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The primary arena for great power competition has shifted from conventional military confrontation to a persistent, multi-domain struggle in the “gray zone” between peace and war. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the alternative forms of conflict employed by the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China. It moves beyond theoretical frameworks to assess the practical application and effectiveness of economic warfare, cyber operations, information warfare, proxy conflicts, and legal warfare (“lawfare”). The analysis reveals distinct strategic approaches: the United States acts primarily as a defender of the existing international order, using its systemic advantages for targeted coercion; Russia operates as a strategic disrupter, employing asymmetric tools to generate chaos and undermine Western cohesion; and China functions as a systemic revisionist, patiently executing a long-term strategy to displace U.S. influence and reshape global norms in its favor.

The key finding of this report is that while these gray zone methods have proven effective at achieving discrete objectives and managing escalation, their long-term strategic success is mixed. Critically, they often produce significant unintended consequences that are actively reshaping the global security and economic order. The use of broad economic sanctions and tariffs, for example, has accelerated the formation of an alternative, non-Western economic bloc and spurred efforts to de-dollarize international trade. Similarly, persistent cyber and information attacks, while achieving tactical surprise and disruption, have hardened defenses and eroded the trust necessary for international cooperation. The gray zone is not a temporary state of affairs but the new, permanent battlespace where the future of the international order will be decided. Navigating this environment requires a fundamental shift in strategy from crisis response to one of perpetual, integrated competition across all instruments of national power.

Section I: The Strategic Environment: Redefining Conflict in the 21st Century

From Open War to Pervasive Competition

The 21st-century strategic landscape is defined by a distinct shift away from the paradigm of declared, conventional warfare between major powers. The overwhelming military and technological superiority of the United States and its alliance network has created a powerful disincentive for peer competitors to engage in direct armed conflict.¹ Consequently, rivals such as Russia and China have adapted by developing and refining a sophisticated toolkit of alternative conflict methods. These strategies are designed to challenge the U.S.-led international order, erode its influence, and achieve significant strategic gains without crossing the unambiguous threshold of armed aggression that would trigger a conventional military response from the United States and its allies.¹ This evolution does not signify an era of peace, but rather a transformation in the character of conflict to a state of persistent, pervasive competition waged across every domain of state power, from the economic and digital to the informational and legal.

Anatomy of the Gray Zone

This new era of competition is primarily conducted within a strategically ambiguous space known as the “gray zone.” The United States Special Operations Command defines this arena as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality”.³ The central characteristic of gray zone operations is the deliberate calibration of actions to remain below the threshold of what could be legally and politically defined as a use of force warranting a conventional military response under international law (jus ad bellum).²

Ambiguity and plausible deniability are the currency of the gray zone. Actions are designed to be difficult to attribute and interpret, thereby creating confusion and sowing hesitation within an adversary’s decision-making cycle.⁴ This calculated ambiguity is particularly effective against democratic nations. The legal and bureaucratic structures of democracies are often optimized for a clear distinction between peace and war, making them slow to recognize and counter threats that defy this binary.³ This can lead to policy paralysis or responses that are either disproportionately escalatory or strategically insignificant, a vulnerability that actors like Russia and China consistently exploit.³ The toolkit for gray zone operations is extensive, including but not limited to information operations, political coercion, economic pressure, cyberattacks, support for proxies, and provocations by state-controlled forces.¹ While many of these tactics are as old as statecraft itself, their integrated and synergistic application, amplified by modern information and communication technologies, represents a distinct evolution in the nature of conflict.¹

The Hybrid Warfare Playbook

If the gray zone is the strategic arena, “hybrid warfare” is the tactical playbook used to compete within it. While not a formally defined term in international law, it is widely understood to describe the synchronized use of multiple instruments of power—military and non-military, conventional and unconventional, overt and covert—to destabilize an adversary and achieve strategic objectives.² The objective is to create synergistic effects where the whole of the campaign is greater than the sum of its parts.²

The Russian strategic approach, often associated with Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, explicitly elevates the role of non-military means, viewing them as often more effective than armed force in achieving political and strategic goals.⁵ This doctrine was vividly demonstrated in the lead-up to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, where Russia combined a massive military buildup with a sophisticated disinformation campaign, cyberattacks, economic pressure on European energy markets, and nuclear blackmail to shape the strategic environment.²

It is essential to distinguish between these two concepts: the gray zone describes the operational space where competition occurs, while hybrid warfare describes the methods employed within that space.² Most hybrid tactics are deliberately applied in the gray zone precisely to exploit its ambiguity and avoid triggering a formal state of armed conflict as defined by international humanitarian law.³ This strategic choice is not an accident but a calculated effort to wage conflict in a manner that neutralizes the primary strengths of a conventionally superior adversary. The gray zone is, therefore, an asymmetric battlespace, deliberately crafted to turn the foundational pillars of the liberal international order—its commitment to the rule of law, open economies, and freedom of information—into exploitable vulnerabilities.

Section II: The Economic Arsenal: Geopolitics by Other Means

The US-China Tariff War: A Case Study in Economic Coercion

The economic competition between the United States and China escalated into open economic conflict in 2018, providing a clear case study in the use, effectiveness, and limitations of tariffs as a tool of modern statecraft.

Goals vs. Reality

The Trump administration initiated the trade war with a set of clearly articulated objectives: to force fundamental changes to what it termed China’s “longstanding unfair trade practices,” to halt the systemic theft of U.S. intellectual property, and to significantly reduce the large bilateral trade deficit.⁸ Beginning in January 2018 with tariffs on solar panels and washing machines, the conflict rapidly escalated. The U.S. imposed successive rounds of tariffs, eventually covering hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods, citing Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as its legal justification.⁸ China responded with immediate and symmetrical retaliation, targeting key U.S. exports with high political sensitivity, such as soybeans, pork, and automobiles, directly impacting the agricultural and manufacturing heartlands of the United States.⁸ This tit-for-tat escalation continued through 2019, culminating in a tense “Phase One” agreement in January 2020 that sought to de-escalate the conflict.⁸

Effectiveness Assessment: A Blunt Instrument

Despite the scale of the tariffs, the trade war largely failed to achieve its primary stated goals. The purchase commitments made by China in the Phase One deal were never fulfilled, with Beijing ultimately buying none of the additional $200 billion in U.S. exports it had pledged.⁸ Rigorous economic analysis has demonstrated that the economic burden of the tariffs was borne almost entirely by U.S. firms and consumers, not by Chinese exporters.¹¹ This resulted in higher prices for a wide range of goods and was estimated to have reduced U.S. real income by $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018.¹²

Furthermore, the pervasive policy uncertainty generated by the conflict had a chilling effect on global business investment and economic growth.¹³ Companies, unable to predict the future of the world’s most important trade relationship, delayed capital expenditures, disrupting global supply chains and slowing economic activity far beyond the borders of the two belligerents.¹³ The trade war thus serves as a powerful example of how broad-based tariffs function as a blunt and costly instrument, inflicting significant self-harm while yielding limited strategic gains.

Unintended Consequences

The most profound and lasting impacts of the trade war were not its intended effects but its unintended consequences. Rather than forcing a rebalancing of the U.S.-China economic relationship, the conflict accelerated a process of strategic decoupling. It compelled multinational corporations to begin the costly and complex process of diversifying their supply chains away from China, a trend that benefited manufacturing hubs in other parts of Asia, particularly Vietnam.¹⁵

Perhaps more significantly, the trade war reinforced Beijing’s conviction that it could not rely on an open, rules-based global economic system dominated by the United States. In response, China has intensified its national drive for technological self-sufficiency in critical sectors like semiconductors, a move that could, in the long term, diminish U.S. technological and economic leverage.¹⁶ By sidelining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in favor of unilateral action, the United States also weakened the very multilateral institutions it had built, encouraging a global shift toward protectionism and regional trade blocs.¹⁴

The Sanctions Regime Against Russia: Testing Economic Containment

The Western response to Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine represents the most comprehensive and coordinated use of economic sanctions against a major power in modern history. This campaign serves as a critical test of the efficacy of economic containment in the 21st century.

