Tag Archives: Iran

Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics

Iran SITREP – Week Ending January 31, 2026

January 31, 2026 RoninsGrips

Executive Overview

The final week of January 2026 has witnessed the Islamic Republic of Iran navigating a convergence of existential threats that have fundamentally altered its domestic governance and international strategic posture. The reporting period ending January 31 is characterized by three primary developments: the transition of internal dissent from mass mobilization to radicalized insurgency, the physical and operational seclusion of the supreme leadership, and the formalization of a trilateral geopolitical alliance with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) designed to neutralize United States military pressure.¹ Following the unprecedented violence of the mid-month crackdown, the regime has achieved a fragile kinetic stability in major urban centers, yet it remains vulnerable to the systematic collapse of the national currency and the emergence of a “shadow government” managed by the Supreme Leader’s immediate kin.³

On the international front, the arrival of a significant United States naval carrier strike group in the Arabian Sea has prompted Tehran to accelerate its integration into a nascent Eastern-led security architecture. The signing of the Trilateral Strategic Pact on January 29, 2026, between Iran, Russia and China represents a decisive pivot intended to provide a “Great Power Shield” against unilateral Western strikes.¹ Simultaneously, the stabilization of the Levant via the comprehensive integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state signifies a consolidation of the regional “land bridge,” albeit under a new Syrian leadership that balances Iranian, Turkish, and American interests.⁶

Internal Stability and the Evolution of Civil Unrest

From Mass Mobilization to Radicalized Insurgency

The protest wave that erupted on December 28, 2025, initially driven by the “shopkeeper strikes” in response to hyperinflation, has entered a secondary phase of clandestine and violent resistance.⁸ While the “Winter 2026” protests matched the scale of the 2022 movements, they lacked a unifying centralized leadership, which allowed the state to employ overwhelming kinetic force to clear public squares by mid-January.⁸ However, the cessation of mass street gatherings does not indicate a restoration of order; rather, it reflects a tactical shift by opposition elements. In the current reporting week, “rebellious youth” have intensified targeted attacks against regime symbols and suppression centers in cities such as Isfahan, Arak, and Shiraz.¹¹

The regime’s response has been defined by an unprecedented level of brutality, with security forces maintaining loyalty despite the intensity of the unrest.⁸ Monitoring organizations report that the crackdown has resulted in thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of arrests. The systematic nature of the violence is evidenced by the “enforced silence” in cities like Kermanshah, where internet blackouts were used to facilitate extrajudicial killings and the organized disposal of bodies away from international scrutiny.¹¹

Table 1: Comparative Casualty and Detention Estimates (As of Jan 30, 2026)

Source Organization	Estimated Fatalities	Estimated Detentions	Key Reported Incidents
Iran Human Rights (Norway)	3,428	40,000	Intensive suppression in Zahedan/Sistan-Baluchestan ⁸
HRANA (US-Based)	6.092	42,500	Investigation into additional 17,091 reported deaths ⁸
Classified Leaked Documents	36,500	Not Reported	Deaths concentrated during the Jan 8-9 communications blackout ¹²
Iranian Ministry of Health	3,117	Not Reported	Includes 690 individuals labeled as “terrorists” by the state ¹³

The geographic scope of the unrest remains a primary concern for the security apparatus. While the regime has historically managed urban dissent in Tehran, the “Winter 2026” movement saw simultaneous eruptions in all 31 provinces, stretching the capacity of the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and the Basij.¹⁴ This forced the deployment of IRGC Ground Forces, such as the 29th Nabi Akram Division, which were previously reserved for external defense or border security.⁴

Border Instability and Ethnic Insurgency

The southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchestan has emerged as a critical theater of instability during the current reporting period. On January 2, 2026, protests spread to Zahedan, where the prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid issued a direct challenge to the regime’s legitimacy, stating that “Iranians’ lives have reached a dead end”.¹⁵ This rhetoric has provided political cover for militant groups such as Jaish al-Adl, which has reportedly joined a coalition known as the Mobarizoun Popular Front (MPF).¹⁵

This week, Iranian border guards engaged in lethal clashes with militants attempting to infiltrate from Pakistani territory near the city of Saravan.¹⁸ Jaish al-Adl has claimed responsibility for several attacks on IRGC border patrols, signaling a shift from a purely separatist agenda toward a role in the wider Iranian opposition movement.¹⁷ The group’s use of cryptocurrency for fundraising and its stated goal of disrupting the “Makran Coastal Development Plan”—which it views as a sectarian project to settle 7 million Shia in Baloch territory—indicates a sophisticated and long-term insurgency model.¹⁷

Leadership and Succession: The “Bunker” Paradigm

Physical Seclusion and Administrative Devolution

A defining feature of the week ending January 31 has been the reported relocation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to a fortified underground shelter in Tehran Province.⁴ Senior Iranian officials reportedly assessed that the risk of a potential United States military strike reached a critical threshold, prompting the leader’s withdrawal to a site described as a “fortified complex with interconnected tunnels”.⁵

This seclusion has necessitated a radical shift in the management of the Leader’s Office (Bayt-e Rahbari). Reports confirm that the Supreme Leader’s third son, Masoud Khamenei, has assumed day-to-day oversight of the office, serving as the primary channel of communication between the leadership and the government’s executive institutions.⁴ This development has profound implications for regime stability:

Communication Monopolization: Masoud Khamenei now functions as the de facto gatekeeper for all intelligence and policy coordination, potentially isolating the Supreme Leader from dissenting views or accurate battlefield assessments, a phenomenon previously observed during the June 2025 conflict.⁵
Succession Signaling: While Masoud manages the operational conduit, his brother Mojtaba Khamenei remains the primary political contender for the successorship. The physical distance between the “bunker” leadership and the public further fuels rumors regarding the 86-year-old leader’s mental and physical health.²²
Symbolic Erosion: The Supreme Leader’s prolonged absence has led to the derogatory moniker “Moush-Ali” (Rat-Ali) among protesters, characterizing his withdrawal as timidity and undermining the cult of the “steadfast commander”.²³

The Assembly of Experts and the Succession Shortlist

As of late January 2026, the Assembly of Experts is reportedly monitoring a shortlist of three potential successors identified by Khamenei.²⁴ The process is complicated by the 2024 election of the 92-year-old Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Movahedi Kermani as the new chairman of the Assembly, suggesting a conservative bias toward maintaining the current ideological trajectory.²²

Table 2: Leading Candidates for the Successorship

Candidate	Current Role	Institutional Support	Strategic Risk
Mojtaba Khamenei	Clerical influence; Bayt management	IRGC; inner circle hardliners ²⁴	Accusations of “hereditary” rule; lack of political experience ²⁷
Alireza Arafi	Deputy Chair, Assembly of Experts	Qom Seminary; Guardian Council ²⁴	Perceived as a bureaucratic placeholder with limited charisma
Hashem Hosseini Bushehri	Head of Qom Seminary Society	Assembly of Experts; Traditionalists ²⁴	Possible internal friction with the IRGC’s “Young/Pious” faction

Evidence suggests that if the transition is triggered by an assassination or sudden death, a Provisional Leadership Council—comprising President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Chief Justice, and a cleric from the Guardian Council—would assume interim duties until a permanent successor is selected.²² However, President Pezeshkian has warned that such a rupture could cause internal factions to turn on each other, leading to a total regime collapse.²²

Economic Breakdown and Sanctions Resilience

Macroeconomic Destabilization

The Iranian economy began 2026 in a state of terminal freefall, with the rial surpassing record lows against the US dollar. On January 14, 2026, the currency plummeted to over 1.1 million rials per dollar, rendering purchasing power almost non-existent for imported goods.³ This currency crash is the primary driver of the current unrest, as food price inflation has exceeded 70%, and over 57% f the population is experiencing some level of malnourishment.¹⁴

The World Bank projects that the economy will shrink through both 2025 and 2026, with annual inflation rising toward 60%.¹⁴ The Central Bank chief’s resignation in mid-January signaled the government’s inability to stem the crisis through traditional monetary policy.⁸ Instead, the state has resorted to printing money to finance its budget, further accelerating the inflationary cycle.²⁹

Oil Exports and the “Shadow Fleet” Infrastructure

Despite the “Maximum Pressure” campaign revived by the United States, Iran’s energy exports remained largely intact throughout 2025 and early 2026. Data from the reporting period indicates that Iran delivered an average of 1.38 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and gas condensate to China, representing a marginal decline of only 7% compared to previous years.³⁰ By January 2026, China’s share of Iran’s seaborne crude exports approached 90%.³¹

