Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics, Russian & Soviet Analytics

SITREP Russia-Ukraine – Week Ending February 06, 2026

Executive Summary

The reporting period ending February 6, 2026, marks a critical inflection point in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as the war enters its fifth year of high-intensity operations. This week was defined by a profound disconnect between high-level diplomatic efforts in Abu Dhabi and a violent escalation of kinetic strikes on the ground, manifesting in the most significant aerial bombardment of the Ukrainian energy sector to date. While trilateral negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and Ukraine yielded a substantive prisoner exchange and the re-establishment of high-level military communication channels, the collapse of a purported “energy truce” suggests that the Kremlin continues to utilize humanitarian coercion as a primary tool of negotiation.

On the frontlines, Russian forces achieved a tactical breakthrough with the seizure of Hulyaipole after a prolonged three-month siege, signaling a shift in operational focus toward the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk administrative boundaries. However, this gain is offset by the increasing “de-mechanization” of the Russian army, which is now heavily reliant on motorized infantry and small-unit probing attacks due to the critical depletion of armored vehicle stocks. The intelligence landscape was further destabilized by a sophisticated assassination attempt in Moscow against Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the First Deputy Head of the GRU, an event the Kremlin has characterized as a Ukrainian “terrorist act” designed to derail the peace process.

Strategic stability remains precarious following the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5. Although informal discussions suggest a potential six-month extension, the Kremlin appears to be leveraging nuclear uncertainty to pressure the United States for concessions regarding the Ukrainian theater. Concurrently, the European Union has reinforced its commitment through a landmark €90 billion support package for 2026–2027, highlighting a widening gap between the long-term industrial endurance of the West and the immediate tactical pressures exerted by the Russian Federation.

Strategic Theater Assessment: The Attrition Paradigm

The conflict has evolved into a war of attrition where the traditional definitions of battlefield momentum are being challenged by the sheer scale of personnel and equipment losses. As of early February 2026, the data indicates that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal territorial gains, suggesting a declining trajectory as a major global power.1 Since February 24, 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million total casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing personnel.1 This represents a higher loss rate than any major power in any conflict since the end of the Second World War.1 At the current rates of engagement, combined casualties for both combatants could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026.1

Despite maintaining the initiative throughout 2024 and 2025, Russian advances have been characterized as glacial, averaging between 15 and 70 meters per day in the most active sectors.1 This pace is notably slower than almost any major offensive campaign in the last century.1 The Russian military command is reportedly planning a significant summer 2026 offensive aimed at seizing the remaining unoccupied parts of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.3 However, intelligence suggests that Moscow lacks the strategic reserves to both prepare for such a large-scale operation and sustain its ongoing tactical objectives.3

CategoryEstimated Russian TotalsEstimated Ukrainian Totals
Total Military Casualties1,200,000500,000–600,000
Fatalities (Military)325,000100,000–140,000
Total Equipment Losses24,02211,290
Tanks and Armored Vehicles Lost13,8555,571
Aircraft Lost361194
Naval Vessels Lost2942
Civilian Fatalities7,24515,954

Comparative Casualty and Equipment Data as of February 2026.1

The “de-mechanization” of the Russian force has become a defining feature of the theater. Over 22,000 Russian vehicles have been destroyed, damaged, or captured, including more than 4,000 tanks and 9,000 armored personnel carriers.5 This has forced a transition from organized armored maneuver to a motorized infantry and motorcycle-based force.5 The reliance on “turtle tanks”—field-modified armored vehicles designed to withstand drone strikes—highlights the tactical desperation of Russian units, with one such vehicle reportedly requiring 60 FPV drone hits before being disabled.5

Frontline Dynamics: Sector Analysis

Southern Axis: The Fall of Hulyaipole

The most significant ground development of the week was the Russian seizure of Hulyaipole, a strategic town in the Zaporizhzhia region.3 The capture of this settlement, which had a pre-war population of approximately 13,000, came after three months of intensive fighting.3 Geolocated footage from February 6 indicates that Russian forces have advanced beyond the town into northern Zaliznychne, suggesting that Ukrainian forces have established new defensive lines further west.4

The fall of Hulyaipole is viewed as a foundational step for future Russian offensive operations in the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City direction.3 However, analysts assess that Russian forces are unlikely to make rapid advances beyond this point without deprioritizing other active fronts, such as Pokrovsk, due to the limited availability of high-readiness operational reserves.3 Ukrainian forces continue to conduct mid-range strikes against Russian rear assets to disrupt the consolidation of these new positions.6

