This report provides a strategic assessment of the primary operational strategies that a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commander will employ in a land confrontation with United States forces. It further outlines the corresponding counter-strategies that a US commander must be prepared to execute to seize the initiative and achieve decisive outcomes. The foundational premise of this analysis is that any future conflict with the PLA will not be a traditional war of attrition focused on the destruction of opposing mechanized forces. Instead, it will be a “systems confrontation”. The PLA’s overarching operational doctrine, “Systems Destruction Warfare” (系統破壞戰), is designed not to annihilate but to paralyze the US operational system by disrupting its critical functions and shattering its cohesion. This philosophy permeates every facet of their warfighting doctrine and capability development, transforming the modern battlefield into a contest between opposing operational systems.

The PLA’s doctrinal evolution has been rapid and deliberate. It has transitioned from its historical roots in a “people’s war” concept to a focus on fighting and winning “informatized local wars”. This shift, heavily influenced by observations of US military operations, moved the PLA’s doctrinal focus from being weapon platform-centric to being cyber- and network-centric. The PLA is now aggressively advancing toward “intelligentized warfare,” a future form of conflict supported primarily by artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. This evolution is not merely a technological upgrade; it represents a fundamental change in their theory of victory. The ultimate goal is to achieve decision dominance by disrupting and collapsing the adversary’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop, rendering them unable to respond coherently.

Critically, any assessment of the PLA’s military strategy must begin with an understanding of its political nature. The PLA is not the army of the Chinese state; it is the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Its primary mission, above all else, is the defense of the Party and its continued rule. This political reality is the bedrock upon which its command structure, doctrine, and battlefield conduct are built. Consequently, political warfare is not an ancillary or supporting effort for the PLA; it is an inseparable and central component of its military operations, fully integrated into its concept of systems destruction.

A surface-level analysis of PLA doctrine reveals a significant degree of imitation. Concepts such as “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” (MDPW) and “informatized warfare” appear to “mirror,” “replicate,” or “copy” US military concepts like Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and net-centric warfare. The PLA is clearly observing and learning from the US military, adopting analogous terminology and pursuing similar technological goals, including networked C4ISR, AI integration, and multi-domain precision strike. However, this mirroring masks a fundamental and exploitable asymmetry. The underlying command philosophies of the two forces are diametrically opposed. The United States is developing JADC2 to empower and accelerate a decentralized Mission Command philosophy, which relies on disciplined initiative at the lowest echelons. The PLA, in contrast, is developing MDPW to enhance and enforce a rigidly centralized, top-down command structure where deviation from the Party’s directives is impermissible.

The PLA is not simply adopting US methods. It is attempting to harness the speed and lethality of a networked force without accepting the political risks associated with decentralized authority, a concept that is anathema to the CCP’s existential need for absolute control. AI and automation are being pursued as a technological solution to a political problem: how to shorten the OODA loop without empowering subordinate commanders. This creates a critical vulnerability. The PLA’s entire operational system is becoming increasingly dependent on a complex, technologically advanced, yet philosophically brittle, centralized architecture. While their system may look like ours on the surface, its “brain” is singular and centralized, making it susceptible to systemic shock. Disrupting their network is not merely a degradation of their command and control (C2); it is a fundamental attack on their entire command philosophy, one that can lead to systemic paralysis. This report will analyze the five key strategies the PLA will employ based on this doctrine and the corresponding US counters designed to exploit these inherent vulnerabilities.

I. Strategy 1: Information Paralysis – Seizing Dominance in the Electro-Cyber Domain

The PLA Commander’s Approach: Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW)

The PLA’s opening salvo in any land confrontation will not be kinetic; it will be an all-out assault on the information domain. PLA doctrine views information as the central resource on the modern battlefield and cyberspace as a primary domain of conflict, co-equal with land, sea, and air. Their primary objective is to achieve information dominance in the earliest phases of a conflict, possibly preemptively, to create “blind spots” and decision-making paralysis within US forces before significant ground combat is joined. This strategy is designed to fragment the US operational system into isolated components, rendering it less than the sum of its parts.

This offensive will be executed by the PLA’s Cyberspace Force, a strategic arm established in April 2024 from the cyberwarfare capabilities of the former Strategic Support Force (SSF). This organization consolidates China’s space, cyber, electronic warfare (EW), and psychological warfare capabilities into a single, integrated force designed to secure the information domain. Their operational approach is “Integrated Network Electronic Warfare” (INEW), which calls for the simultaneous and coordinated application of computer network attacks (CNA) and EW against the entirety of the US C4ISR architecture.

