Executive Summary

The strategic situation for the week ending January 31, 2026, is characterized by a high-stakes convergence of attritional warfare, sophisticated psychological operations, and a nascent, albeit fragile, diplomatic process. The kinetic theater continues to witness an unprecedented human and material cost, with the Russian Federation maintaining its offensive posture despite casualty figures that have now surpassed 1.2 million personnel since the commencement of the full-scale invasion.¹ While the Kremlin asserts that the strategic initiative remains firmly in its hands, geolocated evidence and operational data suggest that territorial gains are increasingly marginal, achieved through a “grinding” strategy that prioritizes the piecemeal destruction of Ukrainian units over rapid maneuvering.¹

The diplomatic landscape has been dominated by the Abu Dhabi trilateral talks, involving the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. These negotiations have produced a temporary, tactical moratorium on long-range strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, a move reportedly mediated by the Trump administration to provide humanitarian relief during a period of extreme climatic distress.⁴ However, the underlying strategic intentions of this pause remain suspect, with intelligence assessments suggesting it may serve as a window for Russian forces to reconstitute missile stockpiles and manage leverage ahead of a February 1st bilateral meeting.²

Strategically, the deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) earlier in the month has fundamentally altered European security perceptions. By striking targets in Lviv near the Polish border, Moscow has demonstrated a willingness to probe NATO’s escalation thresholds while employing hypersonic technologies that currently lack viable Western countermeasures.⁶ Domestically, both belligerents face severe internal pressures: Ukraine is navigating a constitutional crisis regarding the feasibility of wartime elections amidst a catastrophic energy deficit, while Russia’s war economy is reaching a point of diminishing returns, characterized by unanchored inflation expectations and a critical labor shortage in the manufacturing sector.¹

Kinetic Operations and Frontline Tactical Dynamics

The operational environment during the final week of January 2026 has been defined by a shift from large-scale mechanized maneuvers toward small-unit infiltration and high-intensity drone interdiction. Russian forces have intensified assaults in the Pokrovsk and Huliaipole sectors, aiming to exploit gaps in Ukrainian defensive lines caused by acute personnel shortages.²

Attrition Metrics and Personnel Sustainability

The human cost of the conflict has reached a historic inflection point, with combined casualties for both sides projected to reach 2 million by the spring of 2026.¹ Russian forces, in particular, are suffering losses at a rate that exceeds any major power’s experience since 1945. Intelligence estimates indicate that since February 24, 2022, total Russian combat losses have reached approximately 1,239,590 personnel, including over 880 losses in the last 24-hour reporting period alone.²

Combatant	Total Estimated Casualties (Killed/Wounded/Missing)	Estimated Fatalities	Primary Information Source
Russian Federation	1,239,590	275,000 – 325,000	1
Ukraine	500,000 – 600,000	100,000 – 140,000	2
Combined Theater	~1,800,000+	~415,000 – 465,000	1

These fatality rates represent a catastrophic demographic drain. Russian fatalities in Ukraine are more than seventeen times the Soviet losses in Afghanistan and five times the combined losses of all Russian and Soviet wars since World War II.¹ Despite these numbers, the Russian military command continues to rely on “reconnaissance by fire” tactics, often deploying poorly trained small squads to identify Ukrainian positions, resulting in a casualty ratio often favoring Ukrainian defenders by 11:1 in localized engagements.¹

Territorial Fluctuations and Rate of Advance

Geospatial analysis of the front line reveals a decelerating Russian offensive. Between December 30, 2025, and January 27, 2026, Russian forces gained approximately 106 square miles of Ukrainian territory.² This marks a decrease from the 117 square miles gained in the previous four-week period, suggesting that the Russian military is struggling to maintain even its modest 2025 average monthly gain of 171 square miles.²

