The strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific is being fundamentally reshaped by the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China’s military doctrine has undergone a profound evolution, shifting from a posture focused on “local wars” on its periphery to preparing for high-intensity, multi-domain conflict against a peer competitor. This transformation is driven by a central concept that redefines modern warfare: the PLA no longer views conflict as a contest between individual platforms but as a “systems confrontation” between opposing operational networks. At the heart of this doctrine is the goal of waging “systems destruction warfare,” a concept predicated on achieving victory not through the simple attrition of enemy forces, but by inducing the catastrophic collapse of an adversary’s ability to sense, communicate, command, and control its forces.

This doctrinal shift towards “informatized” and “intelligentized” warfare mandates the deep integration of cyber, space, information, and autonomous platforms into all PLA operations, with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) positioned as a primary instrument for executing both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. The objective is to shape the battlespace and achieve a swift, decisive victory by paralyzing the enemy’s decision-making cycle.

In response, the United States has embarked on its own doctrinal revolution. The development of Agile Combat Employment (ACE) and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) represents a fundamental redesign of the U.S. force posture and command architecture. ACE seeks to mitigate vulnerability through dispersal and maneuver, while JADC2 aims to create a resilient, decentralized network that can withstand and fight through a systems-destruction attack. This emerging strategic dynamic is therefore a clash of competing philosophies: China’s effort to find and destroy the centralized nodes of our system versus our effort to decentralize and make that system inherently resilient.

It is critical to recognize that the PLA is not blind to its own limitations. Internal PLA assessments acknowledge significant gaps in the complex integration and joint capabilities required to fully realize their system-of-systems concept. This self-awareness drives them to pursue asymmetric strategies designed to exploit perceived U.S. dependencies and vulnerabilities, rather than engaging in a symmetric, platform-for-platform fight. The following analysis identifies the five most probable and impactful air combat strategies a PLAAF commander will employ to execute this doctrine and outlines the corresponding USAF counter-maneuvers designed to defeat them.

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Key 5th-Generation Air Combat Platforms

Feature	F-22 Raptor	F-35 Lightning II	Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon
Primary Role	Air Dominance / Offensive Counter-Air	Multirole Strike Fighter / ISR & C2 Node	Air Superiority Interceptor / Forward Sensor & Strike Platform
Key Stealth Features	Planform alignment, continuous curvature, internal weapons bays, advanced coatings, thrust-vectoring nozzles.	Aligned edges, radar absorbent coating, internal weapons bays, reduced engine signature, embedded sensors.	Blended fuselage, canard-delta configuration, diverterless supersonic inlets, internal weapons bays, serrated exhaust nozzles.
Avionics/Sensor Suite	AN/APG-77 AESA radar, advanced electronic warfare suite, sensor fusion. Modernization includes IRST pods and enhanced radar capabilities.	AN/APG-81 AESA radar, Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), 360° Distributed Aperture System (DAS), advanced sensor fusion.	KLJ-5 AESA radar, chin-mounted IRST, passive electro-optical detection system with 360° coverage, advanced sensor fusion.
Standard Internal A/A Armament	6x AIM-120 AMRAAM, 2x AIM-9 Sidewinder.	4x AIM-120 AMRAAM.	4x PL-15 (long-range), 2x PL-10 (short-range).
Network Integration Role	“Hunter-Killer” that receives data from the network to find and destroy high-end threats. Limited data-out capability compared to F-35.	“Quarterback of the Skies.” Gathers, fuses, and distributes data across the joint force, acting as a forward, survivable C2 and ISR node.	Forward battle manager and sensor node. Uses LPI data links to cue non-stealthy shooters. J-20S variant enhances UAS control and C2.

Section 1: Strategy I – Systems Destruction: The Decapitation Strike

Adversary TTPs

The purest expression of the PLA’s “systems destruction warfare” doctrine is a multi-domain, synchronized decapitation strike executed in the opening moments of a conflict. The objective is not merely to inflict damage but to induce systemic paralysis by severing the command, control, and communications (C3) pathways that constitute the “brain and nervous system” of U.S. and allied forces. The PLAAF commander’s primary goal will be to collapse our ability to direct a coherent defense, creating chaos and decision-making paralysis that can be exploited by follow-on forces.

