The year 2025 has marked a historic and unprecedented acceleration in the U.S.-Philippine defense alliance, transforming a partnership historically focused on counter-terrorism and legacy obligations into a forward-looking, integrated defense architecture aimed at establishing credible deterrence against state-level coercion. This strategic deepening is not a unilateral U.S. initiative but a symbiotic response to a rapidly evolving regional security environment, characterized by persistent “gray zone” aggression in the West Philippine Sea, and a fundamental doctrinal shift within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The confluence of these factors has created the political will and strategic imperative for a series of landmark cooperative actions.

Key vectors of this transformation in 2025 include: the operationalization of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites as a distributed network of strategic support and power projection hubs; a qualitative leap in the complexity and strategic messaging of joint military exercises, most notably Balikatan 25; the approval of major Foreign Military Sales, including F-16 multi-role fighter aircraft, that promise to modernize the AFP’s conventional capabilities; and the establishment of foundational agreements for defense industrial and classified intelligence cooperation.

Collectively, these year-to-date activities represent the most significant enhancement of the alliance in decades. They signal a shared commitment to uphold international law and defend Philippine sovereignty through a posture of “Peace through Strength.” The United States has moved decisively to equip, train, and posture alongside a Philippine ally that has, in turn, demonstrated a clear-eyed resolve to pivot its defense strategy from internal security to external, archipelagic defense. The result is a more resilient, capable, and interoperable alliance, better positioned to deter conflict and maintain stability in a critical corridor of the Indo-Pacific. This report details and analyzes the specific actions undertaken since January 2025 that constitute this strategic acceleration.

I. The Strategic Imperative: Context for an Alliance Reinvigorated

The rapid deepening of the U.S.-Philippine defense partnership in 2025 did not occur in a vacuum. It is a direct and necessary response to a strategic environment defined by escalating coercion and a corresponding realignment of defense priorities in Manila. U.S. actions throughout the year are best understood as a calculated effort to reinforce an ally facing sustained pressure, while capitalizing on a window of strategic alignment to modernize the alliance for the challenges of the 21st century.

The Evolving Threat Landscape: China’s Coercive “Gray Zone” Campaign

Throughout 2025, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued and intensified its campaign of coercion against the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), the portion of the South China Sea within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This campaign deliberately operates in the “gray zone”—below the threshold of conventional armed conflict—utilizing maritime law enforcement and paramilitary assets to assert unlawful territorial claims and harass Philippine vessels. This pattern of behavior, building on incidents from previous years, has been a primary catalyst for Manila’s strategic reorientation.¹

Incidents in 2025 have demonstrated a consistent and dangerous pattern. Both the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have been implicated in a long list of offenses against Philippine sovereignty, including routine harassment of Filipino fishermen and dangerous altercations with Philippine servicemembers conducting resupply missions.¹ In January, China deployed the 165-meter CCG vessel 5901, colloquially known as the “monster ship,” to Scarborough Shoal, a traditional Filipino fishing ground well within the Philippine EEZ, in a clear act of intimidation.³

The behavior of Chinese vessels has grown increasingly reckless. In one notable incident, a PLAN warship collided with a CCG ship while aggressively pursuing a Philippine vessel, highlighting the dangerous and unprofessional seamanship employed by Chinese forces.¹ In another, CCG vessels shadowed a multilateral naval exercise involving the Philippines, U.S., Australia, and Canada, with a Type 052 destroyer and a Type 054 frigate maneuvering within 40 nautical miles of the allied flotilla near Scarborough Shoal.⁴ These actions are not random encounters but part of a calculated strategy to normalize a Chinese presence, challenge Philippine sovereignty, and test the resolve of the U.S.-Philippine alliance. Compounding this physical intimidation is a persistent disinformation campaign, in which Beijing consistently and bizarrely blames the Philippines for instigating these incidents, signaling a clear intent to continue its coercive activities without de-escalation.¹

Manila’s Doctrinal Shift: The Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC)

In response to this sustained pressure, the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has initiated a fundamental rewriting of Philippine national defense strategy. For decades, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was structured and postured primarily for internal security operations, focusing on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. Recognizing that the principal threat to national sovereignty had shifted from internal actors to an external state aggressor, Philippine policymakers developed the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC).¹