In the most active sectors, such as the push toward Pokrovsk, Russian advances are measured at a “snail’s pace” of 15 to 70 meters per day.¹ This rate of advance is historically anomalous, being slower than the progress made during the Battle of the Somme in 1916.¹ The efficacy of Ukrainian “defense-in-depth”—characterized by dense minefields, extensive trench systems, and pervasive drone surveillance—has effectively saturated the front lines, making vehicle movement nearly impossible within 15 kilometers of the contact line.¹

Sectoral Analysis: Donbas and Dnipropetrovsk

The focus of Russian offensive operations remains the capture of the remaining 10% of Donetsk Oblast still under Kyiv’s control.² This week, Russian units successfully captured Orikhovo-Vasylivka in Donetsk and Zlahoda in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.² These tactical successes are largely attributed to the Russian 10:1 numerical superiority in specific sectors, allowing them to overwhelm exhausted Ukrainian battalions that are often operating at 20% of their authorized strength.²

In the Slovyansk direction, Russian forces have increased the tempo of operations near Dronivka.¹⁶ Intelligence indicates that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is accumulating personnel and materiel in the Serebryanske Forest and Siversk with the intent of establishing fire control over Ukrainian positions in rear areas and consolidating positions on local heights along the Siverskyi Donets River.¹⁶ Ukrainian brigades in this sector have reported a heightened use of fiber-optic FPV drones by Russian units to conduct ambushes on ground lines of communication (GLOCs).¹⁶

Sectoral Analysis: Kharkiv and the Oskil River

Operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast have stalled significantly. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, under the command of Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, has reportedly established a commission to investigate the lack of progress toward Vovchansk.⁴ Despite the heavy application of KAB guided glide bombs and a high volume of tactical UAVs, Russian forces have failed to make confirmed advances in the Vovchanski Khutory and Tykhe areas.⁴

Along the Oskil River axis, Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate westward toward northern Donetsk. While Russian milbloggers claim the seizure of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, geolocated footage and Ukrainian military reports indicate that Russian presence in the area is limited to small infiltration groups that have not yet established firm control of the terrain.³ Specifically, in Petropavlivka and central Kupyansk, Russian servicemen are operating in isolation, reliant on drone-delivered supplies as Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over the primary logistical routes.⁴

Equipment Attrition and Technological Evolution

The material cost of the war continues to escalate, with Russian losses in tanks and armored vehicles reaching unsustainable levels for long-term conventional warfare.¹

Equipment Category	Cumulative Losses (Jan 31, 2026)	Weekly Trend / Notable Change
Tanks	11,619	Continued attrition in Donetsk
Armored Combat Vehicles	23,977	High losses during “meat assaults”
Artillery Systems	36,768	Primary target of Ukrainian FPVs
Multiple Launch Rocket Systems	1,632	Increased targeting of rear logistics
Tactical-level UAVs	119,928	~700 downed daily 13

A significant technological development this week is the increased Russian use of “Molniya” fixed-wing FPV drones equipped with Starlink satellite terminals.⁵ These systems are being utilized for battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian highways at depths of 25 to 100 kilometers.⁵ This adaptation allows Russian forces to bypass traditional electronic warfare (EW) bubbles that are localized to the immediate front line, creating a pervasive threat to Ukrainian logistics and civilian movement.⁵

Strategic Weaponry and the Oreshnik Escalation

The strategic architecture of the conflict underwent a fundamental transition following the Russian Federation’s combat deployment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on January 9, 2026. This strike, which targeted a strategic underground gas storage facility in Lviv within 60 kilometers of the Polish border, represents the most aggressive proximity-based signaling toward NATO since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.⁶

Technical Analysis of the Oreshnik System

The Oreshnik is a road-mobile, solid-fueled system likely derived from the discontinued RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.⁶ It is characterized by its use of a Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) bus, which dispersed 36 sub-munitions during the Lviv strike.⁶ Traveling at speeds exceeding Mach 10 (approximately 12,300 km/h), the Oreshnik is designed specifically to penetrate modern air defenses, including the newly deployed Arrow 3 system in Germany and David’s Sling in Israel.⁶

