitions, the unit uses weapons like the GM-94 pump-action grenade launcher.¹ Operations in low-light conditions are enabled by modern night vision systems, such as the Dedal-NV Gen 3+ binocular goggles.¹

Table: Contemporary Directorate ‘V’ Small Arms

Section 5: The Future of Directorate ‘V’

5.1. Lessons from the “Transparent Battlefield” of Ukraine

The high-intensity conflict in Ukraine has created a new paradigm of warfare, often described as the “transparent battlefield.” The ubiquitous presence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), from small FPV quadcopters to larger reconnaissance drones, has made traditional special operations tactics exceptionally hazardous.⁵¹ The historical advantage of units like Vympel—the ability to infiltrate and operate unseen—is now fundamentally challenged. Future clandestine movement, whether for domestic counter-terrorism or foreign sabotage, will be nearly impossible without sophisticated countermeasures. This reality forces a significant tactical evolution, shifting the emphasis from purely physical stealth to achieving electronic stealth. Vympel’s future success will be contingent on its ability to master the electromagnetic spectrum—blinding enemy sensors with electronic warfare (EW) while effectively employing its own UAS for intelligence, targeting, and direct action.⁵²

5.2. Evolving Threats and a Hybrid Future

Directorate ‘V’ is unlikely to relinquish its domestic counter-terrorism and strategic site protection roles, as these remain foundational responsibilities of the FSB. However, the current geopolitical climate, characterized by renewed great-power competition, suggests that the unit’s utility in foreign “grey-zone” conflicts will expand.⁵¹ The heavy attrition suffered by Russia’s more conventional elite forces, such as the VDV (Airborne Forces) and Naval Infantry, during the war in Ukraine may increase the Kremlin’s reliance on highly skilled, surgical units like Vympel for critical future missions.⁵⁴

Vympel is uniquely positioned to be a premier tool of Russian hybrid warfare. It possesses a unique combination of skills accrued over its four-decade history: the clandestine tradecraft of its KGB origins, the brutal experience of urban counter-terrorism from the North Caucasus, and now, direct combat experience in a high-intensity conventional war.² This layered expertise allows the unit to scale its operations across the entire spectrum of conflict, from a single covert operative conducting an assassination to a fully equipped assault team supporting conventional army operations.

5.3. Technological and Organizational Imperatives

To maintain its elite status, Vympel must continue to integrate emerging technologies. Beyond UAS and EW, this will likely include the use of artificial intelligence for processing intelligence and aiding in target acquisition.⁵¹ Organizationally, the unit may need to develop dedicated sub-units focused on non-kinetic effects, such as cyber warfare and information operations, to support its physical missions.

A significant long-term challenge will be the unit’s reliance on foreign-made components, particularly high-end optics and electronics. International sanctions will make the procurement and maintenance of this equipment increasingly difficult. Vympel’s future effectiveness may therefore hinge on two factors: the ability of the Russian defense industry to finally produce domestic equivalents of sufficient quality, or the state’s ability to establish clandestine supply chains to circumvent sanctions.⁵⁶

Conclusion

The four-decade history of Directorate ‘V’ is a study in transformation and resilience. Born as the KGB’s clandestine sword for a hypothetical World War III, Vympel survived the collapse of its state and the obsolescence of its mission, only to be nearly destroyed by political turmoil. It was reborn within the FSB as a shield against a new and vicious wave of domestic terrorism, a role it learned through the brutal lessons of Moscow and Beslan. Today, the unit has evolved again, emerging as a mature, dual-natured special operations force. It retains the DNA of its covert PGU origins while being fully versed in the realities of modern counter-terrorism and high-intensity warfare. Vympel now stands as a uniquely versatile instrument of Russian state power, capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict. Its future will be defined by its capacity to adapt to the technological realities of the transparent battlefield and to serve the Kremlin’s objectives in an increasingly unstable world.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sources Used

1. FSB Vympel: Russia’s Secretive Unit – Grey Dynamics, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/fsb-vympel-russias-secretive-unit/
2. Vympel – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vympel
3. First Chief Directorate – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chief_Directorate
4. KGB FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ROLE – Russia / Soviet Intelligence Agencies, accessed September 6, 2025, https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/kgb/su0521.htm
5. en.wikipedia.org, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vympel#:~:text=The%20unit%20was%20formed%20in,activation%20in%20case%20of%20war.
6. Team from Group SpetsNaz “Vympel” of KGB in Afghanistan, during the 80s. “Vympel” was part of Foreign Intelligence Directorate (1st Main Directorate) of the KGB and its main missions were Intelligence-Reconnaissance-Sabotage operations [1280X841] – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/hiouno/team_from_group_spetsnaz_vympel_of_kgb_in/
7. Russian Special Forces | What Are Spetsnaz? – SOFREP, accessed September 6, 2025, https://sofrep.com/news/russian-special-forces-what-are-spetsnaz/
8. “Vimpel” super soldiers of KGB. Documentary Film. English Subtitles – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhSgKZY-YHw
9. Spetsnaz GRU – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spetsnaz_GRU
10. SPETsNAZ: A Soviet Sabotage Threat. – DTIC, accessed September 6, 2025, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA168375.pdf
11. “V” For “Vympel”: FSB’s Secretive Department “V” Behind Assassination Of Georgian Asylum Seeker In Germany – bellingcat, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2020/02/17/v-like-vympel-fsbs-secretive-department-v-behind-assassination-of-zelimkhan-khangoshvili/
12. What was the standard weapon of a Russian soldier in Afghanistan? – Quora, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.quora.com/What-was-the-standard-weapon-of-a-Russian-soldier-in-Afghanistan
13. List of equipment of the Soviet Ground Forces – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Soviet_Ground_Forces
14. List of military equipment used by the mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_equipment_used_by_the_mujahideen_during_the_Soviet%E2%80%93Afghan_War
15. List of equipment of the Russian Ground Forces – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Russian_Ground_Forces
16. What was the intended deign use of the VSS Vintorez & AS-Val & why has no one else done something similar? : r/WarCollege – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/comments/qxwnbr/what_was_the_intended_deign_use_of_the_vss/
17. AS Val and VSS Vintorez – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AS_Val_and_VSS_Vintorez
18. The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) History, Tactics, Weapons, accessed September 6, 2025, http://www.anistor.gr/english/enback/e001.htm
19. Russian Spetsnaz Special Forces [RHS] – Steam Community, accessed September 6, 2025, https://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?l=finnish&id=895826156
20. Russian Vympel and Alpha group spetsnaz operators overlooking the white house building during the Russian constitutional crisis, October 4, 1993. [2048 × 1355] : r/MilitaryPorn – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/1m3urhr/russian_vympel_and_alpha_group_spetsnaz_operators/
21. Spetsnaz – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spetsnaz
22. greydynamics.com, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/fsb-vympel-russias-secretive-unit/#:~:text=Originally%2C%20the%20unit%20prioritised%20covert,terrorism%20and%20enforcing%20nuclear%20safety.
23. Moscow theater hostage crisis – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_theater_hostage_crisis
24. The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: The Perpetrators, their Tactics, and the Russian Response – ResearchGate, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233509130_The_Moscow_Theater_Hostage_Crisis_The_Perpetrators_their_Tactics_and_the_Russian_Response
25. Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis – Encyclopedia.pub, accessed September 6, 2025, https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/33143
26. Hostage crisis in Moscow theater | October 23, 2002 – History.com, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/october-23/hostage-crisis-in-moscow-theater
27. Nord-Ost: Russia’s Medical Failure in the 2002 Crisis – ResearchGate, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/376033725_Nord-Ost_Russia’s_Medical_Failure_in_the_2002_Crisis
28. THE LONG SHADOW OF ―NORD OST‖ By David Satter, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162079/Satter_-_Shadow_of_Nord_Ost.pdf
29. Beslan school siege – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beslan_school_siege
30. Beslan school attack | Siege, Massacre, & Aftermath – Britannica, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/event/Beslan-school-attack
31. Beslan: Counter-terrorism Incident Command: Lessons Learned …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/162
32. 20 years after Beslan ‘special operation,’ a legacy of violence, lies and dead children persists – VOA, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.voanews.com/a/years-after-beslan-special-operation-a-legacy-of-violence-lies-and-dead-children-persists/7773668.html
33. TsSN FSB Management “V” (aka Vympel) SpetsNaz infront of a Grozny’s town sign. circa 2000. During Second Chechen Campaign. 19 August is Creation Date of Vympel within Foreign Intel Department of KGB 39 years ago. [1029X663] : r/MilitaryPorn – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/iczm4o/tssn_fsb_management_v_aka_vympel_spetsnaz_infront/
34. FSB TssN Vympel Combat Footage in Mariupol around 2022 : r/SpecOpsArchive – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/SpecOpsArchive/comments/1f39ip9/fsb_tssn_vympel_combat_footage_in_mariupol_around/
35. What is the purpose of Russia’s FSB Vympel? – Quora, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-purpose-of-Russias-FSB-Vympel
36. Weapons of the Russian Special Forces | Navy SEALs, accessed September 6, 2025, https://navyseals.com/5283/weapons-of-the-russian-special-forces/
37. AK105 capabilities || Kalashnikov Media, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/media/ttkh-2019/ttkh-ak-105
38. AK-105 – Kalashnikov Group, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/catalog/boevoe-strelkovoe-oruzhie/avtomaty/avtomat-kalashnikova-ak105
39. AK-74M – Kalashnikov Group, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/catalog/boevoe-strelkovoe-oruzhie/avtomaty/avtomat-kalashnikova-ak74m
40. Kalashnikov AK-74M – Weaponsystems.net, accessed September 6, 2025, https://weaponsystems.net/system/1036-Kalashnikov+AK-74M
41. PP-19-01 Vityaz – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PP-19-01_Vityaz
42. Russian FSB Operatives Love these Western Weapons – The National Interest, accessed September 6, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-fsb-operatives-love-these-western-weapons-199147
43. SV-98 Russian 7.62mm Sniper Rifle – ODIN, accessed September 6, 2025, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/4a1628052f94de01def7d289a1c661c7
44. SV-98 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SV-98
45. Russian SV-98 – Sniper Central, accessed September 6, 2025, https://snipercentral.com/sv98.htm
46. The KSSO: Russia’s Special Operations Command – Grey Dynamics, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/the-ksso-russias-special-operations-command/
47. ORSIS T-5000 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orsis_T-5000
48. ORSIS T-5000 – Weaponsystems.net, accessed September 6, 2025, https://weaponsystems.net/system/700-AA05%20-%20T-5000
49. ORSIS T-5000: New Name in Precision Rifles – Small Arms Defense Journal, accessed September 6, 2025, https://sadefensejournal.com/orsis-t-5000-new-name-in-precision-rifles/
50. Operators from Directorate Alfa of the FSB Special Purpose Center, also known as Spetsgruppa Alfa, armed with AS Val assault rifles and MP-443 Grach sidearms during a hostage rescue exercise in 2009 [1513×1016] – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/1j7njb/operators_from_directorate_alfa_of_the_fsb/
51. Russian Concepts of Future Warfare Based on Lessons from the Ukraine War | CNA, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.cna.org/analyses/2025/08/russian-concepts-of-future-warfare-based-on-lessons-from-the-ukraine-war
52. Russian Drone Innovations are Likely Achieving Effects of Battlefield Air Interdiction in Ukraine | Institute for the Study of War, accessed September 6, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction
53. Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict: Modern Warfare in the Age of Autonomy, Information, and Resilience – CSIS, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-ukraine-conflict-modern-warfare-age-autonomy-information-and-resilience
54. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2025 | ISW, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025
55. The West must study the success of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces – Atlantic Council, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-west-must-study-the-success-of-ukraines-special-operations-forces/
56. Russia’s struggle to modernize its military industry | Identifying the weaknesses in Russia’s military-industrial complex – Chatham House, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/07/russias-struggle-modernize-its-military-industry/identifying-weaknesses-russias-military

