Iran’s dual-military structure, comprising the conventional Artesh (the regular army) and the ideological Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is not an accident of history or a sign of dysfunction. It is a deliberate, core feature of the Islamic Republic’s political architecture, designed to prioritize regime survival above all else. This system is a sophisticated “coup-proofing” strategy ¹ that, by design, values ideological purity and asymmetric deterrence over conventional military efficiency.

This structure has created two fundamentally different organizations with asymmetric missions, power, and resources. The IRGC, the regime’s “praetorian guard” ², has evolved into the state’s political, economic, and military center of gravity, with a constitutional mandate to protect the Revolution.³ In contrast, the Artesh is a “marginalized” ⁵ conventional force, constitutionally tasked with the traditional defense of Iran’s national sovereignty and borders.⁶

This report analyzes the architecture, function, and long-term viability of this split. It finds that while the dual structure is operationally inefficient and fosters resource-wasting competition ¹, it is highly effective at its primary goals: insulating the Supreme Leader from internal military threats and providing a flexible, deniable, and potent asymmetric capability to project power abroad. The system is therefore highly sustainable. Analysis indicates the IRGC’s deep-state power ensures it will emerge as the undisputed “kingmaker” and primary guarantor of state continuity in any post-Khamenei succession scenario.⁹

Part 1: Architecture of a Divided Force: Origins and Command

To understand Iran’s military capabilities, one must first understand that its security apparatus was designed from its inception to serve two masters: the ideological Revolution and the territorial State. This duality is the central pillar of its defense doctrine.

1.1 Ideological Origins of the Split (1979 Revolution)

The dual-military system was born from the foundational mistrust of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.¹⁰ The revolutionary leadership, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was deeply suspicious of the existing “Imperial Army,” which it viewed as a pillar of the toppled Shah’s regime and potentially loyal to the exiled monarch.¹⁰ Despite the Artesh’s February 11, 1979, declaration of neutrality, the new regime saw it as a potential counter-revolutionary threat.¹⁰

Consequently, the regime initiated brutal purges, executing and exiling senior military officials and experienced personnel.⁴ This “ravaged” the Artesh ⁵, draining its manpower by an estimated 40-60 percent and leaving it “ill equipped”.⁴ Simultaneously, Khomeini, fearing a future coup, created a parallel force.³ In May 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formally established, consolidating several Islamist militias loyal to the revolution.³

The IRGC’s purpose was explicitly political and ideological: to serve as a “counterweight” to the regular military ¹¹, to thwart potential coups by the Artesh ³, and to act as an ideologically pure “praetorian guard” ² loyal not to the nation, but to the revolution’s clerical leadership and the doctrine of Velayat-e-faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist).³ This foundational act baked institutional rivalry, resource competition, and doctrinal differences into the DNA of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus.¹⁰ This rivalry was not a flaw; it was the central feature.

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War was not the cause of the split, but its crucible.¹³ The Iraqi invasion in 1980 exposed the weakness of the purged Artesh, which was unable to repel the invasion on its own.⁴ This military necessity forced the rapid professionalization of the IRGC.⁷ The war gave the IRGC a platform to prove its ideological zeal and military value, creating a powerful “sacred defense” narrative that the Artesh, as the Shah’s remnant, could never claim.¹⁴ This conflict cemented the IRGC’s status and entrenched its doctrinal focus on asymmetric warfare, proxy warfare, and ballistic missiles as tools of survival and deterrence.¹⁵

1.2 Constitutional Division of Labor: A Mandate for Asymmetry

The 1979 Constitution formally codifies the dual structure, creating a deliberate and profound asymmetry in mission.

• Article 143 (Artesh): The Artesh, as the national armed forces, is tasked first and foremost with “defending Iran’s independence and sovereignty” and its territorial integrity.⁶ This is a classical, national defense mission focused on external borders.¹⁰
• Article 150 (IRGC): The IRGC is tasked with the “guarding of the Revolution and its achievements”.³

This seemingly subtle distinction is, in practice, a vast chasm in mandate. The Artesh’s mission is finite, clear, and conventional (defend the borders). The IRGC’s mission is ambiguous, ideological, and borderless. This “seemingly more rewarding job” ⁶ is interpreted as an all-encompassing legal mandate for the IRGC to intervene in any sphere to “guard the revolution.” This includes preventing foreign interference ³, thwarting internal coups ³, crushing “deviant movements” ³ and domestic dissent ⁴, and exporting the revolution’s ideology.⁴ This constitutional ambiguity in Article 150 legally justifies the IRGC’s pervasive intervention in domestic politics, foreign policy, the economy, and internal security ², far exceeding the mandate of a traditional military.

1.3 The Supreme Leader’s Command and Control (C2) Architecture

The command and control (C2) structure is the primary mechanism for the regime’s political control and coup-proofing.

1. Supreme Leader as Commander-in-Chief: The Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces.⁷ He has the sole authority to declare war and peace and makes all final security policy decisions.⁷
2. Sidelining the Elected Government: The elected government is deliberately excluded from the military chain of command. The President of Iran has “relatively few powers,” does not control any armed forces, and is not in the C2 chain.⁷ The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) is purely an administrative body for R&D, production, and procurement, not a policy or command institution.⁷
3. Parallel Chains of Command: Both the Artesh and the IRGC report directly and separately to the Supreme Leader.⁷ This C2 architecture is designed for political loyalty, not operational efficiency. By having all military chains terminate only with him, the Supreme Leader ensures their primary loyalty is personal (to the Vali-ye Faqih) and not institutional.
4. Coordinating Bodies: The Supreme Leader uses two primary bodies to coordinate—but explicitly not unify—the parallel forces:

• Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS): The senior-most military body, setting policy and strategic guidance. Its chief (currently an IRGC officer) is tasked with overseeing and coordinating both forces.⁷
• Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters (KCHQ): The top operational headquarters, responsible for operational C2 and coordinating joint military operations.⁷

5. Bypassing the Structure: This formal structure is often subverted. The Supreme Leader frequently bypasses the AFGS and KCHQ to issue orders directly to lower-level commanders.⁷ Furthermore, high-priority branches, most notably the IRGC-Quds Force, have their own privileged, direct line of communication to the Supreme Leader.⁷

This C2 architecture is the central nervous system of the coup-proofing strategy.¹ A successful coup would require the coordination of both the Artesh and the IRGC. The system is designed to make this impossible. With separate C2 chains ¹, separate logistics networks ¹, separate intelligence services ⁷, and pervasive counterintelligence bodies ¹⁷ loyal only to the Supreme Leader’s office, the two militaries are institutionally incapable of coordinating against him.

Table 1: The Artesh vs. IRGC: Foundational Comparison

Part 2: Comparative Analysis: Doctrines and Capabilities

The divergent missions of the Artesh and IRGC manifest in a practical division of labor, equipment, and areas of responsibility. Both forces maintain complete, parallel ground, naval, and air components, but they are optimized for entirely different types of conflict.⁷

2.1 Naval Forces: Blue-Water Ambition vs. Asymmetric Swarm

The naval split is the clearest example of Iran’s hybrid doctrine. The two forces have overlapping functions but are “distinct” in training, equipment, and “how they fight”.³

• Artesh Navy (IRIN): The IRIN is Iran’s “strategic force” ⁷, with a traditional, conventional doctrine.⁷ It is tasked with projecting “blue-water” power into the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and the high seas of the Indian Ocean.⁷ It operates Iran’s largest, most conventional (though “aging” ¹⁶) platforms: larger surface combatants like the Jamaran-class frigate ¹⁰, corvettes, and the core submarine fleet, including Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and domestically produced midget subs.⁷
• IRGC Navy (IRGCN): The IRGCN employs a “revolutionary” ²⁴ asymmetric doctrine.⁷ It is a “guerrilla force at sea” ³ whose primary Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the “Persian Gulf” ⁷ and the critical chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz ²⁵, which it is expected to control in a conflict.³ The IRGCN specializes in “hit-and-run” ³ and “swarming tactics” ²⁷, maintaining a massive inventory of “hundreds” ⁷ of small, fast attack craft armed with guns, rockets, torpedoes, and missiles.³ It also controls large arsenals of coastal defense anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and naval mines.³

This structure is a purpose-built, hybrid naval solution. The IRIN is for prestige and conventional state-on-state presence. The IRGCN is the actual war-fighting and deterrent force, designed to counter a technologically superior navy (i.e., the United States) in the “shallow and confined waterways” of the Strait of Hormuz.⁷ This doctrine was forged by failure; “a series of naval battles with the U.S. Navy in April 1988” during the Iran-Iraq War taught Iran that its “large naval vessels are vulnerable to air and missile attacks”.²⁸ That experience directly “confirmed the efficacy of small boat operations” and “spurred interest in missile-armed fast-attack craft,” forming the foundation of the IRGCN’s swarming doctrine today.²⁸

2.2 Air and Aerospace Forces: Conventional Atrophy vs. Strategic Strike

The split in the air domain highlights the regime’s strategic priorities: asymmetric strike over conventional air superiority.

