The origins of Spain’s elite special operations forces are deeply rooted in the nation’s unique military history and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War. While Spain possesses a long and storied tradition of irregular warfare, dating back to the guerrilleros of the Peninsular War against Napoleon, the modern incarnation of its special forces was conceived in the mid-20th century. The formal proposal to create dedicated special operations units emerged in 1956, a decision influenced by the global proliferation of guerrilla conflicts and the examples set by established Western special forces, notably the United States Army’s Green Berets and the British Special Air Service (SAS).¹

This initiative took concrete form in 1957 with the establishment of the first experimental “Aptitud para el Mando de Unidades Guerrilleras” (Aptitude for Command of Guerrilla Units) course at the prestigious Escuela Militar de Montaña (Military Mountain School – EMM) in Jaca.¹ This venue was not incidental; it forged an inextricable link between high-altitude mountain warfare and special operations that would define the character of Spain’s elite soldiers for decades.

The First “Boinas Verdes”: From UOE to COE

By the end of 1961, the EMM had graduated a sufficient cadre of specialized officers and non-commissioned officers to form the first operational units. On an experimental basis, the Ministry of Defense ordered the creation of two Unidades de Operaciones Especiales (Special Operations Units – UOEs): UOE No. 71, based in Oviedo, and UOE No. 81, in Orense. These units were mandated to be fully organized by March 1, 1962.¹ From their inception, these units were composed exclusively of volunteers who had to pass a stringent selection process. Their initial armament was the standard infantry issue of the day: the robust 7.62x51mm CETME assault rifle, a service pistol, and a combat knife.¹ In December 1962, UOE No. 71 formally adopted the green beret (boina verde), which would become the iconic symbol of Spanish special forces.³

The success of these two experimental UOEs prompted a significant expansion. Between 1966 and 1969, the Spanish Army established a nationwide network of Compañías de Operaciones Especiales (Special Operations Companies – COEs). These company-sized formations were attached to the various Regiments of the Brigadas de Defensa Operativa del Territorio (Territorial Operational Defense Brigades – BRIDOT), a structure that firmly embedded their primary mission within a doctrine of national territorial defense against a potential Warsaw Pact invasion.³ At their peak in 1981, there were 25 distinct COEs spread across Spain’s military regions, each with a unique numerical designation and often a historical sobriquet honoring a famous Spanish guerrilla leader.³

Doctrine, Training, and the “Guerrillero Spirit”

The foundational doctrine of the COEs was guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. Their personnel were universally known as guerrilleros, a title they embraced with pride.⁴ The training regimen was exceptionally arduous and designed to produce soldiers of unparalleled physical and mental resilience. The curriculum was remarkably comprehensive for its era, encompassing a wide array of skills essential for operating behind enemy lines in small, autonomous teams. Subjects included advanced topography and land navigation, demolitions and explosives, instinctive and combat shooting, survival and evasion techniques, rock climbing and rappelling, specialized winter and mountain warfare including skiing, and extensive waterborne operations such as river crossings and coastal reconnaissance.⁴

The culmination of this grueling training was the infamous prueba de la boina (beret test). This was a continuous, multi-day field exercise that pushed candidates to their absolute limits through sleep deprivation, constant physical exertion, and a series of high-stress tests, including live-fire exercises simulating movement under enemy fire and resistance to interrogation.⁴ Only those who successfully completed this ordeal earned the right to wear the green beret. This process cultivated a unique ethos—the “guerrillero spirit”—a mindset characterized by extreme self-sufficiency, unwavering determination, and the conviction that no obstacle was insurmountable.⁴

A crucial distinction must be made, however, between the development of the mainland COEs and the special operations units of the Spanish Legion. While the COEs were training for a hypothetical, future conflict, the Legion’s Secciones de Operaciones Especiales (SOEs) were being forged in the crucible of active combat. During the 1970s, these Legion SOEs were formed to conduct counter-insurgency operations in the Spanish Sahara, specifically heliborne patrols and ambushes to control the movements of the Polisario Front and Moroccan irregulars.¹ The historical record is clear that these Legion units were the only Spanish special operations forces of the era to engage in sustained combat operations and suffer casualties in action.¹ This created two distinct but convergent streams of experience within Spanish SOF: the COEs, whose culture was defined by surviving one of the toughest training regimes in the world, and the Legion SOEs, whose culture was hardened by the realities of a protracted, low-intensity war. This injection of combat-proven experience would later prove invaluable to the unified command.

