Executive Summary

The geopolitical landscape for the week ending February 6, 2026, is characterized by the convergence of kinetic escalation, the collapse of short-term diplomatic truces, and a transformative shift in the nature of non-state actor participation in global conflict. In Eastern Europe, the termination of a brief energy moratorium has led to the most intensive aerial bombardment of the Ukrainian power grid since the conflict’s inception, signaling a Russian commitment to a protracted war of attrition despite immense casualty rates.¹ Concurrently, the Middle East is navigating a precarious “new geopolitical moment” defined by Iranian ballistic missile deployments and the fragile implementation of a landmark agreement between the Syrian government and Kurdish forces.³

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Sudanese civil war has reached a grim milestone of 1,000 days, increasingly fueled by regional rivalries and the involvement of international mercenary networks.⁶ The central Sahel region is witnessing a qualitative shift as the Russian-controlled Africa Corps formally assumes the operational mantle from the disbanded Wagner Group, further entrenching Moscow’s influence in Mali and Burkina Faso amidst a failing regional security architecture.⁸

The Indo-Pacific is under strain from both internal and external pressures. The People’s Republic of China is undergoing a significant internal military purge targeting the highest echelons of the People’s Liberation Army leadership, a move interpreted by intelligence analysts as a consolidation of power ahead of 2027 modernization milestones.¹⁰ In Southeast Asia, Myanmar’s military junta has utilized a disputed electoral process to entrench its authority, even as resistance forces consolidate control over nearly 80 percent of the territory.¹¹ Finally, in the Americas, Haiti faces a critical governance vacuum as the transitional government’s mandate expires, leaving the capital almost entirely in the hands of sophisticated criminal coalitions.¹³ These crises are underpinned by a global economic environment of resource scarcity and a cyber domain increasingly dominated by AI-enabled disinformation and infrastructure disruption.¹⁵

Eastern Europe: Russia-Ukraine Attrition and Infrastructure Degradation

Escalation of the Strategic Bombing Campaign

The tactical pause in energy infrastructure strikes, previously facilitated by international mediation, collapsed on February 2, 2026. Russian forces subsequently launched a massive, coordinated aerial assault involving approximately 450 drones and 71 missiles.¹ This strike was meticulously timed to coincide with a severe cold front, with temperatures in parts of Ukraine plummeting to -13 degrees Fahrenheit.¹ Intelligence suggests this campaign aims not merely at technical degradation but at a systematic dismantling of the civilian will to resist by weaponizing the winter.

The impact has been catastrophic for the Ukrainian energy sector. In Kharkiv, a primary power plant was damaged beyond repair, a loss that has left approximately 300,000 residents without electricity.¹ In the capital, Kyiv, the assault resulted in the cessation of heating for over 1,170 high-rise buildings.¹ This degradation follows a period of earlier grid fragility; on January 31, a major shutdown occurred on the 400-kW and 750-kW lines connecting the Moldovan and Romanian systems with central Ukraine.¹⁷ Although Ukrainian authorities initially characterized the January 31 event as a technological disruption rather than a direct kinetic strike, the cumulative effect of nearly four years of sustained attacks has left the national grid in a state of terminal vulnerability.¹⁷

Frontline Dynamics and Territorial Realities

On the ground, the war remains a grinding conflict of attrition. Data analysis for the period between January 6 and February 3, 2026, indicates that Russian forces gained approximately 123 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase from the 74 square miles gained in the preceding four-week cycle.¹ This territorial expansion, primarily located in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, underscores a shift in the strategic initiative toward the Russian military.¹

The Russian command appears to be exploiting adverse winter conditions to negate Ukrainian advantages in drone surveillance. Ukrainian units in northern Kharkiv and Sumy report that Russian forces are launching high-attrition assaults during periods of poor visibility that grounded traditional reconnaissance drones.¹⁷ In response, Ukrainian forces have pivoted to First-Person View drones for patrolling heavily forested areas, such as the Serebryanske forest, to detect Russian infiltrators.¹⁷ Despite these tactical gains, Russia’s broader strategic performance remains characterized by extreme costs; casualty rates are projected to reach a cumulative total of 2 million for both sides by the spring of 2026.²