The CADC represents a historic pivot for the AFP. It refocuses the military’s procurement, training, and force posture on external threats and the defense of the nation’s maritime territory.¹ The core tenets of the new strategy emphasize the development of capabilities in littoral combat operations, maritime security, air defense, and asymmetric warfare, all designed to protect the full extent of the Philippine archipelago.¹ This doctrinal shift is not merely theoretical; it is being backed by tangible investments. In 2025, the Philippines accepted the delivery of two new guided-missile corvettes from South Korea, a clear move to bolster its maritime operational capabilities in line with the CADC’s priorities.¹ The CADC provides the U.S. with a clear strategic framework for its security assistance, ensuring that American support is aligned with a coherent, Philippine-led vision for its own defense. This has created a fertile ground for deeper cooperation, as Manila’s strategic priorities are now fully synchronized with U.S. regional objectives of upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Washington’s Response: Reaffirming the Mutual Defense Treaty and “Peace through Strength”

The United States has responded to both China’s coercion and the Philippines’ strategic resolve with a series of high-level policy affirmations designed to add clarity and credibility to its alliance commitments. The inaugural visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to the Philippines on March 27-28, 2025, was a landmark event in this regard. In a joint statement with Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro Jr., the two leaders set a robust agenda for the alliance, framed by the guiding principle of achieving “Peace through Strength”.⁵

The most significant outcome of this visit was the explicit and public reaffirmation that the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) extends to armed attacks on either country’s armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft—including those of their coast guards—anywhere in the South China Sea.⁵ This clarification was a critical strategic move. China has overwhelmingly relied on its “white hull” CCG vessels to harass the Philippines, operating under the assumption that such actions would not trigger a military response covered by the MDT. By explicitly including the coast guard under the treaty’s umbrella, the U.S. has removed this calculated ambiguity. An armed attack on a Philippine Coast Guard vessel is now publicly defined as a potential trigger for a U.S. military response, forcing Beijing to recalculate the risks of its primary tool of coercion. This extends the U.S. security guarantee directly to the front lines of the gray zone conflict, a powerful deterrent message delivered without the deployment of a single new asset.

This combination of factors has created a unique dynamic in 2025. Each aggressive act by Beijing, intended to intimidate Manila, has instead provided the Marcos administration with the political capital and strategic justification to deepen its security relationship with Washington.¹ This, in turn, allows the U.S. to accelerate its support for a willing and strategically aligned partner. In effect, China’s coercive strategy has become a catalyst for the very outcome it seeks to prevent: a more robust, capable, and integrated U.S. military partnership with the Philippines, postured to defend the archipelago and uphold the rules-based order in the South China Sea.

II. Enhancing Interoperability: From “Shoulder-to-Shoulder” to a Combined Force

The renewed strategic alignment between Washington and Manila has been translated into tangible operational capability through a series of increasingly complex and realistic joint military exercises and patrols in 2025. These activities have moved beyond foundational interoperability drills to rehearse specific, high-end warfighting scenarios directly relevant to the defense of the Philippine archipelago. The scale, scope, and multilateral nature of these engagements underscore a clear intent to build a truly combined force capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating external aggression.

Balikatan 25: A Deep Dive into the Alliance’s Most Complex Exercise

The 40th iteration of Exercise Balikatan (Tagalog for “shoulder-to-shoulder”), held from April 21 to May 9, was the largest and most complex to date. The exercise involved more than 14,000 service members, including 10,000 U.S. troops and 6,000 from the Philippines, with significant participation from the Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Force.⁷ This year’s exercise was distinguished by several key innovations that signal a profound shift in its strategic purpose.

The centerpiece of Balikatan 25 was the introduction of a “Full Battle Test,” a novel concept that incorporated real-world forces into a virtual and constructive exercise scenario.⁹ This test simulated a full-scale defense of Philippine sovereignty, moving beyond traditional field training to stress high-level command and control (C2), bilateral planning, and joint decision-making processes in a contested environment.⁹ The exercise spanned all five operational domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyber—reflecting the alliance’s commitment to preparing for the complexities of modern, multi-domain warfare.⁹

A powerful demonstration of the exercise’s new focus was the deployment of the U.S. Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) to Batan Island.⁵ NMESIS is a mobile, ground-based anti-ship missile system. Its deployment to a key island in the Luzon Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint, was not a generic training event but a practical rehearsal for denying access to a strategic sea lane to a hostile navy. This deployment, along with six other Combined Joint All-Domain Operations (CJADO) events, enhanced capabilities in air and missile defense, counter-landing, and maritime security and strike.⁸

