Overall Fragility Score: 8.2 / 10 (Highly Fragile)

Lifecycle Stage Assessment: CRISIS

The Islamic Republic of Iran is assessed to be in a Crisis stage of state fragility. The foundational pillars of the state are critically compromised, and its capacity to withstand further shocks is minimal. Core state functions, particularly in the economic and public service domains, are severely impaired. The social contract that once existed between the clerical regime and the populace has been not merely broken, but replaced by a system of pure coercion, where political legitimacy rests almost exclusively on the state’s security apparatus. The regime faces compounding, cross-domain pressures that are locked in reinforcing feedback loops, threatening its medium-term viability and making state failure a plausible outcome within the 36-month forecast horizon.

The key drivers of this advanced state of fragility are interconnected and mutually exacerbating:

• Catastrophic Loss of Political Legitimacy: The regime’s authority is no longer derived from popular consent but is maintained through force. This is empirically demonstrated by historically low electoral turnouts in the 2024 parliamentary and presidential elections, with participation falling below 41%.¹ This quantitative rejection of the system is mirrored by the qualitative reality of recurring, nationwide anti-regime protests, such as the 2022-2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, which have evolved into a state of perpetual, cross-sectoral unrest targeting the regime’s core institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader’s financial conglomerates.³
• Structural Economic Collapse: The Iranian economy is characterized by systemic dysfunction and is incapable of providing for the basic well-being of its population. It is crippled by a combination of severe international sanctions, institutionalized corruption, and chronic hyperinflation, with the real rate estimated to exceed 40%.⁵ The national currency has experienced a near-total collapse on the open market, with the black market exchange rate exceeding 1,100,000 rials per U.S. dollar, a more than 25-fold deviation from the official rate.⁸ This economic decay is structurally embedded, with a parasitic “military-bonyad complex” dominated by the IRGC stifling all productive capacity and fueling the widespread popular anger that drives continuous social unrest.¹¹
• Accelerating Environmental Breakdown: An acute water crisis, driven by decades of catastrophic mismanagement and amplified by climate change, has transitioned from a long-term risk into an immediate national security threat. Plummeting water reservoir levels are actively threatening food security, displacing populations, and serving as a potent catalyst for violent, localized conflicts over resource access.¹³
• Elite Fracture Risk during Succession: The state’s increasing reliance on the IRGC for internal repression and external power projection places immense strain on the security apparatus. The impending succession of the aging and ailing Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, represents the single greatest point of political failure. This event is highly likely to trigger an intense and potentially violent power struggle among hardline factions, which could paralyze the state’s decision-making and fracture the security forces’ chain of command, creating a power vacuum.¹⁷

Forecast Trajectory: Rapidly Deteriorating. The confluence of these drivers creates multiple reinforcing feedback loops that are accelerating the state’s trajectory toward collapse. The probability of Iran transitioning to a ‘Collapse’ or ‘Post-Collapse/Recovery’ stage within the 36-month forecast horizon is assessed as high (40-50%).

4.2. State Fragility Dashboard

The following dashboard provides a quantitative and qualitative snapshot of Iran’s fragility indicators as of Q4 2025. Each score is based on a 1-10 scale, where 1 represents high resilience and 10 represents critical fragility.

4.3. Detailed Domain Analysis

Module A: Economic Resilience and State Capacity

The Iranian economy is in a state of structural collapse, characterized by stagflation, institutional decay, and the state’s near-total failure to provide for the basic well-being of its population. The combination of external pressure from international sanctions and deep-seated internal mismanagement has created a system incapable of recovery without fundamental political change.

The State of Structural Collapse

The economy’s vital signs point toward systemic failure. International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections for 2025 indicate a near-stagnant real GDP growth rate of just 0.3%, a dramatic slowdown from the previous year.5 The nominal GDP is expected to contract significantly, falling by $60 billion to $341 billion.5 This economic paralysis is compounded by chronic hyperinflation. While official forecasts place the average inflation rate at 43.3% for 2025 5, independent analyses and on-the-ground reporting suggest a real rate consistently exceeding 40-50%, with food inflation nearing 60%.6 This relentless price pressure has systematically destroyed household wealth and pushed a vast segment of the population into poverty.

The Currency Devaluation Spiral

The most visible symptom of this collapse is the state of the national currency, the rial. A massive chasm has opened between the official, state-mandated exchange rate of approximately 42,000 IRR per U.S. dollar and the free market (black market) rate.40 By late 2025, the black market rate had plummeted to over 1,100,000 IRR per U.S. dollar, reflecting a near-total loss of confidence in the currency and the Central Bank’s ability to manage it.8 This is not merely economic mismanagement; it is a deliberate system of political control and patronage. State-connected entities, primarily the IRGC and its affiliates, are granted privileged access to foreign currency at the subsidized official rate for imports. They can then engage in massive arbitrage by selling these goods on the domestic market at prices reflecting the free market rate. This dual-rate system functions as a massive wealth transfer mechanism, enriching the regime’s core constituencies while imposing the full cost of hyperinflation on the general population and the unsubmissive private sector. It is a core component of the regime’s political economy, reinforcing the power of the deep state at the direct expense of national economic health.

The Parasitic Deep State Economy

At the heart of Iran’s economic dysfunction lies what can be described as the “military-bonyad complex”.11 This dense, informal network of enterprises controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and unaccountable parastatal foundations (bonyads) dominates the “commanding heights” of the economy, with some estimates suggesting it controls more than 50% of the country’s GDP.11 These entities operate across nearly every major sector, including oil, construction, engineering, manufacturing, and telecommunications, often bypassing formal regulations and public oversight.11 This structure is not just inefficient; it is predatory. It institutionalizes corruption, evades taxes, and uses its immense political power to crush private competition, thereby preventing any possibility of genuine economic growth. International sanctions, paradoxically, have strengthened this complex. As legitimate international trade is restricted, the IRGC’s control over smuggling networks and black market operations has allowed it to further consolidate its economic dominance.11

Impact on the Populace

The direct consequence of these policies is the mass immiseration of the Iranian people. The economic collapse has translated into a profound social crisis. The official unemployment rate is projected to rise to 9.5% in 2025, but this figure masks a much deeper problem of underemployment and a chronic youth unemployment rate of 22.75%.5 This lack of opportunity for a young and educated populace is a primary driver of social despair and anger. The systematic destruction of purchasing power has pushed a majority of the population toward destitution, with one regime-affiliated economist warning that 80% of Iranians are at risk of falling below the poverty line.28 This pervasive economic pain is the primary engine of popular discontent, fueling the continuous and widespread labor strikes and protests by retirees, teachers, oil workers, and other segments of society who directly challenge the regime’s authority.3

Module B: Political Legitimacy and Institutional Integrity

The political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic has collapsed. The foundational social contract of the 1979 revolution, which promised religious piety, social justice, and economic prosperity, is now viewed by a large majority of the population as comprehensively broken. The regime’s authority no longer rests on any claim to popular consent but is sustained solely by the coercive capacity of its security apparatus. This brittle foundation is now facing its most severe test: an impending leadership succession that threatens to fracture the coercive state itself.

The Annihilation of the Social contract

The regime’s inability to generate popular support is no longer a matter of interpretation but a quantifiable fact. The 2024 parliamentary elections saw a historic low voter turnout of just 41%, with only 5% of ballots cast in the capital, Tehran, being deemed valid.2 This was followed by an even more damning result in the 2024 presidential election, where first-round turnout fell to 39.9%, the lowest in the Islamic Republic’s history.1 These figures represent a nationwide, passive boycott—a clear and unambiguous rejection of the system’s “republican” pillar and its claims to representative governance. The state’s reliance on coerced participation in official rallies and its inability to mobilize genuine support underscore the deep chasm between the rulers and the ruled.

From “Woman, Life, Freedom” to Perpetual Protest

The nationwide “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising of 2022-2023 was a watershed moment, representing a fundamental, values-based rejection of the Islamic Republic’s core identity by a huge segment of the population, particularly youth and women.37 While the street protests were eventually suppressed through brutal violence, the underlying dissent has not been extinguished. Instead, it has metastasized into a state of perpetual, low-level insurgency. Protests are now a daily feature of Iranian life, with a constant stream of demonstrations by diverse groups—retirees, teachers, oil workers, bakers, and defrauded housing applicants—across the country.3 Crucially, the slogans at these protests have become increasingly radicalized, directly targeting the IRGC and the financial conglomerates, such as Setad Ejraiye Farman Emam (EIKO), that are under the direct control of the Supreme Leader, blaming them for the plunder of national wealth.3

The Succession Crisis: The Regime’s Single Point of Failure

The single greatest political tipping point facing the Islamic Republic is the impending succession of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is reportedly in poor health.18 His death will remove the ultimate arbiter of factional disputes and the central pillar of the regime’s power structure, likely triggering an intense and potentially violent power struggle among hardline factions. The process is opaque, but several key contenders have emerged, each representing a different power center within the regime’s deep state.

This succession is not merely a political event; it is the most likely catalyst for a security force fracture. The Supreme Leader is the ultimate commander-in-chief, and all senior military promotions require his personal approval, ensuring loyalty is directed toward him personally.³² Upon his death, this single point of unified command will vanish. Contenders like Mojtaba Khamenei and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i will vie for the loyalty of different factions within the IRGC, intelligence services, and judiciary.¹⁷ A contested succession will likely result in conflicting orders being issued down the chain of command. The moment the security forces receive contradictory directives from competing power centers is the moment the state’s coercive capacity could shatter, creating a power vacuum that protestors and ethnic insurgencies could exploit.

Security Apparatus: Cohesion Under Strain

The IRGC’s senior command remains the ideologically committed backbone of the regime.47 The state has spent decades creating a system of control based on intensive indoctrination, economic patronage, and pervasive surveillance to ensure the loyalty of its military elites.32 However, this system is showing signs of strain. The regular army, the Artesh, is considered less ideological, has been historically marginalized by the IRGC, and suffers from aging and poorly maintained equipment.33 More importantly, the regime’s forced pivot toward using the IRGC and its Basij militia for internal repression against fellow citizens erodes morale and risks creating fissures between the officer corps and the lower-ranking members and conscripts who face the same economic despair as the protestors they are ordered to suppress. The June 2025 war with Israel also exposed deep intelligence penetration of the security apparatus and has reportedly created visible criticism within the IRGC’s younger ranks, who question the leadership’s strategic competence.50

Module C: Social Cohesion and Human Development

Iranian society is dangerously fragmented along multiple fault lines, and the state’s capacity to deliver the basic services that might otherwise mitigate these tensions has severely eroded. This social decay provides daily, tangible proof of state failure, further undermining any remaining claims to competence and fueling popular anger.

The Generational and Ideological Chasm

The most significant social fracture is the unbridgeable gap between Iran’s young, educated, and globally-connected population and the aging, dogmatic clerical elite that rules the country. With over 35% of its population between the ages of 15 and 29, Iran is a young nation whose aspirations are fundamentally at odds with the regime’s ideology.38 The intergenerational bargain of the revolution—sacrificing social freedoms for economic advancement—has comprehensively failed. Today’s youth face bleak economic prospects, with high unemployment and a stagnant labor market, coupled with intense social repression, particularly regarding personal freedoms and women’s rights.37 This generational chasm was the primary engine of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests and represents a permanent source of opposition to the regime’s continued existence.

The Brain Drain-Decay Cycle in Action

The lack of economic and social opportunities, combined with pervasive political repression, has triggered a catastrophic brain drain of Iran’s human capital. A 2024 study indicates that the number of Iranian-born migrants has grown from approximately 500,000 before the 1979 revolution to 3.1 million, with the primary destinations being the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.25 This exodus includes an estimated 110,000 Iranian-origin researchers working abroad, a group that represents a massive share of the nation’s scientific and technical capacity.25 The desire among expatriates to return to Iran has plummeted from over 90% in 1979 to less than 10% today, indicating a permanent loss of this talent.25 This flight of doctors, nurses, engineers, and academics directly correlates with the observable decay in public services, creating a vicious cycle where the degradation of quality of life reinforces the motivation for the remaining skilled individuals to emigrate.