Economic Warfare and Sanctions Evasion

The international community continues to leverage economic tools to degrade the Russian war effort, but circumvention remains a pervasive challenge. In late January 2026, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) coordinated an investigation into the suspected circumvention of EU sanctions involving 766 transport vehicles.¹⁸ These vehicles were declared as destined for Turkey but were diverted to Russia via intermediaries in Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova.¹⁸ Furthermore, the EU has formally adopted a regulation to phase out Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports by late 2027, and a ban on refined oil products produced in third countries using Russian crude took effect on January 21, 2026.¹⁸

Military Metric	Statistic (as of Feb 3, 2026)	Source
Russian Territorial Gain (4 Weeks)	123 Square Miles	1
Total Russian Territorial Control	~45,762 Square Miles (13% of Ukraine)	1
Combined Projected Casualties	2,000,000 (by Spring 2026)	2
Daily Rate of Advance	15–70 Meters	2
Russian Casualties (Since Feb 2022)	~1.2 Million	2

The Middle East: Strategic Posturing and Regional Realignments

Iran: The Khorramshahr-4 Deployment and Coercive Diplomacy

The Iranian government has significantly hardened its military and diplomatic posture this week. On February 4, 2026, Tehran announced the combat deployment of the Khorramshahr-4 medium-range ballistic missile.⁴ This system represents a critical evolution in Iran’s deterrent capabilities, utilizing hypergolic liquid fuel that reduces launch preparation time to approximately 12 minutes.⁴ With a range and payload capacity capable of delivering warheads between 1,500 and 1,800 kilograms, the Khorramshahr-4 is explicitly designed to penetrate layered missile defense systems.⁴

The deployment occurred mere hours before scheduled diplomatic talks in Oman, a move that intelligence analysts interpret as a “calculated effort to harden Iran’s negotiating posture” by establishing irreversible military facts on the ground.⁴ Within the Iranian regime, a consensus is reportedly forming that limited retaliatory actions are no longer sufficient to deter U.S. or Israeli military intervention; instead, some policymakers believe that only the credible threat of a “prolonged, costly war” can prevent an attack on the Iranian homeland.⁵ This strategic shift takes place against a backdrop of domestic instability, following an exceptionally violent crackdown on nationwide protests that resulted in thousands of deaths.¹⁹

The Levant: Conflict Resilience in Gaza and the West Bank

In the Palestinian territories, the October 2025 ceasefire is increasingly fragile. The transition toward the “Trump peace plan” has stalled as Hamas refuses to disarm, a prerequisite for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces.²⁰ This deadlock has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis that is now entering its third winter. Between October 7, 2023, and late January 2026, at least 71,667 Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip.²¹ By January 27, 2026, hypothermia had already claimed the lives of 11 children in makeshift shelters.²¹

In the West Bank, the security situation is deteriorating as Israeli forces extended a military order linked to operation “Iron Wall” until March 31, 2026.²¹ This operation has resulted in the emptying of major refugee camps, including Jenin, Nur Shams, and Tulkarm, with 33,000 residents currently displaced.²¹ Economic and social pressures are mounting as UNRWA installations in East Jerusalem have seen their water and electricity services cut following the implementation of Israeli laws targeting the agency’s operations.²¹

Syria and the Red Sea: Shifting Proxies and Maritime Threats

A significant geopolitical development occurred in Syria on January 30, 2026, when the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) reached a 14-point agreement for the gradual integration of the SDF into the Syrian state.⁵ Public endorsement of the deal by high-ranking SDF commanders, such as Sipan Hamo, suggests that internal Kurdish opposition to state integration may be softening, potentially reducing the risk of a Kurdish-led insurgency in the northeast.⁵

However, the threat of maritime escalation persists. The Houthi movement in Yemen remains a critical variable; while they largely paused attacks on commercial shipping after the October ceasefire, analysts warn that any resumption of large-scale kinetic activity in Gaza will trigger a renewed Houthi campaign in the Red Sea.²⁰ Furthermore, internal divisions in Yemen are deepening, with southern factions increasingly at odds with both the Houthi movement and each other, potentially leading to the formal secession of southern Yemen.²⁰