Targeting the War Machine

The sanctions regime implemented by the United States and a broad coalition of allies was designed with a clear purpose: to cripple the Russian Federation’s ability to finance and technologically sustain its war of aggression.¹⁹ The measures were unprecedented in their scope and speed, targeting the core pillars of the Russian economy. Key actions included freezing hundreds of billions of dollars of the Russian Central Bank’s foreign reserves, disconnecting major Russian banks from the SWIFT financial messaging system, imposing a near-total ban on the export of high-technology goods like semiconductors, and implementing a novel price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil exports.²¹ This multi-pronged assault aimed to deny Moscow the revenue, financing, and technology essential for its military-industrial complex.²⁰

The Limits of Efficacy and Russian Adaptation

While the sanctions have inflicted undeniable and significant damage on the Russian economy, they have failed to deliver a knockout blow or compel a change in Moscow’s strategic objectives. Estimates suggest that Russia’s GDP is now 10-12% smaller than it would have been without the invasion and subsequent sanctions.²² However, the Russian economy has proven far more resilient than initially expected.¹⁹

Moscow’s adaptation has been threefold. First, it transitioned its economy onto a full war footing, with massive increases in defense spending fueling industrial production and stimulating GDP growth, albeit in an unsustainable manner.¹⁹ Second, it proved adept at sanctions evasion. Russia successfully rerouted the majority of its energy exports from Europe to new markets in China and India, often selling at a discount but still generating substantial revenue.²¹ It also developed a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers operating outside of Western insurance and financial systems to circumvent the G7 price cap.²² Third, and most critically, it leveraged its partnership with China to procure essential dual-use technologies, such as microelectronics and machine tools, that were cut off by Western export controls.²⁰

Strategic Realignment

The most significant long-term consequence of the sanctions regime has been a fundamental and likely irreversible strategic realignment of the Russian economy. Forced out of Western markets and financial systems, Moscow has dramatically deepened its economic, technological, and financial integration with China. Bilateral trade has surged to record levels, and the Chinese yuan has increasingly replaced the U.S. dollar in Russia’s trade and foreign reserves.¹⁷ This has accelerated the consolidation of a powerful Eurasian economic bloc positioned as a direct counterweight to the U.S.-led financial and trade system. The sanctions, intended to isolate Russia, have inadvertently catalyzed the creation of a more robust and resilient alternative economic architecture, thereby spurring global de-dollarization efforts and potentially weakening the long-term efficacy of U.S. financial power.¹⁹

This dynamic illustrates a central paradox of modern economic warfare: the aggressive use of systemic economic power, while effective at inflicting short-term pain, simultaneously provides a powerful incentive for adversaries to build parallel systems designed to be immune to that very power. Each application of sanctions against Russia or tariffs against China acts as a catalyst for the construction of an alternative global economic order, eroding the foundations of U.S. leverage over time.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Influence Through Investment

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a cornerstone of its foreign policy and a primary instrument of its economic statecraft. While often portrayed through a simplistic lens, its strategic function is nuanced and far-reaching.

Beyond the “Debt-Trap” Narrative

In Western strategic discourse, the BRI is frequently characterized as a form of “debt-trap diplomacy”.²⁷ This narrative posits that China intentionally extends unsustainable loans to developing nations for large-scale infrastructure projects. When these nations inevitably default, Beijing allegedly seizes control of the strategic assets—such as ports or railways—thereby expanding its geopolitical and military footprint.²⁷ The case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port is consistently cited as the primary evidence for this strategy.²⁷

A Nuanced Reality

A detailed examination of the Hambantota Port case, however, reveals a more complex reality that undermines the simplistic debt-trap thesis. The proposal for the port originated with the Sri Lankan government, not with Beijing, as part of a long-standing domestic development agenda.²⁷ Furthermore, Sri Lanka’s severe debt crisis in the mid-2010s was not primarily caused by Chinese lending, but by excessive borrowing from Western-dominated international capital markets and unsustainable domestic fiscal policies.²⁷ Chinese loans constituted a relatively small portion of Sri Lanka’s overall foreign debt.²⁷

Crucially, the port was not seized in a debt-for-equity swap. Instead, facing a balance of payments crisis, the Sri Lankan government chose to lease a majority stake in the port’s operations to a Chinese state-owned enterprise for 99 years in exchange for $1.1 billion in hard currency.²⁷ These funds were then used to shore up Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves and service its more pressing debts to Western creditors.²⁷

While the debt-trap narrative is an oversimplification, it does not mean the BRI is benign. It is a powerful instrument of geoeconomic influence. By becoming the primary financier and builder of critical infrastructure across the developing world, China creates long-term economic dependencies, secures access to resources, opens new markets for its companies, and builds political goodwill that can be translated into diplomatic support on the international stage.³⁰ The BRI allows China to systematically expand its global footprint and embed its economic and, increasingly, technological standards across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, thereby challenging the post-Cold War economic order.

Section III: The Digital Frontlines: Cyber and Electronic Warfare

The cyber domain has emerged as a central theater for great power competition, offering a low-cost, high-impact, and plausibly deniable means of projecting power and undermining adversaries. Russia and China have both developed sophisticated cyber capabilities, but they employ them in pursuit of distinct strategic objectives, reflecting their different geopolitical positions and long-term goals.

Russia’s Doctrine of Disruption

Russia’s approach to cyber warfare is fundamentally asymmetric and disruptive, designed to compensate for its relative weakness in the conventional military and economic domains. Its cyber operations prioritize psychological impact and the creation of societal chaos over permanent destruction.

This doctrine has been demonstrated through a series of high-profile operations against the United States. The cyberattacks on the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 2015-2016 were not merely an act of espionage but an influence operation designed to disrupt the U.S. presidential election and erode public trust in the democratic process.³² The 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack represented a new level of sophistication, compromising the networks of numerous U.S. government agencies and thousands of private sector companies by inserting malicious code into a trusted software update.³⁴ This operation provided Russia with widespread, persistent access for espionage and potential future disruption. Similarly, the 2021 ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline, while attributed to a criminal group, highlighted the profound vulnerability of U.S. critical infrastructure to disruptive cyberattacks, causing widespread fuel shortages along the East Coast.³⁴

The strategic objective underpinning these actions is the generation of uncertainty and the degradation of an adversary’s will to act.³⁷ By demonstrating the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and democratic institutions, Russia aims to create a psychological effect that far exceeds the direct technical damage, sowing division and decision-making paralysis within the target nation.³⁷ Joint advisories from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) repeatedly confirm that Russian state-sponsored actors are persistently targeting U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including energy, finance, and defense, for both espionage and disruptive purposes.³⁸

China’s Strategy of Espionage and Exploitation

In contrast to Russia’s disruptive tactics, China’s cyber strategy is characterized by its industrial scale, persistence, and systematic focus on long-term intelligence gathering and intellectual property (IP) theft. It is not primarily a tool of chaos but a core component of China’s comprehensive national strategy to supplant the United States as the world’s leading economic and military power.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains dedicated units, such as the infamous Unit 61398 (also known as APT1), tasked with conducting large-scale cyber espionage campaigns against foreign targets.⁴² These operations have successfully exfiltrated vast quantities of sensitive data from the United States. Notable examples include the systematic theft of design data for numerous advanced U.S. weapons systems, including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F-22 Raptor, and the Patriot missile system.³⁴ This stolen IP directly fuels China’s own military modernization, allowing it to reverse-engineer and replicate advanced technologies, thereby leapfrogging decades of costly research and development and rapidly eroding America’s qualitative military edge.³⁴

Beyond military secrets, China’s cyber espionage targets a wide array of sectors to advance its economic goals. This includes the theft of trade secrets from leading U.S. companies in industries ranging from energy to pharmaceuticals.³⁴ The massive 2015 breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which compromised the sensitive personal data of over 21 million current and former federal employees, provided Beijing with an invaluable database for identifying, targeting, and recruiting intelligence assets for decades to come.³⁴ Recent intelligence reports indicate a dramatic surge in Chinese cyber espionage operations, with a 150% increase in 2024 alone, highlighting the unabated intensity of this campaign.⁴⁴