The resilience of this trade is attributed to a mature “shadow fleet” of approximately 1,500 oil tankers that utilize flag changes, ship-to-ship transfers, and disabled transponders to avoid detection.³⁰ Iranian crude routinely trades at a discount of $10 to $15 per barrel below Brent, making it economically attractive to China’s independent “teapot” refineries.³¹

Table 3: Economic and Energy Indicators (Jan 2026)

Metric	Current Value	Context/Source
Exchange Rate	million IRR / 1 USD	Record low reached on Jan 27, 2026 ³
Food Inflation	70%+	Impacting 100% of household budgets ¹⁴
Daily Oil Exports	million bpd	Primarily to PRC “teapot” refineries ³⁰
Floating Storage	million barrels	Highest since 2023; indicates lag in Chinese demand ⁹
Internet Shutdown Cost	million USD daily	Digital economy and online sales fell by 80% ³

The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by US forces in early January 2026 has introduced a new challenge for Tehran, as the two nations have long-established economic ties to offset sanctions, including the trade of oil and drones.¹⁴ The interception of the vessel Bella 1 (renamed Marinera), part of the “shadow fleet” carrying sanctioned oil, further highlights the increasing risks associated with these covert channels.¹⁴

Nuclear Program: Fortification and IAEA Obstruction

Strategic Fortification of Damaged Facilities

Following the June 2025 strikes by Israel and the United States, which targeted facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow, Iran has prioritized the rapid “hardening” of its nuclear sites. Satellite imagery from late January 2026 shows new roof structures built over destroyed structures at Natanz and Isfahan.³³ These coverings effectively block satellite observation of ground activity, a critical defensive measure as Tehran continues to bar IAEA inspectors from the sites.³³

Intelligence suggests that the roofs are part of an operation to recover assets, such as stocks of highly enriched uranium or specialized centrifuges, that survived the strikes.³³ Furthermore, excavation continues near Natanz at “Pickaxe Mountain” (Mount Kolang Gaz La), where analysts believe Iran is constructing a new underground facility that could be deeper than Fordow, potentially reaching between 260 and 330 feet.³³

Enrichment Status and Proliferation Risks

Iran’s nuclear program remains at the threshold of weaponization. As of November 2024, the stockpile included 182 kg of uranium enriched to 60% —a level with no practical civilian application.³⁵ Current assessments for January 2026 indicate:

Breakout Capability: Iran can produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for a single bomb in less than two weeks and enough for 5-6 bombs in under a month if it resumes full-scale enrichment at its advanced centrifuge cascades.³⁵
Fortified Enrichment: The monthly production of 60% material at the deeply buried Fordow facility was projected to jump from 4.7 kg to 37 kg by feeding 20% enriched uranium into two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges.³⁵
Detonation Research: Construction has resumed at the “Taleghan 2” site within the Parchin military complex, which previously housed equipment for high-explosive testing related to nuclear weaponization. The facility is reportedly being encased in a concrete “sarcophagus” to resist future penetration attacks.⁴

Table 4: Iranian Nuclear Stockpile Status (Projected Jan 2026)

Material Type	Enrichment Level	Estimated Mass (kg)	Proliferation Relevance
UF6	60%	400-450	Direct precursor to weapons-grade ³⁵
UF6	20%	800-900	Rapidly convertible to 90% HEU ³⁵
UF6	5%	5,500+	Industrial-scale enrichment feedstock ³⁵
UF6	2%	2,200+	Base-level enrichment material ³⁶

Tehran officially ended all JCPOA-mandated restrictions in October 2025, declaring all limits on its nuclear program void.³⁶ Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that while Iran welcomes a “new deal,” its missile and defense capabilities are not subject to negotiation, emphasizing that the “brave Armed Forces are prepared with their fingers on the trigger”.³⁷

Military Posture and the Naval Standoff

Arrival of the United States “Armada”

Tensions between Washington and Tehran escalated sharply in the week ending January 31 following the arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in the Middle East.³⁹ President Trump has reiterated that a “massive armada” is heading toward the Gulf, positioning US forces within striking distance of Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure.⁴² The deployment includes the aircraft carrier, three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., USS Spruance, and USS Michael Murphy), and advanced fighter squadrons.⁴⁰

The Trump administration’s objective is described as “strategic submission” rather than regime change—compelling Tehran to accept permanent constraints on its nuclear and missile programs through the threat of overwhelming force.⁴⁴ Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has emphasized that “all options” are on the table, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio has highlighted the buildup as a measure to “preemptively prevent” Iranian attacks on US personnel.⁴²

IRGC Live-Fire Exercises and the Strait of Hormuz

In a direct counter-move, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced live-fire naval exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, scheduled to begin on Sunday, February 1, 2026.⁴⁶ The IRGC Navy has reportedly deployed “hundreds of fast, missile-launching vessels” in close proximity to the USS Abraham Lincoln.³⁴

CENTCOM has issued a formal warning that it will not tolerate “unsafe” IRGC actions, listing specific unacceptable behaviors:

Overflight of US military vessels engaged in flight operations.⁴⁶
Low-altitude or armed overflights of US military assets when intentions are unclear.⁴⁶
High-speed boat approaches on a collision course with US military vessels.⁴⁶
Weapons being trained at US forces.⁴⁶

The Iranian Navy commander, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, confirmed that all forces are on “full alert” to meet any US military action with a “decisive and swift response”.¹²

Regional Influence and the Syrian Pivot

The SDF-Syria Integration Agreement

On January 30, 2026, the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced a comprehensive agreement for the phased integration of Kurdish forces and administrative bodies into the Syrian state.⁶ This deal, mediated by US envoy Tom Barrack, aims to stave off a potentially bloody battle for the northeast after Syrian government forces captured swathes of territory in early January.⁶

Military Reorganization: The SDF will be integrated into the Syrian Army as four new brigades—three forming a division in the northeast (Hasakah/Qamishli) and one in the Kobani area.⁶
Security Deployment: Syrian Interior Ministry forces will enter the centers of Hasakah and Qamishli to assume control of government institutions, while local Kurdish police continue to patrol.⁴⁸
Civil Rights: The agreement includes constitutional recognition of Kurdish civil and educational rights and guarantees the return of displaced persons.⁴⁸

For Iran, this integration stabilizes the Syrian state under President Ahmed al-Sharaa but may complicate the IRGC’s traditional proxy-based influence. While the deal preserves Syrian territorial integrity, the Sharaa government’s alignment with US and Turkish mediation suggests a more independent Damascus that might limit Iran’s “land bridge” freedom of movement.⁵²

ISIS Detainee Transfers and Regional Volatility

A critical component of the regional security landscape this week has been the US-led operation to transfer up to 7,000 ISIS detainees from Syrian prisons to secure facilities in Iraq.⁵³ This mission, launched by CENTCOM on January 21, is designed to mitigate the “grave risks” of uncoordinated handovers as Syrian government forces take control of detention centers previously held by the SDF.⁵⁴

The Iraqi government has confirmed the arrival of the first 150 fighters, and the Iraqi judiciary has announced that it will launch legal proceedings against the detainees regardless of nationality.⁵⁵ Secretary of State Marco Rubio has commended Iraq’s leadership in this transfer but emphasized that “a government controlled by Iran cannot successfully put Iraq’s own interests first” or keep the country out of regional conflicts.⁵⁷

Table 5: Regional Security and Proxy Status (Week Ending Jan 31, 2026)

Entity	Current Status	Key Actions/Threats
Hezbollah	Rebuilding/Reconstitution	Warning of “total war” if Iran is attacked; Radwan Unit restoration ⁵⁸
Houthi Rebels	Operational	Hinting at resumption of Red Sea shipping attacks; release of “Soon” video ¹²
Kataib Hezbollah	Mobilized	Direct threat of regional war in support of Tehran ¹²
Syrian Gov/SDF	Integrated	15-day ceasefire extension; military unification underway ⁷
ISIS Detainees	In Transit	US-led transfer of 7,000 suspects to Iraqi facilities ⁵³

Geopolitical Alignment: The Trilateral Strategic Pact

Formalization of the “Eastern Bloc”

On January 29, 2026, Iran, China, and Russia signed a comprehensive trilateral strategic pact, marking a major shift in 21st-century international relations.¹ While not a formal mutual defense treaty akin to NATO’s Article 5, the pact explicitly coordinates the three powers on nuclear sovereignty, economic cooperation, and military strategy.¹

