Iran’s dual-military structure, comprising the conventional Artesh (the regular army) and the ideological Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is not an accident of history or a sign of dysfunction. It is a deliberate, core feature of the Islamic Republic’s political architecture, designed to prioritize regime survival above all else. This system is a sophisticated “coup-proofing” strategy ¹ that, by design, values ideological purity and asymmetric deterrence over conventional military efficiency.

This structure has created two fundamentally different organizations with asymmetric missions, power, and resources. The IRGC, the regime’s “praetorian guard” ², has evolved into the state’s political, economic, and military center of gravity, with a constitutional mandate to protect the Revolution.³ In contrast, the Artesh is a “marginalized” ⁵ conventional force, constitutionally tasked with the traditional defense of Iran’s national sovereignty and borders.⁶

This report analyzes the architecture, function, and long-term viability of this split. It finds that while the dual structure is operationally inefficient and fosters resource-wasting competition ¹, it is highly effective at its primary goals: insulating the Supreme Leader from internal military threats and providing a flexible, deniable, and potent asymmetric capability to project power abroad. The system is therefore highly sustainable. Analysis indicates the IRGC’s deep-state power ensures it will emerge as the undisputed “kingmaker” and primary guarantor of state continuity in any post-Khamenei succession scenario.⁹

Part 1: Architecture of a Divided Force: Origins and Command

To understand Iran’s military capabilities, one must first understand that its security apparatus was designed from its inception to serve two masters: the ideological Revolution and the territorial State. This duality is the central pillar of its defense doctrine.

1.1 Ideological Origins of the Split (1979 Revolution)

The dual-military system was born from the foundational mistrust of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.¹⁰ The revolutionary leadership, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was deeply suspicious of the existing “Imperial Army,” which it viewed as a pillar of the toppled Shah’s regime and potentially loyal to the exiled monarch.¹⁰ Despite the Artesh’s February 11, 1979, declaration of neutrality, the new regime saw it as a potential counter-revolutionary threat.¹⁰

Consequently, the regime initiated brutal purges, executing and exiling senior military officials and experienced personnel.⁴ This “ravaged” the Artesh ⁵, draining its manpower by an estimated 40-60 percent and leaving it “ill equipped”.⁴ Simultaneously, Khomeini, fearing a future coup, created a parallel force.³ In May 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formally established, consolidating several Islamist militias loyal to the revolution.³

The IRGC’s purpose was explicitly political and ideological: to serve as a “counterweight” to the regular military ¹¹, to thwart potential coups by the Artesh ³, and to act as an ideologically pure “praetorian guard” ² loyal not to the nation, but to the revolution’s clerical leadership and the doctrine of Velayat-e-faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist).³ This foundational act baked institutional rivalry, resource competition, and doctrinal differences into the DNA of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus.¹⁰ This rivalry was not a flaw; it was the central feature.

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War was not the cause of the split, but its crucible.¹³ The Iraqi invasion in 1980 exposed the weakness of the purged Artesh, which was unable to repel the invasion on its own.⁴ This military necessity forced the rapid professionalization of the IRGC.⁷ The war gave the IRGC a platform to prove its ideological zeal and military value, creating a powerful “sacred defense” narrative that the Artesh, as the Shah’s remnant, could never claim.¹⁴ This conflict cemented the IRGC’s status and entrenched its doctrinal focus on asymmetric warfare, proxy warfare, and ballistic missiles as tools of survival and deterrence.¹⁵

1.2 Constitutional Division of Labor: A Mandate for Asymmetry

The 1979 Constitution formally codifies the dual structure, creating a deliberate and profound asymmetry in mission.