• Artesh Air Force (IRIAF): This is a conventional air force tasked with defensive roles, such as supporting the national integrated air defense system and providing combat support to ground forces.¹⁶ However, it is widely considered Iran’s “most critical weakness” ²⁹ and a “key structural deficiency”.³⁰ The IRIAF is a “badly dated service” ¹⁶ operating a “shrinking and unrenewable air fleet” ³¹ of aging 1970s/80s-era American (F-14, F-4) and Soviet/Russian (MiG-29, Su-24) airframes.¹⁶ It is “vastly inferior” to its adversaries and suffers from high accident rates and crippling budgetary disadvantages.¹⁶
• IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF): Renamed from “Air Force” in 2009 ³², this move signaled its true mission: strategic deterrence.³² This force is the regime’s “crown jewel”.¹⁶ It does not compete with the IRIAF in conventional air-to-air combat. Instead, it controls all of Iran’s most important strategic strike assets:

1. Ballistic Missiles: The IRGC-ASF is the “primary body responsible” ³³ for Iran’s “formidable” ¹² and “large” ⁷ ballistic missile arsenal, the largest in the Middle East.¹⁶ This program, born from the “war of the cities” with Iraq, is the “centerpiece” of Iran’s deterrence doctrine.¹⁵
2. UAV (Drone) Program: The IRGC-ASF controls the lethal, “game-changer” ³⁵ drone arsenal.¹⁶ This program, originating in the 1980s ³⁵, has become a core strategic asset. Its R&D arm, the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), has reverse-engineered captured technology (like the U.S. RQ-170) to create the Shahed family of UAVs.³⁶
3. Space Program: The IRGC-ASF also runs Iran’s military space force and satellite-launch (SLV) program.⁷

The regime has made a conscious strategic and budgetary choice. It has allowed the IRIAF to atrophy ³¹ because it is not cost-effective against U.S. or Israeli airpower. Instead, it has built an “asymmetric air force” composed of ballistic missiles and swarms of attack drones.³⁵ This force is cheaper, has a longer reach, is deniable when used by proxies, and provides the strategic deterrence ¹⁵ that the IRIAF’s aging fighters cannot. The IRGC-ASF’s total control of this portfolio makes it arguably the single most powerful military branch in Iran.

2.3 Ground Forces: Border Defense vs. Internal Security

The ground forces reveal the regime’s “geography of trust.”

• Artesh Ground Force (IRIGF): This is the numerically larger force, with 350,000 personnel to the IRGC-GF’s 150,000.⁷ Its primary mission is conventional territorial defense against a state-level invasion.⁵ It is “avowedly apolitical” ¹⁸ and controls the “preponderance of heavy ground armor” (tanks).¹⁸ It is largely “sidelined” ⁵ from the regime’s core security concerns.
• IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF): This force is focused on regime security.

1. Internal Security: Its primary role is acting as the regime’s “Praetorian Guard” ² to suppress domestic dissent.³
2. Volatile Border Control: The IRGC-GF has taken over primary security responsibility from the Artesh in the most “volatile border provinces,” such as Kurdistan, Sistan va Baluchestan, and West Azerbaijan, which face active insurgencies.⁵
3. Expeditionary Role: The IRGC-GF has deployed to foreign theaters like Syria and Iraq to support Quds Force operations.⁶
4. Basij Organization: The IRGC-GF also controls the Basij, a massive volunteer paramilitary militia with 90,000 active members and 300,000 reservists.³ The Basij is the primary tool for internal suppression, “policing morals,” and acting as a mass mobilization reserve.⁷

The deployment map reveals the regime’s priorities. The “unreliable” but conventional Artesh ¹⁰ is placed on the external borders to face external state enemies.³⁸ The “loyal” IRGC ⁵ is deployed internally in cities and in the most sensitive, ethnically volatile border provinces ⁵ to protect the regime from its own citizens and separatist threats. The Artesh defends Iran; the IRGC defends the Islamic Republic.

While Artesh special forces (the 65th Airborne Brigade) have been deployed to Syria ⁶, this is not a sign of integration. They were deployed as “individual advisor-observers” ⁶ and, critically, “under the auspices of IRGC’s Qods Force”.⁶ This appears to be a token deployment by the Artesh to “ensure its continued relevance” ⁶ and prove its loyalty, rather than a genuine shift in mission. Distrust between the services remains “relatively strong,” and the Artesh continues to be the “subordinate force”.¹⁵

2.4 Air Defense: The One Domain of Integration

Air defense is the single, critical exception to the rule of parallel, rivalrous forces. A divided air defense is operationally suicidal, as it would lead to fratricide and catastrophic failure against a coordinated air and missile strike.

In 2008, the Artesh Air Defense Force (IRIADF) was split from the Air Force (IRIAF) to become its own separate, fourth branch, controlling the country’s military radar network.⁴¹ In 2019, the Supreme Leader established the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters (KADHQ).⁷

This KADHQ is a national command that oversees and integrates all air defense assets (radars, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery) from both the Artesh Air Defense Force (IRIADF) and the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF).¹⁶

Crucially, this KADHQ is “always commanded by a senior Artesh officer”.¹⁶ This is a significant, unspoken concession. The regime, prioritizing operational necessity over ideological purity in this single domain, places its trust in Artesh competence. The Artesh, as the legacy Imperial military, retained the institutional knowledge and “classical doctrine” ¹⁰ for running a complex, networked, conventional Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)—a core competency the asymmetrically-focused IRGC lacked.

2.5 Intelligence and Cyber Warfare: The New Asymmetric Domains

The dual-force concept extends into the non-kinetic domains. Iran has multiple, overlapping intelligence services, including the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), and the Artesh Directorate for Intelligence (J2).⁷ This “overlapping missions” structure “fuel[s] competition”.⁷ The IRGC-IO is described as the “foremost military intelligence service”.⁷

In cyber warfare, the IRGC is the dominant player.⁴³ The IRGC, the Basij (managing tens of thousands of “cyberwar volunteers” ⁴³), and the Passive Defense Organization (NPDO) are the three leading military organizations in cyber operations.⁴³ Iran’s cyber capabilities originated from domestic needs: surveillance and control of its own population during the 2009 “Green Revolution”.⁴³ These tools were then turned outward.

Iran sees cyberattacks as a key part of its asymmetric military capability.⁴³ It is low-cost, high-impact, and deniable.⁴⁵ The IRGC’s dominance here is a natural extension of its doctrine: just as it uses swarm boats and missiles to counter U.S. naval and air supremacy, it uses cyber to counter U.S. economic and military power. The intelligence rivalry, like the military rivalry, is a “coup-proofing” feature, not a bug. By having multiple agencies spying on each other ¹⁷ as much as on external foes, the regime prevents any one from becoming powerful enough to challenge the Supreme Leader.

Table 2: Comparative Capability Analysis by Domain

Part 3: The IRGC as a “State Within a State”

The massive disparity in power between the Artesh and the IRGC cannot be explained by their military roles alone. The IRGC’s power transcends the purely military domain, making it the true center of gravity of the regime. It has become a “state within a state,” with dominant, independent roles in foreign policy, the economy, and domestic politics.