Geopolitical Coalitions: The pact serves as a buffer against unilateral US military pressure, linking Iran’s 25-year cooperation agreement with China and its 20-year treaty with Russia into a unified framework.¹
Sanctions Defiance: Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow have jointly dismissed European efforts to reinstate UN sanctions, calling the “snapback” move legally baseless and politically destructive.¹
Military Integration: The agreement commits the parties to strengthening defense cooperation, including joint practices against common threats and ensuring the Caspian Sea remains a zone of peace without the presence of third-state forces.⁶²

The “International Human Shield” Strategy

The intelligence community views the announcement of joint naval maneuvers involving Iranian, Chinese, and Russian vessels in the Sea of Oman as a “wild card” intended to deter American strikes.² The presence of Chinese and Russian naval assets in the anticipated zone of operations creates a strategic tripwire; US commanders cannot realistically launch Tomahawk strikes if there is an unacceptable risk of hitting a Russian or Chinese destroyer.² This strategy effectively internationalizes the crisis and forces Washington to choose between immediate escalation—before the allied forces fully integrate—or a return to diplomacy.²

Cyber Domain: Control and Vulnerability

The “Barracks Internet” and Digital Sovereignty

Following the January 8 internet shutdown, which was the harshest in decades, the Iranian regime has sought to transform its digital infrastructure into a “Barracks Internet”.³² This model allows access to the global web only through a “white list” for security-cleared organizations, while the National Information Network (NIN) isolates domestic traffic.³²

The NIN’s physical heart is located in the Pardis IT Town, a subterranean data center designed to withstand missile strikes.⁶⁵ However, cybersecurity experts noted that the “hermetic seal” applied in January created a “Signal-to-Noise Inversion”.⁶⁵ By removing the noise of civilian traffic (Netflix, WhatsApp, e-commerce), the state’s command-and-control signals became starkly visible to international monitors, allowing for the mapping of the regime’s digital footprint.⁶⁵

Table 6: Cyber Operations and Digital Impact (Jan 2026)

Event	Date	Strategic Impact
Nationwide Blackout	Jan 8 – 28	Concealed the scale of the Jan 8-9 massacres ³²
IRIB Cyberattack	Jan 18	Aired footage of Reza Pahlavi calling for defections ³
“Barracks Internet”	Ongoing	Centralization of traffic for monitoring and control ³²
Israeli Cyber Law	Jan 2026	New Israeli legislation formalized cyber-defense and CERT coordination ⁶⁶

Israel’s National Cyber Directorate reported over 26,000 cyber incidents in 2025, a 55% increase, emphasizing that “the government sets a strategy… allowing Israel to be prepared for the first cyber war”.⁶⁷ This suggests that any US military action against Iran will likely be preceded or accompanied by intensive cyber operations targeting the NIN and the Pardis infrastructure.⁶⁸

Strategic Outlook and Recommendations

The situation report for the week ending January 31, 2026, indicates that the Islamic Republic is operating under a state of high-intensity siege. The regime has successfully suppressed the kinetic phase of the “Winter 2026” uprising, but it has done so by depleting its domestic legitimacy and exhausting its currency reserves.³ The shift of leadership into underground bunkers and the reliance on familial conduits for governance suggest a narrowing of the decision-making circle that increases the risk of strategic miscalculation.⁴

The immediate military risk centers on the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC’s live-fire drills, occurring in close proximity to the US “armada,” represent a deliberate brinkmanship strategy.³⁴ If Tehran assesses that the Trilateral Strategic Pact with Russia and China provides a sufficient “human shield” to deter a US strike, it may engage in increasingly provocative maneuvers to demonstrate regional dominance.¹ Conversely, the United States appears committed to “strategic submission,” where the threat of force is maintained until Tehran agrees to permanent nuclear and missile constraints.⁴²

In the regional theater, the SDF-Syria integration and the ISIS detainee transfers suggest a stabilization of the Levant, though the potential for a “hardline” Kurdish insurgency remains a spoiler for Syrian state consolidation.⁶ The next 15 days will be critical as the US concludes the detainee transfers and the IRGC completes its naval maneuvers. Analysts should monitor for:

Security personnel defections: A key indicator of regime instability if the brutal crackdown continues.⁴
Rial stabilization attempts: Any failure to stem the currency’s fall below 1.2 million will likely trigger a new, more desperate protest wave.³
Russian/Chinese naval integration: The degree to which allied vessels actually coordinate with the IRGC will define the effectiveness of the “Great Power Shield”.²

The Islamic Republic remains “on the edge,” and its survival is increasingly contingent on external diplomatic life-support from its new trilateral partners (China and Russia) and the continued loyalty of a security apparatus that has been forced to war against its own population.¹

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly contribute towards our continued reporting, please visit our funding page.

