The fundamental nature of conflict as a political instrument, a violent means to compel an adversary to fulfill one’s will, remains an immutable feature of international relations. Yet, over the past 50 years, the character of this conflict—the domains in which it is fought, the tools employed, and the very definitions of victory and defeat—has undergone a radical transformation. The global strategic landscape has shifted from a state of episodic, declared wars, punctuated by periods of discernible peace, to a condition of persistent, undeclared, multi-domain competition. The clear delineation between war and peace has not merely blurred; it has been deliberately eroded and is now actively exploited as a domain of strategic ambiguity.¹

This report analyzes this fundamental evolution in the character of conflict. It begins by establishing a strategic baseline circa 1975, a world defined by the bipolar certainty of the Cold War. In that era, the existential threat of a massive conventional and nuclear exchange between two superpowers paradoxically forced competition into the shadows, creating and refining the playbook for today’s hybrid conflicts. The analysis then traces the profound technological and doctrinal shifts of the post-Cold War era, marked by the “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA), which cemented U.S. conventional military dominance but also accelerated the turn toward asymmetric strategies by its rivals.

Finally, the report examines the current state of international competition, arguing that the major powers are already engaged in a form of “undocumented conflict.” This conflict is waged continuously across new and expanded domains—economic, cyber, and informational—and is increasingly shaped by emerging technologies, most notably artificial intelligence (AI). The ultimate battlefield has expanded from physical territory to encompass critical infrastructure, financial systems, and the cognitive domain of public perception itself. The central challenge for national security in the 21st century is no longer simply preparing for a future war, but navigating the unending conflict that is already here.

Section I: The Cold War Baseline – A World of Bipolar Certainty (c. 1975)

Fifty years ago, the strategic environment was defined by a stark, bipolar clarity. The world was divided into two ideological blocs, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, locked in a competition underwritten by the threat of global thermonuclear war.⁵ This overarching threat of Mutually Assured Destruction created a paradoxical stability at the strategic level. While it made direct, large-scale conventional war between the superpowers unthinkable, it did not eliminate conflict. Instead, it channeled geopolitical competition into deniable, indirect, and asymmetric arenas, creating an incubator for the hybrid methods that define the modern era.

The Conventional Battlefield – The Fulda Gap and the North German Plain

The central front of the Cold War was Europe, where two of the most powerful military alliances in history stood poised for a cataclysmic conventional battle. Military doctrine and force posture on both sides were overwhelmingly focused on this potential high-intensity conflict.

NATO’s strategy was formally codified in 1967 as “Flexible Response.” This doctrine moved away from the previous policy of “Massive Retaliation” and envisioned a tiered response to Warsaw Pact aggression. An attack would be met first with a direct conventional defense, followed by the deliberate and controlled escalation to tactical, and finally strategic, nuclear weapons if necessary.⁶ The goal was to possess a credible deterrent at every level of the escalatory ladder. NATO’s planning called for its forces to be capable of sustaining a conventional defense in Central Europe for approximately 90 days against a full-scale invasion, allowing time for political negotiation or the decision to escalate.⁶ However, a sense of unreality pervaded these preparations; while doctrine called for a seamless transition from conventional to nuclear operations, all practical attempts to devise tactics for actually fighting and winning on a nuclear battlefield had proven futile.⁸

The Warsaw Pact, guided by Soviet military thought, held a fundamentally offensive-oriented doctrine. Soviet theorists believed that the defensive was an inherently weaker form of warfare and that decisive victory could only be achieved through the offense.⁹ Their plans were officially framed as a massive “counterattack” that would follow the repulse of an initial NATO assault. This offensive would depend on the overwhelming numerical superiority of Soviet-style forces, particularly their vast tank armies, to break through NATO lines along axes like the Fulda Gap and the North German Plain and rapidly advance deep into Western Europe.⁹ In 1975, the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a considerable numerical advantage in Central Europe, particularly in tanks and artillery, and held the geostrategic advantage of “interior lines,” which allowed for the rapid transfer of forces between fronts.¹⁰