The armament of these early units reflected their mission. The primary individual weapon was the Spanish-designed CETME assault rifle, initially the Model B, which was replaced by the improved Model C in 1971.¹ The standard sidearm evolved from the Astra 400 to the Star Model B pistol.⁵ For close-quarters work, the reliable Star Z-70/B submachine gun was available.¹¹ Support weapons included the formidable MG-42/58 (a post-war variant of the German MG 42 chambered in 7.62x51mm NATO) and the Spanish-made Instalaza C90 disposable rocket launcher.¹

II. Transformation and Professionalization: The GOE Era and NATO Integration (1979-1997)

The late 1970s and 1980s marked a period of profound transformation for Spain and its armed forces. The transition to democracy and the strategic decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1982 acted as a powerful catalyst for military modernization. This geopolitical shift rendered the foundational doctrine of the COEs—territorial defense against a conventional invasion—effectively obsolete.³ The new strategic imperative was interoperability and the ability to deploy professional, expeditionary forces capable of operating seamlessly alongside NATO allies.

This new reality was the primary forcing function behind a complete reorganization of Spanish special operations forces. The alliance’s operational standards and doctrinal frameworks demanded a move away from a singular focus on guerrilla warfare toward a more versatile and internationally recognized mission set. This necessitated a top-down revolution in the structure, training, and purpose of Spain’s boinas verdes.³

From Companies to Groups (COE to GOE)

The organizational solution to this new doctrinal requirement was the consolidation of the disparate, company-sized COEs into larger, more capable, battalion-sized formations known as Grupos de Operaciones Especiales (Special Operations Groups – GOEs). This process began in May 1979 with the establishment of the first such unit, GOE I “Órdenes Militares,” in Colmenar Viejo, which integrated the former COE 11 and COE 12.¹

Over the next decade, this consolidation continued systematically. Throughout the mid-1980s, new GOEs were formed by merging existing COEs, while others were disbanded:

• 1984: GOE III “Valencia” was formed from COE 31 and 32.¹
• 1985: GOE II “Santa Fé” was formed in Granada, and the Legion’s special operations unit in Ronda was formally established as the Bandera de Operaciones Especiales de la Legión (BOEL) XIX, absorbing personnel and material from the dissolved COEs 21, 22, 91, and 92.¹
• 1986: GOE V “San Marcial” was created in Burgos from COE 61 and 62.¹
• 1987: GOE IV “Almogávares” was formed in Barcelona from COE 41 and 42.¹
• 1988: GOE VI “La Victoria” was established in La Coruña, incorporating the remaining COEs 71, 72, 81, and 82.¹

This structural evolution from company to group provided significant advantages. It centralized command under higher-ranking officers (lieutenant colonels), streamlined logistical support, and greatly enhanced the capacity for independent operational planning and execution.¹ The GOEs were structured into specialized operational teams, mirroring the organization of their NATO counterparts and facilitating easier integration into multinational command structures.⁶

The most fundamental change was doctrinal. The singular focus on guerrilla and counter-guerrilla tactics gave way to the standardized NATO SOF mission triad:

• Direct Action (DA): Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions.
• Special Reconnaissance (SR): Acquiring information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an enemy.
• Military Assistance (MA): Training, advising, and otherwise assisting foreign military and paramilitary forces.

This doctrinal shift marked the birth of modern Spanish special operations forces, representing a deliberate and necessary break from the legacy of the territorial guerrilleros to create a professional, expeditionary force aligned with its new alliance commitments.⁶

Evolving Arsenal

This period of professionalization was also reflected in the force’s weaponry. While the Spanish-made CETME rifle remained in service, it underwent its own evolution with the adoption of the 5.56x45mm NATO caliber CETME Model L in the 1980s, replacing the older 7.62x51mm versions.¹⁵ More significantly, the GOEs began to acquire specialized weapon systems that were becoming the global standard for elite units. The most prominent of these was the Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine gun, particularly its suppressed variants, which offered unparalleled performance in close-quarters and counter-terrorism roles.¹ The focus on NATO interoperability drove the adoption of standardized calibers and equipment interfaces, laying the groundwork for the highly advanced and modular arsenal that would be fielded in the 21st century.