The weapon’s impact profile is particularly significant for subterranean targets. The kinetic energy of the warheads entering the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds allows them to destroy reinforced underground bunkers without the need for a massive explosive payload, utilizing the sheer force of the shock to collapse structures.⁸ While Russian claims about the missile penetrating “dozens of meters” into the ground have been dismissed by experts as unrealistic, visual evidence confirms the system’s ability to pierce multi-story structures and reach basement levels.⁸

Psychological Operations and “Reflexive Control”

Intelligence analysts identify the Oreshnik deployment as a manifestation of the Kremlin’s “reflexive control” campaign. The objective is to deter Western support for Ukraine by demonstrating that Moscow possesses strategic assets for which the West has no current technical or military-technical means to block.⁷ By striking near the EU and NATO border, Russia is probing escalation thresholds and testing the transatlantic community’s collective response.⁸

Head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin, has characterized the effect on Western defense planners as “staggering,” claiming it serves as a warning against direct involvement of Western personnel in the hostilities.⁷ This sentiment has been echoed by Russian ambassadors, who suggest that the demonstration of Oreshnik has successfully reined in the hostility of certain European capitals.⁷

Integration of Starlink in Long-Range Strike Drones

The exploitation of commercial satellite technology remains a critical factor in Russia’s long-range strike capability. Ukrainian officials have reported “hundreds of confirmed cases” of Starlink terminals being attached to Russian long-range strike drones, such as the BM-35.¹⁸

System	Reported Range	Technological Enhancement	Strategic Implication
BM-35 Drone	500 Kilometers	Starlink-equipped tracking	Targets rear infrastructure
Molniya FPV	25 – 100 Kilometers	Starlink/Fiber-optic link	BAI/Logistics disruption
Oreshnik IRBM	Up to 6,000 Kilometers	Hypersonic glide vehicles	Strategic signaling/MIRV

The 500-kilometer range of Starlink-equipped BM-35 drones places most of Ukraine, all of Moldova, and parts of Poland, Romania, and Lithuania within strike distance.¹⁸ These drones are being used to target civilian infrastructure and have been linked to an attack on a Ukrainian passenger train.¹⁸ Kyiv is currently working with SpaceX to implement geofencing measures to prevent Russian forces from utilizing Starlink connectivity for guidance, though the issue has evolved from isolated incidents to a recurring operational problem.¹⁸

Diplomatic Maneuvering: The Abu Dhabi Process

The week ending January 31, 2026, has seen the conclusion of the second round of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, involving delegations from the United States, Ukraine, and Russia.² These negotiations are taking place against the backdrop of a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy and increasing pressure on Kyiv to reach a political settlement.

The Energy Strike Moratorium

A key outcome of the recent diplomatic engagement is a reported week-long moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and the city of Kyiv.⁴ U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly persuaded Vladimir Putin to agree to this pause, which is scheduled to run from 0700 on January 29 through February 3, 2026.²

While President Zelenskyy has expressed gratitude for the pause during a period of extreme winter cold, the strategic consensus among analysts is that the moratorium is a tactical maneuver by Moscow.⁵ The Kremlin has notably refused to comment on the agreement, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has emphasized that any long-term ceasefire (60+ days) is “unacceptable,” as it would allow Ukraine to “rest, rearm, and reconstitute its military”.⁵ Intelligence suggests that Russia may use this period to amass drone and missile stockpiles for a large, combined strike once the moratorium expires.⁵

Security Guarantees and the “Anchorage Formula”

Central to the Abu Dhabi negotiations is the debate over future security guarantees for Ukraine. President Zelenskyy has stated that a bilateral document with the United States is “100 percent ready” and is awaiting a formal signing ceremony.² These guarantees reportedly mirror NATO’s Article 5 and include promises of a coordinated military response in the event of a sustained Russian attack against post-war Ukraine.³

