The operational week of January 11–17, 2026, represents a critical juncture in the geopolitical history of the Western Hemisphere, defined by the consolidation of a new, externally managed governance architecture in Venezuela following the execution of Operation Absolute Resolve. The successful extraction of President Nicolás Maduro Moros and First Lady Cilia Flores by United States special operations forces on January 3 has precipitated a radical restructuring of the Venezuelan state, characterized not by immediate democratization, but by the imposition of a technocratic interim administration under Vice President Delcy Rodríguez. This reporting period has seen the transition from the initial tactical shock of the decapitation strike to a complex phase of strategic maneuvering involving domestic power brokers, regional neighbors, and global superpowers.

Our analysis indicates that the United States, operating under the newly articulated “Donroe Doctrine,” has effectively placed the Venezuelan state into a form of geopolitical receivership. This strategy prioritizes the stabilization of energy markets and the neutralization of transnational criminal networks over the immediate restoration of liberal democratic institutions. This priority was starkly illustrated by the diplomatic sidelining of opposition leader María Corina Machado during her January 15 meeting with President Donald Trump, where the administration signaled its intent to work through the existing Chavista apparatus rather than dismantle it.

Domestically, the reporting period was dominated by a high-stakes, opaque power struggle between the civilian leadership of Delcy Rodríguez and the security apparatus controlled by Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. While the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) under General Vladimir Padrino López have maintained institutional cohesion and pledged loyalty to the interim government, the loyalty of the paramilitary colectivos and the intelligence services remains a volatile variable. The security environment is further complicated by the asymmetric threat posed by the Tren de Aragua criminal syndicate, now designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and persistent tensions on the Guyanese border.

Economically, the country remains in a state of paralysis. The United States’ move to seize control of Venezuelan oil exports has triggered significant market volatility. Despite optimistic rhetoric regarding a production renaissance, the reality on the ground—characterized by a cyber-decimated infrastructure managed via encrypted messaging apps—suggests that a return to pre-1999 production levels remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, the diplomatic fallout has fractured the Latin American consensus, isolating the United States from traditional partners like Brazil and Colombia, who view the intervention as a destabilizing precedent for the region.

This report synthesizes multi-source intelligence to provide a granular assessment of these developments. It argues that while the removal of Maduro has eliminated the figurehead of the Bolivarian Revolution, the underlying structures of the state—including its deep-seated corruption, infrastructural decay, and authoritarian mechanisms—remain intact, presenting the United States with the challenge of managing a “zombie state” for the foreseeable future.

1. The Strategic Context: Operation Absolute Resolve and the Donroe Doctrine

The events of the reporting week cannot be understood without a rigorous analysis of the paradigm shift in United States foreign policy that precipitated them. The intervention in Venezuela marks the operational debut of the “Donroe Doctrine,” a maximalist reinterpretation of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine.

1.1 The Operational Paradigm

Operation Absolute Resolve was a high-intensity, decapitation strike executed on January 3, 2026. The operation involved over 150 U.S. aircraft conducting precision strikes against seven military facilities in Caracas, La Guaira, and Miranda to suppress integrated air defense systems.¹ Simultaneously, a specialized apprehension force, reportedly involving the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and Delta Force, infiltrated the presidential compound.² The extraction resulted in 83 fatalities, primarily among the Venezuelan Presidential Guard and Cuban security detail, with no reported U.S. casualties.²

The psychological impact of this operation on the Venezuelan leadership cannot be overstated. The precision of the strikes and the total failure of the Russian-supplied air defense network created a “sovereignty shock.” During the week of January 11–17, this shock manifested in the total compliance of the surviving leadership with U.S. directives regarding prisoner releases and oil sector management. The lack of a kinetic response from the FANB suggests a pre-planned paralysis or a rapid calculation of survival by the military high command.³

1.2 The “Donroe Doctrine”

President Trump has framed this intervention not merely as a law enforcement action but as a geostrategic imperative. The “Donroe Doctrine” asserts absolute American dominance in the Western Hemisphere, explicitly rejecting the influence of extra-regional powers such as China, Russia, and Iran.⁴ Unlike the Cold War-era containment strategies, this doctrine appears transactional and resource-focused. The administration’s rhetoric during the week focused heavily on “running” Venezuela and seizing its oil assets to pay for the intervention and benefit the American people.²

This doctrinal shift was codified in the administration’s National Security Strategy, which outlines the permissible use of force to seize strategic assets and combat migration drivers at the source.⁴ The implications of this were visible throughout the week as U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Energy Wright, engaged directly with the Venezuelan interim authorities to dictate energy policy, effectively bypassing the concept of national sovereignty in favor of a client-state relationship.²

1.3 Legal Warfare: The Narcoterrorism Indictment

To legitimize the intervention domestically and internationally, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a superseding indictment in the Southern District of New York. This legal instrument reframes the Venezuelan state not as a sovereign entity but as a criminal enterprise—the Cartel de los Soles. The indictment charges Maduro, Cilia Flores, Diosdado Cabello, and others with participating in a narcoterrorism conspiracy designed to “flood” the United States with cocaine.⁷

This legal framework is crucial for understanding the events of Jan 11–17. By designating the leadership as criminal actors, the U.S. justified the bypass of international norms regarding sovereign immunity. During this week, this framework was used to pressure the remaining leadership. While Delcy Rodríguez is recognized as Acting President, the U.S. continues to hold the threat of indictment over other members of the regime, specifically Interior Minister Cabello, creating a coercive lever to ensure compliance.⁸ This “lawfare” strategy allows the U.S. to maintain diplomatic relations with the institution of the presidency while prosecuting the individuals who inhabit it.

2. Internal Political Dynamics: The Interim Administration

The political landscape in Caracas during the week of January 11–17 was defined by a fragile stability. Contrary to expectations of immediate regime collapse, the Chavista infrastructure demonstrated resilience, quickly coalescing around Vice President Delcy Rodríguez.

2.1 The Technocratic Consolidation of Delcy Rodríguez

Delcy Rodríguez, sworn in as Acting President on January 5, spent the reporting week consolidating her tenuous hold on power. Analysts characterize her administration as “pragmatic authoritarianism.” Unlike the ideological firebrands of the Chavismo movement, Rodríguez is viewed as a technocrat capable of navigating the complex requirements of the U.S. occupation.⁹

Her strategy during this period has been twofold: performative sovereignty and covert compliance. Publicly, she has maintained the rhetoric of the revolution, describing Maduro’s capture as a “kidnapping” and promising to defend the constitutional order.² Privately, however, she has facilitated the U.S. takeover of the oil sector and the release of political prisoners. This dual track was evident in her January 14 address to the nation, where she framed the prisoner releases not as a concession to Washington, but as a sovereign decision to “open up to a new political moment”.¹¹

Rodríguez has moved aggressively to secure the loyalty of the state apparatus. A critical development this week was her appointment of Major General Gustavo González to head the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM).⁹ This appointment is a strategic coup; the DGCIM is the regime’s internal policing mechanism, responsible for monitoring loyalty within the armed forces. By placing a loyalist at its head, Rodríguez has effectively insulated herself against coups from within the military, reducing the influence of her primary rival, Diosdado Cabello.

2.2 The Power Struggle: The “Octopus” vs. The Palace

The most significant internal threat to the new order comes from Diosdado Cabello, the Minister of the Interior. Known as “The Octopus” for his pervasive influence across the party and security services, Cabello controls the Bolivarian National Police (PNB), the SEBIN intelligence agency, and the paramilitary colectivos.⁸

Intelligence indicates a severe fracture between the Rodríguez siblings (Delcy and Jorge, President of the National Assembly) and the Cabello faction. The relationship between these power centers is currently a “Cold War” within the Miraflores Palace.

• The Cabello Faction: Represents the hardline, ideological wing of Chavismo with deep ties to illicit networks. Cabello’s power is rooted in his ability to mobilize violence on the streets through the colectivos.
• The Rodríguez Faction: Represents the civilian, transactional wing seeking survival through accommodation with the United States.
• The Arbiter: General Padrino López and the FANB high command, who currently align with Rodríguez to ensure institutional survival.³

During the week of Jan 11–17, Cabello appeared significantly weakened. The U.S. bounty of $25 million on his head has forced him into a defensive posture.¹³ Reports confirm that he has limited his public movements and is broadcasting his television show, Con el Mazo Dando, from secure, undisclosed locations rather than his usual studio.¹³ Former regime insiders suggest Cabello is “a walking zombie,” tolerated by the U.S. only as long as he does not disrupt the oil flow, but marked for eventual removal.⁸ His public appearances with Rodríguez this week were interpreted by analysts as forced displays of unity to prevent panic among the rank-and-file Chavistas.³

2.3 The Opposition Dilemma: The Sidelining of María Corina Machado

For the traditional opposition, the week brought a bitter realization: the removal of Maduro did not equate to their ascension to power. The Trump administration’s strategy relies on the continuity of the state machinery, which means keeping the Chavista bureaucracy in place while changing the leadership’s directives.

