The geopolitical architecture of the Western Hemisphere has undergone a radical and potentially irreversible transformation in the second week of January 2026. Following the United States military’s Operation Absolute Resolve—the kinetic extraction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the neutralization of his executive security apparatus on January 3—the Republic of Cuba finds itself navigating the most precarious existential crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This report, generated by a joint task force of foreign affairs, military, and intelligence analysts, provides an exhaustive reconstruction and strategic assessment of the events transpiring between January 11 and January 17, 2026.
The events of this week confirm that the “strategic depth” Havana cultivated for decades via the Bolivarian Alliance has been shattered. The repatriation of 32 elite Cuban military officers killed during the raid on Caracas has forced the Cuban state to confront a dual crisis of military humiliation and domestic legitimacy. Simultaneously, the decapitation of the Venezuelan leadership has severed the energy artery that sustained Cuba’s failing electrical grid, pushing the island toward a thermodynamic collapse. While the arrival of a Mexican oil tanker offered a fleeting tactical reprieve, it has heightened diplomatic friction between Mexico City and Washington, threatening to regionalize the conflict.
The prevailing doctrine from Washington—now codified as the “Donroe Doctrine”—signals a shift from containment to active rollback. The notable silence from traditional great power patrons, Russia and China, suggests that Havana is strategically isolated. Domestically, the regime has pivoted to a “war economy” footing and mobilized mass ideological demonstrations to mask deep internal fragility, characterized by a “polycrisis” of demographic flight, economic destitution, and infrastructural failure.

1. Introduction: The Strategic Context
The crisis unfolding in January 2026 is not merely a bilateral dispute but the culmination of a decade-long deterioration in regional stability. To understand the gravity of the events of January 11–17, one must situate them within the broader trajectory of US-Cuba relations and the collapse of the “Pink Tide” 2.0.
For over two decades, the survival of the Cuban revolutionary project has been inextricably linked to the petro-diplomacy of Venezuela. The arrangement, forged by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez, exchanged Cuban intelligence and security expertise for subsidized Venezuelan crude oil. This symbiotic relationship allowed Havana to bypass the most severe effects of the U.S. embargo (blockade) and maintain social stability despite an unproductive domestic economy. The U.S. operation on January 3, 2026, which targeted the physical leadership of the Venezuelan state, effectively decapitated this alliance.
The week in review represents the “aftershock” phase of this geopolitical earthquake. Having lost its primary economic patron and suffered a direct military blow, Havana is now operating in a vacuum. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has seized upon this moment of vulnerability to apply maximum pressure, utilizing a hybrid strategy of diplomatic isolation, economic strangulation via naval enforcement, and psychological warfare aimed at fracturing the regime’s internal cohesion. The Cuban government’s response—a retreat into orthodox revolutionary mobilization and a desperate search for alternative energy suppliers—defines the operational tempo of the week.
2. The Military Crisis: Operation Absolute Resolve and Aftermath
The repatriation and burial of 32 Cuban officers this week serves as the focal point for analyzing the current state of Cuba’s military and intelligence capabilities. The events surrounding their deaths in Caracas reveal profound vulnerabilities in Havana’s forward-deployed defense strategy and have triggered a significant information operations battle between the state apparatus and leaking intelligence.
2.1 The “Avispas Negras” and the Failure of Elite Protection
The 32 officers killed during the U.S. Delta Force raid on President Maduro’s Fort Tiuna compound were not rank-and-file conscripts; they were members of the elite Avispas Negras (Black Wasps) and high-ranking officials from the Ministry of the Interior (MININT).1 Historically, this unit has been projected by Havana as a praetorian guard capable of asymmetric superiority, trained specifically to counter U.S. special operations forces. Their presence in Venezuela was governed by secretive “protection agreements” designed to insulate the Bolivarian leadership from internal coups and external decapitation strikes.2
The neutralization of such a significant detachment—32 killed and over a dozen wounded—during a raid that reportedly lasted only 2 hours and 28 minutes 1 represents a catastrophic failure of Cuban tactical doctrine. The Avispas Negras are tasked with the highest level of regime security; their inability to delay or deter the extraction of their principal protectee, Nicolás Maduro, suggests a severe degradation in readiness and intelligence anticipation.