Effectiveness and Asymmetry

Both Russia and China have successfully weaponized the cyber domain as a highly effective asymmetric tool. It allows them to contest U.S. power and impose significant costs while operating below the threshold of armed conflict and maintaining a degree of plausible deniability.⁴⁵ The difficulty of definitive, public attribution for cyberattacks creates a permissive environment for aggression, allowing state sponsors to operate with relative impunity.⁴⁵

This reality reveals a critical divergence in strategic timelines. Russia’s cyber doctrine is optimized for the short term, employing disruptive attacks to achieve immediate political and psychological effects that can shape a specific crisis or event. China, in contrast, is waging a long-term, strategic campaign of attrition. Its patient, industrial-scale espionage is designed to fundamentally alter the global balance of technological, economic, and military power over the course of decades. The United States, therefore, faces a dual cyber threat: Russia’s acute, shock-and-awe style disruptions and China’s chronic, corrosive campaign of exploitation. Effectively countering these divergent threats requires distinct strategies, mindsets, and capabilities.

Section IV: The War for Minds: Information and Influence Operations

In the gray zone, the cognitive domain is a primary battlefield. The strategic manipulation of information to shape perceptions, control narratives, and undermine societal cohesion has become a central pillar of modern conflict. Russia and China, while often collaborating in this space, pursue fundamentally different long-term objectives with their information and influence operations.

Russia’s “Active Measures 2.0”

Russia’s contemporary information warfare is a direct evolution of the Soviet Union’s “active measures,” updated for the digital age.³⁷ The core strategy is not to persuade foreign audiences of the superiority of the Russian model, but to degrade and disrupt the political systems of its adversaries from within.³⁷

The 2016 U.S. presidential election serves as the canonical example of this doctrine in practice. The operation, directed by President Vladimir Putin, was multifaceted, combining the cyber theft of sensitive information with a sophisticated social media campaign.³³ The GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, hacked the computer networks of the DNC and Clinton campaign officials, subsequently leaking the stolen emails through fronts like Guccifer 2.0 and platforms like WikiLeaks to generate damaging news cycles.³³

Simultaneously, the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), a state-sponsored “troll farm,” created thousands of fake social media accounts to impersonate American citizens and political groups.³³ The IRA’s primary tactic was not to spread pro-Russian propaganda, but to identify and inflame existing societal fault lines in the United States, particularly those related to race, gun control, immigration, and religion.⁵⁰ By creating and amplifying hyper-partisan content on both the far-left (e.g., supporting Black Lives Matter) and the far-right (e.g., supporting secessionist movements), the IRA’s goal was to deepen polarization, foster distrust in institutions, suppress voter turnout among targeted demographics, and ultimately undermine faith in the American democratic process itself.⁵⁰ This approach is highly effective because it acts as a social parasite, feeding on and magnifying organic divisions within an open society, making it difficult for citizens and policymakers to distinguish foreign manipulation from authentic domestic discourse.³⁷

China’s Quest for “Discourse Power”

China’s information strategy is more systematic, ambitious, and long-term than Russia’s. It is explicitly guided by the doctrine of the “Three Warfares”: public opinion warfare (shaping public perception), psychological warfare (influencing the cognition and decision-making of adversaries), and legal warfare (using law to seize the “legal high ground”).⁵⁴ The ultimate goal of this integrated strategy is to achieve what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) calls “discourse power” (话语权).⁵⁶

Discourse power is the ability to shape global norms, values, and narratives to create consensus around a new, China-led international order.⁵⁶ This involves a multi-pronged effort to legitimize China’s authoritarian governance model and present it as a superior alternative to what it portrays as the chaotic and declining system of Western liberal democracy.⁵⁶ The CCP pursues this goal through several mechanisms:

Massive Investment in State Media: Beijing has poured billions of dollars into expanding the global reach of its state-controlled media outlets, such as CGTN and Xinhua, to broadcast the CCP’s narratives directly to international audiences.⁵⁴
United Front Work: The CCP’s United Front Work Department orchestrates a vast, global effort to co-opt and influence foreign elites, including politicians, academics, business leaders, and media figures, to advocate for China’s interests and silence criticism.⁵⁴
Digital Dominance: China seeks to shape the global digital ecosystem by exporting its model of “cyber sovereignty,” which prioritizes state control over the free flow of information, and by promoting its own technical standards for next-generation technologies like 5G and AI.⁵⁶

While Russia’s information operations are often opportunistic and focused on tactical disruption, China’s are patient, strategic, and aimed at a fundamental, long-term revision of the global information order.⁵⁸ Russia seeks to burn down the existing house; China seeks to build a new one in its place, with itself as the architect.

The U.S. Response: Public Diplomacy

The primary instrument for the United States in the information domain is public diplomacy, executed largely through the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM). The USAGM oversees a network of broadcasters, including Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA).⁶⁰ The stated mission of these entities is to provide accurate, objective, and comprehensive news and information to audiences in countries where a free press is restricted, thereby serving as a counterweight to state propaganda and supporting the principles of freedom and democracy.⁶⁰ However, the USAGM has historically faced challenges, including internal political disputes and questions regarding its strategic effectiveness in a modern, saturated, and highly fragmented digital media landscape.⁶¹

This reveals a fundamental divergence in strategic approaches. Russian information warfare is a strategy of cognitive disruption, designed to confuse, divide, and ultimately paralyze an opponent by turning its own open information environment against it. Chinese information warfare is a strategy of cognitive displacement, a long-term project aimed at methodically replacing the norms, values, and narratives of the liberal international order with its own. Countering the former requires tactical resilience and societal inoculation against division, while countering the latter requires a sustained, global competition of ideas and a compelling reaffirmation of the value of the democratic model.

Section V: Conflict by Other Means: Proxies and Lawfare

Beyond the economic and digital realms, great powers continue to engage in conflict through indirect means, leveraging third-party actors and legal frameworks to advance their interests while avoiding direct confrontation. Proxy warfare and lawfare are two prominent tools in the gray zone playbook, used to alter the strategic landscape and impose costs on adversaries without resorting to open hostilities.

The Modern Proxy War

Proxy warfare, a hallmark of the Cold War, has been adapted to the contemporary environment. States support and direct non-state or third-party state actors to wage conflict, allowing the sponsoring power to achieve strategic objectives with limited direct risk and cost.

Syria as a Microcosm

The Syrian Civil War serves as a stark example of modern, multi-layered proxy conflict. The Russian Federation intervened militarily in 2015 with the explicit goal of preserving the regime of its client, Bashar al-Assad, which was on the verge of collapse.⁶³ This intervention was a direct pushback against U.S. and Western influence, as it placed Russian forces and their proxies, including the Wagner Group, in direct opposition to various Syrian opposition groups that were receiving support from the United States and its regional partners.⁶³ This created a complex and dangerous battlespace where the proxies of two nuclear powers were engaged in active combat. Throughout this period, the People’s Republic of China played a crucial supporting role for Russia, using its position on the UN Security Council to provide diplomatic cover. Beijing repeatedly joined Moscow in vetoing resolutions that would have condemned or sanctioned the Assad regime, demonstrating a coordinated Sino-Russian effort to thwart Western policy objectives in the Middle East.⁶⁵

Ukraine and the “Proxy Supporter” Model

The war in Ukraine represents a different but equally significant model of proxy conflict. The United States and its NATO allies are engaged in a classic proxy war, providing massive military, financial, and intelligence support to Ukraine to enable its defense against direct Russian aggression.²⁵ A critical evolution in this conflict is the role played by China as a “proxy supporter” for Russia. While Beijing has refrained from providing large quantities of direct lethal aid, its comprehensive economic and technological support has been indispensable to sustaining Russia’s war effort.²⁵ China has become the primary destination for sanctioned Russian energy, the main supplier of critical dual-use components like microelectronics for Russia’s military-industrial complex, and a key diplomatic partner in shielding Moscow from international condemnation.¹⁷ This support, while falling short of a formal military alliance, effectively makes China a co-belligerent in a gray-zone context. The dynamic is further complicated by North Korea’s role as a direct arms supplier to Russia, providing vast quantities of artillery shells and even troops, illustrating a multi-layered proxy network designed to sustain Russia’s war and bleed Western resources.²⁵

China’s Lawfare in the South China Sea

“Lawfare” is the strategic use of legal processes and instruments to achieve operational or geopolitical objectives.⁶⁹ China has masterfully employed lawfare in the South China Sea as a primary tool to assert its expansive territorial claims and challenge the existing international maritime order.