The tactical application of INEW will be multi-faceted and relentless:

• Disrupting Sensors and Data Links: The PLA has invested heavily in ground- and air-based jammers and spoofing systems designed to interfere with wireless communications, tactical data links, radar systems, and GPS signals. The goal is to sever the connections between US sensors and shooters, breaking the kill chains that underpin our precision-strike capabilities. This includes jamming low-orbit satellites and degrading SATCOM links that are vital for beyond-line-of-sight communications.
• Degrading Command Nodes: The PLA’s Cyberspace Force will conduct offensive cyber operations targeting our command posts, logistics hubs, and critical infrastructure. These attacks will aim to disrupt, degrade, or destroy networks by manipulating or corrupting data, deploying ransomware, and executing distributed denial-of-service attacks to slow our decision-making and erode confidence in our own information systems.
• Counter-Space Operations: Recognizing US dependence on space-based assets, the PLA will employ a range of counter-space capabilities. This includes co-orbital anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, direct-ascent kinetic kill vehicles, and ground-based directed energy weapons and jammers designed to deny US forces access to space-based ISR, communication, and PNT (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing) assets.

A critical element of this strategy is the PLA’s concept of “peacetime-wartime integration”. This doctrine posits that effective cyber warfare is an unending activity that seamlessly transitions across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, PLA cyber activities—such as intelligence gathering, mapping critical infrastructure, operational preparation of the environment (OPE), and pre-positioning malicious code on vulnerable networks—are not activities that will begin at the onset of hostilities. They are continuous operations that will simply intensify, aiming to achieve decisive effects before the first shot is fired.

The US Commander’s Response: Assured C2 through Network Resilience and Offensive Cyber

The US response to the PLA’s information paralysis strategy is not predicated on building an impenetrable, static network defense. Such a defense is impossible against a peer adversary with the resources and capabilities of the PLA. Instead, our core response is to build and operate a resilient network architecture that can “fight through” sustained attacks and continue to enable effective command and control. This philosophy of resilience is the central technological and doctrinal pillar of our Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept.

Our approach to achieving this resilience is multi-layered:

• Technical Resilience: We will execute a robust Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) communications plan built upon the principle of transport diversity. This involves creating and maintaining multiple, redundant communication pathways for data to travel, leveraging a hybrid network of Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Orbit (GEO) SATCOM; high-capacity terrestrial microwave and fiber; and line-of-sight optical communication systems. Automated network management systems will intelligently and seamlessly route data over the best available pathway, automatically switching when a primary link is degraded or jammed, often without the user even noticing. To harden our signals, we will employ advanced techniques such as frequency-hopping waveforms, low probability of intercept/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) transmissions, advanced encryption standards, and complex modulation schemes to make it more difficult for the adversary to detect, target, and disrupt our communications.
• Organizational Resilience: The US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) are the primary organizational tool for this fight. At the heart of each MDTF is the Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB), a unique formation that integrates cyber, EW, space, intelligence, and information operations capabilities. The MDEB is our maneuver element in the electro-cyber domain. Its mission is not only to defend our own networks but to conduct offensive operations to disrupt the PLA’s C4ISR system. The MDEB will actively sense the electromagnetic environment, identify and locate PLA emitters and network nodes, and then deliver converged non-kinetic effects—jamming, spoofing, and cyber-attacks—to degrade their ability to command their forces.
• Doctrinal Resilience (JADC2): JADC2 is fundamentally designed to function in a contested, degraded, and intermittent communications environment. By establishing a data-centric enterprise—where data is uncoupled from specific systems and made available to all authorized users—and employing AI-enabled processing at the edge, JADC2 can rapidly re-route information from any available sensor, fuse data from disparate sources, and provide commanders with a “good enough” common operational picture to continue making timely and effective decisions. JADC2 accepts that some nodes will be lost; its purpose is to ensure that the loss of individual nodes does not lead to the collapse of the entire system.

The PLA’s sophisticated doctrine for EW, which outlines a comprehensive campaign plan for achieving electromagnetic dominance, reveals their strategic calculus. Their “Systems Destruction” doctrine correctly identifies an adversary’s C4ISR network as the primary center of gravity in modern warfare. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is the physical terrain upon which this network operates. Therefore, a PLA commander will not view the fight for control of the EMS as a supporting effort; it will be the main effort in the initial phase of any conflict. Their doctrine is explicit: “Whoever controls the EMS…will retain enormous advantages in securing victory”. This necessitates a paradigm shift in our own thinking. We must treat the EMS as maneuver space, on par with land, sea, and air. Our MDEBs cannot be held in reserve or treated as specialized support assets. They must be deployed forward and postured to compete for and establish pockets of electromagnetic superiority from the very outset of hostilities. Our ability to maneuver and win in the physical domains will be directly contingent on our ability to win, or at a minimum achieve a stalemate, in the EMS. This elevates the role of the EW and Cyber operator from that of a supporting specialist to a primary combatant in the opening hours of a modern conflict.

