The question of whether the United States is in a state of decay is not merely a matter of partisan rhetoric but a subject of profound geopolitical and sociological consequence. A rigorous analysis of the nation’s trajectory reveals a complex, bifurcated reality that defies simple binary categorization. The United States is not experiencing a uniform collapse analogous to historical empires, but rather a phenomenon of asymmetric divergence. The nation possesses robust, world-leading capacity in high-technology innovation, energy independence, and aggregate economic output (“hard power”), while simultaneously suffering from profound structural corrosion in social cohesion, institutional trust, human capital metrics, and fiscal sustainability (“soft infrastructure”).

This report applies a modified political decay framework—drawing upon the scholarship of Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama—to assess the nation’s health. We define “decay” technically as institutional rigidity combined with repatrimonialization (capture by special interests) and a declining capacity to deliver public goods effectively.

Our analysis identifies three critical vectors of active decay:

Institutional Sclerosis: The U.S. political system displays symptoms of “vetocracy,” where polarization has rendered legislative mechanisms incapable of addressing long-term structural challenges. Trust in government has collapsed to near-historic lows (approx. 17-20%), creating a legitimacy deficit that decouples state power from state authority.

Social Fragmentation and Biological Regression: Uniquely among advanced economies, the U.S. has experienced periods of declining life expectancy and stagnant educational outcomes. The phenomenon of “deaths of despair”—driven by opioids, suicide, and metabolic disease—indicates a degradation of the social fabric that economic growth figures fail to capture.

Fiscal Unsustainability: The trajectory of the national debt, now exceeding 120% of GDP, coupled with rising debt-servicing costs, represents a long-term threat to state capacity that political gridlock prevents addressing.

However, the “Decay” hypothesis is strongly contradicted by significant counter-trends of resilience and renewal:

Technological Hegemony: The U.S. maintains a commanding lead in artificial intelligence (AI) investment (approx. 12x that of China) and generative model development. This suggests a private sector capable of generating “technological escape velocity” that may offset institutional stagnation.

Energy and Resource Dominance: The U.S. has achieved status as the world’s leading oil and gas producer, insulating it from the energy shocks that constrain peer competitors in Europe and Asia.

Geopolitical Endurability: While the gap with China has narrowed, the U.S. retains a distinct advantage in comprehensive power, alliance networks, and cultural soft power.

Conclusion: The United States is not in a state of terminal collapse but is undergoing Corrosive Bifurcation. The “state” (as an administrative entity) and the “market” (as an engine of wealth) remain powerful, but the “nation” (as a cohesive social and biological community) is decaying. The risk is not immediate conquest or economic depression, but a long-term stratification where high-growth enclaves of extreme wealth and innovation coexist with broad swathes of institutional failure, social anomie, and stagnant mobility.

1. Introduction: Defining and Measuring Decay

To assess the trajectory of a superpower requires a precise methodology that moves beyond partisan grievance or headline volatility. “Decay” in a political science context is a specific technical condition, not merely a synonym for decline. Following the frameworks established by Samuel Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies and expanded by Francis Fukuyama in Political Order and Political Decay, we define Political Decay as a condition where governmental institutions fail to adapt to changing social and economic circumstances due to intellectual rigidity or capture by interest groups.¹

Huntington posited that decay occurs when social modernization (the mobilization of new groups into politics) outpaces political institutionalization (the capacity of the state to absorb and regulate that participation). Fukuyama expands this by identifying “repatrimonialization”—the process by which elites capture state institutions for private gain—as a primary driver of decay.¹ In this framework, a wealthy, powerful nation can still be in a state of decay if its institutions lose the autonomy and flexibility required to solve new problems.

This report assesses decay across five primary dimensions, which serve as the pillars of our methodology:

1. Political & Institutional Health: The ability of the state to govern effectively, the legitimacy it commands, and the level of polarization.
2. Social & Human Capital: The biological and social well-being of the citizenry, including life expectancy, education, and social mobility.
3. Economic Structure: The distribution of wealth, fiscal sustainability, and standard of living (distinct from aggregate GDP).
4. Physical Capacity: The state of infrastructure, energy resilience, and the physical environment.
5. Geopolitical Standing: Relative power projection compared to peer competitors and soft power influence.

The following dashboard summarizes the high-level findings detailed in the subsequent sections, contrasting areas of resilience with areas of active decay.

Summary of Systemic Indicators

The data indicates that the United States is not experiencing a uniform collapse, but rather a hollowing out of the social and institutional middle. The mechanisms of state adaptability—the ability to pass budgets, reform entitlement programs, or maintain public health—are degrading, even as the mechanisms of wealth generation (tech, energy) accelerate. This paradox defines the current American condition.

2. The Political Dimension: Institutional Sclerosis and Polarization

The primary indicator of political decay is the gap between the demands placed on the state and its capacity to respond. In the United States, this dimension manifests as a profound crisis of trust, effectiveness, and institutional flexibility. The constitutional architecture, designed in the 18th century to prevent tyranny through an intricate system of checks and balances, has, in the context of modern hyper-polarization, mutated into a “vetocracy”—a system where stopping action is significantly easier than taking it.

2.1 The Collapse of Institutional Trust and Legitimacy

The bedrock of any democratic state is the legitimacy accorded to it by its citizens. By this metric, the United States has undergone a severe and prolonged decay. Public trust in the federal government has deteriorated to historic lows, a trend that is not cyclical but structural.

As of late 2023 and 2024, only roughly 17-20% of Americans stated they trust the government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time”.³ This represents a catastrophic decline from the mid-20th century. In 1964, trust stood at an all-time high of 77%. Even following the tumult of the Vietnam War and Watergate, trust rebounded to nearly 60% in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001.¹⁰

However, this recovery was decisively reversed by the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, a pivotal event highlighted in the timeline below. The crisis, characterized by a housing market collapse and a massive government bailout of financial institutions, marked a turning point in the American social contract. For many citizens, the state’s response—prioritizing the solvency of banks while millions faced foreclosure and unemployment—permanently severed the psychological bond between the government and the governed. This economic trauma catalyzed a decade of “secular stagnation” and fueled the rise of anti-establishment populism on both the left (e.g., Occupy Wall Street) and the right (e.g., the Tea Party), accelerating the polarization trend visible in the data.⁴ The current nadir has persisted for over a decade, suggesting a permanent decoupling of the citizenry from the state.

This decline is not uniform but is characterized by “conditional legitimacy.” Trust has become a lagging indicator of partisan control. Republicans express trust only when a Republican is president, and Democrats reciprocate, but the overall baseline continues to drift lower. This “partisan oscillation” means that at any given moment, approximately half the country views the federal apparatus as illegitimate or hostile to their interests.¹² Furthermore, while trust in local government remains comparatively higher, it too is eroding, indicating that the crisis of confidence is filtering down from the national to the community level.¹²

This collapse in trust is an operational constraint on governance. It reduces voluntary tax compliance, increases resistance to public health mandates (as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic), and heightens instability during leadership transitions. When citizens believe the system is rigged or incompetent, they withdraw their consent, forcing the state to rely more on coercion or financial inducements, both of which are costly and inefficient.

2.2 Polarization as Systemic Paralysis

Political polarization in the United States has transitioned from “ideological divergence” (disagreement on policy) to “affective polarization” (emotional animosity), where dislike of the opposing party exceeds affinity for one’s own. This shift has fundamentally altered the incentives of governance.