3.1 The Quds Force (IRGC-QF): Architect of the “Axis of Resistance”

The IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is the “expeditionary arm” ¹² and “clandestine external operations element” ⁷ of the IRGC, established in 1990.⁷ Its primary mission is to “export the revolution” ¹⁶ by managing and supporting Iran’s network of foreign proxies and partners, known as the “Axis of Resistance”.⁷

The Quds Force provides leadership, funding, training, intelligence, and materiel ⁷ to a myriad of non-state groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria.¹²

The IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary and most effective foreign policy tool, representing its “comparative advantage” in statecraft.³⁹ It uses an irregular ³⁹ “network-building approach” ⁴⁹ to project power, achieve strategic depth ⁵⁰, and bog down adversaries ⁴⁴ on a budget. This is a mission the conventional, “apolitical” Artesh ¹⁸ is ideologically and structurally incapable of performing. The Quds Force holds a “special place” ¹⁶ in the regime, with a separate line of communication to the Supreme Leader ⁷ that bypasses the regular C2 structure and even gives it more influence in some countries than Iran’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷

3.2 The Economic Empire: Funding the Praetorians

The IRGC is not just a military, but a “business empire” ³ and “industrial empire with political clout”.³ Its economic power is vast, unaccountable, and controlled only by the Supreme Leader.¹³

• Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA): This is the IRGC’s massive engineering and construction arm ¹⁰, established after the Iran-Iraq War to help rebuild the country.²⁰ It has since grown into “the most notable financial institution of the IRGC”.²⁰ It dominates huge sectors of the economy—oil and gas, road construction, housing, water management, and agriculture ¹⁰—and has been awarded tens of billions in no-bid contracts.¹⁰
• Off-Budget Funding: The IRGC uses its political influence ²² to generate income ⁵⁴ to fund its own operations.⁵¹ It has direct access to Iran’s foreign exchange reserve (from which the Artesh is barred) ¹⁰ and engages in large-scale illicit activities, including smuggling ¹⁰ and using front companies to circumvent international sanctions.¹²

In contrast, the Artesh is barred from these lucrative revenue streams.¹⁰ Its economic activities are “limited to several chain stores”.¹⁰ This is the fundamental difference: the Artesh is a traditional military—a pure cost center that drains the national budget. The IRGC is a hybrid military-conglomerate that generates its own revenue.

This economic autonomy makes the IRGC financially independent and “sanction-proof.” When international sanctions ⁵⁵ cripple Iran’s official economy, the IRGC thrives by controlling the smuggling routes ²¹ and the black market. This perversely strengthens its relative power versus the Artesh ⁵⁵ and the civilian government. This economic dominance is the engine of its political and military superiority.

3.3 Political and Social Dominance: The “Deep State”

The IRGC is “a central player in Iran’s domestic politics”.¹² Supreme Leader Khamenei has appointed numerous former IRGC commanders to top political posts, and former guards in parliament advocate for hard-line policies.¹² All parliamentarians with a military background are veterans of the IRGC or Basij.¹⁰ In contrast, the Artesh is “avowedly apolitical” ¹⁸, “forced to remain apolitical” ², and has virtually no influence in the “regime’s political centers of power”.⁵

Socially, the IRGC (through the Basij) is the primary tool for suppressing domestic protests.³ It also controls its own media (Sepah News) ³ and a vast “ideological-political organization” (IPO) to ensure the indoctrination of its forces and the public.⁵⁷ The regime’s “Sacred Defense Cinema” glorifies the IRGC as the victor of the Iran-Iraq War, while largely ignoring the Artesh’s sacrifices, thus cementing its own prestige while diminishing its rival’s.¹⁰

The Artesh is merely “hardware”—tanks and ships for a limited function. The IRGC is both the “hardware” (missiles, boats) and the “software” (ideology, politics, media) of the regime. The Artesh is an employee of the state; the IRGC is a shareholder and “kingmaker”.³

Part 4: Net Assessment: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Sustainability

This dual-military structure, while appearing inefficient from a conventional military perspective, is a rational and highly effective system when viewed through the lens of the regime’s unique strategic goals.

4.1 Strengths of the Dual System (From the Regime’s Perspective)

1. Highly Effective “Coup-Proofing”: This is the system’s primary strength and purpose. By “counterbalancing” ¹ the Artesh with the IRGC, the regime creates parallel forces with separate C2 chains ¹, separate logistics ¹, and institutionalized rivalry.¹⁰ This is reinforced by “pervasive surveillance” from independent counterintelligence organizations.¹⁷ This structure makes a coordinated military coup against the Supreme Leader a practical impossibility.
2. Potent Asymmetric Deterrence: The system allows Iran to “employ a hybrid approach to warfare”.⁴⁵ The IRGC’s focus on asymmetric capabilities—ballistic missiles, drones, proxies, and naval swarms ⁷—provides a potent, cost-effective, and deniable deterrent ¹⁵ against conventionally superior foes.
3. Flexible, Deniable Power Projection: The IRGC-QF’s proxy network (“Axis of Resistance”) ¹⁶ allows Iran to “export its revolutionary ideology” ¹⁶ and wage “war by proxy” ¹⁵ across the Middle East ⁴⁴, giving it strategic depth far from its borders.

This system is perfectly tailored to the regime’s two grand strategic goals: 1) Survive internally, and 2) Deter and resist externally.¹⁶ A single, unified, conventional military might be better at fighting a conventional war, but it would be worse at both of the regime’s core tasks. It would be a coup risk ³ and would lack the ideological zeal and asymmetric doctrine to run a global proxy network.

4.2 Weaknesses of the Dual System (From a Military Effectiveness Perspective)

1. Gross Operational Inefficiency: The dual structure is explicitly listed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency as a “Key Vulnerability”.⁷ The lack of coordination, separate C2, and rivalrous information-hoarding create massive conventional inefficiency and “informational compartmentalization”.¹
2. “Disastrous Results”: This inefficiency is not theoretical. During the Iran-Iraq War, the disjointed command led to “disastrous results” ¹, including accounts of IRGC and Artesh soldiers firing on each other.¹
3. Resource Competition & Wasteful Duplication: The system creates “fierce rivalry” ¹⁰ for funding, recruits, and materiel ¹⁰, leading to an “ineffective use of resources” ⁸ and wasteful duplication (e.g., two navies, two air arms).
4. Conventional Atrophy: The regime’s prioritization of the IRGC has “marginalized” ⁵ the Artesh. This has hollowed out Iran’s conventional capabilities, leaving it with a “deficit in advanced conventional weaponry” ²⁹ and an air force that is “ill-prepared for modern combat”.¹⁶
5. Systemic Corruption & Public Resentment: The IRGC’s unaccountable economic power ¹³ fosters massive corruption ⁵³, which hollows out the civilian economy and breeds deep “discontent” ⁶⁰ and resentment among the population ⁶¹, a long-term vulnerability.

The sum of these weaknesses is that Iran has a military structure that is not designed to win a conventional, state-on-state war against a peer or near-peer competitor. It is designed to survive, deter, and protract conflict through asymmetric means. The system sacrifices war-winning capability for regime-survival capability.

4.3 Assessment of Sustainability and Future Trajectory

The dual-military structure, despite its inefficiencies, is an “inherent feature” ¹⁵ of the regime and is highly sustainable. The rivalry is intentionally maintained by the leadership ¹⁰ precisely because it serves the regime’s primary goal: survival.⁴⁵

The central challenge to this system’s stability is the eventual succession of the Supreme Leader.⁴ Supreme Leader Khamenei is the “unifying force” ⁴ who has a “mutually beneficial relationship” ¹² with the IRGC. Any potential successor is seen as lacking Khamenei’s stature, popularity, and religious credentials.⁹

As a result, any new Supreme Leader “will have no choice but to rely on the IRGC”.⁹ In a post-Khamenei era, the new leader’s reliance on the IRGC will increase, while the IRGC’s dependence on the new leader will decrease.⁹

This dynamic will make the IRGC the “military-security guarantor” ⁹ and “kingmaker” ²¹ of the post-Khamenei regime. It will likely consolidate its power even further ⁹, transforming the state into a “military-theocratic order” ⁶³ with the IRGC as the undisputed “center of gravity”.⁶³ Khamenei, with his revolutionary authority, controls the IRGC; his successor, who will likely owe their position to the IRGC’s support, will be managed by it.