Challenging the International Order

China’s strategy is centered on enforcing its “nine-dash line” claim, which encompasses nearly the entire South China Sea. This claim was authoritatively invalidated in 2016 by an arbitral tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a ruling that Beijing has rejected and ignored.⁶⁹ China’s lawfare is a systematic effort to create a new legal reality that conforms to its territorial ambitions.

Tactics of Creeping Jurisdiction

Beijing’s lawfare tactics are methodical and multi-faceted, designed to create a state of perpetual contestation and gradually normalize its control:

Domestic Legislation as International Law: China passes domestic laws that treat the international waters of the South China Sea as its own sovereign territory. For example, its 2021 Coast Guard Law authorizes its forces to use “all necessary means,” including lethal force, against foreign vessels in waters it claims, in direct contravention of UNCLOS.⁷⁰
Creating “Facts on the Water”: China has engaged in a massive campaign of land reclamation, building and militarizing artificial islands on submerged reefs and shoals. These outposts serve as forward operating bases for its military, coast guard, and maritime militia, allowing it to project power and physically enforce its claims.⁶⁹
Reinterpreting Legal Norms: China actively seeks to redefine long-standing principles of international law. It argues that the right to “freedom of navigation” applies only to commercial vessels and does not permit foreign military activities within its claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a position contrary to the consensus interpretation of UNCLOS.⁷⁰

This strategy of lawfare is not merely a legal or diplomatic maneuver; it is a foundational element of China’s gray zone strategy. By passing domestic laws that criminalize the lawful activities of other nations in international waters, China is attempting to create the legal and political pretext for future military action. This approach aims to reframe a potential act of aggression—such as firing on a Philippine or Vietnamese vessel—not as a violation of international law, but as a legitimate domestic law enforcement action within what it defines as its own jurisdiction. This calculated ambiguity is designed to paralyze the decision-making of adversaries and their allies, most notably the United States, thereby achieving a key objective of gray zone conflict.

Section VI: Strategic Assessment and Outlook

The preceding analysis demonstrates that the contemporary security environment is characterized by persistent, multi-domain competition in the gray zone. The United States, Russia, and China have each developed distinct doctrines and toolkits to navigate this new battlespace, with varying degrees of success and significant long-term consequences for the international order.

Comparative Analysis of National Strategies

The strategic approaches of the three major powers can be synthesized into a comparative framework that highlights their overarching goals and preferred methods across the key domains of conflict. The United States generally acts to preserve the existing international system from which it derives significant benefit, using its power for targeted enforcement and coercion. Russia, as a declining power with significant conventional limitations, acts as a disrupter, seeking to create chaos and exploit divisions to weaken its adversaries. China, as a rising and patient power, acts as a systemic revisionist, seeking to methodically build an alternative order and displace U.S. leadership over the long term.

Conflict Domain	United States Approach	Russian Approach	Chinese Approach
Economic	Systemic dominance (dollar, SWIFT), targeted sanctions, alliance-based trade pressure.	Asymmetric coercion (energy), sanctions evasion, strategic pivot to China, weaponization of food/commodities.	Systemic competition (BRI), supply chain dominance, technological self-sufficiency, targeted economic coercion.
Cyber	Intelligence gathering, offensive/defensive operations, alliance-based threat sharing.	Disruption of critical infrastructure, sowing chaos, psychological impact, election interference.	Industrial-scale espionage for economic/military gain, IP theft, strategic pre-positioning in critical networks (Volt Typhoon).
Information	Public diplomacy (USAGM), countering disinformation, promoting democratic values.	“Active Measures 2.0”: Exploiting and amplifying existing societal divisions, tactical disinformation.	“Discourse Power”: Long-term narrative shaping, censorship, promoting authoritarian model, co-opting elites.
Proxy	Support for state/non-state partners (e.g., Ukraine, Syrian opposition) to uphold international order.	Direct intervention with proxies (Wagner) and state forces to prop up clients and challenge U.S. influence.	Economic/military support to partners (e.g., Russia), avoiding direct military entanglement, using proxies for resource access.
Legal	Upholding international law (e.g., FONOPs), use of legal frameworks for sanctions.	Manipulation of legal norms, undermining international bodies, using legal pretexts for aggression.	“Lawfare”: Using domestic law to rewrite international law, creating new “facts on the ground” to legitimize claims.

What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why

A critical assessment of these strategies reveals clear patterns of effectiveness and failure.

What Works:

Asymmetric and Low-Cost Tools: For Russia and China, gray zone tools like cyber operations, information warfare, and the use of proxies have proven highly effective. They impose significant strategic, economic, and political costs on the United States and its allies at a relatively low cost and risk to the aggressor.⁷³ These methods are particularly potent because they are designed to exploit the inherent openness and legal constraints of democratic societies.
Incrementalism and Patience: China’s strategy of “creeping” aggression, particularly its lawfare and island-building campaign in the South China Sea, has been effective at changing the physical and strategic reality on the ground. By avoiding any single, dramatic action that would demand a forceful response, Beijing has incrementally advanced its position over years, achieving a significant strategic gain through a thousand small cuts.⁷⁴
Targeted, Multilateral Coercion: For the United States, economic and diplomatic actions are most effective when they are targeted, multilateral, and leverage the collective weight of its alliance network. The initial shock of the coordinated financial sanctions against Russia demonstrated the immense power of this collective approach, even if its long-term coercive power has been blunted by Russian adaptation.¹⁹

What Doesn’t Work:

Broad, Unilateral Economic Pressure: The U.S.-China trade war demonstrated that broad, unilateral tariffs are a blunt instrument that often inflicts more economic pain on the imposing country than on the target, while failing to achieve its core strategic objectives and producing negative unintended consequences for the global trading system.¹²
A Purely Defensive Posture: A reactive and defensive strategy is insufficient to deter persistent gray zone aggression. Russia’s continued campaign of sabotage and subversion in Europe, despite heightened defensive measures, indicates that without the credible threat of proactive and costly consequences, adversaries will continue to operate in the gray zone with relative impunity.⁴⁷
Building Compelling Alternative Narratives: While Russia is effective at disruptive information warfare and China is effective at censorship and control, both have largely failed to build a compelling, positive narrative that resonates with audiences in democratic nations. Their influence operations are most successful when they are parasitic on existing grievances rather than when they attempt to promote their own models.⁵⁹

Recommendations for the United States

To compete more effectively in this new battlespace, the United States must adapt its strategic posture. The following recommendations are derived from the analysis in this report:

Embrace Pervasive Competition: The U.S. national security apparatus must shift from a traditional crisis-response model to a posture of continuous, proactive competition across all domains. This requires institutional and cultural changes that recognize the gray zone as the primary arena of conflict.
Strengthen Societal Resilience: The most effective defense against information warfare and foreign influence is a resilient society. This requires a national effort to enhance media literacy, secure critical election infrastructure, and address the deep-seated domestic social and political divisions that adversaries so effectively exploit.
Integrate All Instruments of National Power: Gray zone threats are inherently multi-domain; the response must be as well. The U.S. must break down bureaucratic silos and develop a national strategy that seamlessly integrates economic, financial, intelligence, diplomatic, legal, and military tools to impose coordinated costs on adversaries.
Leverage Alliances Asymmetrically: The U.S. alliance network remains its greatest asymmetric advantage. This network must be leveraged not just for conventional military deterrence, but for gray zone competition. This includes building coalitions for coordinated cyber defense, developing joint strategies for economic security and supply chain resilience, and crafting unified diplomatic and informational campaigns to counter authoritarian narratives.