Collapse of Public Services

The state’s capacity to deliver basic public services has severely eroded. The healthcare system is crumbling under the combined weight of international sanctions, which restrict access to critical medicines and advanced medical equipment, and the systemic decay caused by corruption and the brain drain of medical professionals.34 Reports indicate that even active primary healthcare service points often fall short of required standards, lacking essential staff and equipment, particularly in underserved and deprived regions like Sistan and Baluchestan.34 The most visible evidence of state failure for the average citizen is the collapse of national infrastructure. The country’s power and water grids are failing, leading to daily, prolonged blackouts that cripple industry, disrupt daily life, and serve as a constant flashpoint for protests.28

Ethnic Fault Lines as Accelerants

The regime’s centralized and repressive nature has long fueled tensions with Iran’s ethnic minorities, who are concentrated in the country’s periphery. The state’s brutal crackdown on protests in these regions—particularly in Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan, which saw some of the highest death tolls during the 2022 uprising—has intensified these grievances.30 The regime’s violence, combined with systemic economic and political discrimination, is actively fueling separatist sentiment. These well-established ethnic fault lines represent a major threat to national cohesion. In any scenario of state collapse or a chaotic succession crisis, these movements are highly likely to capitalize on the weakness at the center to assert local control, potentially leading to the violent fragmentation of the country.39

Module D: Environmental and Resource Security

Environmental stress, particularly the escalating water crisis, has transcended from a long-term risk to an immediate and existential threat to Iran’s national security. This crisis is not merely an unfortunate consequence of climate change; it is the direct result of decades of disastrous mismanagement and corruption. It now acts as a powerful threat multiplier, exacerbating economic hardship, fueling social instability, and creating new, violent conflict zones across the country.

The Water Crisis as an Existential Threat

The data on Iran’s water scarcity is stark and points to a systemic collapse of the country’s hydrological systems. As of 2025, Tehran’s five main reservoirs have plummeted to just 13% of their capacity, with the vital Lar dam holding only 1% of its potential volume.14 This is a nationwide phenomenon, with nineteen provinces experiencing significant drought and critical regions like Hormozgan and Sistan and Baluchestan reporting staggering decreases in average rainfall of 77% and 72%, respectively.14 The Karaj Dam, a key source of both water and electricity for Tehran, saw its water reserves decrease by 75% between September 2024 and September 2025, rendering it incapable of generating electricity.13 Former regime officials have warned that unchecked water shortages could eventually displace up to 70% of the population, or nearly 50 million people.16

A Crisis of Mismanagement

While climate change has contributed to reduced precipitation, the crisis is primarily man-made. It is the product of decades of unsustainable development policies characterized by the construction of thousands of dams and the unregulated depletion of groundwater aquifers for inefficient agricultural practices.14 This ecological destruction has been driven by state policy and has been exacerbated by corruption. The IRGC’s construction conglomerate, Khatam al-Anbiya, has been a key player in these projects, profiting from inflated state contracts for dam-building and river diversion projects that were often undertaken without proper environmental assessments or long-term planning.12 These projects have diverted water to politically connected industries and regions while devastating traditional agricultural areas and fragile ecosystems.12

Water as a Direct Driver of Kinetic Conflict

The most critical aspect of the water crisis is its role as a direct driver of violent conflict. Water scarcity is no longer a passive pressure; it is an active catalyst for unrest that directly challenges the state’s ability to maintain internal order. The 2021 “Uprising of the Thirsty” in the ethnically Arab province of Khuzestan, where security forces used live ammunition against protestors demanding water, was a harbinger of this trend.15 Since then, water-related protests have become frequent and have often turned violent in provinces like Isfahan, Hamedan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.16 These are not just demonstrations; they are often violent clashes between citizens and security forces over the most basic resource for survival.

This dynamic creates a powerful “Water-Conflict Multiplier” effect. The crisis takes underlying economic grievances and ethnic tensions and ignites them. A farmer in Khuzestan who loses his livelihood because water is diverted to an IRGC-linked factory in a Persian-majority province does not just see an environmental problem; he sees a political, ethnic, and economic injustice perpetrated by a corrupt and hostile state. The regime’s response—violent repression rather than effective resource management—further inflames these grievances. The water crisis is thus fundamentally altering Iran’s internal security landscape. It is creating new, potent drivers of conflict that are localized, violent, and directly challenge the state’s ability to manage essential resources. It represents a primary pathway through which state fragility can transition into active, violent state failure.

4.4. Synthesis and Predictive Outlook

4.4.1. Critical Reinforcing Feedback Loops

The Iranian state is trapped in a series of self-perpetuating, negative feedback loops. These vicious cycles are not independent but are deeply interconnected, creating a powerful downward spiral that is accelerating the state’s trajectory toward a terminal crisis. The regime’s policy responses to each crisis only serve to worsen the others, leaving it with no viable path to stabilization.

• The Repression-Isolation Spiral: This loop begins with the regime’s core legitimacy crisis. Economic hardship and demands for social and political freedom lead to popular protests.³ The state, lacking any other tool of governance, responds with violent repression, mass arrests, and a surge in executions.³⁰ This brutality triggers new rounds of international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, such as the “snapback” of UN sanctions.⁶ The sanctions, in turn, deepen the economic crisis by crippling oil exports and access to global financial markets.⁶ This intensified economic pain further fuels popular anger and desperation, creating the conditions for the next, more intense, wave of protest. Each cycle leaves the regime more brutal, more isolated, and facing a more enraged populace.
• The Brain Drain-Decay Cycle: This cycle represents the hollowing out of the state’s human capital and functional capacity. The combination of a collapsing economy, lack of social and intellectual freedom, and pervasive political repression creates powerful incentives for educated and skilled professionals to emigrate.²⁵ This massive brain drain of doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs degrades the state’s capacity to manage complex systems, leading to a visible and accelerating decline in the quality of public services like healthcare, education, and infrastructure.³⁴ This decline in the quality of life and public services reinforces the motivation for the remaining skilled individuals to leave, accelerating the systemic decay. The state is losing the very people it needs to function, ensuring its continued decline.
• The Water-Conflict Multiplier: This loop demonstrates how environmental collapse directly fuels political and security crises. Decades of water mismanagement, often by corrupt, IRGC-linked entities, combined with the impacts of climate change, lead to acute resource scarcity in agricultural regions.¹² This scarcity destroys rural livelihoods, forcing internal migration to already over-stressed urban centers and triggering localized, often violent, protests over water rights.¹⁵ The state’s response is invariably repressive and ineffective, which serves to inflame pre-existing ethnic and provincial grievances. In this way, an environmental crisis is transformed into a potent political and security challenge that erodes national cohesion and directly threatens the state’s control over its territory.

4.4.2. Scenario Analysis (36-Month Horizon)

Scenario 1: State Collapse / Civil War (Reasonable Worst-Case, 40-50% Probability)

The death or incapacitation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in late 2026 triggers a chaotic and public succession crisis. Hardline factions within the IRGC, the intelligence services, and the clerical establishment engage in an open and violent power struggle. Key contenders, such as Mojtaba Khamenei and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, issue conflicting orders to security units loyal to them, shattering the central chain of command. This period of elite fragmentation is perceived as a moment of critical weakness by the populace, sparking a nationwide uprising that dwarfs the 2022 protests in scale, intensity, and organization.

Security forces, facing unclear leadership and suffering from internal fractures, are unable to mount a unified or effective response. In several key urban centers, elements of the regular army (Artesh) or disillusioned Basij units refuse to fire on civilians, stand down, or in some cases, side with protestors. Capitalizing on the chaos at the center, well-organized ethnic insurgencies in Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan seize territory and government buildings, declaring regional autonomy.³⁹ The central state effectively loses control over large parts of the country, leading to a de facto, multi-sided civil war between regime remnants, pro-democracy opposition forces, and ethnic separatist movements. This internal collapse creates a massive power vacuum, risking opportunistic military intervention from regional adversaries and transforming the crisis into a wider international conflict.³⁹

Scenario 2: Malignant Stability (Consolidated Military Rule, 30-40% Probability)

In this scenario, the succession crisis is resolved quickly and brutally, averting an immediate slide into civil war. The IRGC’s senior command, recognizing that a prolonged power struggle would lead to the collapse of the entire system, stages a de facto coup. They bypass the traditional clerical process of the Assembly of Experts and install a loyalist—most likely a figure like Mohseni-Eje’i or a senior IRGC commander—as either the new Supreme Leader or the head of a “Supreme Military Council.”

The regime would abandon all remaining pretense of a republic and transition into an overt military dictatorship. This move would trigger massive protests, which the newly consolidated military leadership would crush with extreme and overwhelming violence. While this would avert immediate state collapse, it would result in a highly isolated, heavily sanctioned, North Korea-style garrison state. The economy would continue its precipitous decline, social repression would intensify, and the state’s fragility would remain extremely high. However, the state’s coercive capacity would be temporarily consolidated under a single, unified military command, creating a “malignant stability” that could persist for some time before eventually succumbing to its internal contradictions. This outcome aligns with analyses that identify a full IRGC takeover as a plausible, albeit deeply worrying, scenario.³⁹

4.4.3. Concluding Assessment and Strategic Tipping Points

Concluding Assessment

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a brittle state sustained by coercion, not consent. Its trajectory is negative and accelerating across all key domains of state fragility. Its fundamental pillars of stability—economic viability, political legitimacy, social cohesion, and resource security—have eroded to a critical point. The regime is trapped in a series of vicious, reinforcing cycles that are pushing it inexorably toward a terminal crisis. Its capacity to absorb further shocks, particularly a leadership succession, a severe economic collapse, or a major external conflict, is minimal. The system’s survival now hinges entirely on the cohesion and loyalty of a security apparatus that is itself showing signs of strain.

The probability of the state transitioning to a ‘Collapse’ or ‘Post-Collapse/Recovery’ stage within the 36-month forecast horizon is assessed as high (40-50%).