The character of modern warfare is undergoing a fundamental transformation, driven by the rapid proliferation and operationalization of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), particularly in the form of autonomous swarms. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic, doctrinal, and technological approaches to drone swarm warfare being pursued by the United States, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The analysis reveals a strategic divergence in development and employment philosophies. The United States and its allies are pursuing a technologically-driven approach, developing high-cost, deeply integrated “quality” swarms designed to function as collaborative extensions of exquisite manned platforms, emphasizing human-on-the-loop control. In contrast, observations from the Russo-Ukrainian War and analysis of Chinese military doctrine point toward a strategy centered on “quantity”—the mass employment of low-cost, attritable, and rapidly iterated drones to achieve victory through saturation and an advantageous cost-exchange ratio.

The conflict in Ukraine serves as a crucible for these concepts, demonstrating the devastating effectiveness of both bottom-up, adaptive swarm tactics and sophisticated, top-down combined-arms saturation attacks. It has exposed the critical importance of the electromagnetic spectrum as the primary battleground for swarm conflict and has accelerated a relentless cycle of innovation in both drone capabilities and counter-UAS (C-UAS) measures. China’s doctrine of “intelligentized warfare” represents the most structured pursuit of this new paradigm, viewing autonomous swarms not as a support tool but as the decisive element of future conflict.

This report concludes that the rise of the drone swarm erodes the concept of the rear-area sanctuary, democratizes precision strike capabilities, and forces a re-evaluation of traditional military force structures and procurement models. The future security landscape will likely be defined by a bifurcation of military power: a high-tech competition in fully autonomous swarm warfare among major powers, and a proliferation of low-cost, attritable swarm capabilities among smaller states and non-state actors, each presenting distinct and formidable challenges.

Section 1: The Anatomy of a Swarm: Foundational Concepts and Technologies

To comprehend the strategic implications of drone swarms, it is essential to first dissect their foundational technical and conceptual underpinnings. A swarm is not merely a multitude of drones; it is a complex, cohesive entity defined by its internal communication, collective intelligence, and degree of autonomy. This section establishes the core principles that differentiate a true swarm from a simple multi-drone formation.

1.1 Defining the Swarm: From Multi-Drone Operations to Collective Intelligence

A drone swarm is a system of interconnected agents that exhibit collective, emergent behavior through autonomous coordination.¹ The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) formally defines a swarm as a coordinated system of at least three drones capable of performing missions with minimal human oversight.³ This stands in stark contrast to “multiple drone operation,” a distinct concept where several drones fly independent, predefined routes under the management of a single operator, without the inter-agent communication and collaboration that defines a swarm.²

The principle animating this collective behavior is “swarm intelligence,” which posits that a group of simple agents, each following a basic set of rules, can collectively perform complex tasks and exhibit intelligence beyond the capabilities of any single member.⁵ This concept, inspired by the emergent behavior of natural systems like ant colonies, schools of fish, and flocks of birds, holds that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.⁵ This emergent behavior is typically governed by three fundamental rules, first modeled by Craig Reynolds, which are applied to each individual drone in relation to its neighbors:

• Separation: Maintain a minimum distance to avoid collisions.⁶
• Alignment: Adjust heading to match the average direction of nearby drones.⁶
• Cohesion: Move toward the average position of the group to maintain unity.⁵

These simple, localized interactions generate sophisticated, coordinated global behavior without requiring a central leader or controller. Despite the clear military significance of this technology, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) currently lacks a standardized joint definition for “swarm” in its doctrinal lexicon. This omission hinders the development of a common operational picture, impedes acquisition efficiency, and complicates interoperability among allied forces.⁹ The urgent need for a formal definition is underscored by rapid adversarial advancements and the DOD’s own strategic initiatives, such as Replicator, which are centered on deploying autonomous systems at scale.⁹

1.2 Command, Control, and Communication (C3): The Swarm’s Nervous System

The command, control, and communication (C3) architecture forms the nervous system of a swarm, dictating how it processes information and coordinates action. These architectures exist on a spectrum between two principal models, the choice of which carries profound strategic implications.

The first model is centralized control, where a single ground control station (GCS) or a designated “leader” drone serves as the central brain, processing all sensor data and issuing specific commands to each “follower” drone in the swarm.² While this leader-follower structure is simpler to design and implement, it is inherently “brittle.” The central node represents a critical single point of failure; its neutralization through kinetic attack or electronic warfare can cause the catastrophic collapse of the entire swarm’s operational capability.⁶

The second, more advanced model is decentralized (or distributed) control. In this paradigm, each drone is an autonomous agent equipped with its own processing capabilities. They share information across the network, collaboratively build a shared understanding of the environment, and make collective decisions based on local data and overarching mission objectives.² This architecture is fundamentally more “resilient.” The loss of one or even several drones does not compromise the mission, as the remaining agents can adapt and continue to operate, exhibiting the “self-healing” properties demonstrated in early U.S. tests.¹ A nation’s capacity to field these truly resilient swarms is therefore a direct function of its software prowess in artificial intelligence and edge computing, not merely its drone manufacturing output.

This resilience is enabled by a wireless mesh network topology, where each drone functions as a communication node, relaying data for the entire network.¹³ This creates redundant communication paths and allows the network to dynamically reconfigure around damaged or jammed nodes.¹³ However, maintaining these links in a contested electromagnetic environment is the single greatest challenge in swarm warfare. Protocols such as MQTT and UDP are used to ensure the low-latency data exchange essential for real-time coordination, but adversaries will aggressively target these links with jamming, spoofing, and cyber-attacks.¹⁵

Consequently, the development of robust anti-jamming (AJ) and resilient communication techniques is a primary focus of military research. This has spurred significant investment in countermeasures that move beyond traditional frequency hopping (FHSS).¹⁹ Advanced methods include:

• Directional Communications: Using smart, beam-steering antennas to create narrow, focused data links that are difficult for an enemy to detect and disrupt, while simultaneously creating “nulls” in the direction of jamming sources.¹⁸
• Optical Communication: Employing laser-based systems for inter-drone communication, which are inherently resistant to radio frequency (RF) jamming and interception due to their high bandwidth and narrow, directional beams.²³
• AI-Driven Spectrum Management: Using reinforcement learning algorithms to enable the swarm to autonomously sense the electromagnetic environment, identify jammed frequencies, and dynamically switch channels or reroute data to maintain connectivity.²⁰

This intense focus on communications reveals that the primary battleground for swarm warfare will be the electromagnetic spectrum. A swarm whose C3 links are severed is no longer a cohesive weapon but a collection of isolated, ineffective drones. The decisive action in a future swarm engagement may not be a kinetic dogfight, but a battle of electronic warfare to control the network itself.

