Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics

Venezuela SITREP – Week Ending January 31, 2026

Executive Summary

The reporting period ending January 31, 2026, represents the conclusion of the most volatile month in Venezuelan history since the federal wars, marked by the rapid consolidation of an interim government following the January 3rd United States military intervention, codenamed Operation Absolute Resolve.1 This week was characterized by the transition from kinetic military operations to a phase of radical geoeconomic restructuring and authoritarian stabilization. The political landscape is currently dominated by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, who has successfully leveraged the decapitation of the Maduro regime to position herself as a pragmatic interlocutor for the Trump administration, often at the expense of the democratic opposition led by María Corina Machado.3

Three major pillars defined the strategic developments of the week: the proposal of a transformative General Amnesty Law on January 30, the passage of a landmark oil privatization law on January 29, and the formal re-establishment of U.S. diplomatic presence with the arrival of Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu on January 31.6 The Amnesty Law, covering political violence from 1999 to the present, serves as a survival mechanism for the Chavista bureaucracy while offering a release valve for international human rights pressure.7 Concurrently, the abandonment of socialist hydrocarbon mandates in favor of private foreign control marks the formal end of the “Bolivarian” economic model, as the country seeks to integrate into the U.S.-led energy order.10

Security remains fluid but “managed.” While the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) have recognized the Rodríguez administration, the persistence of colectivo paramilitary activity in marginalized urban centers continues to pose a low-level insurgency risk, albeit one currently tempered by the threat of a “second wave” of U.S. strikes.1 Internationally, the cooling of relations with the Cuba-Russia-Iran axis is accelerating, evidenced by the repatriation of Cuban military remains and the U.S. demand that Caracas sever ties with “malign actors” as a prerequisite for full economic normalization.6 Despite these shifts, the humanitarian situation remains catastrophic, with 7.9 million people in need of assistance and a fragile currency stabilized only by emergency infusions of oil revenue from U.S.-monitored accounts.17

Political Intelligence and Transitional Governance

The Rodríguez Interregnum: Authoritarian Pragmatism

The political week centered on the continued consolidation of power by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and her brother, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez. This “sibling duumvirate” has effectively sidelined both the hardline Maduro loyalists and the pro-democracy opposition.3 On January 30, during a highly symbolic address at the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) to mark the opening of the judicial year, Delcy Rodríguez proposed a “General Amnesty Law”.7 This legislative framework is designed to cover the entire period of political confrontation starting from the inauguration of Hugo Chávez in 1999.21

The amnesty serves a dual strategic purpose. First, it offers a path to freedom for hundreds of political prisoners, a key demand of the Trump administration that has already resulted in the release of over 300 detainees and all known U.S. citizens.6 Second, by spanning the entire 27-year Chavista era, the law provides a de facto shield for current regime figures who facilitated the transition, essentially creating a “stability-for-impunity” bargain.4 The closure of the El Helicoide detention center, announced on the same day, functions as the primary cosmetic centerpiece of this “rebranding” effort, intended to demonstrate a break from the “torture and repression” associated with Nicolás Maduro while keeping the underlying administrative architecture intact.7

The Sidelining of the Democratic Mandate

A critical friction point remains the status of María Corina Machado and the 2024 election victor Edmundo González. Despite their widespread domestic popularity and Machado’s recent Nobel Peace Prize, the U.S. executive branch has prioritized transactional stability over immediate democratic restoration.3 During her visit to Washington in mid-January, Machado was met with significant diplomatic coldness; President Trump publicly questioned her ability to command the respect of the Venezuelan security forces.3

Intelligence analysis suggests that Washington views the Rodríguez administration as a “high-capacity” partner capable of maintaining order and managing the oil sector, whereas an immediate transition to the opposition is perceived as potentially chaotic.5 This has led to a sense of frustration among pro-democracy activists who argue that the U.S. is “running” the country through a proxy government of former socialists who have simply swapped their ideological allegiances for American security guarantees.4

Political ActorCurrent StatusStrategic RoleSource
Delcy RodríguezActing PresidentInterim manager; U.S. interlocutor5
Jorge RodríguezPresident of National AssemblyLegislative facilitator for privatization6
María Corina MachadoOpposition Leader (Exile)Moral authority; Nobel laureate; marginalized3
Vladimir Padrino LópezDefense MinisterGuarantor of military loyalty to interim gov6
Laura DoguU.S. Chargé d’AffairesDiplomatic overseer; primary U.S. contact7

National Security and Military Dynamics

Operation Absolute Resolve and Its Aftermath

The security environment of the week must be viewed through the lens of the January 3rd military operation. Absolute Resolve utilized over 150 U.S. aircraft to suppress Venezuelan air defenses, allowing Delta Force and other special operations teams to apprehend Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, at their compound in Caracas.1 The operation was surgical but lethal; latest confirmed data indicates that 81 to 195 individuals were killed, including 32 Cuban military and intelligence agents who formed the core of Maduro’s personal security detail.6