Key Tipping Points

The following are identified as the most critical tipping points that could trigger this transition from the current ‘Crisis’ stage to a ‘Collapse’ stage:

• Political Tipping Point: The death of Supreme Leader Khamenei, initiating a succession crisis that results in a public, violent, and prolonged fracture among the regime’s security elite, leading to a paralysis of the state’s command and control functions.
• Security Tipping Point: A widespread, sustained, and coordinated refusal by a significant portion of the security forces (e.g., an Artesh division, multiple Basij provincial commands, or key police units) to carry out orders of mass repression against civilians during a nationwide uprising, or the defection of a key military unit to the opposition.
• Economic Tipping Point: A complete hyperinflationary currency collapse (e.g., the black market IRR/USD rate exceeding 2,000,000) leading to mass food shortages and a breakdown of distribution networks, OR a sustained, nationwide general strike by the transport and oil sectors that paralyzes the economy and severs the state’s last remaining economic lifelines.⁴⁴
• Geopolitical Tipping Point: A renewed, direct, and large-scale military conflict with Israel or the United States that successfully decapitates a significant portion of the new IRGC leadership and shatters the already fragile cohesion of the armed forces, presenting an insurmountable, multi-front challenge to the regime’s survival.⁵⁰

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sources Used

1. 2024 Iranian presidential election – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Iranian_presidential_election
2. 2024 Iranian legislative election – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Iranian_legislative_election
3. Iran Witnesses Protests Over Corruption, Repression, and State Failure – NCRI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/iran-witnesses-protests-over-corruption-repression-and-state-failure/
4. Widespread Strikes and Protest Rallies Erupt Across Iran Targeting Government Corruption and Foreign Policy – NCRI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/widespread-strikes-and-protest-rallies-erupt-across-iran-targeting-government-corruption-and-foreign-policy/
5. IMF forecasts modest growth for Iran’s economy in 2025 – Tehran …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/514967/IMF-forecasts-modest-growth-for-Iran-s-economy-in-2025
6. UN Sanctions on Iran Are Reimposed – The Soufan Center, accessed October 7, 2025, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-october-2/
7. Iranian economic crisis – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_economic_crisis
8. Today’s price of US Dollar in the open market (USDIRR) – الان چند, accessed October 7, 2025, https://alanchand.com/en/currencies-price/usd
9. Why Iran is removing four zeroes from its currency: The reason behind the major reform | World News – The Times of India, accessed October 7, 2025, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/why-iran-is-removing-four-zeroes-from-its-currency-the-reason-behind-the-major-reform/articleshow/124354471.cms
10. With Iran under pressure, fears grow of new Israeli strikes, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/02/iran-strikes-sanctions-israel-gulf-nuclear-trump/
11. Beyond the IRGC: The rise of Iran’s military-bonyad complex | Clingendael, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/beyond-irgc-rise-irans-military-bonyad-complex
12. Economic activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_activities_of_the_Iranian_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps
13. Iran Update, September 30, 2025 – Institute for the Study of War, accessed October 7, 2025, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-september-30-2025/
14. No Easy Solutions For Iran’s Water Shortages and Power Outages …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2025/no-easy-solutions-for-irans-water-shortages-and-power-outages/
15. 2021 Iranian water protests – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Iranian_water_protests
16. A Thirsty Iran Provides an Opening for the U.S. – FDD, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/07/31/a-thirsty-iran-provides-an-opening-for-the-u-s/
17. The Supreme Leader is still alive. But when he does eventually die …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/the-supreme-leader-is-still-alive-but-when-he-does-eventually-die-how-will-succession-play-out/
18. Iran’s Next Supreme Leader: The Top Contenders – Newsweek, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/iran-next-supreme-leader-contenders-2089332
19. Iran After Ali Khamenei: Forecasting Trajectories – Critical Threats, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-after-ali-khamenei-forecasting-trajectories
20. The Curse of Succession in Iran – Stimson Center, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.stimson.org/2024/the-curse-of-succession-in-iran/
21. Iran – IMF DataMapper, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/IRN
22. Youth Unemployment Rate for the Islamic Republic of Iran (SLUEM1524ZSIRN) | FRED, accessed October 7, 2025, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSIRN
23. Iran Youth Unemployment Rate (1991-2024) – Macrotrends, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/irn/iran/youth-unemployment-rate
24. Iran Human flight and brain drain – data, chart | TheGlobalEconomy.com, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Iran/human_flight_brain_drain_index/
25. The Rising Trend of Iranian Migration: A Study on Brain Drain and Its Long-term Impact, accessed October 7, 2025, https://ereliever.com/adult/the-rising-trend-of-iranian-migration-a-study-on-brain-drain-and-its-long-term-impact/
26. Islamic Republic of Iran and the IMF, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/IRN
27. Iran Inflation Rate – Trading Economics, accessed October 7, 2025, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi
28. Iran’s Economic Collapse Deepens as 80% Face Poverty, Blackouts Worsen, and Regime Braces for Unrest, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/economy/irans-economic-collapse-deepens-as-80-face-poverty-blackouts-worsen-and-regime-braces-for-unrest/
29. Why Iran Is Entering a Dangerous Moment | Journal of Democracy, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-iran-is-entering-a-dangerous-moment/
30. World Report 2024: Iran | Human Rights Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/iran
31. A/HRC/58/62 – General Assembly – the United Nations, accessed October 7, 2025, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/58/62
32. Survival over Defection: Why Iran’s Military Elites Stay Loyal – Middle …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/survival-over-defection-why-irans-military-elites-stay-loyal
33. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Military and Political Influence in Today’s Iran, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-military-and-political-influence-in-todays-iran/
34. UNICEF Iran – Annual Report 2024, accessed October 7, 2025, https://open.unicef.org/download-pdf?country-name=Iran&year=2024
35. Iran (Islamic Republic of) Crisis Response Plan 2024 – 2025, accessed October 7, 2025, https://crisisresponse.iom.int/response/iran-islamic-republic-crisis-response-plan-2024-2025/year/2024
36. Collapsing Infrastructure and Economic Ruin Trigger Iran Protests – NCRI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/collapsing-infrastructure-and-economic-ruin-trigger-iran-protests/
37. Generational Divide and Entrenched Power: Catalysts for Protests – PersuMedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.persumedia.com/daily-summary/generational-divide-and-entrenched-power-catalysts-for-protests/
38. The Many Crises of Iranian Youth – Brookings Institution, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-many-crises-of-iranian-youth/
39. Iran’s future: Civil war risks and regime collapse | The Jerusalem Post, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-865640
40. Iranian Toman – Quote – Chart – Historical Data – News – Trading Economics, accessed October 7, 2025, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/currency
41. 1 IRR to USD – Iranian Rials to US Dollars Exchange Rate – Xe, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=1&From=IRR&To=USD
42. Iran Exchange Rate against USD, 1957 – 2023 | CEIC Data, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/iran/exchange-rate-against-usd
43. Today’s price of US Dollar (Remittance) in the open market … – الان چند, accessed October 7, 2025, https://alanchand.com/en/currencies-price/usd-hav
44. Will Iran’s Truckers’ Strike Spark Nationwide Uprising? – IranWire, accessed October 7, 2025, https://iranwire.com/en/features/141735-will-irans-truckers-strike-spark-nationwide-uprising/
45. Mahsa Amini protests – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahsa_Amini_protests
46. What a New President and a Looming Succession Means for Iran’s Yemen Policy – The Yemen Review, Quarterly: April-June 2024 – Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies, accessed October 7, 2025, https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/april-june-2024/22892
47. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps
48. Explainer: The Iranian Armed Forces | American Enterprise Institute – AEI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/
49. Explainer: The Iranian Armed Forces | Critical Threats, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces
50. Iran in the Aftermath of the Twelve-Day War, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/giga-focus/iran-in-the-aftermath-of-the-twelve-day-war
51. Iran After the Battle | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed October 7, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2025/07/iran-after-the-battle?lang=en
52. Inside Iran: The political and economic road ahead | June | 2025 | Brandeis Stories, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.brandeis.edu/stories/2025/june/inside-iran.html
53. How to prevent civil war in Iran should the Islamic regime collapse – The Jerusalem Post, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-865497
54. The Risk Of Civil War In Iran: Disunity, The Loss Of Agency – Analysis – Eurasia Review, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.eurasiareview.com/10072025-the-risk-of-civil-war-in-iran-disunity-the-loss-of-agency-analysis/
55. International sanctions against Iran – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_against_Iran
56. Is Iran cornered by Europe’s sanctions with no escape left?, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/is-iran-cornered-by-europes-sanctions-with-no-escape-left-2796799-2025-10-02
57. A New Era of Iranian Military Leadership | American Enterprise Institute – AEI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/a-new-era-of-iranian-military-leadership/

• Overall Fragility Score: 5.2 / 10 (Stable but with Accelerating Systemic Decay)
• Lifecycle Stage Assessment: STRESSED

Canada is assessed to be in a Stressed lifecycle stage, characterized by a slow-motion corrosion of its core sources of national resilience. A deep-seated institutional and political complacency has allowed chronic, structural problems to fester, creating a state that is increasingly brittle and ill-prepared for the next major exogenous shock. While Canada’s foundational democratic institutions remain strong and it is far from a crisis state, a convergence of negative trends across the economic and social domains is actively eroding its long-term stability and state capacity. The forecast trajectory is not merely one of deterioration, but of compounding fragility, where unaddressed weaknesses in one domain begin to actively degrade stability in others.

• Key Drivers of Fragility:

• Systemic Household Debt & Housing Crisis: Canada’s household debt-to-disposable income ratio of approximately 175% represents a critical systemic vulnerability, overwhelmingly driven by a housing market severely decoupled from local incomes.¹ This creates extreme sensitivity to monetary policy and constrains social mobility, acting as a primary drag on economic dynamism.
• Systemic Degradation of Public Healthcare: The universal healthcare system, a foundational pillar of the Canadian social contract, is in a state of measurable, chronic decline. Historically long wait times for priority procedures, critical health workforce shortages, and increasing reliance on costly temporary staffing solutions are eroding public trust in the state’s ability to deliver its most essential services.³
• Deepening Social and Political Fragmentation: Acrimonious federal-provincial relations, particularly with Alberta and Quebec over jurisdictional and resource issues, are undermining national cohesion.⁵ Concurrently, the profound failure to advance meaningful reconciliation with Indigenous peoples—evidenced by stalled progress on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) Calls to Action and new conflicts over resource legislation—presents a foundational challenge to the state’s legitimacy.⁶
• Chronic Economic Underperformance: A persistent and widening labour productivity gap with the United States and other OECD peers, fueled by chronically low business investment, constrains the long-term economic growth required to fund social services for an aging population and allow households to deleverage sustainably.⁸
• Forecast Trajectory: Compounding Deterioration. Over the 36-month forecast horizon, Canada is not at risk of state failure. However, the base case is a steady, grinding erosion of economic resilience, social cohesion, and institutional capacity. The accumulation of these stresses significantly raises the probability that a moderate external shock could trigger a disproportionately severe domestic political and economic crisis.

The Canadian Paradox

The central challenge in assessing Canada’s stability lies in a fundamental paradox. On one hand, the country possesses the hallmarks of a highly stable, advanced G7 economy. It maintains a strong rule of law, low levels of corruption, a well-capitalized and resilient banking system, and a federal debt load that, while elevated post-pandemic, remains manageable and compares favourably to its international peers.⁹ The Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) projects the federal debt-to-GDP ratio will decline to 41.6% in 2025-26 and continue a downward trend to 39.2% by 2029-30, well below the G7 average.¹² These strengths provide a significant buffer against shocks.

On the other hand, the critical systems that underpin Canada’s social contract and long-term economic vitality are in a state of measurable, chronic decay. The healthcare system is failing to meet the needs of the population, housing has become profoundly unaffordable for a generation, national unity is frayed by regional grievances, and the economy suffers from a long-term productivity deficit that suppresses wage growth.³

This analysis concludes that the former strengths are dangerously masking the severity of the latter weaknesses. The outward appearance of macroeconomic stability and institutional integrity has fostered a deep complacency among policymakers, preventing the proactive and often painful reforms required to address the compounding structural fragilities. The country’s primary risk is not a single, identifiable threat, but the slow, corrosive effect of multiple unaddressed problems that are now beginning to interact and reinforce one another, making the entire system progressively more brittle.

Forecast Trajectory (36-Month Horizon)

The outlook for the Q4 2025 to Q4 2028 period is not for a sudden collapse into crisis, but for a continued, grinding erosion of state capacity, economic dynamism, and social cohesion. The base-case forecast is a “muddling through” scenario where living standards stagnate or decline for a significant portion of the population, public service delivery continues to degrade, and political fragmentation deepens. This trajectory of compounding fragility significantly raises the risk profile of the country. As the state’s inherent “shock absorbers”—fiscal capacity, social trust, institutional legitimacy—are worn thin, its ability to manage the next major crisis is diminished. The probability that a moderate external shock, such as a global recession or a severe trade dispute with the United States, could trigger a disproportionately severe domestic crisis is moderate and rising.

II. Canada Fragility Assessment: A Data-Driven Review

The following dashboard provides a revised, data-driven assessment of Canada’s systemic fragility. Each indicator has been re-evaluated and substantiated with the most current data available, providing a more granular and accurate snapshot of the country’s key vulnerabilities and sources of resilience as of Q4 2025.

Note: Environmental impacts are weighted within other indicators (e.g., economic costs, social displacement, infrastructure disruption).