The exercise was structured around four primary components to ensure comprehensive training ⁹:

1. Command-and-Control Exercise (C2X): U.S. and AFP forces operated parallel Joint Task Forces, synchronizing actions through a Combined Coordination Center to refine high-level C2.
2. Field Training Exercise (FTX): This component included the CJADO live-fire events focused on maritime security and coastal defense across Luzon and Palawan.
3. Multilateral Maritime Exercise (MME): The U.S. Navy, Philippine Navy, and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted joint naval drills in the Philippines’ EEZ along the coast of Luzon.
4. Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (CJLOTS): This operation enhanced the combined force’s ability to deliver heavy equipment and supplies to shore without relying on fixed port facilities, a critical capability for archipelagic operations.

Maintaining Presence and Asserting Rights: A Year of Joint Patrols

Complementing the capstone Balikatan exercise, 2025 has seen a sustained tempo of joint patrols designed to maintain presence, uphold freedom of navigation, and build operational familiarity in the South China Sea. These Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs) have grown in both scale and multilateral participation.

The year began with a significant show of force from January 17-18, when the U.S. and the Philippines conducted their first MCA of 2025. Unprecedentedly, the exercise involved the entire U.S. Navy Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (CSG-1), including the aircraft carrier, its air wing, a guided-missile cruiser, and multiple destroyers. They operated alongside the Philippine Navy’s BRP Andres Bonifacio and BRP Antonio Luna.¹² The inclusion of a full carrier strike group represented a major escalation in the scale and visibility of these patrols, sending an unambiguous message of U.S. commitment.

This was followed by a joint air patrol in February over the South China Sea near Scarborough Shoal. This patrol featured Philippine Air Force FA-50 fighter jets flying in formation with U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer strategic bombers, explicitly demonstrating the allies’ commitment to freedom of overflight in international airspace.¹⁵

The trend toward multilateralism was further solidified during the September 12-13 Multilateral MCA. This activity brought together the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John Finn, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s tank landing ship JS Osumi, and the Philippine Navy’s frigate BRP Jose Rizal.¹⁶ The inclusion of Japan, along with Australia’s participation in exercises like ALON 2025—their largest-ever joint exercise with the Philippines, held in Palawan—demonstrates a deliberate strategy to build a “networked security architecture”.⁶ By involving other like-minded regional partners, the U.S. and the Philippines are internationalizing the issue of freedom of navigation and demonstrating a broad, unified front in support of the rules-based order. This approach complicates Beijing’s strategic calculus, transforming what it attempts to frame as a bilateral dispute into a wider test of regional stability and international law.

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Table 1: Major U.S.-Philippine Joint Military Exercises and Patrols (2025)

Exercise/Activity Name	Dates	Key U.S. Assets	Key AFP Assets	Key Partner Nations	Strategic Objectives / Key “Firsts”
Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA)	Jan 17-18	USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (CSG-1), P-8A Poseidon	BRP Andres Bonifacio, BRP Antonio Luna, FA-50 Fighters	N/A	First full U.S. Carrier Strike Group inclusion in a bilateral MCA; reinforced deterrence and freedom of navigation.12
Joint Air Patrol	February	B-1B Lancer Strategic Bombers	FA-50 Fighter Jets	N/A	Underscored freedom of navigation and overflight near Scarborough Shoal; enhanced air domain awareness and interoperability.15
Exercise Balikatan 25	Apr 21 – May 9	10,000 troops, NMESIS, F-16s, F/A-18s, Apaches, Ospreys	6,000 troops, various naval and air assets	Australia, Japan	40th iteration; first-ever “Full Battle Test” scenario; first deployment of NMESIS to the Luzon Strait; comprehensive multi-domain operations.7
Exercise ALON 2025	August	U.S. Forces (unspecified)	AFP Forces (unspecified)	Australia	Largest-ever joint exercise between the Philippines and Australia, focused on forcible entry operations in Palawan.6
Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA)	Sep 3-4	U.S. Naval Assets	BRP Jose Rizal	Australia, Canada	Quadrilateral exercise inside the Philippine EEZ; shadowed by Chinese warships, demonstrating real-world operational context.4
Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity (MMCA)	Sep 12-13	USS John Finn (DDG-113), P-8A Poseidon	BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150), FA-50s, C-208B	Japan	Trilateral exercise focused on anti-submarine warfare, interdiction, and combined maneuvers in the West Philippine Sea.16