2.2 The Information War: “Martyrs” vs. “Sleeping” Soldiers
A critical development during the week of January 11–17 was the unraveling of the Cuban government’s official narrative regarding the battle at Fort Tiuna. The regime, seeking to salvage morale, constructed a narrative of “epic resistance.” President Miguel Díaz-Canel and state media outlets asserted that the officers “fought to the last bullet,” framing their deaths as a heroic sacrifice in the anti-imperialist struggle.3 This narrative was essential to justify the loss of life in a foreign war to a domestic audience already weary of shortages.
However, intelligence analysis of survivor testimonies emerging this week contradicts this narrative entirely. In a remarkable breach of operational security, Colonel Pedro Yadín Domínguez, a high-ranking officer and survivor of the raid, provided testimony that undermined the state’s propaganda. In a broadcast interview, the Colonel—visible in a wheelchair—revealed that the Cuban detachment was “sleeping” and “resting in the early morning” when the operation commenced.4
Colonel Domínguez detailed that the unit “barely had weapons” available at the moment of contact and was “practically defenseless” against the “disproportionate” U.S. assault, which utilized advanced drones, Apache helicopters, and overwhelming air support.4 He described the mission itself as “opaque,” suggesting that the officers on the ground were ill-informed about the threat environment or the specifics of their engagement rules.
This testimony is devastating for the regime’s credibility. It paints a picture not of heroic martyrs holding the line against the empire, but of an unprepared, ill-equipped security detail caught completely off guard by a superior adversary. It implies a total failure of Cuban intelligence (G2) to detect the approaching U.S. force, leaving their most elite operators exposed and vulnerable.

2.3 Repatriation as Political Theater
The return of the remains was orchestrated to maximize political utility. On Thursday, January 15, the bodies arrived at José Martí International Airport. The regime opted for small urns rather than traditional caskets, a detail that grimly confirms reports of the high-kinetic nature of the strike.1
The funeral rites were bifurcated to manage both elite cohesion and public sentiment:
- The Inner Circle Tribute: A solemn, closed ceremony was held at the headquarters of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR). This event was attended by the highest echelons of the Cuban state, including President Díaz-Canel and, crucially, General Raúl Castro.5 The presence of the 94-year-old Raúl Castro is a signal of the highest order; his public appearances are now reserved exclusively for moments of existential threat to the Revolution. His attendance was intended to signal continuity and demand absolute loyalty from the military brass during this period of humiliation.
- The Public Mourning: Following the elite ceremony, a “March of the Combatant People” was organized. The regime decentralized the final burials, sending the remains to “Fallen for the Defense” pantheons in the officers’ respective provinces.5 This dispersal strategy likely served a dual purpose: it allowed local party organs to organize smaller, more manageable tributes across the island, preventing a massive, potentially volatile concentration of grieving families in Havana, while simultaneously spreading the anti-American message to the rural provinces.
3. The Geopolitical Shockwave: The Donroe Doctrine
The week of January 11–17 has provided the clearest definition yet of the U.S. administration’s foreign policy framework for the Western Hemisphere, colloquially and increasingly officially termed the “Donroe Doctrine”.6 This policy represents a hyper-aggressive modernization of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, asserting not just the exclusion of external powers, but the active right of the United States to intervene militarily to remove regimes deemed “illegitimate” or “destabilizing.”
3.1 The Ultimatum: “Make a Deal or Collapse”
On Sunday, January 11, President Donald Trump escalated the diplomatic pressure via a direct ultimatum issued on social media. His message to Havana was stark: “Make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE”.7 This demand was coupled with a definitive declaration that “no more oil or money” would be allowed to flow from Venezuela to Cuba.7
This rhetoric marks a fundamental departure from previous U.S. strategies of containment or gradual pressure. It is an ultimatum of regime extinction. The administration views the removal of the Venezuelan leadership not as an isolated event, but as the removal of the keystone in the arch of authoritarianism in the Americas. The threat is existential: capitulate to U.S. demands—which likely include the dismantling of the single-party state and the expulsion of Chinese/Russian intelligence assets—or face total economic strangulation and potential military consequences.
3.2 Diplomatic Isolation: The UN and OAS Battlegrounds
Cuba’s diplomatic corps launched a frantic offensive this week to garner international condemnation of the U.S. raid, but the results have highlighted Havana’s diminishing influence.