This doctrinal standoff fueled an intense technological arms race in conventional weaponry. The mid-1970s saw the introduction of a new generation of military hardware. Tanks were upgraded with stabilized turrets and electronic fire controls, while armored personnel carriers evolved into heavier infantry fighting vehicles from which troops could fight.⁸ The development of potent anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) forced armored divisions to adopt closer cooperation between tanks and infantry.⁸ Armies on both sides became increasingly motorized and mechanized. This period also saw the first significant use of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), or drones, for surveillance and target acquisition, and the maturation of the attack helicopter as a dedicated “tank-busting” platform, a lesson learned from its massive use in Vietnam.⁸ This unprecedented faith in technology led to a battlefield where the number and quality of electronic systems became a primary index of an army’s modernity.⁸ For the U.S. Army, this era was one of doctrinal ferment, with its focus shifting cyclically between conventional warfare in Europe, the specter of nuclear conflict, and the immediate lessons of counterinsurgency in Vietnam, resulting in a tactical doctrine more complex than at any other point in its history.¹²

The Shadow War – Proxy Conflicts and Clandestine Operations

While the armies in Europe planned for a war that never came, the actual superpower conflict was being fought—brutally and continuously—in the shadows and across the developing world. The high risk of nuclear escalation made direct confrontation too dangerous, turning proxy wars and clandestine operations into the primary instruments of geopolitical competition.¹⁴

Proxy wars were the main event of the Cold War, accounting for an estimated 20 million deaths, almost all of which occurred in the “Third World”.¹⁴ These conflicts were ostensibly local or regional disputes, but they became battlegrounds for the larger ideological struggle between capitalism and communism.¹⁶ The superpowers avoided direct military clashes but fueled the fighting by providing massive amounts of funding, weaponry, training, and political backing to their respective surrogate forces.¹⁴ The Vietnam War, which saw the United States supporting South Vietnam against the Soviet- and Chinese-backed North, was the most devastating example.⁵ Other major proxy conflicts of the era included the Angolan Civil War, where the Soviet Union and Cuba backed the MPLA against U.S.-supported factions ¹⁸, and the Ogaden War, where the superpowers switched allegiances, with the Soviets ultimately backing Ethiopia against U.S.-supported Somalia.²¹ These interventions allowed the superpowers to test strategies and military hardware while avoiding a direct “hot war,” but they left a legacy of devastation and long-term instability in the regions where they were fought.¹⁶

Parallel to these overt-by-proxy conflicts was a relentless, clandestine war fought by the intelligence agencies of both blocs. The CIA and the KGB engaged in a global struggle for influence through espionage, subversion, and covert action. The CIA’s activities included political subversion, such as providing financial support to officers plotting against Chile’s Salvador Allende before the 1973 coup, and paramilitary operations, such as arming and training mujahideen guerrillas in Afghanistan in the following decade.²³ The agency also engaged in numerous, and often bizarre, assassination plots against figures like Fidel Castro.²³ Espionage was rampant, with both sides dedicating immense resources to stealing military-industrial secrets and recruiting high-level agents within the other’s government and intelligence services.²³ The KGB was notoriously effective in this domain, having infiltrated Western intelligence agencies to the point where the CIA was often “utterly ignorant of Soviet espionage operations” against it.²⁵

The KGB, for its part, conducted what it termed “executive actions” or “wet work” (liquidations) through its secretive 13th Department.²⁶ These operations targeted defectors, dissidents, and other “ideological opponents” abroad with the aim of silencing anti-Soviet voices and sowing fear within émigré communities.²⁶ To maintain plausible deniability, the KGB often employed exotic methods, such as the ricin-filled pellet fired from a modified umbrella used to kill Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978, and frequently relied on the intelligence services of allied Eastern Bloc nations to carry out the “dirty work”.²⁶ In Africa, Soviet clandestine operations were particularly large-scale, as the KGB and GRU (military intelligence) worked to counter U.S. influence, supply arms to anti-government groups, and exploit the relatively weak capabilities of local security services to establish intelligence networks.²⁷

This history reveals a significant divergence between the war that was being planned for and the war that was actually being waged. While the formal military doctrines of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were fixated on a decisive, large-scale conventional battle in Europe, the true character of superpower conflict was predominantly irregular, clandestine, and fought through third parties. This created a deep reservoir of institutional knowledge and operational expertise in unconventional warfare, political subversion, and deniable operations within the intelligence and special operations communities. This expertise, developed in the shadows of the Cold War, would prove highly relevant in the multipolar, ambiguous security environment that followed.