Central Donetsk: The Pokrovsk Main Effort

The Pokrovsk front remains the primary focus of the Russian military command, where an average of 170 attacks are mounted daily.5 These assaults typically involve small groups of five or fewer infantrymen attempting to seize lodgments in treelines.5 This tactic leverages an seemingly inexhaustible supply of volunteer recruits (kontrakniki) to conduct repeated probing attacks regardless of the casualty rate.5

In the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, Russian forces have made marginal advances, while Ukrainian defenses remain largely intact despite the sustained pressure.3 The use of motorbikes and e-scooters by Russian units has increased as a means to evade Ukrainian drone surveillance and targeting through high speed and maneuverability.5 Despite these innovations, the lack of coordinated air support continues to hinder Russian efforts to achieve a decisive breakthrough.5

Northern Sector: Kupiansk and Kharkiv

In the northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kupyansk-Lyman directions, the frontline has remained relatively stable despite continued Russian offensive operations.4 Ukrainian forces have successfully conducted clearing operations in the center of Kupiansk, neutralizing a small number of surrounded Russian assault troops and fully securing the southern part of the town.7

The operational environment in the north has been significantly impacted by environmental factors and technological constraints. SpaceX’s decision to block unregistered Starlink terminal operations has reportedly hindered Russian ground operations and tactical strikes, although the blocking is affecting both combatants to varying degrees.3 Ukrainian forces recently achieved localized advances near Borova, demonstrating a capacity for tactical counter-offensives even while maintaining a general defensive posture.3

Diplomatic Maneuvering: The Abu Dhabi Channel

Trilateral Talks and the Prisoner Exchange

A second round of US-brokered trilateral talks concluded in Abu Dhabi on February 5, 2026, marking the most substantive engagement between senior Ukrainian and Russian delegations in months.8 The negotiations, mediated by US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, included high-ranking military and intelligence officials such as Kyrylo Budanov (Ukraine) and Igor Kostyukov (Russia).8

The most concrete outcome was a reciprocal prisoner exchange involving 157 personnel from each side, totaling 314 individuals.8 This included Russian soldiers captured during the Kursk incursion and several civilians.10 While the exchange provided a tangible humanitarian success, negotiators cautioned that significant work remains to address the core territorial and security issues of the conflict.8

Negotiation ComponentStatus/ResultImplications
Prisoner Exchange157 for 157 (Completed)Rare concrete outcome; maintains diplomatic momentum.
Military HotlineRe-established (Feb 5)Channel for consistent contact; intended to avoid collisions.
20-Point ProposalUnder DiscussionRefined from 28 points; focuses on a ceasefire and “neutrality.”
Territorial DemandsDisputedMoscow demands all of Donbas; Kyiv rejects concessions.
Security GuaranteesUnresolvedKyiv demands European presence; Moscow rejects any guarantees.

Outcomes of the Abu Dhabi Trilateral Talks, February 4–5, 2026.8

Re-establishment of Military-to-Military Dialogue

A pivotal development on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi talks was the agreement between the United States and Russia to re-establish high-level military-to-military dialogue for the first time since 2021.9 This agreement followed meetings between US EUCOM Commander Gen. Alexus Grynkewich and senior Russian and Ukrainian military officials.12 The channel is intended to provide a consistent point of contact as the parties work toward a lasting peace, aiming to reduce the risk of accidental escalation between Russian and Allied forces.9

Strategic Stability and Nuclear Arms Control

The expiration of the New START treaty on February 5, 2026, has introduced a new layer of complexity to the international security environment.12 The treaty, which represents the last standing bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the US and Russia, had limited strategic warheads and launchers for over a decade.15 On the sidelines of the peace talks, delegations discussed an informal deal to continue observing the treaty’s quantitative limits for an additional six months while negotiating a new permanent agreement.12

However, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has issued contradictory signals, claiming that Russia is no longer bound by any obligations and is “free to choose its next steps,” including “decisive” countermeasures.12 Analysts assess that the Kremlin is utilizing the treaty’s expiration to pressure the US into making concessions regarding Ukraine, effectively linking strategic nuclear stability to the outcome of the war.12 Concurrently, Russia has backed the PRC’s refusal to enter trilateral strategic arms control talks, likely as a means to secure ongoing Chinese support for the invasion.12

Energy Warfare: The Winter Campaign

The Collapse of the “Energy Truce”

The reporting week began with the dramatic collapse of a brief and disputed “energy truce” between Moscow and Kyiv. President Donald Trump announced on February 2 that he had personally convinced Vladimir Putin to pause strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure for one week to build momentum for peace talks.16 However, the terms and duration of this moratorium were immediately contested. The Kremlin asserted that Putin had only committed to refrain from striking Kyiv for a week until February 1, while Kyiv understood the truce to extend through the Abu Dhabi talks.16