1.3 The Engine of Autonomy: Swarm Intelligence and AI

The behavior of a swarm is orchestrated by a sophisticated suite of algorithms that govern everything from basic flight to complex tactical decision-making.²⁵ These include algorithms for path planning, obstacle avoidance, task allocation, and maintaining specific geometric formations (e.g., line, grid, V-shape) optimized for different missions like search or attack.¹

Central to decentralized operation are consensus algorithms, such as Raft, which are drawn from the field of distributed computing.¹⁵ These protocols allow all drones in the swarm to agree on a single, consistent state—such as the location of a newly detected threat or the position of a friendly unit—without a central authority. This capability is critical for maintaining coherence and enabling autonomous operation in environments where GPS or communication with a ground station may be denied.²⁸

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are the key technologies that elevate a swarm from a pre-programmed formation to a truly adaptive and intelligent system.⁴ Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL), for example, allows drones to learn optimal behaviors through trial-and-error interaction with a simulated or real environment, enabling them to devise novel tactics for complex, unpredictable scenarios without explicit programming.²

In modern military concepts, particularly in the U.S., the ultimate goal is not full autonomy but effective human-machine teaming. In this model, AI handles the computationally intensive tasks—processing vast sensor datasets, optimizing flight paths for hundreds of drones, and identifying potential targets—while a human operator provides high-level commander’s intent, sets mission objectives, and defines the rules of engagement.⁵ This synergistic structure leverages the speed and data-processing power of AI while retaining the contextual understanding and ethical judgment of a human commander.

Section 2: The Vanguard of Autonomy: United States Swarm Doctrine and Programs

The United States military’s approach to swarm warfare is characterized by a top-down, technology-centric strategy, driven by well-funded, long-term research and development programs. The overarching goal is to create highly capable, “exquisite” swarms that are deeply integrated with existing force structures and function as autonomous extensions of the human warfighter, enhancing the lethality and survivability of high-value platforms.

2.1 Department of Defense Strategic Framework

The Department of Defense’s official strategy for countering unmanned systems explicitly acknowledges that future adversaries will employ networked, autonomous swarms and that U.S. forces must be prepared for “stressing cases,” such as attacks involving large numbers of increasingly capable systems.³¹ The U.S. response is twofold: developing its own offensive swarm capabilities while simultaneously fielding a robust, multi-layered defense.

A cornerstone of this strategy is the Replicator Initiative, announced in 2023. This program aims to field thousands of small, attritable, autonomous systems across multiple domains by August 2025, with the explicit goal of countering the numerical mass of potential adversaries, particularly the People’s Republic of China.⁹ This initiative represents a significant acknowledgment at the highest levels of the Pentagon that technological superiority alone may be insufficient and must be complemented by scalable mass.

On the defensive side, the DOD’s counter-UAS (C-UAS) strategy emphasizes that drone defense is the responsibility of the entire Joint Force, not just specialized air defense units.³³ It calls for a layered defense integrating both active systems (interceptors, directed energy) and passive measures (camouflage, hardening), with significant investment in emerging technologies like high-power microwaves (HPM) deemed essential for defeating swarm attacks.³³

2.2 The DARPA Engine: Pioneering Swarm Concepts

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been the primary engine for innovation in U.S. swarm technology, laying the conceptual and technological groundwork that service-level programs now build upon.

The seminal program was the OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) initiative, which ran from 2017 to 2021.³⁰ OFFSET’s vision was to enable small infantry units to command heterogeneous swarms of up to 250 air and ground robots in complex urban environments.³⁰ The program’s key technological thrusts were not just the drones themselves, but the human-swarm interface. It pioneered the use of immersive technologies like virtual and augmented reality (VR/AR), as well as voice and gesture controls, to allow a single operator to manage a large swarm by communicating high-level intent rather than micromanaging individual drones.³⁰ By creating a virtual “wargaming” environment and an open systems architecture, OFFSET fostered a community of developers to rapidly create and test new swarm tactics, proving the feasibility of the human-swarm teaming model.³⁵

Other foundational DARPA efforts validated key enabling capabilities. The Perdix program famously demonstrated the launch of 103 micro-drones from canisters ejected by F/A-18 fighter jets. The drones then autonomously formed a swarm, demonstrating collective decision-making and “self-healing” behaviors when individual units failed.¹ The Gremlins program explored the more complex concept of launching and recovering drone swarms in mid-air from a mothership aircraft, tackling the challenge of reusable swarm assets.⁹

2.3 Service-Specific Applications and Platforms

Building on DARPA’s research, each U.S. military service is developing swarm capabilities tailored to its unique operational domains and doctrinal concepts.

U.S. Air Force: Collaborative Munitions and Autonomous Wingmen

The Air Force is focused on integrating swarming and autonomy into its air superiority and strike missions. The Golden Horde program, one of the service’s priority Vanguard initiatives, seeks to network munitions together into a collaborative swarm.³⁸ By modifying weapons like the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) and the ADM-160 Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) with a collaborative autonomy payload, the program enables them to communicate with each other after launch.³⁹ This allows the swarm of weapons to share sensor data, autonomously re-allocate targets based on battlefield developments (e.g., a higher-priority target appearing), and cooperatively defeat enemy defenses without real-time input from the launch aircraft.⁴⁰

On a larger scale, the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is developing attritable, autonomous drones designed to operate as robotic wingmen for manned fighters like the F-22 and F-35.⁴¹ While a single CCA is not a swarm, Air Force doctrine envisions these platforms operating in teams and potentially swarms, extending the sensor and weapons reach of manned formations and absorbing risk in highly contested airspace.⁴¹ This deep integration of autonomy is forcing the service’s doctrinal thinkers in the Air Force Doctrine 2035 (AFD35) initiative to fundamentally reassess core concepts of air superiority and airspace control in an era of “proliferated autonomous drones”.⁴²

U.S. Navy & Marine Corps: Distributed Lethality and Expeditionary Warfare

For the maritime services, swarms offer a means to distribute offensive and defensive capabilities across the fleet. Early work by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) in the LOCUST (Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology) program demonstrated the ability to rapidly launch swarms of tube-launched drones, like the Coyote, from ships to overwhelm adversary defenses.⁴³ More recently, the Silent Swarm exercise has shifted focus to using swarms of air and surface drones for non-kinetic effects, such as distributed electronic warfare (EW) and deception, to control the electromagnetic spectrum and create tactical advantages for the fleet.⁴⁵

The U.S. Marine Corps views swarming drones as a “critical” enabler for its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) doctrine.⁴⁶ EABO envisions small, mobile, and low-signature Marine units operating from austere, temporary bases within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. Air-launched swarms, designated Long-Range Attack Munitions (LRAMs), launched from platforms like MV-22 Ospreys or F-35Bs, would provide these dispersed units with organic, long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic warfare, and precision strike capabilities, dramatically increasing their lethality and survivability.⁴⁶

U.S. Army: Swarms for the Combined Arms Fight

The U.S. Army is exploring swarm applications to enhance its ground combat operations. The annual Project Convergence experiment serves as a primary venue for testing how swarms can act as a “bridge across domains,” linking ground-based sensors to air- and sea-based shooters, coordinating EW effects, and accelerating the joint kill chain.⁴⁸ The Army is also investigating practical applications for sustainment operations, such as using autonomous drone swarms to provide a persistent ISR “bubble” for convoy security and to monitor the perimeters of large support areas, compensating for personnel shortfalls and providing early warning of threats.³⁷ The Army’s draft UAS strategy reflects this broader shift, emphasizing the need for autonomous systems that can understand and execute a commander’s intent rather than requiring continuous, hands-on piloting.⁵⁰

A consistent theme across all U.S. development is the doctrinal insistence on maintaining a “human on the loop” for lethal decision-making.⁵¹ While ethically and legally crucial, this framework introduces a potential “decision-speed mismatch.” A U.S. swarm that must await human authorization for each engagement could be tactically outpaced by a fully autonomous adversary swarm capable of executing the entire kill chain at machine speed. This places U.S. doctrine in a difficult position, balancing the imperative for ethical control against the demands of tactical effectiveness in a future, high-speed conflict.

Section 3: The Dragon’s Swarm: China’s Doctrine of “Intelligentized Warfare”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing a comprehensive, state-directed strategy for swarm warfare that is deeply integrated into its national military modernization goals. Unlike the U.S. model, which often treats swarms as a supporting capability, China’s emerging doctrine of “intelligentized warfare” positions autonomous systems and swarm intelligence as a central, and potentially decisive, feature of future conflict. This approach leverages a whole-of-nation effort, including a robust civil-military fusion strategy, to achieve both technological superiority and overwhelming mass.