III. A Unified Command: The Modern MOE (1997-Present)

The creation of the GOEs was a critical step in professionalizing Spain’s special operations capabilities, but a final piece of the command structure was needed to fully integrate these assets into the joint operational planning of the Spanish Armed Forces. To achieve this, the Mando de Operaciones Especiales (Special Operations Command – MOE) was officially created in October 1997 and became fully operational in July 1998.¹

Establishment and Structure

The establishment of the MOE consolidated the remaining GOEs and the Legion’s elite BOEL under a single, unified command led by a Brigadier General. After an initial period headquartered in Jaca, the command was permanently established at the Alférez Rojas Navarrete barracks in Alicante.¹ A further reorganization in 1996 had streamlined the force, dissolving GOEs I, II, V, and VI, leaving a core of highly professional units to form the new command.⁶

The modern structure of the MOE is lean and mission-focused, comprising:

• Headquarters Group: Responsible for command, control, planning, and intelligence.
• Grupo de Operaciones Especiales “Valencia” III (GOE III).
• Grupo de Operaciones Especiales “Tercio del Ampurdán” IV (GOE IV).
• Bandera de Operaciones Especiales “C. L. Maderal Oleaga” XIX (GOE XIX): The heir to the Legion’s combat-proven BOEL.
• Logistics Unit: Provides dedicated logistical and maintenance support to the operational groups.³

The Modern Mission Set

The MOE fully embodies the modern, multi-faceted role of a top-tier NATO special operations force. While retaining the toughness and self-reliance of its guerrillero predecessors, its missions have evolved to meet the complex demands of contemporary conflict.²⁰ The core tasks remain Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Military Assistance, executed with surgical precision by small, highly trained operational teams.³

The MOE’s Direct Action capability was demonstrated most publicly in July 2002 during Operation Romeo-Sierra. In response to the occupation of the disputed Perejil Island by Moroccan forces, 23 operators from GOE III were inserted by helicopter, swiftly securing the island without a single shot fired and restoring Spanish sovereignty.³ This operation showcased the command’s ability to execute a high-stakes, politically sensitive mission with speed and precision.

Operational History in the Asymmetric Era

Since its formation, the MOE has been one of Spain’s most consistently deployed military assets, participating in nearly every major international mission undertaken by the Spanish Armed Forces. Operators have served in peacekeeping, stabilization, and counter-terrorism operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and across the Sahel region of Africa.¹

This extensive operational experience, particularly in the post-2003 asymmetric battlefields of Iraq and the Sahel, has shaped the command’s modern identity. While proficient in Direct Action, the MOE has cultivated a deep expertise in the “indirect approach” of Military Assistance. This “by, with, and through” methodology, where indigenous forces are trained and enabled to secure their own territory, has become a hallmark of modern Western SOF strategy.

In Iraq, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the MOE’s primary mission has been the training, advising, and assisting of the elite Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS).²³ Deployed to locations like Baghdad and Erbil, Spanish operators embed with CTS units, providing expert instruction and acting as a critical command-and-control link to the wider coalition. During CTS-led operations against Daesh remnants, the MOE’s Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) coordinates vital coalition support, including airpower, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) capabilities.²³ The depth of this partnership is exemplified by the fact that Iraqi K9 handlers have been trained to give their dogs commands in Spanish.²³

Similarly, in the vast and unstable Sahel region, MOE teams have been instrumental in European Union and multinational training missions in countries like Mali, Mauritania, and the Central African Republic.¹ In these austere environments, they work to build the capacity of local militaries to combat the spread of violent extremist organizations.²⁵

This evolution reveals the MOE’s maturation into a sophisticated and strategically vital force. Its value to Spain and its allies is now defined as much by its ability to teach, advise, and build partner capacity as by its ability to conduct unilateral raids. This shift has profound implications for operator selection, training, and equipment, demanding skills in languages, cultural intelligence, and instruction alongside the traditional martial virtues of the commando.

IV. The Operator’s Toolkit: Contemporary Small Arms and Equipment of the MOE

The small arms inventory of the Mando de Operaciones Especiales reflects a procurement philosophy that is both pragmatic and aligned with the highest standards of modern special operations forces. The arsenal is characterized by its emphasis on proven reliability, logistical commonality with the broader Spanish Army where feasible, and complete interoperability with key NATO partners. This approach prioritizes performance and operator mastery over the adoption of unproven or niche systems. The result is a comprehensive toolkit of high-quality weapons sourced from premier European and American manufacturers, allowing MOE teams to configure their loadouts precisely for any given mission.