This dynamic was brutally illustrated on January 15, 2026, when opposition leader María Corina Machado met with President Trump at the White House.¹⁴ In a gesture intended to cement the bond between the two nations, Machado presented Trump with her Nobel Peace Prize medal, drawing a historical parallel to the Marquis de Lafayette gifting a medal to Simón Bolívar.¹⁴ The medal was displayed in the White House with an inscription recognizing Trump’s “principled and decisive action”.¹⁴

However, despite this symbolic offering, the political outcome was negligible. The White House confirmed it would continue to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as the interim authority.¹⁴ Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated this decision was based on “realities on the ground,” explicitly noting the opposition’s lack of control over the security forces.¹⁴ Trump himself has previously characterized Machado as a “nice woman” who lacks the “respect within the country” necessary to govern.¹⁵ This pragmatism has left the opposition movement demoralized, effectively decapitating their political momentum just as the dictatorship they fought against was decapitated militarily.

3. The Economic Theater: Energy, Sanctions, and Collapse

The economic dimension of the intervention is characterized by the United States’ aggressive move to monetize Venezuelan resources to stabilize global energy markets and offset the costs of the operation. However, the reality of the Venezuelan economy—marked by hyperinflation and infrastructural ruin—presents formidable obstacles.

3.1 The Oil Sector: Ambition Meets Decay

Venezuela possesses the largest proven oil reserves in the world, estimated at 303 billion barrels.¹⁶ The Trump administration’s stated goal is to ramp up production rapidly, targeting a return to the 3 million barrels per day (bpd) levels seen in the 1990s. During the reporting week, the U.S. announced plans to sell 30–50 million barrels of seized Venezuelan crude and encouraged U.S. oil majors to re-enter the market.⁵

However, the gap between this political ambition and the industrial reality is immense. Current production is estimated between 860,000 and 1.1 million bpd, a fraction of its potential.¹⁷ The infrastructure of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) is in a state of catastrophic disrepair due to decades of mismanagement, corruption, and sanctions.

The Cyber-Physical Crisis: A critical and underreported development this week was the revelation that PDVSA is operating without its central digital nervous system. A cyberattack in mid-December—which remains unattributed but is widely suspected to be state-sponsored—destroyed the company’s SAP enterprise resource planning software and compromised the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems that manage refineries and pipelines.19

During the week of Jan 11–17, operations were reportedly being managed via WhatsApp and Telegram. Logistics, payments to contractors, and production data were being handled through handwritten notes and encrypted messages, creating an environment of total opacity and high risk.19 This “analog” management style makes the rapid scaling of exports logistically impossible and raises severe safety concerns regarding the operation of high-pressure infrastructure.

Major oil companies, including ExxonMobil, have signaled that the country remains “uninvestable” in the short term. CEO Darren Woods explicitly stated that the heavy, sour nature of Venezuelan crude, combined with the degraded infrastructure, makes a quick return on investment unlikely.²⁰ Estimates suggest that stabilizing production would require $50 billion over 15 years, while restoring it to 3 million bpd would cost nearly $180 billion.⁵

3.2 Macroeconomic Paralysis

The broader economy remains trapped in a hyperinflationary spiral. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Venezuela’s inflation rate to reach 682% in 2026, the highest globally.²¹ The intervention initially exacerbated this by disrupting the flow of illicit funds that had been propping up the parallel currency market.

During the week, the Venezuelan Bolívar (VES) experienced extreme volatility, trading as high as 800 VES/USD on the black market before strengthening to approximately 341 VES/USD after the interim government announced the resumption of dollar auctions.²² This stabilization is artificial, predicated on the expectation of U.S. dollars entering the system from permitted oil sales. However, with 64% of the population citing the economy as their primary concern, the social pressure on the Rodríguez administration is immense.²⁴ The humanitarian crisis continues, with shortages of medicine and food reported in the barrios, where citizens like “Calderon” report an inability to afford basic protein due to skyrocketing prices.²⁵

4. Geopolitical Repercussions: A Hemispheric Fracture

The external dimension of the Venezuelan crisis has exposed deep fault lines in the international order, particularly within the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. intervention has forced a realignment of regional politics.

4.1 United States Domestic Politics: The Senate Showdown

Domestically, the Trump administration faced a significant constitutional challenge regarding the legality of the intervention. On January 14, the U.S. Senate voted on a war powers resolution designed to limit the President’s authority to conduct further military operations in Venezuela without congressional approval.²⁶

The vote resulted in a dramatic 50-50 tie, broken by Vice President JD Vance to defeat the measure. This legislative battle highlighted a rift within the Republican party between interventionists and constitutionalists. Senators Rand Paul, Lisa Murkowski, and Susan Collins voted with the Democrats, arguing that the “Donroe Doctrine” and the seizure of a foreign head of state constituted acts of war requiring legislative oversight.²⁷ The administration secured victory only after intense pressure was applied to wavering Republican Senators Todd Young and Josh Hawley, who flipped their votes at the eleventh hour after receiving “assurances” regarding the scope of future operations.²⁸ This victory effectively grants the executive branch a blank check for the occupation, signaling the erosion of congressional war powers in the face of the “narcoterrorism” legal framework.

4.2 Latin American Division: The “Pink Tide” Fracture

The intervention has shattered the diplomatic consensus in Latin America. The region is now divided into two distinct blocs based on their reaction to the U.S. operation.

• The Condemnation Bloc: Led by Brazil and Colombia, this bloc views the intervention as an existential threat to regional sovereignty. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva condemned the action as crossing an “unacceptable line,” while Colombian President Gustavo Petro described it as a “kidnapping”.³⁰ Both leaders fear that the precedent of “regime decapitation” could be applied to any government that falls out of favor with Washington. During the week, Petro and Lula engaged in high-level coordination to attempt a diplomatic mediation, but their efforts have been largely sidelined by U.S. unilateralism.³²
• The Support Bloc: Right-leaning governments, including Argentina and Paraguay, have tacitly or explicitly supported the removal of Maduro, viewing it as a necessary step to eliminate a regional destabilizer.³³

This fracture has paralyzed regional bodies like the Organization of American States (OAS) and CELAC, leaving the region without a unified voice.

4.3 Great Power Silence: Russia and China

Conspicuously absent from the crisis is any meaningful counter-move by Venezuela’s traditional patrons, Russia and China.

• Russia: Occupied with the war in Ukraine, Moscow has offered only rhetorical condemnation. The Kremlin’s inaction confirms that its alliance with Venezuela was opportunistic rather than strategic; it is unwilling to risk direct confrontation with the U.S. in the Caribbean theater.³⁴
• China: Beijing faces the potential loss of billions in loans. With the U.S. seizing oil revenues, China’s primary mechanism for repayment is threatened. However, China’s response has been cautious, prioritizing its broader trade relationship with the U.S. over the fate of the Maduro regime.³⁵ This passivity has reinforced the U.S. claim to hegemony under the Donroe Doctrine.

5. Security and Defense Assessment

While the initial invasion was swift, the security situation in Venezuela remains a powder keg. The risk of insurgency, criminal violence, and border conflict persists.

5.1 The Loyalty of the Armed Forces (FANB)

The Bolivarian National Armed Forces have maintained a surprising degree of cohesion. Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López has aligned the military with the interim presidency of Delcy Rodríguez, preventing a fragmentation of command.³ This loyalty is likely transactional: the military controls vast sectors of the economy, including mining and food distribution, and the senior command has likely been offered guarantees of immunity or continuity by the interim administration in exchange for stability. The military’s refusal to mobilize in defense of Maduro on January 3 suggests a pre-arranged acquiescence to the inevitable.

5.2 Asymmetric Threats: Tren de Aragua and Colectivos

The vacuum of authority has emboldened non-state actors.