III. Core Economic Vulnerabilities: The Debt-Stagnation Trap

A. The Household Debt Overhang

Canada’s most acute and immediate systemic risk emanates not from the state’s balance sheet, but from that of its households. Decades of low interest rates and a relentless rise in housing prices have engineered one of the most leveraged household sectors in the developed world. As of the second quarter of 2025, the ratio of household credit market debt to disposable income stood at 174.9%, meaning Canadians owed nearly $1.75 for every dollar of disposable income.¹ This debt, totaling over $3.1 trillion, is overwhelmingly concentrated in mortgages, which account for nearly 75% of the total.¹

This extreme leverage creates a profound sensitivity to monetary policy. The household debt service ratio—the share of disposable income required to cover principal and interest payments—remained elevated at 14.4% in Q2 2025.¹ This means that interest rate adjustments by the Bank of Canada have a disproportionately large and rapid impact on household finances, constraining consumer spending and threatening economic stability.

Crucially, the Bank of Canada’s 2025 Financial Stability Report adds a critical layer of nuance to this risk. While the overall financial system is assessed as resilient, signs of financial stress are increasing and are currently concentrated among households without a mortgage. Arrears rates on credit cards and auto loans for this cohort have risen above their historical averages.¹⁰ This finding is significant because it highlights a key vulnerability: a future economic downturn that leads to a significant rise in unemployment would hit these already-stressed, often lower-income households hardest, potentially triggering a wave of consumer insolvencies that could cascade through the financial system.

B. The Unaffordable Nation

The mountain of household debt is a direct consequence of Canada’s severe and protracted housing affordability crisis. The housing market has been fundamentally decoupled from local economic realities for over a decade. Data from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) illustrates the scale of this decoupling: the national homebuying affordability ratio (the portion of gross household income required for housing costs) surged from an already-high 39% in 2019 to an untenable 54% in 2024.¹³ In major urban centers, the situation is even more dire, with the ratio reaching 74% in Toronto and an astonishing 99% in Vancouver in 2024.¹³

The market is characterized by sharp regional disparities. While the high-cost markets of Toronto and Vancouver are now showing signs of stress—including an oversupply of condominiums, a plunge in pre-construction sales, and a wave of project cancellations—more affordable markets like Calgary and Edmonton have remained resilient, posting record-high housing starts in 2025.²⁰ This divergence underscores the localized nature of the crisis but does not mitigate the national systemic risk posed by the sheer scale of the Toronto and Vancouver markets.

Government responses have thus far proven inadequate. Initiatives like the one-time, tax-free $500 housing benefit payment offered in October 2025 are palliative measures that provide temporary relief to low-income households but do nothing to address the core structural driver of the crisis: a chronic and massive supply shortfall.²² The CMHC estimates that Canada needs to build nearly 6 million new homes by 2030 to restore any semblance of affordability, a pace of construction that current housing starts are nowhere near achieving.¹³ This structural imbalance ensures that housing will remain a primary source of economic and social stress for the foreseeable future.

C. The Productivity Deficit

The intertwined crises of household debt and housing unaffordability are symptoms of a deeper, more foundational economic malaise: Canada’s chronic productivity deficit. For long-term prosperity and stability, an advanced economy must generate sustainable real wage growth, which is overwhelmingly a function of productivity growth. On this front, Canada is failing.

According to the OECD, Canada’s labour productivity grew by a mere 0.8% annually between 2015 and 2023, a rate significantly below the OECD average and considerably behind the United States.⁸ This is not a new phenomenon but a long-term structural weakness. The 2025 OECD Economic Survey of Canada identifies the primary cause as chronically weak business investment. Canadian firms invest substantially less per worker than their peers in other advanced economies, particularly in key productivity-enhancing areas such as information and communication technology (ICT), machinery and equipment, and intellectual property products.⁸

This underinvestment is a critical failure. It means Canadian workers are equipped with less advanced tools and technologies than their American counterparts, leading directly to the productivity gap. This, in turn, suppresses the potential for real wage growth. Real wages in Canada in Q1 2025 had yet to fully recover their pre-pandemic levels, remaining 1.4% lower than in Q1 2021.²⁴ Without robust, productivity-driven wage growth, there is no sustainable path for households to deleverage or for incomes to catch up to housing prices, trapping the economy in a precarious low-growth, high-debt paradigm.

The relationship between the housing crisis and the productivity deficit is not coincidental; they are locked in a reinforcing negative feedback loop that constitutes a systemic trap for the Canadian economy. High housing costs force households to dedicate an enormous share of their income and capital to servicing mortgage debt. This has two direct, negative consequences for productivity. First, it suppresses aggregate demand, as households have less disposable income to spend on other goods and services, reducing the incentive for businesses to invest in expansion and efficiency improvements. Second, it causes a massive misallocation of national capital, diverting investment away from innovative, productive sectors of the economy and into non-productive residential real estate.

Simultaneously, the chronically low productivity growth ensures that real wages stagnate. Without the prospect of rising incomes, the only way for new entrants to access the housing market is by taking on ever-larger amounts of debt relative to their earnings, which further inflates the housing bubble and exacerbates the debt problem. This creates a vicious cycle.

This dynamic paralyzes policymakers. The sheer scale of household debt makes the entire economy exquisitely sensitive to interest rate hikes. This forces the Bank of Canada and the federal government to prioritize financial stability above all else. They become deeply reluctant to implement the kind of disruptive but necessary structural reforms—such as significant changes to tax incentives, competition policy, or internal trade rules—that could boost productivity, for fear of inadvertently triggering a housing market collapse and a systemic financial crisis. The problem (housing debt) thus prevents the implementation of the solution (productivity-enhancing reforms). Canada is locked in a low-growth, high-debt equilibrium that becomes progressively more fragile over time.

IV. The Fraying of the Canadian Social Contract

A. The Collapse of a Pillar: The Healthcare Crisis

For a majority of Canadians, the most tangible and politically corrosive failure of the state is the systemic degradation of the universal healthcare system. Once a source of immense national pride and a key pillar of the Canadian identity, the system is now defined by crisis-level wait times, chronic workforce shortages, and an inability to meet the demands of an aging population. This failure to deliver on a core promise of the social contract is uniquely damaging to state legitimacy.

Data from the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) paints a grim, quantitative picture of this decline. Despite health systems performing a higher volume of many procedures in 2024 compared to pre-pandemic levels in 2019 (e.g., 26% more hip replacements and 21% more knee replacements), the proportion of patients receiving care within the medically recommended timeframe has fallen significantly. In 2024, only 68% of hip replacement patients and 61% of knee replacement patients received their surgery within the 6-month benchmark, down from 75% and 70% respectively in 2019.³ The wait for diagnostic imaging, a critical precursor to treatment, has also lengthened considerably, with the median wait time for an MRI scan increasing by 15 days between 2019 and 2024.³ Emergency departments are under similar strain; for patients admitted to hospital, 9 out of 10 ED visits were completed within a staggering 48.5 hours in 2024-2025.²⁵

The root of this crisis is a catastrophic and worsening health workforce shortage. As of 2023, there were over 29,000 job vacancies for Registered Nurses (RNs) and Registered Psychiatric Nurses (RPNs), and over 13,000 for Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs).⁴ The long-term care (LTC) sector, which serves the country’s most vulnerable citizens, is at the epicentre of this workforce collapse. Between 2021 and 2023, the number of LPNs employed in LTC fell by 6.1% and the number of RNs fell by 2.1%.⁴ To fill the void, LTC facilities have become massively reliant on overtime and expensive private agency staff. Between the 2018-19 and 2023-24 fiscal years, the use of “purchased hours” from private agencies skyrocketed by 238%, while overtime hours surged by 74%.⁴ This is not a sustainable model of care delivery; it is a system in structural failure.

B. The Cracks in the Federation

Concurrent with the decay of universal social programs, the political and social fabric of the Canadian federation is showing significant signs of strain. Acrimonious disputes between the federal government and several provinces are undermining national cohesion and the ability to implement coherent national policy. Research from the Fraser Institute highlights a pattern of increasing federal spending and policy intrusions into areas of exclusive or shared provincial jurisdiction, such as pollution abatement (spending up 1,741%) and K-12 education (spending up 201%) between 2014-15 and 2023-24.⁵

This federal activism has generated the most friction in the province of Alberta, where federal climate policies like the carbon tax and new environmental regulations are widely perceived as a direct assault on the province’s vital oil and gas industry. This has fueled a powerful narrative of “Western alienation” and emboldened political movements demanding greater provincial autonomy, such as the creation of a provincial pension plan and police force to replace their federal counterparts.

In Quebec, the sovereignty movement remains a persistent, if currently latent, threat to national unity. Polling in late 2025 reveals a complex and potentially volatile political landscape. While overall support for sovereignty remains stable at approximately 35-44% and a clear majority of Quebecers (49% “very unfavourable”) oppose holding a referendum in the near term, the pro-sovereignty Parti Québécois (PQ) has surged in popularity and now leads all other parties with 38% of voting intentions.²⁷ This disconnect suggests that many voters are turning to the PQ as a vehicle for change and dissatisfaction with the incumbent government, rather than out of a renewed passion for independence. However, it creates a significant latent risk. The election of a majority PQ government in 2026, which has promised a referendum, combined with an unpopular federal government in Ottawa, could easily reactivate the national unity crisis. The symbolic visit of the PQ leader to Alberta in September 2025 to find common cause against the federal government underscores the growing alignment of regional grievances against central authority.³⁰

C. The Unfinished Work of Reconciliation

The most profound and foundational challenge to the legitimacy and long-term stability of the Canadian state is its ongoing failure to achieve meaningful reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. A decade after the release of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report, progress on its 94 Calls to Action has been glacial, breeding deep cynicism and undermining trust.

A September 2025 progress report from the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) provides a damning verdict on the federal government’s efforts. The report found that zero new Calls to Action had been completed in the 2024-2025 year. To date, only 13 of the 94 calls have been fully implemented, with just two of those completions occurring in the past five years.⁶ The AFN report further argues that progress is not just stalled but is actively being reversed, citing federal budget cuts announced in July 2025 that threaten already underfunded essential programs for First Nations.⁶ Key initiatives, such as the promised Indigenous Justice Strategy, were announced without any attached funding for implementation.⁶

This failure to address historical injustices is being compounded by new legislative actions that are creating fresh conflicts. Both the federal government’s Bill C-5 (One Canadian Economy Act) and the Ontario government’s Bill 5 (Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act) are designed to fast-track major resource and infrastructure projects by streamlining environmental assessments and overriding normal consultation processes.⁷ First Nations leadership has condemned these bills as a profound violation of their constitutional rights to consultation and consent, warning that by prioritizing resource extraction over treaty rights, these laws will inevitably lead to legal challenges, protests, and “conflict on the ground”.⁷ This approach not only undermines the stated goal of reconciliation but also creates significant legal and operational uncertainty for the resource sector, posing a direct risk to future economic development.

The various threads of Canada’s social fragility—the decay of universal services, regional alienation, and the failure of reconciliation—are not independent problems. They are interconnected elements in a cascading crisis of state legitimacy. This cascade begins with a universal grievance that affects all citizens, which then acts as a catalyst, amplifying and validating more specific regional and foundational challenges to the authority of the federal government.

The process begins with the tangible failure of a universally cherished program like healthcare. An average citizen in any province who experiences a multi-day wait in an emergency room or sees a loved one’s surgery postponed indefinitely develops a baseline of dissatisfaction with government competence. This erodes public trust at the most fundamental level of service delivery.

This universal grievance is then refracted through the prism of regional identity. An Albertan, for instance, experiences the same healthcare failure but simultaneously views the federal government as imposing punitive climate policies that threaten their livelihood. Their general dissatisfaction with government incompetence is now compounded by a specific narrative of regional exploitation and alienation. The federal government is no longer just inept; it is perceived as actively hostile to their region’s interests.