Sidearms

• Heckler & Koch USP-SD: The standard-issue sidearm for the MOE is the Heckler & Koch Universelle Selbstladepistole (Universal Self-loading Pistol) in its “SD” configuration, chambered in 9x19mm Parabellum.¹ This robust, polymer-framed pistol operates on a short-recoil, locked-breech principle and features a traditional double-action/single-action (DA/SA) trigger mechanism.²⁸ The “SD” designation indicates that the barrel is extended and threaded, allowing for the direct attachment of a sound suppressor, a critical capability for clandestine operations.¹ Renowned for its durability and reliability in harsh environments, the USP has served the command well for many years.

Submachine Guns & Personal Defense Weapons

• Heckler & Koch MP5SD: For missions requiring maximum acoustic signature reduction, the MOE retains the legendary Heckler & Koch MP5SD.²⁷ This variant of the MP5 family features an integral suppressor that is highly effective even with standard velocity 9x19mm ammunition. Its roller-delayed blowback action makes it an exceptionally smooth-shooting and accurate platform, ideal for stealthy close-quarters engagements, sentry elimination, and operations where discretion is paramount.¹
• Heckler & Koch MP7A1: A more recent addition to the inventory is the HK MP7A1 Personal Defense Weapon (PDW).¹ Chambered for the high-velocity, armor-piercing 4.6x30mm cartridge, the MP7 bridges the gap between a traditional submachine gun and a carbine. Its compact, lightweight design and ability to defeat modern body armor make it an excellent choice for personal security details, vehicle crews, and close-quarters battle (CQB) scenarios where the over-penetration of a rifle round could be a liability.²⁹

Assault Rifles & Carbines

• Heckler & Koch G36 (K/C Variants): The primary individual weapon for most MOE operators is a variant of the Heckler & Koch G36, the standard-issue rifle of the Spanish Army.¹ The MOE favors the shorter, more maneuverable G36K (Kurz/Short) and G36C (Compact) versions.¹ These rifles are heavily customized to meet special operations requirements, featuring extensive MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny or similar rail systems (such as the HKey Slim Line handguard) to accommodate a full suite of mission-essential accessories, including advanced optics, laser aiming modules, and tactical lights.¹ This commonality with the main army provides a significant logistical advantage, simplifying the supply of spare parts and ammunition during deployments.
• Heckler & Koch HK416: The MOE also employs the HK416 assault rifle.¹ This platform, which has become a benchmark for elite Western SOF, utilizes a short-stroke gas piston operating system. This system prevents hot propellant gases from entering the receiver, resulting in a cleaner, cooler-running weapon with enhanced reliability, particularly during suppressed fire or in austere environments like deserts or maritime settings. Its adoption ensures seamless interoperability with the most advanced NATO special operations units.

Battle Rifles & Designated Marksman Rifles (DMR)

• Heckler & Koch G28: To provide operational teams with precision fire capability beyond the effective range of 5.56mm carbines, the MOE fields the Heckler & Koch G28.¹ Based on the HK417 battle rifle, the G28 is a highly accurate semi-automatic platform chambered in the powerful 7.62x51mm NATO cartridge. It functions as a Designated Marksman Rifle (DMR), enabling a skilled shooter to rapidly engage targets out to 800 meters.³¹ The G28 is frequently equipped with high-magnification variable-power optics, such as the Schmidt & Bender 3-20×50 PMII, and has been documented in use as an aerial platform weapon, fired from the side doors of Spanish Army NH90 helicopters to provide precision overwatch.³¹