• Tren de Aragua: This transnational gang, now designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, poses a direct threat to U.S. interests and regional stability. On January 2, a U.S. Navy strike targeted a Tren de Aragua vessel, killing 11 operatives.³⁷ The gang has vowed retaliation. Intelligence suggests they may leverage their networks to target U.S. assets or citizens in the region.
• Colectivos: Pro-government paramilitary groups remain active in the barrios. Reports from the week indicate colectivos setting up roadblocks and searching vehicles for U.S. citizens.³⁸ These groups, historically armed by the state to defend the revolution, now operate as rogue militias. The U.S. State Department’s “Do Not Travel” advisory explicitly cites the threat of colectivo violence against Americans.³⁸

5.3 The Guyana Border Flashpoint

Tensions on the eastern border remain critical. The dispute over the Essequibo region is a dormant volcano. The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) remains on high alert, conducting routine leadership engagements at border bases to ensure readiness.³⁹ The government of Guyana has activated its “security architecture” and is in constant communication with U.S. Southern Command.⁴⁰ While the chaos in Caracas has temporarily paused Venezuelan aggression, there is a risk that rogue elements of the Venezuelan military could stage a border incident to distract from the humiliation in the capital or to rally nationalist sentiment.

6. Human Rights and Social Stability

The human rights situation is evolving as the new government uses political prisoners as bargaining chips.

6.1 The Politics of Prisoner Releases

The release of political prisoners has become a key metric of cooperation between the Rodríguez administration and Washington. As of January 14, the government claimed to have released 406 prisoners, although the NGO Foro Penal could only verify 68.² The releases are chaotic and conditional.

The tragic case of Edilson Torres, a police officer detained on political charges, illustrates the human cost of the crisis. Torres died of a heart attack in prison on January 10, just days before his potential release.⁴¹ His death underscores the brutal conditions within the detention system. Furthermore, released prisoners often face “precautionary measures,” meaning they remain under state surveillance and can be re-arrested at will.⁴³ This “revolving door” strategy allows the government to signal compliance to the U.S. while maintaining a mechanism of social control.

6.2 Social Control and Public Sentiment

Despite the dramatic political changes, there has been no mass uprising. The population, exhausted by years of crisis, is focused on survival. Protests by Maduro loyalists have been small and contained.⁴⁴ The release of prisoners has generated a flicker of hope, but the prevailing sentiment is one of uncertainty. The lack of a clear timeline for elections and the palpable presence of U.S. power have created a “wait and see” attitude among the populace.

Appendix: Methodology

Research Approach:

This report was produced by a multi-disciplinary team utilizing Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and qualitative analysis of provided research snippets. The methodology involved:

1. Source Verification: Claims regarding prisoner releases and economic data were cross-referenced between government statements (Venezuelan and U.S.), NGO reports (Foro Penal), and independent media analysis.
2. Geopolitical Analysis: Events were interpreted through the lens of international relations theory, specifically realism, to understand the strategic calculations of the U.S., Russia, and China.
3. Technical Assessment: Energy sector analysis relied on technical data regarding crude grades, infrastructure status (SCADA/SAP systems), and historical production curves to validate political claims.

Data Limitations:

• Opaque Decision Making: The specific agreements between the Trump administration and the Rodríguez interim government regarding the “Donroe Doctrine” implementation remain classified.
• Economic Data Reliability: Official Venezuelan economic statistics are unreliable. The report relies on estimates from the IMF, World Bank, and private energy consultancies.
• Operational Security: Details on specific U.S. military dispositions and the internal communications of the FANB are limited to public disclosures and inferred from troop movements.

Source Material:

The analysis is based on 109 distinct research snippets covering the period of January 2026. All factual claims are cited using the alphanumeric Source ID format.

Works cited

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43. Q&A on Venezuela: Two things can hold true, and Venezuelans need support now – WOLA, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.wola.org/analysis/qa-on-venezuela-two-things-can-hold-true-and-venezuelans-need-support-now/
44. Caracas, Jan 11, 2026 (AFP) – Maduro loyalists stage modest rally as Venezuelan govt courts US | NAMPA, accessed January 17, 2026, https://www.nampa.org/text/22828809

This is a time-sensitive special report and is based on information available as of January 7, 2026. Due to the situation being very dynamic the following report should be used to obtain a perspective but not viewed as an absolute.

On January 3, 2026, the geopolitical architecture of the Western Hemisphere underwent a seismic shift with the execution of “Operation Absolute Resolve,” a coordinated U.S. military and law enforcement strike that resulted in the capture and extraction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. This event, unprecedented in twenty-first-century Latin American relations, has plunged the Bolivarian Republic into a state of precarious uncertainty, replacing a consolidated authoritarian dictatorship with a fragile interim administration led by Delcy Rodríguez.

This report serves as a comprehensive strategic assessment of the post-Maduro landscape, specifically addressing the political viability of the Rodríguez presidency, the internal power dynamics of the surviving Chavista state, and the transactional U.S. strategy colloquially termed the “Delcy Deal.”

Our analysis indicates that while Operation Absolute Resolve successfully decapitated the executive leadership of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the underlying deep state—comprising the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), the intelligence services (SEBIN/DGCIM), and the paramilitary colectivos—remains largely intact. Into this vacuum steps Delcy Rodríguez, a figure of immense bureaucratic competence but limited independent political capital. Her authority is currently derivative, sustained not by organic support but by a tenuous triumvirate involving her brother Jorge Rodríguez, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, and the erratic, dangerous influence of Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello.

The Trump administration’s decision to recognize and work with the Rodríguez administration represents a pivot from democratic idealism to hardline realism. By prioritizing stability and access to Venezuela’s 300 billion barrels of oil reserves over the immediate installation of the democratic opposition led by Nobel Laureate María Corina Machado, Washington has entered into a high-risk gamble. This strategy aims to prevent a “Somalia on the Caribbean” scenario by co-opting the “moderate” wing of the regime to manage the state’s liquidation and reconstruction.

However, the risks are acute. The immediate short-term danger is not a democratic revolution, but an internecine conflict within Chavismo. Rodríguez must navigate a treacherous path: she must deliver oil revenues to Washington to avoid further intervention, while simultaneously channeling those funds into the patronage networks essential to keeping the military loyal. Failure in either vector will likely result in her removal, either by a U.S.-backed coup or an internal palace revolt led by hardliners. Consequently, while she currently holds the title of President, she lacks the autonomous “political clout” to govern without the explicit, sustained backing of the United States military and the Venezuelan high command.

1. The Geostrategic Shock: Anatomy of a Decapitation

1.1 The Operational Mechanics of Regime Change

The execution of Operation Absolute Resolve in the early hours of January 3, 2026, marked a definitive conclusion to the era of diplomatic gradualism in U.S.-Venezuela relations. Moving beyond the sanctions regimes of the previous decade, the United States employed overwhelming kinetic force to effect an immediate leadership change. The deployment of assets including F-35 Lightning II fighters, B-1 Lancer bombers, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Night Stalkers) against targets in Caracas—specifically the Fuerte Tiuna military complex—demonstrated a capability to breach Venezuelan sovereignty with total impunity.¹

The strike was characterized by its surgical lethality and its specific targeting of the regime’s foreign support structures. Reports indicate casualties ranging from 24 to over 80 personnel, with a significant concentration of fatalities among Cuban military and intelligence operatives.¹ This specific degradation of the Cuban security umbrella is a critical, underreported aspect of the operation. For years, Cuban counterintelligence served as the “praetorian guard” for the Maduro regime, monitoring dissent within the Venezuelan Armed Forces to prevent coups. By physically eliminating this layer of protection, the operation fractured the surveillance cohesion that maintained internal discipline, forcing the remaining leadership to scramble for new security guarantees.