3.1 From Informatization to Intelligentization: A New Theory of Victory

The PLA’s modernization framework has progressed through three distinct, overlapping phases: first Mechanization, then Informatization (信息化), and now Intelligentization (智能化).⁵² “Intelligentized warfare” is the PLA’s conceptual answer to future conflict, a theory of victory predicated on the pervasive use of artificial intelligence, big data, and autonomous systems to gain and maintain a decisive advantage on the battlefield.⁵³

Within this doctrine, the PLA outlines a clear technological and conceptual progression for the employment of unmanned systems ⁵⁶:

1. Fleet Operations: The initial stage, analogous to mechanization, where combat power is generated by the sheer quantity of drones operating with limited coordination.
2. Group Operations: The informatized stage, where drones are networked under a unified command structure and operate as a single, cohesive group to achieve a common task.
3. Swarm Operations: The ultimate, intelligentized stage, characterized by a group of autonomous, networked UAVs that are decentralized, self-organizing, and exhibit emergent group intelligence. PLA strategists believe this capability will “subvert traditional warfare concepts” through autonomous self-adaptation, self-coordination, and self-decision making.⁵⁶

PLA research on human-machine collaboration (人机协同) mirrors this progression, envisioning a future where human input is reduced to high-level command, such as launch and recovery, while the swarm itself handles complex coordination and execution autonomously.⁵⁸ This doctrinal embrace of full autonomy aims to create a military that can leapfrog traditional Western advantages in areas like manned air superiority by shifting the paradigm of conflict to one of intelligent mass and machine-speed decision-making.

3.2 Key Platforms and Industrial Actors

China’s rapid progress in swarm technology is fueled by its national strategy of Civil-Military Fusion (军民融合), which systematically breaks down barriers between the defense and commercial technology sectors.⁵⁹ This allows the PLA to rapidly identify and militarize cutting-edge commercial innovations. A prime example is the containerized mass launch-and-recovery system developed by DAMODA, a company specializing in drone light shows. This system, capable of deploying thousands of quadcopters with the push of a button, has obvious and direct military applications for launching saturation attacks.⁶¹ This fusion creates an unpredictable innovation cycle, presenting a significant challenge for Western intelligence, which must now monitor a vast commercial ecosystem for breakthrough technologies that could be weaponized with little warning.

Key industrial players in China’s swarm ecosystem include:

• State-Owned Defense Giants:

• China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC): A leader in military swarm R&D, CETC has conducted multiple record-breaking tests with fixed-wing drone swarms of up to 200 units.⁶² It has also demonstrated mature, truck-mounted, 48-tube launchers for deploying swarms of loitering munitions.⁶⁴
• AVIC and CAAA: These corporations produce the widely exported Wing Loong and Caihong (CH) series of combat drones, which serve as foundational platforms for more advanced capabilities.⁶⁵
• Private and Dual-Use Companies:
• Ziyan: This company develops and markets advanced unmanned helicopter drones, such as the Blowfish A3. These platforms are explicitly advertised with the capability to form intelligent swarms of up to 10 units for coordinated strikes, carrying mixed payloads including machine guns, grenade launchers, and mortars.⁶⁷
• The “Mothership” Concept: China is actively developing large unmanned “mothership” aircraft, such as the 10-ton Jiu Tian. These platforms are designed to carry and deploy swarms of smaller drones deep into contested airspace, dramatically extending their operational range and providing a survivable launch mechanism far from enemy defenses.³²

3.3 Strategic Application: The Taiwan Scenario

Analysis of PLA doctrinal writings and technical papers reveals a central organizing principle for its swarm development: solving the immense military challenge of a potential invasion of Taiwan.⁷² In this context, the PLA envisions using swarms to execute several critical missions:

• Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): The PLA plans to use massed swarms of “suicide drones” and decoys to saturate and overwhelm Taiwan’s sophisticated, but numerically limited, air defense network.⁷⁵ This could involve using large numbers of converted legacy fighter jets, like the J-6, as large, fast decoys or crude cruise missiles to absorb interceptors ahead of more advanced strikes.⁷⁵
• Amphibious Assault Support: PLA simulations and exercises depict a phased attack where drone swarms first neutralize enemy radar and command centers, followed by saturation strikes from anti-ship missiles to isolate the island, and finally, precision strikes from loitering munitions to support landing forces.⁷⁰
• Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD): In a broader conflict, the PLA would likely deploy swarms from land, air, and sea-based platforms to conduct anti-ship missions, targeting U.S. and allied naval forces attempting to intervene.⁷³

3.4 Global Proliferation and Export Strategy

China has leveraged its massive industrial base to become the world’s leading exporter of combat drones, selling systems like the Wing Loong and CH-4 to at least 17 countries, many of which are denied access to comparable Western technology.⁶⁵ This success is driven by a combination of significantly lower costs, “good enough” capabilities that meet the needs of many regional powers, flexible financing, and fewer end-use restrictions.⁶⁵

This export strategy extends to counter-swarm systems as well. Norinco is actively marketing its “Bullet Curtain” system, a 35mm cannon designed specifically to defeat swarm attacks by firing airburst munitions that create a dense cloud of sub-projectiles.⁵³ By exporting both swarm and counter-swarm technologies, China is positioning itself as an indispensable defense partner for a growing number of nations and shaping the global landscape of unmanned warfare.

Section 4: The Crucible of Combat: Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russo-Ukrainian War has become the world’s foremost laboratory for drone warfare, providing an unprecedented volume of real-world data on the employment, limitations, and rapid evolution of unmanned systems. The conflict serves as a practical crucible, testing theoretical concepts and forcing a relentless pace of innovation from both sides. It demonstrates a clear bifurcation in approach: Ukraine’s bottom-up, asymmetric strategy versus Russia’s top-down, increasingly sophisticated use of massed drone attacks.

4.1 Ukraine’s “Drone Wall”: Asymmetric Innovation at Scale

Facing a numerically and technologically superior adversary, Ukraine has embraced a strategy of asymmetric warfare heavily reliant on drones. This effort is characterized by rapid, decentralized, and battlefield-driven innovation, fueled by a unique ecosystem of state funding, extensive volunteer networks, and direct feedback from frontline units.⁷⁸ This has enabled the domestic production and deployment of millions of First-Person View (FPV) drones.⁷⁸

This mass deployment has given rise to the “Drone Wall” or “Drone Line” concept—a defensive strategy designed to compensate for critical shortages in conventional artillery and trained infantry.⁷⁹ This doctrine envisions a 10-15 kilometer-deep “kill zone” along the front, saturated with a layered network of FPV strike drones, reconnaissance drones, interceptors, and electronic warfare systems. The objective is to attrit any and all Russian activity, preventing enemy forces from massing for assaults and effectively holding the line with technology rather than manpower.⁷⁸

While often not constituting a true “intelligent swarm” with full autonomy, Ukrainian FPV operators employ sophisticated coordinated tactics. Using “wolfpack” or sequential attacks, multiple drones are directed at a single high-value target, such as a tank. The first drone might be used to disable the tank’s protective “cope cage” armor or its electronic warfare jammer, creating a vulnerability for subsequent drones to exploit with a direct, disabling hit.⁸¹ This tactical coordination has made FPV drones the primary source of Russian casualties on the battlefield.⁷⁸

This innovative spirit extends to the maritime domain. Ukraine has used swarms of MAGURA V5 unmanned surface vessels (USVs) to inflict devastating losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. These attacks typically involve packs of 6-10 USVs approaching a target warship from multiple axes in sequential waves.⁸² The primary tactic is to achieve a single successful impact, which slows or disables the vessel, rendering it a stationary target for follow-on strikes from the rest of the swarm.⁸² This strategy has been remarkably successful, neutralizing approximately one-third of the Black Sea Fleet and sinking or heavily damaging numerous vessels, including the missile corvette Ivanovets and the patrol ship Sergey Kotov.⁸³ This has effectively broken Russia’s naval blockade without a conventional navy.

Furthermore, the MAGURA platform has evolved into a multi-purpose “mothership.” Ukrainian forces have adapted these USVs to launch FPV drones against coastal targets and have even armed them with modified R-73 air-to-air missiles, successfully shooting down Russian helicopters and Su-30 fighter jets over the Black Sea.⁸⁴ This tactical validation of the mothership concept—using a larger platform to extend the range of smaller unmanned systems—is a significant development being implemented with low-cost, rapidly iterated technology.

4.2 Russia’s Evolving Swarm Tactics: From Uncoordinated to Sophisticated

Russia’s employment of drones has evolved dramatically throughout the conflict. Its primary tactical loitering munition is the domestically produced ZALA Lancet, a precision weapon used to strike high-value Ukrainian targets like artillery systems, air defenses, and command vehicles, typically cued by a separate reconnaissance drone.⁸⁷ For long-range strategic attacks, Russia relies heavily on the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 (localized as the Geran-2), targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure and cities.⁸⁸

The tactics for employing these strategic drones have progressed through several distinct phases ⁸⁹:

1. Initial Phase (2022): Uncoordinated, individual drones were launched during the day, often following predictable low-altitude flight paths, making them vulnerable to interception.
2. Second Phase (Early 2023): Russia shifted to simple nighttime “swarm attacks,” launching small groups of 6-8 drones simultaneously to complicate defensive efforts.
3. Current Phase (Late 2023-Present): Russia now employs highly sophisticated, combined-arms saturation attacks. A typical strike package begins with waves of cheap Gerbera decoy drones, which have no warhead but are designed to trigger Ukrainian air defense radars. This allows Russia to map the location and activity of the defensive network. This is followed by multiple, coordinated waves of Shahed drones and conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, timed to arrive at their targets simultaneously from different directions and altitudes. This complex tactic is designed to confuse, saturate, and ultimately overwhelm Ukraine’s entire air defense system.