II. Strategy 2: Political Disintegration – The “Three Warfares” on the Battlefield

The PLA Commander’s Approach: Weaponizing Narrative and Law

A PLA commander will view the cognitive and political domains as a battlefield co-equal to the physical domains. For the PLA, political warfare is not an adjunct to military operations; it is a “central pillar” of their strategy and a “critical component of systems destruction warfare”. The objective of this warfare is to achieve victory before the decisive battle is even fought by weakening our will to fight, fracturing our alliances, shaping our strategic assessments, and undermining the morale of our soldiers. This approach is encapsulated in the doctrine of the “Three Warfares” (三戰), which will be employed directly and continuously against our deployed forces, our leadership, and our home front.

The “Three Warfares” will be integrated into every phase of a PLA operation:

• Public Opinion Warfare (輿論戰): The PLA will leverage the CCP’s vast state-controlled media apparatus and its sophisticated social media manipulation capabilities to wage a global information campaign. This will involve disseminating targeted disinformation and propaganda through every available channel to erode US domestic support for the conflict, create and exacerbate rifts between the US and its regional allies, and portray US military actions as aggressive, illegitimate, or incompetent. The goal is to isolate the US politically and create domestic pressure to de-escalate or withdraw.
• Psychological Warfare (心理戰): This warfare will be aimed directly at the minds of US soldiers and commanders. The PLA will conduct tailored psychological operations (PSYOP) designed to instill fear, doubt, and a sense of hopelessness. Tactics will likely include the use of AI-generated deepfakes to create false orders or demoralizing messages from supposed US leaders, exploiting any captured US personnel for coerced “confessions” or propaganda statements—a tactic with deep historical roots in PLA operations from the Korean War—and flooding tactical networks and social media with content designed to create a sense of futility and undermine trust in leadership.
• Legal Warfare (法律戰 or “Lawfare”): The PLA will weaponize international and domestic legal frameworks to constrain US military action. This involves meticulously crafting operations to appear compliant with international law while simultaneously lodging legal challenges and protests that accuse the US of violations. The objective is to challenge the legality of US deployments and operations, restrict our Rules of Engagement (ROE), create hesitation and delay in our decision-making cycles by bogging down commanders and policymakers in legal reviews, and ultimately achieve strategic paralysis through legal ambiguity.

These three “warfares” are not separate lines of effort; they are a converged, mutually reinforcing campaign. A psychological operation targeting US soldiers might be amplified by a public opinion campaign at home, which is then reinforced by a legal challenge at the United Nations. The cumulative effect is intended to disintegrate the political and psychological cohesion of the US operational system.

The US Commander’s Response: Seizing the Narrative and Hardening the Force

To defeat this strategy, we must recognize that we are engaged in an information and political fight from “Phase 0,” long before any shots are fired. Our response cannot be reactive; it must be a proactive campaign of narrative control and comprehensive force inoculation.

Our counter-strategy will be built on the following pillars:

• Proactive Counter-Narrative: We cannot cede the information environment to the adversary. We must develop and articulate a clear, concise, and persistent counter-political warfare strategy. This involves educating our own forces, the American public, and our international partners about the PLA’s methods and objectives. Our Public Affairs elements must be empowered to rapidly deconstruct and expose PLA disinformation. We will “pre-bunk” likely PLA narratives by anticipating their lines of attack and preemptively providing factual context. We must aggressively and transparently highlight the PLA’s coercive, deceptive, and aggressive actions to seize and maintain the initiative in the global narrative.
• Force Resilience and Cognitive Hardening: Our training must evolve to prepare soldiers for the cognitive battlefield. This includes mandatory “cognitive hardening” programs that educate every soldier on the nature of PLA PSYOP, including specific training on identifying deepfakes, resisting social media manipulation, and understanding the historical precedent of the PLA’s use of POWs for propaganda purposes. Critically, this requires reinforcing information discipline and operational security (OPSEC) at all levels, from the individual soldier to the command post, to deny the PLA the raw material for their psychological and public opinion campaigns.
• Legal Preparation and Integration: Our legal teams (JAG) must be fully integrated into the operational planning process from the very beginning. They will not be consulted merely for review; they will be part of the design of operations. Their role is to anticipate and prepare robust responses to likely PLA lawfare tactics, ensuring that our ROE are clear, legally defensible, and provide commanders with the necessary operational flexibility. We must be prepared to counter their legal arguments swiftly and authoritatively on the international stage, defending the legitimacy of our actions.
• Organizational Empowerment: US Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Public Affairs units are our primary maneuver arms in this non-physical domain. They must be resourced, trained, and empowered to compete effectively against the PLA’s whole-of-government approach to information warfare. This requires deep integration with the intelligence community and interagency partners to ensure their efforts are synchronized and effective.