1.2 The Legal Warfare: Indictments as Justification

The legal justification for this intervention rests on the unsealed indictments from the Southern District of New York (SDNY). By framing the operation as a law enforcement extraction of indicted fugitives—Maduro and Flores—rather than a political coup, the U.S. has attempted to navigate the complexities of international law, though this interpretation is fiercely contested by global powers such as China and Russia.⁴ The charges of narco-terrorism, cocaine importation, and weapons possession provide the U.S. with a domestic legal framework to hold the captured leaders, effectively criminalizing the former executive branch.⁶

This “law enforcement” framing has profound implications for the successor government. It establishes a precedent that the United States views the PSUV leadership not as legitimate political actors, but as members of a criminal enterprise—the Cartel de los Soles. This hangs as a sword of Damocles over the heads of the remaining leadership, specifically Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, both of whom face similar U.S. indictments.⁸

1.3 The “Pottery Barn” Principle and the Vacuum

President Donald Trump’s declaration that the United States would “run” Venezuela until a transition is effected invokes the “Pottery Barn rule”—you break it, you own it. However, the administration’s definition of “owning” the problem appears strictly limited to energy infrastructure and security stabilization, rather than nation-building.¹

The administration’s refusal to immediately install the recognized opposition government suggests a strategy of regime modification rather than total regime change. By leaving the administrative infrastructure in place under Delcy Rodríguez, Washington aims to avoid the chaotic dissolution of the state seen in post-invasion Iraq or Libya. The goal is a controlled demolition of the anti-American elements of Chavismo, repurposing the remaining state apparatus to serve U.S. energy and security interests. This is a high-risk gamble that assumes the Venezuelan state is coherent enough to be steered by an external hand.

2. The New Executive: Profile of Delcy Rodríguez

2.1 The Technocratic Hardliner

Delcy Eloína Rodríguez Gómez, 56, is often mischaracterized by foreign observers as merely a loyal bureaucrat or a placeholder. In reality, she is a deeply ideological operator with a personal history that fuels her political worldview. Born in 1969, she is the daughter of Jorge Antonio Rodríguez, a founder of the Marxist Socialist League who was tortured to death in police custody in 1976. This event is the foundational trauma of her life and politics; she views the Venezuelan struggle through the lens of vengeance against the pre-Chávez establishment and the United States, which supported the government responsible for her father’s death.¹⁰

Despite this radical pedigree, Rodríguez projects a polished, cosmopolitan image that contrasts sharply with the rougher, military-man personas of her rivals like Diosdado Cabello. Educated as a lawyer at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) and having specialized in labor law in Paris, she is fluent in English and French and capable of navigating international diplomatic circles with sophistication.¹² This “technocratic” profile makes her the ideal interlocutor for a U.S. administration seeking a “gracious” partner for stabilization, as noted by President Trump following their initial communications.⁹

2.2 The Architect of Authoritarianism

However, her polished demeanor masks a ruthless authoritarian streak. Rodríguez has been the intellectual architect of the regime’s legal consolidation. As President of the Constituent Assembly (2017-2018), she engineered the legislative bypass that stripped the opposition-controlled National Assembly of its power, effectively legalizing Maduro’s dictatorship. As Minister of Communications, she presided over the dismantling of the free press and the construction of the state propaganda apparatus.¹²

Her rise has been characterized by absolute loyalty to the executive. She has served as Minister of the Office of the Presidency, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Executive Vice President, holding the latter post since 2018. In these roles, she oversaw the day-to-day administration of the state, including the feared intelligence services (SEBIN) and the management of the oil economy during the height of sanctions.⁹ She is, therefore, uniquely positioned to understand where the bodies are buried—both metaphorically and literally.

2.3 The Rodríguez Dynasty

Delcy Rodríguez does not govern in isolation. She is one half of the regime’s most powerful civilian dynasty. Her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, currently the President of the National Assembly, serves as the regime’s chief strategist, negotiator, and psychological operator.³

• Jorge Rodríguez: The “Brain.” A psychiatrist by training, he has historically managed the dialogue processes with the opposition, using negotiations as a tool to stall, divide opponents, and buy time for the regime. He presided over Delcy’s swearing-in on January 5, a visual confirmation of their consolidated family power.¹⁵
• Delcy Rodríguez: The “Administrator.” She holds the executive levers, managing the economy, the oil ministry (until recently), and now the presidency.

Together, the Rodríguez siblings form the “Civilian Wing” of the post-Maduro regime. Their power base is bureaucratic and political, not military. They do not command battalions, nor do they control the colectivos (armed gangs). This is their fatal weakness. In a system built on force, they rely entirely on the loyalty of others—specifically Padrino López and Diosdado Cabello—to survive. They are indispensable to the U.S. for their administrative control and diplomatic utility, but they are expendable to the military if the money runs out.

2.4 Legitimacy and Succession

Her ascension on January 5, 2026, followed a meticulous adherence to the 1999 Constitution’s succession protocols. By declaring Maduro “absent” (due to his capture), the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ)—packed with loyalists—ruled that the Vice President must assume the interim presidency.¹ This veneer of legality is vital for two reasons:

1. Internal Cohesion: It gives the military a constitutional excuse to obey her orders rather than fracturing into warlordism.
2. International Cover: It allows countries hesitant to support a U.S. coup (like Brazil or Mexico) to recognize the de facto government, maintaining diplomatic channels.

3. The Triumvirate of Tension: Internal Power Dynamics

The stability of the Rodríguez presidency hangs by a thread, suspended between three competing power centers within the regime. Understanding these factions is essential to predicting the short-term future of Venezuela.

3.1 The “Spoiler”: Diosdado Cabello (The Enforcers)

Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello represents the dark heart of the Chavista state. A former military officer who participated in Hugo Chávez’s 1992 coup, Cabello controls the apparatus of internal repression: the SEBIN (Intelligence Service), DGCIM (Military Counterintelligence), the FAES (Special Police), and the colectivos.⁸

• The Threat: Cabello is the primary target of U.S. pressure. Reports indicate he has been given a stark ultimatum by Washington: cooperate with Rodríguez or face a “targeted law enforcement operation” and the execution of the $15 million bounty on his head.¹⁶
• Recent Actions: Unlike the Rodríguez siblings, Cabello has adopted a stance of aggressive defiance. In the days following the strike, he has appeared in combat fatigues, surrounded by armed loyalists, chanting “Always loyal, never traitors.” He has deployed armed gangs to patrol Caracas neighborhoods, checking civilians’ phones for “subversive” content.¹⁸ This is a direct message to Delcy Rodríguez: while she wears the presidential sash, he controls the streets.
• Strategic Position: Cabello is the “spoiler.” If he feels the Rodríguez siblings are selling him out to the Americans—a likely scenario given the U.S. desire to purge “narco-terrorist” elements—he has the capacity to unleash urban chaos or stage a counter-coup using the intelligence services.

3.2 The “Kingmaker”: Vladimir Padrino López (The Military)

Defense Minister General Vladimir Padrino López remains the arbiter of power in Venezuela. Having served as Defense Minister for over a decade, he has cultivated a deep network of loyalty within the high command. His immediate recognition of Rodríguez and his call for “normalcy” were decisive in preventing a coup in the hours following the strike.¹⁹

• Transactional Loyalty: Padrino’s loyalty is pragmatic, not ideological. The military high command controls significant economic sectors, including oil services, mining, and food distribution. As long as Rodríguez (and by extension, the U.S.) guarantees these revenue streams and protects the “Generals of the Sun” from extradition, the military will support her.
• Fracture Risks: The military is not monolithic. While the top brass is wealthy and loyal to the status quo, the lower ranks are suffering from the same hunger and poverty as the civilian population.²⁰ Padrino sits atop a volcano of discontent. If the “Delcy Deal” fails to funnel money to the barracks, his ability to command the troops will evaporate.

3.3 The Civilian Technocrats (The Rodríguez Faction)

As detailed above, Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez represent the “soft” face of the regime. Their power lies in their utility to the international community. They are the only faction capable of negotiating the lifting of sanctions or the sale of oil without triggering immediate U.S. military retaliation. This makes them indispensable shields for the military and security figures who are too toxic to touch diplomatically. Their goal is survival: transforming Venezuela into an authoritarian capitalist state (similar to China or Vietnam) where they retain political control while opening the economy to Western investment.

4. The “Delcy Deal”: U.S. Strategy and the Opposition Snub

4.1 Stability Over Democracy

The most startling development of the post-Operation Absolute Resolve landscape is the Trump administration’s apparent sidelining of the democratic opposition in favor of working with the Rodríguez regime. This “Delcy Deal” represents a triumph of transactional realism over democratic idealism.