Russia is also beginning to integrate AI into its newest drone models. The latest Shahed variants reportedly use AI to coordinate their terminal attacks, gathering near a target area and then striking in a synchronized swarm to overload point-defense systems, a development that has reportedly decreased Ukrainian interception success rates from 95% down to 70-85%.⁹⁰

4.3 The Electronic Battlefield: The Constant War of Measures and Countermeasures

The Russo-Ukrainian War has unequivocally demonstrated that the electromagnetic spectrum is a decisive domain in modern conflict. The battlefield is saturated with powerful electronic warfare (EW) systems from both sides, creating a highly contested environment where drone command, video, and navigation links are under constant attack.⁸⁰ This has led to extremely high attrition rates for drones, with some estimates suggesting that 60-80% of Ukrainian FPV strikes fail due to Russian jamming.⁷⁸

This intense electronic battle has ignited a rapid and relentless innovation-adaptation cycle:

• Widespread Russian jamming of common drone frequencies prompted Ukrainian developers to shift to different, less-congested frequency bands and incorporate frequency-hopping capabilities.⁹²
• As EW systems became more sophisticated and broad-spectrum, both sides began developing and deploying fiber-optic-guided drones. These drones are physically tethered to their operator by a long, thin fiber-optic cable, making their command link immune to RF jamming.⁸⁰
• The RF emissions from drone operators’ control stations became a liability, as Russian forces began using signals intelligence to triangulate their positions and target them with artillery, glide bombs, and other drones. This has made the human drone operator a high-value target, leading to a significant increase in casualties among these skilled personnel.⁹¹
• To counter both EW and the threat to operators, the latest evolutionary step is the integration of AI-powered terminal guidance and machine vision. This allows a drone to autonomously lock onto and home in on a target even if the connection to its operator is severed by jamming in the final phase of its attack.⁹⁴

This cycle reveals a critical shift in battlefield calculus. In many situations, it is now more effective to target the human operator than the drone itself. This reality forces a doctrinal focus on operator survivability, demanding mobile tactics, hardened control stations, and the development of longer-range, more autonomous systems that allow operators to be positioned further from the front lines.

Section 5: Breaking the Swarm: A Multi-Layered Approach to Counter-UAS

The proliferation of drone swarms has catalyzed a global effort to develop effective counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) technologies and tactics. Defeating a swarm presents a unique challenge distinct from countering a single, sophisticated aircraft; it requires a defense capable of handling overwhelming mass and a severe cost imbalance. The most effective strategies employ a layered, “system of systems” approach that integrates kinetic effectors, directed energy weapons, electronic warfare, and passive measures.

5.1 Kinetic Defeat Mechanisms: Interceptors and Guns

Kinetic solutions aim to physically destroy incoming drones. The leading concept is “it takes a swarm to kill a swarm,” which involves using dedicated interceptor drones to engage attackers.⁹⁶

• Interceptor Drones: The Raytheon Coyote is a premier C-UAS effector in the U.S. arsenal, adopted by both the Army and Navy.⁹⁷ The Coyote Block 2 is a tube-launched, jet-powered interceptor with a blast-fragmentation warhead, designed for high-speed engagements against single drones and swarms.⁹⁹ It is the primary kinetic effector for the U.S. Army’s Low, slow, small-unmanned aircraft Integrated Defeat System (LIDS), where it is cued by the Ku-band Radio Frequency Sensor (KuRFS) radar.⁹⁷ The U.S. Army has committed to multi-billion dollar contracts for Coyote systems, signaling its importance in their C-UAS architecture.¹⁰² Other dedicated interceptors are also in development, such as Anduril’s Roadrunner.⁹⁶
• Gun Systems: Conventional air defense artillery offers a cost-effective solution. Ammunition is cheap and widely available, making gun systems an efficient tool against low-cost drone threats.³³ Systems like the 35mm Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun have proven highly effective in Ukraine against Shahed drones.⁹⁰ China has developed a purpose-built anti-swarm weapon, the “Bullet Curtain,” a 35mm gun system that fires programmable airburst munitions designed to create a dense cloud of sub-projectiles, emphasizing area saturation over single-target precision.⁵³

The fundamental challenge for all kinetic defenses is the cost-exchange ratio. Employing a multi-million-dollar surface-to-air missile, like an SM-2, to intercept a $35,000 Shahed drone is economically unsustainable in a protracted conflict.³² This adverse asymmetry is the primary driver for developing low-cost kinetic solutions like the Coyote (with a unit cost around $100,000) and revitalizing gun-based air defense.¹⁰⁴

5.2 Directed Energy and Non-Kinetic Effectors: Lasers and Microwaves

Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) offer a transformative solution to the cost and magazine depth problems of kinetic interceptors.

• High-Energy Lasers (HEL): HEL systems use a focused beam of light to burn through a drone’s airframe or disable its optical sensors.¹⁰⁷ They provide speed-of-light engagement, extreme precision, and a near-zero cost-per-shot, limited only by the availability of electrical power.¹⁰⁷ Key developmental systems include the U.S. Army’s DE M-SHORAD, a 50 kW-class laser mounted on a Stryker vehicle, and the British Royal Navy’s DragonFire, a 50 kW-class naval laser weapon.¹⁰⁷ However, HELs are generally single-target engagement systems, making them less suited for defeating a dense, simultaneous swarm attack, and their effectiveness can be degraded by adverse atmospheric conditions like rain, fog, or smoke.¹⁰⁸
• High-Power Microwaves (HPM): HPM systems are widely considered the most promising technology for defeating swarm attacks.³³ Instead of destroying targets one by one, an HPM weapon emits a wide cone of intense microwave radiation that disrupts or permanently disables the unshielded electronics of multiple drones simultaneously.¹¹⁰ The leading U.S. system is the Air Force Research Laboratory’s THOR (Tactical High-power Operational Responder). THOR is a containerized system designed for base defense that can be rapidly deployed and can neutralize a swarm with an instantaneous, silent burst of energy.¹¹⁰ The development of HPM systems signifies a critical shift in defensive thinking, moving from single-target interception to area-effect neutralization.

The rise of DEWs fundamentally alters the concept of “magazine depth.” For traditional air defense, it is a physical limit—the number of missiles in a launcher. For DEWs, it is an electrical limit—the capacity and resilience of the power source.¹⁰⁷ This shifts the logistical focus for air defense from resupplying munitions to ensuring robust, high-output mobile power generation on the battlefield.

5.3 Passive and Integrated Defense

No active defense system is infallible. Therefore, a comprehensive C-UAS strategy must include passive measures and an integrated command structure.

• Passive Defense: When active defenses are saturated or fail, passive measures are essential for survival. These include traditional military arts like camouflage, concealment, and dispersal of forces, as well as physical hardening of critical infrastructure.³³ On the modern battlefield, this has also led to the widespread adoption of simple but effective measures like anti-drone netting and vehicle-mounted “cope cages” designed to prematurely detonate the warhead of an FPV drone.⁸⁷
• Integrated, AI-Enabled C2: Effectively countering a swarm requires a “system of systems” approach that fuses data from diverse sensors—including radar, electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) cameras, and RF detectors—into a single common operating picture.¹¹³ AI and machine learning are critical to this process. AI algorithms can rapidly process fused sensor data to detect and classify threats within a swarm, assess their trajectory and level of threat, and automatically assign the most appropriate and cost-effective effector (jamming, HPM, laser, interceptor, or gun) to each target.³³ This automation is essential to accelerate the kill chain to a speed capable of coping with a high-volume swarm attack. This necessity is forcing a convergence of the historically separate disciplines of air defense (kinetic effects) and electronic warfare (spectrum control), requiring future air defenders to be proficient in managing both the physical and electromagnetic domains.¹⁰¹

Section 6: Strategic Implications and Future Outlook

The ascent of drone swarm technology is not merely an incremental improvement in military capability; it represents a paradigm shift with profound implications for the calculus of attrition, military doctrine, and the very character of future conflict. As swarms become more autonomous, interconnected, and prevalent, they will reshape the strategic landscape, challenge established military hierarchies, and force a fundamental rethinking of force design and investment priorities.

6.1 The New Calculus of Attrition: Mass Over Exquisiteness

The most significant strategic impact of drone swarms is the “democratization of precision strike”.³¹ The availability of cheap yet highly effective unmanned systems allows smaller nations and even non-state actors to wield the kind of massed, precision-fire capabilities that were once the exclusive domain of major military powers.

This trend is driven by cost-asymmetry as a strategic weapon. The core principle of swarm warfare is to force a technologically superior adversary into an economically unsustainable exchange: trading swarms of low-cost, attritable offensive drones for the adversary’s limited stocks of high-cost, exquisite defensive munitions.³² A successful attrition strategy can deplete an opponent’s advanced air defense arsenal, rendering them vulnerable to subsequent attacks by more conventional and valuable platforms like manned aircraft or ballistic missiles.

