Analytics and Reports, Military Analytics

An Analytical History of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group DEVGRU

This report provides a comprehensive, multi-decade analysis of the United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), from its inception as SEAL Team Six to its current status and speculative future. Forged in the aftermath of the catastrophic failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, the unit was born of necessity, designed as a dedicated maritime counter-terrorism (MCT) force to address a critical gap in U.S. special operations capabilities. Its initial incarnation, under the controversial but visionary leadership of its founding commander, Richard Marcinko, was characterized by an aggressive, unconventional culture that prioritized mission readiness and effectiveness above all else, establishing a formidable reputation but also creating friction within the institutional Navy.

The unit’s evolution is a study in adaptation. The post-Cold War era of the 1990s saw a diversification of its mission set, moving beyond pure counter-terrorism to include direct action and special reconnaissance in complex environments such as Panama, Somalia, and the Balkans. This period of “mission creep” was instrumental in forging the operational flexibility and institutional maturity that would prove essential in the coming decades.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a fundamental paradigm shift, transforming the unit from a reactive, contingency-based force into a proactive, globally deployed instrument of U.S. national security. As a core component of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), DEVGRU became a primary “hunter-killer” force in the Global War on Terror, industrializing the “Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze” (F3EA) cycle to dismantle terrorist networks. This relentless operational tempo drove a corresponding evolution in tactics, intelligence integration, and weaponry, culminating in the successful 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden.

Today, as the U.S. pivots towards an era of Great Power Competition, DEVGRU faces another inflection point. Its future will likely be defined by a shift away from counter-insurgency and towards missions tailored for near-peer adversaries, including clandestine reconnaissance in contested maritime environments, unconventional warfare, and enabling the conventional fleet in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) scenarios. This evolution will be inextricably linked to the integration of emerging technologies, such as unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and advanced C4ISTAR networks, fundamentally reshaping the role of the individual operator from a kinetic trigger-puller to a hyper-enabled manager of networked assets. This report documents this four-decade journey, analyzing the key drivers of change and providing a detailed technical assessment of the unit’s current and future capabilities.

Section I: Genesis – The Phoenix of Desert One (1980-1987)

1.1 The Catalyst: Failure and Reform

The creation of the unit known today as DEVGRU is a direct and undeniable consequence of the systemic failures that culminated in the disastrous Operation Eagle Claw on April 24, 1980.1 The mission, a complex multi-service effort to rescue 52 American hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, ended in catastrophic failure at a desert staging area known as Desert One. The operation was plagued by a series of cascading problems, including helicopter malfunctions due to unforeseen dust storms (haboobs), which reduced the available aircraft below the minimum required for the mission, forcing the on-scene commander to recommend an abort.2 During the subsequent withdrawal, a U.S. Air Force C-130 transport aircraft collided with a U.S. Marine Corps RH-53D helicopter, resulting in a massive explosion and the deaths of eight American servicemen.2

The failure at Desert One was a profound national humiliation and a watershed moment for the U.S. military. It exposed, in the starkest possible terms, critical deficiencies in the ability of the U.S. armed forces to conduct complex joint special operations.2 The subsequent investigation, led by Admiral James L. Holloway III and known as the Holloway Report, was blunt in its assessment. The commission identified a lack of unified command and control, fractured and incompatible communications systems between the different service branches, inadequate joint training, and a complete absence of a dedicated special operations aviation unit capable of performing the demanding, clandestine, low-level night flying required for such missions.2 The different service elements had not trained together, their equipment was not interoperable, and there was no single commander with overall authority for the mission’s execution.2 The mission’s failure was not one of individual courage, but of institutional structure and doctrine.2

This unforgiving truth spurred the most significant reorganization of U.S. special operations forces since World War II. The Pentagon, acting on the Holloway Report’s recommendations, initiated sweeping reforms to rectify the identified shortcomings. In 1980, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to provide a unified command structure for the nation’s most elite counter-terrorism units, ensuring interoperability and centralized planning and control for future missions.2 To address the critical aviation gap, the Army formed the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), the “Night Stalkers,” an elite unit of helicopter pilots and crews specifically trained and equipped for the unique demands of special operations.2 It was within this crucible of failure and reform that the U.S. Navy identified the need for its own dedicated counter-terrorism force, a unit that would become SEAL Team Six.

1.2 Marcinko’s Mandate: Forging SEAL Team Six

In the wake of Operation Eagle Claw, the U.S. Navy recognized the urgent need for a full-time, dedicated maritime counter-terrorism (MCT) unit capable of operating at the same elite level as the Army’s newly formed 1st SFOD-D (Delta Force).7 The task of designing, developing, and commanding this new unit was given to Commander Richard “Dick” Marcinko, a charismatic and highly decorated combat veteran of the Vietnam War.7 Marcinko was a logical choice; he had served as a Navy representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Terrorist Action Team (TAT), a task force convened during the Iran hostage crisis to develop rescue plans, giving him direct insight into the requirements of such a unit.7

The concept of a naval CT capability was not entirely new. Prior to the formal creation of Team Six, Marcinko, while commanding SEAL Team Two, had already begun developing a specialized cell known as “Mobility Six” or “MOB Six”.1 This two-platoon element was focused on developing advanced tactics, such as fast-roping, in anticipation of a maritime hostage scenario.1 When the Navy’s mandate came down, MOB Six was demobilized, but its personnel and the tactical groundwork they had laid formed the nucleus of the new unit.1

Marcinko was given an exceptionally aggressive six-month timeline to bring the unit to full operational readiness; failure to do so would result in the project’s cancellation.1 This compressed schedule forced him to bypass conventional military bureaucracy and adopt an unconventional approach to building his team. He was granted wide latitude to hand-pick the unit’s founding members, or “plankowners,” from across the entire Navy SEAL and Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) communities.7 He personally interviewed every candidate, selecting an initial cadre of approximately 75 operators.7 Marcinko’s selection criteria were telling; he prioritized combat experience from Vietnam and a demonstrated willingness to operate outside the confines of rigid regulations, often selecting “social misfits” and operators with questionable records who were loyal and effective over more conventional “golden boy” SEALs.12

The unit’s designation was itself a product of Marcinko’s unconventional thinking. At the time, there were only two active SEAL Teams in the Navy: SEAL Team One on the West Coast and SEAL Team Two on the East Coast. Marcinko named his new unit “SEAL Team Six” as a deliberate act of strategic deception, intended to confuse Soviet intelligence as to the true size and disposition of U.S. Naval Special Warfare forces.1 Formally commissioned in November 1980, SEAL Team Six, through an intense and accelerated training program, was declared mission-ready just six months later, meeting its commander’s demanding deadline.1

1.3 Culture and Armament of an “Unconventional” Unit

The culture of the original SEAL Team Six was a direct reflection of its founder. Marcinko intentionally cultivated an ethos that was insular, aggressive, and fiercely loyal, describing the unit as a “mafia” and a “band of brothers”.12 He believed that to create an effective counter-terrorism force, he needed operators who were not just physically capable but also mentally prepared to bend and break rules to achieve the mission objective. This “pirate” or “rogue” mentality was a stark departure from the spit-and-polish discipline of the conventional Navy.8 Operators often sported long hair and beards, looking more like outlaws than professional military personnel, a visual representation of their separation from the mainstream naval hierarchy.4 This culture, while fostering an incredible degree of unit cohesion and operational effectiveness, also contained the seeds of its own demise, as it operated largely outside the bounds of typical command oversight and accountability.12

To forge this elite unit, Marcinko was granted virtually unlimited resources, particularly in terms of ammunition and training opportunities.7 The unit’s training budget was immense, allowing for an unprecedented level of live-fire practice. According to Marcinko’s own accounts, the team expended more ammunition in a single month of training than the entire U.S. Marine Corps used in a year.15 This intensive regimen was designed to build unparalleled skill in Close Quarters Battle (CQB), the unit’s primary mission set.