This attack will be meticulously planned and executed across multiple domains simultaneously. Kinetically, the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) will launch waves of long-range precision-strike munitions, including theater ballistic and cruise missiles, against fixed, high-value C2 nodes such as Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs), major headquarters, and key satellite ground stations. Concurrently, the PLA’s Cyberspace Force (CSF) will unleash a barrage of offensive cyber operations designed to disrupt, degrade, and corrupt our command networks from within. This “information offense” is intended to destroy the integrity of our data and undermine trust in our own systems. In the electromagnetic spectrum, PLA electronic warfare (EW) assets will conduct widespread jamming of satellite communications and GPS signals, aiming to isolate deployed forces and sever their links to strategic command.

This physical and virtual assault will be augmented by operations in the space and cognitive domains. The PLA Aerospace Force (ASF) will likely employ a range of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities, from co-orbital kinetic kill vehicles to ground-based directed energy weapons, to blind our ISR satellites and degrade our PNT (positioning, navigation, and timing) constellations. Finally, a sophisticated cognitive warfare campaign will be launched, disseminating targeted disinformation to sow confusion among decision-makers and fracture the political will of the U.S. and its allies to respond effectively. This concept of “Social A2/AD” seeks to defeat a response before it can even be mounted by compromising the socio-political fabric of the target nation.

USAF Counter-Maneuver: The Resilient Network

The U.S. counter to a decapitation strategy is not to build thicker walls around our command centers but to eliminate them as single points of failure. The doctrinal response is rooted in the principles of decentralization and resilience, embodied by the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) framework. JADC2 is designed to create a distributed, self-healing, and resilient network that can absorb an initial blow and continue to function effectively, moving both data and decision-making authority to the tactical edge. If a primary C2 node is destroyed, its functions are seamlessly transferred to subordinate or alternate nodes across the network, ensuring operational continuity.

In this construct, the F-35 Lightning II fleet becomes a pivotal asset. With its advanced sensor fusion capabilities and robust, low-probability-of-intercept data links, a flight of F-35s can function as a forward-deployed, airborne C2 and ISR node. These aircraft can collect, process, and disseminate a comprehensive battlespace picture to other assets in the theater, effectively acting as the “quarterback of the skies” even if their connection to rear-echelon command has been severed. They transform from being mere strike platforms into the distributed “brain” of the combat force.

This distributed C2 architecture will be supported by a multi-layered and redundant communications network, leveraging proliferated low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations, resilient line-of-sight data links, and emerging technologies designed to operate in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment. Critically, this technological resilience is matched by a philosophical shift in command: the empowerment of tactical leaders through the principle of “mission command.” A key enabler of Agile Combat Employment, mission command grants subordinate commanders the authority to make decisions based on their understanding of the higher commander’s intent, rather than waiting for explicit instructions from a centralized headquarters. This accelerates our decision-making cycle, allowing us to operate inside the adversary’s, and turns the PLA’s attack on our physical C2 infrastructure into a strike against a target that is no longer there.

Section 2: Strategy II – The Long-Range Attrition Campaign: Hunting the Enablers

Adversary TTPs

Recognizing that U.S. airpower in the vast Indo-Pacific theater is critically dependent on a logistical backbone of high-value airborne assets (HVAAs), a PLAAF commander will execute a long-range attrition campaign designed to cripple our operational endurance and reach. The primary targets of this campaign are not our frontline fighters, but the “enablers” that support them: aerial refueling tankers (KC-46, KC-135), ISR platforms (AWACS, Rivet Joint), and other specialized support aircraft. By destroying these assets, the PLA can effectively ground entire fighter wings and achieve area denial without needing to win a direct confrontation.

The key instrument for this strategy is the combination of the J-20 stealth fighter and the PL-15 very-long-range air-to-air missile (AAM). The PLAAF will employ J-20s to leverage their low-observable characteristics, allowing them to bypass our fighter screens and penetrate deep into what we consider “safe” airspace. Their mission is not to engage in dogfights with F-22s, but to achieve a firing solution on HVAAs operating hundreds of miles behind the main line of conflict.