Iranian Missile Capability	Specification (Khorramshahr-4)	Source
Type	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)	4
Fuel System	Liquid-fuel (Hypergolic)	4
Preparation Time	~12 Minutes	4
Payload Capacity	1,500–1,800 kg	4
Strike Time (to Israel)	10–12 Minutes	4

Sub-Saharan Africa: Civil War, Fragmentation, and Paramilitary Influence

The Crisis in Sudan: 1,000 Days of Conflict

As of January 2026, the civil war in Sudan has passed the 1,000-day mark, transitioning into a deeply regionalized conflict of power and profit.⁶ This week, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) achieved a notable tactical breakthrough by lifting the siege on Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, which had been surrounded by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for months.²³ However, this gain was offset by RSF drone strikes on the city, which killed 15 civilians and struck a military hospital.⁷

The conflict is increasingly characterized by the use of sophisticated technology and the recruitment of international mercenaries. The SAF recently claimed to have downed a Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı drone operated by the RSF.⁷ Simultaneously, the United Kingdom has imposed sanctions on Colombian nationals accused of recruiting former soldiers as mercenaries for the RSF, highlighting the globalized nature of the Sudanese war economy.⁷ The humanitarian toll is staggering; approximately 11.7 million people have been displaced, and 7 million face catastrophic levels of famine.⁶

The Sahel and the Formalization of Russian Influence

The security situation in the central Sahel—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—is deteriorating as jihadist groups consolidate territorial influence and target strategic economic nodes, such as fuel and logistics routes.²⁴ A critical shift in the regional security architecture occurred this week with the consolidation of the Russian “Africa Corps,” an entity managed by the Russian Ministry of Defense that has largely subsumed the operations of the former Wagner Group.⁹

In Mali, the Africa Corps has established its primary concentration in Bamako and the central regions, while approximately 1,500 Wagner personnel remain in the north.⁹ In Burkina Faso, the Africa Corps has established a military base in Loumbila to support the Traoré regime.⁹ This transition represents a shift from a “military-business model” to a more explicit state-controlled deployment designed to counter Western influence and secure access to strategic resources, including gold in Mali and uranium in Niger.⁹ Despite these deployments, the security situation remains unstable; an ongoing fuel blockade in Mali is testing the junta’s legitimacy, and Burkina Faso has emerged as the country most affected by terrorism globally.⁸

South Sudan: Renewed Internal Conflict

South Sudan is experiencing a significant escalation in sub-national violence. In Jonglei State, clashes between the national army (SSPDF) and the SPLM-iO opposition have displaced approximately 280,000 people since late December 2025.²⁶ Airstrikes were reported in Akobo County on February 2, leading to an immediate suspension of humanitarian activities in the region.²⁶ This instability has facilitated a national cholera outbreak, with nearly 98,000 cases recorded as of early February 2026, further straining the country’s threadbare healthcare system.²⁶

Regional Actor	Key Operation / Development	Impact / Outcome	Source
Africa Corps	Subsumed Wagner Group structures in Sahel.	Centralized Russian MoD control in Mali/Niger.	9
Sudanese Army (SAF)	Retook Al-Dashol; broke Kadugli siege.	Temporary relief of urban blockades.	7
RSF (Sudan)	Cross-border attack into Chad; drone strikes.	Externalization of conflict; urban terror.	7
SPLM-iO (S. Sudan)	Conflict with SSPDF in Jonglei.	Displacement of 280,000 civilians.	26

Indo-Pacific: Contested Hegemony and Internal PLA Purges

The People’s Republic of China: Internal Purges and Military Readiness

A profound structural shift is underway within the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On January 25, 2026, the PRC announced investigations into CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and CMC Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli.¹⁰ Intelligence reports from the PLA Daily on January 31 and February 2 indicate these purges were necessary to “remove political threats” and ensure absolute obedience to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s command.¹⁰