Research indicates that this polarization is asymmetric, driven significantly by a rightward shift among Republicans in Congress since the 1970s, though partisan antipathy has deepened across the spectrum.⁴ The number of Americans holding “very unfavorable” views of the opposing party has reached record highs.⁴

The practical consequence of this polarization is legislative decline. While the absolute number of laws passed can fluctuate (often inflated by massive omnibus bills), measures of “Legislative Effectiveness” reveal a hollowing out of the lawmaking process. The Center for Effective Lawmaking notes that legislative effectiveness is increasingly concentrated in party leadership, rendering rank-and-file legislators less effective at advancing substantive policy.¹³ This centralization stifles innovation and local representation.

The U.S. political system is unique in the number of “veto players” it empowers—the Senate filibuster, powerful committees, a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and federalism. In a low-polarization environment, these checks encourage compromise. In a high-polarization environment, they are weaponized to prevent the opposing party from governing. This leads to what Fukuyama terms “status quo bias” or rigidity: the system cannot adapt to new realities (such as climate change, fiscal deficits, or immigration pressures) because any proposed solution is immediately blocked by a veto player.¹ This inability to adapt is the hallmark of political decay.

2.3 Corruption and “Repatrimonialization”

Fukuyama argues that a key mechanism of decay is “repatrimonialization,” where the state is captured by powerful elites who use political power to protect their economic interests. In the U.S., this does not typically take the form of petty bribery but rather “legalized” institutional corruption.

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) reflects this concern. While the U.S. remains in the upper tier of “clean” nations globally, its score has shown a concerning downward trend over the last decade. From scores consistently in the mid-70s, the U.S. has slipped to roughly 69 in recent assessments.¹⁶ This decline places the U.S. behind many other advanced democracies.

The mechanism of this capture includes the influence of lobbying, the opacity of campaign finance (dark money), and the “revolving door” between regulatory agencies and the industries they regulate. This creates a perception—and reality—that government procedures have lost their autonomy to outside agents, fulfilling Huntington’s definition of decay as a decrease in institutional autonomy.¹ When policy outcomes (e.g., tax complexity, healthcare pricing) consistently favor organized interest groups over the general public, the state can be said to be in a state of capture.

Verdict on Political Dimension: High State of Decay. The system exhibits classic symptoms of rigidity, polarization, and capture. It retains stability through inertia and immense wealth, but its capacity to generate consensus-based reform has severely atrophied.

3. The Economic Dimension: Aggregate Hegemony vs. Structural Fragility

Economically, the United States presents the most contradictory picture of any dimension in this analysis. By aggregate metrics, it is a global juggernaut, outperforming peers and defying predictions of decline. By distributive and fiscal metrics, however, it shows signs of profound structural weakness and fragility.

3.1 Aggregate Strength: The Unrivaled Engine

Contrary to narratives of economic eclipse, the U.S. economy remains the world’s largest by nominal GDP and second by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).¹⁸ In 2024, U.S. GDP per capita (PPP) reached an all-time high of approximately $75,491, significantly outpacing other major economies.¹⁹ Furthermore, the U.S. share of the global economy has remained remarkably resilient, hovering between 25-26% in nominal terms for decades. This defies the historical pattern of declining hegemons; unlike the British Empire, which saw its share of global GDP collapse, the U.S. has maintained its slice of the pie even as the pie itself has grown.¹⁸

This resilience is underpinned by the U.S. dollar’s role as the global reserve currency, a “exorbitant privilege” that allows the U.S. to borrow cheaply and maintain trade deficits that would crush other nations.

3.2 Distributive Stagnation and Inequality

However, this aggregate growth has not been shared broadly, leading to what some economists call “Secular Stagnation” for the working and middle classes.²¹ The wealth gap has created two distinct economies: an asset-owning class that benefits from financialization and tech growth, and a wage-earning class sensitive to inflation and cost-of-living shocks.

While nominal median household income has risen, real purchasing power has stagnated for significant periods. Adjusted for inflation (CPI), median household income in 2021 was roughly comparable to pre-pandemic levels. More critically, long-term growth for the median worker has been modest compared to top-tier income growth.22

The Gini coefficient, a standard measure of inequality, remains high by OECD standards (approx. 0.48 for the U.S. vs. ~0.3 for many European peers).23 This level of inequality correlates with social instability and reduced intergenerational mobility, feeding back into the political polarization discussed previously.

3.3 The Fiscal Time Bomb

Perhaps the most quantifiable metric of “decay”—defined as borrowing against the future to fund current consumption—is the national debt. The gross federal debt to GDP ratio has exploded from roughly 30-40% in 1980 to over 120% in the 2020s.⁶

This debt is not merely a result of crisis spending (2008 Financial Crisis, COVID-19 pandemic) but of structural imbalance. The U.S. consistently spends more than it collects, driven by mandatory entitlement programs (Social Security, Medicare) and defense spending, coupled with periodic tax cuts.

As interest rates normalized in 2023-2024 following the inflationary spike, the cost of servicing this debt has skyrocketed. Interest payments on the national debt are poised to exceed defense spending, threatening to crowd out discretionary spending on infrastructure, education, and R&D. This is a classic indicator of a “mature” power in decline—spending more on past obligations (debt and entitlements) than on future capacity.

3.4 Innovation as the Counter-Narrative

Despite these headwinds, the U.S. innovation engine refutes the narrative of total economic ossification. In the critical domain of Artificial Intelligence (AI), the U.S. is not decaying; it is accelerating.

In 2024, U.S. private investment in AI reached $109.1 billion, nearly 12 times that of China ($9.3 billion).7 The U.S. produced 61 notable AI models in 2023 compared to China’s 15, dominating the frontier of generative AI.25

This suggests that while the public sector decays (debt, gridlock), the private sector retains immense vitality. The U.S. is unique in its ability to attract global talent and capital to its tech sector, providing a “moat” against absolute economic decline. This “Innovation Exception” is the single strongest argument against the thesis of systemic decay.

Verdict on Economic Dimension: Mixed. The private sector remains dynamic and world-leading (Resilient), while the public fiscal framework and wealth distribution mechanisms are degrading (Decaying).

4. Social Fabric and Human Capital: The “Deaths of Despair”

A nation is ultimately comprised of its people. If the population is becoming sicker, dying younger, and losing hope, the state is in decay regardless of its GDP or military might. In this dimension, the United States is a global outlier among developed nations, exhibiting trends that are typically associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union rather than a thriving democracy.

4.1 The Life Expectancy Crisis

Life expectancy is the “canary in the coal mine” for social health. For most of the 20th century, U.S. life expectancy rose in tandem with other wealthy nations. However, beginning in the 1990s and accelerating in the 2010s, a “Great Divergence” occurred.

U.S. life expectancy at birth was 78.4 years in 2023. While this represents a slight recovery from the COVID-19 nadir, it remains significantly below the OECD peer average of approximately 82.5 years—a gap of roughly four years.5

Crucially, between 2010 and 2019—before the pandemic—U.S. life expectancy growth plateaued (gaining only 0.1 years), while peer nations gained an average of 1.2 years.5 This indicates that the rot is structural and pre-existing. The divergence is driven not by infant mortality, but by mid-life mortality: chronic disease (obesity, diabetes), homicides, and, most alarmingly, “deaths of despair.”