However, the Trump administration has signaled that these guarantees are contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace settlement that would likely involve ceding all territory currently occupied by Russia, including the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.³ This aligns with the so-called “Anchorage formula,” a term frequently used by Kremlin officials to refer to an alleged agreement reached during the August 2025 US-Russian summit in Alaska.³ The Kremlin continues to exploit the lack of clarity surrounding this summit to claim that a joint US-Russian understanding to end the war already exists on terms favorable to Moscow.⁹

The Role of the “Coalition of the Willing”

Ukraine is also seeking a second layer of security through a “Coalition of the Willing,” which would include guarantees from European partners and eventual EU membership.⁹ Zelenskyy has set a target for Ukraine to join the EU in 2027, characterizing membership as an “economic security guarantee”.⁹ Nevertheless, internal U.S. military assessments suggest that the U.S. is no longer a permanent backstop for all European conventional defense, prioritizing Homeland Defense and the Indo-Pacific while demanding that Europe assume “primary responsibility” for its own theater security.⁶

Ukrainian Internal Politics and the Election Crisis

As the conflict approaches its fifth year, Ukraine is facing a profound internal crisis regarding the maintenance of democratic processes under the constraints of martial law. The confluence of a corruption scandal, U.S. pressure for a vote, and the physical impossibility of organizing an election during wartime has created a significant political challenge for the Zelenskyy administration.¹⁰

The Conflict Over Wartime Elections

U.S. President Donald Trump has publicly called for Ukraine to hold elections “as soon as possible,” criticizing the delay as an attempt by Zelenskyy to “cling to power”.¹⁰ In response, Zelenskyy has shifted his stance, asking the Ukrainian parliament to draft legislation that would allow for a presidential election during martial law.²¹ He has stated that Ukraine could be ready to hold a vote within 60 to 90 days, provided that allies help ensure the security of the polling stations and that legal frameworks are updated.²¹

However, the logistical and security challenges are immense:

1. Security Risks: Continuous Russian missile and drone strikes pose a direct threat to voters at polling sites.²¹
2. Displacement: Millions of Ukrainians are displaced abroad, and roughly one-fifth of the country is under occupation, making a nationwide ballot nearly impossible.²¹
3. Military Voting: Finding a way for soldiers on the front line to cast their votes safely is an unresolved challenge.²¹
4. Social Unity: There is a broad consensus across the Ukrainian political spectrum that a competitive election during a war of survival would sow division and weaken the national defense.²¹

Political Rivalries and the Yermak Resignation

Despite the suspension of formal politics, rivalries are intensifying. A survey conducted at the end of last year showed that if a vote were held, former army chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi (currently the ambassador to Britain) would receive nearly 21% support, while Kyrylo Budanov would receive 6%.¹⁰ Zelenskyy remains in the lead but by a narrowing margin.¹⁰

The administration has also been rocked by a major corruption scandal involving the misuse of funds earmarked for energy infrastructure defense.¹⁰ This led to the resignation of Zelenskyy’s influential top aide, Andriy Yermak, and has forced the President to reach out to potential political rivals—such as former Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov—to maintain political stability.¹⁰

Morale and the Manpower Shortage

The internal stability of Ukraine is further strained by an acute manpower crisis. Reports indicate that approximately 2 million Ukrainians are dodging the draft, and over 200,000 have deserted—roughly one-fifth of the total armed forces.² This has led to critical shortages on the front line, with some battalions fielding only 100 soldiers instead of the required 500.² This personnel deficit is the primary factor allowing for recent Russian tactical gains in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.²

The Russian War Economy and Domestic Stability

While the Russian Federation appears stable on the surface, the “war economy” is showing signs of structural fatigue. The Kremlin has prioritized the defense industrial base (DIB) at the expense of civilian sectors, leading to significant economic distortions that are increasingly felt by the Russian populace.¹