On the night of February 2–3, 2026, Russia launched the largest aerial assault of the year, involving 450 drones and 71 missiles, including a record number of ballistic weapons.2 This attack targeted electricity generation and distribution infrastructure across eight regions, dealing a “powerful blow” to the energy sector just as temperatures in Kyiv dropped to -20°C (-4°F).2

Humanitarian Impact and Grid Degradation

The bombardment has left the Ukrainian energy system in a state of crisis. In Kyiv, more than 1,170 high-rise buildings lost heating, and residents are currently limited to only 4–6 hours of electricity per day.2 In Kharkiv, a major power plant was damaged beyond repair, leaving 300,000 residents without electricity.2 The cumulative damage has reduced Ukraine’s available generation capacity from 33.7 GW pre-invasion to approximately 14 GW by January 2026.2

Infrastructure MetricPre-2022 StatusCurrent Status (Feb 2026)
Power Generation Capacity33.7 GW~14 GW
Grid FunctionalityFull~33% of Pre-invasion Capacity
Thermal Capacity Loss0%70%–80%
CHP Plants Damaged/Destroyed018
Large Substations Damaged0~50%

Status of the Ukrainian Energy System as of February 6, 2026.2

The strikes on critical nodes like the Vinnytsia 550 and Kyivska 750 substations have caused cascading failures across the backbone power grid, affecting not only Ukraine but also the interconnected energy systems of Moldova and Romania.21 This strategic targeting of infrastructure reflects a Kremlin policy of psychological and economic attrition, aimed at forcing a political capitulation through the weaponization of winter.21

Intelligence and the Shadow War

Assassination Attempt on Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev

A major intelligence-related event occurred on February 6 in Moscow, when Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the First Deputy Head of the GRU, was shot and wounded in an assassination attempt.3 Alekseyev, who has been instrumental in providing intelligence support for the invasion and was a key negotiator during the 2023 Wagner mutiny, was shot multiple times in his apartment building by an unidentified assailant posing as a food delivery courier.25

The general remains in critical condition and a coma following surgery.26 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov immediately characterized the shooting as a Ukrainian “terrorist act” intended to disrupt the Abu Dhabi negotiations.27 This incident follows a series of high-profile assassinations of Russian military officials, including car bomb attacks on Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov and Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov in late 2025.27 The inability of Russian security services to protect senior military personnel in the capital highlights significant vulnerabilities in domestic counter-intelligence.25

Cyber Operations: Operation Neusploit

In the cyber domain, the Russia-linked state-sponsored threat actor APT28 (also known as UAC-0001) has launched a campaign codenamed “Operation Neusploit”.31 The operation exploits a newly disclosed high-severity vulnerability in Microsoft Office (CVE-2026-21509) to target Ukrainian government agencies, Slovakian entities, and European Union institutions.31

Phishing emails, disguised as meteorological bulletins from the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Center, deliver weaponized documents that trigger a multi-stage infection process.31 This includes the deployment of custom malware payloads such as “MiniDoor,” an Outlook email stealer, and “BEARDSHELL,” a C++ implant.32 The attackers have been observed weaponizing the vulnerability within 24 hours of its public disclosure, demonstrating a high degree of technical agility.31

Economic Endurance and External Support

EU Financial Package: 2026–2027

To bolster Ukrainian resilience, the European Commission proposed a €90 billion financial support package for 2026 and 2027.34 This package is structured into two primary components: €60 billion (two-thirds) for military assistance and €30 billion (one-third) for general budget support.34 The support is intended to help Ukraine strengthen its defense capabilities and ensure the continued functioning of the state as the conflict moves toward its fifth year.34

The package will be financed through common EU borrowing and is expected to cover approximately two-thirds of Ukraine’s overall financing needs for the next two years.34 This commitment underscores Europe’s strategy of providing stable and predictable funding to ensure Ukraine enters negotiations from a “position of strength”.34

Oil Market Dynamics and Russian Revenues

The Russian economy remains heavily reliant on fossil fuel export revenues, which accounted for approximately 30% of total federal revenues in 2025.36 Currently, Russian Urals crude is trading between $62 and $65 per barrel, which is above the original G7 $60 price cap but significantly higher than the new EU floating cap of $47.60 introduced in September 2025.37 To bypass Western sanctions, Russia continues to utilize a “shadow fleet” of tankers, allowing it to maintain export volumes to major buyers like China and India.37

However, falling global oil prices—driven by demand uncertainty and increased OPEC supply—pose a significant risk to the Russian budget.36 The 2026 Russian budget assumes an average export price of $66 per barrel; if the current downward trend continues, Russia could face a budget deficit of up to 5 trillion rubles (2.3% of GDP), potentially forcing a reduction in military spending or increased domestic taxation.36

Oil IndicatorBenchmark/ValueImpact/Context
Brent Crude Price$67.89/bblGlobal benchmark; down 9% YoY.
Urals Crude Price$63.42/bblRussian blend; trading above $60 cap.
Urals-Brent Discount~$4.50Smallest discount since start of war.
EU Floating Price Cap$47.60Aimed at reducing Russian bargaining power.
Russian Budget Target$66.00Price needed to sustain 2026 budget goals.