• Article 143 (Artesh): The Artesh, as the national armed forces, is tasked first and foremost with “defending Iran’s independence and sovereignty” and its territorial integrity.⁶ This is a classical, national defense mission focused on external borders.¹⁰
• Article 150 (IRGC): The IRGC is tasked with the “guarding of the Revolution and its achievements”.³

This seemingly subtle distinction is, in practice, a vast chasm in mandate. The Artesh’s mission is finite, clear, and conventional (defend the borders). The IRGC’s mission is ambiguous, ideological, and borderless. This “seemingly more rewarding job” ⁶ is interpreted as an all-encompassing legal mandate for the IRGC to intervene in any sphere to “guard the revolution.” This includes preventing foreign interference ³, thwarting internal coups ³, crushing “deviant movements” ³ and domestic dissent ⁴, and exporting the revolution’s ideology.⁴ This constitutional ambiguity in Article 150 legally justifies the IRGC’s pervasive intervention in domestic politics, foreign policy, the economy, and internal security ², far exceeding the mandate of a traditional military.

1.3 The Supreme Leader’s Command and Control (C2) Architecture

The command and control (C2) structure is the primary mechanism for the regime’s political control and coup-proofing.

1. Supreme Leader as Commander-in-Chief: The Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces.⁷ He has the sole authority to declare war and peace and makes all final security policy decisions.⁷
2. Sidelining the Elected Government: The elected government is deliberately excluded from the military chain of command. The President of Iran has “relatively few powers,” does not control any armed forces, and is not in the C2 chain.⁷ The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) is purely an administrative body for R&D, production, and procurement, not a policy or command institution.⁷
3. Parallel Chains of Command: Both the Artesh and the IRGC report directly and separately to the Supreme Leader.⁷ This C2 architecture is designed for political loyalty, not operational efficiency. By having all military chains terminate only with him, the Supreme Leader ensures their primary loyalty is personal (to the Vali-ye Faqih) and not institutional.
4. Coordinating Bodies: The Supreme Leader uses two primary bodies to coordinate—but explicitly not unify—the parallel forces:

• Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS): The senior-most military body, setting policy and strategic guidance. Its chief (currently an IRGC officer) is tasked with overseeing and coordinating both forces.⁷
• Khatemolanbia Central Headquarters (KCHQ): The top operational headquarters, responsible for operational C2 and coordinating joint military operations.⁷

5. Bypassing the Structure: This formal structure is often subverted. The Supreme Leader frequently bypasses the AFGS and KCHQ to issue orders directly to lower-level commanders.⁷ Furthermore, high-priority branches, most notably the IRGC-Quds Force, have their own privileged, direct line of communication to the Supreme Leader.⁷

This C2 architecture is the central nervous system of the coup-proofing strategy.¹ A successful coup would require the coordination of both the Artesh and the IRGC. The system is designed to make this impossible. With separate C2 chains ¹, separate logistics networks ¹, separate intelligence services ⁷, and pervasive counterintelligence bodies ¹⁷ loyal only to the Supreme Leader’s office, the two militaries are institutionally incapable of coordinating against him.

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Table 1: The Artesh vs. IRGC: Foundational Comparison

Metric	Artesh (Conventional Military)	IRGC (Revolutionary Guard)
Constitutional Mandate	Article 143: Defend national sovereignty & territorial integrity.6	Article 150: “Guard the Revolution and its achievements”.3
Primary Mission	National Defense (external). Conventional border security.5	Regime Security (internal & external). Internal suppression, border control (volatile areas), exporting revolution.3
Ideological Role	“Apolitical,” national, professional.10 Loyal to the nation.	Deeply ideological (Khomeinism, Shia Islamism).3 “Praetorian Guard”.2 Loyal to the Supreme Leader.
Political Influence	“Marginalized”.5 “Forced to remain apolitical”.2 Wields “very little influence”.5	“Immense”.12 A “central player in Iran’s domestic politics”.12 Former commanders populate parliament & government.10
Budgetary Access	Significantly smaller official budget (e.g., 1/3 of IRGC in 2018).6 “Not as well-funded”.10	Larger official budget.7 Direct access to foreign exchange reserves.10
Economic Role	“Limited to several chain stores”.10 A “military-bonyad complex” entity but minor.19	A “business empire”.3 Controls vast economic sectors via Khatam al-Anbiya 10 and illicit smuggling.21 Generates massive off-budget revenue.22

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Part 2: Comparative Analysis: Doctrines and Capabilities

The divergent missions of the Artesh and IRGC manifest in a practical division of labor, equipment, and areas of responsibility. Both forces maintain complete, parallel ground, naval, and air components, but they are optimized for entirely different types of conflict.⁷