Section II: The Technological Rupture – The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating dramatically after the end of the Cold War, a suite of new technologies catalyzed a fundamental shift in the conduct of conventional warfare. This “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) was characterized by the integration of advanced surveillance, precision-guided weaponry, and networked command and control, creating an era of unparalleled U.S. military dominance.³¹ However, this very dominance had a profound and unintended consequence: it rendered symmetrical, conventional warfare an untenable option for potential adversaries, thereby accelerating their pivot toward the asymmetric and hybrid methods that now define the contemporary conflict landscape.

The Dawn of Precision and Stealth

Two technologies in particular formed the core of the RMA: precision-guided munitions and stealth.

Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), or “smart bombs,” fundamentally altered the calculus of air power. The ability to guide a weapon to its target with a high degree of accuracy represented a quantum leap in lethality and efficiency.³³ During the Vietnam War, PGMs proved to be up to 100 times more effective than their unguided “dumb bomb” counterparts.³⁵ This was starkly illustrated by the destruction of the Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam in 1972. The bridge, a critical supply line, had withstood hundreds of sorties and the loss of numerous aircraft over several years of conventional bombing, but was finally dropped by a small number of aircraft using laser-guided bombs.³³ The 1991 Persian Gulf War served as the global debut for this capability on a massive scale. Coalition forces demonstrated that PGMs could destroy Iraqi armored vehicles with pinpoint accuracy in a process pilots dubbed “tank plinking”.³³ Overall, while guided munitions accounted for only 9% of the total ordnance used in the war, they were responsible for 75% of all successful hits, proving 35 times more likely to destroy their target per weapon dropped than unguided bombs.³³ This shifted the logic of bombing from achieving effects through mass to achieving them through precision.³⁴

Stealth Technology provided the means to deliver these precision weapons by rendering aircraft nearly invisible to enemy radar. Platforms like the F-117 Nighthawk and the B-2 Spirit bomber were designed with faceted shapes and coated in radar-absorbent materials to reduce their radar cross-section (RCS) by several orders of magnitude.³⁷ This innovation effectively negated decades of investment by adversaries in sophisticated integrated air defense systems.³⁹ Like PGMs, stealth technology had its coming-out party during the Gulf War. F-117s flew with impunity over Baghdad, one of the most heavily defended cities in the world at the time, and decimated critical Iraqi command and control nodes, air defense sites, and other high-value targets. No stealth aircraft were lost in the conflict.³⁹

The true power of the RMA, however, lay not in these individual technologies but in their integration into a networked “System of Systems”.⁴⁰ This concept linked intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms—such as satellites, spy planes, and drones—with command, control, and communications (C3) networks and precision-strike assets.³¹ This synergy created a virtuous cycle: ISR assets could find a target, the network could rapidly transmit that information to a decision-maker and a shooter, and a precision weapon could destroy the target with high probability. This integration of technology, doctrine, and organization produced a dramatic increase in military effectiveness.³¹

Doctrinal Transformation and Asymmetric Consequences

This technological revolution was accompanied by a doctrinal one within the U.S. military. Reeling from the experience in Vietnam and absorbing the lessons of the 1973 Yom Kippur War—where modern ATGMs and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) inflicted heavy losses on Israeli armor and aircraft—the U.S. Army undertook a profound intellectual reassessment.⁴¹

In 1976, the Army published Field Manual 100-5, Operations, which codified a new doctrine known as “Active Defense”.⁴⁴ This doctrine was a radical departure from previous thinking, focusing almost exclusively on a high-intensity, conventional battle against the Soviet Union in Europe.⁴⁴ It was heavily focused on firepower, emphasizing the need to “win the first battle of the next war” by attriting the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces with technologically advanced weaponry.⁴⁵ Active Defense was controversial, however, and criticized for being too defensive and ceding the initiative to the enemy.⁴¹