• The Logic: Washington calculates that dismantling the entire Chavista state would lead to anarchy, a refugee crisis of millions more, and a “Somalia on the Caribbean.” By co-opting the “moderate” (relatively speaking) civilian wing of the regime, the U.S. hopes to stabilize the country, secure oil flows, and slowly purge the most toxic elements (Cabello, Cuban intelligence).²²
• The Mechanism: The deal revolves around an “oil quarantine” combined with a specialized purchasing agreement. The U.S. will take 30-50 million barrels of Venezuelan crude, sell it at market rates, and hold the proceeds in escrow. This money is then released to the Rodríguez administration conditionally—for humanitarian aid, infrastructure repair, and potentially buying off military loyalty—giving the U.S. line-item veto power over the Venezuelan budget.²⁴

4.2 The Marginalization of María Corina Machado

María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner and the undisputed leader of the democratic opposition, has been effectively ghosted by the White House. Despite winning the opposition primaries and backing the rightful winner of the 2024 election (Edmundo González), she is viewed by the current U.S. administration as possessing “magical realism” thinking—expecting moral victory to translate into political power without the hard power to enforce it.²³

• Trump’s Assessment: The President’s dismissal of Machado (“She doesn’t have the support within… she doesn’t have the respect”) is a brutal realpolitik assessment. Without control of guns or oil, Machado is seen as a liability who might complicate the stabilization deal with the Chavista military.
• Machado’s Response: Her “Freedom Manifesto” and refusal to recognize Rodríguez highlight the widening chasm. She is now in the difficult position of supporting the U.S. military action that removed her enemy while being rejected by the U.S. political leadership that ordered it.²⁶

5. The First 100 Hours: Governance Under Siege (Jan 3-7, 2026)

The first week of the Rodríguez presidency provides a blueprint for her governance style: a hybrid of desperate diplomacy and intensified repression.

5.1 Diplomatic Double-Speak

Rodríguez has mastered the art of contradictory rhetoric to survive the initial shock of the decapitation.

• For the Base: She thunders against “imperialist aggression,” calls Maduro the “only president,” and demands his release. She demands “proof of life” for Maduro and Flores, framing the capture as a kidnapping. This is theater to pacify the hard core of Chavismo (approx. 15-20% of the population) and prevent a riot by the radical colectivos.⁹
• For Washington: Through backchannels (and confirmed by Trump), she signals total compliance. The willingness to hand over 50 million barrels of oil and accept U.S. oversight of the funds is a surrender of sovereignty that Maduro never fully countenanced. This pragmatism is her defining characteristic and her greatest asset in keeping the U.S. at bay.⁹

5.2 The Security Crackdown

To prevent an uprising during this moment of weakness, the regime has lashed out violently.

• Digital Siege: Police checkpoints have been established across Caracas where officers search civilians’ phones for anti-government messages or contacts with U.S. numbers.
• Colectivo Deployment: The use of irregulars to patrol Caracas neighborhoods (especially former opposition strongholds) is a terror tactic designed to freeze the population.
• Arrests: The detention of journalists and anyone celebrating the U.S. strike serves as a warning: the head is gone, but the body can still bite. At least 14 journalists have been detained in the first few days alone.¹⁸

5.3 Sequence of Events

The sequence of the first week illustrates the regime’s frantic pivot:

• Jan 3: Operation Absolute Resolve executes the strike. Delcy Rodríguez immediately denounces the “kidnapping” but private channels with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio are opened.
• Jan 4: The Supreme Tribunal of Justice orders Rodríguez to assume the presidency.
• Jan 5: Rodríguez is sworn in by her brother Jorge.
• Jan 6: President Trump announces the oil deal, revealing the depth of Rodríguez’s cooperation, while she simultaneously continues public denunciations of the “empire”.⁹

6. The Oil Question: Loot, Leverage, and Logistics

The “oil quarantine” and the proposed U.S. control of Venezuelan revenues is the economic engine of the new status quo. However, the practicalities are daunting and rife with technical hurdles.

6.1 Infrastructure Reality: Reserves vs. Production

Venezuela possesses the world’s largest proven reserves (300+ billion barrels), primarily extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Belt. However, production has collapsed from over 3 million barrels per day (bpd) in the late 1990s to under 800,000 bpd at the time of the strike.³¹

• Diluent Dependency: The crude from the Orinoco Belt is tar-like and cannot flow through pipelines without being mixed with diluents (naphtha). Venezuela previously imported these diluents from Iran or Russia. The U.S. blockade and “quarantine” cut these sources off. For the U.S. plan to work, Washington must now supply the very chemicals needed to extract the oil, creating a closed-loop dependency.³³
• Degraded Facilities: Refineries like the Paraguaná Refining Complex are operating at a fraction of capacity due to years of mismanagement, brain drain, and theft. Ramping up production to the millions of barrels Trump envisions will take billions in investment and years of physical reconstruction.³²

6.2 The Inventory Sale

The “30-50 million barrels” that President Trump announced Venezuela would “turn over” likely refers to existing inventory sitting in storage tanks, which had been unsellable due to sanctions. This is a one-time liquidation of assets, not a sustainable production model. Moving this oil requires a fleet of tankers and a secure coastal environment—neither of which is guaranteed given the threat of sabotage by pro-Maduro elements or rogue colectivos loyal to Cabello.²⁴

6.3 Corporate Hesitance

While Trump claims U.S. oil majors (Chevron, Exxon, ConocoPhillips) will “go in and rebuild,” the companies are reacting with extreme caution.

• Legal Risk: Exxon and ConocoPhillips have arbitration awards worth billions against Venezuela for past expropriations under Hugo Chávez. They will not return without ironclad legal guarantees, debt repayment structures, and protection from future nationalization.
• Security Risk: Investing billions in infrastructure that could be blown up by a rogue faction of the National Guard is a fiduciary nightmare. Chevron, which already has a footprint in the country via its joint ventures with PDVSA, remains the only likely immediate actor, serving as the bridge for this new policy.³⁵

7. The Opposition’s Dilemma and the “Freedom Manifesto”

The U.S. pivot to Rodríguez has left the democratic opposition in a “sovereignty trap.” They celebrated the removal of the dictator but are now excluded from the reconstruction, creating a crisis of relevance for the movement that won the 2024 elections.

7.1 The Freedom Manifesto

María Corina Machado’s “Freedom Manifesto” is an attempt to regain narrative control. It outlines a “First 100 Hours” and “First 100 Days” plan focused on:

• Restoring the Rule of Law: Dismantling the TSJ and irregular armed groups.
• Humanitarian Emergency: Immediate food/medicine influx.
• Economic Liberalization: Privatization of state industries and the return of property rights.

However, without U.S. backing, this remains a theoretical document. The manifesto’s reliance on “natural rights” and moral arguments clashes with the Trump administration’s transactional approach. The opposition is now fighting a two-front war: against the remains of the Chavista state and against the indifference of their former primary ally, the United States.³⁷

7.2 The Risk of Irrelevance and the Diaspora

By snubbing Machado, the U.S. risks alienating the 70% of Venezuelans who voted for the opposition. If the “Delcy Deal” fails to improve living conditions rapidly, the population may turn against both the regime and the U.S. intervention. Furthermore, the 8 million Venezuelans in the diaspora are watching closely. Their remittances are a lifeline for the economy. If they perceive the U.S. deal as propping up the dictatorship under a new name, they may reduce support, furthering economic collapse. Machado serves as the voice of this frustrated, potentially anti-American nationalism—a dangerous reversal of traditional roles where the opposition was the pro-U.S. faction.²³

8. International Fallout

The operation has sent shockwaves through the international community, realigning alliances in the region.

• Russia and China: Both nations have lost their primary interlocutor (Maduro) and face the potential loss of billions in loans and assets if the U.S. controls the oil revenue. Their condemnation has been swift, but their ability to project power to save the regime is limited by the U.S. naval blockade.⁴
• Regional Powers: Brazil (Lula) and Colombia (Petro) have expressed grave concern over the precedent of U.S. military intervention. However, they are also pragmatic; if Rodríguez stabilizes the country and prevents a new refugee wave, they will likely accommodate the new reality, prioritizing border stability over ideological solidarity with the fallen Maduro.³⁹

9. Future Roadmap: What Must She Do?

To answer the core query: Does Delcy Rodríguez have the political clout to keep Venezuela from falling into chaos? Currently, no. She has the position, but not the power. Her survival depends on borrowing power from the U.S. (financial) and the Military (coercive). She acts as the liquidator of the Bolivarian Revolution—managing its bankruptcy receivership under U.S. supervision.

9.1 Short-Term Imperatives (First 90 Days)

1. Purge the Spoiler: She must neutralize Diosdado Cabello. This cannot be done politically; it likely requires a U.S.-assisted move to arrest or exile him. As long as he controls the gun-toting colectivos, her presidency is a hostage situation.
2. Deliver the Cash: She must operationalize the oil deal immediately. The military needs to be paid. If the flow of dollars (via the U.S. escrow accounts) halts, the barracks will revolt.
3. Performative Sovereignty: She must continue to denounce the U.S. publicly while cooperating privately. If she appears too subservient too quickly, she risks a nationalist coup from the lower ranks of the military.