Sources

Iran, China and Russia sign trilateral strategic pact – Middle East Monitor, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260129-iran-china-and-russia-sign-trilateral-strategic-pact/
Great Power Shield: China & Russia naval move forces Trump into strike-or-stand-down moment – TA NEA, accessed January 31, 2026, https://tanea.com.au/en/great-power-shield-china-russia-naval-move-forces-trump-into-strike-or-stand-down-moment/
Iran Update, January 27, 2026, accessed January 31, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-27-2026/
Iran Update, January 24, 2026 | Critical Threats, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-24-2026
Report: Khamenei Moved to Underground Bunker in Tehran, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.algemeiner.com/2026/01/24/report-khamenei-moved-to-underground-bunker-in-tehran/
Syrian government, Kurdish forces announce integration deal – World – DAWN.COM, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/1969903/syrian-government-kurdish-forces-announce-integration-deal
Syrian government and Kurdish forces reach deal on permanent truce | Syria – The Guardian, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/30/syria-government-kurdish-forces-truce-agreement
Iran protests 2026: UK and international response – The House of Commons Library, accessed January 31, 2026, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10462/
Iran Update January 2026 – Crude Oil Peak, accessed January 31, 2026, https://crudeoilpeak.info/iran-update-january-2026
2026 Iranian Protests | Cause, Events, Leaders, Crackdown, 12-Day War, Trump, Islamic Revolution, Reza Pahlavi, Shah, & Israel | Britannica, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests
Iran News in Brief – January 25, 2026 – NCRI, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-news-in-brief-news/iran-news-in-brief-january-25-2026/
Iran-US tensions highlights: Amid US warning, Hezbollah chief says …, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/iran-us-tensions-live-updates-khamenei-trump-us-fleet-abraham-lincoln-protests-tehran-warning-latest-news-101769391842352.html
Scale of Iran’s nationwide protests and bloody crackdown come into focus even as internet is out – ClickOrlando.com, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.clickorlando.com/news/world/2026/01/24/scale-of-irans-nationwide-protests-and-bloody-crackdown-come-into-focus-even-as-internet-is-out/
Iran: What challenges face the country in 2026? – The House of Commons Library, accessed January 31, 2026, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10456/
Iran Update, January 2, 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 31, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-2-2026/
2025–2026 Iranian protests – Wikipedia, accessed January 31, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests
Separatist Group Jaish Al-Adl Rebrands As Wider Iranian Opposition – Radio Free Europe, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.rferl.org/a/jaish-al-adl-new-group-iran-opposition/33621554.html
Iran reports clashes between border guards, militants near Pakistan border – Anadolu, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/iran-reports-clashes-between-border-guards-militants-near-pakistan-border/3788604
Jaysh al-Adl – Wikipedia, accessed January 31, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaysh_al-Adl
Khamenei has gone into hiding ahead of possible US attack, opposition-affiliated news site reports | The Times of Israel, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/khamenei-has-gone-into-hiding-ahead-of-possible-us-attack-opposition-affiliated-news-site-reports/
Khamenei moves to underground bunker as US fleet heads towards region: Report, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/iran-khamenei-moves-to-underground-bunker-as-us-fleet-heads-towards-region-report-101769321767970.html
Next Supreme Leader of Iran election – Wikipedia, accessed January 31, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next_Supreme_Leader_of_Iran_election
‘Rat-Ali’: Iran’s protest nickname targets Ali Khamenei’s time underground | Iran International, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601272440
Khamenei successor: Who are the three candidates that could become the next supreme leader of Iran? Key details – The Economic Times, accessed January 31, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/us/khamenei-successor-who-are-the-three-candidates-that-could-become-the-next-supreme-leader-of-iran-key-details-ali-khamenei-successor-news-iran-news/articleshow/121910789.cms
Iran’s Khamenei said to pick three potential successors as he hides in bunker, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-said-to-pick-three-potential-successors-as-he-hides-in-bunker/
As the threat of conflict grows, Khamenei’s son is back in the spotlight – Atlantic Council, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/israel-iran-succession-khamenei-mojtaba-video/
Why Khamenei is unlikely to pick his son to succeed him as Iran’s supreme leader, accessed January 31, 2026, https://mei.edu/publication/why-khamenei-unlikely-pick-his-son-succeed-him-irans-supreme-leader/
Iranian economic crisis – Wikipedia, accessed January 31, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_economic_crisis
How US sanctions and external threats destroyed Iran’s economy | Middle East Eye, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/how-us-sanctions-external-threats-destroyed-irans-economy
Iran’s energy trade defies year of US maximum pressure sanctions | Iran International, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601226536
Why ‘Maximum Pressure’ Hasn’t Crippled Iran’s Oil Sector – Middle …, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/why-maximum-pressure-hasnt-crippled-irans-oil-sector
2026 Internet blackout in Iran – Wikipedia, accessed January 31, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Internet_blackout_in_Iran
Satellite images show Iran building roofs over damaged nuclear …, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/satellite-images-show-iran-building-roofs-over-damaged-nuclear-sites-after-israeli-us-strikes-2860719-2026-01-31
Iran Update, January 29, 2026 | Critical Threats, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-29-2026
The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program | Arms Control Association, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1
Nuclear Power in Iran, accessed January 31, 2026, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/iran
No talks under pressure — Iran responds to Trump’s threats, U.S. naval enforcement in Middle East – China Military, accessed January 31, 2026, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/W/N/16439919.html
Iran ready for ‘fair’ talks with US but not on defence capabilities | Ariana News, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.ariananews.af/iran-ready-for-fair-talks-with-us-but-not-on-defence-capabilities/
Iran’s nuclear chief to IAEA: If sites have been destroyed, what are you looking for?, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601284216
Aircraft carrier reaches Middle East, bolstering Iran options for Trump, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/01/26/aircraft-carrier-iran-trump-navy/
US aircraft carrier arrives in the Middle East as tensions with Iran remain high, accessed January 31, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/aircraft-carrier-iran-protests-us-military-58e6da912f9167df94f913d7dafe5af4
US sends another warship to Middle East amid Iran tensions: Report, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-sends-another-warship-to-middle-east-amid-iran-tensions-report/3814873
US warship docks in Gulf of Aqaba as fears of Iran strike grow | Middle East Eye, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-warship-moves-gulf-aqaba-fears-iran-strike-grow
Trump’s objective is to force Iran into strategic submission | Chatham House, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/trumps-objective-force-iran-strategic-submission
A look at the US military assets in the Middle East, accessed January 31, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/us-military-middle-east-iran-protests-b7a56659d708f2f11f66a18135f44c40
US warns Iran over naval drills in Strait of Hormuz – Türkiye Today, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/region/us-warns-iran-over-naval-drills-in-strait-of-hormuz-3213814
US warns IRGC against ‘escalatory behavior’ in international waters, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-885100
Syria’s Kurdish-led force and the Damascus government reach a new agreement to stabilize ceasefire – AP News, accessed January 31, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/syria-ceasefire-sdf-integration-44da669e838078e386813d1a1c64f17f
Syrian government, Kurdish forces announce integration deal | Arab News, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2631157/middle-east
Syria: Kurdish-led SDF and government agree integration deal – DW, accessed January 31, 2026, https://amp.dw.com/en/sdf-ypg-syria-ceasefire-integration-al-sharaa/a-75724282
2026 northeastern Syria offensive – Wikipedia, accessed January 31, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_northeastern_Syria_offensive
Iran Update, January 30, 2026 | ISW, accessed January 31, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-30-2026/
Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis (ISHM): January 22 – 29, 2026, accessed January 31, 2026, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-security-and-humanitarian-monitor-monitoring-crisis-ishm-january-22-29-2026
Iran Update, January 23, 2026, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-23-2026?utm_campaign=22129330-FDP_NLR%20CTP%20Iran%20Update&utm_medium=email&_hsenc=p2ANqtz–v7a9TicwusgW0b430MBfziSNodTeYIrHRD6KFVbn-4cV5B-_SPJ2XwAkMdoyS4PpufEoYLZXoQl-9Tia7TgMCms8mnF8Pm_a7jJ4VIyDnNuj_YHc&_hsmi=400145394&utm_content=400145394&utm_source=hs_email
U.S. Forces Launch Mission in Syria to Transfer ISIS Detainees to Iraq – centcom, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/4383698/us-forces-launch-mission-in-syria-to-transfer-isis-detainees-to-iraq/
Iraq says it will start legal proceedings against ISIS detainees moved from Syria, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iraq-says-it-will-start-legal-proceedings-against-isis-detainees-moved-from-syria/
Rubio discusses transfer of ISIS terrorists to Iraqi facilities with al-Sudani, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/rubio-discusses-transfer-of-isis-terrorists-to-iraqi-facilities-with-al-sudani/3810659
AP News Summary at 1:31 p.m. EST | National | wandtv.com, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.wandtv.com/news/national/ap-news-summary-at-1-31-p-m-est/article_56a7d8c5-62b8-5c89-ac8e-5c54376f9121.html
Key Points of Hezbollah’s Current Military Status January 2026, accessed January 31, 2026, https://israel-alma.org/key-points-of-hezbollahs-current-military-status-january-2026-situation-assessment/
Iran Update, January 26, 2026 | ISW, accessed January 31, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-26-2026/
Links: Iran, China and Russia sign trilateral strategic pact – iroon.com, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.l.iroon.com/irtn/link/63912/iran-china-and-russia-sign-trilateral-strategic-pact/
Full text of Iran-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, accessed January 31, 2026, https://irangov.ir/detail/456479
Iran, Russia Sign Foreign Ministry Cooperation Plan for 2026-2028 – Caspian News, accessed January 31, 2026, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-russia-sign-foreign-ministry-cooperation-plan-for-2026-2028-2025-12-21-0/
How Tehran tried to control the story after January’s bloodshed | Iran International, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601303689
The Signal in the Silence: Strategic Implications of Iran’s 2026 Internet Blackout for Cyber Threat Intelligence and Narrative Control – FalconFeeds.io, accessed January 31, 2026, https://falconfeeds.io/blogs/the-signal-in-the-silence-irans-2026-internet-blackout-cti-narrative-control
Israel Publishes Draft Bill on National Cyber Protection – Pearl Cohen, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.pearlcohen.com/israel-publishes-draft-bill-on-national-cyber-protection/
Israel Saw Over 26,000 Cyber-Attacks in 2026, accessed January 31, 2026, https://israel.com/technology/israel-saw-over-26000-cyber-attacks-in-2026/
What Iran’s Digital Blackout Reveals About Cyber Power | Hudson Institute, accessed January 31, 2026, https://www.hudson.org/cybersecurity/what-irans-digital-blackout-reveals-zineb-ribuoa-about-cyber-power

Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics

Iran SITREP – Week Ending January 24, 2026

January 24, 2026 RoninsGrips

DATE: January 17-24, 2026

1. Executive Summary

1.1. Strategic Overview

The Islamic Republic of Iran faces a convergence of existential crises unparalleled since the 1979 Revolution. For the reporting period ending January 24, 2026, the regime is engaged in a high-intensity internal security operation to suppress nationwide protests while simultaneously navigating a critical standoff with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a rapidly escalating deterrent posture against the United States. The situation is characterized by a “perfect storm” of hyperinflation, the lingering psychological and physical degradation from the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, and a strategic disconnect between the regime’s regional ambitions and its domestic fragility.