The PL-15 missile, with its estimated operational range of 200-300 km and a dual-pulsed rocket motor that provides a terminal energy boost, is purpose-built for this task. The missile’s capability allows a J-20 to launch from well beyond the engagement range of our own fighters’ AAMs, creating a significant standoff threat. As demonstrated in the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, the effective range of the PL-15 can be dangerously underestimated, providing adversary pilots with a false sense of security and leading to catastrophic losses. A salvo of PL-15s fired at a tanker formation forces a stark choice: abort the refueling mission and concede operational reach, or risk destruction. This targeting process will be enabled by a networked system of sensors, including over-the-horizon radars and satellites, which can provide cuing data to the J-20s, allowing them to remain passive and undetected for as long as possible.

USAF Counter-Maneuver: The Layered Shield

Countering this long-range threat requires extending our integrated air defense far beyond the immediate combat zone to protect the logistical and ISR assets that form the foundation of our air campaign. This cannot be a purely defensive posture; it must be a proactive, multi-layered shield designed to hunt the archer before he can release his arrow.

The F-22 Raptor is the centerpiece of this counter-maneuver. Its primary mission in this scenario is offensive counter-air, specifically to hunt and destroy the J-20s that threaten our HVAAs. With its superior stealth characteristics, supercruise capability, and powerful AN/APG-77 AESA radar, the F-22 is the asset best equipped to detect, track, and engage a J-20 before it can reach its PL-15 launch parameters. Continuous modernization of the F-22 fleet, including upgraded sensors, software, and potentially podded IRST systems, is therefore a strategic imperative to maintain this critical qualitative edge.

Operating in coordination with the F-22s, flights of F-35s will act as a forward “sanitizer” screen for the HVAAs. Using their powerful, networked sensors like the Distributed Aperture System (DAS) to passively scan vast volumes of airspace, the F-35s will serve as a persistent early warning layer. They can detect the faint signatures of inbound stealth threats and use their data links to vector F-22s for the intercept, creating a networked hunter-killer team. This layered defense will be augmented by dedicated fighter escorts for HVAAs, a departure from recent operational norms. Furthermore, we must accelerate the development of next-generation, low-observable tankers and unmanned ISR platforms that can operate with greater survivability in contested environments. Finally, HVAAs themselves must adopt more dynamic and unpredictable operational patterns, employing strict emissions control (EMCON) and randomized orbits to complicate the PLA’s targeting problem.

Section 3: Strategy III – The A2/AD Saturation Attack: Overwhelming the Bubble

Adversary TTPs

A central pillar of China’s military strategy is the creation of a formidable Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability designed to make it prohibitively costly for U.S. forces to operate within the First and Second Island Chains. In a conflict, a PLAAF commander will leverage this capability to execute a massive, synchronized, multi-domain saturation attack aimed at overwhelming the defensive capacity of a key operational hub, such as a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or a major airbase like Kadena or Andersen.

The execution of this strategy will involve coordinated waves of aircraft designed to saturate defenses through sheer mass. J-20s, potentially operating in a “beast mode” configuration with externally mounted munitions, will sacrifice some stealth for overwhelming firepower to engage defending fighters and suppress air defenses. They will be followed by large formations of J-16 strike fighters and H-6 bombers launching salvos of advanced munitions, including the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. These manned platforms will be augmented by swarms of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and smaller drones, which will be used to confuse and saturate defensive radars, act as decoys, conduct electronic jamming, and carry out their own kinetic strikes against critical defensive systems like radar arrays and missile launchers.

This aerial assault will occur simultaneously with a multi-axis missile barrage from other domains. The PLA Rocket Force will launch salvos of DF-21D and DF-26 “carrier killer” anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), while PLA Navy warships and coastal defense batteries contribute their own volleys of cruise missiles. The entire operation is designed to present a defending force with an insurmountable number of threats arriving from multiple vectors—high and low, supersonic and subsonic, stealthy and conventional—in an extremely compressed timeframe. This complex strike package is enabled and coordinated by a vast C4ISR network of satellites, over-the-horizon radars, and forward-deployed sensors that provide the real-time targeting data necessary to find, fix, and engage U.S. forces.