Future Trajectory of Conflict

The trends identified in this report are likely to accelerate and intensify. The proliferation of advanced technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, will supercharge gray zone conflict. AI will enable the creation of hyper-personalized disinformation campaigns, deepfakes, and autonomous cyber weapons at a scale and speed that will overwhelm current defenses.⁵⁸ The ongoing fragmentation of the global economic and technological landscape will create more clearly defined blocs, turning the economic domain into an even more central and contentious battlefield. The gray zone is not a passing phase of international relations. It is the new, enduring reality of great power competition, a permanent battlespace where ambiguity is the weapon, attribution is the prize, and the contest for influence is constant.

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Glock, Glocks, Gunsmithing, Polymer80, Shooting in General, Uncategorized

Glock Truglo Tritium and Fiber Optic Sights Are Amazing Improvements!

September 4, 2024 RoninsGrips

A fellow emailed me wanting to upgrade his from the generic OEM Glock sights that I don’t think really excite anyone to something that would be more visible in general and also work in the dark. My answer was immediate – go with the TRUGLO TFX Pro Tritium and Fiber Optic Xtreme sights.

The featured photo above shows how bright they are on my G17 slide on it. I bought these sights by the way – so you are getting my honest opinion.

Folks, these are my hands down favorite sights for a number of reasons:

They are CNC machined from steel and have a durable black nitride finish — they are not soft plastic.
They do not need batteries – the lit dots are via fiber optics when there is light and sealed tritium when it is dark so you are covered regardless of the light available. The tritium ought to fluoresce (emit light) for about 10-20 years and I’ll worry about replacing them then.
I really like the three green dot configuration – two on the rear sight and one on the front. The front also has an orange ring that you can see when there is light but is green when operating off the tritium only.
The rear sight goes into the slide’s groove very easily and is then secured with a set screw. Some sights can be a bear to install but not these.
The rear sight is big enough that it can help you rack the slide one handed in a one-handed emergency.
They have a 12 year warranty.
They are assembled in the USA – the tritium capsules are made in Switzerland.

What Glock models are supported?

Because these are so popular TRUGLO is making a variety of models to support the different Glock configurations that are out there. I assembled the following table and you can also check their webpage if you want:

TG13GL1PC	Glock® 17 / 17L, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 45 (Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG13GL2PC	Glock® 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 40, and 41 (Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG13GLAPC (TFX front, Adjustable Rear)	Glock® 17 / 17L, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 45 (Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG13GL3PC	Glock® 42, 43, 43x, 48; Honor Defense® (all models)

Source: https://truglo.com/spare-quiver-mount-spare-quiver-mount

Personally, I use the TG13GL1PC on a G17 and G34. I bought both off sight sets off Amazon – click here to see the large selection there.

This gives you a better view of the sights overall. This is the TFX Pro TG13GL1PC with the fixed rear sight. I really like the sight picture these give day or night.

Here’s the rear sight and you can just barely see the set screw that secures the sight between the two “ears”. The slot at the top of each fiber optic is where it collects light to illuminate the dot. If there isn’t any light then that is where the tritium capsules take over.

Here’s the front sight. The orange ring is nice during the day and you only see the green tritium dot in the dark.

Well, trying to take a photo in the dark of three green dots with a cell phone camera was an experience. I went in a basement room and shut the door to cut off light. It’s fuzzy but you get the idea – all three dots are nicely lit in any lighting condition.

Do they have lower cost models also?

Yes, they do. The Tritium series just has the tritium for illumination in the dark and show as bright white dots during the day.

TG231G1	Glock® 17 / 17L, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 38, and 39 (Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG231G2	Glock® 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 40, and 41(Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG231G1A	Glock® 42, 43

Source: https://truglo.com/catalog/product/view/id/2068/s/tritium-tritium/category/19/

They also make a Tritium Pro series that builds on the Tritium base model and adds an orange ring to the front sight plus the back sight is bigger and that makes it easier if you need to rack the slide with one hand.

TG231G1W	Glock® 17 / 17L, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 38, and 39 (Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG231G2W	Glock® 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 40, and 41(Excluding M.O.S. models)
TG231G1AW	Glock® 42, 43
TG231G1MW	Glock® MOS 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 38 and 39
TG231G2MW	Glock® MOS 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 40 and 41

Source: https://truglo.com/catalog/product/view/id/2069/s/tritium-pro-tritium-pro/category/19/

Do they support other brands and models of pistols?

Definitely. These are very popular lights given their great combination of quality at a fair price. I tend to see the best prices on Amazon – click here to see them.

Conclusion

I find these sights to be an incredible improvement over the plain Glock sights – they are easy to see and aid with rapid aiming. I really do like these sights and use them personally. I strongly recommend them.

I hope this helps you out.

Note, I have to buy all of my parts – nothing here was paid for by sponsors, etc. I do make a small amount if you click on an ad and buy something but that is it. You’re getting my real opinion on stuff.

Uncategorized

Stribog SP10A3 10mm At The Range

September 2, 2024 RoninsGrips

I posted about the modifications to the SP10A3 as well as magazine loaders and now it is time to talk about how it performed. One of my brother-in-laws and nephews were in town and ready to help me try it out. First off, we had a lot of fun and second, the 10mm Stribog ran stunningly well.

Preparing For the Range

When the Stribog arrived, I field stripped, cleaned and lubricated it. This is always a good idea because you never know what all will be in a firearm – preservatives, dirt or even dry with no lubricant.

The manual is well written so read it. The sections on field stripping, cleaning, and oiling are worth your time. I would also recommend hand cycling the action a few hundred times to accelerate your parts getting to know each other – also known as wearing in.

The bolt assembly made up of the large carrier to the rear (right) and the bolt head in front (left), is enormous. A lot of the 10mm recoil is eaten up by inertia, the recoil spring and then a giant buffer block. It’s no wonder the recoil is incredibly mild. Also, when you have something this big, there can be a ton of friction so you need to lubricate it.

This giant rubbery green thing is the recoil buffer. I honestly don’t recall ever seeing one this big – every. If the inertia of the bolt and recoil spring leave enough energy to drive the bolt carrier into this buffer, it can handle it without a doubt.

Visiting the Range

My brother-in-law, Banduy, and nephew, Julian, headed to the range to have some fun and break in the Stribog. It was a great day as we unloaded and set up the targets, moved the bench into place and got ready.

We used the Custom Smith .45 UMP loader to fill up four 20 round magazines with S&B 180gr FMJ. Folks, I have shot cases of this stuff and it’s fantastic range ammo in all of my 10mm pistols and now the Stribog.

I shot the first magazine and was very impressed. The action was smooth with very little felt recoil. I did need to dial in the UH-1 a bit as the laser boresight allowed me to get the UH-1 in the vacinity if the round impacts on the paper.

By the way, I initially had a quick connect sling loop on the A3 Stribog adapter just about the top rear of the grip. It was really annoying and I got rid of it very quickly. Maybe someone with smaller hands wouldn’t notice it but I sure did.

Julian has been shooting with me for almost 20 years now. Time flies by. He was next up and with practiced skill did a steady 20 round set standing freehand with no problems at all.

This was his first 20 round set as he got used to the Stribog. He was about 25-40 feet back getting started.

I haven’t done a comparison of felt recoil with the micro compensator and without. I can tell you that it is incredibly smooth with it on.

We had a lot of fun. The Stribog just rocked it, No failures of any kind through 200 rounds of ammo. The one thing I realized after the outing was that I could shoot through a case of 10mm pretty quick with the SP10A3.