The early armament of SEAL Team Six was tailored specifically for its counter-terrorism and hostage rescue role. The primary weapons were chosen for their reliability, accuracy, and suitability for engagements inside the confined spaces of ships, oil platforms, and buildings.

  • Heckler & Koch MP5: The 9mm MP5 submachine gun was the unit’s signature weapon. Firing from a closed bolt with a roller-delayed blowback action, the MP5 offered exceptional accuracy and controllability, especially in full-automatic fire, making it ideal for the surgical precision required in hostage rescue scenarios.16 Various models, including the compact MP5K and the integrally suppressed MP5SD, were employed.
  • Colt CAR-15 / XM177 Commando: For situations requiring greater range and barrier penetration than the 9mm MP5 could provide, operators used variants of the Colt Commando carbine.19 These short-barreled versions of the M16 rifle, chambered in 5.56x45mm, were compact and lightweight, suitable for CQB while offering superior ballistics to a submachine gun.

This combination of a unique, aggressive culture and access to the best available weaponry, backed by an almost limitless training budget, allowed SEAL Team Six to quickly establish itself as the U.S. military’s premier maritime counter-terrorism force.

1.4 Early Operations and the Inevitable Disbandment

SEAL Team Six participated in a number of operations, both overt and covert, during its seven-year existence. Its first major publicly acknowledged combat deployment was during Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada.5 The unit was tasked with several key missions, including the successful rescue of the island’s Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, whom they extracted from his besieged residence under fire.5 The operation also highlighted the inherent dangers of special operations; an offshore insertion went awry, resulting in the deaths of four SEALs who were lost at sea.5

Despite its operational successes, the unit’s maverick reputation and the controversies surrounding its founder began to attract negative attention from the wider Navy. Marcinko commanded the unit for three years, a year longer than the typical two-year command tour, further cementing his personal stamp on its culture.7 After his departure from command, he went on to form “Red Cell,” a unit designed to test the security of U.S. military installations by acting as an opposing force, a role in which his team’s unconventional methods proved highly effective but also generated considerable friction with conventional security forces.7

Ultimately, the culture Marcinko had fostered proved unsustainable within the institutional framework of the U.S. Navy. Allegations of misappropriation of government funds and equipment for personal use plagued the unit’s reputation.1 The situation culminated in Marcinko’s own conviction in 1989 on charges of conspiracy, bribery, and making false claims against the government, for which he served 15 months in federal prison.1 The very qualities that made him the ideal candidate to rapidly build an effective CT unit—his disregard for bureaucracy and his aggressive, rule-bending ethos—were the same qualities that led to the unit’s downfall. The Navy could not tolerate a high-profile unit that, while operationally proficient, was perceived as a rogue element that brought disrepute to the service.

In 1987, SEAL Team Six was officially dissolved.7 This was not an elimination of the vital capability the unit represented, but rather a strategic rebranding. The Navy needed to preserve the hard-won expertise in maritime counter-terrorism but had to excise the problematic culture and controversial legacy of the Marcinko era. The disbandment was a necessary institutional measure to reset the unit’s identity, paving the way for its reconstitution under a new name and a more formalized command structure.

Section II: Transformation and Redefinition – The Rise of DEVGRU (1987-2001)

2.1 A New Name, A New Mandate: The Birth of NSWDG

The 1987 dissolution of SEAL Team Six was immediately followed by the formation of its successor: the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG), now commonly referred to as DEVGRU.7 While publicly framed as the creation of a new unit, this was in effect a strategic reconstitution designed to preserve the core capabilities and personnel of its predecessor while shedding its controversial reputation.7 The name change was deliberate and significant. The designation “Development Group” provided an official, unclassified mandate that was far more palatable to the conventional military bureaucracy than the provocative moniker of SEAL Team Six.25 Officially, the unit’s primary purpose was now to test, evaluate, and develop new naval special warfare technology, tactics, and procedures for the benefit of the entire SEAL community.14 This served as a functional and discreet public identity for a unit whose true operational activities remained highly classified.

Structurally, the new organization was more formally integrated into the burgeoning U.S. special operations architecture. DEVGRU was placed under the administrative command of the newly established Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM), which was created in 1987 to provide unified leadership and oversight for all Navy SOF units.7 Operationally, however, it remained a “Tier 1” Special Mission Unit (SMU) under the direct command and control of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), alongside the Army’s Delta Force.5 This dual-hatted command relationship ensured that the unit was both properly supported by its parent service and available to the National Command Authority for the most sensitive and critical missions. The core personnel, the MCT mission set, and the rigorous training standards were transferred directly from Team Six to DEVGRU, ensuring a seamless continuation of the nation’s premier maritime counter-terrorism capability.24

2.2 Mission Creep and Diversification in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s profoundly altered the global security landscape. The singular threat of a large-scale confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, which had driven much of U.S. military planning, was replaced by a more complex and unpredictable environment characterized by regional conflicts, failed states, and transnational threats. For DEVGRU, this meant that the specific scenarios it was originally designed for—such as retaking a hijacked ship from Soviet-backed terrorists—became less probable. Consequently, the unit’s unique skill set was increasingly applied to a wider range of high-stakes national security challenges, leading to a period of significant “mission creep” that ultimately forged it into a more versatile and adaptable force.

This operational diversification stress-tested the unit and built the institutional maturity that would be indispensable in the post-9/11 world. By being forced to operate outside its core MCT specialty, DEVGRU developed new TTPs, deepened its integration with the intelligence community, and honed its skills in diverse environments. By the time the Global War on Terror began, it was no longer just a maritime hostage rescue team; it was a seasoned special operations force with a decade of real-world experience in direct action and special reconnaissance, making it an immediately effective tool for the global manhunt that would define the next two decades.