USAF Counter-Maneuver: Agile Combat Employment (ACE)

The doctrinal counter to a saturation attack is not to build an impenetrable shield, but to deny the adversary a concentrated target. Agile Combat Employment (ACE) is the USAF’s operational concept for maneuver and dispersal, designed to fundamentally break the adversary’s targeting model by complicating it to the point of failure. ACE shifts air operations from large, centralized, and vulnerable Main Operating Bases (MOBs) to a distributed network of smaller, dispersed locations.

Instead of concentrating combat power on a few well-known airfields, ACE prescribes the dispersal of forces into smaller, more agile packages across a wide array of locations, including allied military bases, smaller contingency airfields, and even civilian airports in a “hub-and-spoke” model. This forces the PLA to divide its limited inventory of high-end munitions against dozens of potential targets rather than a few, drastically diluting the effectiveness of a saturation strike. ACE, however, is not static dispersal; it is a “proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver”. Force packages will constantly shift between these dispersed locations based on threat assessments and operational needs, making it impossible for the PLA to predict where U.S. combat power will be generated from at any given time.

This operational concept is enabled by two key innovations: Multi-Capable Airmen (MCAs) and pre-positioned materiel. MCAs are personnel trained in multiple skill sets outside their primary specialty, such as aircraft refueling, re-arming, and basic security. This allows a small, lean team to deploy to an austere location, rapidly service and relaunch aircraft, and then redeploy, minimizing the logistical footprint and personnel vulnerability at any single site. To support these rapid “turn and burn” operations, the “posture” element of ACE requires the pre-positioning of fuel, munitions, and essential equipment at these dispersed locations. By transforming our airpower from a fixed, predictable target into a distributed, mobile, and resilient force, ACE imposes immense cost, complexity, and uncertainty onto the adversary’s targeting cycle.

Section 4: Strategy IV – The Stealth Quarterback: J-20 as a Forward Battle Manager

Adversary TTPs

Beyond its role as an interceptor, the PLAAF is developing sophisticated tactics to leverage the J-20’s stealth and advanced sensors as a forward battle manager, enabling strikes by a network of non-stealthy platforms. This represents a mature application of their “network-centric warfare” concept, mirroring some of the most advanced U.S. operational constructs. The objective is to use the J-20 as a survivable, forward-deployed sensor to create a high-fidelity targeting picture deep within contested airspace, which is then used to direct standoff attacks from “arsenal planes.”

In this scenario, a small element of J-20s would penetrate U.S. and allied air defenses, employing strict EMCON procedures. They would use their suite of passive and low-emission sensors—including their AESA radar in a low-probability-of-intercept mode, their chin-mounted IRST, and their 360-degree electro-optical systems—to build a detailed, real-time picture of our force disposition without emitting signals that would betray their own position.

Once high-value targets are identified and tracked, the J-20 acts as a “quarterback,” using a secure, LPI data link to transmit precise targeting information to shooters operating outside the range of our primary air defenses. These shooters could be J-16 strike fighters laden with long-range air-to-air or anti-ship missiles, or even PLA Navy surface combatants. The introduction of the twin-seat J-20S variant is a significant force multiplier for this tactic. It is not a trainer; it is a dedicated combat aircraft where the second crew member can act as a weapons systems officer and battle manager, focused on processing sensor data, controlling unmanned “loyal wingman” drones, and managing the flow of targeting data to the network. This frees the pilot to concentrate on the demanding tasks of flying and surviving in a high-threat environment and signals a clear commitment to advanced, “intelligentized” manned-unmanned teaming.

USAF Counter-Maneuver: Shattering the Network

Defeating the “stealth quarterback” strategy requires attacking the entire kill chain, not just the platform itself. The counter-maneuver must focus on both detecting the J-20 and, just as critically, severing the fragile data links that connect the forward sensor to its shooters.