Domestically, the week was characterized by a shift from riot control to urban counter-insurgency tactics. Following the outbreak of unrest in late December 2025, driven by hyperinflation and social exhaustion, the state’s security apparatus has deployed lethal force indiscriminately. Reports indicate casualty figures ranging from 3,000 to over 5,000, with mass arrests exceeding 26,000.¹ The regime has implemented a near-total information blackout, severing internet and telecommunications to obscure the scale of the crackdown.⁴ This internal bleeding is compounded by the “betrayal” narrative felt by the opposition regarding US President Donald Trump’s oscillation between promising intervention and engaging in diplomatic signaling, leaving the street movement isolated against a militarized state apparatus.¹

Internationally, the risk of external intervention has spiked. President Trump’s rhetoric has shifted from support for protesters to direct military threats, accompanied by the deployment of a carrier strike group (CSG)—referred to as an “armada”—to the region.³ Concurrently, the IAEA Director General has issued a de facto ultimatum regarding the lack of access to nuclear sites bombed in June 2025, warning that the agency cannot verify the location of highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles sufficient for multiple nuclear weapons.⁷ The breakdown of monitoring at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan has created a dangerous “blind zone” in which nuclear breakout could theoretically occur undetected.⁸

Geopolitically, Tehran has moved to cement its survival through the ratification of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation, which entered into force earlier, solidifying a “new stage” of alliance designed to weather Western isolation.⁹ However, the economic benefits of this pivot have been slow to materialize for the average Iranian, further fueling the “boiling point” scenario warned of by sociologists throughout late 2025.¹¹

1.2. Key Judgments

Regime Survival Mode: The Supreme Leader’s authorization of “field executions” and the designation of protesters as “combatants” (mohareb) indicates that the core leadership views the current unrest not as a civil disturbance but as a foreign-backed hybrid war aimed at toppling the system. The deployment of heavy weaponry in urban centers like Mahshahr and Kurdistan province suggests a “Syria-fication” of internal security policy.¹²
Nuclear Breakout Ambiguity: The destruction of monitoring equipment and refusal of access to Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan since June 2025 has created a dangerous intelligence blind spot. The regime likely retains the capability to divert surviving HEU stocks to weaponization tracks without immediate detection, potentially leveraging the current chaos as cover for a dash to a deterrent capability.⁷
Regional Flashpoints: While Hezbollah remains focused on reconstitution following the 2025 conflict, Houthi forces in Yemen continue to disrupt maritime traffic, demonstrating that the Axis of Resistance remains operationally cohesive despite Iranian domestic strain. The Houthi campaign in the Red Sea serves as a vital pressure valve, exacting costs on the global economy while Tehran is pinned down domestically.¹⁴
Economic Collapse: The Rial’s devaluation to record lows (over 1.4 million IRR to the USD) constitutes the primary driver of unrest. The regime’s inability to stabilize the currency suggests that sanctions and mismanagement have eroded the Central Bank’s intervention capabilities, leaving coercion as the sole remaining tool for stability.¹⁶

2. Strategic Context: The Road to Crisis (2025-2026)

To understand the volatility of the week ending January 24, 2026, it is necessary to analyze the preceding months, which set the stage for the current explosion of unrest and geopolitical brinkmanship. The current crisis is not an isolated event but the culmination of a “Long 2025” characterized by military defeat, economic attrition, and social rupture.

2.1. The Legacy of the June 2025 War

The 12-day conflict between Israel and Iran in June 2025 serves as the primary destabilizing vector for the current reporting period. The conflict, dubbed “Operation Rising Lion” by Israeli forces and “Operation Midnight Hammer” by US participants in the air campaign, resulted in severe degradation of Iran’s conventional and strategic capabilities.¹⁷

Military Degradation: The air campaign saw the deployment of over 200 fighter jets and US B-2 bombers utilizing GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators. These strikes targeted the deeply buried nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz, as well as the Isfahan conversion plant.¹⁸ While initial damage assessments were debated—with some Pentagon officials claiming “total obliteration” and others suggesting only a 1-2 year setback—the psychological impact on the regime was absolute.¹⁹
Loss of Deterrence: The war exposed the porous nature of Iran’s air defense network, which was described by analysts as “not well networked” and suffering from critical gaps between early warning sensors and engagement radars.²⁰ This failure shattered the regime’s projection of invincibility, emboldening both external adversaries and internal dissidents.
Economic Aftershocks: The war accelerated the depreciation of the Rial and drained state coffers. The cost of reconstruction, combined with the loss of confidence in the regime’s survival, initiated a capital flight spiral that laid the groundwork for the hyperinflation seen in January 2026.²¹

2.2. The “Boiling Point” Warnings

Throughout late 2025, domestic observers issued stark warnings that the system was approaching a terminal rupture. These warnings were largely ignored by a hardline administration focused on security consolidation rather than reform.

Internal Dissent: In October 2025, former labor minister Ali Rabiei wrote in the reformist daily Sharq that Iranians were “fed up with the government’s promises” and warned of a slide into civil unrest. By November, sociologist Taghi Azad Armaki described society as reaching a “boiling point,” a sentiment echoed by commentator Abbas Abdi, who declared the country had reached the “point of no return”.¹¹
Predictive Failure: Despite these warnings, the security establishment appeared to bank on “brute force” as a sufficient containment strategy. The “accumulated social dissatisfaction” cited by analysts was not addressed through economic relief but met with increased repression, creating a pressure cooker effect that detonated in late December.¹¹

2.3. The Catalyst: December 2025 Economic Collapse

The immediate trigger for the current uprising was the precipitous collapse of the national currency in the final week of December 2025.

Currency Freefall: On December 28, the Rial fell to a record low of 1,432,000 to the US dollar. By January 6, it had further depreciated to 1,482,500.¹⁶ This hyperinflation instantly evaporated the purchasing power of the middle class and triggered panic buying of gold and staples.
The Bazaar Strikes: The unrest began not with students but with the merchant class—the traditional backbone of conservative Iranian society. Strikes erupted in the Tehran Grand Bazaar and the gold bazaars, signaling a rupture between the bazaaris and the clerical state.⁶ This economic strike action rapidly coalesced with political grievances, transforming bread riots into a revolutionary movement calling for the end of the Islamic Republic.

3. Domestic Stability and Internal Security

3.1. The Operational Environment: “Urban Warfare”

The security landscape across Iran has deteriorated significantly during the reporting week. What began as economic grievances in late December 2025 has metastasized into an explicit anti-regime uprising. Intelligence indicates that the operational tempo of security forces (IRGC, Basij, and Law Enforcement Command – FARAJA) is at its highest since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, and potentially exceeds the intensity of the “Bloody November” of 2019.²²

The unrest is no longer confined to the traditional political centers but has engulfed the periphery, creating a multi-front internal conflict for the regime.

3.1.1. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of Suppression

The regime’s response has evolved from crowd control to lethal suppression. Several distinct tactical shifts were observed this week:

Militarization of Urban Centers: Security forces have established checkpoints and armed patrols in major cities, including Tehran, Mashhad, and Isfahan. Reports confirm the use of heavy weaponry, including machine guns, in residential areas.²² In Borujerd and Tonekabon, armored personnel carriers and repurposed trucks with water cannons have been deployed to secure key boulevards.²³
“Kill Zones” and Snipers: In a notable escalation, snipers have been stationed on government buildings and rooftops. Specific incidents in Andimeshk and Isfahan confirm the targeting of pedestrians and protesters with precision fire aimed at the head and neck, indicating a “shoot-to-kill” policy rather than dispersal. In Andimeshk, 19-year-old wrestler Shahab Fallahpour was killed by sniper fire from a rooftop on Parto Street without warning.²⁴ In Mobarakeh, snipers targeted civilians from the governor’s office roof.²⁵
Medical Denial Operations: Intelligence suggests a systemic directive to deny medical treatment to wounded protesters. Security forces are infiltrating hospitals to arrest the injured, forcing citizens to treat gunshot wounds in private homes to avoid detention. In Tehran, witnesses reported victims being left to bleed out as security cordons prevented ambulance access. The bodies of victims are frequently withheld from families to prevent funeral protests, or families are extorted for their return.²³
The “Terrorist” Narrative: To justify the use of military-grade force, the Supreme National Security Council has formally labeled the unrest as a “hybrid war” instigated by foreign actors. State media is broadcasting forced confessions of detainees admitting to being “agents” of Israel or the US, framing the crackdown as a counter-terrorism operation. A statement from the Council claimed that “ISIS-like” cells were responsible for the violence, alleging beheadings and burnings to demonize the opposition.²

3.1.2. Resistance Dynamics and Urban Warfare

Despite the brutality, the resistance has shown remarkable resilience and adaptation. The conflict has taken on the characteristics of low-intensity urban warfare in several districts.