This strategy necessitates a profound cultural and doctrinal shift toward an attritable mindset. The resilience of a decentralized swarm is predicated on the idea that the loss of individual units is not only acceptable but expected.⁶ The swarm’s strength lies in the collective, not the individual platform. This directly challenges the traditional Western military focus on force preservation, where every platform, from a fighter jet to a main battle tank, is a high-value asset whose loss is significant.

6.2 Doctrinal and Organizational Imperatives

Adapting to the reality of swarm warfare requires significant changes to military doctrine, training, and organization.

• Force-Wide Training: Counter-UAS can no longer be the exclusive responsibility of specialized air defense units. Every military unit, from a frontline infantry squad to a rear-area logistics convoy, must be trained and equipped for self-protection against drone threats.³³ This may necessitate the creation of new military occupational specialties (MOS) dedicated to drone operations and C-UAS, as the U.S. Army is currently exploring.⁵⁰
• Agile Acquisition: The rapid, iterative innovation cycles observed in the Russo-Ukrainian War, where new drone variants and countermeasures appear in a matter of months, render traditional, multi-year defense acquisition processes obsolete.⁸³ Militaries must adopt more agile procurement models that can rapidly identify, fund, and field new technologies, with a greater emphasis on leveraging the commercial sector and open-systems architectures.¹¹⁶
• The Imperative for Mass: For decades, Western military philosophy has prioritized small numbers of technologically superior platforms over numerical mass. The swarm paradigm challenges this assumption. Initiatives like the U.S. DOD’s Replicator are a direct response to this challenge, but fully embracing the need for mass will require a fundamental transformation in procurement philosophy, industrial base capacity, and a willingness to field “good enough” systems in large numbers.³²

6.3 The Future Trajectory of Swarm Warfare

The evolution of swarm technology is proceeding along several key vectors that will further intensify its impact on the battlefield.

• Increasing Autonomy: The clear trend is toward greater autonomy, with advancements in AI and ML enabling swarms to conduct increasingly complex missions with progressively less human intervention. The ultimate goal for nations like China is to shorten the “observe-orient-decide-act” (OODA) loop to machine speed, creating fully autonomous swarms that can execute kill chains faster than a human-in-the-loop system can react.⁵⁶
• Cross-Domain Integration: The future of swarm warfare lies in integrated, cross-domain operations. A single commander will likely orchestrate swarms operating simultaneously in the air, on land, and at sea.⁴⁴ For example, aerial drones could provide ISR and electronic warfare cover for a swarm of unmanned ground vehicles seizing an objective, while unmanned surface vessels provide perimeter security.
• The Proliferation of “Motherships”: The use of large platforms—manned aircraft, large drones, ships, or even ground vehicles—to transport, launch, and potentially recover swarms of smaller drones will become a standard tactic.⁷¹ This concept overcomes the range and endurance limitations of small drones, enabling their deployment deep within contested territory and fundamentally altering concepts of standoff distance and force projection.

The proliferation of long-range swarms effectively marks the end of the “sanctuary.” Rear-area logistics hubs, airbases, and command-and-control centers, once considered safe from direct attack, are now vulnerable to persistent, low-cost, high-volume threats.³⁷ This reality erodes the distinction between the front line and the rear, forcing a doctrinal shift toward dispersal, mobility, and hardening for all elements of a military force.

Ultimately, the high technological barrier to entry for developing exquisite, AI-driven swarms (the U.S./China model) compared to the low barrier for fielding massed, simpler drones (the Ukraine/Russia model) may lead to a bifurcation of global military power. Future great-power conflicts may be defined by contests between highly autonomous, intelligent swarms. Simultaneously, the majority of regional conflicts will likely be dominated by the kind of attritional, grinding warfare demonstrated in Ukraine, enabled by the widespread proliferation of low-cost, commercially-derived drone technology. To remain effective, modern militaries must develop the force structures, technologies, and doctrines necessary to compete and win in both of these distinct environments.

Summary Table

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of National Drone Swarm Strategies

Appendix: Data Collection and Assessment Methodology

This appendix documents the systematic methodology employed to gather, process, and analyze the information presented in this report, ensuring transparency and analytical rigor.

A.1 Phase 1: Scoping and Keyword Definition

The initial phase involved defining the scope of the analysis and establishing a consistent lexicon. Key search terms and concepts were defined, including “drone swarm,” “swarm intelligence,” “manned-unmanned teaming,” “collaborative autonomy,” “loitering munition,” “counter-UAS (C-UAS),” and “intelligentized warfare” (and its Chinese equivalent, 智能化战争). This ensured a focused and consistent data collection process.

A.2 Phase 2: Source Identification and Collection

A multi-source collection strategy was employed, focusing on authoritative and recent information (primarily from 2017-2025) from the four specified countries of interest: the United States, Ukraine, Russia, and China.

• Source Categories:

• Official Government & Military Documents: U.S. DOD strategy documents, GAO reports, DARPA program descriptions, service branch (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) publications, and official press releases.
• Military Journals and Academic Publications: Papers from institutions like the U.S. Army War College (e.g., Military Review), National Defense University (e.g., JFQ), technical papers from journals (e.g., MDPI, IEEE), and Chinese academic sources (e.g., 航空学报).
• Think Tank and Research Institute Reports: In-depth analyses from organizations such as the RAND Corporation, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Jamestown Foundation, and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
• Specialized Defense and Technology News Outlets: Reporting from reputable sources like Defense News, The War Zone (TWZ), Breaking Defense, DefenseScoop, and others that provide timely information on program developments, tests, and battlefield applications.
• State-Affiliated Media (for Russia and China): Sources such as CCTV, Global Times, and Voennoe Delo were consulted to understand official narratives and publicly disclosed capabilities, while maintaining awareness of inherent state bias.

A.3 Phase 3: Data Extraction and Thematic Categorization

All collected data was systematically reviewed and tagged based on a thematic framework aligned with the report’s structure.

• Primary Themes:

1. Foundational Technology: C3 architectures, communication protocols, AI algorithms.
2. National Doctrine: Official strategies, conceptual frameworks, and military writings.
3. Platforms & Programs: Specific drone systems, munitions, and development programs.
4. Tactics & Employment: Observed or documented methods of use in exercises and combat.
5. Counter-Measures: Defensive systems and tactics (kinetic, non-kinetic, passive).
6. Country of Origin/Focus: US, China, Russia, Ukraine.

A.4 Phase 4: Comparative Analysis and Insight Generation

This phase involved synthesizing the categorized data to identify patterns, contrasts, and causal relationships. The methodology focused on moving beyond first-order observations (e.g., “China is developing swarms”) to second and third-order insights (e.g., “China’s civil-military fusion doctrine accelerates its swarm development by allowing rapid militarization of commercial tech, creating a shorter warning cycle for Western intelligence”).

The analysis was guided by key questions:

• How do the doctrinal approaches of the four nations differ, and what drives these differences (e.g., strategic culture, technological base, perceived threats)?
• What is the relationship between technological capabilities and tactical employment observed in combat?
• What are the key feedback loops in the innovation-counter-innovation cycle, particularly in the Russo-Ukrainian War?
• What are the strategic implications of the emerging cost-asymmetry in swarm vs. counter-swarm warfare?

A.5 Phase 5: Validation and Bias Mitigation

Information was cross-referenced across multiple source types to validate claims and identify consensus findings. For example, a capability mentioned in a state media report was considered more credible if also analyzed in a Western think tank report or observed in combat footage. An awareness of source bias was maintained throughout. Information from state-controlled media (Russia, China) was treated as indicative of official messaging and intended perception, while analysis from independent think tanks and battlefield reporting was used to assess actual capabilities and effectiveness. Contradictory information was noted and analyzed as part of the complex information environment surrounding this topic.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sources Used