4.2 Deaths of Despair: Opioids and Suicide

The term “deaths of despair,” coined by economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton, refers to deaths from suicide, drug overdose, and alcoholic liver disease. These deaths have surged among Americans without a college degree, driving the mortality trends described above.²⁸

The Opioid Epidemic: The opioid crisis continues to ravage the workforce and families. While some specific overdose rates showed stabilization in 2023 (e.g., heroin deaths down 33%), the overall burden remains catastrophic compared to historical norms and peer nations.29 The introduction of fentanyl has turned addiction into mass casualty events.

Suicide Rates: Suicide rates have trended upward since 2000, correlating with regions of economic deindustrialization and social fragmentation.28 This contrasts with many European nations where suicide rates have fallen or remained stable.

Social Fragmentation: This biological decay is mirrored by social decay. Participation in community organizations has declined, replaced by “horizontal fragmentation” where citizens retreat into like-minded enclaves (digital and physical), reducing social trust and the “social capital” necessary for a functioning democracy.30

4.3 Education and Social Mobility

The “American Dream” is predicated on social mobility—the idea that talent and hard work allow anyone to rise. However, the data suggests this engine is seizing up.

Stagnant Mobility: Data indicates that intergenerational mobility in the U.S. is now lower than in many European “welfare states” often criticized for their rigidity. The correlation between a father’s earnings and a son’s earnings is higher in the U.S. (elasticity of 0.47) than in peer OECD countries (where lower is better), indicating significant class entrenchment.32 Geography has become destiny; a child’s future is heavily determined by the zip code of their birth.33

Education Stagnation: The PISA 2022 results show U.S. students scoring average in math (465) compared to the OECD average, significantly trailing leaders like Singapore (575).34 While reading and science scores are better, the lack of significant improvement over decades—despite high per-pupil spending—suggests institutional inefficiency. The U.S. education system excels at the tertiary level (universities) but fails to provide a competitive baseline for the median student at the K-12 level.

Verdict on Social Dimension: Severe Decay. The biological and social health of the American population is deteriorating in absolute terms (life expectancy) and relative terms (education/mobility). This is the most acute vector of decay.

5. The Physical Dimension: Infrastructure and Environment

State capacity is also physical: the ability to maintain the roads, bridges, ports, and power grids that underpin the economy. A decaying state literally crumbles; a thriving state builds.

5.1 The ASCE Report Card: A Slow Climb from Failure

For decades, U.S. infrastructure was notoriously graded “D” (Poor). The 2021 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Report Card finally raised the cumulative grade to a “C-“.8

This slight improvement reflects increased investment (through state gas taxes and federal infrastructure bills). Ports (B-) and Rail (B) are bright spots, benefiting from private investment and strategic importance.

However, a “C-” still implies “mediocre, requiring attention.” Critical sectors like Aviation (D+), Dams (D), and Roads (D) remain in poor condition.35 The investment gap is estimated at $2.59 trillion over 10 years.36 The persistence of “poor” grades in foundational infrastructure acts as a drag on economic productivity (a “congestion tax”) and a risk to public safety.

5.2 Grid Reliability: The Fragility of Modernity

A strictly First World problem that has become a distinct U.S. weakness is the reliability of the electric grid.

Reliability metrics like SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) have worsened in recent years. In 2024, excluding major events, the average interruption duration was roughly 126 minutes, but including major events (weather), it spiked to over 660 minutes in some datasets.37

The U.S. grid is aging and increasingly vulnerable to extreme weather events. Unlike peers in Europe or Asia who bury lines or modernize transmission infrastructure faster, the U.S. utility model (fragmented, regulated monopolies) has been slower to adapt, leading to a “resilience gap”.38 Frequent power outages in a digital economy represent a significant failure of state planning and utility regulation.

5.3 Energy Dominance: A Critical Asset

Conversely, in terms of raw energy production, the U.S. has reversed a trend of decay. The “Shale Revolution” has made the United States the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas.³⁹ In August 2024, U.S. crude oil production reached a record 13.4 million barrels per day.⁴¹ This energy independence is a massive strategic asset, insulating the U.S. economy from the types of energy shocks that have crippled European industry following the war in Ukraine. This is a clear example of where the U.S. has successfully adapted and grown, countering the narrative of general decline.

Verdict on Physical Dimension: Moderate Decay with Strategic Bright Spots. The trend has shifted from “rapid decay” to “stabilization,” but the backlog of deferred maintenance remains a massive liability. Energy independence provides a crucial buffer.

6. Geopolitical Standing: Relative vs. Absolute Power

The debate over American decline often conflates domestic health with international power. A nation can decay internally while remaining the dominant global hegemon (e.g., the late Roman Empire or the Ottoman Empire).

6.1 The Rise of China and the Narrowing Gap

The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index (2024) ranks the United States as the #1 power in Asia, but notes its power score has fallen to its lowest level since the index began in 2018.42

The gap between the U.S. (Score 80.5) and China (Score 73.7) is narrowing. China has eroded U.S. advantages in military capability and economic relationships.9

However, the “Thucydides Trap” narrative often ignores China’s own internal decay. The Lowy report notes that “China faces too many long-term constraints” (demographics, slowing growth) to fully eclipse the U.S..9 This suggests the U.S. is not necessarily falling behind a continuously rising giant, but rather that both superpowers are grappling with internal constraints in a “competitive endurance” contest.

6.2 Soft Power and Alliance Networks

Contrary to the “decline” narrative, U.S. soft power remains resilient. The Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2024 ranked the U.S. #1 for the third consecutive year.43 The U.S. leads in familiarity, influence, and media reach.

More importantly, the U.S. possesses “network power”—a system of formal alliances (NATO, AUKUS, Japan/Korea treaties) that China lacks. This acts as a force multiplier, preserving U.S. influence even as its relative share of the global economy diminishes slightly.

6.3 Military and Strategic Power

The U.S. continues to outspend the next 10 nations combined on defense. While China builds ships faster, the U.S. retains qualitative superiority in key domains: nuclear submarines, 5th-generation aircraft, and combat experience. The ability to project power globally remains unmatched, even if the margin of superiority has shrunk.

Verdict on Geopolitical Dimension: Relative Decline, Absolute Strength. The U.S. is no longer the uncontested hyperpower of the 1990s, but it remains the world’s indispensable power. Its external decay is relative (others catching up), not absolute.

7. Conclusion: The Corrosive Bifurcation

Is the United States of America in a state of decay?

The Analyst’s Conclusion:

The United States is in a state of Advanced Institutional and Social Decay, masked by Economic and Technological Dynamism.

It is not experiencing the “total collapse” seen in historical examples like the Soviet Union. Instead, it is experiencing a divergent evolution:

1. The “Hardware” is Strong: The U.S. economy, military, geography, resources, and innovation ecosystem remain the envy of the world. The private sector continues to generate wealth and technology at a pace no other nation can match. By these metrics, there is no decay—only evolution and growth.
2. The “Software” is Corrupted: The mechanisms that bind the nation together—trust, shared truth, social mobility, public health, and functional governance—are rotting. The political system has lost the capacity to solve structural problems, and the social system is failing to protect the biological well-being of the population.