The PLA’s long and documented history of using intense indoctrination and psychological coercion on prisoners of war is not merely a historical footnote; it is a window into their strategic mindset. Their doctrine explicitly aims to “weaken the enemy’s will to fight” as a primary line of effort. Western military tradition often treats morale as an outcome of physical combat—if you win the battle, morale will be high. The PLA, however, stemming from its revolutionary and CCP roots, views the psychological state of the enemy as a distinct center of gravity to be actively targeted, degraded, and shattered. The goal of their PSYOP is not simply to demoralize, but to induce “lasting behavioral changes” and create a stream of propaganda that serves their strategic objectives. In the 21st century, this means that every US soldier with a smartphone is a potential target for tailored, AI-driven psychological attacks designed to undermine their trust in their leaders, their faith in their mission, and their connection to their country. This reality demands that our definition of force protection expand beyond the physical domains of armor and fortifications. We must implement and institutionalize robust “cognitive force protection” measures. This requires a paradigm shift in training and leadership, where commanders at every level are held responsible for the psychological and informational resilience of their troops with the same gravity and seriousness they apply to physical security, maintenance, and combat readiness.

III. Strategy 3: Stand-off Strike – The “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” Kill Web

The PLA Commander’s Approach: Achieving Victory through Fires

The PLA’s core operational concept for the kinetic fight is “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” (MDPW). This concept is the physical manifestation of their “Systems Destruction Warfare” doctrine. It leverages a vast, networked C4ISR system, increasingly enhanced by big data analytics and AI, to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities and critical nodes in the US operational system and then launch overwhelming, multi-axis precision strikes against them. Instead of seeking to close with and destroy US ground forces in direct combat, the PLA commander will attempt to achieve victory from a distance, using their massive arsenal of Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) to attack the nodes that provide our system with its cohesion and lethality—our command posts, logistics hubs, air and missile defense sites, and concentrations of forces.

This strategy is enabled by a formidable and growing suite of capabilities:

• Massed Rocket and Cannon Artillery: The PLA has made significant breakthroughs in MRLS (Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems) and self-propelled artillery. Systems like the PHL-03 and the newer PHL-16 are not simply area-fire weapons; they are precision-strike systems capable of launching guided rockets to ranges of 70-130 km and over 220 km, respectively. The PHL-16 is reportedly capable of launching tactical ballistic missiles, blurring the line between conventional artillery and strategic assets. These systems will be used to provide a high volume of precision fires against tactical and operational targets.
• Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles: The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is a separate service branch that controls the world’s largest and most diverse arsenal of conventional land-based ballistic and cruise missiles. This includes hundreds of short-range (SRBM), medium-range (MRBM), and intermediate-range (IRBM) ballistic missiles, as well as ground-launched cruise missiles. The introduction of hypersonic glide vehicles, which are highly maneuverable and travel at speeds greater than Mach 5, is designed specifically to defeat advanced air and missile defense systems and hold critical fixed sites like ports, airfields, and command centers at risk from hundreds or thousands of kilometers away.
• Integrated Targeting Kill Chain: The lethality of these strike systems is entirely dependent on a robust, multi-domain “system-of-systems” for targeting. The PLA has invested heavily in a network of ISR satellites, over-the-horizon radars, electronic intelligence platforms, and a growing fleet of UAVs to find, fix, track, and target US forces across the theater. This network is designed to provide high-fidelity, real-time targeting information to their shooters, enabling them to strike both static and mobile targets with precision at extended ranges.

The PLA commander’s intent will be to use this kill web to establish an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment, attriting our forces as they deploy into the theater and then systematically dismantling our operational system by destroying its key nodes before we can bring our combined arms capabilities to bear.

The US Commander’s Response: A Multi-Layered Counter-Fire Strategy

Our response to the PLA’s stand-off strike strategy cannot be a single system or a simple tit-for-tat exchange of fires. It must be a comprehensive, multi-layered approach that attacks every link in the PLA’s kill chain—from their sensors to their shooters to their C2 nodes. This is a central tenet of our Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine, which emphasizes the convergence of effects from all domains to create and exploit windows of superiority.