Key operations during this era illustrate this evolution:

  • Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989): DEVGRU deployed as part of the JSOC task force during the U.S. invasion of Panama. Working in concert with Delta Force and other elite units, its operators were involved in the effort to capture Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega.5 This operation demonstrated the unit’s successful integration into broader JSOC direct action (DA) campaigns in a conventional conflict setting.
  • Operation Pokeweed (Panama, 1990): The unit reportedly returned to Panama in a clandestine operation aimed at apprehending the Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar. The mission is believed to have been unsuccessful due to flawed intelligence, but it underscored the unit’s employment in the burgeoning counter-narcotics mission set.5
  • Operation Gothic Serpent (Somalia, 1993): DEVGRU operators formed a key component of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia, tasked with capturing the warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid and his lieutenants.5 This deployment culminated in the infamous Battle of Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993, later chronicled as “Black Hawk Down.” The intense urban combat and the challenges of operating in a failed state pushed the unit’s capabilities in high-risk DA and personnel recovery to their limits.5
  • Balkans Operations (Bosnia, 1998): In the aftermath of the Yugoslav Wars, DEVGRU was deployed to Bosnia to hunt and apprehend individuals indicted for war crimes.5 This mission required a sophisticated blend of low-visibility special reconnaissance (SR), human intelligence operations, and clandestine apprehension, a far cry from the overt assaults of traditional counter-terrorism. The successful capture of several key figures, including Bosnian Serb general Radislav Krstić, demonstrated the unit’s maturation into a force capable of conducting highly sensitive, intelligence-driven operations.5

2.3 Tactical and Equipment Modernization

The operational experiences of the 1990s drove a steady, albeit less dramatic, evolution in DEVGRU’s equipment and tactics compared to the revolution that would occur post-9/11. As a “development group,” the unit was at the forefront of testing and fielding new technologies for Naval Special Warfare. This period saw the adoption of more advanced and reliable night vision devices, secure satellite communications systems that allowed for global command and control, and improved underwater infiltration systems.

The shift from a purely maritime focus to a multi-environment one necessitated changes in TTPs. Lessons learned from the urban gunfights of Mogadishu and the clandestine surveillance requirements in Bosnia forced the unit to refine its land warfare skills. This included developing more sophisticated methods for vehicle-based operations, rural reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering in non-permissive environments. While the core competency of maritime CQB remained the unit’s bedrock, this decade of diverse operational employment broadened its skillset and prepared it for the multi-domain challenges of the 21st century. The unit that entered the new millennium was more experienced, more versatile, and more integrated into the joint special operations community than its 1980s predecessor.

Section III: The Global War on Terror – JSOC’s Primary Manhunters (2001-Present)

3.1 The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift: From Reactive to Proactive

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, served as a powerful catalyst, fundamentally and irrevocably transforming the mission, authorities, and operational tempo of the Joint Special Operations Command and its subordinate units, including DEVGRU.11 Before 9/11, JSOC and its components were largely viewed as a “break glass in case of emergency” force—a strategic asset held in reserve for responding to specific, high-stakes contingencies like hijackings or hostage crises.23 The post-9/11 era demanded a radical departure from this reactive posture.

Under the direction of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, JSOC was unleashed as the primary kinetic instrument in the newly declared Global War on Terror (GWOT).29 The command’s mandate shifted from crisis response to a continuous, proactive, global campaign to dismantle terrorist networks. This new paradigm endowed JSOC with unprecedented authorities, a vastly expanded budget, and direct lines of communication to the highest levels of the National Command Authority.23 DEVGRU, as one of JSOC’s two premier direct-action units, was thrust to the forefront of this new, relentless form of warfare, evolving into a globally deployed “hunter-killer” force tasked with finding and eliminating high-value targets around the clock.30

3.2 The F3EA Cycle: Industrializing Special Operations

To execute its new global manhunting mission, JSOC developed and perfected a systematic, intelligence-driven operational methodology known as the F3EA cycle: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze.31 This process transformed special operations from a series of discrete missions into a self-perpetuating, industrial-scale campaign of targeting and elimination. The F3EA cycle became the engine of the GWOT, and DEVGRU was one of its key pistons.

  • Find and Fix: The initial phases of the cycle involved identifying and locating high-value targets. This required an unprecedented level of integration between DEVGRU and the wider U.S. intelligence community. The unit worked in close cooperation with the Central Intelligence Agency’s Special Activities Division and the Army’s highly secretive Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), also known as “The Activity” or Task Force Orange.5 Internally, DEVGRU’s own Black Squadron became a critical asset for this phase. Composed of reconnaissance and surveillance specialists, Black Squadron operators would deploy clandestinely as an advance force, conducting low-visibility surveillance to pinpoint a target’s location, map their patterns of life, and provide terminal guidance for the subsequent assault force.24
  • Finish: This was the kinetic phase of the cycle, executed by DEVGRU’s four assault squadrons: Red, Blue, Gold, and Silver.7 These squadrons became the primary “finish” element, conducting thousands of high-risk direct-action raids, typically at night, to capture or kill designated HVTs.
  • Exploit and Analyze: The “Finish” phase was not the end of the mission. Immediately following a raid, any intelligence materials seized from the objective—documents, cell phones, laptops, and other “pocket litter”—were rapidly collected. This sensitive site exploitation (SSE) was critical. The collected material was immediately passed to analysts who would exploit it for actionable intelligence, such as the identities and locations of other network members. This analysis would then “feed” the beginning of the cycle, generating new targets and allowing JSOC to attack the terrorist networks faster than they could regenerate.31 This relentless, 24/7 cycle created a high-tempo, data-driven approach to warfare that defined DEVGRU’s experience for more than a decade.

3.3 A Decade of Continuous Combat

The period from 2001 to the present has been one of continuous combat deployment for DEVGRU, a stark contrast to the sporadic operations of the pre-9/11 era. While the Army’s Delta Force initially took the lead in the JSOC campaign in Iraq, DEVGRU was the primary effort in Afghanistan, which became the unit’s main theater of operations.34

  • Afghanistan: DEVGRU was involved from the very beginning of the conflict. A squadron was part of the initial JSOC element, Task Force Sword, established in October 2001 to hunt senior al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership.32 Operators participated in the early search for Osama bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains and were part of the Advance Force Operations (AFO) teams that conducted covert reconnaissance along the Afghan-Pakistan border.32 During the major conventional battle of Operation Anaconda in 2002, DEVGRU teams were tasked with reconnaissance and direct action against entrenched enemy forces, including the brutal fight on Takur Ghar mountain.32 For years, the unit also provided the high-risk close protection detail for Afghan President Hamid Karzai.24 The bulk of their work, however, consisted of a relentless campaign of night raids against HVT’s across the country.5
  • Global Operations and Hostage Rescue: While focused on Afghanistan, the unit remained JSOC’s premier maritime force and was called upon for critical hostage rescue missions globally. These operations showcased a return to the unit’s original core competency, but in a far more complex and high-stakes environment.
  • Rescue of Captain Richard Phillips (2009): In a textbook demonstration of maritime counter-terrorism, DEVGRU snipers, operating from the fantail of the USS Bainbridge, simultaneously killed three Somali pirates who were holding Captain Phillips hostage in a lifeboat on the high seas. The operation required extraordinary feats of marksmanship from unstable platforms at night and was a major public success.34
  • Attempted Rescue of Linda Norgrove (2010): This operation in Afghanistan highlighted the tragic risks inherent in hostage rescue. During the assault on the Taliban compound where the Scottish aid worker was being held, Norgrove was accidentally killed by a fragmentation grenade thrown by a DEVGRU operator as he engaged a combatant. The incident underscored the brutal complexity and split-second decisions required in such missions.5
  • Operation Neptune Spear (2011): This was the apex of DEVGRU’s GWOT mission and one of the most significant special operations in U.S. history. The raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was the culmination of years of intelligence work and a perfect execution of the F3EA cycle.5 The mission involved deep collaboration between the CIA and JSOC, the use of highly modified, previously unknown stealth Black Hawk helicopters from the 160th SOAR, and a precision assault by two dozen operators from DEVGRU’s Red Squadron deep inside a sovereign, non-permissive nation.5 The successful execution of the raid, despite the crash of one of the helicopters, cemented DEVGRU’s place in the public consciousness and represented the pinnacle of the manhunting capabilities it had honed over the preceding decade.