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III. Building a Credible Defense: U.S. Materiel Support and Capability Development

Parallel to enhancing operational interoperability, the United States has made substantial commitments in 2025 to the material modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This support, channeled through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and a new framework for industrial cooperation, is directly tailored to address the capability requirements outlined in the Philippines’ Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC). The year’s initiatives signal a strategic evolution from a simple FMS relationship to a more integrated partnership aimed at building a credible, self-reliant Philippine defense posture for the long term.

Modernizing the Philippine Air Force: The F-16 and TH-73A Foreign Military Sales

The year 2025 witnessed two landmark FMS approvals that promise to transform the capabilities of the Philippine Air Force (PAF). These sales represent a significant U.S. investment in the Philippines’ ability to defend its own airspace and maritime territory.

On April 1, 2025, the U.S. State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Philippines of a squadron of F-16 fighter jets for an estimated cost of $5.58 billion.²⁰ The proposed package includes sixteen F-16C Block 70/72 single-seat aircraft and four F-16D Block 70/72 two-seat aircraft, along with advanced engines, radars, and a comprehensive suite of munitions.²² This sale, if finalized, would be the Philippines’ largest-ever arms purchase and would provide the PAF with a modern, fourth-generation multi-role fighter capability for the first time in decades.²³ According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the F-16s will enhance the PAF’s ability to conduct maritime domain awareness, air defense, and suppression of enemy air defenses, while also expanding interoperability with U.S. forces.²² This is more than a simple hardware transfer; it represents a multi-decade strategic commitment that will bind the two air forces through integrated training, maintenance, and operational planning.

Just two weeks later, on April 15, 2025, the State Department approved a possible sale of TH-73A training helicopters and associated support for an estimated $120 million.²⁴ While smaller in value, this sale is a critical enabler for the AFP’s overall modernization. The DSCA noted that the TH-73A platform will serve as the primary method for improving pilot training and skills, helping to ensure the development of a proficient rotary-wing aviator corps.²⁵ This foundational investment is essential for the AFP to effectively operate its current and future helicopter fleet.

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Table 2: Proposed U.S. Foreign Military Sales to the Philippines (2025)

Platform/System	DSCA Notification Date	Estimated Cost	Key Components	Stated Capability Enhancement for AFP
F-16 C/D Block 70/72 Aircraft	April 1, 2025	$5.58 billion	16 F-16C & 4 F-16D aircraft, F110-GE-129D or F100-PW-229 engines, APG-83 SABR AESA radars, Viper Shield EW systems, advanced missiles and bombs.22	Enhance maritime domain awareness, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and aerial interdiction capabilities; expand interoperability with U.S. forces.22
TH-73A Training Helicopters	April 15, 2025	$120 million	TH-73A helicopters, aircraft simulator, spare engines, fuel tanks, commercial avionics, and support services.25	Improve pilot training and skills to ensure the development of a proficient rotary-wing aviator corps capable of meeting current and future threats.25

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Investing in Asymmetric Advantage: Unmanned Systems and Advanced Sensors

Recognizing the economic constraints facing the Philippines and the asymmetric nature of the threat in the West Philippine Sea, a major focus of U.S. support in 2025 has been on providing cost-effective unmanned systems.¹ Unmanned platforms were identified as a priority area during Secretary Hegseth’s March visit and in the subsequent Joint Vision Statement.⁵

This effort is being operationalized through the U.S. Department of Defense’s Maritime Security (MARSEC) Consortium, a public-private initiative designed to rapidly deliver asymmetric and autonomous capabilities to partners in Southeast Asia.²⁸ The Philippines is a key recipient of this program, which is providing unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and other autonomous systems to enhance maritime domain awareness and surveillance capabilities within its EEZ.³ These systems offer a persistent, low-cost means of monitoring vast maritime areas, directly supporting the CADC’s emphasis on asymmetric capabilities to deter aggression.¹

Defense Industrial Cooperation: From Purchaser to Partner

Perhaps the most strategically significant development in 2025 was the shift toward deeper defense industrial cooperation, aimed at transforming the Philippines from a passive recipient of U.S. hardware into an active partner in the regional defense industrial base. This policy was formalized in the Joint Vision Statement on U.S.-Philippine Defense Industrial Cooperation, released on March 28.²⁷