Our counter-fire strategy comprises three mutually supporting lines of effort:

• Passive Defense and Deception: The most effective way to defeat a missile is to ensure it is never fired, and the second most effective is to ensure it has nothing to hit. We must deny the PLA’s ISR systems a clear and static target. This requires a radical commitment to dispersal of forces, hardening of critical assets, constant mobility of command posts and logistics nodes, and the sophisticated use of camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD). We cannot allow our forces to concentrate in predictable locations that are easily targeted by PLA LRPF.
• Active Defense: We will protect our critical assets and maneuver forces with a layered and resilient Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture. This architecture will integrate sensors and effectors from all services to provide a comprehensive defense against the full spectrum of PLA threats, from UAV swarms and cruise missiles to ballistic and hypersonic weapons. This includes kinetic interceptors like Patriot and THAAD, as well as emerging directed energy and other advanced capabilities.
• Offensive Counter-Fire: We will not assume a defensive posture and absorb the PLA’s first punch. The Army’s MDTFs are specifically designed and equipped to penetrate and disintegrate enemy A2/AD networks. The Strategic Fires Battalion within the MDTF will employ its own organic LRPF assets—including the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) with a range exceeding 500 km, the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) based on the SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)—to hold the PLA’s own sensors, launchers, and C2 nodes at risk. These land-based fires provide a persistent, 24/7 strike capability that is highly survivable and complicates the adversary’s targeting problem.
• JADC2-Enabled Dynamic Targeting: The key to defeating the PLA’s numerous and often mobile missile launchers is speed. JADC2’s “any sensor, best shooter” architecture is the doctrinal and technical solution to this problem. By networking all available sensors (from satellites to ground-based radar to special operations forces) with all available shooters across the joint force, and by using AI/ML algorithms to rapidly process data and generate targeting solutions, we can dramatically compress our own OODA loop. This will enable us to find, fix, and finish time-sensitive PLA targets before they can fire and relocate.

The PLA’s MDPW and the US JADC2 are conceptually parallel; both are ambitious efforts to build a “system-of-systems” that links sensors to shooters across all domains. However, their developmental priorities reveal their underlying strategies. The PLA has invested massively in the “shooters”—the long-range missiles themselves. The US, while also developing new LRPF, has placed a primary emphasis on perfecting the network that connects the system. This sets the stage for a duel not of missiles, but of kill chains. A kill chain consists of several links: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA). The PLA’s strategy is to overwhelm us at the “engage” link with a massive volume of high-speed, long-range munitions. Our counter-strategy is to dominate the “find, fix, track, and target” links through a superior, more resilient, and faster network (JADC2), and then use our own precision fires to break the PLA’s kill chain at its most vulnerable points—their sensors and their C2 nodes. Victory in the fires duel will go to the side that masters information, not just ballistics. Therefore, our primary effort must be to attack the PLA’s kill chain before they can launch. This means prioritizing our MDEBs to blind their sensors and disrupt their command networks, turning their technologically advanced missiles into inert munitions on the launcher. Our own LRPF will be most effective not when trading salvos with their launchers, but when used to destroy the “eyes” and “brain” of their entire strike system.

IV. Strategy 4: Asymmetric Overwhelm – The Use of Unmanned and Autonomous Swarms

The PLA Commander’s Approach: Manned-Unmanned Teaming and Saturation

The PLA is aggressively pursuing what it terms “intelligentized warfare,” a concept that centers on the integration of AI-enabled unmanned and autonomous systems to create asymmetric advantages and achieve decision dominance. A PLA commander will leverage these emerging capabilities to create tactical and operational dilemmas that are difficult to solve with traditional, platform-centric military forces. The PLA is already testing and fielding drone swarm technology for a wide range of missions, including ISR, ground surveillance, precision strike, and amphibious landing support.

In a land confrontation, a PLA commander will likely employ two primary tactics leveraging unmanned systems:

• Saturation Attacks with Drone Swarms: The PLA understands the economic asymmetry of modern air defense. They will use swarms of small, low-cost, expendable drones, potentially numbering in the hundreds, to saturate and overwhelm our sophisticated air defense systems. A single high-value interceptor, such as a Patriot missile, cannot be economically or logistically sustained to defeat a large number of inexpensive drones on a one-for-one basis. This tactic is designed to exhaust our limited supply of advanced interceptors, open gaps in our defensive coverage, and allow their more valuable assets, like cruise missiles or manned aircraft, to penetrate our defenses.
• Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T): The PLA is actively exercising with “human-machine collaborative combat teams,” integrating unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), often referred to as “robot wolves,” and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) directly with their conventional combined arms brigades. In complex terrain, such as urban environments, these unmanned systems will be used to lead the advance. They will conduct reconnaissance into high-threat areas, breach obstacles under fire, provide direct fire support for dismounted infantry, and absorb the initial casualties of an engagement, thereby preserving the lives of their own soldiers while increasing the tempo and lethality of their assault. This approach also creates immense psychological pressure on defending forces, who must contend with a relentless, unfeeling mechanical advance.