The industrialization of manhunting during this period created the most combat-experienced and effective operators in the unit’s history. However, this unprecedented operational tempo also placed immense physical and psychological strain on personnel. Furthermore, it raised complex questions of accountability and the blurring of lines in a global, undeclared war, as evidenced by the tragic Norgrove incident and later allegations surrounding a clandestine 2019 mission in North Korea where civilian fishermen were reportedly killed.5 The unit’s very success created a new and difficult set of human and ethical challenges.

3.4 Modern Organization and Selection

To support its sustained global mission, DEVGRU’s organizational structure has matured into a comprehensive, multi-faceted command of approximately 1,787 personnel as of 2014, including military and civilian support staff.7 The unit is organized into several color-coded squadrons, each with a specific function 7:

  • Assault Squadrons: Red Squadron (“The Tribe”), Blue Squadron (“The Pirates”), Gold Squadron (“The Knights”), and Silver Squadron (“The Crusaders”). These are the primary direct-action elements, also known as Tactical Development and Evaluation Squadrons (TACDEVRON) 1 through 4.
  • Black Squadron (TACDEVRON 5): The Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance Squadron. This squadron is responsible for advance force operations, intelligence gathering, and pre-assault reconnaissance.
  • Gray Squadron: The Mobility and Transportation Squadron. This squadron consists of teams of specialist drivers and operators of the unit’s fleet of customized land vehicles, as well as dedicated maritime mobility teams who operate specialized watercraft for insertions and extractions. They also serve as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).
  • Green Team: The Selection and Training Squadron. This is the gateway into DEVGRU.

The selection process for DEVGRU, known as “Green Team,” is an arduous 6-to-9-month course that serves as both a selection and training pipeline.23 Candidates are drawn exclusively from the ranks of experienced Navy SEALs, typically those who have served for at least five years and completed multiple combat deployments.11 The course has an attrition rate that is often higher than 50%.40 Unlike the initial SEAL training (BUD/S), which is primarily a test of physical endurance and water competency, Green Team places a heavy emphasis on mental acuity, problem-solving under extreme stress, and advanced marksmanship and tactical skills.7 It is designed to find mature, intelligent, and highly skilled operators capable of functioning at the highest levels of U.S. special operations.

Section IV: The Current Arsenal – An Engineering and Operational Analysis

The small arms employed by the Naval Special Warfare Development Group are a reflection of its dual mission: to execute the nation’s most sensitive operations and to serve as a “development group” for new weapons and tactics. The unit constantly tests, evaluates, and fields equipment that offers a tangible advantage in reliability, accuracy, ergonomics, and mission-specific performance. This has led to an arsenal that includes both highly refined military-issue weapons and best-in-class commercial systems, often customized to the unit’s exacting standards.

4.1 Primary Carbines: Piston vs. High-Performance DI

The primary individual weapon of a DEVGRU assaulter has evolved significantly since the GWOT began. The intense operational tempo, particularly in the harsh desert environments of Afghanistan and Iraq, exposed the limitations of the standard M4A1 carbine, especially when used with a sound suppressor. This operational need drove the adoption of a more reliable platform and, more recently, a return to a highly optimized version of the original system.

Heckler & Koch HK416:

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber: 5.56x45mm NATO
  • Action: Short-stroke gas piston, rotating bolt 43
  • Barrel Lengths: Primarily the 10.4-inch D10RS variant for close-quarters battle 43
  • Rate of Fire: Approximately 850 rounds per minute 43
  • Material Composition: Cold hammer-forged barrel; high-grade aluminum receivers; steel bolt components.
  • Operational Rationale: The HK416 was adopted by JSOC units, including DEVGRU, around 2004 to address significant reliability issues encountered with direct impingement (DI) M4A1 carbines.45 When an M4 is fitted with a suppressor, the back-pressure from the can forces hot, carbon-fouled propellant gases back into the receiver at high velocity. This drastically increases fouling of the bolt carrier group and chamber, leading to increased heat, accelerated parts wear, and a higher rate of malfunctions.48 The HK416’s short-stroke gas piston system vents these gases forward, away from the receiver, keeping the action cleaner, cooler, and more reliable, especially during sustained automatic fire.43 This increased reliability was deemed a critical advantage for no-fail missions. The HK416’s use by the DEVGRU team that conducted Operation Neptune Spear cemented its status as the unit’s iconic rifle of the GWOT era.43

Noveske N4:

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber: 5.56x45mm NATO; also available in.300 AAC Blackout
  • Action: Direct Impingement 50
  • Barrel Length: Primarily 10.5-inch “Shorty” upper receiver groups 50
  • Material Composition: Precision machined 7075-T6 billet or forged aluminum receivers; high-quality stainless steel or cold hammer-forged barrels with optimized gas systems 50
  • Operational Rationale: In recent years, DEVGRU has been observed using carbines built around Noveske Rifleworks upper receivers.7 This represents a significant shift back to a direct impingement system. This move is likely driven by several factors. The Noveske rifles are generally lighter and have a better balance than the more front-heavy piston-driven HK416.51 Furthermore, Noveske is renowned for the exceptional accuracy of its barrels.54 Over the last two decades, advancements in DI system components, gas block design, buffer systems, and ammunition have mitigated many of the reliability issues that plagued the M4 in the early 2000s. The adoption of a high-end commercial system like the Noveske allows the unit to leverage the latest innovations in the civilian market to build a lighter, more accurate, and highly ergonomic weapon system tailored to their specific requirements, fulfilling their role as a “development group”.11

4.2 Personal Defense Weapon (PDW): Specialized Firepower

Heckler & Koch MP7:

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber: HK 4.6x30mm 55
  • Action: Gas-operated, short-stroke piston, rotating bolt 55
  • Weight: Approximately 4.2 lbs (1.9 kg) with an empty 20-round magazine 55
  • Rate of Fire: Approximately 950 rounds per minute 55
  • Effective Range: Approximately 200 meters 55
  • Operational Rationale: The MP7 fills a specialized niche role within DEVGRU’s arsenal. It is not a primary assault weapon but a Personal Defense Weapon (PDW) for operators whose primary role may not be as a direct assaulter. The high-velocity, small-caliber 4.6mm cartridge is specifically designed to defeat soft body armor at close ranges, a capability that traditional 9mm submachine guns lack.55 Its extremely compact and lightweight design makes it ideal for close protection details, K9 handlers who need to control a dog with one hand, breachers laden with heavy tools, and for operations in extremely confined spaces like ship corridors, tunnels, or vehicles.60 The MP7 was reportedly carried by some operators during the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound.59

4.3 Sidearms: The Transition to Striker-Fired Systems

The sidearm is a critical piece of an operator’s kit, serving as a backup weapon and a primary tool for certain CQB scenarios. DEVGRU’s choice of pistols has mirrored the broader trend in military and law enforcement, moving from traditional hammer-fired guns to more modern striker-fired systems.