- United Nations Security Council: At an emergency meeting in New York, Cuba’s Permanent Representative, Ernesto Soberón Guzmán, delivered a blistering denunciation of the operation. He characterized the capture of Maduro as a “kidnapping” and a “criminal act” that violated the UN Charter and the sovereignty of the Venezuelan state.8 He argued that the U.S. was imposing its domestic laws extraterritorially. While the representatives of Russia and China echoed these sentiments—warning against the precedent of “law of the jungle” 9—the Council failed to pass any binding resolution. The U.S. Ambassador, backed by veto power, effectively dismissed the complaints, framing the operation as a necessary law enforcement action against “narco-terrorists”.10
- Organization of American States (OAS): The regional body remains deeply fractured. In a special meeting held to address the crisis, the polarization of the hemisphere was on full display. A bloc of leftist governments—led by Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico—condemned the U.S. action as a violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for regional stability.11 However, they were counterbalanced by the “Lima Group” nations and right-wing administrations in Argentina and Ecuador, which tacitly or openly supported the removal of Maduro.12 This division paralyzed the OAS, preventing the consensus statement of condemnation that Havana desperately sought.
3.3 The Great Power Void: Russia and China Stand Down
Perhaps the most alarming development for Havana this week was the lack of material support from its “strategic partners.”
The Russian Silence: President Vladimir Putin’s reaction to the dismantling of his Venezuelan ally was characterized by a “total silence”.13 In the week following the raid, the Kremlin issued no direct threats of retaliation. Analysts attribute this passivity to Moscow’s total strategic consumption by the war in Ukraine. Russia simply lacks the naval bandwidth or the logistical capacity to project power into the Caribbean to challenge a U.S. carrier strike group. The Kremlin’s support for Cuba is now exposed as purely rhetorical.14
The Chinese Retreat: Beijing’s response was equally cautious. While the Foreign Ministry expressed “shock” and condemned “power politics,” its primary concern was the safety of its investments and the repayment of Venezuelan debt.11 President Trump’s explicit warning to China to “stay away from the Americas” appears to have been effective. China, prioritizing its global trade stability and wary of a direct kinetic conflict with the U.S. in its own “backyard,” has opted to retreat to diplomatic platitudes rather than mobilizing naval assets.15
The geopolitical map has been redrawn: The U.S. has tightened a cordon around Cuba, backed by the threat of force, while Cuba’s traditional allies are either distant, distracted, or unwilling to pay the cost of intervention. The “Ring of Pressure” is complete, with the U.S. and its aligned OAS states forming a tightening noose, while Russia and China remain low-impact, distant observers.
4. The Energy War: Siege Economics
The most immediate and lethal threat to the Cuban state is not a marine landing, but the thermodynamic collapse of its national infrastructure. The events of January 11–17 have accelerated an energy crisis that was already critical, pushing the island toward a “zero energy” scenario.
4.1 The Venezuelan Cutoff
For two decades, Venezuelan oil has been the lifeblood of the Cuban economy. Prior to the U.S. raid, Venezuela supplied approximately 35,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and refined products to Cuba.16 This flow has now ceased completely. Shipping data analyzed this week confirms that no cargoes have departed Venezuelan ports for Cuba since the capture of Maduro.7
The U.S. blockade, combined with direct U.S. control over the Venezuelan oil export terminals (as implied by Trump’s statement that the U.S. would “run” the country’s oil sales), means this suspension is not temporary. It is a permanent structural shift. Cuba’s thermoelectric plants, many of which are specifically calibrated to process the heavy, sulfur-rich Venezuelan crude, are now starving for fuel.
4.2 The Mexican Lifeline and the Ocean Mariner Incident
In a desperate attempt to bridge the energy deficit, Havana turned to the only regional neighbor willing to defy the U.S. blockade: Mexico.