This strategy of asymmetric overwhelm is designed to invert the traditional strengths of US forces. It targets our reliance on technologically advanced, high-cost platforms by presenting a threat that is too numerous and too cheap to defeat with conventional means, while simultaneously reducing the PLA’s own historical vulnerability to high casualty rates.

The US Commander’s Response: Layered, Integrated Counter-UAS Defense

There is no single “silver bullet” solution to the threat of unmanned and autonomous swarms. An effective response requires a layered, integrated, defense-in-depth that is made organic to all units, not just siloed within specialized air defense formations. Every unit on the battlefield must have the ability to defend itself against small uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

Our counter-swarm strategy is built on a framework of layered effectors and AI-enabled command and control:

• Layered and Diverse Effectors:

• Kinetic Systems: For high-volume, short-range defense, we will employ gun-based systems (like the C-RAM) and low-cost, guided rocket interceptors. These systems provide an immediate and proven capability to engage individual drones or small groups.
• Electronic Warfare: Our EW systems, organic to the MDEBs and other formations, will provide a non-kinetic option to defeat less sophisticated drones by jamming their command and control links or spoofing their GPS navigation.
• Directed Energy (DE): High-energy laser systems offer a critical advantage: a deep magazine with a very low cost-per-shot. These systems are ideal for engaging large numbers of drones and can be mounted on tactical vehicles to provide mobile protection for maneuvering forces.
• High-Power Microwave (HPM): HPM weapons are the most promising technology for defeating entire swarms simultaneously. Systems like the Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR) can emit a cone of energy that disables the electronics of multiple drones with a single pulse, providing a true area-defense capability against saturation attacks.

• AI-Enabled Command and Control: Defeating a drone swarm, which can involve hundreds of targets moving in a coordinated fashion, is a problem that exceeds human cognitive capacity. The response must occur at machine speed. We will use AI-enabled C2 systems that can autonomously fuse data from multiple sensors (radar, electro-optical/infrared, RF detection), classify and prioritize threats, and then recommend or direct the optimal effector for each engagement. This AI-driven C2 is essential to shorten the kill chain and effectively manage a layered defense against a high-volume attack.
• Offensive Action: We will not remain purely on the defensive. A key part of our counter-swarm strategy is to attack the system at its source. This involves using our own ISR and strike assets to target the drone operators, their ground control stations, their launch vehicles, and their C2 networks. Furthermore, the US is developing its own autonomous swarm capabilities, which can be employed offensively to counter PLA swarms or to conduct our own saturation attacks against their critical assets.

The PLA correctly assesses that small, expendable drones offer “key offensive and defensive asymmetric advantages”. The US military is rightly concerned about the unsustainable economics of wasting expensive precision munitions on low-cost drones. This dynamic fundamentally alters battlefield geometry and economics. Traditional warfare has often been a contest of exquisite, high-cost platforms against each other, where the side with the qualitatively and quantitatively superior platforms held the advantage. Drone swarms introduce a new paradigm: the triumph of mass over class. A swarm of hundreds of drones, each costing only a few thousand dollars, can potentially disable or destroy a multi-billion-dollar asset, such as an advanced IAMD radar or a theater-level command post. This inverts the traditional cost-imposition curve, making it economically impossible to rely on million-dollar interceptors for defense. This reality forces a strategic shift in our defensive thinking, moving from a focus on platform protection to a broader concept of area defense, and from a model of attrition to one of cost-effective engagement. We must therefore accelerate the development, procurement, and fielding of non-kinetic and low-cost kinetic C-UAS solutions across the entire force. The future of battlefield air defense against this threat will be dominated by directed energy and high-power microwave systems, and our resourcing and acquisition priorities must reflect this fundamental change in the character of war.

V. Strategy 5: Command Decapitation – Exploiting Centralization through Combined Arms Assault

The PLA Commander’s Approach: System Warfare at the Tactical Level

The PLA’s doctrine of system warfare extends down to the tactical level. Here, it translates into a focus on identifying and destroying the high-value battlefield systems that enable the enemy’s operational effectiveness, with a particular emphasis on command and communication nodes. A PLA commander will seek to physically decapitate US command and control on the battlefield, believing that this will induce systemic paralysis and create the conditions for a rapid victory.