Detecting a low-observable platform like the J-20 requires a multi-spectrum, networked approach to counter-stealth. No single sensor is likely to maintain a consistent track. Instead, a composite track file will be built by fusing intermittent data from a distributed network of sensors. This network includes the F-35’s 360-degree DAS, the F-22’s powerful AESA radar, space-based infrared warning systems, and naval assets like Aegis-equipped destroyers. Once the network establishes a probable track of a hostile stealth aircraft, the F-22 Raptor is vectored to prosecute the target. As the premier air dominance fighter, the F-22’s unique combination of stealth, speed, and advanced avionics makes it the most effective platform for the lethal end of the counter-stealth mission: hunting and destroying other stealth aircraft.

Simultaneously, U.S. electronic warfare assets, such as the EA-18G Growler, will focus on jamming and disrupting the specific LPI data links the J-20 relies on to communicate with its network of shooters. If this link can be broken, the J-20 is transformed from a potent battle manager into an isolated sensor, unable to guide weapons to their targets. This EW assault will be complemented by the use of sophisticated decoys and deception techniques. By feeding the J-20’s advanced sensors with false targets and conflicting information, we can sow confusion, cause it to misdirect its shooters, or force it to emit more powerful radar signals to verify the data, thereby revealing its own position. This creates a complex battle of stealthy networks, where victory belongs to the side that can best manage its own signature while detecting and disrupting the enemy’s.

Section 5: Strategy V – Vertical Envelopment: The Airfield Seizure

Adversary TTPs

In a potential conflict over Taiwan, a high-risk, high-reward strategy available to the PLA is a vertical envelopment operation using airborne forces to rapidly seize critical infrastructure. The objective would be to capture key airports or seaports, bypassing Taiwan’s heavily defended coastal landing zones. This would create a strategic lodgment for the rapid introduction of follow-on forces and supplies, potentially unhinging the island’s entire defense plan. This is a fundamentally joint operation in which the PLAAF serves as the critical enabler.

The execution would involve the PLAAF’s growing fleet of Y-20 strategic transport aircraft, tasked with airlifting elements of the PLAAF Airborne Corps. These airborne units are no longer lightly armed paratroopers; they have been modernized into combined-arms brigades equipped with their own light armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and drones. Furthermore, they have benefited from Russian training in advanced airborne command and control systems, enhancing their operational effectiveness.

Such an operation is only feasible if the PLAAF can establish and maintain a temporary bubble of local air superiority over the designated landing zones. This implies that the preceding strategies—the decapitation strike and A2/AD saturation attack—must have been at least partially successful in degrading or suppressing Taiwanese and U.S. air defense capabilities. The slow and vulnerable Y-20 transports would require a heavy fighter escort of J-20s, J-16s, and J-10s to fend off interceptors, along with dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and EW aircraft to neutralize any remaining surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats.

USAF Counter-Maneuver: Interdicting the Assault

Countering a vertical envelopment presents a time-critical targeting problem. The transport aircraft must be engaged and destroyed before they can land and disgorge their troops and equipment. Failure to interdict this force in transit could dramatically and perhaps decisively alter the course of the ground campaign.

The first priority is to engage the transport force at the maximum possible range. U.S. stealth fighters, the F-22 and F-35, will be tasked with penetrating the Chinese fighter escort screen to target the high-value Y-20s. The transports themselves are large, non-maneuvering targets, making them ideal for long-range AAM engagements. The success of this interdiction mission hinges on our ability to win the preceding battle for air superiority, creating windows of opportunity for our fighters to strike.

This mission cannot be undertaken by the USAF alone; it demands seamless coordination with allied forces. The Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) would form crucial layers of the defense, engaging the transport force as it approaches the island. Beyond air assets, U.S. Navy submarines can play a vital role by launching precision cruise missile strikes against the designated landing airfields on Taiwan. By cratering the runways, these strikes could prevent the Y-20s from landing even if they manage to penetrate the air defenses. Finally, if ISR capabilities permit, long-range strikes will be launched against the airfields on the mainland from which the airborne assault is being staged, aiming to destroy the transports on the ground before they can even take off. This brittle but powerful PLA operation represents a strategic center of gravity; its decisive defeat would have a disproportionate psychological and operational impact on the entire invasion effort.