Summary

We shot the Strbog freehand back to about 25 yards and found it to be a delight to shoot. It definitely filled my desire for a 10mm carbine vs. my various 10mm pistols and would highly recommend it. GrandPower did another great job with the SP10A3.

I’ve since had it out a couple of more times and it’s run great everytime. Yes, I did have to buy more S&B 180gr ammo because of it 🙂

I hope this helps you out.

Uncategorized

The Stribog 10mm Is Amazing!

September 1, 2024 RoninsGrips

Back in 2022, I bought a Stribog SP9A1 and really liked it. Then the ATF brace fiasco rolled around and I decided to sell it. It was a darned nice 9mm pistol caliber carbine (PCC) with the brace and I have since regretted selling it. Once the brace ruling was shot down, it went back on my “I need to get another one some day list”. Before I decided to buy te SP9A3, Grand Power decided to release a 10mm version – the SP10A3. Two weeks later I had one.

Why did I jump on the 10mm? In general, I like to let new designs settle down and get the bugs worked out. In this case, Grand Power was taking a very proven design and upscaling it. The second reason is that 10mm is God’s Pistol Cartridge in my mind. Sure, the 9mm has thousands of loads and can do the job but 10mm was designed by Colonel Cooper to fill a gap he saw for pistols reaching out to 50 yards. It was souped up from the get go.

At any rate, I have a number of 10mm pistols right now, have always liked the 10mm round including for back woods bear defense. I wasn’t adding a caliber but extending the situations wherein I could use it. I’m honestly not accurate with a pistol beyond 25 yards due to my tremor and have wanted a 10mm pistol caliber carbine (PCC) for quite some time. I have always been far more accurate with a carbine than a rifle. The problem has always been a lack of affordable 10mm PCC options on the market. So, when I read the first blog post about a 10mm Stribog being released, I moved fast.

The Stribog SP10A3 showed up in a very nice hardcase with three of it’s magazines. It was time to get creative.

Making the Mods

I knew the base Stribog SP10A3 would be too heavy for me to shoot as a pistol so I started researching what all I was going to do in terms of the brace, compensator, optic and handstop.

The Brace

For the brace, my first choice was the F5 modular brace but they were sold out because they really hadn’t kicked back into gear after the brace ruling was repealed. I knew I wanted a folder so I went with an A3 Tactical Modular Folding Brace – which has adapter, folder and aluminum struts. For the actual brace portion, I like the aluminum Tailhook Mod 1 braces – they have great machining and don’t flex at all. I also opted for a Xeno cheekpiece that attaches to the strut.

By the way, the SP10A3 can use the same braces as the SP9A1 and SP9A3 series weapons. It comes with a polymer rear cap that has an integral 1913 Picatinny rail on it so you can use one of the many options out there – notably the various options from JMAC Customs that pioneered the concept.

This is the A3 modular brace comprised of the Stribog adapter, folding mechanism, straight aluminum strut and a Mod 1 Tailhook brace. Note, The SP10A3 uses the same braces as the SP9A1 and A3.

This is a close up of the Tailhook Mod 1 brace. You push a button on the other side and it opens up to provide support under your arm for more stable one-handed shooting.

The Compensator

Now this part might have been overkill. The Stribog SP10A3 is a chunky boy but not in a bad way. I expected it to manage the 10mm cartridge’s recoil just fine all on its own but it had a 9/16-24 threaded barrel that needed something stuck on it! Take that thread size and a 10mm/.40 S&W caliber and you enter the land of limited choices. Hint – search for the .40 and you’ll get more results.

First, I detest aluminum muzzle brakes. When you shoot a lot, the erode quickly due to the heat and particles of the muzzle blast. I’ve also seen aluminum brakes and fake cans droop/sag when the aluminum gets so hot it starts to melt. So, I wanted steel.

After some digging, I went with an HK Parts Micro Comp. It’s ordnance grade steel, nitride finished, very small and they have two models – one with slotted ports and one with numerous circular port holes. I went with the latter just because I’ve used the circular port style in the past with good luck.

That huge green chunk of rubber is the recoil buffer of the Stribog SP10A3. As I wrote this, I was trying to think of all the SciFi movies that had some substance made up of this green color. Well, I’ll let you ponder that but I can tell you it does the job of soaking uip some of the remaining recoil remarkably well.

This is the HK Parts Micro Comp – 9/16-24 for .40 caliber.

The Optic and BUIS

I wanted a fast optic sight for target acquisition within 100 yards. The Vortex AMG UH-1 is a perfect fit for this situation. Being a holographic sight, it is parallax free, has unlimited eye relief and appears to the eye as being on the same plane as the target. Moreover, the laser projected EBR-CQB reticle has a one minute of angle (MOA) red dot surrounded by a 65 MOA target acquisition ring.

People ask me why I am so pro-Vortex and the reasoning is simple – the optics have excellent engineering, work as claimed, are very durable and are backed up by a no-hassle warranty. To save money, I could have opted for the Vortex Crossfire red dot but the UH-1 is such a step up with its bigger window and reticle that I went with it.

By the way, unless a weapon will only be used at ranges, always factor in backup iron sights (BUIS). In the case of pairing BUIS with the UH-1, I used Magpul Pro Sights. The Pro series sights are made from steel vs. their polymer counterparts and I have slowly drifted towards them over the years because I find them robust and reliable.

Here is the Vortex AMG UH-1 optic and the front and rear Magpul Pro Sights. I tend to run the BUIS folded down until I need them. They are in the deployed/up position right now for the photo.

The Handdguard and Handstop

One design difference that I appreciate is that the SP10A3 has a long handguard right out of the box. With the SP9 series you either had a lot of barrel exposed or you added something like the Dragon Snout. So, no changes there.

The one thing I did add was an Arisaka HS-P hand stop. Call me paranoid but I want something at the end of the handguard that stops my hand from sliding off the end. The Arisaka is a simple rugged hand stop that has a really novel way of locking itself onto your Picatinny rail vs. unsightly exposed screws.

You slide the HS-P on your rail to the location you want. You then use a hex head wrench to deploy the silver lug shown above between the elevated Picatinny segments and it locks in place. It’s such an elegant design and rock solid.

Here is a photo of the Arisaka HS-P in position. It works great and feels great — I seriously like this little hand stop!

I Haven’t Changed The Trigger Yet

One thing I did notice was the trigger. The SP9A1 Stribog I owned had a surprisingly good trigger. What was in my SP10A3 was a “meh” trigger. Not great but not horrible either. Guess what? It turns out it is an AR fire control group. You can go to whatever AR trigger you want although I am doubtful cartridge triggers will work. I may change it out for a Geiselle in the future or even just polish it but left it alone for now.

I was surprised to find out from Grand Power USA that the Stribog SP10A3 uses an AR fire control group. I never asked about my SP9A1 because it was remarkably decent straight from the factory. Looking at the finish on the hammer, it could use some polishing or just to get worn in — in other words, shoot it a bunch, let the parts get to know each other ane a lot of the roughness will smooth itself out as imperfections get worn down.

End Result

The Stribog turned out slick. The only thing I have ditched so far is the quick disconnect sling swivel you see just above the pitol grip. While it seemed like a great idea, it annoyingly interefered with the web of my hand between my thumb and index finger.

Summary

I was genuinely excited. The SP9A1 I had impressed me so much that I ordered this SP10A3, planned and installed some modifications. Next up was to take it to the range and just to spoil the next post a bit – it ran stunningly well with S&B 180gr 10mm FMJ ammo.

Uncategorized

Are Weaver and Picatinny Rails the Same Thing?

January 20, 2024 RoninsGrips

The short answer to that question is “No” but then when someone asks if they can use some Picatinny mount on a Weaver rail it becomes “It depends”. Why is that?

Well, the Picatinny rail does have a true military specification – “MIL-STD-1913″ that lays out the details but nothing like that exists for Weaver rails – when writing this post, I did some digging and I can’t find an authoritative width of the rail, the recoil slot is about 0.180” but their spacing, number and depth can all vary.