This foundational document outlines a shared interest in strengthening defense industrial resilience to advance mutual security and prosperity. It identifies several priority areas for near-term cooperation, including:

• Unmanned systems (co-production and logistics)
• Ammunition components and energetics
• Critical minerals refinement
• Logistics support, including ship and aircraft maintenance and repair
• Additive manufacturing (3-D printing) ²⁷

The stated goal is to support the Philippines as it develops its own defense industrial base, in line with its Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Revitalization Act, while also contributing to the resilience of the broader U.S. and allied supply chain.²⁷ This vision was put into action in August, when the US-ASEAN Business Council led its largest-ever Aerospace, Defense, and Security (ADS) Mission to the Philippines. The mission brought 26 leading U.S. companies, including Boeing and Lockheed Martin, to Manila to explore concrete opportunities for co-production, joint development, and technology transfers with Philippine counterparts.²⁹ This initiative represents a strategic evolution from a patron-client FMS relationship to a more sustainable and integrated partnership. By fostering a local defense industry, the U.S. helps make the AFP’s modernization more affordable and resilient, while also creating a distributed industrial network in a critical region, providing a strategic hedge against supply chain disruptions in a crisis.

IV. Fortifying the Archipelago: The Acceleration of EDCA

The physical manifestation of the revitalized U.S.-Philippine alliance is most evident in the accelerated implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Signed in 2014, the agreement allows for the rotational presence of U.S. forces and the prepositioning of defense materiel at agreed-upon locations within Philippine military bases.³¹ After years of slow progress, 2025 has seen a concerted effort to develop these sites, transforming them from notional locations into functional hubs for combined operations, logistics, and humanitarian response.

Strategic Basing and Access: The Nine EDCA Sites

The EDCA framework currently encompasses nine sites, strategically distributed throughout the archipelago to address a range of contingencies.³¹ These include the five original locations agreed upon in 2016 and four additional sites announced in 2023:

• Original Sites: Cesar Basa Air Base (Pampanga), Fort Magsaysay (Nueva Ecija), Antonio Bautista Air Base (Palawan), Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base (Cebu), and Lumbia Air Base (Cagayan de Oro).³¹
• New Sites: Naval Base Camilo Osias (Santa Ana, Cagayan), Lal-lo Airport (Lal-lo, Cagayan), Camp Melchor Dela Cruz (Gamu, Isabela), and Balabac Island (Palawan).³¹

The geographic placement of these sites is deliberate and strategically significant. The three new sites in Northern Luzon (Camilo Osias, Lal-lo, and Dela Cruz) provide critical access to the Luzon Strait, a vital chokepoint for any potential conflict involving Taiwan.³¹ The sites in Palawan (Antonio Bautista and Balabac Island) are directly oriented toward the South China Sea, serving as forward staging areas for maritime security and domain awareness operations.³

2025 Infrastructure Developments

The year 2025 has been marked by an acceleration of infrastructure projects at these sites, backed by increased U.S. funding. The U.S. has committed to expanding its investment on top of the initial $82 million allocated for the first five sites, with the President’s FY2025 budget request including an additional $128 million for EDCA projects.³³ This funding is being translated into tangible construction designed to support the specific operational needs of the alliance.

In Palawan, the U.S. announced plans in July to fund and construct a new fast boat base on the province’s western coast in the municipality of Quezon.³ This facility, strategically located just 160 miles from the contested Second Thomas Shoal, is designed to support rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) and assault boats, enabling rapid deployment into the Spratly Islands.³ This directly addresses the CADC’s requirement for enhanced littoral combat capabilities. Additionally, upgrades are underway at Naval Detachment Oyster Bay, including a new boat repair facility equipped to service both manned and unmanned surface vessels.³

In Northern Luzon, the Philippines is seeking U.S. assistance for critical upgrades at the new sites. Planned projects include the construction of a new pier and repairs to the airstrip at Naval Base Camilo Osias, as well as the construction of a fuel storage facility and a command center at Lal-lo Airport.³⁶ These improvements will enhance the ability of U.S. and Philippine forces to conduct sustained air and maritime operations in and around the Luzon Strait.