Analysts suggest that Zhang and Liu may have disagreed with the rapid modernization goals set for 2027, which include the capability to successfully execute an invasion of Taiwan.¹⁰ This purge is distinct from previous anti-corruption efforts as it explicitly cites political obstacles rather than financial crimes, signaling a “ideological hardening” of the military leadership ahead of potential regional conflict.¹⁰

Taiwan Strait and South China Sea Coercion

Maritime and aerial pressure on Taiwan remains at historically high levels. In January 2026, the PRC sent 30 high-altitude balloons into Taiwan’s ADIZ, 21 of which violated territorial airspace.¹⁰ Simultaneously, the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration expanded its list of “suspicious” PRC vessels from 300 to 1,900, following reports of massive blockade-like formations involving the Chinese Maritime Militia in the East China Sea.¹⁰

Taiwan’s internal political landscape is complicating its defense posture. Opposition parties have repeatedly blocked the proposed $40 billion defense budget, favoring a reduced $13 billion version that omits critical funding for the “T-dome” air defense network and a mass-drone program.¹⁰ In the South China Sea, the PLA conducted a record 163 operations in 2025, shifting its most aggressive naval harassment tactics away from the Second Thomas Shoal toward the Scarborough Shoal to further pressure Philippine sovereignty.²⁷

Myanmar: The Post-Election Failed State Trajectory

The week ending February 6, 2026, saw the military junta in Myanmar formalize its control following widely disputed elections. On February 4, the junta-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was declared the winner.¹¹ Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has signed laws allowing him to run a new governing council, effectively institutionalizing the military’s 2021 coup.¹¹

The military has intensified its air campaign, reportedly utilizing Iranian jet fuel and urea deliveries to strike more than 1,000 civilian locations over the past year.¹¹ However, resistance forces have made historic gains, now controlling nearly 80 percent of the country’s territory.¹² Despite these battlefield successes, the opposition remains politically fragmented, lacking a viable institutional alternative to the regime.²⁸ The UN projects that over 16 million people will require humanitarian assistance in 2026 as the country slides toward total state failure.²⁹

Naval Procurement Plan (Taiwan)	Targeted Quantity	Completion Horizon	Source
Yushan-class LPD	1	2028–2034	10
Anti-Air Light Frigates	5	2040	10
Anti-Submarine Light Frigates	5	2040	10
Submarine Rescue Ship	1	2027–2033	10
Panshi-class Support Ship	1	Ongoing	10

The Americas: Haiti’s Governance Crisis and Gang Supremacy

The February 7 Deadline and the Governance Vacuum

Haiti is currently at a critical impasse as the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) is set to expire on February 7, 2026.¹³ With no elected national officials in place since January 2023, the country faces a total governance vacuum. Internal infighting within the Council has prevented the formation of a succession plan, even as international partners like the United States have called for the Council to adhere to the February 7 deadline.¹⁴

Armed gangs now control an estimated 90 percent of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and are expanding into strategic agricultural corridors in the Artibonite Department.³¹ These gangs have reorganized from fragmented local crews into structured criminal networks with defined leadership and diversified revenue streams, including kidnapping, extortion, and drug trafficking.³¹ The security gains made by the UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force remain fragile, as gang coalitions like “Viv Ansanm” continue to mount coordinated attacks on prisons and economic infrastructure.³¹

Regional and Humanitarian Implications

The collapse of order in Haiti is driving a regional migration crisis. The United States has positioned naval ships off the Haitian coast and signaled a shift toward a “security-first” posture focused on containment.¹⁴ Furthermore, the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians in the U.S., effective February 3, 2026, has placed 350,000 people at risk of deportation, a move that local officials in stable northern cities like Cap-Haitien warn will overwhelm limited municipal services.³³

Transversal Security Threats and Global Risks

Cyberwarfare: The Convergence of AI and Infrastructure Disruption

Cybersecurity risks in 2026 are accelerating due to the weaponization of artificial intelligence. Survey data indicates that 94% of organizations identify AI as the most significant driver of cyber change.¹⁵ This week, intelligence reports highlighted the “Milkyway” ransomware, a sophisticated strain that uses “double extortion” tactics, including threats to report victims to tax authorities and contact their business partners directly.³⁵

