Tag Archives: Russian

The history of Soviet and, subsequently, Russian small arms development over the past century is often dominated by the towering success of the Kalashnikov platform. However, to fully comprehend the reasons for the AK’s enduring dominance, one must study not only its triumphs but also the numerous ambitious, innovative, and sometimes bizarre projects that failed to supplant it. These failures, far from being mere historical footnotes, are crucial for understanding the foundational philosophy that has guided Soviet and Russian weapons procurement for generations. This philosophy can be best described as the “Doctrine of Sufficient Excellence.”

Forged in the crucible of the Second World War and solidified during the Cold War, this doctrine is not a formal written mandate but an ingrained institutional mindset. It prioritizes a specific hierarchy of characteristics for a general-issue infantry weapon. At the apex is absolute reliability under the most adverse conditions imaginable—mud, sand, ice, and neglect.¹ Following closely are simplicity of operation, enabling a vast, conscript-based army to achieve basic proficiency with minimal training, and ease of mass production, allowing for rapid armament and replacement during a large-scale conflict.¹ Ergonomic refinement, modularity, and even exceptional accuracy, while desirable, are considered secondary attributes. A weapon is deemed “sufficiently excellent” when it perfectly fulfills these primary requirements, even if it is surpassed by competitors in other metrics.

This report will analyze a selection of key Soviet and Russian small arms projects that are considered failures. A project is categorized as a “failure” not necessarily because it was a technically deficient weapon in isolation, but because it violated one or more of the core tenets of this doctrine without offering a sufficiently compelling, game-changing advantage to justify the deviation. Through an examination of these case studies, we will explore projects that were too complex for their time, too radical for their military culture, too expensive for their economy, or doctrinally misaligned with the realities of the Soviet and Russian way of war.

Part I: The Pre-Kalashnikov Era – Forging a Doctrine in Steel and Fire

Before the Kalashnikov became the defining symbol of Soviet military might, the Red Army’s small arms development was characterized by ambitious experimentation. This period produced some of the world’s first examples of modern weapon concepts, but it also provided harsh, formative lessons that would directly shape the stringent requirements for all future infantry arms.

Case Study: The AVS-36 Automatic Rifle

The Avtomaticheskaya Vintovka Simonova obraztsa 1936 goda (AVS-36) stands as a landmark of firearms history, being one of the world’s first select-fire infantry rifles to be formally adopted for military service.³ Designed by Sergei Simonov, it represented a technologically bold leap for the Red Army in the 1930s, promising to equip the individual soldier with the firepower of a machine gun in the form of a standard rifle. However, its service life would prove to be a brief and cautionary tale.

Technical Flaws

The AVS-36 was a gas-operated rifle chambered in the powerful 7.62x54mmR cartridge. Its ambition was matched only by its mechanical complexity. The operating mechanism was intricate, utilizing a short piston stroke and a vertically sliding locking block that was highly susceptible to fouling.3 The very construction of the rifle, with its numerous openings and moving parts, was an invitation for dirt and debris to enter the action, a critical flaw for a weapon intended for frontline infantry use.3 Russian sources note that the rifle suffered from a fragile receiver and a problematic bolt group, further compromising its field-worthiness.4 It was also notoriously “fickle” regarding ammunition quality, a significant liability for an army that prioritized logistical simplicity.3

Operational Failure (The Winter War)

The AVS-36’s baptism by fire came during the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts and, most significantly, the 1939-1940 Winter War against Finland. It was in the brutal, sub-zero conditions of the Karelian Isthmus that the rifle’s design deficiencies became catastrophically apparent. Many rifles were shipped to the front still coated in their thick, cosmoline-like storage grease. In the extreme cold, this grease “froze” solid, rendering the complex actions of the rifles completely inoperable.3 This single issue, born of a combination of poor logistical preparation and a design intolerant of such neglect, crippled the weapon’s effectiveness.

Furthermore, while the rifle’s large muzzle brake was quite effective at mitigating muzzle climb, the sheer, intense recoil impulse of the full-power 7.62x54mmR cartridge made automatic fire wildly impractical.³ The weapon was virtually uncontrollable in full-auto, negating its primary conceptual advantage over bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles. The intended doctrine of using automatic fire to repulse sudden attacks was largely a fantasy, as soldiers could not keep their sights on target.⁵

Political and Logistical Demise

The AVS-36’s poor performance did not go unnoticed. A competing design by Fedor Tokarev, the SVT-38, was also adopted and, while not without its own initial flaws, was considered a sturdier and more reliable weapon.3 A politicized dispute arose within the Soviet elite, and Simonov’s design, seen as lighter but more fragile, lost out.3 Production of the AVS-36 was terminated in 1940 after a run of approximately 35,000 to 65,000 units, and the rifle was rapidly withdrawn from service, with many captured examples being used by Finnish forces.3

The failure of the AVS-36 was a pivotal moment in the formation of Soviet small arms doctrine. It was a brutal, real-world lesson that advanced features and theoretical advantages are utterly worthless if they come at the expense of fundamental reliability in the hands of a conscript soldier under the worst possible conditions. The Red Army’s experience in Finland, where the simple, crude, but utterly dependable PPSh-41 submachine gun proved devastatingly effective, stood in stark contrast to the failure of the complex AVS-36. The Soviet command learned that the ideal infantry weapon was not the one with the most features, but the one that always worked. This experience directly shaped the non-negotiable requirements for simplicity and reliability in the post-war trials that would ultimately produce the AK-47. The AVS-36 had to fail so the Kalashnikov could succeed.

Part II: The Shadow of the AK – Challenging an Icon

Following the adoption of the AK-47, Soviet small arms design entered a new era. The Kalashnikov was not just a rifle; it was the physical embodiment of the Doctrine of Sufficient Excellence. It became the benchmark against which all future designs would be judged. Any potential replacement would not only have to be better, but so overwhelmingly superior that it could justify the monumental cost of replacing an entire, established ecosystem.

Case Study: The TKB-517 – The Technically Superior Contender

In the mid-1950s, the Soviet military initiated a competition to find a replacement for the original milled-receiver AK-47. The primary objectives were to develop a weapon that was cheaper and faster to produce using modern stamped-steel manufacturing techniques, and to improve upon the AK-47’s notoriously poor controllability during automatic fire.⁶ The two main finalists in this contest were Mikhail Kalashnikov’s modernized prototype, which would become the AKM, and a highly refined rifle from the Tula design bureau, the TKB-517, designed by the brilliant German A. Korobov.⁶

Technical Analysis

Externally, the TKB-517 bore a strong resemblance to the Kalashnikov, featuring a similar layout and construction from stamped steel with wood furniture.7 Internally, however, it was a completely different machine. Instead of the AK’s robust and simple long-stroke gas piston and rotating bolt, Korobov employed a sophisticated lever-delayed blowback mechanism based on the principles pioneered by Pál Király.7 This system used mechanical leverage to delay the rearward motion of the bolt, allowing chamber pressure to drop to safe levels before extraction. This method of operation offered several potential advantages, including a smoother recoil impulse and the elimination of the violent impacts characteristic of the AK’s gas system.

Performance in Trials

During extensive competitive trials, the TKB-517 demonstrated clear superiority over the Kalashnikov prototype in several key performance areas. Multiple sources, including Russian-language publications, confirm that Korobov’s rifle was significantly more accurate and controllable, especially during full-automatic fire.7 One report from the 1955 trials explicitly states that even poorly trained soldiers, firing in bursts from a supported position, achieved better results with the TKB-517 than with the proto-AKM.10 Furthermore, the TKB-517 was found to be more reliable, particularly in fine sand conditions where the AK’s open gas system was more vulnerable, and was also lighter and simpler (and therefore cheaper) to manufacture.7 By most objective metrics of the competition, the TKB-517 was the better rifle. One Russian source bluntly states that the AKM was “losing the competition”.10

Reasons for Rejection

Despite its demonstrated superiority, the TKB-517 was not selected. The decision was not based on a failure of the weapon itself, but on powerful institutional and logistical factors. The official justification cited the Soviet military’s existing familiarity and “greater proficiency” with the Kalashnikov’s manual of arms and operating system.7 The selection committee, faced with a choice between a superior but novel design and an evolutionary improvement of a known and trusted system, chose the latter.10 While a potential technical concern may have been the higher extraction pressure common to lever-delayed actions, the primary driver was institutional conservatism and logistical pragmatism.7

The rejection of the TKB-517 is the quintessential example of “procurement inertia.” The failure was not one of engineering, but of the rifle’s inability to overcome the immense industrial, training, and logistical ecosystem already built around the Kalashnikov. The Soviet Union had already invested heavily in the AK platform. Millions of soldiers were trained on its operation and maintenance. Armorers across the armed forces were experts in its service. Factories were tooled for its specific manufacturing processes. Adopting the TKB-517 would have necessitated a complete and costly overhaul of this entire system: new factory tooling, new training manuals and curricula for every soldier and armorer, and a completely separate supply chain for spare parts. The performance advantages offered by Korobov’s rifle, while real, were simply not great enough to justify the astronomical economic and logistical cost of replacing the entire, entrenched Kalashnikov ecosystem. The Soviet system chose the “good enough” evolutionary step (the AKM) over the “better” revolutionary one because the former was exponentially cheaper, faster, and less disruptive to implement on a national scale. This decision cemented the Kalashnikov’s dominance for decades to come.