Inflation and the VAT Increase

On January 1, 2026, a new law increased the value-added tax (VAT) from 20% to 22%, aimed at funding the massive increase in military spending.⁹ This has led to an immediate rise in the prices of almost all essential goods and services.⁹ Official inflation in early January was recorded at 1.91% for the first three weeks of the month, with annual inflation reaching 6.43%.²⁴

Economic Indicator	Value / Status (Jan 2026)	Source / Context
Household Inflation Expectations	13.7% (Unchanged from Dec)	11
Observed Inflation (Public)	14.5%	11
VAT Rate	22% (Effective Jan 1, 2026)	9
GDP Growth (2025 Estimate)	0.6% – 0.9%	1
3-Year Bond Yield	14.6%	14

Inflation expectations among the population remain “unanchored” at 13.7%, a factor that the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) considers critical for its upcoming February rate-setting meeting.¹¹ Businesses have reported their highest price expectations since April 2022, largely attributed to the increased tax burden and rising labor costs.¹¹

The Industrial Development Fund and Labor Shortages

To maintain the production of military hardware, the Russian government’s Industrial Development Fund has provided trillions of rubles in low-interest loans to manufacturers.²⁷ The DIB now employs 3.8 million people, having added 800,000 workers over the last three years.²⁷ However, this expansion has created a “labor crunch” in the civilian sector, forcing major manufacturers to introduce four-day work weeks or announce layoffs in late 2025.¹

The competition for labor has inflated wages, fueling a wage-price spiral that complicates the Central Bank’s efforts to curb inflation.⁹ Furthermore, the lack of globally competitive technology firms—Russia has zero companies in the world’s top 100 by market capitalization—suggests that the current military-led growth is not sustainable in the long term.¹

Internal Disaffection and Recruitment Challenges

Intelligence assessments indicate that the unexpectedly high cost of the war—both in terms of casualties and economic strain—has generated internal disaffection within Russia.²⁸ Western intelligence agencies have reportedly been able to exploit this discontent for recruitment purposes.²⁸

The Russian Ministry of Defense has also faced challenges with its new recruitment efforts for “special contracts.” Reports indicate that recruiters are using “bait and switch” tactics, promising students and university graduates safe positions as drone operators 20 kilometers behind the front line with salaries of up to 5.5 million rubles ($73,000) per year.⁵ However, many of these recruits are reportedly being diverted into frontline infantry units with no guarantee of their promised assignments.⁵

Hybrid Warfare and Regional Security Impacts

The conflict continues to spill over into the cyber and hybrid domains, with Russia targeting NATO infrastructure and utilizing unconventional methods to disrupt regional stability.

The Attack on the Polish Power Grid

In late January 2026, Russian state-sponsored threat actors, identified as the Sandworm (or Electrum) group, conducted a sophisticated cyberattack on the Polish power grid.²⁹ The operation targeted communication and control systems at approximately 30 sites, including combined heat and power plants and wind/solar dispatch centers.²⁹

Target Category	Number of Sites	Specific Equipment Affected
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)	~10	Grid safety/stability systems
Renewable Dispatch (Wind/Solar)	~20	Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)
Communication Infrastructure	Global to grid	Windows-based devices (wiped)

Unlike previous attacks in Ukraine, this strike did not result in immediate outages but instead focused on “bricking” (irreparably damaging) industrial control system (ICS) hardware.²⁹ Cybersecurity firm Dragos described the attack as “rushed and opportunistic,” suggesting it was intended to cause hardware damage and reset configurations rather than execute a precisely planned blackout.²⁹ This incident marks the first major operation specifically targeting distributed energy resources (DER) within a NATO country.²⁹

Sanctions Enforcement and the “Shadow Fleet”

The 19th EU sanctions package, adopted on October 23, 2025, is now moving into its critical implementation phases. Key measures targeting the energy sector include a prohibition on the purchase or transfer of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), effective April 25, 2026, for new contracts.² The package also removes previous exemptions that allowed imports of oil and gas from Rosneft and Gazprom Neft into the EU.³¹