This week, the Liberian-flagged oil tanker Ocean Mariner arrived in Havana Bay (January 9/10), carrying a cargo of Mexican oil.17 This arrival was a major event, visible to thousands of Havanans who gathered along the Malecón to watch the ship dock, viewing it as a symbol of hope.18
Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has attempted to thread a geopolitical needle. She defended the shipment as “humanitarian aid” consistent with Mexico’s long-standing foreign policy of non-intervention and solidarity.19 In press conferences this week, she explicitly stated, “We are not sending more oil than we have sent historically,” and emphasized that the shipments were legal.20
However, this move places Mexico in the direct crosshairs of the Donroe Doctrine. The U.S. administration views the Ocean Mariner not as a humanitarian vessel, but as a blockade runner sustaining a hostile regime. President Trump’s rhetoric regarding Mexico—threatening to “hit land” to combat cartels and warning neighbors to “get their act together”—suggests that Mexico’s energy largesse could incur severe costs.21 The upcoming review of the USMCA trade agreement provides the U.S. with a powerful economic weapon to coerce Mexico into halting these shipments.22
4.3 Grid Collapse: The 50% Deficit
The arrival of the Ocean Mariner, while symbolically potent, is mathematically insufficient. The Mexican shipments (historically averaging ~5,500 bpd) cannot replace the 35,000 bpd lost from Venezuela.16
The impact on the ground has been immediate and devastating. During the reporting week, the Cuban Ministry of Energy and Mines reported an electricity generation deficit of approximately 50%.23 This translates to a shortfall of 1,500 to 1,700 megawatts during peak demand hours.
- The “Asticar” Solution: In a scramble to add capacity, the regime has deployed a land-based power barge known as “Asticar” in Havana Harbor.24 While officials hope this will stabilize the capital, its output is a fraction of what is needed.
- Blackout Reality: The population is enduring blackouts of up to 20 hours a day in the provinces and significant outages in Havana. The “energy island” strategy, where provinces are cut off to save the capital, is fracturing as the entire system destabilizes.25
The current situation is not merely a “Special Period” of scarcity; it is a systemic failure of the energy grid that threatens the water supply, food preservation, and hospital operations.
5. The Domestic Front: Polycrisis and Control
The convergence of military humiliation, diplomatic isolation, and energy famine has created a domestic environment characterized by what sociologists and analysts are calling a “polycrisis”.26
5.1 The “Polycrisis” Framework
The term “polycrisis” refers to the mutually reinforcing interaction of multiple catastrophic failures:
- Demographic Collapse: New independent studies released this week indicate that Cuba’s population has plummeted by 25% in just four years, dropping below 8 million.26 This is the fastest population decline of any nation in the world not currently in a kinetic civil war. The exodus is comprised primarily of the youth and the working-age population, leaving behind a demographic structure heavily skewed toward the elderly and dependent.
- Economic Destitution: The state has ceased to function as a provider of basic goods. The “libreta” (ration book), once the guarantor of minimal subsistence, has been decimated. This week, the government announced a reduction in the weight of the standard rationed bread roll from 80 grams to an even lower weight, following previous cuts.27
- Hyper-Inflation and Dollarization: The informal economy has fully dollarized, rendering the state salaries (paid in Cuban Pesos) worthless.
5.2 The January 16 Demonstration: Orchestrated Mobilization
On Friday, January 16, the regime attempted to regain the narrative initiative by staging a massive demonstration at the José Martí Anti-Imperialist Tribune, located directly in front of the U.S. Embassy in Havana.28
- The Mobilization: Tens of thousands of Cubans filled the plaza. The crowd was a mix of true believers, state employees whose jobs depend on attendance, and students mobilized by the Union of Young Communists.
- The Rhetoric: President Díaz-Canel addressed the crowd, framing the moment as a struggle against “barbarism, plunder and neo-fascism”.28 The rhetoric was defensive and apocalyptic, designed to instill a siege mentality. “Independence is sacred, and we will defend it tooth and nail,” declared one protester, echoing the official line.28
- The Reality: Despite the show of force, observers noted a disconnect. The “March of the Combatant People” 5 masked a deep underlying exhaustion. The youth, whom the regime relies on for future legitimacy, are largely disengaged or actively seeking to emigrate. The rally was a demonstration of the state’s logistical capacity to move bodies, not necessarily a demonstration of its popular legitimacy.
5.3 “War Economy” Measures
In response to the tightening siege, the government has effectively declared a “war economy.”
- Price Hikes: The Prime Minister announced increases in the prices of fuel, electricity, and transportation.29
- Resource Centralization: Critical resources (fuel, food) are being prioritized for the military (MINFAR) and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) to ensure the loyalty of the security services. The civilian sector is being forced to absorb the entirety of the shortages.
6. Diplomatic Breakdown and Humanitarian Weaponization
The diplomatic channel between Washington and Havana, which had been tenuous, has now effectively collapsed into open hostility.