This critique led to another doctrinal evolution. In 1982, the Army released a new version of FM 100-5 that introduced the concept of AirLand Battle.⁴¹ This doctrine was more aggressive and maneuver-oriented, designed specifically to defeat the Soviet operational concept of echeloned attacks.⁴³ AirLand Battle envisioned an “extended battlefield” where U.S. forces would not just defend against the enemy’s front-line troops but would use integrated air power and long-range fires to attack and disrupt their follow-on echelons, command posts, and logistics deep in the rear.⁴² This required unprecedented levels of cooperation between the Army and the Air Force and was a perfect doctrinal match for the emerging technologies of the RMA.⁴⁸

The stunning success of this new American way of war in the 1991 Gulf War had a chilling effect on potential adversaries. It became clear that challenging the United States in a conventional, state-on-state conflict was a recipe for swift and certain defeat. This reality, however, did not lead to a more peaceful world. Instead, it created a “compelling logic for states and non-state actors to move out of the traditional mode of war”.⁵¹ Unable to compete symmetrically, adversaries were forced to invest in asymmetric capabilities and strategies that could bypass or neutralize U.S. technological strengths.³² This strategic adaptation accelerated the global shift toward the very hybrid, irregular, and grey-zone methods that had been practiced during the Cold War. The RMA, in effect, made conventional war obsolete for most actors, thereby making unconventional conflict the new norm. The U.S. military had perfected a doctrine for fighting a specific adversary in a specific way, just as that adversary collapsed and the fundamental character of conflict was shifting beneath its feet.

Section III: The Expanded Battlefield – Hybrid Actors in New Domains

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent era of U.S. conventional military primacy did not end great power competition; it merely displaced it. Conflict migrated from the physical battlefield into non-physical and previously non-militarized domains. We have entered a state of persistent, low-level conflict where the distinction between peace and war is not simply blurred but is actively manipulated as a strategic tool. Adversaries now operate in a “grey zone,” employing hybrid methods to achieve strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of overt warfare.

The New Domains of Contestation

The modern battlefield is no longer confined to land, sea, and air. It has expanded to encompass the global economic system, digital networks, and the critical infrastructure that underpins modern society.

Economic Warfare has evolved into a primary instrument of statecraft, a sophisticated method of coercion that leverages global interdependence as a weapon.⁵² The “weaponization of finance” allows states, particularly the United States with its control over the global dollar-based financial system, to “cripple [countries] financially” through targeted sanctions against individuals, companies, and entire sectors of an economy.⁵² The unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which froze central bank assets and cut off major banks from international payment systems, demonstrate the power of this tool.⁵⁶ Similarly, the “weaponization of trade” involves using tariffs, embargoes, and regulatory barriers to induce policy changes in a target state by exploiting economic dependencies.⁵³ China’s campaign of economic coercion against Australia, which targeted key exports like wine, barley, and coal after Australia called for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19, is a prime example of this strategy in action.⁵⁹ Russia has also long used its position as a major energy supplier to Europe as a tool of political leverage, manipulating gas prices and threatening supply cutoffs to achieve foreign policy goals.⁶² This trend transforms economic interdependence from a source of mutual benefit into a critical vulnerability.⁵⁵

Cyber Warfare has matured from a tool of espionage into a distinct domain of military operations. The watershed moment was the 2010 Stuxnet attack, a highly sophisticated computer worm believed to be a joint U.S.-Israeli operation. Stuxnet infiltrated Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility and caused physical damage to its uranium enrichment centrifuges, demonstrating for the first time that malicious code could produce kinetic effects.⁶⁷ Since then, state-sponsored cyber operations have become commonplace. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups linked to the governments of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea now routinely conduct campaigns against adversaries.⁷¹ Their objectives range from espionage and intellectual property theft to prepositioning for future disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy grids, and transportation networks.⁷⁴

Critical Infrastructure has become a new front line. The physical systems that support the global economy and information flow are now considered legitimate targets for grey-zone aggression. Undersea cables, which carry an estimated 99% of all transoceanic digital communications and trillions of dollars in financial transactions daily, are a point of extreme vulnerability.⁷⁸ This vast network is susceptible to damage from both accidental causes, like fishing trawlers and dragging anchors, and deliberate sabotage.⁸⁰ State actors, particularly Russia, are developing the capabilities to target these cables. Russia’s Main Directorate for Deep-Water Research (GUGI) operates specialized submarines and surface vessels, such as the