SIG Sauer P226 (MK25):

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber: 9x19mm Parabellum
  • Action: Double-Action/Single-Action (DA/SA), short-recoil operated 64
  • Barrel Length: 4.4 inches (112 mm) 64
  • Special Features: The MK25 variant features a true MIL-STD-1913 Picatinny rail, phosphated internal components for exceptional corrosion resistance in maritime environments, and a distinctive anchor emblem engraved on the slide.64
  • Operational Rationale: Adopted by the U.S. Navy SEALs in the 1980s, the P226 earned a legendary reputation for its superb accuracy, ergonomic design, and exceptional reliability, especially in saltwater conditions.65 For decades, its DA/SA action was considered a robust and safe standard for a combat pistol. It remains a proven and respected sidearm within the community.

SIG Sauer P320 / M17 / M18 & Glock 19:

  • Technical Data (P320/M17):
  • Caliber: 9x19mm Parabellum 67
  • Action: Striker-fired 69
  • Special Features: A key feature is its serialized internal chassis, which allows the operator to swap grip modules, slides, and barrels, creating a truly modular system. The trigger pull is consistent for every shot, unlike the DA/SA transition of the P226.67
  • Operational Rationale: The adoption of striker-fired pistols like the Glock 19 and custom variants of the SIG Sauer P320 reflects a broader shift in doctrine.7 These pistols are generally lighter, have a simpler manual of arms, and feature a consistent trigger pull that many find easier to master under stress.69 DEVGRU is known to use highly customized versions of the P320, featuring specialized optic cuts for red dot sights (like the Trijicon RMR), upgraded triggers, and threaded barrels for suppressors, demonstrating their preference for tailored, high-performance sidearms.70 The Glock 19 is also valued for its ubiquitousness, extreme reliability, and vast ecosystem of aftermarket support.7

4.4 Sniper & Designated Marksman Systems: Scalable Precision

DEVGRU sniper teams employ a range of precision rifle systems, allowing them to scale their capabilities to the specific target and engagement distance required by the mission.

Knight’s Armament SR-25 (Mk 11 Mod 0):

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber: 7.62x51mm NATO
  • Action: Gas-operated, semi-automatic 71
  • Barrel Length: 20 inches (508 mm), free-floating match grade 71
  • Weight: Approximately 15.3 lbs (6.9 kg) with scope, suppressor, and bipod 71
  • Effective Range: Approximately 800 meters 36
  • Operational Rationale: The Mk 11 provides the sniper or designated marksman with the ability to deliver rapid, precise semi-automatic fire at ranges beyond the capability of a 5.56mm carbine. It is particularly valuable for overwatch missions where multiple targets may need to be engaged quickly, and for firing from unstable platforms like helicopters or small boats, where a fast follow-up shot is critical. Its use by DEVGRU snipers during the Captain Phillips rescue is a prime example of its application in the maritime environment.36

Remington 700 / Mk 13 Mod 5:

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber:.300 Winchester Magnum
  • Action: Bolt-action, based on the Remington 700 long action 72
  • Chassis: Accuracy International Chassis System (AICS), featuring a folding stock and adjustable cheek piece 72
  • Effective Range: Approximately 1,200 meters 72
  • Operational Rationale: The Mk 13 is the unit’s workhorse anti-personnel sniper rifle. The powerful.300 Winchester Magnum cartridge provides a significant advantage in range, accuracy, and terminal performance over the 7.62mm NATO round, making it exceptionally well-suited for the long-range engagements common in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.36 The modern AICS platform provides a rigid, ergonomic, and highly adjustable base for the proven and accurate Remington 700 action, creating a state-of-the-art precision weapon system.72

McMillan TAC-338:

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber:.338 Lapua Magnum
  • Action: Bolt-action, McMillan G30 long action 75
  • Barrel Length: 26.5 – 27 inches, match grade 75
  • Effective Range: 1,600+ meters 75
  • Operational Rationale: This is a specialized extreme long-range anti-personnel system. The.338 Lapua Magnum cartridge was specifically designed for military sniping and offers superior ballistic performance to the.300 WinMag, particularly at ranges beyond 1,000 meters. It provides a flatter trajectory, is less susceptible to wind drift, and retains more energy at extreme distances, bridging the capability gap between anti-personnel calibers like.300 WinMag and heavy anti-materiel calibers like.50 BMG.36

4.5 Support Weapons: Mobile Firepower

To provide a base of suppressive fire during assaults and other direct-action missions, DEVGRU teams utilize machine guns that have been specifically optimized for the needs of special operations forces.

Mk 46 Mod 1 & Mk 48 Mod 1:

  • Technical Data:
  • Caliber: 5.56x45mm (Mk 46) & 7.62x51mm (Mk 48) 11
  • Action: Gas-operated, open bolt
  • Operational Rationale: These weapons are highly modified versions of the FN Minimi (M249 SAW) and FN SCAR-H, respectively. The modifications are focused on reducing weight and increasing modularity for SOF users. For example, the Mk 46 removes the M249’s standard magazine well (as SOF operators exclusively use belt-fed ammunition), uses a lighter fluted barrel, and incorporates a Picatinny rail system for mounting optics and accessories.11 The Mk 48 provides the heavier-hitting power of the 7.62mm round in a package that is lighter and more compact than the traditional M60 or M240 machine guns it replaced.11 These weapons give the assault teams a critical capability to suppress enemy positions and gain fire superiority during an engagement.

Table 4.1: Summary of Current DEVGRU Small Arms

Weapon DesignationManufacturer(s)CaliberAction TypeCommon Barrel(s)Weight (Unloaded)Max Effective RangePrimary Role
HK416Heckler & Koch5.56x45mm NATOShort-Stroke Gas Piston10.4 in~6.7 lbs~400 mPrimary Carbine, CQB
Noveske N4Noveske Rifleworks5.56x45mm /.300 BLKDirect Impingement10.5 in~6.2 lbs~400 mPrimary Carbine, CQB
HK MP7A1Heckler & Koch4.6x30mmShort-Stroke Gas Piston7.1 in~4.2 lbs~200 mPersonal Defense Weapon (PDW)
P226 (MK25)SIG Sauer9x19mmDA/SA Recoil Operated4.4 in~2.1 lbs~50 mSidearm (Maritime Focus)
P320 (Custom)SIG Sauer9x19mmStriker-Fired3.9 in / 4.7 in~1.8 lbs~50 mPrimary Sidearm
Glock 19Glock9x19mmStriker-Fired4.0 in~1.5 lbs~50 mSidearm
SR-25 (Mk 11)Knight’s Armament7.62x51mm NATOGas Operated, Semi-Auto20 in~15.3 lbs (w/ acc.)~800 mDesignated Marksman Rifle (DMR)
Mk 13 Mod 5Remington / NSWC Crane.300 WinMagBolt-Action26.5 in~11.4 lbs~1,200 mAnti-Personnel Sniper Rifle
TAC-338McMillan Firearms.338 Lapua MagnumBolt-Action27 in~13 lbs~1,600+ mExtreme Long-Range Sniper Rifle
Mk 46 Mod 1Fabrique Nationale5.56x45mm NATOGas Operated, Open Bolt~16 in~15.7 lbs~800 m (Area)Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW)
Mk 48 Mod 1Fabrique Nationale7.62x51mm NATOGas Operated, Open Bolt~20 in~18.4 lbs~1,000 m (Area)Light Weight Machine Gun (LWMG)