Finally, this is layered upon the foundational, unresolved colonial relationship with Indigenous peoples. A First Nations community experiences the healthcare crisis (often far more acutely than the general population), endures systemic economic marginalization, and then witnesses the passage of new federal legislation that explicitly overrides their constitutionally protected rights to consultation on a resource project in their traditional territory. For this community, the crisis of confidence is not merely about competence or regional fairness; it is about the fundamental legitimacy of the Canadian state’s sovereignty and the entire legal framework upon which it is built.

The result is a multi-front, cascading crisis of legitimacy. A universal failure primes the population for discontent, which is then channeled and intensified along pre-existing regional and historical fault lines. This makes it exceedingly difficult for any federal government to build a national consensus for action on any major file, as it faces different, and often contradictory, legitimacy deficits across the country.

V. Climate Shocks as a Systemic Risk Multiplier

Canada is a climate vulnerability hotspot, warming at twice the global average rate.¹⁸ In recent years, the escalating frequency and intensity of climate-related disasters, particularly catastrophic wildfires, have ceased to be isolated environmental events. They now function as a systemic risk multiplier, a powerful catalyst that actively strains Canada’s public finances, disrupts its economy, and overwhelms its state capacity, thereby amplifying all other identified fragilities.

The wildfire seasons of 2023 and 2025 provided a stark preview of this new reality. The 2023 season was the most destructive in Canadian history, burning an unprecedented 16.5 to 18 million hectares of land—more than double the previous record.¹⁷ The 2025 season continued this severe trend, scorching over 8.3 million hectares by early September and ranking as potentially the second-worst season on record.¹⁷

These events inflict staggering direct and indirect costs, acting as a powerful economic multiplier of fragility. The 2024 Jasper wildfire, for example, caused an estimated $1.3 billion in insured damages, destroyed 358 homes and businesses, and crippled the local tourism-dependent economy, with park visitation collapsing by 54% year-over-year.¹⁷ Beyond the immediate destruction, these mega-fires disrupt critical national infrastructure. Smoke and fire risk forced the temporary suspension of CN Rail services near Jasper, delaying the movement of grain and other goods to the Port of Vancouver for export.¹⁷ These disruptions ripple through supply chains, harming sectors far from the fire line.

The fiscal impact is equally severe. The direct cost of wildfire protection in Canada has been rising by approximately $150 million per decade since the 1970s.³¹ The multi-billion-dollar costs of emergency response and post-disaster recovery place an immense and unplanned strain on both federal and provincial budgets. This diverts critical financial resources that could otherwise be allocated to addressing other chronic fragilities, such as funding healthcare, building affordable housing, or investing in productivity-enhancing infrastructure.

Finally, these climate shocks act as a social multiplier. Wildfire smoke blankets cities thousands of kilometres away, causing widespread air quality alerts and posing serious health risks, which in turn places additional stress on already-overwhelmed healthcare systems.³¹ Critically, the burden of these disasters falls disproportionately on Indigenous communities. Between 1980 and 2021, over 42% of all wildfire evacuations in Canada were from majority-Indigenous communities, further traumatizing populations and straining the already fraught relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state.³¹ Each catastrophic fire season demonstrates the state’s limited capacity to protect its citizens from predictable 21st-century threats, further eroding its legitimacy.

VI. Synthesis and Predictive Outlook (2026-2028)

A. Critical Reinforcing Feedback Loops

Canada’s fragility is not the result of a single point of failure but of multiple, interacting stressors that have created self-perpetuating negative cycles. These feedback loops entrench structural problems, paralyze policy responses, and accelerate the erosion of national resilience.

1. The Housing-Stagnation Trap: As detailed previously, extreme housing costs force households into massive debt, which suppresses domestic consumption and misallocates capital away from productive investment. The resulting low productivity growth prevents the real wage gains necessary for incomes to catch up to house prices. Fear of triggering a housing crash and financial crisis in a highly leveraged population prevents policymakers from enacting the bold reforms needed to boost productivity, thus locking the economy in a low-growth, high-debt paradigm.
2. The Healthcare Decay -> Legitimacy Erosion Loop: An aging population, chronic underfunding, and severe workforce shortages lead to the tangible degradation of healthcare services, manifested in historically long wait times. This visible failure of a cherished national institution directly erodes public trust in government competence and the value of the Canadian social contract. This loss of trust and political capital makes it exceedingly difficult for governments to implement the necessary but politically painful reforms (e.g., significant tax increases, service reorganization) required to fix the system, thus ensuring its continued decline.
3. The Resource Alienation -> National Unity Spiral: Federal climate policies, which are often supported in central Canada, are perceived in energy-producing provinces like Alberta as a direct attack on their core industry and economic viability. This perception fuels a powerful sense of Western alienation, leading to direct political and legal challenges to federal authority (e.g., provincial “sovereignty” acts). This open defiance weakens national cohesion and the federal government’s capacity to implement any national-scale project, which in turn reinforces the perception in the West that the federation no longer serves its interests, driving a spiral of fragmentation.

B. Scenarios and Tipping Points

Most Likely Scenario (75% Probability): The Grinding Decline.

Over the 36-month forecast horizon, Canada is most likely to avoid a full-blown, acute crisis. Instead, it will continue on its current trajectory of slow, systemic decay. Economic growth will remain anemic, failing to keep pace with population growth and leading to a decline in per capita GDP. Housing affordability will continue to worsen, particularly for younger generations. Healthcare wait times will lengthen further as workforce shortages persist, and public dissatisfaction will grow. Federal-provincial and federal-Indigenous relations will remain acrimonious and characterized by legal and political standoffs. The overall resilience of the state will continue to erode, leaving it progressively more vulnerable to shocks that may occur beyond the 36-month horizon. This scenario represents a future of managed decline, characterized by political stagnation and a fraying social fabric.

Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario (15% Probability): The Converging Crisis.

A global economic shock in 2026, such as a sharp recession or a severe trade war with the United States, acts as the primary trigger. Persistently elevated interest rates, combined with a spike in unemployment, finally cause the Canadian housing market to undergo a severe and disorderly correction, with prices falling by over 35%. This leads to a wave of mortgage defaults and consumer insolvencies, placing one or more of Canada’s six major banks under severe stress and requiring a massive public bailout, as warned by the Bank of Canada.10 The resulting deep recession causes a fiscal crisis for both federal and provincial governments, forcing austerity measures that further degrade public services.

Amid this economic turmoil, the political fault lines fracture. A newly elected sovereigntist government in Quebec, capitalizing on the crisis, announces its intention to hold a referendum on independence by 2028. Simultaneously, the government of Alberta uses the crisis to push for radical constitutional changes under its “sovereignty” agenda, effectively opting out of key federal programs and challenging federal jurisdiction over its resources. The federal government, crippled by the economic and fiscal crisis and facing existential secessionist threats on two fronts, lacks the political capital and financial capacity to manage the situation, leading to a profound constitutional crisis, capital flight, and a potential breakup of the federation.

C. Concluding Assessment and Key Tipping Points to Monitor

Canada remains a fundamentally stable country, but its key sources of resilience—economic dynamism, a functioning social safety net, and national unity—are being steadily and measurably eroded by chronic, unaddressed structural problems. The state’s primary challenge is a deep-seated complacency that prevents proactive reform, allowing vulnerabilities to compound over time. The probability of a transition to a ‘Crisis’ stage is low within the 36-month horizon but is not negligible and is increasing.

Probability of transitioning to a ‘Crisis’ stage within 36 months is assessed as low-to-moderate (15%).

Key Tipping Points that could trigger this transition include:

• Economic Tipping Point: A rise in the national unemployment rate of more than 2 percentage points within a six-month period. This would likely trigger a wave of defaults among the highly leveraged non-mortgage holding households identified as a key risk by the Bank of Canada, potentially initiating a systemic financial crisis.¹⁰
• Social Tipping Point: The sustained, multi-province collapse of essential services (e.g., the widespread, indefinite closure of hospital emergency rooms) leading to large-scale civil disobedience or tax revolts that overwhelm law enforcement capacity and signal a complete breakdown of the social contract.
• Political Tipping Point: The election of a majority Parti Québécois government in the 2026 Quebec provincial election that subsequently wins a Supreme Court reference case affirming its right to hold a referendum on a simple, unilateral question of independence. This legal victory would trigger a full-blown and potentially irreversible national unity crisis.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sources Used

1. The Daily — National balance sheet and financial flow accounts …, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/250911/dq250911a-eng.htm
2. Household debt-to-income ratio ticks higher in Q2 – Investment Executive, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.investmentexecutive.com/news/research-and-markets/household-debt-to-income-ratio-ticks-higher-in-q2/
3. Wait times for priority procedures in Canada, 2025 | CIHI, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cihi.ca/en/wait-times-for-priority-procedures-in-canada-2025
4. Recent staffing and quality indicator trends in Canadian long-term …, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cihi.ca/en/recent-staffing-and-quality-indicator-trends-in-canadian-long-term-care
5. Stay-in-Your-Lane Federalism: Keeping the Peace in Federal …, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/stay-in-your-lane-federalism-keeping-peace-federal-provincial-relations
6. Progress on Realizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s …, accessed October 8, 2025, https://afn.bynder.com/m/21a223c344077b7/original/Progress-on-Realizing-the-Truth-and-Reconciliation-Commission-s-Calls-to-Action-September-2025.pdf
7. Protecting Our Lands: A First Nations Response to Bill 5 & Bill C-5 …, accessed October 8, 2025, https://chiefs-of-ontario.org/resources/protecting-our-lands/
8. What Canada Must Do Now to Strengthen Productivity: OECD …, accessed October 8, 2025, https://thefutureeconomy.ca/op-eds/what-canada-must-do-now-to-strengthen-productivity-oecd-economic-survey-of-canada/
9. Archived – Department of Finance Canada 2024–25 Departmental plan, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/corporate/transparency/plans-performance/departmental-plans/2024-2025/dp-full-page.html
10. Financial Stability Report—2025 – Bank of Canada, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2025/05/financial-stability-report-2025/
11. Canada: Financial System Stability Assessment-Press Release and Staff Report, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2025/07/31/Canada-Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-569167
12. Economic and Fiscal Outlook – March 2025, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/publications/RP-2425-030-S–economic-fiscal-outlook-march-2025–perspectives-economiques-financieres-mars-2025
13. Canada’s Housing Supply Shortages: Moving to a New Framework – CMHC, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/professionals/housing-markets-data-and-research/housing-research/research-reports/accelerate-supply/canadas-housing-supply-shortages-a-new-framework
14. Concern about misinformation: Connections to trust in media, confidence in institutions, civic engagement, and hopefulness – Statistique Canada, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75-006-x/2025001/article/00008-eng.htm
15. 2024-2025 Public Opinion Research on Privacy Issues, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2025/por_ca_2024-25/
16. Working together in the Canadian federation – Environics Institute, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/working-together-in-the-canadian-federation
17. Canada’s wildfire crisis: Economic & trade disruption | EDC, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.edc.ca/en/article/2025-wildfires-impact-canadian-trade.html
18. Canada wildfire season already second worst on record as experts warn of ‘new reality’, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/11/canada-wildfire-season
19. Q2 Canadian household net worth rises again despite economic uncertainties – RBC, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.rbc.com/en/thought-leadership/economics/featured-insights/q2-canadian-household-net-worth-rises-again-despite-economic-uncertainties/
20. Fall 2025 Housing Supply Report – CMHC, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/professionals/housing-markets-data-and-research/market-reports/housing-market/housing-supply-report
21. Canada Housing Market 2024-2025: Recovery Amid Affordability Strains – BuildCheck AI, accessed October 8, 2025, https://buildcheck.ai/insights-case-studies/canada-housing-market-2024-2025-recovery-amid-affordability-strains
22. Canada Housing Benefit $500 Payment in October 2025: Are You Eligible to Get it?, accessed October 8, 2025, https://cfihaiti.com/en/canada-housing-benefit-500-payment/
23. OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2025, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-canada-2025_28f9e02c-en.html
24. OECD Employment Outlook 2025: Canada, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-employment-outlook-2025-country-notes_f91531f7-en/canada_7843efa6-en.html
25. NACRS emergency department visits and lengths of stay | CIHI, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cihi.ca/en/nacrs-emergency-department-visits-and-lengths-of-stay
26. Wait times for priority procedures, 2019 to 2024: Insights into trends and contributing factors, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cihi.ca/en/wait-times-for-priority-procedures-2019-to-2024-insights-into-trends-and-contributing-factors
27. Most Quebecers reject holding referendum on … – CTV News, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.ctvnews.ca/montreal/article/most-quebecers-againt-holding-sovereignty-referendum-poll/
28. Majority of young Quebecers back independence: poll – CTV News, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.ctvnews.ca/montreal/article/majority-of-young-quebecers-back-independence-poll/
29. 30 years on, is Quebec headed for another independence referendum? | CBC News, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/pq-independence-referendum-1.7423259
30. MEDIA ADVISORY – Conference of the leader of the Parti Québécois in Alberta, accessed October 8, 2025, https://www.quebec.ca/en/news/actualites/detail/media-advisory-conference-of-the-leader-of-the-parti-quebecois-in-alberta-64893
31. FACT SHEET: Climate change and wildfires in Canada, accessed October 8, 2025, https://climateinstitute.ca/news/fact-sheet-wildfires/
32. Canada’s 2025 wildfire season: A national emergency – The Brock Press, accessed October 8, 2025, https://brockpress.com/canadas-2025-wildfire-season-a-national-emergency/