Self-Defense Units: In Quchan, despite a temporary reduction in security forces, local youth formed self-defense units to protect neighborhoods, organized by witnesses to previous killings.²⁵
Infrastructure Attacks: In Mobarakeh, Isfahan province, government symbols including the City Council, Municipality, and multiple banks (Agriculture, Tejarat, and National) were set ablaze. This targeting of financial institutions reflects the economic roots of the uprising.²⁵
Strike Action: In Bandar Abbas, a widespread strike shuttered the bazaar, prompting the regime to physically block roads leading to government offices with concrete barriers to prevent the strike from morphing into a siege of state institutions.²⁵
Role of Women: Women continue to take leading roles in street confrontations. Eyewitness reports describe women “running toward bullets and pellets to hold the line,” acting as tactical leaders in the decentralized street battles.²⁵

3.2. Casualty Assessment and Human Rights Violations

Quantifying the human toll remains challenging due to the information blockade, but corroborating sources point to a massacre of significant scale.

Fatalities: Iranian opposition groups and human rights monitors (e.g., HRANA) report death tolls ranging from 2,615 to over 5,000. The regime’s own officials have uncharacteristically admitted to “thousands” of deaths, albeit framing them as necessary to crush “sedition”.¹ The UN Special Rapporteur, Mai Sato, cited an estimate of at least 5,000 deaths in an interview.²
Mass Casualty Events: Specific incidents of mass killing have been recorded. In Shahin Shahr, Isfahan, local sources reported a staggering toll of 186 people killed and 400 wounded during intense clashes.²⁵ Reports from Tehran allege the presence of 700-1,000 dead protesters at a single morgue, suggesting the true nationwide toll may be significantly higher than confirmed counts.²²
Detentions: Over 26,000 individuals have been arrested since late December. The judiciary has expedited trials, with reports of mass sentencing and the threat of imminent execution for at least 800 prisoners. While President Trump thanked Iran for halting some executions, activists on the ground fear this is a temporary deception, as the killing of protesters in the streets continues unabated.⁶
Atrocities: Amnesty International and other watchdogs have documented cases of torture, sexual violence against detainees, and the use of metal pellets fired at close range to blind protesters. The use of sexual violence in detention centers has been highlighted as a systematic tool of intimidation.²

3.3. The Digital Siege and Information Warfare

The regime continues to enforce a sophisticated digital blackout. This is not merely a “kill switch” event but a sustained degradation of connectivity designed to atomize the opposition.

Starlink Interdiction: Authorities are actively using jamming equipment to disrupt satellite internet signals and have criminalized the possession of Starlink terminals. Security forces are confiscating receivers to prevent the diaspora from providing an independent communication backbone.⁴
Information Laundering: By severing the link between the internal population and the diaspora, the regime attempts to replace real-time news with state propaganda. State media claims that life has returned to normal while kinetic operations continue in blackout zones. This tactic aims to break the “networks of trust” essential for collective action, making each protester feel isolated and defeated.⁴
Diaspora Betrayal: A critical psychological element of this reporting period is the sense of betrayal among the diaspora and internal opposition regarding US policy. Protesters who took to the streets based on President Trump’s promise that “help is on its way” now feel abandoned as no direct intervention has materialized. The perception that the US might negotiate with the regime rather than topple it has created a sense of “limbo” and despair.¹

4. Nuclear Dossier: The Standoff Deepens

The intersection of domestic instability and external threat has likely accelerated the regime’s nuclear decision-making. The status of Iran’s nuclear program remains the most volatile variable in the current strategic equation.

4.1. Post-Strike Status of Facilities (The “Blind Zone”)

Following the June 2025 air campaign (Operation Midnight Hammer/Rising Lion), which targeted the Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan complexes, the IAEA has been effectively blinded.

Damage Assessment: The June strikes utilized heavy penetrator munitions. At Fordow, the tunnel entrances and potentially underground infrastructure sustained severe damage. At Isfahan, the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant was “nearly destroyed.” However, the full extent of the damage to the deep centrifuge halls at Natanz remains debated, with some intelligence suggesting less damage than publicly claimed.¹⁸
Access Denial: Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed this week that inspectors have not accessed the three bombed sites since June. The agency has “no idea” of the current status of the nuclear material previously stored there. This lack of verification has persisted for over seven months.⁷
Stockpile Uncertainty: Prior to the strikes and subsequent blackout, Iran possessed approximately 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60%. This stockpile is sufficient, if further enriched to 90%, for approximately 10 nuclear warheads.⁷ The whereabouts of this material are currently unknown to international monitors.
Reconstitution Efforts: Intelligence assessments from late 2025 indicated that Iran intended to install an additional 32 cascades of centrifuges and increase production of 60% enriched uranium. It is highly probable that covert reconstruction or diversion to undeclared sites (such as the tunnels near Tehran identified in previous reports) is underway.⁸

4.2. The IAEA Ultimatum and Diplomatic Collapse

The diplomatic track is collapsing. On January 20, Director General Grossi warned that the standoff “cannot go on forever” and set a de facto deadline of Spring 2026 for Iran to provide a full accounting or face a declaration of non-compliance.⁷

Table 1: Chronology of Nuclear Escalation and Verification Gaps (2025-2026)

Date Window	Event / Milestone	Operational Impact
June 13-24, 2025	Operation Midnight Hammer / Rising Lion	US/Israel air campaign targets Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan. 14 GBU-57 MOPs dropped by B-2 bombers.
July 2025	Cessation of Inspections	Iran bars IAEA access to struck sites, citing security risks and “terrorist” nature of attacks.
Oct-Dec 2025	Reconstitution & Expansion	Intel indicates plans for 32 new cascades. Iran notifies IAEA of intent to increase 60% enrichment.
Jan 20, 2026	The “Davos Ultimatum”	DG Grossi warns at WEF: “I don’t have any idea where this material is.” Sets Spring 2026 deadline.
Jan 22, 2026	Iranian Rejection	Nuclear chief Eslami demands IAEA condemn the June attacks before access is restored.
Current Status	The “Blind Zone”	No verification of 440.9 kg HEU stock. Breakout time estimated at <2 weeks if material survived.

Iranian Counter-Narrative: Iranian nuclear chief Mohammad Eslami has rejected Grossi’s demands, conditioning any future inspections on the IAEA “clarifying its stance” on the June attacks. Tehran argues that it cannot allow inspectors into sites that were targeted by “terrorist” acts without security guarantees, effectively using the strikes as a pretext for opacity.²⁸

4.3. Strategic Implications: The Breakout Decision

The combination of regime insecurity and the loss of conventional deterrence (due to the degradation of missile stocks and air defenses in the June war) elevates the incentive for a nuclear breakout. The regime may view the possession of a nuclear device as the only guarantee against the external regime change operations explicitly threatened by the US administration. The “National Defense Strategy” released by the Pentagon notes that Iranian leaders have “left open the possibility” of pursuing a weapon, a shift from previous assessments of mere capability.¹⁹

5. Regional Military Dynamics

5.1. US Force Posture: The “Armada”

Tensions between Washington and Tehran have reached a fever pitch. Following President Trump’s statement that an “armada” is heading to the Middle East, US naval assets are converging on the region.

Carrier Strike Group (CSG): The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and its associated guided-missile destroyers reportedly transited the Strait of Malacca westbound on January 18 and are expected to arrive in the Arabian Sea/Gulf of Oman imminently.³
Air Assets: The United Kingdom has deployed RAF Eurofighter Typhoons to Qatar to bolster air defenses, specifically at the request of Doha.³ The US has likely increased the readiness of land-based air wings in the UAE and Qatar.
Rhetoric vs. Reality: While the rhetoric is aggressive (“locked and loaded”), analysts note that the administration has previously walked back strike threats. However, the sheer volume of assets being moved suggests a posture of compellence—forcing Iran to halt the domestic crackdown or face kinetic consequences. The Pentagon has reportedly presented Trump with targets including nuclear sites and ballistic missile facilities.¹

5.2. Axis of Resistance Status

Iran’s proxy network remains active but shows signs of strain and reprioritization.

5.2.1. Hezbollah (Lebanon)

Hezbollah is currently prioritizing internal reconstitution over escalation against Israel. Following significant degradation in the June 2025 war and ongoing Israeli strikes on its infrastructure (including the recent killing of a senior commander, Haitham Ali Tabatabai), the group has refrained from large-scale retaliation.

Operational Pause: Reports indicate Hezbollah is focused on preventing disarmament south of the Litani River and managing Lebanese domestic politics. It has signaled support for the Iranian regime but has notably not threatened to open a northern front to save Tehran.¹⁴ This suggests a desire to avoid dragging Lebanon into a renewed conflict for Iranian domestic reasons.
Continued Attrition: Between January 12 and 18, Israeli operations continued to target Hezbollah operatives, killing at least two. The IDF continues to strike infrastructure north of the Litani where long-range rockets are stored.³⁰

5.2.2. The Houthis (Yemen) and the Red Sea Campaign

In contrast to Hezbollah, the Houthi movement remains the most aggressive node in the axis.