6.1 The Embassy Wars
The relationship has deteriorated significantly following the expulsion of U.S. diplomats in late 2025, a move cited by Havana as a response to espionage, which triggered reciprocal expulsions by Washington.30
- Current Status: The U.S. Embassy in Havana is currently operating on a skeletal staff. During the week of January 11–17, it issued multiple “Demonstration Alerts,” warning U.S. citizens to avoid the area around the embassy due to the state-sponsored rallies.31 Visa services were suspended on Friday, January 16, further severing the few remaining legal links between the two nations.31
6.2 The Humanitarian Aid Trap
A critical narrative battle unfolded this week regarding disaster relief. The Trump administration announced a $3 million humanitarian aid package for the Cuban people to assist with recovery from Hurricane Melissa.32
- The U.S. Condition: The State Department explicitly stated that the aid would be distributed through the Catholic Church and non-governmental organizations to “bypass the regime” and ensure it reached the people directly.33 This was a calculated political maneuver: offering aid that the regime cannot accept without admitting loss of sovereignty, or refusing aid and appearing cruel to its own suffering people.
- The Cuban Rejection: Predictably, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez rejected the offer, labeling it “opportunistic and politically manipulative”.2 The regime views the direct distribution mechanism as a Trojan horse designed to undermine its authority and empower civil society groups that it considers “mercenaries.”
- The Warning: A senior U.S. State Department official, Jeremy Lewin, warned Cuba not to interfere with the shipment, implying that blocking the aid could trigger further punitive measures.34 This standoff perfectly illustrates the total breakdown of trust; even humanitarian relief has become a theater of asymmetric warfare.
6.3 Global Reaction Summary
The following table summarizes the key international reactions observed during the reporting period.
| Actor | Stance | Key Actions/Statements (Jan 11-17) | Strategic Implication |
| United States | Hostile | Raid on Venezuela; “Make a deal” ultimatum; Aid conditionality. | Strategy of regime suffocation and forced transition. |
| Venezuela (Interim) | Aligned with US | Interim Gov. signaling alignment; Oil exports to Cuba halted. | Loss of Cuba’s primary economic and intelligence patron. |
| Mexico | Supportive | Shipment of oil via Ocean Mariner; Diplomatic defense of sovereignty. | The sole remaining lifeline; risks triggering US trade retaliation. |
| Russia | Passive | Putin silent; no military mobilization; bureaucratic condolences. | Preoccupied with Ukraine; effectively abandoning Caribbean foothold. |
| China | Passive | Rhetorical condemnation of “power politics”; focus on debt/assets. | Unwilling to challenge US military dominance in the region. |
| OAS | Fractured | Split between Lima Group (US-aligned) and Leftist bloc. | Regional paralysis prevents collective defense of Cuba. |
| European Union | Ambivalent | Focus on Venezuela’s democratic transition; weak support for Cuba. | No economic bailout forthcoming; alignment with US on democracy. |
7. Intelligence Forecast: Scenarios for Q1 2026
Based on the intelligence gathered and analyzed during the week of January 11–17, the Task Force projects three potential scenarios for the immediate future.
Scenario A: The “Special Period” 2.0 (High Probability)
The regime survives the immediate shock by employing the “survival manual” of the 1990s: extreme repression, centralized rationing, and a pivot to a subsistence economy. The Mexican oil lifeline continues intermittently, providing just enough energy to power the security apparatus and the tourism enclaves, while the general population is left in the dark. The regime uses the U.S. aggression to rally the party core, framing the hardship as a “second blockade.” Dissent is crushed preemptively.
- Indicators: Increased military presence in urban centers; successful arrival of subsequent Mexican tankers; further reductions in the ration book.
Scenario B: Grid Failure and Spontaneous Uprising (Moderate Probability)
The energy deficit proves unmanageable. A nationwide blackout lasting more than 72–96 hours triggers spontaneous, leaderless looting and protests in Havana and Santiago de Cuba. Unlike July 11, 2021, the security forces—demoralized by the Venezuela raid and lacking fuel for mobility—struggle to contain the unrest. The regime fractures from within, with mid-level officers refusing to fire on civilians.
- Indicators: U.S. Navy interdiction of Mexican tankers; announcement of “zero energy” days; high-level defections or rumors of family members of the elite fleeing.