• Overall Fragility Score: 8.5/10
• Lifecycle Stage Assessment: CRISIS
• Key Drivers of Fragility:

• Absolute Centralization of Power: The regime’s structure as a personalist dictatorship creates a “single point of failure” dynamic, where the sudden incapacitation of the Supreme Leader could trigger systemic collapse.
• Systemic Economic Dysfunction: An irreconcilable conflict exists between the moribund state-run command economy and the semi-tolerated informal markets (jangmadang) that are essential for the population’s survival but erode state control and ideology.
• International Isolation and Sanctions: The regime is caught in a self-perpetuating cycle where its pursuit of nuclear weapons for security guarantees triggers international sanctions, which in turn deepens its economic hardship and reinforces its paranoid worldview and reliance on the nuclear program.
• Succession Uncertainty: The absence of a designated, adult, and consolidated heir represents the single greatest vulnerability, creating the potential for a violent elite power struggle in a leadership contingency.
• Forecast Trajectory: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is assessed to be in a state of perpetual, managed crisis. Its stability is exceptionally brittle, but collapse within the 36-month forecast horizon is unlikely, barring a major internal shock such as a leadership contingency. The overall trajectory is static (↔), but this masks high underlying volatility and the potential for rapid, catastrophic state failure should a key tipping point be reached.

State Fragility Dashboard

Detailed Domain Analysis

Module A: Economic Resilience and State Capacity (The “Palace Economy”)

The DPRK operates a bifurcated economy. The formal, state-run command economy is largely defunct and incapable of providing for the population. In its place, the regime relies on a “palace economy” funded by illicit activities to finance its core priorities—the military, the nuclear program, and the loyalty of the elite—while the general population subsists on a semi-tolerated informal market economy.

A.1. State Finances & Illicit Revenue

The solvency of the Kim regime is fundamentally detached from the health of the national economy. Its financial resilience is a direct function of its ability to bypass international sanctions and generate hard currency through a sophisticated, state-directed criminal enterprise.

• Current State: The regime has professionalized its illicit revenue generation to a remarkable degree. State-sponsored cybercrime has become a primary source of funds. The UN Panel of Experts reports that North Korean cyber actors, primarily under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), stole an estimated $3 billion in cryptocurrency between 2017 and 2023.⁴ This activity is accelerating; in 2024 alone, North Korean hackers stole an estimated $1.34 billion, a 103% increase from 2023, accounting for an unprecedented 60% of all crypto funds stolen globally.⁵ These funds are explicitly used to finance the country’s WMD programs.¹⁶ Beyond cyberspace, the regime continues to engage in arms trafficking, smuggling of sanctioned goods, and the production of counterfeit currency and narcotics, often using its diplomatic missions as cover.¹⁷ While comprehensive UN sanctions have reduced overt trade in items like small arms, covert transfers, particularly of munitions to partners like Russia, provide another revenue stream.¹⁹ This illicit economy is backstopped by China, which accounts for approximately 98% of the DPRK’s official trade and provides a crucial economic lifeline, largely as a strategic subsidy to prevent state collapse.²¹ Beijing’s inconsistent enforcement of sanctions is a primary reason for their overall ineffectiveness.²² Reliable estimates of the regime’s foreign currency reserves are unavailable; however, the emphasis is on the continuous flow of hard currency to fund immediate priorities rather than the accumulation of static reserves.²⁴
• Trajectory (Δ): The regime’s ability to generate illicit revenue is increasing (↑). Its cyber operations are growing in sophistication, targeting higher-value exploits and leveraging a global network of IT workers operating under false identities.⁵
• Volatility: High. Revenue streams are dependent on exploiting security vulnerabilities in the global financial system and the geopolitical cover provided by China and Russia, both of which are subject to change.

The “Sanctions Paradox” is a key dynamic. Rather than crippling the regime, decades of sanctions have forced it to perfect a pariah economy. This has empowered and enriched the very hardline institutions, such as the RGB, that are most ideologically opposed to reform and engagement. The regime’s pariah status has become profitable for its security elite, creating a powerful internal constituency whose interests are served by continued confrontation and isolation, thereby institutionalizing resistance to any potential for economic opening.

A.2. Economic Structure & the Jangmadang

The North Korean economy is defined by the profound and irreconcilable tension between the failed socialist command system and the dynamic, bottom-up market system that has replaced it in practice.

• Current State: The official command economy is moribund. The Public Distribution System (PDS), which once provided all necessities, collapsed during the 1990s famine and has never been restored for the general populace.²⁶ The country’s industrial infrastructure is in a state of advanced decay following decades of underinvestment and the prioritization of military spending under the Byungjin policy (simultaneous military and economic development).²⁸ In this vacuum, informal markets known as jangmadang have become the “real” economy.⁶ A majority of North Koreans—with some studies suggesting over 70% of households—now derive most of their income from market activities.³² These markets are the primary source of food, consumer goods, and, critically, illicit foreign media.³⁴ The regime’s posture toward the jangmadang is deeply contradictory; it levies taxes and fees on merchants for revenue, yet views the markets as a fundamental ideological threat to its monopoly on power.²⁶ This has led to recent, intensified crackdowns aimed at reasserting state control, including market closures and increased surveillance of merchants.⁷
• Trajectory (Δ): The dominance of the jangmadang over the command economy is an established fact, but the regime’s recent efforts to rein them in represent a negative trend (↓) for market autonomy and, by extension, the welfare of the population that depends on them.
• Volatility: Medium. The regime is unlikely to attempt a full-scale eradication of the markets, as this would risk mass starvation. However, the intensity of crackdowns can fluctuate based on the political climate, creating uncertainty for merchants and consumers.

This situation creates the “Market Dilemma.” The jangmadang function as a critical balancing feedback loop, a societal pressure valve that prevents total economic collapse and famine, thereby ensuring the regime’s survival. However, they also function as a reinforcing feedback loop of ideological decay. They create a nascent class of citizens with economic agency, foster a “Jangmadang Generation” with no memory of or loyalty to the socialist state, and act as the primary vector for outside information that contradicts state propaganda.⁶ The regime is thus trapped: it cannot survive without the markets, but its long-term ideological foundation is corroded by their very existence.

A.3. Population Welfare

For the DPRK regime, the welfare of the general population is not a measure of state performance but a tool of political control. Resources are distributed not based on need, but on political loyalty.

• Current State: Chronic food insecurity and malnutrition are the baseline conditions for a significant portion of the population. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), over 40% of the population, or 10.7 million people, are undernourished, with nearly one in five children suffering from stunting due to chronic malnutrition.¹⁵ The country faces a persistent annual food deficit of approximately one million tons.³⁵ The PDS is non-functional for most citizens, who must rely on the jangmadang for sustenance.²⁷ This hardship is not uniform but is deliberately stratified through the “Engineered Inequality” model. The Songbun socio-political classification system dictates access to all essential goods and services, creating a vast disparity in living standards between the privileged “core” class in Pyongyang and the “wavering” or “hostile” classes in the provinces.¹⁰ This is starkly reflected in the healthcare system, which has effectively collapsed for all but the elite. Defector testimonies confirm that ordinary citizens must pay for even the most basic medical supplies in hospitals that often lack electricity and heat.³⁷
• Trajectory (Δ): The state of population welfare is static (↔) at a very low level. The regime has no incentive to improve conditions for the general populace, as this would diminish one of its key levers of control.
• Volatility: Low. Widespread suffering is a stable feature of the system. Volatility would only increase if a crisis became so acute that it threatened the food supply for the security forces and Pyongyang elite.

The regime has weaponized austerity. By creating and maintaining a hierarchy of suffering based on political loyalty, it prevents the formation of horizontal solidarity that could arise from universal hardship. A population where everyone is equally desperate might unite in opposition; a population where people are divided by privilege, competing for the state’s favor to avoid falling to a lower rung of misery, will not. Therefore, chronic malnutrition in the provinces is not a sign of regime failure, but a key feature of its successful system of social control.

Module B: Political Legitimacy and Institutional Integrity (The Suryong System)

The DPRK is not a conventional state; it is the personal domain of the Supreme Leader (Suryong). Its stability is almost entirely a function of the leader’s absolute personal control and the unwavering loyalty of the coercive apparatus that enforces his will. This module carries the highest analytical weight.

B.1. Governance and Elite Cohesion

The entire state structure is designed for absolute control by one individual, creating a system that is both exceptionally stable and exceptionally brittle.

• Current State: Governance is synonymous with the personal rule of Kim Jong Un. The Suryong system establishes the leader as the infallible center of the party, state, and military, with his authority being absolute.¹ Elite cohesion is maintained not through consensus but through fear and patronage. Kim Jong Un has consolidated his power through frequent and ruthless purges, eliminating hundreds of senior officials, including his uncle Jang Song Thaek, to remove potential rivals and enforce discipline.² Recent disciplinary actions against officials in the Propaganda and Agitation Department demonstrate the ongoing use of this tool.³⁹ The top leadership bodies, such as the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Politburo and the Central Military Commission (CMC), are not independent centers of power but extensions of the leader’s will.⁴⁰ The leader’s health is a critical variable and a source of high volatility; Kim Jong Un’s public absences and visible weight changes consistently fuel intense speculation, as his sudden death or incapacitation would create an immediate power vacuum.⁴³
• Trajectory (Δ): Kim Jong Un’s personal control appears absolute and stable (↔).
• Volatility: High. The system’s stability is entirely contingent on the health and survival of a single individual. The most significant vulnerability is the lack of a clear succession plan. While his sister, Kim Yo Jong, holds a powerful position, her ability to command the loyalty of the patriarchal military and security elite is unproven.42 The recent public promotion of his young daughter, Kim Ju Ae, is a long-term signal but provides no solution for a near-term contingency.46
  This structure creates a “Single Point of Failure” dynamic. The centralization of all authority provides unparalleled stability by preventing the formation of rival factions. However, it simultaneously eliminates any institutional mechanism for a peaceful transfer of power. The system is perfectly designed for continuity under one ruler but is completely unprepared for the transition to the next. A leadership contingency would not trigger a constitutional process but a raw, and likely violent, struggle for power among the top elite.