Table 1: Comparative Performance Metrics: AKM vs. TKB-517 (c. 1955 Trials)

Feature	TKB-517 (Korobov)	AKM (Kalashnikov Prototype)
Action Type	Lever-Delayed Blowback	Gas-Operated, Rotating Bolt
Caliber	7.62×39mm	7.62×39mm
Weight (Unloaded)	3.18 kg ⁷	Heavier than TKB-517
Length	910 mm ⁷	Similar to TKB-517
Barrel Length	415 mm ⁷	415 mm
Rate of Fire	560 rounds/min ⁷	~600 rounds/min
Accuracy (Trials)	Superior to AKM, especially in full-auto ⁷	Inferior to TKB-517 ¹⁰
Reliability (Trials)	Superior to AKM, especially in sand ⁷	Met requirements, but less reliable than TKB-517 ¹²
Production Method	Stamped Steel	Stamped Steel
Production Cost	Lower than AKM ⁹	Higher than TKB-517 ⁹

Part III: The Avant-Garde – When Innovation Outpaces Doctrine

While the mainstream of Soviet arms development flowed conservatively down the path of the Kalashnikov, there were powerful undercurrents of radical innovation. Designers, often working in the relative obscurity of state design bureaus, explored concepts that were decades ahead of their time. These projects, while engineering marvels, almost invariably failed to gain traction, crashing against the rigid wall of Soviet military doctrine and technological readiness.

Case Study: German Korobov and the Bullpup Heresy (TKB-022PM)

German A. Korobov was perhaps the most prolific and visionary of the Soviet Union’s “unknown” weapons designers.¹⁴ While none of his designs were ever adopted for mass production, his work consistently pushed the boundaries of conventional firearm engineering.¹¹ His TKB-022PM series of assault rifles, developed in the 1960s as a potential competitor to the AKM, was his most radical and perhaps most brilliant creation.¹⁸

Radical Design

The TKB-022PM was a bullpup rifle, a configuration that places the action and magazine behind the trigger group to achieve a shorter overall weapon length without sacrificing barrel length.19 This was already a novel concept for the time, but Korobov’s design went much further. It utilized a vertically moving breechblock and an annular gas piston that encircled the barrel, allowing for an incredibly compact receiver group.18

Its most revolutionary feature, however, was its forward ejection system. A U-shaped rammer/extractor would chamber a round, and after firing, would pull the spent casing back and then push it forward and up into an ejection tube running parallel to and above the barrel. The casing would then exit from a port near the muzzle.¹⁸ This ingenious solution completely solved the primary drawback of most bullpup designs—the ejection of hot brass into the face of a left-handed shooter—making the TKB-022PM truly and effortlessly ambidextrous.¹⁸ This design gave the TKB-022PM the best barrel-length-to-overall-length ratio of any assault rifle of its era.¹⁸

Performance

The rifle’s performance in trials was exceptional. Firing from unstable positions, it demonstrated three times better accuracy than the standard-issue AKM.18 It was also remarkably light, with some variants weighing as little as

2.34 kg, thanks to its extensive use of Bakelite, an early polymer, for its housing.¹⁸

Reasons for Rejection

Despite its stellar performance, the TKB-022PM was rejected by the Soviet army for being “too radical”.18 The military establishment, deeply conservative in its approach to infantry weapons, was unwilling to embrace such a dramatic departure from the conventional layout of the Kalashnikov. Specific concerns were raised about the unfamiliar rearward balance of the bullpup design, and, critically, the long-term durability of the plastic housing under the harsh conditions of Soviet military service or during decades of strategic storage.18 One Russian source also suggests a more pragmatic reason for its rejection: at the time, small arms were considered an auxiliary component of the Soviet war machine, and the leadership decided that development funds were better spent on higher-priority systems like missiles and tanks.25

Case Study: The VAG-73 Caseless Pistol – A Technological Mirage

In 1973, a self-taught engineer named Vladimir Gerasimenko presented the authorities with a unique and ambitious project: the VAG-73, a select-fire machine pistol that used caseless ammunition.²⁶ This was not a state-sponsored program but a personal initiative, a testament to the innovative spirit present even within the rigid Soviet system.

Ambitious Technology

The VAG-73 was designed around a revolutionary ammunition concept. It fired a 7.62mm projectile that had no traditional brass or steel cartridge case. Instead, the propellant charge was pressed directly into a recess in the base of the steel bullet itself.26 Upon firing, the propellant was consumed entirely, eliminating the need for an extraction and ejection cycle. This technology is sometimes referred to as a “gyrojet” type, as the projectile is essentially a self-propelled rocket.28 To feed this unique ammunition, Gerasimenko designed a massive tandem magazine system, effectively two double-stack magazines welded together, giving the pistol an unheard-of 48-round capacity.26

Catastrophic Failure

The project was an unmitigated disaster. While conceptually brilliant, the underlying technology was simply not mature enough for a practical weapon. The VAG-73 was plagued with problems. It was extremely unreliable, overly complicated, and excessively heavy, weighing 1.2 kg—one and a half times more than the standard Makarov pistol it was intended to compete against.26 The caseless ammunition itself was the core of the problem. It was prohibitively expensive to manufacture and suffered from all the classic issues of early caseless designs: poor accuracy due to inconsistent propellant burn, low muzzle velocity, and a dangerous propensity for “cook-offs,” where residual heat in the chamber could prematurely ignite the exposed propellant of the next round.26 The weapon comprehensively failed what one analyst called the “Russia test”: it was finicky, demanded constant care, was difficult to disassemble and clean, and proved utterly non-durable.26 Only a single prototype was ever made, and the project led to no further developments.28

These two case studies perfectly illustrate the dual prerequisites for successful innovation within a conservative military structure: a clear doctrinal need and sufficient technological maturity. Korobov’s TKB-022PM was a brilliant solution to a problem—the need for a more compact infantry rifle—that the Soviet army, with its doctrine of massed infantry combat in open terrain, did not believe it had. There was no “doctrinal pull” to justify the risk of adopting a radical new layout. Furthermore, its reliance on polymers, while forward-thinking, was perceived as a liability by a military that trusted only steel and wood.¹⁸ The VAG-73, on the other hand, pursued the “holy grail” of caseless ammunition, but the fundamental science was not ready. The resulting weapon was a collection of unworkable compromises that failed to meet even the most basic requirements of a service firearm. Visionary engineering, in isolation, is not enough. Without a clear military requirement to justify the risk and cost of change, and without a mature industrial and material science base to reliably support the new design, even the most brilliant concepts are destined to remain museum pieces. German Korobov was ahead of his time; Vladimir Gerasimenko was ahead of his technology.

Part IV: Project “Abakan” – The Perilous Pursuit of Perfection

By the late 1970s, the Soviet military had adopted the AK-74 and its new 5.45x39mm cartridge. While the new rifle was an effective evolution of the Kalashnikov design, there was a growing concern that the accuracy of the average conscript soldier was insufficient for the modern battlefield. In 1978, the Ministry of Defense launched an ambitious research and development competition, codenamed “Abakan,” with a single, highly specific goal: to develop a new assault rifle with a combat effectiveness—primarily defined as hit probability—1.5 to 2 times greater than the AK-74, especially when firing in bursts from unstable positions.³² This narrow and demanding requirement spurred a wave of some of the most complex and mechanically ingenious rifle designs ever created.

Table 2: Key Finalists of the “Abakan” Competition

Feature	AN-94 (Nikonov)	AO-63 (Simonov & Tkachev)	TKB-0146 (Stechkin)
Core Technical Approach	Blowback Shifted Pulse (BBSP) with recoiling receiver, pulley, and cable ³⁶	Double-barreled, dual gas systems ³⁵	Recoil Impulse Displacement (carriage-mounted system) ³²
Burst Rate of Fire	1,800 rounds/min (2-round) ³⁶	6,000 rounds/min (2-round) ³⁷	High (unspecified, similar principle to AN-94) ³³
Key Strengths (Trials)	Excellent accuracy in 2-round burst, met core requirement ³⁸	Highly accurate, simple, and reliable according to reports ³⁷	Excellent accuracy, very low felt recoil ³³
Key Weaknesses	Extreme mechanical complexity, poor ergonomics, high cost ⁴⁰	Prohibitive production cost and complexity due to dual components ³⁵	High complexity, sensitivity to dirt ³⁴

Case Study: The AO-63 Double-Barreled Rifle

Of all the entries in the Abakan trials, the AO-63, designed by Sergei Simonov and Peter Tkachev, was perhaps the most direct and audacious solution to the accuracy problem.³⁷ Rather than attempting to manage the recoil of a single barrel, the designers simply added a second one.