9.2 Long-Term Challenges (1-3 Years)

1. The Transition Trap: The U.S. goal is an eventual transition. Rodríguez’s goal is indefinite survival. This divergence will eventually cause a rupture. She must either engineer a “managed democracy” (fake elections that satisfy the U.S. minimums) or fully consolidate a new dictatorship.
2. Economic Reconstruction: She must pivot the economy away from the pure kleptocracy of Maduro to a functioning state capitalism. This requires reigning in the corruption that buys her support—a catch-22.
3. The Migration Valve: If she stabilizes the economy, some of the diaspora may return, bringing capital. If she fails, the exodus will accelerate, destabilizing the entire region and angering her U.S. patrons.

10. Conclusion

The capture of Nicolás Maduro has decapitated the snake, but the venom remains in the body. Delcy Rodríguez is a capable, ruthless operator, but she is sitting on a throne of bayonets. Her “clout” is artificial, constructed entirely of U.S. leverage and military necessity. For now, Venezuela has traded a chaotic dictatorship for a precarious, U.S.-managed interregnum. The chaos has not ended; it has merely been paused.

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25. FACT SHEET: President Trump is Restoring Prosperity, Safety and Security for the United States and Venezuela | Department of Energy, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-president-trump-restoring-prosperity-safety-and-security-united-states-and
26. Maria Machado praises Trump for his ‘courageous visions’ and ‘historical actions’, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.denvergazette.com/2026/01/06/maria-machado-praises-trump-for-his-courageous-visions-and-historical-actions/
27. María Corina Machado vows to return to Venezuela and rejects rule of Maduro’s deputy, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/06/maria-corina-machado-vows-return-venezuela-rejects-rule-maduro-deputy-delcy-rodriguez
28. Venezuela’s Interim Leader Strikes Defiant Tone After Trump’s Threats: ‘My Destiny Is Decided Only by God’, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.latintimes.com/venezuelas-interim-leader-strikes-defiant-tone-after-trumps-threats-my-destiny-decided-only-593329
29. DHS wants Venezuelans to return home, but fears remain as long as Maduro regime is in power – OPB, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.opb.org/article/2026/01/07/dhs-wants-venezuelans-to-return-home-but-fears-intensify-as-maduro-regime-remains-in-power/
30. accessed January 7, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_strikes_in_Venezuela#:~:text=On%203%20January%202026%2C%20the,and%20his%20wife%20Cilia%20Flores.
31. Trump says US companies will invest billions in Venezuelan oil production. Experts aren’t so sure, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/06/trump-oil-companies-venezuela
32. Trump claims Venezuela is set for an oil boom after US attack – history points to a bumpy road ahead, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/07/trump-venezuela-oil-regime-after-maduro
33. The Implications of U.S. Action in Venezuela on the Energy and Critical Minerals Sector, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.bhfs.com/insight/the-implications-of-u-s-action-in-venezuela-on-the-energy-and-critical-minerals-sector/
34. Rubio Details Ambitious Venezuela Plan, Claims No Cost to U.S., accessed January 7, 2026, https://time.com/7344479/venezuela-oil-rubio-trump/
35. Venezuela oil industry too shaky for U.S. companies to rush to re-enter, experts say, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/venezuela-oil-maduro-chevron-exxon-mobil-conocophiillips/
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40. U.S. capture of Maduro divides Latin America, thrilling Trump’s allies and threatening his foes, accessed January 7, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/us-capture-of-maduro-divides-latin-america-thrilling-trumps-allies-and-threatening-his-foes

Published: January 6, 2026

This is a time-sensitive special report and is based on information available as of January 6, 2026. Due to the situation being very dynamic the following report should be used to obtain a perspective but not viewed as an absolute.

1. Executive Summary: The Physics of State Decapitation

The Venezuelan state system, as of January 2026, has entered a phase of non-linear disequilibrium characterized by the rupture of its primary homeostatic control mechanism: the centralized executive authority of the Chavista hegemony. The United States military operation “Absolute Resolve,” executed on January 3, 2026, which resulted in the targeted extraction of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, has not merely removed a political leader; it has shattered the “Super-Warden” node that arbitrated the complex, competitive equilibrium between the military, criminal syndicates, and ideological factions.

This report employs a rigorous Systems-Dynamic Framework to model the trajectory of the Venezuelan state over the next 36 months (2026–2029). By treating the state not as a static bureaucracy but as a complex adaptive system defined by stocks (legitimacy, oil revenue, infrastructure capacity) and flows (migration, capital flight, violence), we project a trajectory that deviates significantly from the optimistic “democratic transition” narratives prevalent in Washington policy circles.

The central finding of this analysis is that the removal of the apex leader does not dismantle the underlying autopoietic structure of the regime. Instead, it removes the central dampening mechanism for centrifugal forces, accelerating the system toward a state of “Fragmented Warlordism” (Scenario B, 65% Probability). While the “Trump Plan” to utilize US oil majors for reconstruction introduces a theoretical stabilizing inflow of capital, the system’s physical and legal constraints—specifically the degradation of heavy crude upgraders, the $150 billion debt overhang, and the entrenchment of the Tren de Aragua—create massive frictional resistance.

The system is currently dominated by a reinforcing feedback loop of instability (R1), where the vacuum of central authority incentivizes the commodification of violence by the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) and non-state actors. Without a massive, sustained exogenous injection of capital and security—exceeding current US commitments—the model predicts a fracturing of the state into semi-autonomous criminal fiefdoms by Q4 2027.

2. System Initial Conditions: The “Absolute Resolve” Inflection Point

2.1 The Operational Shock and the “Authority Vacuum”

The trajectory of the Venezuelan state cannot be accurately modeled without a precise accounting of the kinetic energy introduced into the system by Operation Absolute Resolve.¹ This was not a standard diplomatic pressure campaign but a high-intensity military shock. On January 3, 2026, the United States deployed over 150 aircraft to conduct precision strikes across northern Venezuela, targeting air defense systems, command and control nodes, and the Ft. Tiuna military installation.²

The operation resulted in significant systemic disruption. Venezuelan officials reported over 80 casualties, including 32 Cuban military and intelligence personnel.³ This specific targeting of the Cuban apparatus is a critical system variable; for two decades, Cuban counterintelligence served as the “nervous system” of the Maduro regime, monitoring loyalty and preventing coups. Its degradation creates an immediate “blindness” within the remaining regime structure, making internal coordination exponentially more difficult.

The extraction of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores created an immediate “Authority Vacuum.” In systems terms, Maduro was not merely a head of state but the “Key Administrator” of the complex web of patronage that kept the military and criminal syndicates in alignment. His removal releases these constituent elements to pursue localized Nash equilibriums—optimizing for their own survival rather than the stability of the central state. The result is an immediate oscillation of power, where orders are issued by the interim government but execution is contingent on the idiosyncratic calculations of local commanders.⁴

2.2 The “Dual-Executive” Dilemma

The system currently suffers from a “Dual-Executive” dissonance that paralyzes decision-making.

• The De Facto Interim Executive: Delcy Rodríguez, the former Vice President, has assumed the presidency.⁵ Her authority is derived from the remnants of the 1999 Constitution and the acquiescence of the Padrino López military faction. However, her legitimacy is severely compromised by her previous role as a core pillar of the Maduro autocracy and her precarious need to appease the United States to avoid her own prosecution.
• The Neo-Trusteeship Executive: The US administration, led by President Donald Trump, has asserted a form of neo-trusteeship, claiming the US will “run” Venezuela temporarily until a transition is managed.⁷ This claim, devoid of clear international legal standing, acts as a “System Override” signal. It emboldens US-aligned actors but triggers a fierce nationalist immune response from the deep state and the populace, complicating any collaborative governance.⁸

This duality creates a chaotic signal environment. Bureaucrats, military officers, and oil executives are receiving conflicting directives: one set prioritizing national sovereignty and resistance (from the hardline Chavista base), and another prioritizing compliance with US dictates to secure amnesty and investment (from the Rodríguez/US channel).