Their Combined Arms Brigades (CA-BDEs) are the primary tool for this mission. These are not the infantry-heavy formations of the past; modern PLAA CA-BDEs are powerful, mobile, artillery-heavy formations designed for rapid and violent offensive action, with envelopment and penetration being their primary offensive tactics. PLA guidelines for offensive operations call for achieving overwhelming local superiority, suggesting a four-to-one advantage in maneuver forces and a five-to-one to seven-to-one advantage in artillery firepower at the point of attack.

The likely PLA approach to command decapitation will follow a clear sequence:

1. Find and Fix: The PLA will dedicate significant ISR assets, including unmanned aerial systems, electronic intelligence, and forward-deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF), to the task of locating and fixing the position of our operational and tactical command posts (CPs).
2. Isolate and Suppress: Once a CP is fixed, the PLA commander will leverage their overwhelming advantage in organic artillery firepower to suppress and isolate the target. Massed fires from 122mm/155mm self-propelled guns and 122mm rocket artillery will be used to disrupt the CP’s operations, sever its communication links, and prevent reinforcement or withdrawal.
3. Penetrate and Destroy: With the CP suppressed and isolated, a mechanized CA-BDE will execute a high-speed penetration or envelopment. Using its organic infantry fighting vehicles and assault guns, the brigade will bypass frontline defenses and drive directly to the CP’s location with the singular objective of physically destroying the node.

This tactic is designed to directly attack what the PLA perceives as our critical vulnerability—our reliance on a networked command structure. It is also perfectly suited to their own centralized, prescriptive command philosophy, which excels at executing well-defined, pre-planned operations against a fixed objective and requires less freedom of action and initiative from subordinate commanders.

The US Commander’s Response: Leveraging Mission Command for Asymmetric Advantage

The PLA’s greatest perceived strength—its ability to orchestrate highly centralized, controlled operations—is simultaneously its most profound weakness. Our response to their command decapitation strategy is to turn this strength against them by fully embracing our own unique and powerful command philosophy: Mission Command.

Our counter is not primarily technological, but philosophical and doctrinal, enabled by technology:

• Command Post Survivability: We will refuse to present the PLA with a fixed target. Our command posts will not be static, high-signature headquarters. We will employ active survivability measures, including constant mobility and frequent displacement, and passive measures, including dispersal of CP functions across multiple smaller nodes and rigorous signature management (EMCON, thermal, acoustic). Agile, distributed, and low-signature command nodes are significantly harder to find, fix, and target, complicating the PLA’s entire operational sequence.
• Decentralized Execution through Mission Command: Mission Command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. By providing subordinate leaders with a clear commander’s intent—the purpose, key tasks, and desired end state of the operation—we empower them to exercise disciplined initiative. They understand why they are fighting, not just what they are supposed to do. This means they are trained and trusted to adapt to the local situation and continue the fight to achieve the commander’s intent even if communications with higher headquarters are severed. The successful destruction of a single brigade or division command post, while a serious blow, will not paralyze our force. Subordinate units will continue to operate based on their understanding of the intent, preventing the systemic collapse the PLA seeks to achieve.
• Turning the Tables on the Attacker: A PLA CA-BDE executing a deep, prescriptive penetration against a single objective is a powerful but predictable force. With its focus narrowed on a single goal dictated from a higher headquarters, its flanks, rear area, and logistical tail become exposed and vulnerable. Empowered by Mission Command, our subordinate units, who are not paralyzed by the attack on a single CP, can seize the initiative. They can transition from a defensive posture to launching decisive counter-attacks against the over-extended and exposed PLA force. By exploiting the predictability inherent in the PLA’s centralized system, we can disrupt their timetable, shatter their operational plan, and turn their decapitation strike into a decisive engagement fought on our terms.