Sanction Measure	Effective Date	Target / Objective
LNG Import Ban	Apr 25, 2026	Decoupling EU energy from RU
Mir/SBP Payment Ban	Jan 25, 2026	Financial isolation 31
UK Oil Price Cap ($44.10)	Jan 31, 2026	Reducing RU oil revenue 32
Space/AI Service Ban	Jan 2026	Technological degradation 30

A major escalation in enforcement occurred this week with the UK government identifying a legal basis to board and detain Russian-sanctioned vessels in the “shadow fleet”.³² The UK intends to use the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to authorize the use of military force for these operations, representing a significant shift in the effort to disrupt Russia’s ability to bypass oil price caps.³²

Humanitarian Landscape and Displacement Trends

The humanitarian crisis in Ukraine has entered a new, more dangerous phase as the war enters its fifth winter. Russian attacks have cost Ukraine’s energy sector over $714 million in damage and reduced the country’s generating capacity from 33.7 GW to approximately 14 GW.²

The Energy Crisis and Winter Displacement

In Kyiv, the Jan 24 combined strike left nearly 6,000 high-rise buildings without heat, forcing some 500,000 residents to evacuate the city.² Nationwide, approximately 1.2 million customers were left without power during the coldest week of the year.² The damage to critical infrastructure has heightened protection risks for the most vulnerable, particularly the 3.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have already depleted their resources over four years of war.³³

Humanitarian Metric	2026 Estimate	Primary Driver
People in Need (PIN)	10.8 Million	Infrastructure destruction
Internally Displaced (IDP)	3.7 Million	Frontline shifts / Blackouts
International Refugees	3.7 Million	Sustained hostilities
Shelter Deficit	2.5 Million Families	Aerial bombardment 33

The European Union has allocated an additional €145 million in emergency humanitarian aid for Ukraine to address these winter-specific needs, alongside €8 million for Moldova.² Nevertheless, the UN and its partners face a $2 billion funding gap for 4.1 million people prioritized for assistance in 2026.³⁵

War Crimes and Executions

The week has seen a disturbing increase in reported war crimes. Ukraine’s Prosecutor General is investigating the deliberate killing of an elderly couple attempting to evacuate from Hrabovske in Sumy Oblast by Russian FPV drones.² Furthermore, there are systemic reports of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POW) on the battlefield in violation of international law.⁴ To date, Russia has taken at least 13,500 Ukrainian soldiers prisoner, with widespread reports of torture and starvation being used as tools of interrogation and psychological pressure.²

Conclusion and Strategic Outlook

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, as of the end of January 2026, remains a war of grinding attrition with no clear path to a decisive military victory for either side. Russia possesses the numerical superiority and the “war economy” structure to sustain its offensive for the foreseeable future, albeit at the cost of long-term economic and demographic decline.¹ The deployment of the Oreshnik IRBM and the cyber-strikes against Poland indicate that Moscow is increasingly willing to risk direct confrontation with NATO to achieve its maximalist war aims.⁶

For Ukraine, the primary challenge is the preservation of its statehood and democratic identity in the face of catastrophic energy losses and a widening manpower gap.² The Abu Dhabi trilateral talks provide a tenuous diplomatic opening, but the “Anchorage formula” and the pressure for wartime elections create significant internal political risks for the Zelenskyy administration.³

The strategic outlook for the first quarter of 2026 is one of continued high-intensity localized fighting, punctuated by tactical pauses for diplomatic signaling. The expiration of the New START treaty on February 5th will be a critical indicator of the future of US-Russian strategic stability.⁹ In the absence of a breakthrough in Abu Dhabi, the conflict is likely to remain focused on the “grinding” destruction of personnel and infrastructure, with both sides preparing for a renewed escalation once the current winter moratorium expires.⁵

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