Yantar, which are equipped for deep-sea operations and have been observed loitering near critical cable routes.⁷⁸ Recent incidents in the Baltic Sea, where data cables and a gas pipeline were damaged by a Chinese-flagged vessel dragging its anchor, have heightened concerns about coordinated hybrid attacks.⁸³ The key strategic advantage of such attacks is the challenge of attribution. It is exceptionally difficult to prove that a cable cut by a commercial vessel was an intentional act of state-sponsored sabotage rather than an accident, providing the aggressor with plausible deniability and complicating any response by NATO or other targeted nations.⁷⁸

The Doctrine of Ambiguity – Hybrid and Grey-Zone Warfare

To describe this new era of persistent, ambiguous conflict, analysts have developed two interrelated concepts: grey-zone conflict and hybrid warfare.

The Grey Zone is the conceptual space in which this competition occurs. It is defined by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as “the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare”.⁸⁶ It is a realm of coercive and subversive activity deliberately designed to remain below the threshold that would provoke a conventional military response.¹ In this space, revisionist powers like Russia and China use a range of non-military and quasi-military tools—including information operations, political and economic coercion, cyber operations, and the use of proxies—to gradually achieve strategic gains and weaken adversaries without triggering a full-scale war.⁸⁶

Hybrid Warfare is the methodology employed within the grey zone. It is not a new form of warfare, but rather the integrated and synchronized application of multiple instruments of power—conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert—in a unified campaign to achieve a strategic objective.⁸⁹ Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent intervention in the Donbas region of Ukraine is the archetypal modern example. This operation seamlessly blended the use of deniable special forces (“little green men”), local proxy militias, economic pressure, cyberattacks, and a sophisticated, multi-platform disinformation campaign to achieve its goals before the West could formulate a coherent response.⁵¹

This environment has also transformed the nature of Proxy Warfare. The Cold War model of two superpowers manipulating client states has been replaced by a far more complex, multipolar system.⁹⁶ Today’s sponsors include not only great powers but also ambitious regional actors like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE. The proxies themselves are no longer just state armies but a diverse ecosystem of non-state actors, including militias, transnational terrorist groups, private military companies, and political movements, many with their own ideologies and agendas that may diverge from those of their sponsors.⁹⁶ The proliferation of advanced technology, from anti-tank missiles to armed drones and secure communications, has made these proxy forces more lethal and capable than ever before.¹⁰¹ Modern proxy battlefields, such as the Syrian civil war, are characterized by a dizzying array of local and international actors, with multiple sponsors backing various factions, creating a complex and brutal multi-sided conflict.¹⁴ Iran’s long-standing support for Hezbollah is a prime example of a modern proxy relationship, where financial aid, weapons, and training have cultivated a formidable non-state actor that serves as a key instrument of Iranian foreign policy.¹⁰⁶

The defining trend of this new era is the normalization of hostile acts. Actions that would have once been considered casus belli—such as sabotage of critical national infrastructure, systemic economic coercion, or major cyberattacks against government and industry—are now treated as features of routine international competition. This has shifted the nature of conflict from an episodic state of declared war to a persistent condition of undeclared competition. In this grey zone, ambiguity is not a byproduct of conflict; it is a central objective and a strategic weapon. The ability to conduct a hostile act while making attribution difficult or impossible paralyzes the victim’s decision-making process and allows the aggressor to act with a degree of impunity.

Section IV: The Cognitive Domain – The Battle for Perception

Perhaps the most fundamental transformation in the character of conflict over the past half-century has been the elevation of the human mind and collective public perception as a primary, and often decisive, battlefield. The strategic objective is increasingly not to defeat an enemy’s military forces, but to erode their society’s cohesion, paralyze their political will, and manipulate their very understanding of reality. This is narrative warfare, and its tools have evolved from state-controlled broadcast media to a global, AI-powered, social media-driven disinformation engine.

The Weaponization of Media and Social Media

The power of modern media to shape conflict was evident throughout the late 20th century, but the rise of the internet and social media in the 21st century created a new paradigm.