Section V: The Future Operator – DEVGRU in an Era of Renewed Competition (Speculative Analysis)

5.1 Pivoting from Counter-Terrorism to Great Power Competition (GPC)

The strategic landscape guiding U.S. national security has undergone a fundamental shift. The 2018 National Defense Strategy officially marked the end of the post-9/11 era’s primary focus on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, reorienting the Department of Defense towards an era of long-term strategic competition with near-peer adversaries, namely the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.31 This pivot has profound implications for all elements of the U.S. military, but especially for elite special operations forces like DEVGRU, whose mission sets, training, and equipment were honed to perfection for the GWOT.

The operational environment of GPC is vastly different from the permissive or semi-permissive settings of Afghanistan and Iraq. Near-peer adversaries possess sophisticated Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), pervasive electronic warfare capabilities, space-based surveillance assets, and highly capable conventional forces. In such an environment, the direct-action “night raid” model that was the hallmark of JSOC’s GWOT campaign becomes exceptionally high-risk and potentially less strategically relevant.

Consequently, DEVGRU’s mission set is likely to evolve and rebalance, emphasizing skills that are critical in a contested, A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) environment. Future missions will likely include:

  • Maritime Special Reconnaissance (SR): Leveraging its naval heritage, DEVGRU is uniquely positioned to conduct clandestine surveillance of enemy naval bases, coastal defense sites, and critical maritime infrastructure in regions like the South China Sea or the Baltic. This would involve covert insertion via submarine, specialized combatant craft, or autonomous underwater vehicles to provide critical intelligence to the fleet.
  • Unconventional Warfare (UW): In a potential conflict, DEVGRU could be tasked with training, advising, and equipping partner nation maritime special operations forces in contested regions, building local capacity to resist aggression and conduct irregular warfare.28
  • Counter-Proliferation and Maritime Interdiction: The unit’s core competency in Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) will remain critical for missions involving the covert interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD), advanced military technology, or other illicit materials.29
  • Enabling the Fleet: In a high-end conflict, DEVGRU operators could act as forward sensors for the Navy’s long-range fires, clandestinely infiltrating denied areas to provide terminal guidance for anti-ship or land-attack missiles, a mission that requires exquisite stealth and technical proficiency.

5.2 Next Generation Weaponry: The 6.8mm Question

The U.S. Army’s Next Generation Squad Weapon (NGSW) program represents the most significant shift in infantry small arms in over 60 years and will undoubtedly influence the future of SOF weaponry.78 The program’s winners—the SIG Sauer XM7 Rifle and XM250 Automatic Rifle, chambered in the new 6.8x51mm “Common Cartridge”—are designed to defeat advanced enemy body armor at ranges beyond the capability of the current 5.56mm NATO round.79

For a unit like DEVGRU, the NGSW presents a complex set of trade-offs. The increased lethality, range, and barrier penetration of the 6.8mm cartridge is a clear advantage when facing a technologically advanced, peer adversary equipped with modern personal protective equipment.78 However, this capability comes at a cost. The XM7 and XM250 are heavier than the weapons they are intended to replace, and the 6.8mm ammunition is also heavier and bulkier.78 This means an operator would have to carry a heavier weapon system or reduce their overall ammunition load, a significant consideration for a unit that often operates far from resupply.

It is highly probable that DEVGRU, in its “development group” role, will rigorously test and evaluate the NGSW systems. However, they may not adopt them wholesale. The unit may determine that the weight penalty is too great for their specific mission profiles, particularly in CQB and maritime operations. Instead, they may pursue alternative solutions, such as intermediate calibers like 6.5mm Creedmoor or 6mm ARC in their AR-pattern rifles, or continue to leverage the.300 Blackout for its excellent suppressed performance, seeking a more optimized balance of lethality, weight, and ammunition capacity.

5.3 The Technological Battlespace: Man-Unmanned Teaming and C4ISTAR

The future evolution of DEVGRU will be defined less by the rifle in an operator’s hands and more by their ability to integrate with and leverage a network of advanced technologies. The individual operator is transforming from a standalone shooter into a “hyper-enabled” node within a vast system of sensors, platforms, and data processors. This shift is necessary to survive and operate effectively in the information-saturated, highly contested battlespace of the future.

  • Unmanned and Autonomous Systems: The proliferation of small, attritable, and increasingly autonomous systems will revolutionize special operations. DEVGRU operators will likely deploy and control a suite of unmanned assets as organic extensions of their team.31 Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) will provide persistent, over-the-horizon reconnaissance; autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) will conduct clandestine hydrographic surveys and deliver payloads; and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) will provide standoff fire support or serve as decoys.82 The operator of the future will be a pilot and mission commander for a personal fleet of robotic systems.
  • Advanced C4ISTAR and Artificial Intelligence: The sheer volume of data generated by sensors in a GPC environment will be impossible for humans to process alone. The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) into command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) networks will be critical.31 AI algorithms will be able to sift through vast amounts of sensor data in real-time to identify threats, suggest courses of action, and provide predictive analysis.31 Operators will likely be equipped with augmented reality (AR) displays integrated into their helmets or eyewear, overlaying critical data—such as drone feeds, friendly force locations, and threat indicators—directly onto their field of view. This creates a “hyper-enabled operator” with unprecedented situational awareness and decision-making speed.86
  • Operating in a New Domain: While DEVGRU operators will not carry directed energy weapons (DEWs) or launch hypersonic missiles themselves, they will be required to operate on a battlefield where these systems are employed by both friendly and enemy forces.81 Their role will adapt to this reality, potentially involving laser designation of targets for DEW platforms, providing terminal guidance for hypersonic weapons, or conducting reconnaissance to locate and target an adversary’s advanced weapon systems.

This technological evolution will fundamentally alter the very definition of a special operator. While the core requirements of physical toughness, mental resilience, and unwavering discipline will remain, they will be necessary but insufficient. The future DEVGRU will demand a new breed of operator who is also a technologist, a data analyst, and a systems integrator, capable of making split-second decisions not just under fire, but under a deluge of complex information. The selection and training pipeline for the unit will have to evolve accordingly, placing as much emphasis on cognitive and technical aptitude as it does on physical performance.

Conclusion

The four-decade history of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group is a compelling narrative of continuous and necessary evolution. Born from the ashes of a catastrophic operational failure at Desert One, SEAL Team Six was forged as a specialized tool to solve a specific problem: the lack of a dedicated maritime counter-terrorism capability. Under its founding commander, it rapidly achieved a high level of proficiency, but its unconventional culture made it an outlier within its parent service, necessitating a formal rebirth as DEVGRU to ensure its long-term institutional viability.