The Trajectory:

If this divergence continues, the U.S. will not cease to be a superpower, but it will increasingly resemble a “high-capacity developing nation”: an opulent, armed, and technologically advanced elite functioning atop a crumbling public infrastructure and a socially fragmented, unhealthy populace.

The “State of Decay” is therefore real, but it is containable. The decay is located in the institutions and the social contract, not in the capacity or talent of the nation. Reversing it requires not economic stimulus (of which there is plenty), but political reformation—breaking the “vetocracy” and restoring the feedback loops between the government and the governed. The challenge for the United States is not to become rich or powerful again, but to become functional and cohesive again.

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8. Works Cited

1. Fukuyama, Francis. “Political Order and Political Decay.” Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014. (Referenced via Snippets ¹).
2. Huntington, Samuel P. “Political Order in Changing Societies.” Yale University Press, 1968. (Referenced via Snippets ¹).
3. Pew Research Center. “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2025.” Pew Research Center, Dec 4, 2025. (Snippet ³).
4. Pew Research Center. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” Pew Research Center, June 12, 2014. (Snippet ⁴⁶).
5. Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). “U.S. Life Expectancy Compared to Other Countries.” Health System Tracker, 2024. (Snippet ⁵).
6. Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). “Gross Federal Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product.” St. Louis Fed, 2024. (Snippet ⁶).
7. Stanford HAI. “2025 AI Index Report: Economy.” Stanford University, 2025. (Snippet ⁷).
8. American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). “2021 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure.” ASCE, 2021. (Snippet ¹⁰).
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11. Gallup. “Trust in State and Local Governments, by Political Party.” Gallup News, 2025. (Snippet ¹²).
12. Center for Effective Lawmaking. “Legislative Effectiveness Scores.” TheLawmakers.org, Nov 19, 2025. (Snippet ¹³).
13. Volden, Craig, and Alan E. Wiseman. “Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress.” Cambridge University Press, 2014. (Snippet ¹⁴).
14. Fukuyama, Francis. “America in Decay.” Foreign Affairs, 2014. (Snippet ¹⁵).
15. Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2024.” Transparency International, 2024. (Snippet ⁴⁷).
16. Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2012.” Transparency International, 2012. (Snippet ⁴⁸).
17. World Bank. “GDP, PPP (current international $) – United States.” World Bank Data, 2024. (Snippet ⁴⁹).
18. Trading Economics. “United States GDP per capita PPP.” Trading Economics / World Bank, 2024. (Snippet ¹⁹).
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20. Monthly Review. “Stagnation and Financialization.” Monthly Review, 2024. (Snippet ⁵⁰).
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22. JPMorgan Chase Institute. “Household Purchasing Power 2019 to 2022.” JPMorgan Chase, 2022. (Snippet ⁵¹).
23. World Bank. “Gini Index – United States.” World Bank Data, 2024. (Snippet ⁵²).
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26. Stanford HAI. “2024 AI Index Report: Economy.” Stanford University, 2024. (Snippet ⁵³).
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28. Case, Anne, and Angus Deaton. “Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism.” Princeton University Press, 2020. (Snippet ²⁸).
29. CDC/NCHS. “Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 2003–2023.” NCHS Data Brief No. 522, 2024. (Snippet ²⁹).
30. Royal Society Interface. “The effect of social balance on social fragmentation.” Royal Society Publishing, 2020. (Snippet ³¹).
31. Cambridge University Press. “Citizen among Institutions: Fragmentation and Trust.” Social Policy and Society, 2024. (Snippet ⁵⁴).
32. Economic Policy Institute. “USA Lags Peer Countries in Mobility.” EPI, 2012. (Snippet ³²).
33. Visual Capitalist. “Ranked: The Best and Worst American Cities for Economic Mobility.” Visual Capitalist, 2024. (Snippet ³³).
34. OECD. “PISA 2022 Results: The State of Learning and Equity in Education.” OECD Publishing, 2023. (Snippet ³⁴).
35. ASCE. “2021 Report Card: Aviation, Dams, Roads.” InfrastructureReportCard.org, 2021. (Snippet ¹⁰).
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Appendix: Methodology

A.1 Framework of Analysis

This report utilized a “Dimensions of State Capacity” framework, synthesizing three primary academic models:

1. Huntington’s Political Decay: Measuring the ratio of institutionalization to participation to determine stability.
2. Fukuyama’s “Getting to Denmark” Model: Assessing State Capacity, Rule of Law, and Democratic Accountability.
3. Case & Deaton’s Social Welfare Model: Using “deaths of despair” and life expectancy as proxies for deep social health.

A.2 Data Selection and Sources

Research material was aggregated from high-credibility sources across multiple domains:

• Quantitative Economic Data: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) for debt and GDP; World Bank for inequality metrics.
• Social & Health Data: Centers for Disease Control (CDC) for mortality; OECD/PISA for education; UN Population Division for demographics.
• Political & Institutional Data: Pew Research Center for trust and polarization; Transparency International for corruption; Center for Effective Lawmaking for legislative output.
• Geopolitical Data: Lowy Institute Asia Power Index; Brand Finance Soft Power Index; Stanford HAI AI Index.

A.3 Interpretation of “Decay”

“Decay” was operationalized not as “negative growth” but as “structural regression.” For example, a rising GDP does not disprove decay if life expectancy is falling; it merely highlights the nature of the decay (wealth without health). The analysis prioritized “structural” metrics (institutions, health, education) over “flow” metrics (quarterly GDP, stock prices) to identify long-term trajectories rather than short-term cycles. Consideration was given to distinguishing between absolute decay (metrics getting worse in real terms) and relative decay (metrics improving slower than competitors).

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Sources Used

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This report assesses the strategic capabilities, internal cohesion, and geopolitical implications of the expanded BRICS+ group of nations. The analysis concludes that BRICS+ represents a significant, long-term systemic challenge to the U.S.-led international order. However, its potential to act as a unified, revisionist bloc is severely constrained by profound internal divisions and structural contradictions. It is best understood not as a monolithic anti-Western alliance, but as a heterogeneous coalition of convenience, leveraging its collective economic weight to pursue often divergent national interests under the shared banner of creating a multipolar world.

The bloc’s primary strengths are formidable and growing. Demographically and economically, BRICS+ now constitutes the center of gravity for global growth, commanding approximately 45% of the world’s population and a larger share of global GDP (in purchasing power parity terms) than the G7. Its strategic power is further magnified by its substantial control over global energy and critical mineral supply chains, positioning it as a gatekeeper of the resources essential for both the 20th-century industrial economy and the 21st-century green transition. Diplomatically, it has successfully branded itself as the preeminent voice of the “Global South,” attracting widespread interest from developing nations seeking alternatives to Western-led institutions.

Conversely, the bloc is plagued by critical weaknesses. The intractable strategic rivalry between its two largest members, China and India, represents a fundamental fault line that prevents deep political or security integration. This core tension is exacerbated by the vast economic and political heterogeneity among its members—a mix of democracies and autocracies, wealthy creditors and indebted nations—whose divergent interests frequently preclude consensus on contentious issues. The group’s intentionally informal, consensus-based structure, which lacks a binding charter or a central secretariat, provides necessary flexibility but simultaneously renders it incapable of decisive, unified action in a crisis.