The revelation of high-ranking Cuban deaths, including Colonel Humberto Roca, has triggered a significant geopolitical shift.6 The repatriation of these remains on January 15 marked the effective termination of the “strategic axis” between Havana and Caracas.6 Acting President Rodríguez has moved quickly to satisfy U.S. demands to “kick out” foreign adversaries, including personnel from Cuba, Iran, and Russia, signaling that the Bolivarian Republic will no longer serve as a platform for extra-regional actors in the Western Hemisphere.15

Internal Stability and the Colectivo Threat

Despite the high-level transition, the ground-level security situation is characterized by “authoritarian quietude” enforced by both the military and paramilitary groups.12 In the early weeks of January, colectivos (armed pro-government militias) patrolled the streets of Caracas on motorbikes, searching citizens’ mobile phones for evidence of pro-U.S. sentiment or “celebration” of Maduro’s ouster.4

However, by the end of the reporting week, there are signs that the Rodríguez government is beginning to rein in these irregular forces. The “state of emergency” declared on January 3, which empowered security forces to detain anyone supporting the U.S. raid, is being selectively used to target those who challenge the new interim order.12 The U.S. has signaled that a “second wave” of attacks remains an option if the interim government fails to maintain “maximum cooperation” in dismantling these criminal and paramilitary structures.15

Kinetic Operations Against Narcotrafficking

While major land operations have ceased, the U.S. continues to execute a “war-like” campaign against maritime drug trafficking. Since September 2, these strikes have resulted in at least 126 deaths.29 The most recent engagement occurred on January 23, the first such strike since Maduro’s capture, underscoring the Trump administration’s commitment to using the “Absolute Resolve” momentum to permanently degrade the “Cartel of the Suns” and other criminal networks like the Tren de Aragua.2

Security EventDateOutcome/DetailSource
Operation Absolute ResolveJan 3, 2026Capture of Maduro; 32 Cubans, 47 FANB killed6
Declaration of EmergencyJan 3, 202690-day state of emergency; suppression of dissent1
Release of U.S. PrisonersJan 30, 2026All known U.S. citizens released from custody8
Arrest of “Colectivo” LeadersJan 25-31Selective reining in of radical paramilitaries13
Post-Raid Maritime StrikeJan 23, 2026First narco-interdiction since Maduro’s capture29

Economic Assessment: The Great Privatization Pivot

The Oil Law of January 29

On January 29, 2026, the National Assembly passed a transformative law that effectively dismantles the socialist control of the Venezuelan oil industry.6 This legislation permits private foreign companies to take majority ownership stakes in oil production and marketing, a policy shift aimed at securing the $100 billion in investment that President Trump has promised to revitalize the “rotting” infrastructure of the OPEC nation.10

Acting President Rodríguez, standing before a portrait of Maduro but speaking the language of free-market reform, described the law as “the country we are going to give to our children”.10 The move was immediately met with the issuance of a U.S. Treasury general license (GL-2026-A) that authorizes transactions with PDVSA necessary for the exportation and sale of crude, provided revenues flow through U.S.-monitored custody accounts.19

Financial Architecture and Revenue Custody

The Trump administration has implemented a stringent “revenue protection” mechanism to prevent the interim government from misusing funds or repaying debts to China and Russia.19 Under the January 9 executive order, all proceeds from Venezuelan oil sales are classified as “Foreign Government Deposit Funds” and held in a custodial capacity by the U.S. government.33

A significant portion of these funds—estimated at $200 million of the first $500 million sale—is currently held in an account at a commercial bank in Qatar.19 This “Qatari mechanism” is designed to shield the assets from judicial attachment by the dozens of private creditors and bondholders who hold roughly $60 billion in defaulted Venezuelan debt.33 On January 20, $300 million was released to private banks in Venezuela to shore up the bolivar, providing a temporary but necessary stabilization of the exchange rate, which currently hovers around 345.94 bolivars per dollar.6

Hydrocarbon Logistics and Market Outlook

Despite the legislative opening, analysts from Goldman Sachs and Rystad Energy caution that a “renaissance” in oil production will take years.36 The country’s heavy crude is costly to extract and requires specialized diluents that were previously blocked by sanctions.19 While Chevron reported on January 30 that it is already delivering crude to market, meaningful increases in supply (to 1.3-1.4 million bpd) are not expected before 2028.11

Economic IndicatorValue/StatusContextSource
Oil Production (Current)~900,000 bpdFlat due to infrastructure decay38
Oil Production (Target)2.5 million bpdLong-term (10-year) objective38
Inflation Rate682% (IMF Est.)Highest globally; eroding wages39
Bolivar Exchange Rate345.94 VES/USDStabilized by $300m infusion19
External Debt$150 BillionIncludes $60B in defaulted bonds33
Qatari Bank Deposits$200 MillionInitial tranche of oil sale proceeds19

Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic Re-alignment

The Return of the U.S. Mission

The arrival of Laura Dogu on January 31 as Chargé d’Affaires marks the first formal U.S. diplomatic presence in Caracas since 2019.8 Dogu’s mission is to manage the “stabilization phase” of the transition and ensure that the Rodríguez administration complies with the “Ten Point List of Priority Demands” issued by civil society and endorsed by Washington.30 The U.S. has also lifted the ban on commercial flights to Venezuela, a sign of confidence in the security guarantees provided by the FANB.7

Russia and China: Rhetorical Resistance, Practical Retreat

Russia and China have both condemned the U.S. intervention as “unilateral and illegal,” using the UN Security Council as a platform to attack what they describe as a “new era of imperialism”.1 However, intelligence assessments indicate that both powers have largely accepted the new reality.14

Russia is focusing on safeguarding its existing investments and has already engaged in “respectful and productive” dialogues with the Rodríguez administration, signaling that it will not militarily challenge the U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.14 China, while “deeply shocked,” remains a “buyer of last resort” for certain oil blends but is currently being frozen out of the new financial architecture by U.S. Treasury controls.33

Regional Neighbor Dynamics

The response from the “Zone of Peace” in Latin America has been one of deep apprehension. Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico issued a joint statement rejecting the use of force and expressing concern about “external appropriation of natural resources”.1 This regional consensus highlights a significant rift: while most Latin American governments viewed Maduro as illegitimate, they view the U.S. military ouster as a violation of the UN Charter and a dangerous precedent for their own sovereignty.1

Colombia, under President Gustavo Petro, faces a complex security dilemma. While Bogota condemned the raid, it is using the Venezuelan internal distraction to launch aggressive operations against guerrillas and paramilitaries (such as the ELN) that previously found sanctuary on the Venezuelan side of the border.2 The “Absolute Resolve” operation has effectively ended the era of Venezuela as a “safe haven” for regional insurgents.5

Humanitarian and Social Outlook

The OCHA Baseline and Urgent Needs

As of late January 2026, the humanitarian crisis remains the world’s most underfunded displacement situation. OCHA reports that 7.9 million people require urgent assistance, yet the 2025 humanitarian response plan received only 17% of its required $606 million.17 The “political rupture” has created a period of uncertainty for the 7.7 million Venezuelans living in exile; while many hope for a return to democracy, the lack of immediate economic relief and the persistent “authoritarian atmosphere” under Rodríguez has kept return movements limited.12

Humanitarian SectorPeople in NeedCritical ChallengesSource
Food Security5 Million+Basic basket cost ($586) exceeds wages18
Health7.9 MillionShortage of medicines; electricity blackouts17
Protection900,000Colectivo violence; arbitrary detention18
Migration7.7 Million17-country regional response required17

The Symbolic Impact of El Helicoide

The planned closure of El Helicoide and the proposal of the General Amnesty Law on January 30 have provided the first tangible signs of social de-escalation.7 Rights groups like Foro Penal and Provea have expressed “reserved optimism,” noting that while an amnesty is welcome, it must not become a “cloak of impunity” for those who ordered systemic abuses.9 The conversion of a site of torture into a community center is a powerful narrative tool for the Rodríguez administration as it seeks to convince the international community that it is a “reformist” regime.7

Strategic Forecast and Risk Indicators

The situation in Venezuela as of January 31, 2026, is a “managed transition” that prioritizes geoeconomic realignment over democratic restoration. The interim government of Delcy Rodríguez has successfully traded its loyalty to the Maduro family for survival under the U.S. umbrella. However, several critical risks remain that could destabilize this fragile order:

  1. The Opposition-Executive Schism: If María Corina Machado and the democratic movement feel permanently disenfranchised by the U.S.-Rodríguez pact, they could mobilize mass street protests that the interim government would be forced to repress, potentially triggering the “second wave” of U.S. military action that President Trump has threatened.3
  2. The Colectivo Insurgency: Radical elements of the Chavista paramilitaries may view the Rodríguez privatization pivot as a betrayal of the “revolution” and launch an urban guerrilla campaign against the new administration and foreign oil workers.13
  3. Debt Restructuring Stalemate: China’s role as a “spoiler” in debt negotiations could prevent the IMF from re-engaging with Venezuela, leaving the country dependent on volatile oil spot prices and emergency U.S. infusions to avoid total economic collapse.33
  4. The Essequibo Variable: While currently dormant, the territorial claim against Guyana remains a potent nationalist tool. Any attempt by Rodríguez to reactivate this dispute to distract from internal unpopularity would likely trigger a direct U.S. military response.52

The week ending January 31 concludes with the arrival of Ambassador Dogu, signaling that the “kinetic” phase of the Venezuelan crisis has ended, and a “diplomatic-economic” phase of deep American oversight has begun. The success of this transition depends entirely on the ability of the Rodríguez siblings to balance the demands of the Trump administration with the residual expectations of the Chavista military high command.

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