The reason that Weaver rings and mounts can typically fit a Picatinny rail is that the recoil slots are 0.206″ wild and spaced 0.394″ apart. However, if you are using rings that were on a Weaver rail, while the bolts or recoil bars may fit the Picatinny slots, the spacing between the mounts may need to be adjusted.

There are plenty of posts out there with more details but I would tell you to only use Picatinny rails and mounts going forward if at all possible. The reason is that because there is the published MIL-STD-1913 specification, the interoperability of parts from different vendors is far, far more likely.

This is the Picatinny Rail / MIL-STD-1913 cross-section view.
It is from the Wikipedia entry about the MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny Rail.

This side-view shows the details of the recoil slots.
It is from the Wikipedia entry about the MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny Rail.

I was unable to find a US DOD direct link for the MIL-STD-1913 but I did find two sites hosting scanned copies – BiggerHammer and EverySpec

Some Photos

What inspired me to sit down and write this is my working on a 5.56 Polish Beryl right now. The actual Beryl optics rails are a both rare and cost a fortune. While there are Picatinny versions out there, I have two of the older Weaver rail design they started with and am lucky that my ADM and Vortex mounts all surprisingly fit – it’s always nice when things work out in a good way.

At first glance, you’d think it was a Picatinny rail with the slots going the whole length. It’s actually a Weaver rail. Weaver rails can have dramatically different numbers of slots and spacing.

The top is a RS Regulate Picatinny rail. The bottom is the Beryl’s Weaver rail. You can see the difference in the recoil slot spacing. By the way, RS Regulate is my favorite AK scope mount hands down.

That is the bottom side of an American Defense Manufacturing (ADM) mount and my goto scope mounts these days when I want quick connect levers. The recoil bar is what may or may not fit a Weaver rail. Now this only has one lever and bar – One piece scope mounts will likely have two recoil bars and the spacing between them could compound fitting challlenges.

The Vortex UH-1 and Crossfire red dot on an ADM base both fit the Beryl rail.

In Closing

Weaver and Picatinny rails are different. In general, you can use Weaver mounts on a Picatinny rail but you may not be able to put a Picatinny mount on a Weaver Rail.

In my case, I got lucky and could mount the red dots no problem. A mount with two screws/contact points may or may not line up – that will just depend on many factors in terms of the spacing between the recoil bars, size of the bars, etc.

Bottom line, go with Picatinny rails and mounts going forward to maximize your ability to move components around.

For more information:

History, Military, Uncategorized

Civil War Monument With an Eleven Inch Dahlgren Gun in Saint Joseph, MI

October 26, 2023 RoninsGrips

In Saint Joseph, MI, near the intersection of Lake and Broad Streets sits a civili war monument consisting of an Eleven Inch Dahlgren and some stacked shot. The gun is pointing out to the lake and there is a simple sign for curious folks to read.

I’ve read this sign and looked at the cannon many times over the years and realized it was time to write a post about it.

Photo Gallery

The following is a gallery of photos of the 11-inch (XI) Dahlgren. If you clck on one, then you can see it full size and navigate around:

Some History

St. Joseph’s 11-inch Dahlgren gun was built in 1864 at Hinkley, Williams & Co. in Boston, Massachusetts, for service in the Civil War. It and other guns of its type were designed by Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren who wanted to use more more modern design methods to create a safer and more powerful gun. His designs were known as “Soda Bottles” because of their characteristic rounded shapes with additional steel at the rear to strengthen the breach.

Rear Admiral John A Dahlgren – the designer of the Dahlgren guns (Source: Wikipedia)

In total, 465 of the XI (Eleven) inch guns were made at five different foundaries between 1856-1864. That means the Saint Joseph gun was built during the last production year.

The smoothbore gun was cast hollow, bored out and lathed to a finished weight of 15,890 pounds which is marked on the gun. The sign and the reference table from Wikipedia are close but not exact:

The sign says the gun used a 15 pound charge and could hurdle either a 130 pound exploding shell or 200 pound solid shot a distance of over two miles.

Wikipedia cites a reference book on Civil war artillery that the gun used a 20 pound charge to launch either a 133.5 pound exploding shell or 166 pound solid shot a distance of 3,650 yards (2.07 miles) at a 15 degree elevation.

There is an interesting 12 year gap here. The gun was made in 1864 and the sign says it was removed from the USS Marion in 1876 and it’s previous use was uncertain. Was it on the Marion the whole time? Let’s try and look at that.

USS Marion

Drawing of the Marion at Hampton Roads circa 1880 (Source: Wikipedia)

From Wikipedia, here’s a quick timeline of the USS Marion:

April 24, 1839 – Launched as a sloop-of-war – 25 years before the St. Joseph gun was made in 1864
1856-1857 in ordinary – this means it was in a reserve fleet. It might have needed repairs or overhauling.
June 21, 1861 – recommissioned after the Civil War broke out
July 14, 1861 – set sail
May 1862 – ordered to Boston for repairs
July 24, 1862 – ordered to Annapolis for use as a practice ship until 1870
1864 – The St. Joseph gun was made in Boston (according to the sign)
1871 – Rebuilt as a third-class steamer
January 12, 1876 – Recommisioned
1876 – The gun was removed from the Marion (according to the sign in St. Joseph)
July 5, 1897 – gun dedicated in Saint Joseph – it had to travel there, be installed, etc. (according to the sign)

So, not much we can glean from what I can find. Odds are the 11-inch Dahlgren was getting dated by that time.

Summary

Today, kids climb around on the XI-Dahlgren gun and families take photos but they don’t know much about it. I suppose the Civil War is becoming just a few days, if even that, in history classes. Regardless, it is a memorial for men who served from the area. It’s well maintained by the city and gracefully stands guard looking out at the lake.

References

Information on Dahlgren guns and historic photos of Rear Admiral Dahlgren and the USS Kearsarge are from the Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dahlgren_gun
Information about the USS Marion and photos of it are from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Marion
USNI article on Dahlgren and his guns https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2013/may/armaments-and-innovations-soda-bottle-shaped-shell-guns

Uncategorized

Fitting a Ronin’s Grips Beryl Grip To Your Rifle

October 24, 2023 RoninsGrips

Some time back in 2017 or 2018, I bought some original Beryl second generation grips – the larger one with finger grip cut outs. I then made a couple of molds based on the originals. I thought they would be popular right away, but I’d sell one here and there and then Arms of America started importing Beryls with the AKM-looking grip. Guys started buying my grip and reports started coming back to me this year that my grip was loose on their Beryl rifles. This really confused me as my mold was cast from an original. At first I thought it was occasional issues with the customer or the rifle but then more reports came back and I had to dig in.

A customer, Phillip, sent me a ton of photos and links to posts of guys sharing how they fit my grips to their rifles. Whoa! I had no idea! Thanks to Phillip’s help, I was able to figure out what was going on and write this post.

What is keeping the grip from sitting all the way is the grip nut – the small square forging that the pistol grip screw threads into for securing the grip against the receiver and trigger guard. It’s just a tad too long and the inside top of the grip is hitting it.

The grip nut is hitting the inside top of the grip. That inside top shelf was in the original grip. Maybe they had a grip reinforcement plate or shorter grip nuts when using this style of grip – I’m not sure.

Not all grip nuts are too long – this is a Romy G kit that I built way, way back sometime between 2004 and 2006. I know I did not need to trim the nut. This is what threw me off when guys said they weren’t fitting. In hindsight, different countries and makers of grip nuts having different lengths isn’t surprising – you often see a lot of differing parts tolerances across AK makers and models.

Trimming the Nut

At this point, I can’t change the mold so you need to make any adjustments on your end. You either need to carve open the inside top of the grip using a bur, sanding tip or even a small 1-2″ saw blade. That seems like a lot of work – the easiest seems to be to file or grind the grip nut’s bottom so it is a tad shorter.

If you want to save your original grip nut, you can buy another and trim it if you want. Any AKM-style grip nut ought to work. For the screw though, use the one we supply with the grip.