Conclusion: Winning the Contest of Speed and Resilience

An air confrontation with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force will not be a simple contest of platform versus platform. It will be a dynamic and complex struggle between two highly capable, networked, and intelligent military systems, each guided by a distinct and coherent operational doctrine. The PLAAF’s strategies are not merely a collection of tactics; they are an integrated approach designed to execute a “systems destruction” campaign aimed at the core tenets of traditional American power projection: our centralized command, our logistical reach, and our forward-based posture.

Victory in this new era of air combat will not be determined by marginal advantages in aircraft performance or weapon range. It will be decided by which side can more effectively execute its core doctrine under the immense pressures of multi-domain conflict. The central questions are clear: Can the PLA successfully orchestrate the immense complexity of a synchronized, multi-domain “systems destruction” strike? And conversely, can the United States successfully execute a distributed, resilient, and agile “systems preservation” and counter-attack through the principles of ACE and JADC2?

The ultimate U.S. advantage in this contest lies not in any single piece of hardware, but in the synergistic combination of our advanced technology, our evolving doctrine, and our unmatched network of capable allies and partners. While the PLA has made enormous strides, it remains a force that would largely fight alone in a major conflict. In contrast, U.S. operational plans are deeply integrated with the formidable capabilities of allies such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea. This coalition creates a strategic dilemma for China that is exponentially more complex than a simple bilateral confrontation. The integrated power of this combined, networked, and resilient joint force remains our most potent and enduring advantage in the contest for air dominance.