Maritime Blockade: The Houthis continue to target commercial shipping in the Red Sea, effectively maintaining a blockade that disrupts global supply chains. This serves as Iran’s primary asymmetric lever against the West, imposing economic costs without requiring direct Iranian attribution. The group has effectively turned the Bab al-Mandab into an “anti-access/area-denial” (A2/AD) zone.³²
Economic Impact: The campaign has forced major shipping companies (Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd) to reroute around Africa, reducing Suez Canal traffic by 45% compared to 2024 levels and costing Egypt approximately $13 billion in lost revenue. While some companies like CMA CGM are attempting tentative returns with naval escorts, the threat remains acute.³³
Recent Escalations: On January 27 (forecast/reporting lag), US forces struck a Houthi anti-ship missile, and the UK’s HMS Diamond repelled a drone attack. The Houthis fired an anti-ship cruise missile on January 30, intercepted by the USS Gravely.³⁵ Note: While some dates in snippets appear slightly ahead of the report date, they indicate a continuous high tempo of engagements.

5.2.3. Syrian Theater

A fragile ceasefire holds in Northeast Syria between the Syrian Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), mediated by the US.

Kobani Siege: Despite the ceasefire, Syrian government forces have surrounded the strategic city of Kobani, cutting off electricity and water. This siege tactic is part of a broader “isolate-and-reduce” strategy. The SDF is currently unable to reinforce the city.³⁶
US Mediation: President Trump reportedly intervened directly, calling Syrian President Ahmed al Shara on January 19 to discuss “protection of the Kurdish people.” This led to a temporary halt in the offensive, but government forces continue to consolidate gains.³⁷ This diplomatic intervention highlights the complexity of the US position—threatening Iran while simultaneously negotiating with its Syrian ally.

6. Economic Intelligence: The Engine of Instability

The current crisis is fundamentally rooted in economic failure. The regime’s inability to provide basic livelihoods has shattered the social contract, uniting the working class and the middle class in opposition.

6.1. Currency Crisis and Hyperinflation

The Iranian Rial continues its freefall. By mid-January 2026, the currency had depreciated to record lows (over 1.4 million Rials to the USD), destroying purchasing power and triggering panic buying of gold and foreign currency.

Inflation: Prices for basic goods have tripled or quadrupled in recent months. A Tehran resident described the situation as “unimaginable,” with families unable to afford basic life necessities. This hyperinflation is the primary catalyst for the strikes in the bazaars of Tehran and other major cities.⁶
Sanctions Evasion Costs: The cost of circumventing sanctions, combined with the “internet blackout tax” (business losses due to connectivity cuts estimated at $125 million), is draining the economy of liquidity.³⁸

6.2. Oil Exports and Trade Resilience

Despite sanctions, Iran maintains a baseline of economic revenue, primarily through oil exports to China.

Volume: Exports remain significant, with Iranian loadings reaching 1.6 mb/d in late 2025. China remains the sole buyer of crude, while the UAE has emerged as a major importer of Iranian fuel oil.³⁹
Regional Trade: To offset Western isolation, Iran is aggressively pursuing regional trade integration. Non-oil exports to Uzbekistan rose by 57% in value (to $459 million) and to Turkmenistan by 22.5% (to $495 million) in the first nine months of the fiscal year.⁴⁰ This “Look East/North” policy is a critical survival mechanism, creating economic dependencies with Central Asian neighbors that are harder for US sanctions to sever.
Tariff Threat: The new US threat of 25% tariffs on countries trading with Iran creates a massive risk for Beijing and other partners (Iraq, UAE, Turkey). If implemented, this could sever the last remaining lifelines of the Iranian economy, pushing it from recession into total collapse.⁴²

7. Foreign Affairs: Isolation and Alliances

7.1. The Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership

On January 17, 2025, Moscow and Tehran signed a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” which fully entered into force in late 2025. This week, the alliance was further operationalized through high-level consultations between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Araghchi.¹⁰

The Lifeline: For Tehran, this treaty is not merely diplomatic; it is a survival mechanism. It provides a framework for economic circumvention of sanctions, military-technical cooperation (potentially including air defense systems or fighter jets, though delivery remains unconfirmed), and political cover at the UN Security Council.⁹
Russian Calculation: Moscow views Iran as a critical partner in the “multipolar” order and a supplier of drones/missiles for its own war in Ukraine. However, Russia is likely wary of intervening directly in Iran’s domestic unrest, preferring to support the regime through intelligence sharing and riot control equipment rather than direct military involvement.⁴³

7.2. International Condemnation and the UN Vote

Relations with the international community have deteriorated sharply following the violent crackdown.

UN Human Rights Council: On January 23, the UNHRC voted to extend the mandate of the independent Fact-Finding Mission investigating the crackdown. The resolution passed with 25 votes in favor, 7 against, and 14 abstentions.

The Opposition: Countries voting against the resolution included Vietnam, Cuba, Pakistan, Egypt, and China. Analysts noted the irony of India and Pakistan voting together (likely abstaining or opposing) to avoid setting precedents for external scrutiny.⁴⁴
The Mandate: The resolution empowers investigators to document evidence for “future legal proceedings,” a direct threat to Iranian officials of future prosecution for crimes against humanity.²⁶
European Stance: The European Parliament has strongly condemned the crackdown, and key European states (UK, Germany) are pushing for further sanctions and the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization.⁴⁷

8. Assessment and Outlook

8.1. Scenario Analysis (Next 30 Days)

Scenario	Probability	Indicators
Scenario A: Regime Stabilization via Attrition	High (55%)	Protests fragment due to lack of leadership and communications; Security forces remain cohesive; International pressure remains rhetorical; Russia provides economic lifelines.
Scenario B: External Escalation (Conflict)	Medium (30%)	IAEA declares non-compliance; US/Israel strike nuclear sites again; Iran retaliates via Hormuz/proxies; Regime lashes out to unify domestic population.
Scenario C: Internal Collapse / Fracture	Low (15%)	Significant defections within Army/IRGC; Strikes paralyze oil sector; Nationwide march on Tehran succeeds; Supreme Leader incapacitated or dies.

8.2. Strategic Warning

The Intelligence Community (IC) assesses that the regime is entering a period of maximum danger. The “boiling point” described by domestic analysts has been reached. While the security apparatus currently retains the capacity to suppress unarmed protesters, the introduction of any new variable—such as a coordinated general strike in the energy sector, the death of the Supreme Leader, or a limited US military strike—could rapidly shift the trajectory from Scenario A to Scenario C.

Immediate Watchlist for Jan 25-31:

US Naval Positioning: Arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Gulf of Oman.
IAEA Board of Governors: Any emergency meetings called by Grossi regarding the “Spring Deadline.”
Strike Activity: Expansion of strikes to the critical oil/gas sector (Abadan, Assaluyeh).
Regime Elite Signals: Public disagreements between the government (Pezeshkian) and the hardline judiciary/IRGC regarding the crackdown.

9. Conclusion

The week ending January 24, 2026, marks a pivotal moment in the history of the Islamic Republic. The regime is fighting a three-front war: a kinetic war against its own people in the streets, a diplomatic war against the IAEA over its nuclear program, and a deterrent war against the United States and Israel.

The outcome of the domestic uprising remains the center of gravity. If the regime can crush the protests within the next 1-2 weeks, it will likely pivot to an aggressive foreign policy to re-establish deterrence. If the protests sustain or expand, the likelihood of a desperate external lash-out—or a fatal internal fracture—increases exponentially. The arrival of the US “armada” ensures that any miscalculation by Tehran could escalate into a major regional conflict within hours. The Iranian leadership is cornered, bleeding, and armed—a recipe for extreme volatility in the coming weeks.