3. The Political Subsystem: Governance and Legitimacy Dynamics

3.1 The Rodríguez Interregnum: Balancing on the Razor’s Edge

The political subsystem is currently defined by the “Rodríguez Pivot.” Delcy Rodríguez is attempting to execute a maneuver with a historically high failure rate: transitioning from a pariah regime deputy to a US-approved transitional leader while retaining the loyalty of the revolutionary base. Her survival depends on balancing two opposing feedback loops.

The Appeasement Loop (External)

Rodríguez has signaled a willingness to “collaborate” with the Trump administration, dialing down anti-imperialist rhetoric to avoid the “very big price” threatened by the US President.⁶ This loop is driven by personal survival. To maintain this loop, she must deliver tangible results to Washington: specifically, the extradition of other high-value targets (potential rivals) and the total opening of the oil sector to US firms. However, every step in this direction weakens her position in the internal loyalty loop.

The Loyalty Loop (Internal)

The PSUV (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) and the FANB are built on a foundational mythos of anti-American resistance. Rodríguez’s collaboration is viewed by the colectivos (armed pro-government gangs) and ideological hardliners as a betrayal.³ The system predicts that as she moves closer to the US position to release sanctions pressure, the risk of an internal coup or assassination by hardliners increases exponentially. The “Loyalty Stock” is depleting rapidly, and without Maduro’s personal connection to the rank-and-file, Rodríguez lacks the charisma to replenish it.

3.2 The Marginalization of the Democratic Opposition

A counter-intuitive finding of this systems analysis is the structural marginalization of the democratic opposition, despite the removal of their primary antagonist. María Corina Machado, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate and undisputed leader of the opposition electorate, finds herself in a “Success to the Successful” trap where the US administration has bypassed her in favor of a pragmatic deal with the existing regime structure.¹⁰

The US administration’s calculation appears to be that the Chavista state apparatus is too deeply entrenched to be dismantled by an outsider like Machado without triggering a civil war. Therefore, they have opted for a “decapitation and co-optation” strategy—removing the head but keeping the body (Rodríguez) to maintain order.¹² This leaves Machado and her proxy, Edmundo González Urrutia, with high moral legitimacy but zero operational control.

Machado’s rejection of Rodríguez ¹³ places the opposition outside the primary decision-making loop. Unless the opposition can mobilize mass street protests that threaten the stability of the Rodríguez interregnum—a high-risk strategy given the potential for violence from colectivos—their influence on the system’s state variables will remain low in the short term (Q1-Q2 2026). The risk here is political radicalization; finding themselves shut out by both the regime and their supposed US allies, elements of the opposition may turn to disruptive tactics, further destabilizing the system.

4. The Economic-Energy Subsystem: The Inertia of Decay

4.1 The “Trump Plan” vs. Physical Reality

The core stabilizing mechanism proposed by the US administration—the “Trump Plan”—relies on the premise that US oil majors (Chevron, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips) will rapidly recapitalize the Venezuelan energy sector, utilizing future oil revenues to reimburse costs and stabilize the economy.¹⁴ However, a detailed audit of the “Stock of Infrastructure” reveals that this plan faces massive physical and temporal friction.

The State of Degradation

The Venezuelan oil industry is in a state of advanced entropy. Production has collapsed from a peak of 3.5 million b/d in the late 1990s to approximately 934,000 b/d in late 2025.¹⁶ This decline is not merely a function of policy but of physical corrosion.

• The Pipeline Crisis: The transport network, consisting of 25 operational pipelines, has not seen significant upgrades in 50 years. It suffers from daily spills and catastrophic integrity failures.¹⁸ Moving increased volumes through this vascular system without massive prior repairs invites environmental disaster and operational stoppages.
• The Upgrader Bottleneck: Venezuela’s reserves are primarily extra-heavy crude from the Orinoco Belt, which resembles asphalt. To be exportable, this crude must be processed in massive “upgraders” or blended with imported diluents.¹⁷ Most of these upgraders are currently offline or operating at a fraction of capacity due to a lack of spare parts and maintenance. Restarting them is not a matter of turning a key; it requires a complex industrial commissioning process that takes 12-18 months.

The Investment Gap

Industry analysts estimate that restoring production to 3 million b/d would require an investment of approximately $183 billion over 15 years.²⁰ To simply arrest the decline and hold production flat requires $53 billion. The “Trump Plan” suggests US companies will front this capital. However, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips have outstanding arbitration claims against Venezuela totaling billions from previous expropriations.²¹ It is highly improbable that boards of directors will authorize new billions in capital expenditure without a settled legal framework and the resolution of past debts.

4.2 The Debt Trap and Creditor Dynamics

The economic subsystem is heavily constrained by the “Debt Stock,” estimated between $150 billion and $170 billion.²¹ This creates a powerful Balancing Loop (B2): Any increase in oil revenue immediately triggers claims from a diverse array of creditors, draining the capital available for reinvestment or social spending.

This debt structure functions as a “poison pill” for the recovery:

• Bondholders: Approximately $60 billion is owed to bondholders who have been unpaid since the 2017 default.²³
• Arbitration Awards: Billions are owed to companies like Crystallex and ConocoPhillips, who have legal judgments allowing them to seize Venezuelan assets abroad (e.g., Citgo).
• China’s Leverage: China is owed approximately $12 billion and is the main buyer of Venezuelan crude.¹⁹ This debt is serviced through oil-for-loan swaps. If the US redirects Venezuelan oil exports to the Gulf Coast to feed US refineries, China loses its repayment mechanism. This creates a geopolitical flashpoint; Beijing could retaliate by halting maintenance on the Chinese-built infrastructure that underpins much of Venezuela’s current grid or by exercising diplomatic vetoes at the UN.²⁵

4.3 The Legal Quagmire

Restructuring this debt is a prerequisite for large-scale capital entry, but the process is historically slow. The “odious debt” argument (that the debt was incurred by a corrupt regime) creates legal uncertainty. A comprehensive restructuring would likely take 18-24 months, during which time Venezuela would remain locked out of international capital markets.²⁴ Consequently, the “petro-state” recovery engine will remain stalled in neutral for the first half of the forecast period (2026–2027).

5. The Security Subsystem: Fragmented Sovereignty and Warlordism

5.1 The Loyalty Metrics of the FANB

The Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) are not a monolithic professional military but a conglomerate of interest groups held together by a system of patronage, mutual surveillance, and shared criminal liability. The removal of Maduro disrupts this cohesion, leading to a “loyalty liquidity crisis.”

The “Loyalty Stock” was previously maintained through the distribution of illicit rents. With Maduro gone and the US scrutinizing financial flows, the incentive structure fractures.

• The Upper Echelon (The Generalato): This group, particularly the Generals and Admirals, is heavily implicated in the Cartel of the Suns (drug trafficking) and human rights abuses.²⁶ Their dominant strategy is survival. They face a prisoner’s dilemma: defect to the US early in exchange for leniency, or entrench and fight to protect their assets. The US designation of the Tren de Aragua and other groups as FTOs signals a hardline approach that may back the Generalato into a corner, making them “spoilers” who have no path to a dignified exit.
• The Mid-Level Officers: Facing economic hardship and demoralization, with many earning poverty wages ²⁸, this stratum is susceptible to bribery or mutiny. However, without a clear alternative leader (since Machado is sidelined), their dissatisfaction is likely to manifest as desertion rather than a coordinated coup.
• The Lower Ranks: Often malnourished and ill-equipped ²⁸, the rank-and-file are the most volatile element. High desertion rates are expected, with many former soldiers likely to sell their skills to criminal syndicates for survival.

5.2 The Rise of Criminal Governance

As the state’s central authority recedes, a phenomenon of “Fragmented Sovereignty” emerges. The state no longer holds a monopoly on violence; instead, it competes with powerful non-state actors who control territory and populations.

The Tren de Aragua (TdA) as a Proto-State

The Tren de Aragua has evolved from a prison gang into a transnational criminal organization with a footprint extending to the US.²⁹ The US government’s designation of TdA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) ³⁰ fundamentally alters the conflict landscape. This is no longer a law enforcement issue; it is a counter-terrorism conflict. TdA controls local economies, extorts businesses, and manages migration routes. In the absence of a strong central state, TdA is likely to deepen its territorial control, effectively governing barrios and border towns, providing “security” and social services in exchange for loyalty—a classic warlord model.