2.1 Naval Forces: Blue-Water Ambition vs. Asymmetric Swarm

The naval split is the clearest example of Iran’s hybrid doctrine. The two forces have overlapping functions but are “distinct” in training, equipment, and “how they fight”.³

• Artesh Navy (IRIN): The IRIN is Iran’s “strategic force” ⁷, with a traditional, conventional doctrine.⁷ It is tasked with projecting “blue-water” power into the Gulf of Oman, the Caspian Sea, and the high seas of the Indian Ocean.⁷ It operates Iran’s largest, most conventional (though “aging” ¹⁶) platforms: larger surface combatants like the Jamaran-class frigate ¹⁰, corvettes, and the core submarine fleet, including Russian-built Kilo-class submarines and domestically produced midget subs.⁷
• IRGC Navy (IRGCN): The IRGCN employs a “revolutionary” ²⁴ asymmetric doctrine.⁷ It is a “guerrilla force at sea” ³ whose primary Area of Responsibility (AOR) is the “Persian Gulf” ⁷ and the critical chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz ²⁵, which it is expected to control in a conflict.³ The IRGCN specializes in “hit-and-run” ³ and “swarming tactics” ²⁷, maintaining a massive inventory of “hundreds” ⁷ of small, fast attack craft armed with guns, rockets, torpedoes, and missiles.³ It also controls large arsenals of coastal defense anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and naval mines.³

This structure is a purpose-built, hybrid naval solution. The IRIN is for prestige and conventional state-on-state presence. The IRGCN is the actual war-fighting and deterrent force, designed to counter a technologically superior navy (i.e., the United States) in the “shallow and confined waterways” of the Strait of Hormuz.⁷ This doctrine was forged by failure; “a series of naval battles with the U.S. Navy in April 1988” during the Iran-Iraq War taught Iran that its “large naval vessels are vulnerable to air and missile attacks”.²⁸ That experience directly “confirmed the efficacy of small boat operations” and “spurred interest in missile-armed fast-attack craft,” forming the foundation of the IRGCN’s swarming doctrine today.²⁸

2.2 Air and Aerospace Forces: Conventional Atrophy vs. Strategic Strike

The split in the air domain highlights the regime’s strategic priorities: asymmetric strike over conventional air superiority.

• Artesh Air Force (IRIAF): This is a conventional air force tasked with defensive roles, such as supporting the national integrated air defense system and providing combat support to ground forces.¹⁶ However, it is widely considered Iran’s “most critical weakness” ²⁹ and a “key structural deficiency”.³⁰ The IRIAF is a “badly dated service” ¹⁶ operating a “shrinking and unrenewable air fleet” ³¹ of aging 1970s/80s-era American (F-14, F-4) and Soviet/Russian (MiG-29, Su-24) airframes.¹⁶ It is “vastly inferior” to its adversaries and suffers from high accident rates and crippling budgetary disadvantages.¹⁶
• IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF): Renamed from “Air Force” in 2009 ³², this move signaled its true mission: strategic deterrence.³² This force is the regime’s “crown jewel”.¹⁶ It does not compete with the IRIAF in conventional air-to-air combat. Instead, it controls all of Iran’s most important strategic strike assets:

1. Ballistic Missiles: The IRGC-ASF is the “primary body responsible” ³³ for Iran’s “formidable” ¹² and “large” ⁷ ballistic missile arsenal, the largest in the Middle East.¹⁶ This program, born from the “war of the cities” with Iraq, is the “centerpiece” of Iran’s deterrence doctrine.¹⁵
2. UAV (Drone) Program: The IRGC-ASF controls the lethal, “game-changer” ³⁵ drone arsenal.¹⁶ This program, originating in the 1980s ³⁵, has become a core strategic asset. Its R&D arm, the Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), has reverse-engineered captured technology (like the U.S. RQ-170) to create the Shahed family of UAVs.³⁶
3. Space Program: The IRGC-ASF also runs Iran’s military space force and satellite-launch (SLV) program.⁷

The regime has made a conscious strategic and budgetary choice. It has allowed the IRIAF to atrophy ³¹ because it is not cost-effective against U.S. or Israeli airpower. Instead, it has built an “asymmetric air force” composed of ballistic missiles and swarms of attack drones.³⁵ This force is cheaper, has a longer reach, is deniable when used by proxies, and provides the strategic deterrence ¹⁵ that the IRIAF’s aging fighters cannot. The IRGC-ASF’s total control of this portfolio makes it arguably the single most powerful military branch in Iran.