The primary threat to U.S. interests is not military but systemic. It is most acute in the financial domain, where a concerted, albeit slow-moving, effort toward “de-dollarization” aims to create parallel payment systems and trade settlement in local currencies. The goal is less to replace the U.S. dollar than to insulate member economies from the reach of U.S. financial sanctions, thereby eroding the effectiveness of a key instrument of American foreign policy. Geopolitically, the bloc challenges U.S. primacy by creating alternative diplomatic forums, promoting a narrative of multipolarity that resonates across the Global South, and providing a “safe harbor” for states seeking to counter U.S. pressure.

In response, this report recommends that U.S. policy shift from a posture of broad confrontation, which has proven counterproductive in fostering BRICS+ unity, to a nuanced strategy of “competitive coopetition.” This strategy involves:

1. Exploiting Internal Fissures: Treating the bloc not as a monolith but as a collection of individual actors, deepening strategic ties with members like India and Brazil whose interests often align with a rules-based order, thereby exacerbating internal divisions.
2. Reinforcing the U.S.-led Financial Architecture: Proactively pursuing governance reforms at the IMF and World Bank to give emerging economies a greater voice, and scaling up high-quality, transparent development finance alternatives to outcompete the New Development Bank.
3. Building Counter-Coalitions: Strengthening alliances with key democratic and market-oriented partners in the Global South to offer a more compelling alternative to the BRICS+ model of governance.
4. Employing Targeted Economic Statecraft: Replacing blunt instruments like broad tariffs with precise, surgical measures designed to impose costs on specific adversarial actions, such as prohibiting dual participation in SWIFT and alternative payment systems, without alienating neutral parties.

Section 1: The Architecture of a Counter-Hegemonic Coalition

The BRICS+ grouping is not an accidental collection of emerging economies but a deliberate, albeit imperfect, political project designed to alter the global balance of power. Its evolution from a market-driven investment concept to a state-driven political forum reflects a calculated response to perceived inequities in the post-Cold War international order. Understanding its current architecture—its strategic purpose, expanded membership, and institutional ambitions—is essential to accurately assessing its capabilities and intentions.

1.1 From Acronym to Alliance: A Deliberate Evolution

The bloc’s origin as the “BRIC” acronym, coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to highlight promising investment markets, is a historical footnote that belies its current geopolitical significance.¹ The critical transformation began when political leaders, particularly in Russia, recognized the potential to forge a political grouping from this economic concept.⁴ The intellectual groundwork for a multipolar coalition can be traced back to Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in the late 1990s, who envisioned a “strategic triangle” of Russia, India, and China to balance U.S. influence.⁴

This political ambition began to crystallize with the first meeting of BRIC foreign ministers on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2006, followed by the inaugural leaders’ summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009.¹ The timing was not coincidental. The 2008 global financial crisis, which originated in the United States and Europe, severely damaged the credibility of Western economic stewardship and created what analysts have termed a “legitimacy crisis of the international financial order”.⁷ As Western economies faltered, the relative resilience and continued growth of the BRIC nations, particularly China and India, imbued them with a newfound confidence and a shared purpose.⁷ This crisis served as the primary catalyst, providing the political will and strategic opportunity for the BRIC countries to institutionalize their cooperation. They transitioned from an informal discussion forum to an action-oriented bloc with the explicit goal of reforming the global financial and political architecture to better reflect the rising weight of emerging powers.⁸

The group’s stated objectives, reiterated across numerous summit declarations, have consistently centered on advocating for a “more democratic and just multipolar world order” and demanding reforms of global governance institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Security Council.⁸ This is not merely aspirational rhetoric but a core strategic goal that provides the foundational ideological glue for its otherwise disparate members. The admission of South Africa in 2011, transforming BRIC into BRICS, was the first step in broadening its geographic and political representation, explicitly positioning the group as a champion for the broader developing world.¹

1.2 The Logic of Expansion: Consolidating Resource Power and Geopolitical Reach

The 2024-2025 expansion was the most significant development in the bloc’s history, bringing in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Indonesia as full members.² While Argentina’s subsequent withdrawal under a new administration and Saudi Arabia’s initial hesitation underscore the complexities of consensus-based enlargement, the overall move represents a strategic consolidation of the bloc’s power.³ More than 40 countries have expressed interest in some form of affiliation, signaling the group’s growing international appeal.¹⁶

The expansion’s logic is best understood through two primary lenses: strategic resources and geopolitical influence.

First, the inclusion of major energy producers fundamentally transforms BRICS+ into a dominant energy bloc. By uniting some of the world’s largest oil and gas exporters (Russia, Iran, UAE, and potentially Saudi Arabia) with two of the world’s largest importers (China and India) within a single political forum, the group has created an unprecedented platform to coordinate on energy policy and potentially challenge the petrodollar system.9 This internalizes a significant portion of the global energy supply chain, creating opportunities for trade settlement in local currencies and insulating members from the volatility of Western-controlled markets.

Second, the expansion deepens the bloc’s geopolitical footprint across the Middle East and Africa, reinforcing its claim to be the authentic voice of the “Global South”.¹¹ The addition of regional powers like Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia enhances its diplomatic weight and extends its influence into critical geostrategic zones. To manage the high demand for affiliation, the bloc institutionalized a “partner country” category at the 2024 Kazan summit.⁷ This creates a tiered system of engagement, allowing BRICS+ to build a wider network of aligned states (including countries like Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam) without diluting the core decision-making process or importing new internal conflicts associated with full membership.²

1.3 Institutional Ambition: Building a Parallel Financial Universe

The most concrete manifestation of the bloc’s ambition to reshape global governance is its creation of a parallel financial architecture. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) at the 2014 Fortaleza summit marked the group’s transition from rhetoric to institution-building.⁶

The New Development Bank (NDB)

The NDB was established to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects” in member states and other emerging economies, explicitly to “complement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions”.²² With an authorized capital of $100 billion and a subscribed capital of over $52.7 billion, the NDB is a significant financial institution, though still much smaller than the World Bank.²¹ As of early 2025, its total assets stood at $33.5 billion, and it had approved over $32.8 billion in financing for more than 96 projects across sectors like clean energy, transport infrastructure, and water sanitation.²¹

The NDB’s true strategic innovation lies not in its scale but in its operating model. Its key value proposition is the provision of financing without the political conditionalities related to governance and economic policy that are often attached to loans from the IMF and World Bank.²⁷ This approach directly addresses a long-standing grievance of many Global South nations. Furthermore, the NDB is increasingly focused on lending in the local currencies of its members, a direct effort to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar in development finance and insulate projects from exchange rate volatility.¹⁸ While the NDB’s balance sheet cannot replace that of the World Bank, its strategic significance lies in its ability to exert competitive pressure. By providing a viable, non-aligned alternative, it grants developing nations greater leverage in their negotiations with Bretton Woods institutions, forcing the existing order to be more responsive and thereby achieving a core BRICS objective of reform through competition.

The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)

The CRA is a $100 billion framework of mutual financial support among BRICS central banks, designed to provide liquidity during balance of payments difficulties.²¹ The contribution structure is intentionally asymmetric, reflecting the economic weight of its members: China provides $41 billion, Brazil, India, and Russia contribute $18 billion each, and South Africa provides $5 billion.²¹

Although the CRA has never been activated, its existence serves a powerful symbolic and strategic purpose. It functions as a collective financial safety net, intended to deter currency speculation and provide a first line of defense against financial shocks, reducing the need to turn to the IMF in a crisis.²¹ It represents a foundational pillar of an alternative global financial architecture, signaling a collective commitment to financial self-sufficiency and providing a hedge against the perceived weaponization of Western-led financial rescue mechanisms.