B.2. State Ideology and Information Control

The regime’s survival is existentially dependent on maintaining an “Information Blockade” to isolate its population from outside realities that contradict its official narrative.

• Current State: The state’s ideology is a syncretic blend of Marxism-Leninism and extreme ethno-nationalism, codified as Juche (self-reliance) and Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.⁴⁷ This ideology portrays the Kim dynasty as the sole defender of the Korean race against a hostile outside world, particularly the United States. Absolute loyalty to the leader is enshrined as the highest civic duty in texts like the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System”.⁴⁹ To maintain this ideological monopoly, the state exercises total control over all domestic media, with televisions and radios fixed to state channels.⁵⁰ However, this blockade is porous. A constant stream of outside information—primarily South Korean films, music, and news—is smuggled into the country on USB drives and memory cards, sold in the jangmadang.⁶ This creates a cognitive dissonance between the state’s narrative of a destitute, puppet South Korea and the reality of its prosperity and cultural vibrancy. In-country surveys confirm that a large majority of the population has been exposed to foreign media and finds it more relevant to their lives than government pronouncements.⁸ The regime has responded with an intensified crackdown, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic, by fortifying the border and enacting draconian laws like the “Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act” to punish those who consume or mimic foreign culture.⁹
• Trajectory (Δ): The effectiveness of the state’s ideological control is decreasing (↓) as the influx of information continues to erode its credibility, especially among the younger “Jangmadang Generation.”
• Volatility: Medium. While the long-term trend is negative for the regime, its capacity for brutal repression can temporarily halt or reverse the flow of information, as seen with the post-COVID border lockdown.

The regime is engaged in a constant war of political immunology. Its ideology functions to identify foreign ideas as hostile pathogens requiring elimination. The jangmadang and associated technologies act as vectors, constantly introducing these “pathogens” into the body politic. The state’s response—heightened surveillance, new laws, and fortified borders—is an aggressive immune response to this perceived existential threat. While the regime is currently preventing any organized ideological opposition, its “immune system” is weakening, requiring ever more resource-intensive and repressive measures to manage what has become a chronic condition of ideological sickness.

B.3. Security Apparatus Cohesion

The absolute loyalty of the security apparatus is the regime’s center of gravity and the ultimate guarantor of its survival. This loyalty is not taken for granted but is ruthlessly engineered and enforced.

• Current State: The Korean People’s Army (KPA), the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and other coercive bodies are bound to the Supreme Leader through a multi-layered system of control. This includes pervasive surveillance by competing agencies, a vast network of informants, and the ever-present threat of brutal punishment for perceived disloyalty.³ The regime employs classic “coup-proofing” strategies, such as creating parallel security forces that spy on one another, promoting officers based on political loyalty rather than military competence, and frequently rotating key commanders to prevent them from building independent power bases.³ Kim Jong Un has also worked to reassert the WPK’s authority over the military, partially rolling back his father’s “military-first” policy to ensure the army remains the “army of the party”.⁵⁵ The security forces are the top priority for resource allocation, but the immense cost of the strategic nuclear and missile programs comes at the expense of the conventional forces, creating a potential source of friction.⁵⁷ The integrity of border security has been dramatically enhanced since 2020, with new fences, guard posts, and “shoot-on-sight” orders demonstrating the regime’s capacity for total control when it deems it necessary.⁹
• Trajectory (Δ): Cohesion and loyalty to the current leader remain absolute and stable (↔).
• Volatility: Medium. The system is stable under a single, clear commander. Volatility would spike to extreme levels in a leadership succession crisis, where competing security services could turn on one another.

This system represents the “Perfection of Tyranny” feedback loop. The interlocking mechanisms of surveillance and the threat of collective punishment create a state of pervasive fear that makes conspiracy or organized dissent virtually impossible. Any nascent threat is immediately identified and eliminated. This powerful balancing loop ensures stability. However, the system’s perfection is its weakness. It is optimized to defend against threats from below but is entirely dependent on a single command node at the top. It is not designed to manage a crisis of authority within the leadership itself. In such a scenario, the very mechanisms of coup-proofing—pitting agencies against each other—would likely accelerate a catastrophic failure as they engage in a violent conflict for control.

Module C: Social Cohesion and Human Development

In the DPRK, social cohesion is not a goal of the state but a threat to be managed. The regime’s primary tool of social control is the deliberate and systematic fragmentation of society.

C.1. Social Fragmentation (Songbun)

• Current State: North Korean society is fundamentally atomized by the Songbun system, a hereditary socio-political caste system that is the bedrock of the regime’s control.¹⁰ Every citizen is classified at birth into one of three main classes—”core,” “wavering,” or “hostile”—based on the perceived political loyalty of their ancestors.¹⁰ This status dictates every aspect of a person’s life, including where they can live, their access to education and employment, and their allotment of food and housing.¹¹ This system is reinforced by a pervasive surveillance network, including the inminban (neighborhood watches), which function as state-level informant systems, and severe restrictions on internal movement and communication.⁶¹ The explicit purpose of this structure is to prevent the formation of horizontal social bonds and collective identity outside of the state’s control. While the rise of the jangmadang has introduced wealth as a secondary factor influencing one’s life chances—allowing some with low Songbun to bribe their way to certain privileges—it has not dismantled the fundamental discriminatory structure of the system.⁶⁴
• Trajectory (Δ): The Songbun system remains a stable (↔) and core feature of the regime’s control architecture.
• Volatility: Low. The system is deeply entrenched and is a foundational element of the state.

The regime’s strategy is one of social control through engineered distrust. Unlike other authoritarian states that attempt to foster a unified national identity, the DPRK deliberately and permanently divides its people against each other. Songbun ensures that citizens view their neighbors not as potential allies, but as competitors for scarce resources or as potential informants. This institutionalized distrust is arguably the single most powerful stabilizing feature of the regime. It explains how the state survived the catastrophic famine of the 1990s without facing a large-scale, organized rebellion. Even under conditions of extreme universal hardship, the population remained fragmented, focused on individual survival, and incapable of the collective action necessary to challenge the state.

Module D: Environmental and Resource Security

Environmental factors in the DPRK are not merely background stressors but can act as direct triggers for acute humanitarian and economic crises, which the regime then incorporates into its cycle of political control.

D.1. Food Security and Climate Vulnerability

• Current State: The country is exceptionally vulnerable to environmental shocks. Decades of systemic mismanagement, including widespread deforestation for fuel and the creation of terraced farms on steep, unsuitable hillsides, have resulted in catastrophic soil degradation and erosion.¹² This has decimated the land’s natural resilience, making it highly susceptible to extreme weather events.⁶⁷ Combined with decrepit agricultural infrastructure, such as crumbling irrigation systems and dams, even moderate floods or droughts can have a devastating impact on crop yields.¹³ This pattern was the immediate trigger for the 1990s famine, when massive floods in 1995 washed away harvests and critical grain reserves.¹³ This vulnerability persists, with North Korea consistently ranking as one of the countries most at risk from climate-related disasters.¹⁵
• Trajectory (Δ): The country’s environmental vulnerability is static (↔) at a very high level, with no meaningful state-led efforts to address the root causes of deforestation and soil degradation.
• Volatility: High. The country’s food supply is subject to the high volatility of regional weather patterns.

This dynamic creates the “Famine Cycle,” a reinforcing feedback loop that the regime has learned to exploit. The cycle begins with systemic vulnerability caused by poor environmental and agricultural management. A climate shock, such as a typhoon or drought, then triggers a harvest failure. The state’s dysfunctional and corrupt distribution system fails to cope, leading to widespread malnutrition or famine. However, the regime uses the ensuing crisis as a political opportunity. It tightens domestic social controls under the guise of an emergency, blames external enemies (e.g., “hostile forces” and sanctions) for the hardship, and issues appeals for international humanitarian aid. When this aid arrives, it is not distributed equitably but is channeled through the PDS to reward the loyal elite and security forces, thus reinforcing the “Engineered Inequality” model and shoring up the regime’s power base. The underlying environmental vulnerabilities remain unaddressed, ensuring the cycle will repeat.

Synthesis and Predictive Outlook

The DPRK endures not because it is strong, but because it has perfected a unique system of control that turns its weaknesses into instruments of survival. It operates in a perpetual state of managed crisis, balancing on the knife’s edge between total control and catastrophic collapse. Its stability is an emergent property of interlocking feedback loops that reinforce the primacy of the Kim regime above all other state functions.

Analysis of Critical Feedback Loops

• The “Perfection of Tyranny” Loop (Balancing/Stabilizing): This is the regime’s core stabilizing mechanism. It begins with the state’s demand for absolute loyalty to the Suryong. To enforce this, the regime has built an unparalleled apparatus of mutual surveillance, comprising the Songbun system, the inminban informant network, and multiple, competing security agencies that monitor the population and each other.³ This creates a pervasive atmosphere of fear and distrust, which atomizes society and prevents the formation of any organized opposition.⁷⁰ The successful preemption of dissent reinforces the absolute power of the leader and the security organs, which in turn justifies even greater surveillance. This powerful balancing loop explains the regime’s remarkable resilience to internal pressures.
• The “Nuclear Trap” (Reinforcing/Vicious Cycle): This loop defines the DPRK’s foreign policy and economic strategy.

1. Initial Condition: The regime perceives an existential threat from the United States and South Korea and views nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee of its survival.⁵⁸
2. State Action: It diverts a massive portion of national resources to the nuclear and missile programs, starving the civilian economy and agricultural sector.⁵⁷
3. Systemic Reaction: This action triggers severe international sanctions, which cripple the formal economy and worsen the population’s welfare.²³
4. Political Consequence: The resulting economic hardship and international isolation reinforce the regime’s paranoid, siege mentality. It concludes that its hostile external environment makes the nuclear deterrent even more essential, justifying further investment in weapons over welfare. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of militarization, isolation, and economic decay.

• The “Market Dilemma” (Balancing vs. Reinforcing): This loop represents the central contradiction of the modern DPRK economy. The collapse of the state’s command economy created a crisis (famine) that threatened the regime’s existence. The spontaneous emergence of the jangmadang acted as a crucial balancing loop, providing food and goods, preventing mass starvation, and relieving pressure on the state.⁶ However, these same markets have become a reinforcing loop of ideological erosion. They create economic independence, undermine the state’s role as provider, and serve as the primary conduit for illicit foreign information that delegitimizes the regime’s propaganda.⁸ The regime is thus caught: cracking down too hard on the markets risks triggering the very collapse they prevent, while allowing them to flourish cedes ideological and social control.
• The “Famine Cycle” (Reinforcing/Vicious Cycle): This loop demonstrates how the regime turns environmental crisis into political opportunity. Decades of poor agricultural planning and deforestation create extreme vulnerability to climate shocks.¹² A major flood or drought causes a harvest failure. The state’s dysfunctional distribution system fails to cope, leading to a food crisis. The regime then uses the crisis to tighten political control, blame external enemies, and appeal for international aid, which it diverts to shore up the loyalty of its elite, thus perpetuating the underlying vulnerabilities and ensuring the cycle’s repetition.¹⁴

Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario (36-Month Horizon): “The Succession Crisis”

Given the system’s design, a popular uprising is a low-probability event. The most plausible path to rapid state failure is an elite-driven crisis triggered by a leadership contingency.