In this future, the Artesh’s marginalization ⁵ will only accelerate. The IRGC, as the “kingmaker,” will ensure its rival remains subordinate ¹⁵ and on the periphery.⁵ The dual system is sustainable, but not as a balance of rivals. It will sustain as an increasingly unequal partnership, with the IRGC effectively absorbing the state and the Artesh relegated to a hollow, ceremonial role as a “national” border guard. The system’s inefficiency is its sustainability, as it guarantees the survival of the ruling ideology, which is its one and only true purpose.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly contribute towards our continued reporting, please visit our funding page.

Sources Used

1. (PDF) Relationship between Coup-proofing and Counterinsurgency …, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/369082254_Relationship_between_Coup-proofing_and_Counterinsurgency_Insights_from_Iran
2. The 2010s shifts between IRGC and Artesh: How false nationalism gave hope for an IRGC coup : r/NewIran – Reddit, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/NewIran/comments/15ax1pm/the_2010s_shifts_between_irgc_and_artesh_how/
3. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Wikipedia, accessed November 14, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps
4. IRGC History and Role in Iranian Statecraft – AHS – Alexander Hamilton Society, accessed November 14, 2025, https://alexanderhamiltonsociety.org/security-strategy/issue-one/irgc-history-and-role-in-iranian-statecraft/
5. The Artesh: Iran’s Marginalized and Under-Armed Conventional …, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/artesh-irans-marginalized-and-under-armed-conventional-military
6. Iran’s National Army Reorganizes | The Washington Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-national-army-reorganizes
7. Iran Military Power – Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
8. Soviet, Russian, and Israeli Assessments of Iran’s Nuclear Strategic Culture – Executive Services Directorate, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Litigation_Release/Litigation%20Release%20-%20Soviet,%20Russian,%20and%20Israeli%20Assessments%20of%20Iran’s%20Nuclear%20Strategic%20Culture%20%20200909.pdf
9. Moving to a post-Khamenei era: The role of the IRGC and the clergy …, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/moving-post-khamenei-era-role-irgc-and-clergy
10. Eternal Rivals? The Artesh and the IRGC | American Enterprise Institute – AEI, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/eternal-rivals-the-artesh-and-the-irgc/
11. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) | History, Growth, & Sanctions – Britannica, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-Revolutionary-Guard-Corps
12. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards
13. Khatam al-Anbyia – United Against Nuclear Iran, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/ideological-expansion/khatam-al-anbyia
14. Guarding History – Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Iran_study_complete.pdf
15. The Strategic Foundations of Iran’s Military Doctrine, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/images/comment/analysis/2017/december/2-mcinnis2125.pdf
16. Explainer: The Iranian Armed Forces | American Enterprise Institute – AEI, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/
17. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC’S ART of SURVIVAL: – The Washington Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3027
18. The Politics of Iran’s Regular Army | Middle East Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/politics-irans-regular-army
19. Beyond the IRGC: The rise of Iran’s military-bonyad complex | Clingendael, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/beyond-irgc-rise-irans-military-bonyad-complex
20. The Khatam al-Anbiya company and the future of the IRGC empire – JNS.org, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.jns.org/the-khatam-al-anbiya-company-and-the-future-of-the-irgc-empire/
21. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from an Iraqi View – a Lost Role or a Bright Future? – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-iraqi-view-lost-role-or-bright-future
22. Decoding Iran’s defence spending: pitfalls and new pointers, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2018/11/decode-iran-defence-spending/
23. The Iranian Maritime Challenge – DTIC, accessed November 14, 2025, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1200387.pdf
24. Eternal Rivals? The Artesh and the IRGC – Middle East Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/eternal-rivals-artesh-and-irgc
25. Iran 022217SP.pdf – ONI.Navy.mil, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf
26. Iranian Naval Strategy: The Domestic Roots of Iran’s Asymmetric Warfare, accessed November 14, 2025, https://gulfif.org/iranian-naval-strategy-the-domestic-roots-of-irans-asymmetric-warfare/
27. Iranian Naval “Swarming” Tactics – CNAS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.cnas.org/publications/blog/iranian-naval-swarming-tactics
28. Iran’s Doctrine of Asymmetric Naval Warfare | The Washington Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-doctrine-asymmetric-naval-warfare
29. Iran’s Conventional Military Capabilities – New Lines Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/irans-conventional-military-capabilities/
30. Iran’s Airpower Mirage: Why New Jets Won’t Fix a Broken System?, accessed November 14, 2025, https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/publications/analysis/irans-airpower-mirage-why-new-jets-wont-fix-a-broken-system/
31. Iran’s Air Force Overshadowed by the IRGC – The Washington Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-air-force-overshadowed-irgc
32. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force – Wikipedia, accessed November 14, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps_Aerospace_Force
33. accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/#:~:text=The%20IRGC%20is%20the%20primary,Aerospace%20Force%2C%20and%20Quds%20Force.
34. How IRGC Manages Iran’s Strategic Missiles | Defense.info, accessed November 14, 2025, https://defense.info/global-dynamics/2023/07/how-irgc-manages-irans-strategic-missiles/
35. Iran’s low-cost drones have shifted regional balance, senior Guards commander says, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202511119726
36. Iran’s Game of Drones | The Washington Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-game-drones
37. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization | Iran Watch, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-aerospace-force-self-sufficiency-jihad-organization
38. Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era – RAND, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1320/RAND_MR1320.pdf
39. War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/war-proxy-irans-growing-footprint-middle-east
40. Iran after Sanctions: Military Procurement and Force-Structure Decisions – The International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/images/comment/analysis/2017/december/3-eisenstadt2125.pdf
41. Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force – Wikipedia, accessed November 14, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Republic_of_Iran_Air_Defense_Force
42. Iran Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory – Office of Foreign Assets Control, accessed November 14, 2025, https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932206/download?inline
43. Iran and Cyber Power – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-and-cyber-power
44. Strategic Competition With Iran: The Military Dimension – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-competition-iran-military-dimension
45. Iran Military Power Report Statement – Department of War, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2021009/iran-military-power-report-statement/
46. Forecasting Iranian Government Responses to Cyberattacks – Marine Corps University, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-13-no-1/Forecasting-Iranian-Government-Responses-to-Cyberattacks/
47. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/irans-revolutionary-guards-al-quds-force-and-other-intelligence-and-paramilitary-forces
48. The IRGC-Quds Force: Iran’s Secret Military Empire – YouTube, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gu3i5FJ_iPM
49. Iranian Networks in the Middle East – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iranian-networks-middle-east
50. Iran After the Battle | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed November 14, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2025/07/iran-after-the-battle?lang=en
51. Treasury Targets Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, accessed November 14, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg539
52. The Economic Empire of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran – Gulf International Forum, accessed November 14, 2025, https://gulfif.org/the-economic-empire-of-the-revolutionary-guards-in-iran/
53. Economic activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Wikipedia, accessed November 14, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_activities_of_the_Iranian_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps
54. A United States Marine’s View of the Artesh and IRGC | Middle East Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/united-states-marines-view-artesh-and-irgc
55. Sanctioning Iran’s Military-Industrial Complex | Middle East Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.mei.edu/publications/sanctioning-irans-military-industrial-complex
56. IRGC and Terrorism-Related Sanctions: Why They Fail, What They Achieve | Middle East Briefs | Publications – Brandeis University, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/meb160.html
57. Beyond Borders: the Expansionist Ideology of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, accessed November 14, 2025, https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/beyond-borders-expansionist-ideology-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps
58. Iran: Background and U.S. Policy – Congress.gov, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47321
59. Iran: More War(s) In the Middle East? There Still May Be Options. – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-more-wars-middle-east-there-still-may-be-options
60. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Military and Political Influence in Today’s Iran, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-military-and-political-influence-in-todays-iran/
61. Iran’s foreign policy weaknesses, and opportunities to exploit them – Brookings Institution, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/irans-foreign-policy-weaknesses-and-opportunities-to-exploit-them/
62. Adversaries and the Future of Competition – CSIS, accessed November 14, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-1-adversaries-and-future-competition
63. THE DOSSIER – Post-Khamenei Iran: The Future of Evolutionary Regime Change – New Lines Institute, accessed November 14, 2025, https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20240423-Dossier-Iran-Future-NLISAP-1-1.pdf

To comprehend the distinct roles and evolutionary trajectories of Iran’s elite special operations forces, one must first understand the unique and deliberately bifurcated structure of its national military apparatus. The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not a monolithic entity but are composed of two powerful, parallel, and often competing institutions: the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (the Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami, or IRGC). Both are subordinate to a single commander-in-chief, the Supreme Leader, a structure that bypasses the elected presidency and concentrates ultimate military authority within the clerical establishment.¹ This dual-military system is the foundational context in which the Artesh’s 65th NOHED Airborne Special Forces Brigade and the IRGC’s Quds Force were born and have evolved.