Sniper & Anti-Materiel Rifles

• Accuracy International AXMC: For long-range anti-personnel engagements, the MOE’s primary precision weapon is the Accuracy International AXMC (AX Multi Caliber) bolt-action sniper rifle, chambered in.338 Lapua Magnum.¹ This cartridge offers exceptional ballistic performance, allowing operators to accurately engage targets well beyond 1,500 meters.³² The AXMC is built on AI’s legendary chassis system, renowned for its accuracy, ruggedness, and modularity. It is typically paired with a world-class optic, such as the Schmidt & Bender 5-25×56 PMII, to maximize its extreme-range potential.¹
• Barrett M95 / M107A1: When the mission requires the engagement of hard targets, the MOE turns to the Barrett anti-materiel rifle, chambered in the formidable 12.7x99mm NATO (.50 BMG) cartridge.²⁷ Both the bolt-action M95 and the semi-automatic M107A1 are in service.³³ The role of this weapon is not anti-personnel, but rather the destruction of high-value enemy equipment, including light-skinned vehicles, communications arrays, radar installations, and ordnance, at ranges approaching 2,000 meters.³³

Machine Guns

• FN Minimi: For squad-level suppressive fire, the MOE utilizes the Belgian-designed FN Minimi light machine gun, chambered in 5.56x45mm NATO.³⁵ This belt-fed weapon provides a high volume of fire in a relatively lightweight and portable package, allowing a small team to effectively suppress enemy positions.
• Heckler & Koch MG5: The command is in the process of replacing its aging inventory of MG3 machine guns with the modern Heckler & Koch MG5.¹ The MG5 is a general-purpose machine gun chambered in 7.62x51mm NATO. It offers significant advantages over its predecessor, including a more controllable, user-selectable rate of fire (640-800 rounds per minute), superior ergonomics, and an integrated Picatinny rail on the receiver cover for the mounting of modern optics, which greatly enhances its accuracy.³⁶
• Browning M2HB: For heavy, vehicle-mounted fire support, the MOE relies on the timeless Browning M2HB heavy machine gun. Chambered in.50 BMG, the M2 provides devastating firepower against both personnel and light materiel targets.¹

Summary of Contemporary MOE Small Arms

Weapon System	Type	Origin	Caliber	Weight (Unloaded)	Length (Overall)	Feed System	Primary Role / Remarks
Heckler & Koch USP-SD	Semi-Automatic Pistol	Germany	9x19mm	0.72 kg 27	194 mm 27	15-round magazine 27	Standard issue sidearm; threaded barrel for suppressors.
Heckler & Koch MP5SD	Submachine Gun	Germany	9x19mm	3.4 kg 27	610 mm 27	30-round magazine 27	Integrally suppressed for clandestine CQB operations.
Heckler & Koch MP7A1	Personal Defense Weapon	Germany	4.6x30mm	< 2.0 kg 29	415 mm (stock collapsed)	20/30/40-round magazine 29	Armor-piercing capability in a compact platform.
Heckler & Koch G36K	Assault Carbine	Germany	5.56x45mm	3.40 kg 27	860 mm (stock extended) 30	30-round magazine 27	Primary individual weapon; shortened barrel for mobility.
Heckler & Koch HK416	Assault Rifle	Germany	5.56x45mm	~3.12 kg	~881 mm (14.5″ barrel)	30-round STANAG magazine	Piston-operated system for enhanced reliability; NATO SOF standard.
Heckler & Koch G28	Designated Marksman Rifle	Germany	7.62x51mm	~5.8 kg	965 mm 31	10/20-round magazine	Precision semi-automatic fire to 800 meters.
FN Minimi	Light Machine Gun	Belgium	5.56x45mm	~7.1 kg 35	1,040 mm 35	Belt-fed / STANAG magazine	Squad-level suppressive fire.
Heckler & Koch MG5	General-Purpose Machine Gun	Germany	7.62x51mm	~11.2 kg 36	1,160 mm 37	Belt-fed (M13 links)	Replacing the MG3; controllable rate of fire and optics-ready.
Accuracy Int’l AXMC	Sniper Rifle	United Kingdom	.338 Lapua Magnum	~6.8 kg	~1,250 mm	10-round magazine 1	Primary long-range anti-personnel system (>1500m).
Barrett M95 / M107A1	Anti-Materiel Rifle	USA	12.7x99mm (.50 BMG)	10.7 kg (M95) 34	1,143 mm (M95) 34	5/10-round magazine	Engagement of hard targets (vehicles, equipment) to 2000m.
Browning M2HB	Heavy Machine Gun	USA	12.7x99mm (.50 BMG)	~38 kg	~1,654 mm	Belt-fed (M2/M9 links)	Vehicle-mounted heavy fire support.