Throughout the 1990s, the unit adapted to a changing world, its mission set expanding in response to new geopolitical realities. This period of diversification, from Panama to Somalia to Bosnia, was not a dilution of its purpose but a crucial crucible that forged the versatility and resilience required for the challenges to come. The transformative impact of the September 11th attacks thrust the unit into the forefront of a new kind of global conflict, where it became a central component in an industrialized, intelligence-driven manhunting enterprise that operated at a tempo unprecedented in special operations history.

Today, DEVGRU stands at another strategic crossroads. The pivot to Great Power Competition demands another evolution, away from the familiar fight against non-state actors and towards the complex challenges posed by near-peer adversaries in highly contested, technologically saturated environments. The unit’s future relevance will depend on its ability to integrate emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and unmanned systems, and to redefine the role of the operator as a hyper-enabled manager of networked assets.

The throughline of the unit’s history is adaptation. It has consistently evolved its tactics, its technology, and its people in response to failure, to shifting mission demands, and to fundamental changes in the character of warfare itself. This inherent capacity for change, more than any single weapon system or tactical success, is the defining characteristic of the Naval Special Warfare Development Group and the key to its enduring status as one of the world’s most capable special mission units.

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly donate to help fund our continued report, please visit our donations page.

Sources Used

  1. International Counter-Terrorism: SEAL Team Six, accessed September 6, 2025, https://newsite.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/seal-team-six
  2. What Operation Eagle Claw Taught Us About Leadership and Resolve, accessed September 6, 2025, https://embleholics.com/operation-eagle-claw/
  3. JSOC: America’s Joint Special Operations Command – SOF Support Foundation, accessed September 6, 2025, https://sofsupport.org/jsoc-americas-joint-special-operations-command/
  4. Why SEAL Team 6 was Created | The DEVGRU Files – Episode 4 – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGT6fhDuvuw
  5. The Storied History of SEAL Team Six, the Secret Unit That Killed …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.history.com/articles/the-secret-unit-that-killed-bin-laden
  6. Delta Force – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delta_Force
  7. SEAL Team Six – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEAL_Team_Six
  8. How Richard Marcinko Created SEAL Team 6 (And Spent 15 Months in Jail) – 19FortyFive, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/how-richard-marcinko-created-seal-team-6-and-spent-15-months-in-jail/
  9. Richard Marcinko – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Marcinko
  10. The Hidden History Behind SEAL Team 6 – Patriot Wood, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.patriotwood.com/blogs/news/171361607-the-hidden-history-behind-seal-team-6
  11. DEVGRU: Also Known as Seal Team 6 – Grey Dynamics, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/devgru-also-known-as-seal-team-6/
  12. The Complicated Legacy Of Richard Marcinko, The Founder Of US Navy SEAL Team Six, accessed September 6, 2025, https://allthatsinteresting.com/richard-marcinko
  13. Founder and First commanding officer of Seal Team 6 and Red Cell Richard Marcinko (1940-2021) : r/JSOCarchive – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/JSOCarchive/comments/1ehgoiq/founder_and_first_commanding_officer_of_seal_team/
  14. SEAL Team 6 | Missions, Facts, & Description – Britannica, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/SEAL-Team-6
  15. Revealing the history! Devgru or Seal Team 6, a top-notch special operations unit from the US Navy. – Valor Tactical, accessed September 6, 2025, https://valortacticalstore.com/en/blogs/blog/devgru-seal-team-6
  16. Heckler & Koch MP5 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_MP5
  17. MP5 – Heckler & Koch, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.heckler-koch.com/en/Products/Military%20and%20Law%20Enforcement/Submachine%20guns/MP5
  18. Army Weapons – Angelfire, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.angelfire.com/sc2/obc/submachineguns.htm
  19. CAR-15 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAR-15
  20. National Park Service Museum Collections – GUN, SUBMACHINE, accessed September 6, 2025, https://museum.nps.gov/ParkObjdet.aspx?rID=SPAR%20%20%20%203292%26db%3Dobjects%26dir%3DCR%20AAWEB%26page%3D1
  21. Centrefire automatic military carbine – Colt AR-15 Model 629 Commando XM177 E2 – about 1967 | Collection Object | Royal Armouries, accessed September 6, 2025, https://royalarmouries.org/collection/object/object-275611
  22. Colt XM177E1 / GAU-5 / CAR-15 (1965-1966) – Retro Rifles, accessed September 6, 2025, https://retrorifles.com/colt-xm177e1-gau-5-car-15-1965-1966/
  23. What Makes SEAL Team 6 So Special – National Security Journal, accessed September 6, 2025, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/what-makes-seal-team-6-so-special/
  24. SEAL Team Six | DEVGRU – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/devgru/
  25. Why is SEAL Team 6 called DEVGRU? – Quora, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.quora.com/Why-is-SEAL-Team-6-called-DEVGRU
  26. United States Naval Special Warfare Command – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Naval_Special_Warfare_Command
  27. Joint Special Operations Command – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Special_Operations_Command
  28. Special Operations forces: the beginning, accessed September 6, 2025, https://specialops.org/special-operations-forces-the-beginning/
  29. US Joint Special Operations Command | Research Starters – EBSCO, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/political-science/us-joint-special-operations-command
  30. “Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2015/12/relentless-strike-the-secret-history-of-joint-special-operations-command/
  31. The Tech Revolution and Irregular Warfare: Leveraging Commercial …, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tech-revolution-and-irregular-warfare-leveraging-commercial-innovation-great-power
  32. List of operations conducted by SEAL Team Six – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_operations_conducted_by_SEAL_Team_Six
  33. JSOC: America’s Joint Special Operations Command – Grey Dynamics, accessed September 6, 2025, https://greydynamics.com/jsoc-americas-joint-special-operations-command/
  34. JSOC Operations – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/jsoc/operations/
  35. 5 Key Differences Between Delta Force and SEAL Team 6 | Military.com, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.military.com/off-duty/2020/02/03/5-key-differences-between-delta-force-and-seal-team-6.html
  36. SEAL Team Six | DEVGRU | Snipers – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/devgru/snipers/index.php
  37. NY Times defends report about failed SEAL Team 6 mission into North Korea, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.livenowfox.com/news/ny-times-seal-team-6-north-korea-raid
  38. Trump says he doesn’t know ‘anything’ about reported North Korea SEAL Team 6 mission, accessed September 6, 2025, https://uk.news.yahoo.com/trump-says-doesnt-know-anything-231159270.html
  39. Story of the failed secret SEAL Team 6 Mission into North Korea in 2019 – Daily Kos, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2025/9/5/2341995/-Story-of-the-botched-secret-SEAL-Team-6-Mission-into-North-Korea-in-2019