Section 2: A Strategic Audit of BRICS+ Capabilities (Strengths)

The expanded BRICS+ bloc commands a formidable array of assets that make it a significant actor on the global stage. Its power is not merely symbolic; it is rooted in quantifiable demographic, economic, and resource-based strengths. These capabilities, even when not wielded by a perfectly cohesive group, collectively shift the global center of gravity and provide the foundation for its challenge to the existing international order.

2.1 The Demographic and Economic Engine: A Center of Global Gravity

The sheer scale of the BRICS+ countries is its most fundamental strength. Following its 2024-2025 expansion, the bloc now comprises approximately 45% of the world’s population, or over 3.5 billion people.¹⁶ This immense demographic weight translates into vast consumer markets, a deep labor pool, and significant long-term growth potential that cannot be ignored.

This demographic scale is matched by growing economic clout. While the G7 still leads in nominal GDP, a measure reflecting financial market depth, the more telling metric for real economic activity—Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)—reveals a historic shift. The BRICS+ share of global GDP (PPP) has already surpassed that of the G7. Projections for 2025 place the BRICS+ share at nearly 40%, compared to the G7’s 28.4%.³⁰ This is not a future forecast but a present reality, indicating that the bulk of the world’s industrial production, manufacturing of goods, and provision of services now occurs within the BRICS+ nations.³³ China alone accounts for over half of the bloc’s economic output and is the world’s top merchandise exporter, anchoring a shift in the center of global manufacturing gravity.⁴

The bloc’s role in international commerce is correspondingly large, accounting for approximately 21-24% of global exports.³⁴ Critically, trade within the BRICS+ group is expanding at a faster rate than global trade, fostering the development of increasingly resilient, non-Western-centric supply chains.³⁵ This growing intra-bloc trade reduces dependence on traditional markets in North America and Europe and enhances the group’s collective economic security.

Table 1: BRICS+ vs. G7: A Comparative Dashboard (2025 Projections)

Note: Figures are estimates based on 2024-2025 data and projections. GDP figures are approximate based on combined member data. Population data is based on 2025 estimates. Trade and military spending shares reflect recent available data. Sources:.⁴

2.2 Dominance in Strategic Commodities: The Gatekeepers of the Global Economy

The expansion of BRICS+ has consolidated its position as a “resource superpower”.³⁹ The bloc now exerts significant, and in some cases dominant, influence over the global supply of commodities that are essential for both the legacy energy system and the emerging green economy.

In the energy sector, the inclusion of Iran and the UAE, alongside Russia and founding members Brazil and China, creates a formidable concentration of power. The expanded bloc now accounts for approximately 43.6% of global crude oil production.¹⁹ This gives the group—which includes the world’s largest producers and two of its largest consumers—unprecedented potential to coordinate energy policy and influence global prices, operating as a political counterpart to the economic function of OPEC+. Its control extends to other fossil fuels, with members producing 36% of the world’s natural gas and over 78% of its mineral coal.³⁶

Even more strategically significant in the long term is the bloc’s dominance over critical minerals required for high-tech manufacturing and the clean energy transition. This concentration of resource control gives BRICS+ immense structural power over the global supply chains of the future. Members have already demonstrated a willingness to leverage this power through export restrictions, as China has done with rare earths and graphite, signaling the potential for coordinated action to achieve geopolitical objectives.¹⁹ This power is not just over raw materials, but also processing; China alone processes an estimated 90% of the world’s rare earth elements.⁴⁰

Table 2: BRICS+ Control of Key Global Resources

Note: Figures are estimates based on the expanded BRICS+ membership. Percentages can vary slightly by year and data source. Sources:.⁴

2.3 The “Voice of the Global South”: A Diplomatic Counterweight

Beyond its material strengths, BRICS+ has successfully cultivated significant soft power by positioning itself as the primary political and diplomatic forum for the Global South.⁸ This appeal is rooted in a shared historical narrative—many members experienced European colonialism—and a common desire for a more equitable international order that is less dominated by the United States and its Western allies.³

The bloc offers a platform for countries to pursue “strategic autonomy,” allowing them to maintain productive relationships with a range of global powers without being forced into rigid, binding alliances.⁴² This message resonates deeply in an era of renewed great-power competition, particularly with nations wary of being caught in the crossfire of U.S.-China rivalry. For many developing countries, BRICS+ represents a “safe harbor” from U.S. diplomatic coercion and economic statecraft, providing an alternative path to development and international recognition.²⁹

The high level of interest in joining the group is empirical evidence of this growing diplomatic magnetism. The fact that over 40 countries have formally applied or expressed a desire to join demonstrates that the BRICS+ vision of a multipolar world has a broad and receptive audience.¹⁶ This allows the bloc to act as a powerful diplomatic counterweight in multilateral institutions like the UN and the G20, where it can coordinate positions and amplify the collective voice of the developing world.²⁰

The power of BRICS+ is therefore asymmetric when compared to the G7. Its dominance in production, population, and raw materials (reflected in its PPP GDP and resource control) directly challenges the G7’s long-standing dominance in finance and military power (reflected in nominal GDP and defense spending). The core geopolitical dynamic of the coming decades will be the contest between these two forms of power: the BRICS+ leverage over the physical economy versus the G7’s control over the financial and security architecture that governs it. This structural conflict is the fundamental driver behind initiatives like de-dollarization and the creation of the NDB.

Section 3: An Assessment of Inherent Vulnerabilities (Weaknesses)

Despite its formidable collective strengths, the BRICS+ bloc is fundamentally constrained by deep-seated internal contradictions and structural weaknesses. These fissures are not temporary disagreements but enduring features of the group’s composition that cap its potential to act as a coherent, unified global actor. Its aspirations are consistently checked by the divergent realities of its members.

3.1 The Sino-Indian Fault Line: The Rivalry at the Core

The single greatest impediment to BRICS+ cohesion is the intractable strategic rivalry between its two most populous members, China and India. This is not merely a bilateral issue but a structural flaw that permeates the entire bloc. The unresolved border dispute along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which escalated into the first deadly clashes in decades in 2020, is the most visible symptom of a much deeper competition for regional and global influence.⁴⁵

This rivalry manifests in fundamentally competing visions for the purpose of BRICS itself. China, increasingly aligned with Russia, views the bloc as a key instrument in an explicitly anti-Western, revisionist project aimed at directly challenging U.S. hegemony and creating an alternative world order centered on Beijing.³ In contrast, India, often finding common cause with Brazil and South Africa, espouses a “non-Western, not anti-Western” stance.⁴⁸ New Delhi sees BRICS as a vehicle to achieve a “multipolar” world, enhance its own “strategic autonomy,” and reform—not necessarily overturn—the existing global governance system to gain a more prominent seat at the table.³

This divergence is amplified by a stark power asymmetry. China’s economy is larger than that of all other ten BRICS+ members combined, fueling Indian and Brazilian fears that the bloc could devolve into a “pro-China alliance” or a mere instrument of Chinese foreign policy.⁴⁹ India’s initial resistance to China’s push for rapid expansion, its insistence on establishing clear membership criteria, and its concurrent participation in the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) are all direct consequences of this deep-seated suspicion.⁴⁹ This central rivalry ensures that on any critical geopolitical or security issue that requires deep trust, bloc-wide consensus is virtually unattainable.