A Brute-Force Solution

The AO-63 was a twin-barreled assault rifle, with two barrels mounted side-by-side in a single receiver.35 To function, this required a complete duplication of the core operating mechanism: two gas pistons, two rotating bolts, and two hammers, all working in concert.35 Its signature feature was a two-round burst mode that fired the barrels sequentially with a minuscule delay of just 0.01 seconds. This translated to a theoretical rate of fire of an astonishing 6,000 rounds per minute.37 The design philosophy was brutally simple: to land two projectiles on the target in such rapid succession that the shooter’s aim would not be disturbed by the recoil impulse of the first shot. The rifle also featured a unique full-automatic mode that fired the initial hyperburst from both barrels before continuing sustained fire from only the primary (right) barrel at a more conventional 850 RPM.35

Performance and Rejection

According to official reports from the trials, the AO-63 performed remarkably well. It was described as being highly accurate, as well as simple and reliable in its operation—a surprising assessment given its internal complexity.37 Despite this positive evaluation, the rifle was eventually dropped from the competition. While the official records state the reasons are “unknown,” the cause is almost certainly rooted in the practical realities of production.37 The sheer complexity of manufacturing a service rifle with two of every core component would have been an industrial and logistical nightmare, leading to prohibitively high production and maintenance costs.35

Case Study: The AN-94 – Victory in Trials, Failure in Service

The eventual winner of the Abakan competition was Gennadiy Nikonov’s design, which would be formally adopted in 1994 as the AN-94.³⁸ It was a weapon of breathtaking mechanical complexity, often compared to a Swiss watch for its intricate internal workings.

A Watchmaker’s Solution

The AN-94 achieved its accuracy through a system Nikonov called “blowback shifted pulse” (BBSP).36 The entire firing mechanism—barrel, receiver, and bolt group—was a single unit capable of recoiling back and forth within an external polymer housing that the soldier held. This unit was connected to the bolt carrier via a pulley and a short steel cable.36 When fired, this system allowed the rifle to fire two rounds at a rate of 1,800 RPM. The first round fired as normal. As the internal unit recoiled, a mechanism would feed and fire the second round

before the recoiling mass had completed its rearward travel and impacted the housing. The result was that the felt recoil impulse from both shots reached the shooter’s shoulder at roughly the same time, after both bullets had already left the barrel.⁴³ This system worked as advertised, allowing for two rounds to be placed on a target with incredible precision, thus fulfilling the core Abakan requirement.³⁶

Operational Failure

While the AN-94 was a triumph of engineering that won the competition, it was a catastrophic failure as a service rifle. In the hands of ordinary soldiers, its complexity became its downfall.

Ergonomics: The rifle was poorly balanced and noticeably front-heavy, weighing almost 9.5 pounds loaded.⁴⁰ Its controls were awkward, with a separate safety and fire selector that was difficult to manipulate.⁴⁰ Most bizarrely, the magazine had to be inserted at a slight angle to the right to accommodate the recoiling mechanism, which made reloading awkward and prevented the use of the magazine as a monopod when firing from the prone position.⁴⁰
Complexity and Maintenance: The AN-94 was a maintenance nightmare. Its intricate pulley-and-cable system and complex trigger group were far too complicated for a conscript army accustomed to the AK-74’s elegant simplicity. Clearing common malfunctions was an exceedingly difficult and time-consuming process.⁴⁰
Cost: The rifle was exorbitantly expensive to manufacture, with a level of machining and complexity that far exceeded the simple stampings of the AK-74.

Due to these profound and insurmountable flaws, the AN-94 was never produced in large numbers. It saw very limited service, primarily with special forces and internal ministry troops, but it completely failed in its stated goal of replacing the AK-74 as the standard-issue rifle of the Russian military.³⁵ It was a weapon that won a competition but lost the war of practicality.

The entire Abakan program, culminating in the flawed victory of the AN-94, represents a massive strategic miscalculation and a profound departure from the proven Soviet arms doctrine. It was an attempt to solve a human factors problem—the marksmanship limitations of the average conscript—with an extremely complex and expensive mechanical solution. This occurred at the very time when Western militaries were beginning to address the same problem with far more practical and effective solutions, such as universal adoption of optical sights and improved training regimens. The designers in the Abakan program created mechanically brilliant but baroque and costly weapons to meet a very narrow metric. The AN-94 “won” because it was the best at solving this isolated technical puzzle. In doing so, however, it failed every other practical test of a service rifle: cost, simplicity, ergonomics, and ease of maintenance. It sacrificed the holistic “Sufficient Excellence” of the Kalashnikov for “Perfection” in a single, narrow parameter. The failure of the AN-94 taught the Russian military a costly but vital lesson: over-optimizing for one performance metric at the expense of all others results in an unbalanced and ultimately useless design for a general-issue weapon. Its failure led the Russian military to abandon the pursuit of a “hyperburst” rifle and eventually return to the proven Kalashnikov platform with the modernized AK-12, a tacit admission that the entire Abakan detour was a dead end.

Conclusion: A Century of Lessons Learned

The history of failed Soviet and Russian small arms projects is not a story of engineering incompetence. On the contrary, it is filled with visionary designers and mechanically brilliant concepts. The failures were rarely technical in the purest sense; rather, they stemmed from a fundamental disconnect between engineering possibility and military reality. The road not taken was, in most cases, a road that led away from the fundamental truths of what makes a successful military weapon for a massive land army.

A century of development reveals a recurring conflict between the allure of radical innovation and the powerful inertia of doctrinal conservatism and logistical pragmatism. The AVS-36, with its complex and fragile mechanism, taught the Red Army the brutal lesson that reliability is the paramount virtue of an infantry rifle. The TKB-517, a technically superior weapon, demonstrated that even a better rifle cannot overcome the immense institutional and industrial ecosystem built around an established platform like the Kalashnikov. The avant-garde designs of Korobov and Gerasimenko showed that innovation cannot succeed without a clear doctrinal need and a mature technological base to support it. Finally, the entire Abakan program and its flawed champion, the AN-94, served as the ultimate cautionary tale against the perilous pursuit of perfection in a single metric at the expense of the holistic qualities that define a practical tool of war.

These historical precedents cast a long shadow that directly informs contemporary Russian weapons development. The troubled, iterative design process of the modern AK-12 rifle, with its focus on evolutionary rather than revolutionary improvements, is a direct reflection of the lessons learned from the Abakan fiasco. The ghosts of the AN-94 and TKB-022PM still haunt Russian procurement offices, serving as powerful reminders of the dangers of excessive complexity and radical change. The enduring legacy of these failed projects is the continuous reaffirmation of the Doctrine of Sufficient Excellence—a philosophy that, for better or worse, has kept the simple, rugged, and reliable Kalashnikov at the heart of Russian military power for over seventy years.

Summary of Failed Projects

Project/Weapon	Era/Competition	Primary Reason for Failure	Key Lesson Learned
AVS-36	Pre-WWII (1930s)	Overly complex, unreliable in harsh conditions, uncontrollable in full-auto ³	Absolute reliability and simplicity are paramount over advanced features.
TKB-517	Post-WWII (1950s AKM Trials)	Institutional inertia; military familiarity with the AK platform and high cost of re-tooling outweighed superior performance ⁷	A “better” weapon is not enough to displace an entrenched, “good enough” system without a game-changing advantage.
TKB-022PM	Cold War (1960s)	“Too radical” design (bullpup), concerns over durability of new materials (polymers), lack of doctrinal need ¹⁸	Innovation requires both doctrinal “pull” and technological maturity to be accepted by a conservative military.
VAG-73	Cold War (1970s)	Immature technology (caseless ammo), unreliable, heavy, complex, expensive ²⁶	Technological ambition must be supported by a mature scientific and industrial base to be viable.
AO-63	Late Cold War (Project Abakan, 1980s)	Prohibitive complexity and production cost due to its double-barreled design ³⁵	A brute-force solution, even if effective, can be logistically and economically impractical for mass issue.
AN-94	Post-Cold War (Project Abakan winner)	Extreme mechanical complexity, poor ergonomics, high cost, and difficult maintenance made it unsuitable for general issue ³⁵	Over-optimizing for a single performance metric at the expense of holistic practicality results in a failed service weapon.