The Artesh is Iran’s conventional military, the inheritor of the legacy of the pre-revolutionary Imperial Iranian Armed Forces. Its constitutional mandate is the defense of Iran’s territorial integrity and national borders against external aggression.³ The Artesh comprises traditional ground, naval, air, and air defense forces and operates the majority of Iran’s heavy conventional platforms, including tanks, major surface combatants, and fighter aircraft.¹ However, decades of international sanctions have severely degraded its ability to maintain and modernize this arsenal.¹ Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the new clerical leadership under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini viewed the Artesh, with its Western training and historical loyalty to the Shah, with deep suspicion.²

This distrust was the primary catalyst for the creation of the IRGC in April 1979. Established by Khomeini’s decree, the IRGC was conceived as a deeply ideological “people’s army” and a praetorian guard whose primary function was not to defend the borders, but to protect the Revolution itself from both internal and external threats.¹ Its constitutional role is explicitly the preservation of the revolutionary system.⁴ Over the subsequent decades, the IRGC has evolved from a paramilitary militia into Iran’s dominant military, political, and economic institution, wielding immense influence across all sectors of the state.³ It is geared toward asymmetric warfare and is the primary custodian of Iran’s most critical strategic assets, including its ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) arsenals, and is responsible for managing Iran’s network of regional proxies through its expeditionary arm, the Quds Force.¹

This structure is not an accident of history but a calculated strategy of institutionalized redundancy designed to ensure regime survival. By creating two powerful and parallel military organizations, each with its own command structure reporting directly to the Supreme Leader, the regime engineered a system of internal checks and balances. This arrangement effectively prevents any single military faction from accumulating sufficient power to challenge the clerical government, a lesson drawn from the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq and restored the Shah to power.² This internal dynamic, characterized by competition for resources, influence, and the Supreme Leader’s favor, is a defining feature of Iran’s defense posture. The existence and divergent development of the Artesh’s 65th NOHED Brigade and the IRGC’s Quds Force are the direct manifestation of this dual-pillar strategy at the apex of Iran’s special operations capabilities.

II. The 65th NOHED Airborne Special Forces Brigade: The Artesh’s Elite Tip

The 65th NOHED Brigade represents the pinnacle of the Artesh’s special operations capabilities, a unit forged in the Western mold but tempered by decades of regional conflict and loyalty to the Islamic Republic. Its evolution from an Imperially-sponsored, US-trained commando force to a modern expeditionary unit is a testament to its institutional resilience and tactical adaptability.

Inception and Imperial Legacy: U.S. Special Forces Influence and Early Operations

The origins of the 65th NOHED Brigade are deeply rooted in the Western military tradition, a legacy that distinguishes it from its IRGC counterparts. The genesis of Iranian airborne forces began in 1953, when a contingent of ten Imperial Iranian Army officers was sent to France for parachute training.⁸ This led to the establishment of a formal Parachute Unit in 1955, which expanded into a Parachute Battalion by 1959.⁹

The pivotal year was 1959, with the establishment of the 23rd Special Forces Brigade, the direct parent unit of what would become the 65th.⁹ During the 1960s, this nascent force was shaped profoundly by American mentorship. Under the Shah’s pro-Western alignment, the United States dispatched advisors from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School to train and structure Iran’s special forces.⁸ This American influence was not superficial; it was embedded in the unit’s DNA. The brigade adopted the iconic green beret of its American trainers, and its qualification badge was designed to be nearly identical to the US Army Special Forces’ “De oppresso liber” insignia, a clear visual marker of its doctrinal heritage.⁸

This Western-style training was soon put to the test. In the early 1970s, the brigade, then known as the 23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade, received its baptism by fire in the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman.⁹ Deployed to assist the Sultan of Oman in combatting Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, the Iranian forces engaged in a classic counter-insurgency campaign, the very type of unconventional warfare for which their American advisors had prepared them.¹¹ This early operational experience cemented the unit’s reputation as a capable and professional fighting force.

Post-Revolutionary Crucible: The Iran-Iraq War and the Forging of a Modern Identity

The 1979 Islamic Revolution placed the Western-trained 23rd Brigade in a precarious position. The new regime was inherently suspicious of any institution associated with the Shah and his American patrons. This distrust culminated in a call by then-parliament-member Hassan Rouhani to disband the unit following the 1980 Nojeh coup plot, in which some military elements were implicated.⁹ However, the unit was saved by the staunch opposition of Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran, who recognized its strategic value.⁹

The crucible that would reforge the unit’s identity and prove its loyalty to the new republic was the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). As part of the 23rd Commando Division, the brigade was deployed extensively across all fronts of the brutal, eight-year conflict.⁸ The war demanded a broad spectrum of skills. The unit participated in large-scale conventional battles, such as the Breaking of the Siege of Abadan and Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, where it functioned as elite light infantry.⁹ Simultaneously, it was tasked with missions that leveraged its specialized training. It engaged in grueling mountain warfare, successfully holding strategic positions like the Dopaza and Laklak mountains against repeated Iraqi assaults, which included the use of chemical weapons.⁹ Furthermore, a select cadre of its personnel was detached to conduct clandestine special operations under the direct command of Defense Minister Chamran’s Irregular Warfare Headquarters, showcasing its dual-capability in both conventional and unconventional domains.⁹

Evolving Missions in the Modern Era: From Counter-Insurgency to Hybrid Warfare

The post-war reorganization of the Iranian military led to the formal establishment of the Artesh’s premier special forces unit. In 1991, the 3rd Brigade was separated from the 23rd Division to form the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, commonly known by its Persian acronym NOHED (Nīrūhāye Vīzheye Havābord, or Airborne Special Forces).⁹

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the 65th NOHED Brigade became the Artesh’s go-to force for complex domestic security challenges. It was consistently deployed for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism missions, primarily in the restive border provinces. It engaged drug trafficking syndicates and insurgent groups in Sistan and Baluchestan province and conducted operations against Kurdish separatist groups like the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) in the country’s northwest.⁹

A fundamental strategic shift occurred in April 2016, marking a new chapter in the brigade’s history. The Iranian government officially announced that “advisors” from the 65th NOHED Brigade were being deployed to Syria to support the government of Bashar al-Assad.⁸ This was a landmark event, representing the first official deployment of Artesh combat troops outside Iran’s borders since the 1979 revolution. For decades, extraterritorial operations had been the exclusive domain of the IRGC and its Quds Force. The deployment of NOHED to the Syrian battlefield was a clear signal from the Artesh leadership. Facing years of receiving less funding and political favor than the IRGC, the Artesh seized the opportunity to demonstrate its own expeditionary capabilities and relevance in modern hybrid conflicts.¹³ By proving its utility in a complex foreign theater, the Artesh could argue for a greater share of the defense budget and a more prominent role in national security strategy, directly challenging the IRGC’s monopoly. Furthermore, leveraging the more popular and less politicized national army for a controversial foreign intervention could provide a “patriotic” veneer to the policy, potentially bolstering domestic support.¹¹

In Syria, NOHED personnel fulfilled “advisory” and intelligence-gathering roles, primarily around Aleppo, and sustained casualties in direct combat with jihadist factions, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.¹¹

Current Doctrine, Training, and Capabilities

Today, the 65th NOHED Brigade is widely regarded as the most elite, best-trained, and best-equipped special forces unit within the Artesh.⁸ It is an all-professional, volunteer force, a rarity in Iran’s conscript-heavy military.¹³ Its unique background and continuous operational tempo have produced a force with a distinct set of capabilities.