From Logistics Hubs to Power Projection Platforms

The function of the EDCA sites has demonstrably evolved in 2025. While their official purpose remains to support rotational access and prepositioning of equipment, their practical application has expanded, proving their value in both peacetime and as a foundation for contingency operations.

A prime example of this was the activation of all nine EDCA sites in July 2025 to serve as hubs for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) efforts during severe monsoon rains and flooding.³² This was not a theoretical exercise but a real-world operation. Prepositioned supplies funded by the U.S., such as 2,500 tarps stored at Fort Magsaysay, were distributed to affected communities, and fuel stored at Lal-lo Airport was used to support U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys flying relief missions to the remote Batanes islands.³⁹

This HADR activation served a crucial dual purpose. First, it provided tangible, life-saving benefits to the Filipino people, generating significant domestic goodwill and creating a powerful positive narrative that counters criticism of the U.S. presence.³⁸ Second, it served as a real-world stress test of the logistical network underpinning the EDCA concept. The process of coordinating U.S. and Philippine assets and moving supplies from these strategic locations exercised the exact same command, control, and logistical functions that would be essential in a military conflict. The HADR mission was, in effect, a full-scale “dress rehearsal” for conflict logistics, conducted under a politically palatable and humanitarian justification, which enhanced both alliance readiness and public acceptance.

Furthermore, the specific infrastructure projects initiated in 2025 are not generic but are precisely tailored to support the Philippines’ CADC. The fast boat base in Palawan and the pier and airfield upgrades in Northern Luzon directly enable the AFP to better project power into its own maritime zones, demonstrating a highly responsive and integrated approach to alliance planning and investment.³

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Table 3: Status of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) Sites (2025)

Site Name	Location (Province)	Strategic Significance	Key 2025 U.S.-Funded Projects / Activities
Cesar Basa Air Base	Pampanga	Main fighter base for PAF; hub for air defense operations over Luzon and SCS.	Continued upgrades to runway and facilities; largest recipient of initial EDCA funding.42
Fort Magsaysay	Nueva Ecija	AFP’s largest military reservation; primary site for large-scale joint training like Balikatan.	Activated as HADR hub; 2,500 prepositioned tarps distributed during July monsoon relief.39
Antonio Bautista Air Base	Palawan	Key AFP base for air and maritime patrols over the West Philippine Sea.	Serves as a staging point for operations in the Spratly Islands.31
Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base	Cebu	Strategic logistics and mobility hub in the central Philippines.	Ongoing projects from previous funding allocations.31
Lumbia Air Base	Cagayan de Oro	Logistics and air mobility hub for Mindanao and the Sulu Sea.	Ongoing projects from previous funding allocations.31
Naval Base Camilo Osias	Cagayan	Northernmost EDCA site; provides access for maritime control of the Luzon Strait.	Proposed projects include pier construction and airstrip repairs.36
Lal-lo Airport	Cagayan	Airfield in Northern Luzon, crucial for air operations and logistics in a Taiwan contingency.	Activated as HADR hub; prepositioned fuel used for U.S. Osprey relief flights to Batanes.41
Camp Melchor Dela Cruz	Isabela	Major army base in Northern Luzon; staging area for ground forces.	Designated for future development projects.31
Balabac Island	Palawan	Southernmost Palawan site; enhances monitoring and response capabilities in the southern SCS.	New fast boat base to be constructed on Palawan’s western coast nearby; new boat repair facility at Oyster Bay.3

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V. Securing the Digital and Intelligence Domains

Beyond the visible enhancements in hardware and infrastructure, 2025 has been a pivotal year for strengthening the less tangible, yet critically important, foundations of the U.S.-Philippine alliance: intelligence sharing and cybersecurity. The initiatives launched this year are creating an integrated “nervous system” for the alliance, enabling the secure, rapid exchange of information necessary for true combined operations in the modern era.