The Mining Arc (Arco Minero)

In the resource-rich south (Bolívar and Amazonas states), gold mining is controlled by a toxic mix of military units (operating autonomously), ELN guerrillas, and criminal syndicates.³² This region operates almost independently of Caracas, functioning as a “state within a state.” The illicit gold trade generates an estimated $2-3 billion annually, funds that bypass the national treasury and sustain these armed groups.³³ With the central government distracted by the transition in Caracas, these groups will consolidate their hold, creating “no-go zones” for the US-backed administration.

5.3 System Leakage: The Resource Diversion

A critical system failure is the diversion of national resources away from state recovery and into the hands of these non-state actors and creditors. The flow of value in the Venezuelan system is currently bifurcated:

• Legitimate Flows: Oil revenues are heavily encumbered by debt service to China and bondholders. What little remains is often absorbed by corruption or the opaque financial structures of the “Anti-Blockade Law.”
• Illicit Flows: The wealth generated from the Mining Arc (gold, coltan) and the drug trade flows directly to criminal syndicates (TdA, ELN) and corrupt military factions. This capital does not contribute to national reconstruction; instead, it finances the very groups that undermine state authority.
  This dynamic creates a “Resource Drain” where the state is starved of the capital needed to rebuild its institutions, while its internal enemies are well-funded and resilient.

6. The Geopolitical Subsystem: Regional and Global Pressures

6.1 The “Neighborhood Effect”: Colombia and Brazil

The US intervention has generated acute anxiety and instability in Venezuela’s immediate neighbors, creating a “Geopolitical Bounding Box” that constrains the new government.

Colombia: The Risk of Spillover

Colombia, under President Gustavo Petro, has taken a highly confrontational stance. Petro has threatened to “take up arms again” if the US intervenes in Colombia, viewing the attack on Maduro as a prelude to a broader imperialist campaign.34 This is not merely rhetoric; Colombia has deployed 30,000 troops to the border.35

• The Insurgency Risk: The border region is a sanctuary for Colombian armed groups like the ELN and FARC dissidents (Segunda Marquetalia). These groups have historically enjoyed safe haven in Venezuela. A hostile relationship between Bogotá and the US-backed Caracas government could lead Petro to turn a blind eye to these groups using Colombian territory to launch attacks into Venezuela, destabilizing the Rodríguez regime.
• Diplomatic Isolation: Colombia’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the US intervention complicates logistics for humanitarian aid and diplomatic normalization.

Brazil: The Containment Strategy

President Lula da Silva has condemned the US action as crossing an “unacceptable line”.36 Brazil’s primary concern is the destabilization of the Amazon region and a new wave of refugees. Brazil is likely to pursue a policy of “containment,” reinforcing its borders and seeking to insulate itself from the Venezuelan chaos rather than actively engaging in reconstruction.

6.2 The Great Power Proxy War

While Russia and China have shown “calculated restraint” militarily, avoiding a direct confrontation with the US ³⁷, they serve as powerful asymmetric balancers.

• Asymmetric Response: Russia may utilize its remaining intelligence assets and cyber capabilities to disrupt US operations or support anti-US insurgent factions. The goal would be to mire the US in a “quagmire” that drains American resources and political capital.
• Financial Warfare: China’s leverage as a major creditor is significant. By demanding strict adherence to debt repayment schedules or utilizing lawfare to seize assets, Beijing can effectively block the financial rehabilitation of the Venezuelan state.²⁵ This “debt weaponization” can strangle the interim government’s liquidity, preventing it from delivering the social goods necessary to quell unrest.

6.3 International Law and Legitimacy

The intervention faces a severe legitimacy deficit at the United Nations. The Security Council meeting on January 5, 2026, highlighted the deep divisions, with the Secretary-General warning of a “dangerous precedent”.³⁸ This lack of international consensus means that the US-led reconstruction effort will lack the imprimatur of the UN, complicating the involvement of international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) and European allies who are wary of endorsing “regime change by force.”

7. The Social Subsystem: Humanitarian Crisis and Migration

7.1 The Humanitarian Baseline

The social fabric of Venezuela is tattered. The ENCOVI survey data indicates that multidimensional poverty remains high, with significant portions of the population suffering from food insecurity and a collapse of public services.⁴⁰ The humanitarian need is quantified at 7.9 million people requiring urgent assistance.⁴²

7.2 The “Expectation Shock” and Migration

The social subsystem is currently driven by a volatile variable: Public Expectation. The US intervention has generated a surge of hope among some sectors of the population that “rescue” has arrived. However, the structural lags described in Section 4 mean that material conditions (electricity, water, food prices) will not improve immediately—and may arguably worsen in the short term due to transition chaos.

When the “Trump Plan” fails to deliver instant prosperity in Q2 2026, this “Expectation Shock” is likely to transmute into despair and anger. The result will be a reactivation of the Migration Pump.

• The Mechanism: Economic despair drives migration -> Loss of human capital (doctors, engineers, teachers) -> Further degradation of state services -> Increased despair.
• The Forecast: We project a renewed outflow of 1-2 million Venezuelans over the next 24 months, straining the already saturated capacities of Colombia, Brazil, and the US border. This creates a feedback loop where the loss of “human infrastructure” makes the physical reconstruction of the state impossible, creating a “Poverty Trap.”

8. Dynamic Modeling: 36-Month Forecast Scenarios (2026–2029)

Based on the complex interaction of the political, economic, security, and geopolitical subsystems, we present three probabilistic scenarios for the Venezuelan state trajectory.

Scenario A: The “Petro-State Restoration” (Probability: 15%)

• Mechanism: Delcy Rodríguez successfully transitions the PSUV into a nationalist-corporatist party, effectively purging the criminal elements in the military. The US provides massive bridge loans and legal shields against creditors. Oil majors rush in, rapidly repairing key facilities.
• Outcome: Oil production hits 2 million b/d by 2028. Social unrest is managed through renewed subsidies funded by oil rents. Venezuela becomes a stable, authoritarian client state of the US (analogous to Egypt).
• Why it is Unlikely: This scenario assumes a level of administrative competence and capital deployment that contradicts the historical record (e.g., Iraq, Libya) and ignores the massive friction of the $150bn debt and infrastructure decay.

Scenario B: “Fragmented Warlordism” (Probability: 65%)

• Mechanism: The central government in Caracas retains control over the capital, the main ports, and the coastal oil terminals, but effectively loses authority over the interior. The “Authority Vacuum” is filled by local power brokers.
• Outcome:

• Caracas: Ruled by a weak interim government dependent on US security guarantees.
• The Hinterland: Ruled by a patchwork of ELN, FARC dissidents, and military warlords controlling gold mines and drug routes.
• Oil Sector: Production recovers modestly (to ~1.2 million b/d) but is plagued by sabotage, theft, and extortion by criminal groups in the producing regions.
• Society: Continued high migration as security collapses in the provinces.
• System Logic: The Reinforcing Failure Loop (Weak State -> Warlordism -> Resource Diversion) dominates the Stabilization Loop. This is the “Libya Model” or the “Mexico Cartel Model.”

Scenario C: “The Quagmire / Insurgency” (Probability: 20%)

• Mechanism: Hardline Chavistas and military units, fearing prosecution and viewing the US presence as an occupation, coalesce into a coherent insurgency. They are supported covertly by Russia and Iran with weapons and intelligence.
• Outcome: Asymmetric warfare against US assets and oil infrastructure. Pipelines are blown up; US personnel are targeted. The “Trump Plan” collapses as oil companies refuse to invest in a war zone. US troops are drawn into a long-term counter-insurgency mission.
• System Logic: The “Occupier’s Dilemma” – increased US presence generates increased nationalist resistance, fueling the insurgency.

9. Conclusion: The Limits of Kinetic Intervention

The systems analysis of the post-Maduro landscape leads to a sobering conclusion: the Venezuelan state is currently in a trajectory of managed disintegration. The removal of the autocrat has not removed the autocracy’s structural pathologies; it has merely decentralized them.

The “Decapitation Strategy” employed by the US was a tactical success but a strategic gamble. By removing the central node of the system without having a viable, pre-positioned replacement architecture (like a unified opposition government with military support), the intervention has triggered a chaotic phase transition. The most likely outcome is not a swift return to democracy or a boom in oil production, but a prolonged period of “Fragmented Warlordism” where the state exists in name only, and power is brokered at the barrel of a gun—whether held by a US marine, a Venezuelan soldier, or a Tren de Aragua gangster.

For the international community and investors, the “Buy” signal on Venezuela is premature. The risks of asset seizure, violence, and legal paralysis remain extreme. The path to a stable equilibrium is measured not in months, but in decades.

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