3.2 Economic and Political Heterogeneity: A Coalition of Contradictions

The expansion in 2024 has amplified the group’s already vast internal diversity, creating a coalition of profound contradictions. The economic disparities are stark, undermining the potential for common policy. The bloc includes some of the world’s wealthiest nations on a per capita basis, such as the UAE (GDP per capita PPP of ~), and some of the poorest, like Ethiopia (GDP per capita PPP of ~).¹⁴ It contains major global creditors like China and nations struggling with high public debt, such as Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa, where public debt has approached or exceeded 90% of GDP.⁵³ Members face vastly different domestic challenges, from China’s looming demographic crisis and real estate bubble to India’s massive informal labor market and South Africa’s chronic unemployment and infrastructure decay.⁵⁴ These divergent economic realities make harmonizing fiscal, monetary, or trade policies exceptionally difficult.

The political divergence is equally pronounced. The group is a mixture of established, albeit stressed, democracies (India, Brazil, South Africa), consolidated one-party states (China), managed autocracies (Russia, Egypt, UAE), and a theocracy (Iran). This is not a trivial distinction; it leads to fundamentally different values and approaches to critical issues such as human rights, internet freedom, data governance, and the principles of international law. While research on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly indicates a degree of cohesion on broad development and economic issues, it also reveals that the BRICS countries are least cohesive on matters of international security and human rights, where their core national interests and political systems diverge most sharply.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the expansion has imported new potential bilateral conflicts into the group’s internal dynamics, notably the historic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the ongoing dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River.¹³

3.3 The Cohesion Paradox: The Weakness of an Informal Structure

BRICS+ remains a fundamentally informal political grouping. It operates without a binding charter, a permanent secretariat to drive initiatives, or a centralized budget.¹ Its primary operating principle is consensus, meaning all substantive decisions must be agreed upon by all members.⁸

This informality creates a “cohesion paradox.” On one hand, it is a necessary feature, not a bug. The loose, consensus-based structure is what allows such a diverse and internally competitive group to coexist. It provides the flexibility for members to cooperate on areas of clear mutual interest (such as funding infrastructure through the NDB) while avoiding direct confrontation on deeply divisive issues. For a country like India, the consensus rule acts as a crucial veto, preventing the bloc from being hijacked by a more radical Sino-Russian agenda that would compromise its strategic autonomy.⁴⁸ The institutional weakness is, in effect, a precondition for the group’s continued existence.

On the other hand, this same structure severely limits the bloc’s capacity to act as a decisive and effective global actor, especially in response to fast-moving crises. The need for consensus among eleven countries with competing interests ensures that the group’s collective actions will almost always gravitate toward the lowest common denominator.⁶⁰ This structural reality prevents BRICS+ from evolving into a true military or political alliance with the capacity for unified, binding action, in stark contrast to treaty-based organizations like NATO. The “spaghetti bowl” effect, where overlapping and sometimes competing subgroups and initiatives exist (such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil, and South Africa), further complicates coordination and dilutes the bloc’s focus.⁶²

Table 3: BRICS+ Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix

Section 4: Threat Assessment: A Systemic Challenge to U.S. Primacy

The threat posed by the BRICS+ bloc to United States national interests is not primarily a conventional military one, but rather a long-term, systemic challenge aimed at eroding the foundational pillars of U.S. global power: its financial dominance, its diplomatic leadership, and the effectiveness of its economic statecraft. While the bloc’s internal fractures limit its ability to act as a unified adversary, its collective weight and targeted initiatives are actively reshaping the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape.

4.1 The Financial Challenge: De-Dollarization and Parallel Systems

The most potent and coordinated challenge from BRICS+ is directed at the central role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system. This effort is driven by a shared desire among members to reduce their vulnerability to U.S. financial sanctions and what they perceive as the “weaponization” of the dollar.⁶³ The unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia’s central bank following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine served as a powerful catalyst, demonstrating to other nations the profound risks of dependence on the Western-led financial infrastructure.⁶³ The threat is not the imminent replacement of the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, but rather the construction of a parallel financial system large enough to render U.S. sanctions increasingly ineffective.

The mechanisms being pursued include:

• Promotion of Local Currency Trade: Members are actively working to bypass the dollar in bilateral trade. This is most advanced in Russia-China energy trade, which is now largely settled in yuan and rubles, but also includes initiatives like India’s rupee-based trade experiments.⁶⁴ The share of the Chinese renminbi in total intra-BRICS trade transactions has reportedly reached approximately 47%.⁴
• Development of Alternative Payment Systems: China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is being promoted as a potential alternative to the SWIFT messaging network for international bank transfers.⁶⁶ Concurrently, the bloc is exploring a unified payment platform, often referred to as “BRICS Pay” or the “BRICS Bridge,” to facilitate seamless cross-border transactions in members’ national currencies, potentially leveraging blockchain technology.⁶³
• Institutional Support: The New Development Bank is mandated to increase the share of its lending in local currencies, further reducing dollar dependency in development finance.¹⁸

Despite these efforts, the de-dollarization project faces formidable headwinds. The dollar’s dominance is entrenched, accounting for roughly 58% of global foreign exchange reserves and being on one side of nearly 90% of all foreign exchange trades.⁵⁴ This is due to the unparalleled depth, liquidity, and perceived safety of U.S. financial markets, which no BRICS+ member can currently replicate.⁵⁴ China’s own capital controls and the non-convertibility of its currency remain significant obstacles to the yuan’s emergence as a true global reserve currency.⁶⁶ Therefore, the BRICS+ financial strategy should be understood as a long-term project to build “hedging options” and create financial insulation, rather than an attempt to dethrone the dollar overnight.⁶⁹

4.2 The Geopolitical Challenge: A Fragmented but Assertive Bloc

Geopolitically, BRICS+ erodes U.S. influence by creating a high-profile and increasingly institutionalized diplomatic venue where major global issues are discussed without U.S. or Western participation. This normalizes a multipolar world where Washington is no longer the indispensable convener for every significant international conversation, thereby diminishing U.S. diplomatic centrality.²⁰

The bloc’s most effective geopolitical tool is its successful positioning as the champion of the “global majority”.⁶⁴ It actively promotes a narrative that contrasts its stated principles of equality, sovereignty, and mutual respect with what it portrays as a coercive and hegemonic Western approach.⁶⁴ This narrative is highly resonant across the Global South, granting BRICS+ significant soft power and making it an attractive forum for developing nations seeking to amplify their voice on the world stage.⁸

This diplomatic appeal allows the bloc to function as a “safe harbor” for countries seeking to resist U.S. diplomatic or economic pressure. By offering alternative trade partners, sources of investment (via the NDB), and a platform of political legitimacy, BRICS+ undermines the efficacy of U.S. sanctions and other coercive measures against states like Russia and Iran.²⁹ Aggressive U.S. policies, such as the broad application of tariffs, have proven to be a primary catalyst for BRICS+ cohesion, providing the shared external threat that helps its members overcome their internal differences and accelerates their anti-hegemonic agenda.⁶⁵