Operationalizing GSOMIA: The Transformation of U.S.-Philippine Intelligence Sharing

A cornerstone of this transformation is the operationalization of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Signed in late 2024, this legally binding accord came into effect in 2025, establishing a standardized framework for the two countries to handle and protect classified military information.⁴⁴

Prior to GSOMIA, the exchange of sensitive intelligence was often ad-hoc, slow, and procedurally complex. The agreement provides a robust legal and procedural backbone that allows for a smoother, more frequent, and more secure flow of classified data.⁴⁴ The impact of this is profound. It is the essential prerequisite that enables the U.S. to share higher-level intelligence, such as real-time data from satellite and unmanned surveillance platforms, which is critical for building maritime domain awareness in the West Philippine Sea.⁴⁵ Furthermore, GSOMIA is a key enabler for the transfer of advanced U.S. weapons systems, like the F-16, which involve sensitive, proprietary technology that requires stringent security protocols.⁴⁵ Without the assurances provided by GSOMIA, the level of materiel and operational cooperation seen in 2025 would not be possible.

The New Frontier: The Bilateral Cybersecurity Campaign

Recognizing that any future conflict will be fought across all domains, Secretary Hegseth and Secretary Teodoro announced the launch of a new bilateral cybersecurity campaign during their March meeting.⁵ This initiative acknowledges that digital infrastructure is both a critical enabler and a key vulnerability. The campaign is structured around three primary lines of effort:

1. Establishing a secure defense network for reliable communication.
2. Developing a capable and skilled cybersecurity workforce within the AFP.
3. Enabling advanced operational cooperation in the cyber domain.⁵

This campaign was immediately put into practice during Exercise Balikatan 25, which for the first time featured a comprehensive Cyber Defense Exercise (CYDEX).⁴⁸ Held at Camp Aguinaldo, the CYDEX challenged joint U.S.-Philippine teams to defend simulated critical national infrastructure, such as telecommunications and healthcare systems, against realistic cyberattacks launched from remote locations.⁴⁸ This hands-on training allowed participants to exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures, building not only technical skills but also the trust and procedural interoperability needed to jointly respond to a major cyber incident—which could very well be the first shot fired in a future crisis.⁴⁸

Building a Common Operating Picture

To translate shared intelligence into coordinated action, the alliance requires a physical nexus for planning and operations. To this end, U.S. and Philippine officials broke ground on a new Combined Coordination Center (CCC) at Camp Aguinaldo in Manila.⁴⁴ Scheduled to open in the fall of 2025, the CCC will provide a dedicated, secure facility where U.S. and Philippine military personnel can work side-by-side.⁴⁴ The center will be equipped with both classified and unclassified information feeds, allowing planners to fuse intelligence from multiple sources, develop a shared common operating picture, and coordinate responses to regional challenges, particularly in the South China Sea.⁴⁴

These advanced initiatives build upon a foundation of continued cooperation in the law enforcement and counter-terrorism spheres. The U.S. continues to provide support to the FBI-assisted Anti-Terrorism Task Force in the Philippines.⁴⁹ In March 2025, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducted a joint maritime security training workshop in Manila focused on countering the trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials through seaports, involving a wide range of Philippine agencies including the Coast Guard, Navy, and Bureau of Customs.⁵⁰

Together, these three pillars—the GSOMIA legal framework, the cybersecurity campaign, and the physical CCC—form a cohesive architecture. GSOMIA allows the data to flow, the cyber initiatives protect the digital pathways, and the CCC provides the human-machine interface to analyze that data and direct a coordinated response. This represents a quantum leap in the alliance’s C2 capabilities, a force multiplier more significant than any single weapons platform.

VI. Strategic Assessment and Forward Outlook

The year-to-date activities in 2025 have fundamentally reshaped the U.S.-Philippine alliance, accelerating its modernization at a pace not seen in decades. The confluence of policy affirmations, advanced military exercises, significant materiel support, infrastructure development, and foundational intelligence agreements has substantially enhanced the alliance’s posture. This final section provides a strategic assessment of this progress and identifies key challenges and recommendations for sustaining this momentum.

Gauging Success: Progress in Establishing Credible Deterrence

The cumulative effect of the initiatives undertaken in 2025 has been a marked increase in the credibility of the U.S.-Philippine alliance and its collective deterrent posture. The strategic ambiguity that once clouded the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty has been significantly reduced, particularly with its explicit extension to the Philippine Coast Guard.⁵ This policy clarity, backed by tangible capability enhancements, presents a more complicated and costly proposition for any potential aggressor.