The left is a Romanian MD.63 nut and the right is a new slightly taller LBE Unlimited nut, The LBE is just a tad taller but either one would need to be trimmed to sit flush. Regardless, it is the part of the grip nut that is face up in this photo that you need to shorten via a file, sanding belt, end mill or whatever. Normally, this flat part is facing downwards the the grip screw slides into it.

It’s that bottom edge that needs to be trimmed.

To fit it, trim off a bit and test over and over. You don’t need to do it all at once. If the threads seem off at some point, run the grip screw in from the other direction to clear the threads.

Trim the bottom of the grip nut until the grip sits nice and flush against the receiver.

By the way, if you are wondering what the grip is against, it is an old AK-Builder bent flat where I messed up the top rails years ago and now use it for mocking things up.

Summary

I didn’t know the grip nut length was going to be a problem and don’t have a way to change the molds at this point. What I’d recommend is either trimming your nut or buying a replacement and trimming it as needed.

I hope this helps you out.

Uncategorized

Fitting a C39 Micro Orca Handguard

October 2, 2023 RoninsGrips

By popular demand we are bringing back our C39 Micro handguard that can also be fit to the Micro Draco. The purpose of this post is to share some fitment issues you need to be aware of and general guidance.

In my honest opinion, installing the Orca requires some expertise with woodworking or machining and is not something I would recommend to a novice. it is not just a drop in handguard like you would expect with an AR handguard for example.

Safe Use Is Your Responsibility – This is a short handguard on a short pistol. Please be mindful of safety whenever you are shooting it. Do not let anyone with a weak upper body, grip or who can’t control the pistol, fire the pistol.

Why You Must Fit the Handguard – A First-Hand Lesson

There are two reasons – first, there are a lot of things that can differ pistol to pistol and the pressure casting method we use has a tolerance that will require you to make some adjustments.

Second reason, the rear of the handguard must butt up against the front of the receiver to transfer the stress of recoil. If these surfaces do not contact each other, all of the stress will be placed on a small #8-32 screw that can’t handle the load and will shear off – I’ll show you what I mean.

Some time early this year, my friend Scott told me the screw sheared off when his wife was shooting his C39 Micro. This caused me to stop bringing the Orca handguard back until I sorted things out.

So, I finally had some time to look at it and the handguard wasn’t fully seated back against the receiver. His was the first Orca I made and I missed it. So, the Orca beat the heck out of the screw until it snapped off.

The handguard is firmly against the receiver and you can see what was left of the screw was towards the front of the hole. This tells you that I messed up installing it years ago and the #8 screw was taking all of the load.

The screw sheared off right at the top of the hol.

I sanded it flat, center punched the screw, drilled a hole and then used a Hanson screw extractor to back it out.

Thanks to Brownell’s Oxpho-Blue, you would never know the original finish was missing.

Fitting the Handguard the Right Way to a C39 Micro

Armed with what went wrong, I dug in. I had the original handguard and I also cast two new ones to test with. For those of you reading this to install an Orca on a Micro Draco, read this for information but there will be a section further down with a video you need to watch.

Safety Brief: Before you do anything with your pistol, please make sure it is unloaded and safe.

Okay, the plastic used is a temperature resistant glass fiber reinforced urethane. It does not like to bend or compress. Think of it as a hardwood with an attitude. It can be sanded, filed, whatever you like. Wear a dustmask to avoid breathing the dust – you don’t want to do that.

The orange areas will likely need trimming to clear your gas block and the purple areas may need adjusting to allow the area around the barrel to seat. The orange virtually always needs adjusting the but the purple may or may not.

To fit the handguard, pretty much all you need is a file or sandpaper wrapped around a couple of paint stir sticks. I just use a file and you’ll see what in the photos.

I use a file and take the same amount off each side. Count your strokes and equal pressure. Don’t try and remove everything at once – take off just a bit and test over and over.

When removing material, do it equally with a few strokes from each side. If you slide the handguard on and the screw hole is off-center then you need to decide which side needs adjusting. Ideally, you don’t want to see that at all – remove material equally from both sides and do it slowly – don’t rush.

The sides need to clear the gas block and gas tube.

When you are trying to clear the front, make sure the barrel is to the bottom of the handguard. Here, it is sticking because it is out of position towards the top.

This test handguard had the waste plastic sawed off but no sanding that’s why the front looks so coarse. I wanted you to see that it is a snug fit up front and the barrel must sit down in the channel during fitting and testing.

You will need the threaded hole to be centered.

The trick is to test fit, remove a bit of material equally and test again. I have a dead blow mallet to tap the Orca on or off but it is not done forcefully – you want snug. If you try and force it, the plastic will snap sooner or later.

The dead blow mallet is there to help me tap it on and off. It is not there for a “Mongo smash” level of force. You want a snug fit only.

Depending on your pistol and how the fitting goes you may or may not need to add a shim. A shim is a thing piece of material that closes the gap between the handguard and the front of the receiver. It can be metal strips or a high temp gasket material. Just don’t use paper or cardboard or something that heat or oil/solvents can destroy.

I had three handguards during testing. One need an 1/8th in shim and the other two needed far less – somewhere between 1/32nd and a 1/16th. I made this one so you could see it.

The shims are 2″ tall and 5/32″ wide – I cut them from a sheet of high-temp abrasion resistant Buna rubber. As mentioned, these are an 1/8th” thick. You just need the sides but if you want to go all around and shim every contact surface you could. You can leave them free-floating or but a dab of super glue or your favorite adhesive behind them once you know they are what you need. Don’t glue them in until you’ve done all the testing, etc.

So that’s pretty much it for the C39 Micro – get the handguard to slide on centered over the threaded hole in the gas block and shim if needed to it seats fully.

Fitting the Micro Draco

A fellow did a real nice job documenting how he converted the Orca to fit a Micro Draco. He created this video and put it on YouTube so everyone can benefit from it:

In Conclusion

I hope this install guide helps you out!

Section I: The Strategic Environment: Redefining Conflict in the 21st Century

From Open War to Pervasive Competition

Anatomy of the Gray Zone

The Hybrid Warfare Playbook

Section II: The Economic Arsenal: Geopolitics by Other Means

The US-China Tariff War: A Case Study in Economic Coercion

Goals vs. Reality

Effectiveness Assessment: A Blunt Instrument

Unintended Consequences

The Sanctions Regime Against Russia: Testing Economic Containment

Targeting the War Machine

The Limits of Efficacy and Russian Adaptation

Strategic Realignment

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Influence Through Investment

Beyond the “Debt-Trap” Narrative

A Nuanced Reality

Section III: The Digital Frontlines: Cyber and Electronic Warfare

Russia’s Doctrine of Disruption

China’s Strategy of Espionage and Exploitation

Effectiveness and Asymmetry

Section IV: The War for Minds: Information and Influence Operations

Russia’s “Active Measures 2.0”

China’s Quest for “Discourse Power”

The U.S. Response: Public Diplomacy

Section V: Conflict by Other Means: Proxies and Lawfare

The Modern Proxy War

Syria as a Microcosm

Ukraine and the “Proxy Supporter” Model

China’s Lawfare in the South China Sea

Challenging the International Order

Tactics of Creeping Jurisdiction

Section VI: Strategic Assessment and Outlook

Comparative Analysis of National Strategies

What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why

Recommendations for the United States

Future Trajectory of Conflict

Works cited

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What Glock models are supported?

Do they have lower cost models also?

Do they support other brands and models of pistols?

Conclusion

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Preparing For the Range

Visiting the Range

Summary

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Making the Mods

The Brace

The Compensator

The Optic and BUIS

The Handdguard and Handstop

I Haven’t Changed The Trigger Yet

End Result

Summary

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Some Photos

In Closing

For more information:

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Photo Gallery

Some History

USS Marion

Summary

References

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Trimming the Nut

Summary

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Why You Must Fit the Handguard – A First-Hand Lesson

Fitting the Handguard the Right Way to a C39 Micro

Fitting the Micro Draco

In Conclusion