2.3 Ground Forces: Border Defense vs. Internal Security

The ground forces reveal the regime’s “geography of trust.”

• Artesh Ground Force (IRIGF): This is the numerically larger force, with 350,000 personnel to the IRGC-GF’s 150,000.⁷ Its primary mission is conventional territorial defense against a state-level invasion.⁵ It is “avowedly apolitical” ¹⁸ and controls the “preponderance of heavy ground armor” (tanks).¹⁸ It is largely “sidelined” ⁵ from the regime’s core security concerns.
• IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF): This force is focused on regime security.

1. Internal Security: Its primary role is acting as the regime’s “Praetorian Guard” ² to suppress domestic dissent.³
2. Volatile Border Control: The IRGC-GF has taken over primary security responsibility from the Artesh in the most “volatile border provinces,” such as Kurdistan, Sistan va Baluchestan, and West Azerbaijan, which face active insurgencies.⁵
3. Expeditionary Role: The IRGC-GF has deployed to foreign theaters like Syria and Iraq to support Quds Force operations.⁶
4. Basij Organization: The IRGC-GF also controls the Basij, a massive volunteer paramilitary militia with 90,000 active members and 300,000 reservists.³ The Basij is the primary tool for internal suppression, “policing morals,” and acting as a mass mobilization reserve.⁷

The deployment map reveals the regime’s priorities. The “unreliable” but conventional Artesh ¹⁰ is placed on the external borders to face external state enemies.³⁸ The “loyal” IRGC ⁵ is deployed internally in cities and in the most sensitive, ethnically volatile border provinces ⁵ to protect the regime from its own citizens and separatist threats. The Artesh defends Iran; the IRGC defends the Islamic Republic.

While Artesh special forces (the 65th Airborne Brigade) have been deployed to Syria ⁶, this is not a sign of integration. They were deployed as “individual advisor-observers” ⁶ and, critically, “under the auspices of IRGC’s Qods Force”.⁶ This appears to be a token deployment by the Artesh to “ensure its continued relevance” ⁶ and prove its loyalty, rather than a genuine shift in mission. Distrust between the services remains “relatively strong,” and the Artesh continues to be the “subordinate force”.¹⁵

2.4 Air Defense: The One Domain of Integration

Air defense is the single, critical exception to the rule of parallel, rivalrous forces. A divided air defense is operationally suicidal, as it would lead to fratricide and catastrophic failure against a coordinated air and missile strike.

In 2008, the Artesh Air Defense Force (IRIADF) was split from the Air Force (IRIAF) to become its own separate, fourth branch, controlling the country’s military radar network.⁴¹ In 2019, the Supreme Leader established the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters (KADHQ).⁷

This KADHQ is a national command that oversees and integrates all air defense assets (radars, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery) from both the Artesh Air Defense Force (IRIADF) and the IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF).¹⁶

Crucially, this KADHQ is “always commanded by a senior Artesh officer”.¹⁶ This is a significant, unspoken concession. The regime, prioritizing operational necessity over ideological purity in this single domain, places its trust in Artesh competence. The Artesh, as the legacy Imperial military, retained the institutional knowledge and “classical doctrine” ¹⁰ for running a complex, networked, conventional Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)—a core competency the asymmetrically-focused IRGC lacked.

2.5 Intelligence and Cyber Warfare: The New Asymmetric Domains

The dual-force concept extends into the non-kinetic domains. Iran has multiple, overlapping intelligence services, including the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), and the Artesh Directorate for Intelligence (J2).⁷ This “overlapping missions” structure “fuel[s] competition”.⁷ The IRGC-IO is described as the “foremost military intelligence service”.⁷

In cyber warfare, the IRGC is the dominant player.⁴³ The IRGC, the Basij (managing tens of thousands of “cyberwar volunteers” ⁴³), and the Passive Defense Organization (NPDO) are the three leading military organizations in cyber operations.⁴³ Iran’s cyber capabilities originated from domestic needs: surveillance and control of its own population during the 2009 “Green Revolution”.⁴³ These tools were then turned outward.