The alliance is clearly shifting toward a strategy of “deterrence by denial.” This approach seeks not to match an adversary symmetrically but to field capabilities that can deny an aggressor its objectives or make the cost of achieving them prohibitively high. The deployment of the mobile, land-based NMESIS anti-ship missile system during Balikatan is a textbook example of this strategy in action.⁸ By distributing such systems across the Philippine archipelago, enabled by the network of EDCA sites, the alliance can threaten to contest key sea lanes and littoral areas, thereby deterring an attack by making its success uncertain and its potential losses unacceptable. The proposed F-16 sale, the focus on unmanned systems, and the hardening of the EDCA sites are all mutually reinforcing components of this denial-focused defense posture.

Challenges and Vulnerabilities

Despite the significant progress, several challenges must be managed to ensure the long-term success and sustainability of this strategic acceleration.

1. Pacing and Absorption Capacity: The AFP is being asked to absorb a tremendous amount of new technology, doctrine, and training in a very short period. High-end platforms like the F-16 require a massive, multi-year investment in pilot training, maintenance infrastructure, and logistical support.²² The United States must carefully pace its provision of advanced capabilities to align with the AFP’s ability to effectively operate, maintain, and integrate them. Rushing this process could lead to “hollow” capabilities that look impressive on paper but lack the human capital and logistical tail to be effective in a crisis.
2. Political Sustainability: The current alignment between the Marcos administration and Washington is exceptionally strong. However, U.S. policy must be insulated from the vagaries of domestic Philippine politics to ensure the durability of these initiatives. Building broad-based institutional and public support for the alliance is critical. The successful use of EDCA sites for HADR missions is a powerful tool in this regard, as it demonstrates the alliance’s direct benefit to the Filipino people beyond abstract security concerns.³⁸
3. Economic Constraints: While the Philippines has committed to a significant military modernization budget, its economic realities differ from those of other key U.S. allies in the region, such as Japan or Australia.¹ The long-term lifecycle costs of operating and sustaining sophisticated systems like the F-16 fleet will be a persistent challenge. Without a sustainable funding model, these new assets risk becoming an operational and financial burden. This underscores the strategic importance of the defense industrial cooperation initiative, which aims to lower long-term costs and build a more self-reliant defense posture.²⁷

Recommendations for Sustaining Momentum into 2026

To build upon the successes of 2025 and mitigate the identified challenges, the United States should pursue the following lines of effort:

• Prioritize and Expedite EDCA Execution: The nine EDCA sites are the physical bedrock of the alliance’s modernized posture. The U.S. Department of Defense should work with Congress to ensure consistent and accelerated funding for infrastructure projects at all sites. The timely completion of key projects, such as the fast boat base in Palawan and the airfield and port upgrades in Northern Luzon, should be a top priority, with a goal of having them substantially complete by the end of 2026.¹
• Deepen Defense Industrial Cooperation: The alliance must move swiftly from the Joint Vision Statement to tangible pilot projects. The U.S. should facilitate partnerships between American and Philippine firms for the co-production of high-priority, lower-complexity items such as unmanned systems, ammunition, or small watercraft. Success in this area is essential for the long-term sustainability of AFP modernization and for building deeper political and economic buy-in for the alliance within the Philippines.
• Institutionalize Multilateral Security Cooperation: The participation of Japan and Australia in major exercises and maritime patrols should become the rule, not the exception. The U.S. should work to regularize trilateral and quadrilateral activities, creating a persistent, combined presence in the South China Sea. This normalizes a broader international commitment to the rule of law and distributes the burden of presence patrols.
• Expand Professional Military Education (PME): Hardware is only as good as the personnel who operate it. The U.S. should significantly increase the number of training slots for AFP officers at U.S. PME institutions, such as war colleges and command and staff schools.¹ This investment in human capital is crucial for developing the next generation of Filipino strategic thinkers and alliance managers who can effectively employ the new capabilities being acquired.
• Plan for the 2026 Mutual Defense Board-Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB): The annual MDB-SEB meetings are the primary venue for planning future alliance activities.² Planning for the 2026 iteration should begin now, with an emphasis on building upon the complexity of Balikatan 25 and introducing even more integrated, multi-domain scenarios to ensure the strategic acceleration of the alliance continues unabated.

Image Source

Poto by U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Madelyn Keech. Image obtained from Wikimedia on 9/21/2025. Description: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth signs the Filipino Department of National Defense guest book at Camp Aguinaldo, Philippines, March 28, 2025. (DOD photo). Note, that is Filipino Secretary of National Defense Gilbert Teodoro watching SecDef Hegseth sign.

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