The Arab Spring, beginning in late 2010, was the first major geopolitical event to showcase the power of social media as a tool for political mobilization. Activists across Tunisia, Egypt, and other nations used platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to organize protests, share information about government brutality, and bypass state-controlled media censorship to broadcast their message to a global audience.¹¹⁵ In Egypt, the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook page became a rallying point for a movement that ultimately toppled a decades-old regime.¹¹⁷ This demonstrated the potential for these new platforms to empower organic, bottom-up movements and challenge authoritarian control.¹²⁰

However, state actors quickly recognized the power of these tools and began to co-opt them for their own purposes, leading to the industrialization of influence operations. The most prominent example is Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA), a state-sponsored “troll farm” dedicated to conducting online influence operations.¹²¹ The IRA’s tactics, revealed in detail following its interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, involve a sophisticated, multi-layered approach. Operators create and manage vast networks of fake social media accounts, or “bots,” designed to impersonate real citizens.¹²² These accounts are used to amplify divisive narratives, spread disinformation, and infiltrate online communities on both the political left and right, with the overarching goal of exacerbating existing social divisions and eroding trust in democratic institutions.¹²³ The IRA’s methods include “narrative switching,” where accounts post non-political content most of the time to build a credible persona before injecting targeted political messages, and organizing real-world events, such as opposing protests, to bring online division into the physical world.¹²²

This weaponization of information is not merely opportunistic; it is now a core component of state military doctrine. China’s concept of the “Three Warfares” explicitly codifies this approach. It includes “public opinion warfare” to dominate narratives and ensure domestic and international support, “psychological warfare” to demoralize an adversary and weaken their will to fight, and “legal warfare” (lawfare) to use international and domestic law to challenge the legitimacy of an opponent’s actions.¹¹⁴ Similarly, Russia’s doctrine of

“New Generation Warfare” (often associated with General Valery Gerasimov) views “information-psychological warfare” as a critical tool for achieving strategic goals by creating domestic chaos within a target state, often before any military action is taken.³ The Syrian Civil War serves as a stark case study of this new reality, where a brutal physical conflict has been accompanied by a relentless narrative war waged by all factions—the Assad regime, various rebel groups, and their respective foreign backers (including Russia, Iran, and Western powers)—each using traditional and social media to frame the conflict, legitimize their actions, and demonize their opponents.¹²⁵

The AI-Powered Disinformation Engine

If social media provided the platform for modern information warfare, artificial intelligence is now providing the engine, promising to “supercharge” disinformation campaigns by dramatically increasing their speed, scale, and sophistication.¹³⁰

The most alarming development is the rise of deepfakes and other forms of synthetic media. Using advanced AI techniques like generative adversarial networks (GANs), malicious actors can now create highly realistic but entirely fabricated audio and video content.¹³² This technology makes it possible to convincingly impersonate political leaders, military officials, or other public figures, having them appear to say or do things they never did.¹³⁴ The national security implications are profound. A well-timed deepfake video could be used to fabricate a scandal to influence an election, spread false orders to military units to create chaos, or create a fake atrocity to serve as a pretext for war.¹³⁵ An AI-generated image of an explosion at the Pentagon in 2023 briefly caused a dip in the U.S. stock market, demonstrating the real-world impact of such fabrications.¹³⁷

Beyond deepfakes, AI is being used to automate and personalize propaganda on an unprecedented scale. Large language models can now generate false news articles and social media posts that are often indistinguishable from human-written content.¹³⁸ These tools can be used to create tailored messages designed to appeal to the specific psychological vulnerabilities of target audiences, and to automate the operation of vast bot networks that can amplify these messages across multiple platforms.¹³⁰ This dramatically lowers the barrier to entry for conducting large-scale influence operations, making these powerful tools available not just to states, but to a wide range of malicious actors.¹³⁸

The cumulative effect of this AI-driven information warfare is not simply the spread of more falsehoods. Its ultimate strategic objective is the erosion of trust itself. The goal is not necessarily to make people believe in a specific lie, but to destroy their confidence in all sources of information—in the media, in government institutions, in scientific experts, and ultimately, in their own ability to discern fact from fiction. This fosters a state of what can be called “epistemic exhaustion,” where citizens become so overwhelmed by the flood of conflicting information that they disengage from civic life, making them passive and more susceptible to manipulation. A population that trusts nothing cannot form the consensus required to recognize and counter a national security threat, thereby achieving an adversary’s goal of societal paralysis without firing a single shot.