Iran sees cyberattacks as a key part of its asymmetric military capability.⁴³ It is low-cost, high-impact, and deniable.⁴⁵ The IRGC’s dominance here is a natural extension of its doctrine: just as it uses swarm boats and missiles to counter U.S. naval and air supremacy, it uses cyber to counter U.S. economic and military power. The intelligence rivalry, like the military rivalry, is a “coup-proofing” feature, not a bug. By having multiple agencies spying on each other ¹⁷ as much as on external foes, the regime prevents any one from becoming powerful enough to challenge the Supreme Leader.

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Table 2: Comparative Capability Analysis by Domain

Domain	Artesh (Conventional Force)	IRGC (Revolutionary Force)
Naval	Artesh Navy (IRIN)	IRGC Navy (IRGCN)
Mission:	Conventional coastal defense; “blue-water” power projection.7	Asymmetric “guerilla” warfare; sea denial; chokepoint control.3
AOR:	Gulf of Oman, Caspian Sea, Indian Ocean (High Seas).7	Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz.7
Key Assets:	Large surface ships (frigates, corvettes), Kilo-class submarines, midget subs.7	Hundreds of small, fast attack craft; swarming boats; naval mines; coastal anti-ship missiles.3
Air / Aerospace	Artesh Air Force (IRIAF)	IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)
Mission:	Defensive air-to-air, support for IADS, ground support.16	Strategic deterrence; strategic strike.32
Key Assets:	“Badly dated” 16 fleet of aging 1970s/80s US/Soviet fighter jets (F-14, F-4, MiG-29, Su-24).30	Total control of Iran’s: 1. Ballistic Missile Arsenal 12 2. Strategic UAV (Drone) Program 16 3. Military Space Program.32
Ground	Artesh Ground Force (IRIGF)	IRGC Ground Force (IRGCGF)
Mission:	Conventional territorial defense 6; “apolitical” national defense.18	Internal regime security; counter-insurgency; rapid reaction; suppression of dissent.4
AOR:	National borders.5	Internal provinces; volatile border regions (Sistan, Kurdistan) 5; foreign expeditionary.6
Key Assets:	Largest force by manpower (350k) 7; preponderance of heavy armor/tanks.18	150k troops 7; Basij Organization (paramilitary militia) 3; light infantry; domestic surveillance tools.
Air Defense	Artesh Air Defense (IRIADF)	IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF)
Mission:	Operates national radar network 41 and IADS components.16	Operates its own air defense assets (SAMs, radars).16
Command:	INTEGRATED: Both forces’ assets are integrated under the Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense HQ 16, which is commanded by an Artesh officer.16

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Part 3: The IRGC as a “State Within a State”

The massive disparity in power between the Artesh and the IRGC cannot be explained by their military roles alone. The IRGC’s power transcends the purely military domain, making it the true center of gravity of the regime. It has become a “state within a state,” with dominant, independent roles in foreign policy, the economy, and domestic politics.

3.1 The Quds Force (IRGC-QF): Architect of the “Axis of Resistance”

The IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is the “expeditionary arm” ¹² and “clandestine external operations element” ⁷ of the IRGC, established in 1990.⁷ Its primary mission is to “export the revolution” ¹⁶ by managing and supporting Iran’s network of foreign proxies and partners, known as the “Axis of Resistance”.⁷

The Quds Force provides leadership, funding, training, intelligence, and materiel ⁷ to a myriad of non-state groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria.¹²