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Экспериментальный автомат ТКБ-022ПМ: masterok — LiveJournal, accessed August 15, 2025, https://masterok.livejournal.com/7302522.html
TKB-022PM experimental Soviet bullpup rifle and its variants. : r/WeirdWeapons – Reddit, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/WeirdWeapons/comments/aca55g/tkb022pm_experimental_soviet_bullpup_rifle_and/
Picture: TKB-022PM Korobov assault rifle : r/LessCredibleDefence – Reddit, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/LessCredibleDefence/comments/24xow9/picture_tkb022pm_korobov_assault_rifle/
Экспериментальный автомат ТКБ-022ПМ – Мастерок.жж.рф – LiveJournal, accessed August 15, 2025, https://masterok.livejournal.com/10970140.html’
The most unusual Soviet pistol – Irish Sun, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.irishsun.com/news/258370693/the-most-unusual-soviet-pistol
Caseless ammunition – Wikipedia, accessed August 15, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caseless_ammunition
This PISTOL holds more ammo than an M4! #shorts – YouTube, accessed August 15, 2025, https://m.youtube.com/shorts/ILkaYz-tT2w
VAG-73 caseless 48 round pistol with Tandem magazine #history #war #firepower #future #tech – YouTube, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/NJUDg05m_AI
Exploring the VAG 73 Russian Caseless Gyrojet Weapon – TikTok, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.tiktok.com/@scifiandswords/video/7526576786860182797
AK-47’s Underrated Rival Ahead of Its Time: Korobov Rifle – YouTube, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=37ZjwxCiqsk
Абакан (конкурс) — Википедия, accessed August 15, 2025, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%BD_(%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D1%81)
Simonov & Tkachev AO-63 assault rifle | Secret Projects Forum, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/simonov-tkachev-ao-63-assault-rifle.5611/
Simonov & Tkachev AO-63 assault rifle – Indians For Guns, accessed August 15, 2025, https://indiansforguns.com/viewtopic.php?t=6030
Avtomat AO-63: The Assault Rifle that Never Was – Small Arms Review, accessed August 15, 2025, https://smallarmsreview.com/avtomat-ao-63-the-assault-rifle-that-never-was/
The Secret Story of The AN-94 “Abakan” Assault Rifle – Small Arms Review, accessed August 15, 2025, https://smallarmsreview.com/the-secret-story-of-the-an-94-abakan-assault-rifle/
AO-63 assault rifle – Wikipedia, accessed August 15, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AO-63_assault_rifle
Project Abakan – Wikipedia, accessed August 15, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Abakan
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Russian 5.45x39mm AN-94 Nikonov Rifle: Better Than the AK-74 …, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.firearmsnews.com/editorial/russian-545x39mm-an94-nikonov-review/383282
AO-63: The Soviet Rifle That Fired 6,000 Rounds Per Minute #shorts – YouTube, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qS6noZ93WA
AO-63 – ArtStation, accessed August 15, 2025, https://www.artstation.com/artwork/8Bllqx
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AK Analytics, Analytics and Reports, Russian & Soviet Analytics

The AKS-74U “Ukorochenniy”: A Technical and Historical Analysis of the Soviet Compact Carbine and Its Successors

September 7, 2025 RoninsGrips

The genesis of the AKS-74U is rooted in the evolving tactical doctrines of the Soviet military in the early 1970s. Following the adoption of the AK-74 and its revolutionary 5.45x39mm small-caliber, high-velocity cartridge, a distinct capability gap was identified. While the new rifle provided a significant advantage in accuracy and effective range for front-line infantry, its full-length barrel and fixed stock were cumbersome for a large contingent of military personnel. This created a doctrinal requirement for a highly compact, select-fire weapon chambered in the new service cartridge, intended to arm “second-echelon” troops who operated in confined spaces and for whom a full-size rifle was a hindrance rather than a primary tool.¹

The Doctrinal Need

The demand was for a weapon that bridged the gap between a submachine gun and an assault rifle, a concept that would later be defined in the West as a Personal Defense Weapon (PDW). The intended users included armored vehicle crews, artillerymen, helicopter pilots, combat engineers, radio operators, and rear-echelon support units.⁴ For these soldiers, the primary need was for a self-defense firearm that was more potent and had a greater effective range than a standard service pistol but was compact enough to be stowed and deployed within the tight confines of a vehicle cabin or cockpit. Existing solutions, such as the 9x18mm Stechkin APS machine pistol, had proven inadequate for the modern battlefield, lacking the range and armor-penetrating capability of a rifle cartridge.⁸ The goal was to equip these personnel with a weapon that shared ammunition and training commonality with the standard-issue AK-74, thereby simplifying logistics and supply chains across the armed forces.

The “Modern” (Модерн) Competition (1973-1979)

To address this requirement, the Soviet Ministry of Defense initiated a formal research and development program in 1973, codenamed “Modern” (Модерн).³ This competition brought together the premier small arms design bureaus of the Soviet Union—from Izhevsk, Tula, and Kovrov—to develop a weapon that met a stringent set of Technical-Tactical Requirements (TTT).³ The TTT specified a weapon with a maximum weight of 2.2 kg (approximately 4.9 lbs), a maximum length of 75 cm with the stock extended and 45 cm with the stock folded, and an effective firing range of 500 meters.⁵

The competition saw entries from the most prominent Soviet designers of the era:

Mikhail T. Kalashnikov (Izhmash): Kalashnikov’s team submitted a design, designated PP1, that was fundamentally a radically shortened version of the recently adopted AKS-74 paratrooper rifle.³ This approach prioritized reliability and manufacturability by leveraging an existing, proven platform. A second prototype, the A1-75, was also presented, featuring an experimental muzzle device for enhanced flash and sound suppression.⁵
Yevgeny F. Dragunov (Izhmash): The famed designer of the SVD sniper rifle presented a highly innovative and forward-thinking design known as the MA (Малогабаритный Автомат, or “small-sized automatic rifle”).⁵ The MA was a departure from traditional Kalashnikov architecture, featuring extensive use of polymers, a unique hinged upper and lower receiver, and a folding stock that collapsed over the top of the receiver.¹¹
Igor Y. Stechkin (Tula): Stechkin, creator of the APS pistol, submitted the TKB-0116, another unconventional design that explored alternative operating principles.⁵
Sergei G. Simonov (Klimovsk): The veteran designer entered the AG-043 prototype.³
A.S. Konstantinov: Submitted the AEK-958 design.⁵

The Verdict – Pragmatism Over Innovation

Following extensive trials, the GRAU (Main Missile and Artillery Directorate) selected Kalashnikov’s design in 1977.⁵ The decision was not based on overwhelming performance superiority; in fact, the weapon’s performance was judged to be “no worse than the competition”.⁵ The decisive factor was industrial and logistical pragmatism. The Kalashnikov entry shared approximately 50% of its components—including pins, springs, and screws—with the full-size AK-74 already in mass production.¹⁴ This high degree of commonality promised immense cost savings, as it could be manufactured on existing tooling and machinery. Furthermore, it simplified armorers’ training, maintenance procedures, and the supply of spare parts in the field.³

This outcome highlights a core tenet of Soviet military procurement: a “good enough” solution that can be mass-produced efficiently and maintained easily is strategically superior to a technically more advanced or innovative solution that would require retooling factories and disrupting the established industrial base. The Dragunov MA, while lighter and more ergonomic, represented a completely new system.¹¹ The adoption of Kalashnikov’s design was a low-risk, economically sound decision that provided the required capability with minimal disruption.

Interestingly, the final adopted weapon failed to meet the original TTT specifications. The AKS-74U, with an empty weight of 2.7 kg and a folded length of 490 mm, was both heavier and longer than the program’s initial targets of 2.2 kg and 450 mm.⁵ This discrepancy suggests that during the trial phase, the emphasis shifted from adhering to the ambitious physical parameters to achieving acceptable ballistic performance while ensuring maximum manufacturability. A functional compromise was ultimately deemed the only achievable and practical outcome. The weapon was officially adopted into service in 1979 under the GRAU designation 6P26, though its formal name, AKS-74U, tied it to the 1974 rifle family.⁶

Section 2: Engineering the “Ukorochenniy” – A Technical Deep Dive

The transformation of the AKS-74 into the AKS-74U was not a simple matter of shortening components. It was a complex engineering challenge that required a series of interconnected solutions and compromises to maintain reliable function in a drastically smaller package. Each modification had a cascading effect on other aspects of the weapon’s design and performance.

The Barrel and Ballistics

The most defining feature of the AKS-74U is its extremely short barrel. Reduced from the AK-74’s 415 mm (16.3 inches) to just 206.5 mm (8.1 inches), this change was the source of most of the weapon’s subsequent engineering hurdles.²

Muzzle Velocity and Range: This nearly 50% reduction in barrel length resulted in a significant loss of muzzle velocity. The 5.45x39mm projectile, which exits an AK-74 at approximately 900 m/s, leaves the AKS-74U at a much-reduced 735 m/s.⁶ This drop in velocity directly impacted the weapon’s ballistic performance, reducing its effective range and the terminal effectiveness of the projectile, which relies on high velocity to yaw and fragment upon impact.²
Rifling Twist Rate: To ensure the projectile remained stable in flight after leaving such a short barrel, the rifling twist rate had to be dramatically increased. The standard AK-74 barrel features a 1:200 mm (1:7.87 inches) twist. The AKS-74U barrel was given a much faster 1:160 mm (1:6.3 inches) twist rate.⁵ This was a critical modification to impart sufficient rotational velocity on the bullet to prevent it from tumbling or “keyholing” after exiting the muzzle, which would have rendered the weapon uselessly inaccurate.⁴

The Gas System and Muzzle Device

Shortening the barrel had a profound effect on the Kalashnikov’s long-stroke gas piston operating system. The gas port had to be moved rearward, necessitating a proportionally shortened gas piston and operating rod.⁵ This created a new problem: the “dwell time”—the brief period the bullet travels in the barrel after passing the gas port but before exiting the muzzle—was drastically reduced. In a standard AK, this dwell time ensures the system is pressurized long enough to reliably cycle the heavy bolt carrier group. In the shortened system, there was insufficient pressure for reliable operation.