Section V: The Next Revolution – The AI-Enabled Battlespace

Just as the integration of precision, stealth, and networking catalyzed a Revolution in Military Affairs at the end of the 20th century, artificial intelligence is now driving another profound transformation in the character of warfare. This emerging revolution is centered on three key elements: the compression of decision-making to machine speed, the proliferation of intelligent autonomous systems, and the dominance of data as the central resource of military power. This shift promises unprecedented efficiency but also introduces complex new risks of escalation and loss of human control.

Accelerating the Kill Chain – AI in Intelligence and C2

Modern military operations are drowning in data. A torrent of information flows from satellites, drones, ground sensors, and countless other sources, far exceeding the capacity of human analysts to process it in a timely manner.¹⁴⁰ Artificial intelligence is becoming the essential tool for turning this data overload into a decisive advantage.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s Project Maven (officially the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team) is a flagship initiative in this area. Launched in 2017, Maven employs machine learning algorithms to automatically analyze full-motion video from drones and other ISR platforms.¹⁴² The system can detect, classify, and track objects of interest—such as vehicles, buildings, or groups of people—freeing human analysts from the tedious task of watching countless hours of footage and allowing them to focus on higher-level analysis and decision-making.¹⁴⁴ This capability dramatically accelerates the intelligence cycle, reducing the time it takes to find and validate a target from hours or days to minutes or even seconds.¹⁴⁶

This accelerated intelligence is being fed into increasingly AI-enhanced Command and Control (C2) systems. The objective is to create a seamless, networked architecture that connects any sensor to any decision-maker and any weapon system on the battlefield. This concept is at the heart of the U.S. military’s overarching strategy for Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).¹⁴⁷ AI algorithms within these C2 systems can fuse data from disparate sources to create a unified, real-time operational picture, predict enemy movements, analyze potential courses of action, and recommend optimal responses to commanders.¹⁴⁰ The ultimate goal is to radically compress the “sensor-to-shooter” timeline, enabling forces to act at a tempo that overwhelms an adversary’s ability to react.

This pursuit of AI-driven military advantage has ignited a fierce technological competition, often described as an AI arms race, primarily between the United States and China.¹⁵⁰ China has made AI a national priority and is pursuing a strategy of “military-civil fusion” to systematically leverage the expertise and innovation of its burgeoning private tech sector and universities for military modernization.¹¹¹ Beijing’s goal is to achieve “intelligentized warfare,” using AI to achieve “decision dominance” through a highly integrated “systems warfare” approach.¹¹¹ While the United States is widely seen as maintaining a lead in developing the most advanced, cutting-edge AI models, China’s state-directed approach gives it an advantage in the broad-scale adoption and practical integration of AI technologies across its military and economy.¹⁵³

The Proliferation of Autonomy

The most visible and disruptive impact of AI on the battlefield is the proliferation of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The drone revolution has unfolded in two parallel tracks. On one end of the spectrum are sophisticated, reusable military drones like the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. In conflicts such as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, the TB2 proved devastatingly effective, combining long-endurance surveillance with precision-guided munitions to destroy Armenian air defenses, armor, and artillery, effectively dominating the battlefield.¹⁵⁴ On the other end of the spectrum is the widespread use of cheap, commercially available, and often disposable drones, a trend brought to the forefront by the war in Ukraine. Both sides have deployed thousands of small quadcopters for reconnaissance and, more significantly, as first-person-view (FPV) “kamikaze” drones capable of destroying multi-million-dollar tanks and other armored vehicles.¹⁵⁷ This has created a new reality of attritional drone warfare, where the low cost and sheer quantity of these systems can overwhelm even sophisticated defenses.¹⁵⁹

This trend points toward the next frontier of military autonomy: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), colloquially known as “killer robots.” These are weapon systems that, once activated, can independently search for, identify, target, and kill human beings without direct human control over the final lethal decision.¹⁵⁰ The development of LAWS raises profound legal and ethical challenges. Organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have raised serious concerns about whether such systems can comply with the core principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution.¹⁶³ Key questions revolve around accountability—who is responsible when an autonomous weapon makes a mistake?—and the fundamental ethical principle of “meaningful human control” over the use of lethal force.¹⁶⁶ In response to these concerns, the ICRC and numerous other bodies have called for the negotiation of new, legally binding international rules to prohibit unpredictable autonomous systems and those that target humans directly.¹⁶²