The IRGC-QF is Iran’s primary and most effective foreign policy tool, representing its “comparative advantage” in statecraft.³⁹ It uses an irregular ³⁹ “network-building approach” ⁴⁹ to project power, achieve strategic depth ⁵⁰, and bog down adversaries ⁴⁴ on a budget. This is a mission the conventional, “apolitical” Artesh ¹⁸ is ideologically and structurally incapable of performing. The Quds Force holds a “special place” ¹⁶ in the regime, with a separate line of communication to the Supreme Leader ⁷ that bypasses the regular C2 structure and even gives it more influence in some countries than Iran’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷

3.2 The Economic Empire: Funding the Praetorians

The IRGC is not just a military, but a “business empire” ³ and “industrial empire with political clout”.³ Its economic power is vast, unaccountable, and controlled only by the Supreme Leader.¹³

• Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA): This is the IRGC’s massive engineering and construction arm ¹⁰, established after the Iran-Iraq War to help rebuild the country.²⁰ It has since grown into “the most notable financial institution of the IRGC”.²⁰ It dominates huge sectors of the economy—oil and gas, road construction, housing, water management, and agriculture ¹⁰—and has been awarded tens of billions in no-bid contracts.¹⁰
• Off-Budget Funding: The IRGC uses its political influence ²² to generate income ⁵⁴ to fund its own operations.⁵¹ It has direct access to Iran’s foreign exchange reserve (from which the Artesh is barred) ¹⁰ and engages in large-scale illicit activities, including smuggling ¹⁰ and using front companies to circumvent international sanctions.¹²

In contrast, the Artesh is barred from these lucrative revenue streams.¹⁰ Its economic activities are “limited to several chain stores”.¹⁰ This is the fundamental difference: the Artesh is a traditional military—a pure cost center that drains the national budget. The IRGC is a hybrid military-conglomerate that generates its own revenue.

This economic autonomy makes the IRGC financially independent and “sanction-proof.” When international sanctions ⁵⁵ cripple Iran’s official economy, the IRGC thrives by controlling the smuggling routes ²¹ and the black market. This perversely strengthens its relative power versus the Artesh ⁵⁵ and the civilian government. This economic dominance is the engine of its political and military superiority.

3.3 Political and Social Dominance: The “Deep State”

The IRGC is “a central player in Iran’s domestic politics”.¹² Supreme Leader Khamenei has appointed numerous former IRGC commanders to top political posts, and former guards in parliament advocate for hard-line policies.¹² All parliamentarians with a military background are veterans of the IRGC or Basij.¹⁰ In contrast, the Artesh is “avowedly apolitical” ¹⁸, “forced to remain apolitical” ², and has virtually no influence in the “regime’s political centers of power”.⁵

Socially, the IRGC (through the Basij) is the primary tool for suppressing domestic protests.³ It also controls its own media (Sepah News) ³ and a vast “ideological-political organization” (IPO) to ensure the indoctrination of its forces and the public.⁵⁷ The regime’s “Sacred Defense Cinema” glorifies the IRGC as the victor of the Iran-Iraq War, while largely ignoring the Artesh’s sacrifices, thus cementing its own prestige while diminishing its rival’s.¹⁰

The Artesh is merely “hardware”—tanks and ships for a limited function. The IRGC is both the “hardware” (missiles, boats) and the “software” (ideology, politics, media) of the regime. The Artesh is an employee of the state; the IRGC is a shareholder and “kingmaker”.³

Part 4: Net Assessment: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Sustainability

This dual-military structure, while appearing inefficient from a conventional military perspective, is a rational and highly effective system when viewed through the lens of the regime’s unique strategic goals.

4.1 Strengths of the Dual System (From the Regime’s Perspective)

1. Highly Effective “Coup-Proofing”: This is the system’s primary strength and purpose. By “counterbalancing” ¹ the Artesh with the IRGC, the regime creates parallel forces with separate C2 chains ¹, separate logistics ¹, and institutionalized rivalry.¹⁰ This is reinforced by “pervasive surveillance” from independent counterintelligence organizations.¹⁷ This structure makes a coordinated military coup against the Supreme Leader a practical impossibility.
2. Potent Asymmetric Deterrence: The system allows Iran to “employ a hybrid approach to warfare”.⁴⁵ The IRGC’s focus on asymmetric capabilities—ballistic missiles, drones, proxies, and naval swarms ⁷—provides a potent, cost-effective, and deniable deterrent ¹⁵ against conventionally superior foes.
3. Flexible, Deniable Power Projection: The IRGC-QF’s proxy network (“Axis of Resistance”) ¹⁶ allows Iran to “export its revolutionary ideology” ¹⁶ and wage “war by proxy” ¹⁵ across the Middle East ⁴⁴, giving it strategic depth far from its borders.