The unit’s Western-style professional ethos and skillset, a direct legacy of its American training, remain a key differentiator. This “Western SOF DNA” provides the Iranian regime with a unique strategic tool. Unlike the Quds Force, which specializes in organizing and leading irregular militias, NOHED brings a high-level tactical and training capability geared towards professional military standards. This allows Iran to engage in different forms of military assistance simultaneously, tailoring its support to the specific needs of its allies, whether they are state or non-state actors.

Training for the brigade, nicknamed “Powerful Ghosts” within the Iranian military, is exceptionally demanding.⁸ Operators must master parachute operations and demonstrate proficiency in a wide array of environments. Specialized training camps are maintained for this purpose: jungle warfare in the forests of Kelardasht, snow and mountain warfare at the Emamzadeh Hashem ski resort, desert warfare near Qom, and amphibious operations at the Karaj Dam.⁸ The curriculum also includes espionage, reconnaissance, telecommunications, and irregular warfare, providing a robust guerrilla warfare capability.⁸

The brigade’s structure mirrors that of many Western special operations forces, with specialized sub-units dedicated to specific mission sets. These include a Hostage Rescue Unit (Unit-110), a psychological operations company, a support battalion, and irregular warfare teams.⁸ This organization grants the 65th NOHED Brigade a comprehensive skill set spanning direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, and unconventional warfare.⁹

III. The IRGC-Quds Force: Instrument of Extraterritorial Influence

The IRGC-Quds Force is a fundamentally different entity from the 65th NOHED Brigade. It is not a conventional special forces unit but a unique hybrid organization that blends intelligence, covert action, and unconventional warfare to function as the primary instrument of Iranian foreign policy and power projection. Its evolution has been driven by the ideological imperative to export the 1979 revolution and to build a regional security architecture favorable to Tehran’s interests.

Origins in Irregular Warfare and Formal Establishment

The Quds Force is a specialized branch of the IRGC, focused on extraterritorial operations, military intelligence, and unconventional warfare.¹³ It is often mischaracterized as a “commando” unit; its role is far more strategic and intelligence-driven.¹³ Its genesis lies in the irregular warfare directorates established during the Iran-Iraq War. Precursors included a special intelligence unit known as ‘Department 900’ and a headquarters dedicated to managing irregular operations with allied Iraqi Kurdish and Shia Arab militias fighting against Saddam Hussein’s regime.¹³

Following the end of the war in 1988, the IRGC underwent a significant reorganization. The various external operations and intelligence bodies were consolidated and formally established as an independent service branch: the Quds Force.¹³ Its name, which translates to “Jerusalem Force,” reflects its official, ideologically charged mission: the “liberation of Muslim land,” with a particular focus on Jerusalem.¹⁶ Its personnel, estimated to number between 5,000 and 20,000, are handpicked from the broader IRGC for their skill and ideological commitment.¹³

The Doctrine of Proxy Warfare: Cultivating the “Axis of Resistance”

The central pillar of Quds Force doctrine and strategy is the cultivation and command of a network of non-state partners and proxy forces across the Middle East. This network, which Tehran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance,” is the primary vehicle through which Iran projects power.¹ The Quds Force’s core mission is to organize, train, fund, arm, and provide operational guidance to these groups.²

This strategy of proxy warfare offers several key advantages to Iran. It allows Tehran to challenge and bog down more powerful adversaries, such as the United States and Israel, in costly asymmetric conflicts. It creates a strategic buffer, enabling Iran to engage in hostilities far from its own borders. Crucially, it provides a layer of plausible deniability, allowing Iran to advance its interests while shielding the homeland from direct retaliation.¹⁸ Under the command of the late Major General Qassem Soleimani, who led the force from 1998 until his death in 2020, this doctrine was refined and perfected. Soleimani’s vision was to create a transnational movement of Shia militancy and to build proxy “deep states” in allied countries—paramilitary forces that would eventually become better armed and more organized than the host nation’s official military, while remaining loyal to Tehran.¹⁷

Operational Evolution Across Key Theaters

The Quds Force has systematically applied and evolved its proxy warfare model across numerous conflict zones over four decades.

• Lebanon (1982-Present): The Quds Force’s first and most successful application of its doctrine came in Lebanon. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion, Quds Force operatives were deployed to the Bekaa Valley, where they were instrumental in organizing, training, and funding the nascent Shia militia that would become Hezbollah.⁵ Hezbollah became the template for the Quds Force’s proxy model: a highly capable, ideologically aligned force that serves as a powerful deterrent against Israel and a key node in Iran’s regional network.
• Afghanistan (1990s): Demonstrating strategic pragmatism, the Quds Force shifted its attention to Iran’s eastern border in the 1990s. It provided support to the predominantly Sunni Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban, who were backed by Iran’s regional rivals, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.⁵ This operation showed the Quds Force’s willingness to partner with non-Shia groups to counter a more immediate strategic threat.
• Iraq (2003-Present): The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a fertile environment for Quds Force operations. It moved quickly to organize, arm, and direct a multitude of Shia militias to wage an insurgency against Coalition forces.⁵ The Quds Force is widely credited by US military intelligence with flooding the Iraqi theater with sophisticated weaponry, most notably Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFPs). These advanced improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were capable of penetrating armored vehicles and were responsible for a significant percentage of American combat fatalities in Iraq.²
• Syria (2011-Present): The Syrian Civil War represents the largest and most complex intervention in the Quds Force’s history. To prevent the collapse of its key regional ally, Bashar al-Assad, the Quds Force executed a massive and multifaceted campaign. It deployed its own officers as frontline advisors and commanders, but its main effort was to build a local proxy army from the ground up.² By one estimate from a senior Iranian general, the IRGC created 82 distinct fighting units in Syria, totaling some 70,000 armed combatants.²² These forces, along with deployed Hezbollah militants and Shia fighters recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan, fought alongside the Syrian Arab Army to turn the tide of the war.²

A Multi-faceted Approach: Integrating Hard and Soft Power

The operational methodology of the Quds Force demonstrates that it is far more than a simple military unit; it is a comprehensive instrument of statecraft. Its structure is divided into functional branches covering not only special operations and sabotage but also intelligence, finance, politics, and foreign languages.¹⁶ This allows it to pursue a holistic strategy that integrates hard military power with sophisticated “soft power” initiatives designed to win the “hearts and minds” of local populations and embed Iranian influence deep within the social fabric of target nations.²²

This approach has been on full display in Syria. In the aftermath of the devastating February 2023 earthquake, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani personally visited Aleppo to oversee the delivery of Iranian humanitarian aid.²⁴ Simultaneously, these aid convoys were reportedly used as cover to move military reinforcements into the area.²⁴ The Quds Force has funded the restoration of hundreds of Syrian schools, established networks of Islamic libraries, and provided digital training, all aimed at cultivating a new generation with a pro-Iranian, Shia-centric worldview.²⁴ Following a model inspired by Iran’s own Basij militia, Quds Force operatives organize the purchase of houses, shops, and farmland, which are then given to pro-Iranian fighters and their families. This tactic embeds them within the local community rather than isolating them in barracks, fostering human links and long-term loyalty.²² This fusion of military, economic, social, and ideological tools makes the Quds Force a uniquely effective—and uniquely challenging—actor on the international stage.

IV. Comparative Analysis: Divergent Paths to Special Operations

The 65th NOHED Brigade and the IRGC-Quds Force, while both representing the elite of Iran’s military, are fundamentally dissimilar organizations. They are products of their parent institutions—the conventional Artesh and the ideological IRGC—and their differences in mission, methods, and strategic purpose are stark. They are parallel spears in Iran’s arsenal, but they are designed for entirely different targets.