Another trending threat is the “Pulsar” Remote Access Trojan (RAT), which prioritizes stealth over speed by operating primarily in system memory to evade traditional signature-based detection.³⁵ The blurring of lines between state-sponsored espionage and cybercrime is increasingly evident; for example, the Russia-linked group ELECTRUM recently disabled key equipment at 30 distributed energy resource sites in Poland, demonstrating the potential for cyberattacks to cause permanent kinetic damage to national power grids.³⁵

Resource Scarcity: Water and Mineral Security

Water scarcity has emerged as a primary threat to regional stability in Central Asia. Over the past 40 years, water availability per capita has decreased more than threefold, from 8,400 to 2,500 cubic meters annually.³⁶ Tensions over the transboundary Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers are rising as upstream and downstream nations struggle to coordinate resource management.³⁶

In the domain of critical minerals, global cooperation is faltering. At the UN Environment Assembly, efforts to establish a legally binding treaty for supply chain traceability were defeated by resistance from major resource producers, including Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.³⁷ This “national security” framing of mineral extraction is expected to intensify geoeconomic confrontation, which experts rank as the most severe short-term risk to global stability in 2026.¹⁶

Global Risk Category	Short-Term (2 Year) Rank	Long-Term (10 Year) Rank	Source
Geoeconomic Confrontation	1	8	16
State-Based Armed Conflict	2	12	16
Extreme Weather Events	3	1	16
Misinformation/Disinformation	4	2	16
AI Adverse Outcomes	5	3	16

Strategic Conclusion

The week ending February 6, 2026, serves as a harbinger of a more violent and fragmented international system. The transition from private military companies to state-controlled paramilitary groups in Africa, the ideological purging of military leadership in China, and the weaponization of winter in Europe all point to a world where state actors are increasingly willing to incur extreme costs to achieve strategic aims. The “new geopolitical moment” in the Middle East suggests that diplomacy is now being conducted under the immediate shadow of high-speed ballistic delivery systems, while in the Americas and Southeast Asia, the rise of “criminal governance” and failed-state dynamics creates persistent vacuums that international stabilization efforts have thus far failed to fill. For global policymakers, the challenge of 2026 is not merely to manage individual conflicts but to navigate a systemic breakdown in the norms that previously governed international security and resource management.

---

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly contribute towards our continued reporting, please visit our funding page.