This system is perfectly tailored to the regime’s two grand strategic goals: 1) Survive internally, and 2) Deter and resist externally.¹⁶ A single, unified, conventional military might be better at fighting a conventional war, but it would be worse at both of the regime’s core tasks. It would be a coup risk ³ and would lack the ideological zeal and asymmetric doctrine to run a global proxy network.

4.2 Weaknesses of the Dual System (From a Military Effectiveness Perspective)

1. Gross Operational Inefficiency: The dual structure is explicitly listed by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency as a “Key Vulnerability”.⁷ The lack of coordination, separate C2, and rivalrous information-hoarding create massive conventional inefficiency and “informational compartmentalization”.¹
2. “Disastrous Results”: This inefficiency is not theoretical. During the Iran-Iraq War, the disjointed command led to “disastrous results” ¹, including accounts of IRGC and Artesh soldiers firing on each other.¹
3. Resource Competition & Wasteful Duplication: The system creates “fierce rivalry” ¹⁰ for funding, recruits, and materiel ¹⁰, leading to an “ineffective use of resources” ⁸ and wasteful duplication (e.g., two navies, two air arms).
4. Conventional Atrophy: The regime’s prioritization of the IRGC has “marginalized” ⁵ the Artesh. This has hollowed out Iran’s conventional capabilities, leaving it with a “deficit in advanced conventional weaponry” ²⁹ and an air force that is “ill-prepared for modern combat”.¹⁶
5. Systemic Corruption & Public Resentment: The IRGC’s unaccountable economic power ¹³ fosters massive corruption ⁵³, which hollows out the civilian economy and breeds deep “discontent” ⁶⁰ and resentment among the population ⁶¹, a long-term vulnerability.

The sum of these weaknesses is that Iran has a military structure that is not designed to win a conventional, state-on-state war against a peer or near-peer competitor. It is designed to survive, deter, and protract conflict through asymmetric means. The system sacrifices war-winning capability for regime-survival capability.

4.3 Assessment of Sustainability and Future Trajectory

The dual-military structure, despite its inefficiencies, is an “inherent feature” ¹⁵ of the regime and is highly sustainable. The rivalry is intentionally maintained by the leadership ¹⁰ precisely because it serves the regime’s primary goal: survival.⁴⁵

The central challenge to this system’s stability is the eventual succession of the Supreme Leader.⁴ Supreme Leader Khamenei is the “unifying force” ⁴ who has a “mutually beneficial relationship” ¹² with the IRGC. Any potential successor is seen as lacking Khamenei’s stature, popularity, and religious credentials.⁹

As a result, any new Supreme Leader “will have no choice but to rely on the IRGC”.⁹ In a post-Khamenei era, the new leader’s reliance on the IRGC will increase, while the IRGC’s dependence on the new leader will decrease.⁹

This dynamic will make the IRGC the “military-security guarantor” ⁹ and “kingmaker” ²¹ of the post-Khamenei regime. It will likely consolidate its power even further ⁹, transforming the state into a “military-theocratic order” ⁶³ with the IRGC as the undisputed “center of gravity”.⁶³ Khamenei, with his revolutionary authority, controls the IRGC; his successor, who will likely owe their position to the IRGC’s support, will be managed by it.

In this future, the Artesh’s marginalization ⁵ will only accelerate. The IRGC, as the “kingmaker,” will ensure its rival remains subordinate ¹⁵ and on the periphery.⁵ The dual system is sustainable, but not as a balance of rivals. It will sustain as an increasingly unequal partnership, with the IRGC effectively absorbing the state and the Artesh relegated to a hollow, ceremonial role as a “national” border guard. The system’s inefficiency is its sustainability, as it guarantees the survival of the ruling ideology, which is its one and only true purpose.

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Sources Used

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