4.3 The Security Challenge: Nascent but Evolving Cooperation

It is crucial to assess that BRICS+ is not, and shows no sign of becoming, a collective security alliance akin to NATO. The deep-seated Sino-Indian rivalry, along with the divergent security interests of other members, makes any form of mutual defense pact a political impossibility.⁴⁷

However, specific security alignments are deepening within the BRICS+ framework. The most significant of these is the strengthening military-to-military relationship between China and Russia.⁷⁵ This “no limits” partnership, while bilateral in nature, is politically amplified within the BRICS context. Their joint military exercises are increasing in frequency, complexity, and geographic scope, moving from counter-terrorism drills to simulated joint operations in regional wars and expanding into contested maritime zones like the Sea of Japan and the Bering Sea.⁷⁵ These exercises signal a clear alignment of security interests in countering U.S. power and provide the People’s Liberation Army with valuable operational experience.⁷⁵

Furthermore, this axis is expanding to include other BRICS+ members in targeted trilateral and multilateral formats. The “Mosi” naval exercises involving Russia, China, and South Africa off the coast of Africa, and the “Maritime Security Belt” exercises with Russia, China, and new member Iran in the Gulf of Oman, demonstrate an expanding web of security cooperation that deliberately bypasses the U.S. and its traditional alliance structures.⁷⁶ While not representing a unified BRICS+ military posture, these exercises enhance interoperability among key members and project a coordinated challenge to U.S. power projection in vital strategic regions.

Table 4: U.S. Threat Vector Analysis

Section 5: Strategic Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In response to the systemic challenge posed by BRICS+, the United States must adopt a sophisticated and forward-looking strategy that moves beyond a reactive, confrontational posture. A policy framework built on broad opposition and punitive tariffs has proven counterproductive, inadvertently fostering greater unity within a bloc rife with internal contradictions.⁶⁵ An effective U.S. strategy must be proactive and nuanced, designed to leverage American strengths while exploiting BRICS+ weaknesses. The overarching goal should be to manage the rise of this coalition through a policy of “competitive coopetition.”

5.1 Recalibrating U.S. Engagement: From Confrontation to “Competitive Coopetition”

The foundational error in past U.S. policy has been to treat BRICS+ as a monolithic entity.⁷⁴ A more effective approach requires a differentiated strategy that recognizes the deep fissures within the group and tailors U.S. engagement accordingly.

• Deepen the Strategic Partnership with India: India is the critical swing state and the primary counterweight to Chinese dominance within BRICS+. The U.S. should prioritize and accelerate security, intelligence, technology, and economic cooperation through bilateral channels and minilateral formats like the Quad. The strategic objective is not to force India to leave BRICS—an unrealistic goal that would undermine its principle of strategic autonomy—but to ensure that its calculus remains more aligned with a U.S.-backed vision of a free and open, rules-based multipolar order, rather than a Chinese-led, revisionist one.⁵⁰
• Cultivate Ties with Brazil and South Africa: As fellow democracies, Brazil and South Africa share U.S. interests in areas such as climate action, public health, and the rule of law. The U.S. should intensify diplomatic engagement and offer tangible benefits, including enhanced trade access, investment in their green transitions, and a greater voice in Western-led institutions. This provides these countries with viable alternatives and reduces their incentive to align with the more explicitly anti-Western agenda of the Russia-China axis.⁶⁹
• Isolate and Contain Revisionist Actors: For members like Russia and Iran, whose core strategic goals are fundamentally hostile to U.S. interests, a policy of containment and pressure should continue. The U.S. should work with allies to maintain and enforce targeted sanctions while clearly communicating that their inclusion in BRICS+ will not shield them from accountability for malign activities.

5.2 Reinforcing the U.S.-led Financial Architecture

The most effective long-term defense against the appeal of the NDB and the push for de-dollarization is to address the legitimate grievances that fuel their existence. The U.S. must lead a proactive effort to reform and strengthen the Bretton Woods system.

• Champion Meaningful Institutional Reform: The U.S. should publicly and vigorously champion a redistribution of voting shares at the IMF and World Bank to give major emerging economies like India and Brazil a stake that is commensurate with their growing economic weight. Such a move would significantly diminish the appeal of creating parallel institutions by demonstrating that the existing system is capable of evolution and inclusivity.⁶⁹
• Offer a Superior Development Finance Proposition: The U.S., in coordination with G7 partners, must scale up, streamline, and better market its own development finance offerings through mechanisms like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and regional initiatives. These projects must be faster to approve, more transparent in their terms, and focused on high-quality, sustainable infrastructure to present a clear and superior alternative to the often opaque and debt-heavy financing offered by Chinese state-led entities.³³
• Lead in Financial Innovation: To maintain the dollar’s primacy, the U.S. financial system must remain the most efficient, secure, and innovative in the world. This requires the U.S. to take a leading role in setting global standards for digital currencies, cross-border payment systems, and financial technology, ensuring that the next generation of global finance is built on a dollar-based foundation.

5.3 Building a Counter-Coalition of Like-Minded Partners

The U.S. cannot counter the diplomatic weight of BRICS+ alone. It must actively build and reinforce a network of allies and partners who share a commitment to a rules-based international order.

• Revitalize the G7 and Expand its Outreach: The G7 should be reinforced as the core steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies. The U.S. should push for a more permanent and structured outreach format that regularly includes key non-BRICS democratic partners from the Global South, such as Mexico, Nigeria, and South Korea, effectively creating a “Democracies 10 (D10)” or similar grouping. This would offer an alternative vision of global governance based on shared values and mutual interests.⁶⁷
• Double Down on Minilateralism: The U.S. should continue to invest in flexible, issue-based coalitions. Formats like the Quad, AUKUS, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) are powerful tools for countering BRICS+ influence in specific domains (e.g., maritime security, infrastructure) and regions without requiring the rigid consensus of a formal alliance.¹³

5.4 Targeted Economic Statecraft

U.S. economic policy must become more surgical and strategic, abandoning blunt instruments that have proven counterproductive in favor of precise measures that impose costs on adversarial behavior without alienating neutral countries.

• Abandon Broad, Unilateral Tariffs: The use of broad, punitive tariffs against entire blocs or countries has demonstrably failed, serving only to unify BRICS+ members and drive them toward closer cooperation.⁷³ U.S. trade policy should pivot to negotiating high-standard bilateral and regional trade agreements with willing partners and using targeted, multilaterally-coordinated sanctions against specific entities for specific violations of international law or trade rules.
• Impose Costs for Bypassing the System: In response to the development of alternative payment systems designed to evade sanctions, the U.S. should adopt a clear and narrowly defined policy of prohibiting dual participation. Any global financial institution that chooses to transact through a designated parallel system like CIPS for illicit purposes should risk losing its access to the U.S. dollar clearing system. This forces a clear choice and leverages the dollar’s enduring centrality, making the cost of circumvention prohibitively high for most major international banks.⁶⁶
• Compete on Strategic Supply Chains: Rather than simply attempting to block BRICS+ consolidation of resource control, the U.S. should accelerate its own “allied-shoring” and “friend-shoring” initiatives. This involves co-investing with allies and partners in the development of secure, transparent, and resilient supply chains for critical minerals, semiconductors, and other strategic goods, thereby reducing Western dependence on BRICS+ controlled resources.³³

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