The relentless pace of technological development is creating a strategic environment where the speed of combat is poised to exceed the limits of human cognition. As AI-enabled C2 systems compress decision cycles to seconds and autonomous weapons are designed to react instantly to threats, conflicts between two AI-enabled militaries may be fought and decided at machine speed, potentially before human commanders can fully comprehend the situation or intervene. This creates an inescapable and dangerous strategic logic: to remain competitive, militaries feel compelled to delegate more and more decision-making authority to AI systems, despite the profound ethical concerns and the immense risk of rapid, unintended escalation.¹⁷¹

Furthermore, the proliferation of cheap, effective, and increasingly autonomous systems is upending the traditional military-technical balance. The war in Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the problem of “cost asymmetry,” where inexpensive drones, costing only a few thousand dollars, can neutralize or destroy highly valuable military assets like tanks and warships that cost millions.¹⁵⁸ Defending against swarms of these cheap drones with expensive, sophisticated air defense missiles is an economically unsustainable proposition.¹⁶⁰ This challenges the entire Western military model, which has for decades relied on a relatively small number of expensive, technologically superior platforms. The future battlefield may not be dominated by the nation with the most advanced fighter jet, but by the one that can deploy the largest, most adaptable, and most intelligent swarm of inexpensive, autonomous, and attritable systems.

Conclusion: A State of Undocumented, Perpetual Conflict

The evidence of the past 50 years is conclusive: while the fundamental nature of war as a political act has not changed, its character has been irrevocably transformed. The clear, binary world of the Cold War, with its defined states of “peace” and “war,” has been replaced by a state of persistent, multi-domain competition. The lines have not just blurred; they have been erased and weaponized. The major powers are not on the brink of a new conflict; they are, and have been for some time, engaged in one. It is an undocumented, undeclared, and unending conflict fought not primarily with massed armies on physical battlefields, but with a new arsenal of hybrid tools across a vastly expanded battlespace.

This transformation has been driven by a confluence of factors. The nuclear stalemate of the Cold War forced competition into the shadows, normalizing the use of proxies, covert action, and political subversion. The subsequent Revolution in Military Affairs created such a profound U.S. advantage in conventional warfare that it compelled adversaries to abandon symmetrical competition and double down on these asymmetric, hybrid methods. The globalization of finance and information, coupled with the proliferation of cyber capabilities and advanced technologies, provided the new domains—economic, digital, and cognitive—in which this competition would be waged.

Today, Russia, China, the United States, and other powers are engaged in a constant struggle for advantage in the grey zone. This is a conflict fought with sanctions designed to cripple economies, with cyberattacks that probe critical infrastructure, with deniable sabotage of undersea cables, with proxy forces that allow for influence without attribution, and, most pervasively, with information campaigns designed to fracture societies from within.

The advent of artificial intelligence is now catalyzing the next revolution, one that promises to accelerate the speed of conflict beyond human comprehension. AI is transforming intelligence analysis, command and control, and the very nature of weaponry, pushing toward a future of algorithmic warfare and autonomous systems. This raises the specter of a battlefield where decisions are made in microseconds and escalation can occur without deliberate human intent.

In this new era, the traditional concept of “victory” is becoming obsolete. Victory is no longer solely defined by a signed treaty or a captured capital. It may be the successful paralysis of a rival’s economy through financial warfare ⁵⁵; the quiet degradation of their military readiness through sustained cyber espionage ⁷⁶; the fracturing of their political system through a multi-year disinformation campaign ¹²³; or the achievement of a decisive technological breakthrough in AI that renders an adversary’s entire military doctrine irrelevant.¹⁵⁰

The greatest danger of this new paradigm is not necessarily a deliberate, cataclysmic war, but the potential for uncontrollable escalation out of the grey zone. A miscalculation in a proxy conflict, a cyberattack with unforeseen cascading effects, or the autonomous action of an AI-powered weapon system could trigger a rapid spiral into a conventional conflict that no party initially intended. The central challenge for national security in the 21st century is therefore twofold: not only to prepare to win the wars of the future, but to learn how to successfully navigate the unending, undocumented conflict that is already here.

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