• Trigger: The sudden, unexpected death or severe incapacitation of Kim Jong Un.
• Scenario Narrative:

1. Initial Power Vacuum: A small circle of top officials, including Kim Yo Jong and senior figures from the WPK Organization and Guidance Department, the Central Military Commission, and the Ministry of State Security, attempts to manage the situation in secret while they jockey for position.
2. Contested Regency: Kim Yo Jong, leveraging her Paektu bloodline and control over the propaganda apparatus, moves to establish herself as regent for a young heir. She issues directives through official party channels.
3. Factional Split: A hardline faction within the military and/or security services, deeply embedded in a patriarchal power structure and viewing Kim Yo Jong as an illegitimate or weak leader, refuses to accept her authority. Seeing a once-in-a-generation opportunity to seize power, they challenge her legitimacy, arguing for a collective leadership dominated by the military or promoting their own figurehead.
4. Breakdown of Command and Control: The “coup-proofing” architecture backfires catastrophically. Competing and contradictory orders are issued to different security units—for example, the KPA General Staff versus the Supreme Guard Command (Kim’s personal bodyguards). The agencies, long conditioned to view each other with suspicion, begin to act on their own interests.
5. Elite Violence in Pyongyang: The power struggle escalates from political maneuvering to armed clashes between rival security units for control of key locations in the capital—party headquarters, television stations, and leadership compounds.
6. State Fragmentation: As central authority collapses, provincial leaders and regional KPA commanders are forced to choose sides or act autonomously to secure their own territory, resources, and nuclear/conventional assets. This leads to the de facto fragmentation of the state, a cessation of central political authority, and a high risk of wider conflict and humanitarian disaster.

Concluding Assessment and Tipping Points

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, assessed as being in a perpetual CRISIS state, maintains a high degree of stability against external pressures and internal popular dissent due to its perfected mechanisms of political and social control. Its primary fragility is internal, structural, and concentrated at the absolute apex of the power structure. The system is designed to be shock-resistant, but not resilient; it can withstand immense pressure but will shatter rather than bend if its central pillar is removed.

Therefore, the estimated probability of a regime-threatening instability event within the 36-month forecast period is LOW (10-15%). However, the impact of such an event would be catastrophic and rapid, with a high likelihood of leading directly to the Collapse stage of the state lifecycle.

The key tipping points that could trigger this rapid transition are:

1. Political Tipping Point (Highest Probability/Impact): The sudden death or incapacitation of Kim Jong Un without a designated and consolidated adult successor, triggering a violent power struggle between Kim Yo Jong and senior figures in the military and security services.
2. Security Tipping Point: A factional split within the senior command of the KPA or MSS, potentially triggered by a senior official launching a preemptive coup attempt to avoid being purged. This could lead to a situation where different security units receive conflicting orders, initiating the “Succession Crisis” scenario even with the leader still alive.
3. Economic/Humanitarian Tipping Point (Lowest Probability): A catastrophic famine on a scale surpassing that of the 1990s, caused by a confluence of a multi-year environmental disaster, a complete withdrawal of China’s economic safety net, and the simultaneous failure of illicit revenue streams. For this to become a regime-threatening event, the crisis would have to be so severe that it causes a systemic breakdown of the food supply chain for the military and provincial security forces, leading to large-scale desertions, localized mutinies, and a loss of the state’s monopoly on force outside of Pyongyang.

Works Cited

• Analysis from specialist outlets such as 38 North, NK News, and CSIS Beyond Parallel.
• Investigative journalism and defector testimony.
• Official reports from the UN Panel of Experts on DPRK sanctions.
• Reports from the World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
• Reports from human rights organizations and academic journals.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sources Used

1. North Korea’s Political System*, accessed October 7, 2025, http://www.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/korean_peninsula/160331_Takashi_Sakai.pdf
2. Report: Kim Jong Un Has Purged a Confirmed 421 Officials – Radio …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nksc-purge-02222019182245.html
3. Keeping Kim: How North Korea’s Regime Stays in Power | The …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/keeping-kim-how-north-koreas-regime-stays-power
4. UN probing 58 alleged crypto heists by North Korea worth $3 billion …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://therecord.media/north-korea-cryptocurrency-hacks-un-experts
5. 2024: A jackpot year for North Korea’s cyber criminals, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/2024-a-jackpot-year-for-north-korea-s-cyber-criminals
6. A Changing North Korea, accessed October 7, 2025, https://libertyinnorthkorea.org/learn-a-changing-north-korea
7. Beyond State Control: The Struggle Over North Korea’s Markets – 38 …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2025/09/beyond-state-control-the-struggle-over-north-koreas-markets/
8. Information and Its Consequences in North Korea – Beyond Parallel, accessed October 7, 2025, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/information-and-its-consequences-in-north-korea/
9. “A Sense of Terror Stronger than a Bullet” | Human Rights Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/03/07/a-sense-of-terror/stronger-than-a-bullet-the-closing-of-north-korea-2018%E2%80%932023
10. Han Nam-su: Songbun | George W. Bush Presidential Center, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.bushcenter.org/freedom-collection/han-nam-su-songbun
11. SONGBUN | Social Class in a Socialist Paradise – Liberty in North Korea, accessed October 7, 2025, https://libertyinnorthkorea.org/blog/songbun
12. Inside North Korea’s Environmental Collapse | NOVA | PBS, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/inside-north-koreas-environmental-collapse/
13. 1990s North Korean famine – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990s_North_Korean_famine
14. Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System | American Enterprise Institute – AEI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.aei.org/events/marked-for-life-songbun-north-koreas-social-classification-system/
15. DPR Korea | World Food Programme, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.wfp.org/countries/democratic-peoples-republic-korea
16. An Overview of the Report of the UN Panel of Experts … – CCDCOE, accessed October 7, 2025, https://ccdcoe.org/incyder-articles/an-overview-of-the-report-of-the-un-panel-of-experts-established-pursuant-to-the-security-council-resolution-1874-2009-investigations-into-north-korean-cyberattacks-continue/
17. Treasury Targets Arms Trafficking Network and Financial Facilitators for DPRK Weapons Programs, accessed October 7, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0264
18. Illicit activities of North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illicit_activities_of_North_Korea
19. North Korea’s Trading of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Open …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation/
20. Beyond Parallel – Bringing transparency to Korean Unification. – CSIS, accessed October 7, 2025, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/
21. CRINK Economic Ties: Uneven Patterns of Collaboration – CSIS, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/crink-economic-ties-uneven-patterns-collaboration
22. Sanctions against North Korea: An Unintended Good? – CSIS, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/sanctions-against-north-korea-unintended-good
23. Trading with Pariahs: North Korean Sanctions and the Challenge of …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/4/2/ksae031/7668102
24. What the Estimates of the Balance of Foreign Exchange of North Koreans Would Tell Us, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.kdi.re.kr/file/download?atch_no=7%2FPMLB%2BdGY7QLK2TW3cKOw%3D%3D
25. North Korean remote worker scheme – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korean_remote_worker_scheme
26. The Emergence of a Hidden Market Economy in North Korea (Chapter 5) – Questioning Conventional Assumptions of Competition Dynamics, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/questioning-conventional-assumptions-of-competition-dynamics/emergence-of-a-hidden-market-economy-in-north-korea/618AF6BD97C1BE3E8D6FE403CC7AA379
27. North Korea’s antique food rationing « North Korean Economy Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.nkeconwatch.com/2005/01/15/north-koreas-antique-food-rationing/
28. North Korea’s Shackled Economy | NCNK, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/north-koreas-shackled-economy
29. NORTH KOREA’S INFRASTRUCTURE CONDITIONS AND …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hri.co.kr/upload/board/EVP200007_05.PDF
30. Economy of North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_North_Korea
31. Jangmadang (North Korea) – Global Informality Project, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.in-formality.com/wiki/index.php?title=Jangmadang_(North_Korea)
32. Jangmadang – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jangmadang
33. Paradise Evaporated: Escaping the No Income Trap in North Korea – CSIS Beyond Parallel, accessed October 7, 2025, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/paradise-evaporated-escaping-no-income-trap-north-korea/
34. The Rise of the Jangmadang – Economics Declassified, accessed October 7, 2025, https://economicsdeclassified.wordpress.com/2022/02/15/the-rise-of-the-jangmadang/
35. [INSS] The Hidden Food Crisis in North Korea (Issue Brief 101).hwp, accessed October 7, 2025, http://www.inss.kr/upload/bbs/BBSA05/202306/F20230629171422140.pdf
36. dpr korea – needs and priorities – UNICEF, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.unicef.org/dprk/media/296/file/DPR%20Korea.pdf
37. Health in North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Health_in_North_Korea
38. Kim Jong Un – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Jong_Un
39. PAD-ing Out a Purge? | North Korea Leadership Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.38north.org/articles/affiliates/north-korea-leadership-watch/32781/
40. Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Military_Commission_of_the_Workers%27_Party_of_Korea
41. Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Committee_of_the_Workers%27_Party_of_Korea
42. Kim Jong-un and North Korea’s Power Structure, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-power-structure
43. Kim Jong-un: North Korean leader’s longest absence in seven years sparks new health rumours | The Independent, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/east-asia/kim-jong-un-health-update-north-korea-b1957006.html
44. Clickbait on Kim Jong Un’s Health – 38 North: Informed Analysis of …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2022/02/clickbait-on-kim-jong-uns-health/
45. Kim Yo Jong – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Yo_Jong
46. Sister or daughter? A look at who could succeed North Korean …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/north-korea-leader-succession-kim-jong-un-sister-daughter-5383386
47. en.wikipedia.org, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juche#:~:text=It%20is%20summarized%20as%20%22the,of%20everything%20and%20decides%20everything%22.
48. Juche | North Korea, Ideology, Kim Dynasty, & Facts | Britannica, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Juche
49. Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ten_Principles_for_the_Establishment_of_a_Monolithic_Ideological_System
50. Propaganda in North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda_in_North_Korea
51. Censorship in North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Censorship_in_North_Korea
52. World Report 2024: North Korea | Human Rights Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea
53. Mass surveillance in North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mass_surveillance_in_North_Korea
54. Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/pyongyangs-survival-strategy-tools-authoritarian-control-north-korea
55. North Korea Briefing – 38 North, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/North-Korea-Briefing_2025-0731.pdf
56. Korean People’s Army – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_People%27s_Army
57. North Korea and weapons of mass destruction – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction
58. NORTH KOREA – Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/North_Korea_Military_Power.pdf
59. Number of North Korean Defectors Drops to Lowest Level in Two …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/number-north-korean-defectors-drops-lowest-level-two-decades
60. Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hrnk.org/documentations/marked-for-life-songbun-north-koreas-social-classification-system/
61. World Report 2025: North Korea | Human Rights Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/north-korea
62. Inminban – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inminban
63. People’s Groups and Patterns in Neighborhood Surveillance …, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ddraudt121020/
64. North Korea’s Caste System | Human Rights Watch, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/05/north-koreas-caste-system
65. Songbun – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Songbun
66. Impact of Deforestation on Agro-Environmental Variables in Cropland, North Korea – MDPI, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/9/8/1354
67. Environment of North Korea – Wikipedia, accessed October 7, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environment_of_North_Korea
68. Reckless deforestation blamed for flood damage in North Korea | IATP, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.iatp.org/news/reckless-deforestation-blamed-for-flood-damage-in-north-korea
69. Natural Disasters and Food Shortages in North Korea: Disaster Justice, accessed October 7, 2025, https://ipus.snu.ac.kr/eng/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/01/%EC%9D%B4%EC%8A%88%EB%B8%8C%EB%A6%AC%ED%95%91%EC%A7%80%EC%8B%9D%EA%B3%BC-%EB%B9%84%ED%8F%89-9%ED%98%B8%EC%98%81%EB%AC%B8_%EC%B5%9C%EC%A7%84%EC%9A%A9.pdf
70. Shades of Parallel Oppression: South Africa’s Apartheid and North Korea’s Songbun as Crimes Against Humanity – NK Hidden Gulag Blog, accessed October 7, 2025, https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/shades-of-parallel-oppression-south-africas-apartheid-and-north-koreas-songbun-as-crimes-against-humanity
71. Korea: The Enduring Policy Blindspot – Army War College – Publications, accessed October 7, 2025, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3974660/korea-the-enduring-policy-blindspot/