The battlefield is a crucible that tests not only technology and tactics but also command philosophies. The PLA employs a strict, top-down command structure where deviation from centrally directed orders is not permitted, and the ever-present political commissar ensures absolute loyalty to the Party’s directives. The US system of Mission Command is built on the foundations of trust, mutual understanding, and the empowerment of subordinate leaders to act—and even to act contrary to the last received order if the situation demands it, as long as their actions remain within the commander’s intent. The PLA’s command system is optimized for planned, deliberate operations in a controlled environment; it is inherently brittle and struggles to adapt to the friction, chaos, and uncertainty of modern combat. The US Mission Command philosophy, in contrast, is designed for chaos and uncertainty. It assumes that plans will fail, communications will be lost, and opportunities will emerge unexpectedly. It empowers leaders at the lowest possible level to adapt, innovate, and win. The PLA’s attempt to decapitate our command structure is a direct attempt to force their preferred style of warfare upon us—to remove our flexible, distributed “brain” and make us as rigid and fragile as they are. Our response—resilient CPs and decentralized execution—is a direct counter that leverages our most powerful asymmetric advantage. We will refuse to fight on their terms. Our single most crucial advantage over the PLA is not a particular weapon system, but our philosophy of command. We must therefore relentlessly train and cultivate Mission Command in our leaders at every echelon. In a chaotic, contested environment where networks are degraded and units are isolated, the side whose junior leaders are best able to understand intent, seize the initiative, and make bold, decisive actions will win. The PLA’s political system makes it structurally incapable of replicating this advantage. Therefore, our leader development programs are as critical to future victory as our weapons modernization programs.

Conclusion: Prevailing in the Contest of Systems

The five core strategies a People’s Liberation Army commander will employ in a land confrontation—Information Paralysis, Political Disintegration, Stand-off Strike, Asymmetric Overwhelm, and Command Decapitation—are not disparate lines of effort. They are the integrated components of a singular, overarching warfighting philosophy: Systems Destruction Warfare. The PLA will not seek a linear, attrition-based fight. It will wage a holistic, multi-domain campaign aimed at finding and exploiting the critical vulnerabilities within the US operational system to induce paralysis and collapse.

To prevail in this contest of systems, US forces must counter with a system that is not only technologically superior but also doctrinally and philosophically more resilient. Our response must be equally integrated, leveraging the technological backbone of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and the profound doctrinal strength of Mission Command. JADC2 provides the means to build a resilient, adaptable, and lethal network that can withstand and fight through the PLA’s initial information onslaught. Mission Command provides the human element—the trained and trusted leader who can adapt, innovate, and seize the initiative in the chaos and uncertainty that JADC2 is designed to endure.

This combination creates a powerful asymmetry. The PLA’s system, for all its technological sophistication and impressive scale, is ultimately constrained by the political imperatives of the Chinese Communist Party. Its reliance on rigid, centralized control makes it powerful when executing a pre-ordained plan but brittle and slow to adapt when confronted with unexpected friction and complexity. The US system, in contrast, is designed for chaos. It embraces decentralized execution and empowers initiative at the edge, creating a more resilient, adaptable, and ultimately more lethal force in the fluid reality of modern combat.

By understanding the PLA’s system-centric approach and its inherent vulnerabilities, we can tailor our operational concepts, training, and capabilities to attack their system at its weakest points. We will win not by fighting their preferred battle of systems—a deliberate, centralized, and predictable contest—but by forcing them to fight ours: a fast-paced, decentralized, and chaotic engagement that their rigid command structure is fundamentally ill-equipped to handle. The key to victory lies in exploiting the philosophical gap between our two armies—a gap that no amount of technology can bridge.

Table 1: PLA Strategy vs. US Counter-Strategy Matrix

PLA Strategy	Core PLA Doctrine/Capability	Primary US Counter-Doctrine	Key US Organizational Counter	Key US Technological Counter
1. Information Paralysis	“Informatized Warfare” / Integrated Network Electronic Warfare (INEW)	Assured C2 / Network Resilience	Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) – Multi-Domain Effects Battalion (MDEB)	JADC2 / Resilient Comms (Transport Diversity, LPI/LPD)
2. Political Disintegration	“Three Warfares” (Public Opinion, Psychological, Legal)	Narrative Control / Force Inoculation	PSYOP, Public Affairs, Civil Affairs Units / Integrated JAG planning	N/A (Doctrinal/Informational focus)
3. Stand-off Strike	“Multi-Domain Precision Warfare” (MDPW) / Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF)	Multi-Layered Counter-Fire / Dynamic Targeting	MDTF – Strategic Fires Battalion	JADC2 / IAMD / US LRPF (PrSM, LRHW)
4. Asymmetric Overwhelm	“Intelligentized Warfare” / Unmanned/Autonomous Swarms	Layered, Integrated C-UAS Defense	All units equipped with organic C-UAS capabilities	AI-enabled C2 / Directed Energy / High-Power Microwave (HPM)
5. Command Decapitation	System Warfare / Combined Arms Brigade (CA-BDE) Assault	Decentralized Execution / Command Post Survivability	All echelons trained in Mission Command	Agile/Mobile Command Posts / Resilient Comms

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