Scenario C: External Intervention (Low Probability, High Impact)
The U.S. administration, perceiving the Cuban regime as teetering, moves from blockade to active intervention. This could take the form of a naval blockade (quarantine) to stop “contraband” oil, or limited airstrikes against intelligence facilities if Havana attempts to retaliate asymmetrically. Alternatively, a mass migration crisis (tens of thousands of rafters) forces a U.S. military response to “secure the border” at the source.
- Indicators: Movement of U.S. Carrier Strike Groups to the Florida Straits; explicit U.S. recognition of a Cuban government-in-exile; invocation of the Insurrection Act or similar domestic measures in the U.S. regarding the war.
8. Appendix: Methodology
Analytic Approach:
This report employs a multi-source fusion methodology, synthesizing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), diplomatic communiqués, shipping logistics data, and military forensic analysis. The assessment relies on the “Red Team” approach, viewing the conflict from the perspective of the Havana regime to understand their constraints and likely reactions.
Data Sourcing:
- Military Data: Derived from official Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) statements, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) press releases, and verified survivor testimonies broadcast in regional media (specifically the interview with Col. Domínguez).
- Economic Data: Energy sector analysis relies on shipping tracking of the Ocean Mariner, historical export data from PDVSA (Venezuela), and official Cuban National Electric Union (UNE) grid status reports.
- Diplomatic Intelligence: Analysis of UN Security Council transcripts, OAS voting records/statements, and official state department press briefings from the US, Mexico, and China.
Verification Standards:
Information regarding the death of the 32 soldiers was cross-referenced between the official Cuban state narrative (heroism) and the contradicting survivor testimony (defenselessness) to establish a confidence interval regarding the raid’s tactical reality. Energy projections are based on hard data regarding daily barrel consumption vs. import capacity.
Persona Statement:
This report was drafted by a Joint Intelligence Cell comprised of senior analysts specializing in Latin American security dynamics. The team integrates expertise in military strategy, foreign affairs, and economic forecasting to provide a holistic assessment of the crisis. The tone is strictly objective and analytical, designed for decision-makers requiring an unvarnished view of the deteriorating stability in the Caribbean theater.
If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly contribute towards our continued reporting, please visit our funding page.
Sources Used
- Cuba Brings Home 32 Special Forces Killed During US Capture of …, accessed January 17, 2026, https://united24media.com/latest-news/cuba-brings-home-32-special-forces-killed-during-us-capture-of-maduro-who-were-they-15106
- Remains of 32 Cuban officers killed during strike on Venezuela …, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.mariettatimes.com/news/international-news-apwire/2026/01/remains-of-32-cuban-officers-killed-during-strike-on-venezuela-repatriated-as-u-s-threat-lingers/
- Cuba pays tribute to 32 soldiers killed in US attack on Venezuela – Al Jazeera, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/15/cuba-pays-tribute-to-soldiers-killed-in-us-attack-on-venezuela
- A Survivor Contradicts the Official Cuban Gov. Account… – Havana …, accessed January 17, 2026, https://havanatimes.org/features/a-survivor-contradicts-the-official-cuban-gov-account/
- Cuban authorities paid tribute to 32 soldiers killed in Venezuela …, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.plenglish.com/news/2026/01/16/cuban-authorities-paid-tribute-to-32-soldiers-killed-in-venezuela/
- Future Center – Unpacking Russia’s and China’s Calculations on the U.S. Attack on Venezuela, accessed January 17, 2026, https://futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/10741
- Trump tells Cuba to ‘make a deal’ or face the consequences, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/11/trump-tells-cuba-to-make-a-deal-or-face-the-consequences
- Statement delivered by the Republic of Cuba at the Security Council Emergency Meeting on the U.S. military aggression against Venezuela, accessed January 17, 2026, https://cubaminrex.cu/en/statement-delivered-republic-cuba-security-council-emergency-meeting-us-military-aggression-against
- US critics and allies condemn Maduro’s abduction at UN Security Council – Al Jazeera, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/6/us-critics-and-allies-condemn-maduros-abduction-at-un-security-council
- Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Venezuela, accessed January 17, 2026, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-venezuela-2/