Mission Sets: Tactical Direct Action vs. Strategic Covert Influence

The core distinction lies in their respective mission sets. The 65th NOHED Brigade is a tactical and operational asset. Its purpose is to execute discrete military missions with clear objectives: conducting special reconnaissance behind enemy lines, rescuing hostages, eliminating specific high-value targets, or training allied military forces.⁹ Its focus is on direct action and the application of specialized combat skills to achieve a battlefield effect.

The Quds Force, in contrast, is a strategic asset. Its missions are not typically single, time-bound operations but rather long-term, open-ended political-military campaigns. Its purpose is to alter the geopolitical landscape of a region by building, managing, and directing a network of foreign proxy forces.² Its success is measured not in hills taken or targets destroyed, but in the degree of political influence and military control its proxies can exert within their host countries.

Operational Methods: The Commando vs. The Operative

This difference in mission dictates their operational methods. The 65th NOHED Brigade operates as a uniformed military unit. Its members are commandos, trained for direct combat and leveraging their superior training and equipment to overwhelm an enemy. Their value lies in their direct proficiency as warfighters and trainers.⁸

The Quds Force operates primarily in the shadows. Its members are operatives, working covertly, often under diplomatic or non-official cover. They function as advisors, intelligence officers, logisticians, and political organizers. Their primary method is not to fight battles themselves, but to enable others to fight on Iran’s behalf. Their value lies in their ability to act as a force multiplier, creating armies out of local militias and providing the strategic guidance and material support necessary for them to succeed, all while maintaining plausible deniability for Tehran.¹³

Relationship and Deconfliction in Shared Battlefields (e.g., Syria)

The deployment of both units to the Syrian theater highlights this functional divergence. They operate under separate command structures, one answering to the Artesh and the other to the IRGC.¹ While they share the overarching national objective of preserving the Assad regime, their roles on the ground appear to be complementary rather than integrated. The Quds Force’s mission was to create and lead the vast network of local and foreign militias that formed the backbone of the pro-regime ground forces.²² The 65th NOHED Brigade’s official role was “advisory,” suggesting they were likely tasked with a different mission: training and mentoring conventional units of the Syrian Arab Army, a foreign internal defense role for which their professional military background is uniquely suited.⁸ This indicates a deliberate division of labor, allowing Iran to support both the state and non-state pillars of Assad’s military power simultaneously.

V. Small Arms and Equipment Assessment

The small arms and individual equipment of Iran’s special operations capable forces reflect the divergent doctrines, supply chains, and operational philosophies of the Artesh and the IRGC. The 65th NOHED Brigade shows a clear trend toward modernization and alignment with international SOF standards, while the Quds Force prioritizes robust, reliable, and easily proliferated weapon systems suitable for its own operators and its vast network of proxies.

Armament of the 65th NOHED Brigade: A Blend of Legacy and Modernization

The individual kit of the 65th NOHED Brigade operator is undergoing a visible transformation. Recent imagery shows the increasing adoption of modern, Western-style personal protective equipment, including MOLLE-compatible plate carriers and FAST-type ballistic helmets, indicating a focus on operator survivability and modularity.⁹

Their service weapons have evolved similarly. Historically, the unit was equipped with the Iranian-made Tondar (a clone of the Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine gun) and its predecessor, the Uzi.⁹ The East German Mpi Kms 72, a side-folding stock variant of the AKM, was also a primary weapon for Artesh commandos.²⁵

Today, the brigade’s arsenal is more diverse and modern. The Russian-designed AK-103, chambered in 7.62x39mm, is now in common use.⁹ More significantly, the unit has embraced domestically produced AR-15 pattern rifles. This includes platforms like the Masaf, a direct clone of the Heckler & Koch HK416, which utilizes a short-stroke gas piston system.²⁵ The adoption of these modular, optics-ready 5.56x45mm platforms represents a significant leap in capability, bringing the brigade’s primary weapon systems in line with those used by many NATO special operations forces. The standard issue sidearm is reported to be the Czech-designed CZ 75 pistol.⁹

The brigade has also demonstrated a capacity for battlefield acquisition. Following the collapse of the Afghan National Army in 2021, NOHED units were photographed with captured US-made small arms, including M4 carbines, M16A3/A4 rifles, and M249 light machine guns, which were evidently brought into Iran by fleeing Afghan soldiers.²⁷

The Quds Force Arsenal: Equipping the Vanguard and its Proxies

The Quds Force arsenal is a reflection of its dual role as both an elite operational unit and the primary arms supplier for the Axis of Resistance. The weapons its operators carry are often the same ones it distributes to its partners, prioritizing ruggedness, reliability, and compatibility with regional supply chains.

The backbone of the IRGC’s, and by extension the Quds Force’s, long arms inventory is the Kalashnikov platform. This includes Iranian-produced versions of the AKM (designated KLS/KLF/KLT) and licensed or reverse-engineered copies of the more modern AK-103 (designated AK-133 or KL-133).²⁵ These 7.62x39mm rifles are ubiquitous across Middle Eastern conflict zones, making them simple to supply and maintain.

For specialized applications, particularly for its proxy forces, the Quds Force makes extensive use of the Iranian-made AM-50 Sayyad anti-materiel rifle.²⁵ This is an unlicensed copy of the Austrian Steyr HS.50 rifle, chambered in the powerful 12.7x99mm (.50 BMG) cartridge.²⁸ The Sayyad provides a devastating capability against light armored vehicles, fortified positions, and enemy personnel at extended ranges. It has been widely proliferated by the Quds Force and has been documented in the hands of proxy militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories.²⁸

Beyond small arms, the Quds Force is responsible for facilitating the transfer of a wide spectrum of advanced weaponry to its allies. This includes rockets, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), advanced IED components like EFPs, anti-aircraft weapons, and a growing arsenal of sophisticated unmanned aerial systems.⁷

The Role of Iran’s Domestic Defense Industry

Iran’s domestic Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is the critical enabler for arming its forces under a decades-long international sanctions regime. Unable to procure modern weapon systems from abroad, Iran has developed a robust capability for reverse-engineering and producing unlicensed copies of proven foreign designs.²⁶

This strategy is evident across the entire small arms catalog. The PC-9 Zoaf pistol is a clone of the SIG Sauer P226.²⁵ The Tondar SMG is a copy of the H&K MP5.²⁵ The S-5.56 assault rifle is a copy of the Chinese Norinco CQ, which itself is a copy of the American M16A1.²⁹ The Masaf rifle is a copy of the H&K HK416.²⁵ This approach provides self-sufficiency but can result in inconsistent quality. The AM-50 Sayyad, for example, is noted to have a significantly worse fit and finish than the original Austrian rifle it copies.²⁸

Not all domestic designs have been successful. The KH-2002 Khaybar, an ambitious bullpup assault rifle intended to replace the G3, proved to be a failure. During field trials in Syria, the rifle suffered from numerous jamming malfunctions and was ultimately rejected by potential foreign buyers. Production was reportedly discontinued in 2012.³⁰ Similarly, the Fateh assault rifle, another AR-15-style platform developed by the IRGC, was introduced in 2014 but discontinued by 2016, failing to enter widespread service.³² These failures underscore the challenges Iran’s defense industry faces in moving from simple reverse-engineering to reliable, original design and mass production.

Table: Current Small Arms of Iranian Special Operations Capable Forces

VI. Future Trajectory: Speculative Analysis

Based on established trends in doctrine, procurement, and operational employment, a speculative analysis of the future trajectories of both the 65th NOHED Brigade and the IRGC-Quds Force can be projected. Their paths will likely continue to diverge, shaped by the institutional priorities of the Artesh and the IRGC, even as they adapt to an evolving regional security landscape.

Projected Evolution of the 65th NOHED Brigade

The 65th NOHED Brigade is poised to continue its trajectory of professionalization and modernization, aiming to achieve tactical and equipment parity with other Tier 1 and Tier 2 international special operations forces. This will involve the continued adoption of modular small arms, advanced optics, encrypted communications systems, and night vision technology. The goal will be to solidify its status as a high-end direct-action and special reconnaissance force.