The solution was the single most visually distinctive feature of the AKS-74U: its large, cylindrical muzzle device. This is not merely a flash hider but a purpose-built muzzle booster.¹ This device is a non-optional, critical component of the operating system. It functions by creating a large internal expansion chamber. As the bullet exits the barrel, this chamber momentarily traps the rapidly expanding propellant gases, creating a pocket of high back-pressure at the muzzle.² This pressure surge provides the necessary impulse to the gas piston, ensuring a robust and complete cycle of the action. Without this device, the weapon would fail to cycle reliably.¹⁹

The booster has secondary effects as well. The expansion chamber allows more complete combustion of unburned powder, which helps to mitigate what would otherwise be a blinding muzzle flash from the short barrel. Despite this, the weapon is notorious for its concussive and highly visible muzzle blast.² The device attaches via standard M24x1.5 right-hand threads to the integrated gas block and front sight base.²⁰ The entire functionality of the AKS-74U, therefore, hinges on this clever but brute-force engineering workaround.

Receiver, Sights, and Furniture

The radical shortening of the weapon necessitated a complete redesign of the sighting system and receiver cover.

Sights and Top Cover: With the gas block moved so far back, there was no room for the standard AK rear sight leaf on the receiver. The solution was to create a new, hinged receiver top cover that pivots forward from the rear sight block trunnion.⁵ A simple, L-shaped flip aperture sight was integrated directly onto the rear of this cover.¹ This sight is rudimentary, featuring just two settings: a “П” (Постоянная, or “constant”) battle sight zero set for 350 meters, and a “4-5” setting for engaging targets between 400 and 500 meters.⁵ These ranges were highly optimistic, as the sight radius was dramatically shortened, severely limiting practical accuracy.
Stock and Furniture: The “S” in the weapon’s designation stands for “Skladnoy” (Складной), meaning “folding”.²¹ It was fitted with the same stamped-metal, triangular, side-folding stock developed for the AKS-74 paratrooper rifle, which locks securely to the left side of the receiver.⁴ The handguards were shortened versions of the standard AK-74 pattern, initially produced from laminated wood and later from polymer.⁴

The final design of the AKS-74U is a masterclass in interdependent compromises. The primary requirement for extreme compactness dictated the short barrel. The short barrel, in turn, necessitated the specialized muzzle booster for reliability and the faster rifling twist for stability. This combination produced a violent muzzle blast. The shortened action forced the relocation of the rear sight onto a new hinged top cover, which reduced the sight radius and limited precision. Each engineering solution created a new challenge, resulting in a weapon that was functionally reliable but deeply compromised in terms of accuracy, effective range, and user comfort.

The production life of the AKS-74U spanned approximately 14 years, during which it was manufactured at two of the Soviet Union’s primary small arms facilities. Over this period, the weapon underwent material refinements and was adapted into specialized variants to meet emerging operational needs.

Manufacturing History

Initial production of the AKS-74U commenced in 1979 at the Izhevsk Machine-Building Plant (Ижмаш), or Izhmash, the same facility responsible for the full-size AK-74.⁸ However, this was a relatively short-lived arrangement. In 1981, the entire production line, including all tooling and documentation, was transferred to the Tula Arms Plant (Тульский Oружейный Завод), or TOZ.⁸ From 1981 onwards, TOZ became the sole manufacturer of the AKS-74U for the Soviet military. Production continued at Tula until it was officially ceased around 1993, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁵

Evolution of Furniture

Like its full-sized sibling, the AKS-74U’s furniture—the handguards and pistol grip—evolved with Soviet polymer technology. These material changes are key identifiers for dating a particular rifle.

Laminated Wood (1979 – mid-1980s): The earliest production models, from both Izhmash and early Tula, were fitted with distinctive reddish-brown laminated wood handguards.¹⁴ These are often considered the most iconic version of the weapon.
“Plum” Polymer (mid-1980s): Around 1985, in a military-wide transition, production shifted away from wood. The new furniture was made from a glass-fiber reinforced polyamide (PA-6) in a distinctive plum color.²³
Black Polymer (late 1980s – 1993): The final production runs of the AKS-74U saw a transition to the true black polymer that would become standard on the modernized AK-74M and the subsequent AK-100 series of rifles.²³

Specialized Variants

As the AKS-74U saw wider service, particularly during the Soviet-Afghan War, the need for specialized versions became apparent. This development was largely reactive, adapting the base design to accommodate new technologies and tactical requirements rather than being part of an initial modular concept.

AKS-74UN (“Night”): The “N” suffix (from Ночной, or “Night”) designates the variant equipped with a standard Warsaw Pact dovetail optics rail.⁶ This rail was riveted to the left side of the stamped steel receiver and allowed for the mounting of Soviet night vision scopes, such as the 1PN51 or 1PN58 (NSPUM), as well as various daytime optics.²⁸ While this provided enhanced low-light capability, the weapon’s inherent ballistic limitations and short sight radius meant it was never a true precision platform.
AKS-74UB (“Silent”): The “B” suffix (from Бесшумный, or “Silent”) denotes the variant optimized for suppressed fire.²⁶ This model was designed for use by Spetsnaz and other special operations units. It retained the side optics rail of the UN model but was intended to be paired with the PBS-4 suppressor and specialized 7U1 subsonic 5.45x39mm ammunition.²⁹ To account for the drastically different trajectory of the subsonic round, the AKS-74UB was often fitted with a unique rear sight leaf calibrated specifically for its use.²⁶

The following table provides a clear chronological overview of the weapon’s manufacturing and design milestones.

Year(s)	Event	Manufacturer	Key Features / Changes
1973	“Modern” Competition Begins	N/A	Development of a compact 5.45mm weapon initiated.
1979	Official Adoption (GRAU Index 6P26)	Izhmash	Initial production begins with laminated wood furniture.
1981	Production Transferred to Tula	Tula Arms Plant (TOZ)	TOZ becomes the sole manufacturer.
Mid-1980s	Furniture Material Change	Tula Arms Plant (TOZ)	Transition from laminated wood to plum-colored polymer.
Late-1980s	Furniture Material Change	Tula Arms Plant (TOZ)	Transition from plum polymer to black polymer.
~1980s	Introduction of Variants	Tula Arms Plant (TOZ)	Development of AKS-74UN (optics rail) and AKS-74UB (suppressor-ready) models.
1993	Production Ceases	Tula Arms Plant (TOZ)	End of the weapon’s official production run.

Section 4: A Complicated Legacy – Service History and Combat Performance

The operational history of the AKS-74U is one of stark contrasts. It is simultaneously an iconic symbol of Soviet special forces and a weapon frequently criticized by the very soldiers who carried it. This complicated legacy is a direct result of a fundamental mismatch between its intended design role and its actual tactical deployment, a disparity that was laid bare in the mountains of Afghanistan and the urban ruins of Chechnya.

Intended Role vs. Actual Deployment

As conceived under the “Modern” program, the AKS-74U was a PDW, a defensive weapon for personnel whose primary duties were not infantry combat.¹ Its design prioritized extreme compactness for storage and maneuverability inside vehicles.² However, in the field, its small size and light weight proved irresistibly appealing for offensive roles.

The weapon saw its first major combat use during the Soviet-Afghan War, where it began appearing in significant numbers around the summer of 1981.⁸ It was issued not only to its intended users but also widely to airborne (VDV) troops, Spetsnaz units, and even some motor rifle infantry squads who valued its handiness in the mountainous terrain and during helicopter insertions.⁸ This widespread issuance as a primary combat carbine pushed the weapon far beyond its design parameters, exposing its inherent flaws.

Combat Performance Analysis

When evaluated against its intended role, the AKS-74U performed adequately. It was exceptionally compact, with a folded length of just 490 mm (19.3 inches), making it far more practical than a full-length rifle inside a cramped BMP fighting vehicle or a Mi-24 Hind helicopter cockpit.¹⁴ In a last-ditch defensive scenario at close range, it provided a formidable volume of fire.

However, when pressed into service as a frontline infantry weapon, its performance was deeply problematic:

Severe Overheating: The combination of a high cyclic rate of fire (around 700 rounds per minute) and a short, thin barrel caused the weapon to overheat with alarming speed.⁵ Soldiers reported that after firing just two or three 30-round magazines in quick succession (60-90 rounds), the handguards would become too hot to hold, and accuracy would degrade precipitously as the barrel heated up.⁸ This made it unsuitable for providing the sustained suppressive fire crucial in infantry engagements.
Limited Effective Range: While the rear sight was optimistically marked for 500 meters, the reality of the weapon’s ballistics and ergonomics rendered such ranges purely theoretical. The significant loss in muzzle velocity, combined with the extremely short sight radius and a sharp, concussive recoil impulse, limited its practical effective range to approximately 200 meters under ideal conditions.² In the heat of combat, many veterans considered its effective range to be as little as 50 to 100 meters.⁸
Reduced Terminal Effectiveness: The 5.45x39mm 7N6 cartridge’s lethality is largely dependent on its high velocity, which causes the bullet to yaw and fragment upon impact. The AKS-74U’s lower muzzle velocity reduced this effect, leading to reports from soldiers in both Afghanistan and later in Chechnya of the round lacking “stopping power” and failing to incapacitate targets as effectively as the full-size AK-74.²
Inability to Mount Grenade Launchers: A major tactical drawback was its incompatibility with the standard GP-25 under-barrel grenade launcher. The GP-25 was a vital tool for Soviet infantry in Afghanistan, providing organic, indirect fire capability. Soldiers issued the AKS-74U were deprived of this critical asset, placing them at a significant disadvantage.⁸

Reputation and the “Krinkov” Myth

This doctrinal mismatch created a dual reputation for the weapon. Among the Soviet troops who were forced to use it as a primary assault rifle, it was often disliked and viewed as a poor substitute for the AKS-74.⁸ Conversely, among their adversaries, the Afghan Mujahideen, the weapon became a highly coveted status symbol. They gave it the nickname “Krinkov,” a name of Pashtun origin with no Russian etymology.⁴ To the Mujahideen, possessing a “Krinkov” was a sign of prestige, as it was most often carried by high-value targets like vehicle commanders, pilots, and Spetsnaz officers. Capturing one implied a successful ambush against elite Soviet forces.¹⁶ This mystique, born from its use by adversaries, cemented its iconic status in the West, often overshadowing its well-documented shortcomings.