- International reactions to the 2026 United States intervention in Venezuela – Wikipedia, accessed January 17, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_reactions_to_the_2026_United_States_intervention_in_Venezuela
- U.S. capture of Maduro divides Latin America, thrilling Trump’s allies and threatening his foes – PBS, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/us-capture-of-maduro-divides-latin-america-thrilling-trumps-allies-and-threatening-his-foes
- The Quiet Of The Kremlin: Upheaval In Iran, Venezuela Gets A Muted Moscow Response, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-iran-venezuela-upheaval-kremlin-reaction/33647996.html
- Venezuela shows Russia has lost the initiative in Trump’s global order, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/venezuela-shows-russia-has-lost-initiative-trumps-global-order
- With Venezuela raid, U.S. tells China to keep away from the Americas, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/01/12/world/politics/venezuela-raid-us-china-americas/
- A battered Cuba braces for aftershocks as US seizures of oil tankers linked to Venezuela surge – AP News, accessed January 17, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/cuba-venezuela-us-oil-economy-outages-tankers-155b49ee43bffbbc750768fc2a3efce6
- Mexico Oil Shipment Reaches Cuba, Increasing Tensions With US – gCaptain, accessed January 17, 2026, https://gcaptain.com/mexico-oil-shipment-reaches-cuba-increasing-tensions-with-us/
- Two oil tankers spotted entering Cuba bay over past 2 days, despite US restriction efforts, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xuFVoQFCuFU
- Cuba Seeks to Secure Energy Cooperation with Mexico – Radio Angulo, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.radioangulo.cu/en/2026/01/10/cuba-seeks-to-secure-energy-cooperation-with-mexico/
- Mexico denies boosting oil shipments to Cuba | Latest Market News – Argus Media, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2772991-mexico-denies-boosting-oil-shipments-to-cuba
- What would Trump’s threatened strikes on Colombia, Mexico or Cuba achieve?, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/what-would-trumps-threatened-strikes-colombia-mexico-or-cuba-achieve
- Mexico, in Trump’s sights over its oil exports to Cuba, accessed January 17, 2026, https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-01-11/mexico-in-trumps-sights-over-its-oil-exports-to-cuba.html
- Cuba producing only enough power for half its needs – CTV News, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/article/cuba-producing-only-enough-power-for-half-its-needs/
- Cuba’s Latest Attempts to Curb Worsening Power Outages – Havana Times, accessed January 17, 2026, https://havanatimes.org/features/cubas-latest-attempts-to-curb-worsening-power-outages/
- Cuba confirms partial improvement of the electrical system by 2026 – Cuban News Agency, accessed January 17, 2026, http://www.cubanews.acn.cu/cuba/27928-cuba-confirms-partial-improvement-of-the-electrical-system-by-2026
- ‘History will tell’: as US pressure grows, Cuba edges closer to collapse amid mass exodus – The Guardian, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/10/cuba-regime-polycrisis-collapse-exodus-economy-migration-us-sanctions-trump
- Cuban Government Reduces Weight of Rationed Bread Rolls – Havana Times, accessed January 17, 2026, https://havanatimes.org/news/cuban-government-reduces-weight-of-rationed-bread-rolls/
- Cuba launches mass demonstration to US attack on … – Daily Pioneer, accessed January 17, 2026, https://dailypioneer.com/news/cuba-launches-mass-demonstration-to-us-attack-on-venezuela-demand-maduros-release
- New Cuban Economic Measures Raise Prices On Island | Cigar Aficionado, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.cigaraficionado.com/article/new-cuban-economic-measures-raise-prices-on-island
- Cuba Reinforces Diplomatic Ties Amid Rising Tensions with United States in 2026 – weareiowa.com, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.weareiowa.com/article/news/local/plea-agreement-reached-in-des-moines-murder-trial/524-3069d9d4-6f9b-4039-b884-1d2146bd744f?y-news-25063611-2026-01-09-cuba-reinforces-diplomatic-ties-amid-rising-tensions-with-united-states-2026
- Demonstration Alert: U.S. Embassy Havana, Cuba – January 15, 2026, accessed January 17, 2026, https://cu.usembassy.gov/demonstration-alert-u-s-embassy-havana-cuba-january-15-2026/
- Delivering on Our Commitment: U.S. Disaster Assistance to the Cuban People, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/delivering-on-our-commitment-u-s-disaster-assistance-to-the-cuban-people
- U.S. Disaster Assistance to the Cuban People – U.S. Department of State, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/u-s-disaster-assistance-to-the-cuban-people
- Cuba to accept US aid as Washington warns against interference | The Mighty 790 KFGO, accessed January 17, 2026, https://kfgo.com/2026/01/15/cuba-to-accept-us-aid-as-washington-warns-against-interference/