The experience gained in Syria is likely to have a lasting impact on the Artesh’s strategic thinking. The leadership will probably leverage NOHED’s successful deployment to advocate for a more permanent and institutionalized expeditionary role. This could see the brigade formally tasked with foreign internal defense (FID) missions, carving out a distinct niche for the Artesh in training and advising the conventional militaries of allied nations. This would complement, rather than compete with, the Quds Force’s focus on non-state actors and allow Iran to project influence through both conventional and unconventional military partnerships.

The Future of the Quds Force

The Quds Force will remain the centerpiece of Iran’s “forward defense” doctrine, which seeks to confront perceived threats far from Iran’s borders through a network of proxies.³³ Its core mission of managing the Axis of Resistance will not change. However, its methods will continue to evolve. The future of Quds Force operations will see a deeper integration of technology into its proxy warfare model. This will include the continued proliferation of more advanced and precise UAVs and loitering munitions, the provision of cyber warfare capabilities to its partners, and the potential distribution of guided rockets and short-range ballistic missiles to key allies like Hezbollah.⁷

The primary challenge facing the Quds Force will be one of command and control. As its proxy groups mature and gain significant political and military power in their own right, they may begin to pursue local agendas that diverge from Tehran’s strategic interests.²¹ The long-term success of the Quds Force’s model will depend on its ability to maintain ideological alignment and operational control over an increasingly complex and geographically dispersed network of powerful non-state actors.

Potential for Inter-Service Cooperation, Competition, and Doctrinal Convergence

The future relationship between the 65th NOHED Brigade and the Quds Force will be a key barometer of the broader Artesh-IRGC dynamic. While the Supreme Leader could mandate closer cooperation in a future crisis, the more probable trajectory is one of continued institutional competition. The IRGC will likely view any expansion of the Artesh’s expeditionary role as an encroachment on its traditional domain and a threat to its primacy in foreign operations. This competition for missions, resources, and influence will continue to define their relationship.

Over time, a degree of doctrinal convergence is possible. The 65th NOHED Brigade, having been exposed to the realities of hybrid warfare in Syria, will undoubtedly incorporate lessons on operating in ambiguous, multi-actor environments into its training and doctrine. Conversely, the Quds Force may seek to instill greater professionalism and more conventional combined-arms capabilities into its most mature proxy forces, like Hezbollah, blurring the lines between irregular and conventional forces.

VII. Concluding Assessment

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s special operations capabilities are embodied by two distinct, parallel, and highly evolved instruments of national power: the Artesh’s 65th NOHED Airborne Special Forces Brigade and the IRGC’s Quds Force. They are the products of vastly different institutional cultures and historical circumstances. NOHED was born from a Western-mentored, professional military tradition and was re-forged as a loyal and capable tactical force in the fires of the Iran-Iraq War. The Quds Force was born from the ideological fervor of the 1979 revolution and the brutal necessities of irregular warfare, becoming the master of a unique and highly effective doctrine of political-military influence.

The 65th NOHED Brigade has evolved from its origins as a conventional commando unit into a modern, multi-role special operations force capable of direct action, counter-terrorism, and, as demonstrated in Syria, expeditionary advisory missions. It represents a tactical and operational spear, sharp and precise. The Quds Force has perfected a strategic methodology of proxy warfare, leveraging a network of allies and integrating the full spectrum of hard and soft power to achieve long-term geopolitical objectives far beyond Iran’s borders. It represents a strategic spear, long-reaching and patient.

Their separate evolutionary paths, distinct equipment philosophies, and divergent operational methods are a direct reflection of Iran’s dual-military structure. This system provides the Iranian regime with a flexible, resilient, and multi-layered toolkit for projecting power and ensuring its own security. Whether a mission requires the surgical precision of a commando raid or the patient cultivation of a foreign insurgency, Tehran possesses a specialized spear for the task.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly contribute towards our continued reporting, please visit our funding page.

Sourcs Used

1. Explainer: The Iranian Armed Forces | American Enterprise Institute …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.aei.org/articles/explainer-the-iranian-armed-forces/
2. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards
3. Strait of Hormuz – Iranian Military – The Strauss Center, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.strausscenter.org/strait-of-hormuz-iranian-military/
4. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Revolutionary_Guard_Corps
5. Quds Force | Iran, IRGC, Meaning, History, & Israel-Hamas War …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Quds-Force
6. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – Critical Threats, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/imce-imagesIRGC_CommandNetwork_context-1.pdf
7. The 15 Deadly Weapons Of Iran – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lu2t4APKFYQ
8. NOHED Brigade: Iran’s Special Forces – Grey Dynamics, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/nohed-irans-special-forces/
9. 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade
10. 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade – Wikiwand, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade
11. Iran’s Army Suffers Its First Casualties in Syria | The Washington Institute, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-army-suffers-its-first-casualties-syria
12. About: 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade – DBpedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://dbpedia.org/page/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade
13. Iranian Special Forces – Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, accessed September 6, 2025, http://cast.ru/products/articles/iranian-special-forces.html
14. en.wikipedia.org, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/65th_Airborne_Special_Forces_Brigade#:~:text=After%20the%201979%20Revolution%20in,the%20Sistan%20and%20Baluchestan%20insurgency.
15. Iran Military Power – Defense Intelligence Agency, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.dia.mil/portals/110/images/news/military_powers_publications/iran_military_power_lr.pdf
16. Quds Force – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quds_Force
17. The Quds Force – United Against Nuclear Iran | UANI, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/report/quds-force
18. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – National Counterterrorism Center | Terrorist Groups, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/irgc.html
19. What is Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Why is it Designated a Terror Group by the United States? – American Jewish Committee, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.ajc.org/news/what-is-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps
20. Iran’s Regional Armed Network – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/irans-regional-armed-network
21. The Limits of Iran’s Proxy Strategy: How Soleimani’s Vision Failed in Recent Conflicts, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/the-limits-of-irans-proxy-strategy-how-soleimanis-vision-failed-in-recent-conflicts
22. The Quds Force in Syria: Combatants, Units, and Actions, accessed September 6, 2025, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions/
23. Saberin Unit – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saberin_Unit
24. The Quds Force in Syria – Combating Terrorism Center, accessed September 6, 2025, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/CTC-SENTINEL-062023.pdf
25. List of equipment of the Iranian Army – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Iranian_Army
26. The new Iranian standard issue chambered in 7.62×51 nato of all things – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/ForgottenWeapons/comments/1n8pd2h/the_new_iranian_standard_issue_chambered_in/
27. Iranian 65th NOHED Rapid Reaction Brigade armed with US made M4,M16A3/A4 and M249 LMG which was confiscated from fleeing/surrendered Afghan National Army soldiers who fled to Iran after the fall of Kabul in 2021 : r/ForgottenWeapons – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/ForgottenWeapons/comments/1i77o1j/iranian_65th_nohed_rapid_reaction_brigade_armed/
28. Steyr HS .50 / HS .460 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steyr_HS_.50_/_HS_.460
29. Khaybar: Iran’s 5.56mm Assault Rifle – Guns and Ammo, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/khaybar-irans-5-56mm-assault-rifle/248021
30. KH-2002 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KH-2002
31. KH2002 – IOP Wiki, accessed September 6, 2025, https://iopwiki.com/index.php?title=KH2002&mobileaction=toggle_view_desktop
32. Fateh rifle – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fateh_rifle
33. Iran’s Forward Defense Doctrine and the Evolution of Its “Long Arm Strategy – İRAM Center, accessed September 6, 2025, https://iramcenter.org/en/irans-forward-defense-doctrine-and-the-evolution-of-its-long-arm-strategy_en-2600
34. Iran’s Evolving Military: Complementing Asymmetric Doctrine with Conventional Capabilities, accessed September 6, 2025, https://bisi.org.uk/reports/irans-evolving-military-complementing-asymmetric-doctrine-with-conventional-capabilities