Section 5: The Line of Succession – Post-Soviet Replacements

The operational shortcomings of the AKS-74U, particularly when used outside its intended PDW role, created a clear impetus for its replacement. The post-Soviet Russian arms industry did not seek a single, direct successor. Instead, the tactical roles the AKS-74U had been forced to fill were bifurcated and addressed by two distinct, specialized weapon systems: a true compact carbine and a dedicated submachine gun. More recently, a third, technologically advanced platform has emerged, aiming to finally fulfill the original “Modern” program’s goals in a single package.

5.1 The Carbine Successor: The AK-105

Developed in 1994 as part of the AK-100 series, the AK-105 is a direct engineering correction of the AKS-74U’s ballistic failures.²¹ It represents the perfection of the compact carbine concept within the Kalashnikov lineage.

Design and Improvements: The AK-105 is essentially a shortened version of the modernized AK-74M. Its most critical improvement is a longer barrel, measuring 314 mm (12.4 inches).³⁵ This intermediate length strikes a balance, restoring much of the muzzle velocity lost by the AKS-74U (up to ~840 m/s) while remaining significantly more compact than a full-length rifle.¹⁵ This enhanced ballistic performance extends its practical effective range and improves terminal effectiveness. The longer barrel also allows for a more conventional gas system placement, eliminating the need for the AKS-74U’s oversized muzzle booster in favor of a smaller, more efficient design derived from it.³⁵ It incorporates all the modern features of the AK-74M, including the more robust, solid polymer side-folding stock and a standard dovetail side rail for mounting optics.²¹
Role and Users: The AK-105 is a true carbine, effective in CQB but far more capable at the intermediate ranges where the AKS-74U struggled. It has been adopted in limited numbers by the Russian Army and is a favored weapon for various law enforcement and special forces units, including the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) teams.³⁵

5.2 The Submachine Gun Descendant: The PP-19-01 Vityaz

Where the AK-105 addressed the carbine role, the PP-19-01 Vityaz was developed to perfect the submachine gun/PDW role. Developed in 2004 by Izhmash (now Kalashnikov Concern), the Vityaz was a direct response to a request from the elite MVD “Vityaz” special forces unit.³⁹ They required a weapon with the familiar ergonomics and manual of arms of the Kalashnikov platform but chambered in the 9x19mm Parabellum pistol cartridge, which is better suited for law enforcement and CQB scenarios where over-penetration is a critical concern.⁴¹

Design and Heritage: The Vityaz is a masterful example of platform commonality. It utilizes the receiver, trigger group, safety selector, and folding stock of the AKS-74U and AK-100 series.³⁹ However, its internal mechanism is a simple, reliable straight blowback system, with the gas piston and rotating bolt of the rifle design removed.⁴³ This fusion of proven ergonomics with a more appropriate operating mechanism and caliber resulted in a highly effective and easily adopted submachine gun.
Role and Users: The Vityaz has become the standard submachine gun for a wide array of Russian special units, including the FSB, the Federal Protective Service (FSO), and various Spetsnaz elements of the MVD and National Guard.⁴⁴ It has effectively replaced the AKS-74U in the close-quarters, urban law enforcement role for which the rifle-caliber weapon was ill-suited.

5.3 The Future Replacement: The AM-17

The most recent development in this lineage is the AM-17 (Автомат Малогабаритный, or Small-sized Automatic Rifle), a 21st-century weapon designed as the ultimate replacement for the entire AKS-74U fleet.⁴⁵ In a remarkable historical turn, the AM-17 is a direct descendant of the Yevgeny Dragunov MA prototype—the very rifle that lost to the Kalashnikov design in the original “Modern” competition nearly 50 years prior.¹⁰

Design and Improvements: The AM-17 abandons the traditional stamped steel Kalashnikov receiver in favor of the MA’s innovative layout: a hinged upper and lower receiver assembly made extensively from high-strength polymers with steel reinforcements.⁴⁵ This modern construction makes it lighter than the AKS-74U, weighing only 2.5 kg (5.5 lbs).⁴⁹ It incorporates features now standard on modern carbines, including a full-length, monolithic Picatinny rail on the upper receiver for stable optics mounting, a side-folding and adjustable telescopic stock, fully ambidextrous controls, and a reversible charging handle.⁴⁵ Its 230 mm barrel offers a ballistic improvement over the AKS-74U in a lighter, more ergonomic, and vastly more modular package.⁴⁵
Status: The AM-17 has completed state trials, with design modifications made based on feedback from operational testing in Ukraine. Kalashnikov Concern has announced that serial production is scheduled to begin in 2025.¹⁰ The AM-17 represents a re-convergence, leveraging five decades of advancements in materials and design to finally create a single weapon that is as compact as a submachine gun while firing a true intermediate rifle cartridge, resolving the compromises that defined its predecessor.

The technical evolution from the AKS-74U to its successors is summarized in the table below.

Specification	AKS-74U	AK-105	PP-19-01 Vityaz	AM-17
Caliber	5.45x39mm	5.45x39mm	9x19mm Parabellum	5.45x39mm
Action	Gas-operated, long-stroke piston	Gas-operated, long-stroke piston	Simple Blowback	Gas-operated, short-stroke piston
Barrel Length	206.5 mm (8.1 in)	314 mm (12.4 in)	237.5 mm (9.4 in)	230 mm (9.1 in)
Muzzle Velocity	~735 m/s	~840 m/s	~380 m/s	~750 m/s
Cyclic Rate	~650-735 RPM	~600 RPM	~800 RPM	~850 RPM
Weight (Empty)	2.7 kg (6.0 lbs)	3.2 kg (7.1 lbs)	2.9 kg (6.4 lbs)	2.5 kg (5.5 lbs)
Length (Folded)	490 mm (19.3 in)	586 mm (23.1 in)	480 mm (18.9 in)	490 mm (19.3 in)
Length (Extended)	730 mm (28.7 in)	824 mm (32.4 in)	705 mm (27.8 in)	750 mm (29.5 in)
Optics Mounting	Dovetail Side Rail (UN model)	Standard Dovetail Side Rail	Picatinny Rail / Dovetail Side Rail	Integrated Full-Length Picatinny Rail

Conclusion

The AKS-74U occupies a unique and paradoxical position in the history of Soviet small arms. Born from the pragmatic, cost-conscious “Modern” program, it was an exercise in compromise—a weapon that met the immediate need for a compact 5.45mm firearm by leveraging an existing production base, even at the cost of failing to meet its own initial design specifications. Its engineering is a testament to the ingenuity required to make a fundamentally unsuitable platform function reliably under extreme modification, with the muzzle booster standing as the lynchpin of a system of cascading trade-offs.

In service, its legacy is bifurcated. For its intended users—vehicle crews and support personnel—it was a functional PDW. However, its widespread deployment as a primary infantry carbine in Afghanistan and Chechnya exposed its profound limitations in range, thermal endurance, and terminal ballistics. This doctrinal mismatch cemented its controversial reputation: an iconic “Krinkov” to its adversaries and a flawed tool to many of its users.

Ultimately, the most enduring legacy of the AKS-74U is not the weapon itself, but the clear lessons it provided. Its shortcomings in the field directly informed the development of a new generation of Russian firearms. Its dual roles were logically separated and perfected in two successor platforms: the AK-105, which corrected its ballistic flaws to become a true compact carbine, and the PP-19-01 Vityaz, which adopted its ergonomics for a more suitable submachine gun role. The recent emergence of the AM-17, a direct descendant of the design that lost to the AKS-74U fifty years ago, marks the completion of this evolutionary cycle. By utilizing modern materials and design principles, the AM-17 promises to finally deliver what the “Modern” program originally sought: a weapon that successfully merges the power of a rifle cartridge with the compact dimensions of a submachine gun, closing a chapter that the AKS-74U opened but could never fully write.