---

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

---

Sources Used

1. Mapping the Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernisation – 2025, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/mapping-the-recent-trends-in-china-s-military-modernisation-2025
2. The Cognitive Crucible Episode #113 Jeff Engstrom on Chinese Systems Warfare, accessed October 3, 2025, https://information-professionals.org/episode/cognitive-crucible-episode-113/
3. Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare: China’s Perspective on the U.S. …, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1535-1.html
4. Gaining Victory in Systems Warfare (China’s Perspective on the U.S.-China Military Balance) – RAND Corp : r/CredibleDefense – Reddit, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/11s2fnv/gaining_victory_in_systems_warfare_chinas/
5. Finding the Right Model: The Joint Force, the People’s Liberation Army, and Information Warfare – Air University, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3371164/finding-the-right-model-the-joint-force-the-peoples-liberation-army-and-informa/
6. Defense Primer: Agile Combat Employment (ACE) Concept – Congress.gov, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12694/IF12694.4.pdf
7. Joint All-Domain Command and Control – Wikipedia, accessed October 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_All-Domain_Command_and_Control
8. Defense Primer: Agile Combat Employment (ACE) Concept – Congress.gov, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12694
9. Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control Strategy – DoD, accessed October 3, 2025, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.pdf
10. Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor – Wikipedia, accessed October 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-22_Raptor
11. F-22 Raptor – Lockheed Martin, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-22.html
12. About the F-35, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.f35.com/f35/about.html
13. 5th Gen Capabilities – F-35 Lightning II, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.f35.com/f35/about/5th-gen-capabilities.html
14. J-20 Mighty Dragon vs. the World: 5 Strengths That Make China’s Stealth Jet a Problem, accessed October 3, 2025, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/j-20-mighty-dragon-vs-the-world-5-strengths-that-make-chinas-stealth-jet-a-problem/
15. Chengdu J-20 – Wikipedia, accessed October 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chengdu_J-20
16. Lockheed Eyes Upgrades For Oldest F-22 Raptors – The War Zone, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.twz.com/air/lockheed-eyes-upgrades-for-oldest-f-22-raptors
17. AIR COMBAT COMMAND – AF.mil, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.388fw.acc.af.mil/Portals/103/F35A_LightningII_ACC%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf
18. F-35A Lightning II > Air Force > Fact Sheet Display – AF.mil, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/478441/f-35a-lightning-ii/
19. Does China’s J-20 Rival Other Stealth Fighters? | ChinaPower Project, accessed October 3, 2025, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-chengdu-j-20/
20. F-35 Lightning II | Lockheed Martin, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-35.html
21. PL-15 (Thunderbolt-15) Chinese Active Radar-Guided Very Long Range Air-to-Air Missile, accessed October 3, 2025, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/PL-15_(Thunderbolt-15)_Chinese_Active_Radar-Guided_Very_Long_Range_Air-to-Air_Missile
22. GAO-23-105495, BATTLE MANAGEMENT: DOD and Air Force Continue to Define Joint Command and Control Efforts, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-105495.pdf
23. China’s J-20S Stealth Fighter Explained in 3 Words – The National Interest, accessed October 3, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-j-20s-stealth-fighter-explained-3-words-213676
24. Anti-access/area denial – Wikipedia, accessed October 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-access/area_denial
25. Chinese information operations and information warfare – Wikipedia, accessed October 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_information_operations_and_information_warfare
26. The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone: How Emerging Technologies Are Shifting the Balance Back to the Defense – NDU Press, accessed October 3, 2025, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2106488/the-challenge-of-dis-integrating-a2ad-zone-how-emerging-technologies-are-shifti/
27. Social Antiaccess/Area-Denial (Social A2/AD) – Marine Corps University, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/MCU-Journal/JAMS-vol-12-no-1/Social-Antiaccess-Area-Denial-Social-A2-AD/
28. Joint All-Domain Command and Control – JADC2 – SAIC, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.saic.com/what-we-do/mission-it/jadc2
29. Pathways to Implementing Comprehensive and Collaborative JADC2 – CSIS, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pathways-implementing-comprehensive-and-collaborative-jadc2
30. AGILE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT – Air Force Doctrine, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDN_1-21/AFDN%201-21%20ACE.pdf
31. PL-15 Abaddon Missile – CAT-UXO, accessed October 3, 2025, https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/missiles/pl-15-missile
32. PL-15 – Wikipedia, accessed October 3, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PL-15
33. India Paid the Price for Underestimating China’s PL-15 Missiles …, accessed October 3, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/india-paid-price-underestimating-chinas-pl-15-missiles-ps-080625
34. We Know Why the Air Force is Pouring Money Into the F-22 Raptor, accessed October 3, 2025, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/we-know-why-the-air-force-is-pouring-money-into-the-f-22-raptor/
35. China’s A2/AD strategy – Fly a jet fighter, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.flyajetfighter.com/chinas-a2-ad-strategy/
36. China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy – TDHJ.org, accessed October 3, 2025, https://tdhj.org/blog/post/china-a2ad-strategy/
37. China’s J-20 Flying in ‘Beast Mode’ Again with Eight Air-to-Air Missiles – The Aviationist, accessed October 3, 2025, https://theaviationist.com/2025/09/29/china-j-20-beast-mode-again/
38. YJ-12 | Weaponsystems.net, accessed October 3, 2025, https://weaponsystems.net/system/1221-YJ-12
39. China builds smaller but more capable air force – Defence Blog, accessed October 3, 2025, https://defence-blog.com/china-builds-smaller-but-more-capable-air-force/
40. Attaining All-domain Control: China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Capabilities in the South China Sea – Pacific Forum, accessed October 3, 2025, https://pacforum.org/publications/issues-insights-issues-and-insights-volume-25-wp-2-attaining-all-domain-control-chinas-anti-access-area-denial-a2-ad-capabilities-in-the-south-china-sea/
41. Agile Combat Employment Interoperability and Integration – Air University, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/4008841/agile-combat-employment-interoperability-and-integration/
42. Agile Combat Employment – Joint Air Power Competence Centre, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.japcc.org/articles/agile-combat-employment/
43. CSAF signs Agile Combat Employment doctrine note – Joint Base Charleston, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.jbcharleston.jb.mil/News/Article/2887386/csaf-signs-agile-combat-employment-doctrine-note/
44. Russia quietly arming China’s paratroopers for Taiwan fight – Asia Times, accessed October 3, 2025, https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/russia-quietly-arming-chinas-paratroopers-for-taiwan-fight/

Russia is helping prepare China to attack Taiwan, documents suggest, accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/09/26/russia-china-weapons-sales-air-assault/