V. The Future Commando: MOE 2035 and Beyond

As the character of global conflict continues to evolve, the Spanish Mando de Operaciones Especiales is proactively shaping its future force structure, capabilities, and technology to maintain its edge. The command’s strategic vision is encapsulated in the “MOE-35” initiative, a comprehensive plan designed to ensure the unit is fully adapted to the multi-domain, technologically saturated battlefields of the coming decades.³⁹

The “MOE-35” Initiative

Launched in 2020, MOE-35 is more than a simple modernization program; it is a fundamental rethinking of what a special operator is and what the command provides to the Spanish state. The plan calls for a significant expansion of the force, increasing its ranks from approximately 900 to 1,300 personnel by 2035.³ However, the core of the initiative is not merely quantitative growth but a qualitative evolution of its “human capital”.³⁹

Recognizing that future conflicts will be won not just by kinetic force but also by influence and information, MOE-35 places a heavy emphasis on recruiting and developing operators with specialized non-kinetic skills. This includes creating teams of experts in communications, negotiation, and regional studies, possessing deep knowledge of the cultures, customs, and languages of potential operational areas.³⁹ This focus is a direct lesson learned from the command’s extensive experience in Military Assistance missions in Iraq and the Sahel, where understanding the human terrain is as critical as mastering the physical terrain.

The Networked Operator and Future Technology

The future MOE operator will function as a fully integrated node within a networked battlespace. A key enabler of this vision is the Spanish Army’s “Future Soldier System” (SISCAP) program. This initiative aims to equip individual operators with a suite of advanced technologies, including a helmet-mounted vision system with augmented reality overlays. This will allow the operator to see real-time tactical data, the positions of friendly forces, and identified threats without looking down at a separate device.⁴¹

Furthermore, the system will integrate personal and weapon-mounted cameras (both visible and thermal), allowing an operator to share their perspective with the team and command elements. This also enables non-line-of-sight engagement, where an operator can point their weapon around a corner and use their helmet display to aim, minimizing their exposure to enemy fire.⁴¹ This constant flow of data transforms the operator from a simple combatant into a mobile sensor platform, contributing to a common operational picture shared across the force.

The integration of unmanned systems will also deepen. The command will expand its use of small, tactical Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) for organic, team-level intelligence and reconnaissance, as well as enhancing its cinology (military working dog) capabilities.²¹ Crucially, the MOE is developing its capacity to operate in the non-physical domains of conflict, integrating cyber and electronic warfare techniques to protect its own communications and disrupt those of its adversaries.¹⁸

Speculative Armament Evolution

While the MOE’s current arsenal is formidable, it will continue to evolve in line with technological advancements and emerging threats.

• Sidearms: The venerable HK USP-SD, while reliable, lacks the features of more modern pistols. A future transition to a striker-fired, polymer-framed pistol with a modular optics system is highly probable. Platforms like the Glock 17 Gen5 MOS, which are becoming a de facto standard among many Western SOF units, offer superior ergonomics, trigger characteristics, and the ability to easily mount miniature red dot sights for faster target acquisition.⁴²
• Carbines: The 5.56x45mm cartridge, while effective, has known limitations in barrier penetration and performance against modern body armor. The MOE, along with other NATO SOF, will be closely observing the long-term results of the U.S. Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program and its adoption of the 6.8mm cartridge.⁴⁵ While a complete caliber change represents a massive logistical challenge, a future adoption of a more powerful intermediate caliber for special operations use is a distinct possibility to ensure overmatch against peer adversaries.
• Precision Weapons: The evolution in this domain will be driven by advancements in sensor and data processing technology. The integration of “smart scopes” with onboard ballistic computers, laser rangefinders, and atmospheric sensors will become standard, dramatically increasing the first-round hit probability at extreme ranges and reducing the cognitive load on the sniper.

Ultimately, the MOE-35 initiative and its associated technological programs point toward a future where the special operator is a hybrid warrior. This individual will be a master of the kinetic fight but also a sensor, a communicator, and a non-kinetic effector. They will be capable of processing vast amounts of data from the network, controlling multiple unmanned assets, and applying a precise effect—be it a rifle shot, an electronic warfare pulse, or a targeted influence message—to achieve strategic objectives. This vision ensures that the legacy of the adaptable and resilient guerrillero will continue to evolve, keeping the Mando de Operaciones Especiales at the cutting edge of modern warfare.

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