Works cited

AK-47: A Pop Cultural Icon. – Grey Dynamics, accessed August 2, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/ak-47-a-pop-cultural-icon/
The Littlest AK – RifleShooter, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.rifleshootermag.com/editorial/featured_rifles_rs_thelittlestak_200902/84272
Автомат АКС-74У – характеристика, дальность, ттх, устройство, accessed August 2, 2025, https://guns.club/lib/oruzhie/kompaktnyy-avtomat-aks-74u/
What is a Krinkov?: A Guide to the AKS-74U – Pew Pew Tactical, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.pewpewtactical.com/krinkov-aks-74u/
How a AK-74u Works – YouTube, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PYZaUldEwwU
Kalashnikov AKS-74U – Weaponsystems.net, accessed August 2, 2025, https://weaponsystems.net/system/680-Kalashnikov+AKS-74U
Конкурс “Модерн” на 5,45 мм малогабаритный автомат (1973-78гг.) – war-russia.info, accessed August 2, 2025, http://war-russia.info/index.php/nomenklatura-vooruzhenij/428-sukhoputnye-vojska/strelkovoe-oruzhie/strelkovoe-oruzhie-2/avtomaty-pistolety-pulemety-2/2727-5-45-mm-opytnye-malogabaritnye-avtomaty-1973-78gg
The “Krinkov” – AKS-74U/AKSU in Afghanistan – Safar Publishing, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.safar-publishing.com/post/the-krinkov-aks-74u-in-afghanistan
Эволюция АК: Автомат АКС-74У || Калашников Медиа, accessed August 2, 2025, https://kalashnikovgroup.ru/media/evolyutsiya-ak/evolyutsiya-ak-avtomat-aks
“Cutting-Edge” russian Rifle AM-17: Created in 1975, Production Launch in 2025, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/cutting_edge_russian_rifle_am_17_created_in_1975_production_launch_in_2025-12145.html
Can anybody translate these. I found them on a weird russian site. It seems to be a magazine about the Dragunov MA : r/ForgottenWeapons – Reddit, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/ForgottenWeapons/comments/rzutns/can_anybody_translate_these_i_found_them_on_a/
Малогабаритный автомат Драгунова – Военное обозрение, accessed August 2, 2025, https://topwar.ru/94641-malogabaritnyy-avtomat-dragunova.html
AK Dominance: A History of the World’s Most Popular Rifle Platform – Athlon Outdoors, accessed August 2, 2025, https://athlonoutdoors.com/article/ak-rifle-platform-development/
AK-74 – Wikipedia, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AK-74
АКС-74У – Википедия, accessed August 2, 2025, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D0%9A%D0%A1-74%D0%A3
1986 Soviet Tula AKS-74U : r/guns – Reddit, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/guns/comments/8q1765/1986_soviet_tula_aks74u/
Автомат АКС-74У. Старый новый друг пехоты – Раздел: Военное дело – ВикиЧтение, accessed August 2, 2025, https://military.wikireading.ru/8455
Muzzle booster – Wikipedia, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muzzle_booster
Ian’s Customs: The Terrible Krinkov – Forgotten Weapons, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.forgottenweapons.com/ians-customs-the-terrible-krinkov/
12 камерный ДТК закрытого типа на АКС-74У(5,45х39, М24х1.5), accessed August 2, 2025, https://zemlyak.pro/spravochnik/12-kamernyy-dtk-zakrytogo-tipa-na-aks-74u-kalibr-545-geksagon
Does AK-74U (not AKS-74U) exist? – Quora, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.quora.com/Does-AK-74U-not-AKS-74U-exist
AK Variants: A Closer Look – The Primary Source On PrimaryArms.com, accessed August 2, 2025, https://blog.primaryarms.com/guide/ak-variants-explored/
The AK-74: From Soviet Small Arm To Resistance Symbol | An Official Journal Of The NRA, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.americanrifleman.org/content/the-ak-74-from-soviet-small-arm-to-resistance-symbol/
store.steampowered.com, accessed August 2, 2025, https://store.steampowered.com/news/posts/?feed=steam_community_announcements&appids=1030780&appgroupname=Afterconflict&enddate=1606683295
维基百科：AK-74(组图) | www.wenxuecity.com, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.wenxuecity.com/blog/201208/26128/11877.html
Whats the difference between the AK-74Us? : r/EscapefromTarkov – Reddit, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/EscapefromTarkov/comments/nm31yf/whats_the_difference_between_the_ak74us/
Автомат Калашникова укороченный АКС-74у – Vip Безопасность, accessed August 2, 2025, https://bezpekavip.com/avtomat-kalashnikova-ukorochenniy-aks-74u
AK74 Side Mount Scope Rail – AK-Builder.com, accessed August 2, 2025, https://ak-builder.com/index1.php?dispatch=products.view&product_id=30259
Редкое фото советского спецназа в Афганистане с AKS-74У и ПБС-4 : r/MilitaryPorn, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/dbcugw/rare_photo_of_soviet_spetsnaz_in_afghanistan_with/?tl=ru
Why AKS-74 Was the Soviet Soldier’s Top Pick in War – Safar Publishing, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.safar-publishing.com/post/aks-74-the-true-choice-of-the-soviet-soldier-in-afghanistan
Why did Russian Soldiers in Afghanistan Use AK-74, but the Spetsnaz Prefer Old AKMs, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIlgTVI4IsM&pp=0gcJCdgAo7VqN5tD
Why did Russian Soldiers in Chechnya Hate AKS-74U – YouTube, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oadU4D6hbAY
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en.wikipedia.org, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AK-105#:~:text=The%20AK%2D105%20has%20matching,in%20(210%20mm)%20barrel.
AK-105 – Wikipedia, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AK-105
AK-105 – Kalashnikov Group, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/catalog/boevoe-strelkovoe-oruzhie/avtomaty/avtomat-kalashnikova-ak105
AK-105 | RHS: Status Quo – Red Hammer Studios, accessed August 2, 2025, https://docs.rhsmods.org/rhs-status-quo-user-documentation/arma-reforger/rhs-status-quo/redfor/weapons/ak-105
The AK-105. The Russian Alpha AK. – YouTube, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ki_uE34Akl0
Steam Workshop::PP-19-01 Vityaz-SN (MP5), accessed August 2, 2025, https://steamcommunity.com/sharedfiles/filedetails/?id=3306961648
Пистолет-пулемет ПП-19-01 «Витязь» и «Витязь-СН» (Россия) | DogsWar.ru – Всё о стрелковом оружии и военной технике, accessed August 2, 2025, http://www.dogswar.ru/strelkovoe-oryjie/pistolety-pylemety/2356-pistolet-pylemet-pp-.html
From special forces for special forces! Best RUSSIAN SMG – Vityaz-SN!!! All terrorist aware of it! – YouTube, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GbpkHm_Juo0
PP-19 Submachine Gun – Kalashnikov Group, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/catalog/boevoe-strelkovoe-oruzhie/pistolety-pulemyety/pistolet-pulemet-pp-19-vityaz
PP-19-01 Vityaz – Wikipedia, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PP-19-01_Vityaz
Vityaz | Weaponsystems.net, accessed August 2, 2025, https://weaponsystems.net/system/195-Vityaz
Kalashnikov Concern AM-17 – Wikipedia, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalashnikov_Concern_AM-17
Новинка! АМ-17 и АМБ-17 – новый малогабаритный автомат Концерна Калашников на форуме Армия-2018. – YouTube, accessed August 2, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fRTK9BgcTo
АМ-17 – Википедия, accessed August 2, 2025, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D0%9C-17
АМБ-17 – Википедия, accessed August 2, 2025, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%90%D0%9C%D0%91-17
AM-17: Specs || Kalashnikov Media, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/media/ttkh-2019/am-17-ttkh
Kalashnikov: AM-17 State Trials Completed, accessed August 2, 2025, https://en.kalashnikovgroup.ru/news/kalashnikov-am-17-state-trials-completed
Автомат АМ-17 прошел государственные испытания – Калашников Клуб, accessed August 2, 2025, https://kalashnikov.club/a/avtomat-am-17-proshel-gosudarstvennye-ispytaniya
Малогабаритный автомат АМ-17 – Военное обозрение, accessed August 2, 2025, https://topwar.ru/174528-malogabaritnyj-avtomat-am-17.html

Russia and also USSR

Video: Russian Gunbusters Fires An AK-12 Until It Fails. Wow! Very interesting comments about 5.45 and 5.56 AK barrel Stresses

July 13, 2020 RoninsGrips

In this episode, Georgiy Gubich operates a 5.45×39 AK-12 on full auto until it fails. You’ll notice he is wearing body armor and for good reason as you’ll learn from the video.

He starts by loading up a case of 7N6 ammo into 30 mags and then dumping one after another. You get views from several angles and a shot counter plus his observations during the process.

The handguards are starting to smoke and Georgiy mentions he smells burning plastic.

Note the barrel and brake care glowing red at 503 rounds. It’s hard to say for sure, but this puts the temperature at 930-1175F (500-635C) degrees. I don’t know if it is the camera lens distortion but the brake looks like it is drooping. In later photos it does not so I’m thinking the wide angle lens might be causing distortion.

The handguard is on fire by round 510. It’s hard to say for sure but the temperature might be closer to 1490F (810C). She is hot!! Depending on the polymer they are using for the handguards, the ignition flash point could be from 572-1292F (00-700C). I would guess they are using something good because we can see the barrel is well past 1000F and there is an air gap plus the thermal mass of the handguard to consider which is why it took a while to reach the heat of ignition.