Oil Market Indicators as of February 6, 2026.36

Regional and Global Geopolitics

The Sino-Russian Alliance

On February 4, 2026, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin held a video call to reaffirm their strategic partnership.40 Both leaders hailed their countries’ “stabilizing” role in a “turbulent” global environment and committed to deepening coordination within multilateral frameworks like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).40

While China has not officially denounced the war, it has become Russia’s most critical economic lifeline, absorbing redirected energy exports and providing high-tech components.40 The call highlighted a shared vision for an “equal and orderly multipolar world,” contrasting their partnership against what they characterize as “unpredictable” US initiatives like the “Board of Peace”.40 Putin has accepted an invitation to visit China in the first half of 2026, signaling that the relationship will continue to break “new ground” despite Western pressure.40

NATO’s Northern Flank: The Finland Border

In response to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Russia has begun a long-term military buildup near the Finnish border.6 Satellite imagery reveals new military infrastructure, including expanded helicopter bases near Murmansk and increased concentrations of Tu-22 long-range bombers at the Olenya air base.43 At a restored Cold War-era base in Kamenka, over 130 troop tents and dozens of new buildings have appeared to house military vehicles.43

Finland has responded by indefinitely closing land border crossings to counter Russia’s weaponization of migration and is hosting a forward NATO land force of 4,000–5,000 troops.44 Norwegian defense officials have also warned of a “formidable nuclear fleet” amassing on the Kola Peninsula, signaling that Russia is prioritizing its Northern Fleet and Arctic capabilities even as ground forces are consumed by the war in Ukraine.45

Russian “informational war” strategies have intensified, utilizing the “Gerasimov doctrine” to shape global narratives and demoralize Ukrainian civilians.46 The Russian bot network “Matryoshka” has recently launched a campaign exploiting the release of US Justice Department files related to Jeffrey Epstein to smear European leaders and the Ukrainian government.47 This includes fabricated reports claiming French President Emmanuel Macron visited Epstein’s island 18 times and false suggestions that President Zelenskyy had knowledge of child involvement in the network.47

These operations are designed to create “hybrid confusion,” blending cyberattacks with deepfake audio and video to transform minor technical outages into public safety crises.48 For example, AI-generated disinformation was recently used to manufacture safety threats ahead of the 2026 Winter Olympics, aiming to deter spectators and delegitimize host nations.49 In Ukraine, the Russian military continues to use electronic warfare systems like the Orlan-10 drone to send threatening text messages to the mobile phones of Ukrainian soldiers and their families to spread panic.46

Conclusions and Strategic Forecast

The situation as of February 6, 2026, indicates a high-stakes transition toward a fifth year of conflict, characterized by tactical deadlock and strategic competition. The capture of Hulyaipole represents a marginal Russian success, but the systemic “de-mechanization” of the Russian army suggests that Moscow lacks the armored capacity for a decisive offensive breakthrough in 2026. Conversely, Ukraine’s resilience is increasingly tied to the functionality of its energy grid; the record-breaking strikes this week demonstrate that Russia remains capable of inflicting severe humanitarian and economic costs that could eventually undermine domestic stability.

The “Abu Dhabi channel” has emerged as a vital de-escalation mechanism, facilitating the return of POWs and the re-opening of military hotlines. However, as long as Moscow maintains its maximalist demands for the entirety of the Donbas and Ukrainian neutrality, a comprehensive settlement remains unlikely. The expiration of New START and the subsequent linkage of nuclear arms control to the Ukrainian theater suggests that the Kremlin will continue to utilize strategic uncertainty to leverage concessions from the West.

In the near term, the conflict will likely remain focused on the “energy war” as both sides attempt to endure a particularly harsh winter. Ukraine’s ability to repair and defend its grid, supported by European financial aid and advanced air defenses, will be the decisive factor in preventing a humanitarian catastrophe. Simultaneously, the assassination attempt on Lt. Gen. Alekseyev and the discovery of “Operation Neusploit” indicate that the shadow war of intelligence and cyber operations will continue to escalate, potentially leading to increased paranoia and instability within the Russian military command.

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