---

Sources Used

1. The Russia-Ukraine War Report Card, Feb. 4, 2026, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-feb-4-2026
2. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine – CSIS, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-grinding-war-ukraine
3. Iran and the New Geopolitical Moment, accessed February 7, 2026, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2026/02/the-iran-crisis-in-a-new-geopolitical-moment
4. Iran Deploys Khorramshahr-4 Ballistic Missile for Combat Duty, Redefining Middle East Deterrence and Escalation Dynamics – Defence Security Asia, accessed February 7, 2026, https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/iran-deploys-khorramshahr-4-ballistic-missile-combat-duty-middle-east-deterrence/
5. Iran Update, February 4, 2026 | ISW, accessed February 7, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-4-2026/
6. Sudan: Foreign Secretary’s statement, 5 February 2026 – GOV.UK, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/sudan-foreign-secretarys-statement-5-february-2026
7. Timeline of the Sudanese civil war (2026) – Wikipedia, accessed February 7, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Sudanese_civil_war_(2026)
8. The Waiting Game: Signposts of Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa – Small Wars Journal, accessed February 7, 2026, https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/01/01/the-waiting-game-signposts-of-russias-coming-failure-in-africa/
9. Africa Corps (Russia) – Wikipedia, accessed February 7, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africa_Corps_(Russia)
10. China & Taiwan Update, February 6, 2026 | ISW, accessed February 7, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-february-6-2026/
11. Civil War in Myanmar | Global Conflict Tracker – Council on Foreign Relations, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar
12. February 26: Junta on the Defense – Making Sense of Myanmar in 2026, accessed February 7, 2026, https://iis.berkeley.edu/news/february-26-junta-defense-making-sense-myanmar-2026
13. A roadmap for security and governance reform in Haiti | Chatham House, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/roadmap-security-and-governance-reform-haiti
14. Haiti’s Political Crisis Deepens Amid a Slide Into Criminal Governance – Americas Quarterly, accessed February 7, 2026, https://americasquarterly.org/article/haitis-political-crisis-deepens-amid-a-slide-into-criminal-governance/
15. Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 – World Economic Forum, accessed February 7, 2026, https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_2026.pdf
16. Global Risks Report 2026: What climate, conflict and economy mean for water and environment, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.indiawaterportal.org/environment/global-risks-report-2026-what-climate-conflict-and-economy-mean-for-water-and-environment
17. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2026 | ISW, accessed February 7, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2026/
18. Russia/Ukraine Sanctions Update – Month of January 2026 | Insights – Mayer Brown, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/01/russiaukraine-sanctions-update–month-of-january-2026
19. CrisisWatch: January Trends and February Alerts 2026, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/january-trends-and-february-alerts-2026
20. Middle East Forecast for 2026, accessed February 7, 2026, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-january-9/
21. UNRWA Situation Report #207 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the …, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.unrwa.org/resources/reports/unrwa-situation-report-207-situation-gaza-strip-and-west-bank-including-east-jerusalem
22. More Spasms of Violence Await the Middle East in 2026 – Stimson Center, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2026/more-spasms-of-violence-await-the-middle-east-in-2026/
23. In Washington, Fletcher presses for action as Sudan war grinds on – UN News, accessed February 7, 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166885
24. West Africa & the Sahel: Escalating Fragmentation, Expanding Extremism, and Regional Political Volatility | African Security Analysis, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/west-africa-and-the-sahel-escalating-fragmentation-expanding-extremism-and-regional-political-volatility
25. Russia’s Security Operations in Africa – Congress.gov, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12389/IF12389.8.pdf
26. South Sudan: Conflict in Jonglei State – Flash Update No. 4 (as of 3 February 2026), accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-conflict-jonglei-state-flash-update-no-4-3-february-2026
27. Tracking China’s Increased Military Activities in the Indo-Pacific in 2025, accessed February 7, 2026, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-increased-military-activities-indo-pacific-2025/
28. Download English – ISP-Myanmar, accessed February 7, 2026, https://ispmyanmar.com/community/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/SOM01_English_20260131.pdf
29. Myanmar Crisis Situation Analysis: 22/12/25 – 28/12/25 – ReliefWeb, accessed February 7, 2026, https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-crisis-situation-analysis-221225-281225
30. U.S. sends warning as Haiti transitional council’s term is set to expire Saturday, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/haiti-government-unrest-tps-battle/
31. Haiti crisis at breaking point as gangs tighten grip ahead of transition deadline, accessed February 7, 2026, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166806
32. Haiti’s gang violence crisis: What to know and how to help, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.rescue.org/article/haitis-gang-violence-crisis-what-know-and-how-help
33. Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status – Federal Register, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/28/2025-21379/termination-of-the-designation-of-haiti-for-temporary-protected-status
34. Haiti’s week ahead is the next test for Trump’s Western Hemisphere focus, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/haitis-week-ahead-is-the-next-test-for-trumps-western-hemisphere-focus/
35. Weekly Intelligence Report – 06 February 2026 – CYFIRMA, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.cyfirma.com/news/weekly-intelligence-report-06-february-2026/
36. New Lines Institute: “Water shortage becomes a key threat to economic development in Central Asia”, accessed February 7, 2026, https://asiaplustj.info/en/node/357697
37. Environmental Security Weekly Watch: February 2-6, 2026 | New …, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2026/02/environmental-security-weekly-watch-february-2-6-2026/
38. World Economic Forum – Global Risks Report 2026, accessed February 7, 2026, https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2026.pdf
39. Ranked: The World’s Biggest Risks Today vs. in 10 Years – Visual Capitalist, accessed February 7, 2026, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-global-risks-today-vs-10-years-wef/