  40. Every DEVGRU Squadron Explained – SEAL Team 6 – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QEniLwG9bNw
  41. How are Devgru better trained than the normal Seal teams? I thought Seals were the best anyway. – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/JSOCarchive/comments/10taim0/how_are_devgru_better_trained_than_the_normal/
  42. SEAL Team Six and Delta Force: 6 Key Differences – History.com, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.history.com/articles/seal-team-six-and-delta-force-6-key-differences
  43. Heckler & Koch HK416 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_HK416
  44. HK 416 – Weaponsystems.net, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/AA04+-+HK+416.html
  45. HK416 | Delta Force – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/delta-force/weapons/hk416.php
  46. HK416 – Heckler & Koch, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.heckler-koch.com/en/Products/Military%20and%20Law%20Enforcement/Assault%20rifles/HK416
  47. A Look Into The Rare HK 416 Rifle – Firearms News, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.firearmsnews.com/editorial/look-into-rare-hk-416-rifle/516277
  48. HK 416 / HK416-A5 5.56mm x 45, accessed September 6, 2025, https://hk-usa.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/HK416_HK416-A5-Info-Sheet.pdf
  49. HK416: The special ops forces rifle used by Navy Seals and Delta Force – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_HQV3O2XCf4
  50. Noveske Rifleworks – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noveske_Rifleworks
  51. WEAPONS: Does DEVGRU let the HK416 fall? | SPARTANAT, accessed September 6, 2025, https://spartanat.com/en/waffen-laesst-devgru-das-hk416-fallen
  52. RA-TECH NOVESKE N4-300 model 2018 | WMASG – Airsoft & Guns, accessed September 6, 2025, https://wmasg.com/en/articles/view/9004
  53. “N4” | Noveske Rifleworks, accessed September 6, 2025, https://noveske.com/search/N4
  54. Did Devgru made a good to choice to replace 416’s with Noveske’s? : r/JSOCarchive – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/JSOCarchive/comments/1acui7x/did_devgru_made_a_good_to_choice_to_replace_416s/
  55. Heckler & Koch MP7 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_MP7
  56. MP7 | Heckler & Koch, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.heckler-koch.com/en/Products/Military%20and%20Law%20Enforcement/Submachine%20guns/MP7
  57. Heckler & Kock HK MP7A1 Submachine Gun (Germany) 8 | PDF | Projectiles | Weapon Design – Scribd, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.scribd.com/document/191549851/Heckler-Kock-HK-MP7A1-Submachine-Gun-Germany-8
  58. THE MP7A1 – HK DEFENSE INC., accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.hkdefense.us/pages/military-le/smg/mp7/mp7.html
  59. HK MP7a1 | US Special Operations | Weapons, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-ops-weapons/hk-mp7.php
  60. What Makes the MP7 Seal Team 6’s Favorite Weapon? – The National Interest, accessed September 6, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/what-makes-mp7-seal-team-6s-favorite-weapon-207827
  61. Heckler & Koch MP7: SEAL Team Six’s Weapon of Choice? – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UjhEyOZbDTI&pp=0gcJCRsBo7VqN5tD
  62. MP7A1 – HK USA, accessed September 6, 2025, https://hk-usa.com/product/mp7a1/
  63. SEAL Team Six Weapons – DEVGRU – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/devgru/weapons/
  64. Sig Sauer P226 MK25 Navy NS 9mm Full-Sized 10-Round Pistol – Academy Sports, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.academy.com/p/sig-sauer-p226-mk25-navy-ns-9mm-full-sized-10-round-pistol
  65. SIG Sauer P226 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIG_Sauer_P226
  66. U.S. Navy SEAL Pistol P226 MK25 | SIG SAUER, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.sigsauer.com/p226-mk25-full-size.html
  67. SIG M17 vs M18: Exploring Differences for the Modern Shooter | Craft Holsters, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.craftholsters.com/sig-m17-vs-m18-a-detailed-comparison-for-the-modern-shooter
  68. Portfolio – PM SL – M17/M18 Modular Handgun System – PEO Soldier, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.peosoldier.army.mil/Equipment/Equipment-Portfolio/Project-Manager-Soldier-Lethality-Portfolio/M17-M18-Modular-Handgun-System/
  69. SIG P320 vs P226: Which is the better combat pistol? – Task & Purpose, accessed September 6, 2025, https://taskandpurpose.com/military-life/sig-sauer-p320-p226-best-combat-pistol/
  70. Devgru pistol 2020-2025?? : r/JSOCarchive – Reddit, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.reddit.com/r/JSOCarchive/comments/1lx12xw/devgru_pistol_20202025/
  71. SR-25 – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SR-25
  72. SOCOM MK-13 Mod 5 sniper rifle – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-ops-weapons/mk-13-sniper-rifle.php
  73. REMINGTON DEFENSE M24 7.62 NATO – Zero Whiskey Tactical Arms, accessed September 6, 2025, https://zerowhiskeytacticalarms.com/rifle/remington-defense-m24-7-62-nato/
  74. The Guns in the US Navy SEAL Arsenal – 24/7 Wall St., accessed September 6, 2025, https://247wallst.com/special-report/2023/08/08/the-guns-in-the-us-navy-seal-arsenal/
  75. McMillan TAC-338 Sniper Rifle – American Special Ops, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.americanspecialops.com/special-ops-weapons/tac-338-sniper-rifle.php
  76. McMillan TAC-338, accessed September 6, 2025, https://mcmillanfirearms.com/product/uncategorized/tac-338/
  77. US Navy’s Role in Countering Maritime Terrorism | Office of Justice Programs, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/us-navys-role-countering-maritime-terrorism
  78. Next Generation Squad Weapons (NGSW) Program – PEO Soldier – Army.mil, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.peosoldier.army.mil/Equipment/Equipment-Portfolio/Project-Manager-Soldier-Lethality-Portfolio/Next-Generation-Squad-Weapons-Program/
  79. Next Generation Squad Weapon – Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Generation_Squad_Weapon
  80. NGSW (Next Generation Squad Weapon) – Sig Sauer, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.sigsauer.com/glossary/ngsw-next-generation-squad-weapon/
  81. Navigating the Future: The U.S. Naval Science and Technology (S&T) Strategy, accessed September 6, 2025, https://idstch.com/military/navy/navigating-the-future-the-u-s-naval-science-and-technology-st-strategy/
  82. Fleet of the Future: Next-Gen Naval Capabilities – Performance Defense, accessed September 6, 2025, https://performancedefense.com/fleet-of-the-future-next-gen-naval-capabilities/
  83. U.S. Marines and Sailors Train and Experiment with Emerging Drone Technology in Okinawa, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/4293383/us-marines-and-sailors-train-and-experiment-with-emerging-drone-technology-in-o/
  84. Unmanned Systems (UxS) – Sierra Nevada Corporation, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.sncorp.com/capabilities/unmanned-systems/
  85. C4ISR Integrated Systems | L3Harris® Fast. Forward., accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/c4isr-integrated-systems
  86. Joint Chiefs of Staff > Directorates > J6 | C4 & Cyber, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.jcs.mil/directorates/j6-c4-cyber/
  87. PM IS&A – PEO IEW&S, accessed September 6, 2025, https://peoiews.army.mil/pm-isa/
  88. United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) – Justification Book – DoD, accessed September 6, 2025, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2017/budget_justification/pdfs/2017MarchAmended/02_Procurement/USSOCOM%20_FY17_ABS_PROC_20170314.pdf
  89. Mind Blowing Naval Weapons Coming in 2025! – YouTube, accessed September 6, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEnwt7MMjrY