1. What Are Drone Swarms? | Built In, accessed October 23, 2025, https://builtin.com/articles/drone-swarm
2. Learn about Commercial Drone Swarms | Droneii 2025, accessed October 23, 2025, https://droneii.com/commercial-use-of-drone-swarms
3. dsm.forecastinternational.com, accessed October 23, 2025, https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/01/21/drone-wars-developments-in-drone-swarm-technology/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CDrone%20swarms%E2%80%9D%2C%20as%20defined,autonomously%20with%20minimal%20human%20oversight.
4. GAO-23-106930, SCIENCE & TECH SPOTLIGHT: DRONE SWARM TECHNOLOGIES, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106930.pdf
5. Military Drone Swarm Intelligence Explained – Sentient Digital, Inc., accessed October 23, 2025, https://sdi.ai/blog/military-drone-swarm-intelligence-explained/
6. Drone Swarms: Collective Intelligence in Action, accessed October 23, 2025, https://scalastic.io/en/drone-swarms-collective-intelligence/
7. From animal collective behaviors to swarm robotic cooperation – PMC – PubMed Central, accessed October 23, 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10089591/
8. Multi-Agent Systems and Swarm Intelligence for Autonomous Drone Coordination | Scientific Research Journal of Engineering and Computer Sciences – iarconsortium, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.iarconsortium.org/srjecs/178/2899/multi-agent-systems-and-swarm-intelligence-for-autonomous-drone-coordination-4985/
9. Defining Swarm: A Critical Step Toward Harnessing the Power of …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2025-ole/defining-swarm/
10. UAV swarm communication and control architectures: a review, accessed October 23, 2025, https://cdnsciencepub.com/doi/10.1139/juvs-2018-0009
11. Review of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarm Communication … – MDPI, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/10/10/3661
12. Drone Swarm Coordination – Meegle, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.meegle.com/en_us/topics/autonomous-drones/drone-swarm-coordination
13. Swarm Communication. Before looking at why and what drones… | by Aaron Sempf | CӔLUS Concept | Medium, accessed October 23, 2025, https://medium.com/c%D3%95lus-concept/swarm-communication-33cffc47db6d
14. A Secure Communication Framework for Drone Swarms in Autonomous Surveillance Operations – Scientific Research Publishing, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.scirp.org/journal/paperinformation?paperid=137084
15. SWARM: Pioneering The Future of Autonomous Drone Operations and Electronic Warfare, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/swarm-pioneering-the-future-of-autonomous-drone-operations-and-electronic-warfare/
16. Low-Latency Communication Protocols for Drone IFF: Ensuring Swift and Secure Identification – Decent Cybersecurity, accessed October 23, 2025, https://decentcybersecurity.eu/low-latency-communication-protocols-for-drone-iff-ensuring-swift-and-secure-identification/
17. Secure Communication and Dynamic Formation Control of Intelligent Drone Swarms Using Blockchain Technology – MDPI, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/16/9/768
18. A Genetic Algorithm Approach to Anti-Jamming UAV Swarm Behavior This work was supported by national funds through FCT, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, under project UIDB/50021/2020 – arXiv, accessed October 23, 2025, https://arxiv.org/html/2510.07292v1
19. Jamming-Resistant UAV Communications: A Multichannel-Aided Approach – arXiv, accessed October 23, 2025, https://arxiv.org/html/2507.14945v1
20. Anti-Jamming Communications in UAV Swarms: A Reinforcement Learning Approach, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338145158_Anti-Jamming_Communications_in_UAV_Swarms_A_Reinforcement_Learning_Approach
21. Reliable Communication Systems for Long-Range Drone Operations – XRAY, accessed October 23, 2025, https://xray.greyb.com/drones/communication-protocols-long-range-drone-networks
22. A Genetic Algorithm Approach to Anti-Jamming UAV Swarm … – arXiv, accessed October 23, 2025, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2510.07292
23. (PDF) Application of Optical Communication Technology for UAV …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/389582917_Application_of_Optical_Communication_Technology_for_UAV_Swarm
24. Joint Communication and Action Learning in Multi-Target Tracking of UAV Swarms with Deep Reinforcement Learning – MDPI, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2504-446X/6/11/339
25. Innovations in Drone Swarm Technology – XRAY – GreyB, accessed October 23, 2025, https://xray.greyb.com/drones/coordination-of-multiple-drones
26. Swarm Intelligence and Multi-Drone Coordination With Edge AI | Request PDF, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/391548696_Swarm_Intelligence_and_Multi-Drone_Coordination_With_Edge_AI
27. Advancement Challenges in UAV Swarm Formation Control: A Comprehensive Review, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2504-446X/8/7/320
28. SwarnRaft: Leveraging Consensus for Robust Drone Swarm Coordination in GNSS-Degraded Environments – arXiv, accessed October 23, 2025, https://arxiv.org/html/2508.00622v1
29. Special Issue : Swarm Intelligence in Multi-UAVs – Drones – MDPI, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/journal/drones/special_issues/R4521UCCA1
30. OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics – DARPA, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/research/programs/offensive-swarm-enabled-tactics
31. Fact Sheet: DoD Strategy for Countering Unmanned Systems, accessed October 23, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/05/2003599149/-1/-1/0/FACT-SHEET-STRATEGY-FOR-COUNTERING-UNMANNED-SYSTEMS.PDF
32. Drone Wars: Developments in Drone Swarm Technology – Defense Security Monitor, accessed October 23, 2025, https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/01/21/drone-wars-developments-in-drone-swarm-technology/
33. Countering the Swarm | CNAS, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/countering-the-swarm
34. OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) Sixth Field Experiment – YouTube, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W34NPbGkLGI
35. OFFSET Swarms Take Flight in Final Field Experiment – DARPA, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.darpa.mil/news/2021/offset-swarms-take-flight
36. DARPA OFFSET: Autonomous Drone Swarms for Warfighters – DSIAC, accessed October 23, 2025, https://dsiac.dtic.mil/articles/darpa-offset-autonomous-drone-swarms-for-warfighters/
37. Swarm Technology in Sustainment Operations | Article | The United …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/282467/swarm_technology_in_sustainment_operations
38. Air Force Drone Swarm Program Entering Virtual Phase – National Defense Magazine, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/9/21/air-force-drone-swarm-program-entering-virtual-phase
39. Golden Horde Swarming Munitions Program Back On Target After …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.twz.com/39581/golden-horde-swarming-munitions-program-back-on-target-after-second-round-of-tests
40. US Air Force’s ‘Golden Horde’ swarming munitions program to get second chance, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/02/04/air-forces-golden-horde-swarming-munitions-program-to-get-a-second-chance-this-month/
41. Swarm Clouds on the Horizon? Exploring the Future of Drone Swarm Proliferation – Modern War Institute, accessed October 23, 2025, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/swarm-clouds-on-the-horizon-exploring-the-future-of-drone-swarm-proliferation/
42. Air Force Doctrine 2035, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/home/AFD35/
43. Swarm of small UAVs are used in Navy’s LOCUST demonstrations, accessed October 23, 2025, https://militaryembedded.com/unmanned/sensors/swarm-of-small-uavs-are-used-in-navys-locust-demonstrations
44. Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver – NDU Press, accessed October 23, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1326017/robotic-swarms-in-offensive-maneuver/
45. Silent Swarm Exercise Accelerates Navy’s Path To Distributed …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.twz.com/sea/silent-swarm-exercise-accelerates-navys-path-to-distributed-electronic-warfare-future
46. Marines Betting Big On “Critical” Air-Launched Swarming Drones, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.twz.com/marines-betting-big-on-critical-air-launched-swarming-drones
47. Marines Test New Drone Swarms a Single Operator Can Control | Military.com, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.military.com/defensetech/2018/07/23/marines-test-new-drone-swarms-single-operator-can-control.html
48. Project Convergence | U.S. Department of War, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.war.gov/Spotlights/Project-Convergence/
49. Let Them Fly: To Generate Drone Combat Readiness, Army Installations Must Step Up, accessed October 23, 2025, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/let-them-fly-to-generate-drone-combat-readiness-army-installations-must-step-up/
50. The Army wants drones that understand ‘commander’s intent’ – Defense One, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/10/army-wants-drones-understand-commanders-intent/408953/
51. Drone swarms with 1,000 unmanned aircraft could be possible within 5 years, DARPA leader says | FedScoop, accessed October 23, 2025, https://fedscoop.com/darpa-drone-swarms-with-1000-unmanned-aircraft-within-5-years/
52. The Path to China’s Intelligentized Warfare: Converging on the …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2024-Fall/Baughman_CDRV9N3-Fall-2024.pdf
53. The ‘Bullet Curtain’: China’s Answer to the Growing Drone Swarm Threat – SVI, accessed October 23, 2025, https://thesvi.org/the-bullet-curtain-chinas-answer-to-the-growing-drone-swarm-threat/
54. PLA’s Perception about the Impact of AI on Military Affairs* – IIDA Masafumi, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/security/pdf/2022/01/04.pdf
55. PLA’s Intelligentized Warfare: The Politics on China’s Military Strategy*, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/security/pdf/2022/01/05.pdf
56. 352. The PLA and UAVs – Automating the Battlefield and Enhancing Training, accessed October 23, 2025, https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/352-the-pla-and-uavs-automating-the-battlefield-and-enhancing-training/
57. Swarms at War: Chinese Advances in Swarm Intelligence – The Jamestown Foundation, accessed October 23, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/swarms-war-chinese-advances-swarm-intelligence/
58. 有人/无人机协同作战：概念、技术与挑战 – 航空学报 – 北京航空航天大学, accessed October 23, 2025, https://hkxb.buaa.edu.cn/CN/10.7527/S1000-6893.2023.29653
59. The Chinese Swarming Programme – Part Three of Three – The Security Distillery, accessed October 23, 2025, https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/the-chinese-swarming-programme-part-three-of-three
60. Swarms at War: Chinese Advances in Swarm Intelligence …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/12/swarms_at_war_chinese_advances_in_swarm_intelligence_111785.html