Round 630 – Wow! That is an impressive photo. The handguard is on fire and by luck the camera caught one hell of a muzzle flash. I can’t help but wonder what the temperature of the barrel is under the handguards at this point.

The barrel is started to rupture just prior to this point. Sparks could well be burning powder and there is definitely shrapnel flying as well. Yeah, right about now the body armor, gloves and face shield are making a lot of sense!

Georgiy inspects the rifle and sees the burst barrel.

This is where the barrel ruptured and it looks like it took out part of the gas block. Georgiy mentioned this is a common failure areas for 5.56 and 5.45 rifles due to the heat and pressure compare to larger calibers (I assume is he is referring to 7.62×39 and x51 variants). The rust you see is “flash rust” caused by the heat and being cooled down by water.

Time for the Video!

Summary

The rifle held up three times as long as the Russian Ministry of Defense 180-round burst requirement. Practically, you would expect pauses during firing to allow it to cool down some. I thought his comments about the high-pressure 5.56 x 5.45 rounds causing significant stresses on the barrel was very interesting and hope you enjoyed this video as well.

By the way, a big shout out to Kalashnikov Concern for making these videos available. They are very good!

Please note that all images were extracted from the video and are the property of their respective owner.

PSA AK Webstore Links

Interested in an American made AK? Consider Palmetto State Armory (PSA) as a source. Click on the following links for the associated webstore categories for AK-related rifles, pistols and parts at PSA:

Russia and also USSR

Video: Russian Gunbusters Fires An AK-74M Until It Fails

July 13, 2020 RoninsGrips

In this episode, Georgiy Gubich operates a 5.45×39 AK-74M built in 2014 on full auto until it fails. You’ll notice he is wearing body armor and for good reason as you’ll learn from the video.

As with his other videos, you definitely want to watch it to hear his observations during the testing and the post mortem review afterwards.

Georgiy is 210 rounds and gives us a great quote “The smell isn’t great”!!

480 rounds into the test he can hear the plastic hissing as the bolt carrier is starting to stick when he is reloading. The plastic is still holding its shape.

When he went ,to reload after round 570, he had so slam the rifle on the ground to get it to cycle. I’ve heard of this but it’s my first time seeing someone really do it and does it smoothly.

Round 587 – the barrel ruptured just in front of the lower handguard retainer. Note, the Russian Ministry of Defense requires the weapon to handle a 180-round burst so they passed that test more than three times over.

Here’s the rupture. Note the cooked plastic.

Now this fascinates me. They are using a polyamide plastic and it held up remarably well. The solid parts closest to the barrel and gas tube were definitely decomposing but you will notice the horizontal ribbing was able to dissapate the heat fast enough to that point to retain its shape and structural integrity. That pattern makes even more sense to me now after seeing this.

Watch the Video!

Summary

Definitely a cool video and I appreciate Kalashnikov Concern making it possible. Georgiy rocks and really like how he changes mags and cycles the action not to mention his running observations during and after the test.

The biggest take-away for me by far is the understanding of why they ribbed the lower handguards – enabling the ribs to cool enough to maintain structural integrity is fascinating. In theory there will be a upper round-count limit causing more heat than can be dissipated but under practical use, they ought to hold up great.

I hope you found it interesting as well.

Please note that all images were extracted from the video and are the property of their respective owner.

PSA AK Webstore Links

Russia and also USSR

Video: Russian Gunbusters Fires a 1974 RPK in 7.62×39 Until It Fails – You Totally Need To Watch This!!

July 13, 2020 RoninsGrips

Ever wonder how long a heavy duty 1974 Russian RPK in 7.62×39 can fire almost non-stop until failure? Now’s your chance. This video features Georgiy Gubich firing in an episode of the Russian series Gunbusters firing an RPK as fast as he can doing drum and mag dumps on full auto. Yes, he’s wearing armor because he literally shoots it while it starts to burn an ultimately fails.

That is a ton of ammo and a RPK I would much rather own than see them fry it.

Somewhere near 500 rounds being dumped from 75 round mags the handguards are starting to smoke.

About round 997 or 998 the handguard bursts into flame

Even though the handguard were on fire, he shot it until the barrel burst at round 1232.

For me, it’s fascinating that the only thing that truly failed were the handguards and barrel. Everything else could still be used if the barrel was pressed out and replaced.

So you need to watch the video!!

Summary

You might be surprised by the seemingly fast failure of the rifle. Near the end Georgiy takes the RPK apart, notes what happened and points out that the problem for the rifle was the intense heat of the 75 round drums being dumped one after another. Normally you would fire a 2-1/2 30 round magazines and the pause in firing during reloads gives the barrel a chance to cool down plus practical applications aren’t going to see that type of sustained firing. One would assume that if all he had were drums that the RPK would have failed even sooner than round 1,232.

This was really a fascinating video to watch. Part of me really wants to bring that poor abused RPK home and repair it and part of me was interesting to see a video detailing testing to failure with this level of detail. A big thank you to Kalashnikov Group for helping put this video together.

Please note that all images were extracted from the video and are the property of their respective owner.

PSA AK Webstore Links

Video: Russian Gunbusters Fires 1,400 Rounds Through A 7.62×39 AK-103 Trying to Get It To Fail

July 13, 2020 RoninsGrips

In this episode, Georgiy Gubich operates a 7.62×39 AK-103 built in 2019 on full auto trying to get it to fail. The AK-103 is a remarkable rifle as you will see in the video

Starting here forward he really needs to struggle to get the bolt to exit the chamber. It seems to return and cycle just fine when firing.

The lower handguard had already fallen off during a previous reload but look at the barrel glowing red.

The rifle survived through two spam cans, 1,400 rounds, of ammo!

After all that, it could still shoot 2 MOA at 100 meters. Definitely a remarkable rifle.

Watch the Video!

Summary

I’m a fan of both the 7.62×39 round and the AKs that shoot it so I was rooting for the rifle the whole time. It’s pretty amazing that it still ran after 1,400 rounds.

I hope you enjoyed this!

Please note that all images were extracted from the video and are the property of their respective owner.

PSA AK Webstore Links

Really Cool Russian Page With A Detailed Breakdown of the 5.45mm AK-12 Rifle

July 19, 2019 RoninsGrips

Folks, there is a really cool page in the Russian language that has an excellent breakdown of the Kalashnikov Concern’s AK-12. You can visit it and get a ton of info . A trick I would recommend is to use your browser’s ability to translate a webpage – it will not be perfect but you sure will get a much better idea of what they are talking about.

Click here to go to that page.

We also have a great video in English that gives an overview of the AK-12K, AK-15K AND RPK-16K if you are interested. Click here for that.

Please note, the image shown above is from the article and remains the property of its respective owner.

Ian McCollum Interviews Max Popenker Who Shares His Deep Knowledge On The History Surrounding the Design of the AK-47

May 15, 2019 RoninsGrips

I’m definitely a fan of the AK-47 rifle and am always looking for more insights about the history and design. Ian McCollum of Forgotten Weapons recently hosted Max Popenker, who is a Russian small arms researcher and publisher of Modern Firearms – one of the original firearm research websites. Between the two of them, there is a ton of knowledge.

The AK-47 design was the result of collaboration and competition amongst designers and didn’t happen magically overnight.

Now the video portion is ok but what is really cool is listening to Max unravel the history that led up to the AK-47 rifle’s design – the desire by the Soviets to develop a system of small arms, the influence of German small arms, and other Russian designs.

Part I: The Pre-Kalashnikov Era – Forging a Doctrine in Steel and Fire

Case Study: The AVS-36 Automatic Rifle

Part II: The Shadow of the AK – Challenging an Icon

Case Study: The TKB-517 – The Technically Superior Contender

Part III: The Avant-Garde – When Innovation Outpaces Doctrine

Case Study: German Korobov and the Bullpup Heresy (TKB-022PM)

Case Study: The VAG-73 Caseless Pistol – A Technological Mirage

Part IV: Project “Abakan” – The Perilous Pursuit of Perfection

Case Study: The AO-63 Double-Barreled Rifle

Case Study: The AN-94 – Victory in Trials, Failure in Service

Conclusion: A Century of Lessons Learned

Summary of Failed Projects

Sources Used

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The Doctrinal Need

The “Modern” (Модерн) Competition (1973-1979)

The Verdict – Pragmatism Over Innovation

Section 2: Engineering the “Ukorochenniy” – A Technical Deep Dive

The Barrel and Ballistics

The Gas System and Muzzle Device

Receiver, Sights, and Furniture

Section 3: Production, Refinement, and Specialization (1979-1993)

Manufacturing History

Evolution of Furniture

Specialized Variants

Section 4: A Complicated Legacy – Service History and Combat Performance

Intended Role vs. Actual Deployment

Combat Performance Analysis

Reputation and the “Krinkov” Myth

Section 5: The Line of Succession – Post-Soviet Replacements

5.1 The Carbine Successor: The AK-105

5.2 The Submachine Gun Descendant: The PP-19-01 Vityaz

5.3 The Future Replacement: The AM-17

Conclusion

Works cited

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Summary

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When Strength and Quality Matter Most