61. “They Pushed One Button”: China’s New Drone System Can Launch Thousands at Once—and the World’s Militaries Are Alarmed – Energy Reporters, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.energy-reporters.com/news/they-pushed-one-button-chinas-new-drone-system-can-launch-thousands-at-once-and-the-worlds-militaries-are-alarmed/
62. CETC Breaks Record for Biggest Fixed-Wing Drone Swarm – Yicai Global, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/cetc-breaks-record-for-biggest-fixed-wing-drone-swarm
63. China launches world-record swarm of 119 drones – CGTN, accessed October 23, 2025, https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d4d6a4e3049444e/share.html
64. China Conducts Test Of Massive Suicide Drone Swarm Launched …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.twz.com/37062/china-conducts-test-of-massive-suicide-drone-swarm-launched-from-a-box-on-a-truck
65. How China became the world’s leading exporter of combat drones …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/24/how-china-became-the-worlds-leading-exporter-of-combat-drones
66. All the drone companies in China — a guide to the 22 top players in …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://thechinaproject.com/2021/06/18/all-the-drone-companies-in-china-a-guide-to-the-22-top-players-in-the-chinese-uav-industry/
67. Company Overview – ZIYAN UAS – Professional UAV Helicopter Manufacturer | Military & Civilian Drone Solutions, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.ziyanuas.com/abouta/about
68. Ziyan Develops High-Performance Electric Unmanned Helicopters & Avionics | UST, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2020/11/ziyan-develops-high-performance-electric-unmanned-helicopters-avionics/
69. Chinese helicopter drones capable of intelligent swarm attacks …, accessed October 23, 2025, http://en.people.cn/n3/2019/0509/c90000-9576712.html
70. Autonomous Battlefield: PLA Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/autonomous-battlefield-pla-lessons-from-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/
71. China has developed the largest drone carrier in the world — and it’s getting ready for takeoff | Live Science, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.livescience.com/technology/engineering/china-has-developed-the-largest-drone-carrier-in-the-world-and-its-getting-ready-for-takeoff
72. China Readies Drone Swarms for Future War | CNA, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2025/09/china-readies-drone-swarms-for-future-war
73. PRC Concepts for UAV Swarms in Future Warfare | CNA, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.cna.org/analyses/2025/07/prc-concepts-for-uav-swarms-in-future-warfare
74. PRC Concepts for UAV Swarms in Future Warfare | CNA Corporation, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.cna.org/reports/2025/07/PRC-Concepts-for-UAV-Swarms-in-Future-Warfare.pdf
75. The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems – Air University, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2018-08-29%20PLAs_Unmanned_Aerial_Systems.pdf
76. A Plague on the Horizon: Concerns on the Proliferation of Drone Swarms, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/a-plague-on-the-horizon-concerns-on-the-proliferation-of-drone-swarms
77. The ‘Bullet Curtain’: China’s Answer to the Growing Drone Swarm …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/the-bullet-curtain-chinas-answer-to-the-growing-drone-swarm-threat/
78. Game of drones: the production and use of Ukrainian battlefield …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-10-14/game-drones-production-and-use-ukrainian-battlefield-unmanned
79. How Ukraine’s Data-Driven Approach is Impacting the War Effort, accessed October 23, 2025, https://voxukraine.org/en/how-ukraine-s-data-driven-approach-is-impacting-the-war-effort
80. Russia Assails Ukraine’s Drone Wall – CEPA, accessed October 23, 2025, https://cepa.org/article/russia-assails-ukraines-drone-wall/
81. Russian Fpv drone finishes Two Ukrainian soldiers hiding in trench in city of Lyman (Oct 15, 2025) : r/CombatFootage – Reddit, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1o7cmj9/russian_fpv_drone_finishes_two_ukrainian_soldiers/
82. Analysis: An Operational View on the USV Attacks in the Black Sea …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/02/analysis-an-operational-view-on-the-usv-attacks-in-the-black-sea-from-an-admirals-eyes/
83. Ukraine’s Drone War Over the Black Sea Is Heating Up – The National Interest, accessed October 23, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ukraines-drone-war-over-the-black-sea-is-heating-up
84. Ukraine’s Magura Sea Drone, the Last Thing a Russian Warship Wants to See, accessed October 23, 2025, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraines-magura-sea-drone-the-last-thing-a-russian-warship-wants-to-see-12586
85. Ukraine’s Magura Naval Drones: Black Sea Equalizers | Proceedings, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2025/september/ukraines-magura-naval-drones-black-sea-equalizers
86. MAGURA V5 – Wikipedia, accessed October 23, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAGURA_V5
87. ZALA Lancet – Wikipedia, accessed October 23, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZALA_Lancet
88. The war in Ukraine shows the game-changing effect of drones depends on the game, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180
89. Russia’s Changes in the Conduct of War Based on Lessons from …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2025/Lessons-from-Ukraine/
90. Ukraine. Russia relies on swarms and AI in drone warfare, accessed October 23, 2025, https://militaeraktuell.at/en/long-range-drone-war-russia-relies-on-swarms-ai-and-more-lethal-warheads/
91. NATO Should Not Replace Traditional Firepower with ‘Drones …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-defence-systems/nato-should-not-replace-traditional-firepower-drones
92. Ukraine’s 40+ km Strike Drones vs Russian Electronic Warfare. Inside Brave1’s Test Range, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubLTNs2sdy8
93. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War, accessed October 23, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/
94. The Battlefield AI Revolution Is Not Here Yet: the Status of Russian …, accessed October 23, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-battlefield-ai-revolution-is-not-here-yet-the-status-of-current-russian-and-ukrainian-ai-drone-efforts/
95. The Russia-Ukraine Drone War: Innovation on the Frontlines and Beyond – CSIS, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-ukraine-drone-war-innovation-frontlines-and-beyond
96. Counterswarming Is Imperative | Proceedings – August 2024 Vol. 150/8/1,458, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/august/counterswarming-imperative
97. Coyote | Raytheon – RTX, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-missile-defense/coyote
98. Coyote UAS | Raytheon – RTX, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/lang/ro/capabilities/products/counter-uas/effectors/coyote
99. Raytheon Coyote – Wikipedia, accessed October 23, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raytheon_Coyote
100. Raytheon Displays Coyote Block 2+ C-UAS Interceptor – TURDEF, accessed October 23, 2025, https://turdef.com/article/raytheon-displays-coyote-block-2-c-uas-interceptor
101. LIDS-Family-of-Systems-Brochure.pdf – SRC, Inc., accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.srcinc.com/pdf/LIDS-Family-of-Systems-Brochure.pdf
102. Contracts For Sept. 29, 2025 – > U.S. Department of War > Contract, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/4317777/
103. Army announces rapid acquisition authority contract for Coyote Interceptors, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/273625/army_announces_rapid_acquisition_authority_contract_for_coyote_interceptors
104. Coyote Loitering Drone Interceptors Have Arrived On U.S. Navy Destroyers – The War Zone, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.twz.com/sea/coyote-loitering-drone-interceptors-have-arrived-on-us-navy-destroyers
105. Military Drones | RAND, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.rand.org/topics/military-drones.html
106. U.S. Navy destroyer equipped with Raytheon Coyote anti-drone interceotprs in major upgrade – Defence Industry Europe, accessed October 23, 2025, https://defence-industry.eu/u-s-navy-destroyer-equipped-with-raytheon-coyote-anti-drone-interceotprs-in-major-upgrade/
107. High-Energy Lasers | Raytheon – RTX, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.rtx.com/raytheon/what-we-do/integrated-air-and-missile-defense/lasers
108. C-UAS Directed Energy Weapons – Unmanned Systems Technology, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/expo/directed-energy-weapons/
109. DragonFire (weapon) – Wikipedia, accessed October 23, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DragonFire_(weapon)
110. THOR (weapon) – Wikipedia, accessed October 23, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/THOR_(weapon)
111. Electromagnetic Weapons Seen as Key Against Ukraine’s Drone Swarms, accessed October 23, 2025, https://voennoedelo.com/en/posts/id1236-electromagnetic-weapons-seen-as-key-against-ukraine-s-drone-swarms
112. THOR: AFRL Electromagnetic counter-swarm drone weapon, accessed October 23, 2025, https://ledrones.org/thor-electromagnetic-counter-swarm-drone-weapon/
113. Swarm Warning: The Future of Unmanned Aerial Systems | Article | The United States Army, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/239210/swarm_warning_the_future_of_unmanned_aerial_systems
114. Ukraine’s New VAMPIRE Family Just Got More Bite | by Wes O’Donnell – Medium, accessed October 23, 2025, https://wesodonnell.medium.com/ukraines-new-vampire-family-just-got-more-bite-4c785246c99b
115. Why the Army may need a specialized counter-drone MOS, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2025/10/20/why-the-army-may-need-a-specialized-counter-drone-mos/
116. Hegseth directive on ‘unleashing U.S. military drone dominance’ includes deadlines for major overhauls | DefenseScoop, accessed October 23, 2025, https://defensescoop.com/2025/07/10/hegseth-memo-unleashing-us-military-drone-dominance-deadlines/
117. Countering Swarms: Strategic Considerations and … – NDU Press, accessed October 23, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-107/jfq-107_4-14_Bell.pdf?ver=mvjNNii9AA2OUQau2KBWTA%3D%3D
118. Cooperative Threat Engagement Using Drone Swarms – ResearchGate, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367447433_Cooperative_Threat_Engagement_Using_Drone_Swarms
119. Designing for Doctrine: Decentralized Execution in Unmanned Swarms – Air University, accessed October 23, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/2703656/designing-for-doctrine-decentralized-execution-in-unmanned-swarms/
120. Swarm Talk: Understanding Drone Typology – Modern War Institute, accessed October 23, 2025, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/swarm-talk-understanding-drone-typology/
121. Russia Revives Old Battlefield Tactics to Evade Ukrainian Drones, accessed October 23, 2025, https://voennoedelo.com/en/posts/id2188-russia-revives-old-battlefield-tactics-to-evade-ukrainian-drones