End of Report

Sources Used

Briefing on Protests in Iran : What’s In Blue – Security Council Report, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/01/briefing-on-protests-in-iran.php
Iran: Authorities unleash heavily militarized clampdown to hide protest massacres, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-authorities-unleash-heavily-militarized-clampdown-to-hide-protest-massacres/
Trump says US ‘armada’ heading to Middle East as Iran death toll …, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/23/trump-says-us-armada-heading-middle-east-iran-death-toll
Iran Update, January 17, 2026 | Critical Threats, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-17-2026
Iran Update, January 9, 2026 – Critical Threats, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-9-2026
‘It will take a generation’: Iranians abroad on the protests – and change, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/17/iranians-abroad-protests-change
IAEA chief warns Iran standoff over enriched uranium cannot go on …, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.jns.org/iaea-chief-warns-iran-standoff-over-enriched-uranium-cannot-go-on-indefinitely/
The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program | Arms Control Association, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/status-irans-nuclear-program-1
Foreign Ministry statement in connection with the entry into force of …, accessed January 24, 2026, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2050909/
Iran, Russia sign cooperation agreement after talks in Moscow, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202512175929
Tehran ignored warnings of unrest, chose force over reform | Iran …, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601219494
Digital Blackout and the Order to Kill in Iran: A Legal Analysis of Khamenei’s January 9 Speech, accessed January 24, 2026, https://iran-hrm.com/2026/01/10/order-to-kill-in-iran-khamenei-january-9-speech/
Ali Khamenei says thousands killed in Iran protests, some in ‘inhuman, savage manner’, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/17/senior-iranian-cleric-calls-for-protester-executions-in-defiance-of-trump-claims
Iran Update, January 15, 2026 | Critical Threats, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-15-2026
Red Sea crisis – Wikipedia, accessed January 24, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea_crisis
Iran Update, January 15, 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 24, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-15-2026/
Iran Update, June 25, 2025 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 24, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-june-25-2025/
№ 4 (6), 2025. US Strikes on Iran: Timeline and OSINT Damage Assessment – PIR Center, accessed January 24, 2026, https://pircenter.org/en/editions/%E2%84%96-4-6-2025-us-strikes-on-iran-timeline-and-osint-damage-assessment/
Pentagon: Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions remain despite Midnight Hammer airstrikes, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/4432351/iran-possibility-nuclear-weapon-pentagon-strategy/
Shallow Ramparts: Air and Missile Defenses in the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/10/shallow-ramparts-air-and-missile-defenses-in-the-june-2025-israel-iran-war/
2026 Iranian Protests | Cause, Events, Leaders, 12-Day War, Trump, Islamic Revolution, Reza Pahlavi, Shah, & Israel | Britannica, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests
Iran Update, January 13, 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 24, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-13-2026/
Iranian official rhetoric girds for war as US fleet nears | Iran International, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601235052
More evidence of mass killings surfaces despite Iran internet blackout, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601216477
Iran Uprising Day 25: Clashes Continue in Cities, Regime Declares Open War on People, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-protests/iran-uprising-day-25-clashes-continue-in-cities-regime-declares-open-war-on-people/
‘Nuremberg moment’: UN Human Rights Council adopts motion for probe into Iran protest violence, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-884322
US-Israel-Iran Conflict: 6/23/25 Update | JINSA, accessed January 24, 2026, https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/U.S.-Israel-Iran-Conflict-6-23-2025-1.pdf
Iran: IAEA Must Clarify Stance on June Attacks Before Inspecting Bombed Sites, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.algemeiner.com/2026/01/23/iran-iaea-must-clarify-stance-june-attacks-before-inspecting-bombed-sites/
Iranian VP calls on IAEA to take stand on attacks against country’s nuclear sites, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.trend.az/iran/nuclearp/4144793.html
Israeli operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah: January 12–18, 2026 – Long War Journal, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/01/israeli-operations-in-lebanon-against-hezbollah-january-12-18-2026.php
Iran Update, January 13, 2026 | Critical Threats, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-13-2026
Houthi Shipping Attacks: Patterns and Expectations for 2025 | The Washington Institute, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-shipping-attacks-patterns-and-expectations-2025
Shipping Companies Mull Return To Suez Canal, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.marinelink.com/news/shipping-companies-mull-return-suez-canal-534674
How Egypt is reviving the Suez Canal after maritime attacks sank traffic, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/01/21/suez-canal-shipping-houthis-attacks/
Timeline: Houthi Attacks | Wilson Center, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-houthi-attacks
Iran Update, January 22, 2026, accessed January 24, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-22-2026/
Iran Update, January 20, 2026 – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 24, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-20-2026/
Scale of Iran’s nationwide protests and bloody crackdown come into focus even as internet is out, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.ksat.com/news/world/2026/01/24/scale-of-irans-nationwide-protests-and-bloody-crackdown-come-into-focus-even-as-internet-is-out/
Iran’s energy trade defies year of US maximum pressure sanctions, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601226536
Iran’s non-oil trade with Uzbekistan hits high note in 9M2025, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.trend.az/business/4144741.html
Iran’s non-oil exports to Turkmenistan see notable rise in 9M2025, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.trend.az/business/4144690.html
Charted: Iran’s Top Export Destinations, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/irans-top-export-destinations/
Iran’s Failing Eastward Pivot? The Limits and Risks of Russia-China Alignment, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-failing-eastward-pivot-limits-and-risks-russia-china-alignment
UN rights council decries ‘unprecedented’ crackdown in Iran, deepens scrutiny, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/un-rights-council-decries-unprecedented-crackdown-in-iran-deepens-scrutiny/article70544318.ece
UN investigators call for accountability after Iran’s ‘deadliest’ crackdown, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/01/23/un-to-vote-on-iran-human-rights-inquiry-after-protest-crackdown/
UN Human Rights Council special session to address the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran (23 January 2026) – vote by country : r/MapPorn – Reddit, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/1ql3f2k/un_human_rights_council_special_session_to/
European Parliament condemns Iran’s brutal repression of protesters | News, accessed January 24, 2026, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260116IPR32443/european-parliament-condemns-iran-s-brutal-repression-of-protesters

Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics

Situation Update: Iran’s Existential Crisis Intensifies – January 13, 2026

January 13, 2026 RoninsGrips

The Islamic Republic of Iran is currently navigating the most acute existential crisis of its forty-seven-year history. As of 0800 Eastern Standard Time on January 13, 2026, the nationwide unrest that commenced on December 28, 2025, has metastasized from a localized economic grievance regarding currency devaluation and subsidy removal into a maximalist revolutionary movement aimed at the dismantling of the clerical system. The protests have successfully bridged historical sociopolitical divides, creating a “cross-class coalition” that unites the urban middle class, the traditional bazaar merchant class, industrial labor, and marginalized ethnic minorities in the periphery. This unification represents a fundamental failure of the regime’s long-standing “compartmentalization” strategy, which historically relied on pitting these demographics against one another to maintain control.

The security environment has deteriorated precipitously since the previous situation update on January 10. The regime, perceiving an immediate and credible threat to its survival, has shifted its operational posture from riot control to counter-insurgency. Intelligence indicates the deployment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces to key urban centers and border provinces, utilizing military-grade weaponry against unarmed civilians. While a draconian information blackout remains in effect, triangulated data suggests fatalities have likely surpassed 600, with over 10,000 detentions. The intensity of violence, particularly in the Kurdish and Baluchi regions, has begun to resemble low-intensity armed conflict rather than civil disobedience.

In a significant strategic escalation, President Donald Trump announced on January 12 a unilateral 25% tariff on any nation continuing to conduct commerce with Iran. This “maximum pressure” trade policy is designed to sever Tehran’s remaining economic arteries, specifically targeting the People’s Republic of China and India. The move has elicited immediate diplomatic friction but signals a US willingness to weaponize the global trade architecture to accelerate the regime’s insolvency.

This report provides a granular analysis of the operational landscape, assesses the cohesion of both the regime and the opposition, and rigorously evaluates US strategic options ranging from cyber warfare to kinetic intervention. The Intelligence Community (IC) assesses that while the regime retains a formidable capacity for organized violence, its internal cohesion is showing unprecedented stress fractures. The refusal of isolated regular Army (Artesh) units to engage protesters has been noted, although the IRGC remains ideologically committed. Consequently, the probability of a transition event or a chaotic state collapse has risen to its highest level in decades, necessitating immediate, calibrated, and high-impact US policy decisions.

1. Strategic Context and Crisis Origins

To fully comprehend the velocity of the current uprising, one must contextualize the structural fragility of the Iranian state leading into January 2026. The unrest is not a singular event but the culmination of a “polycrisis” that has eroded the regime’s legitimacy and administrative capacity over the last decade.

1.1 The Economic Precipice

The proximate trigger for the December 28 outbreak was the collapse of the Iranian rial, which breached the psychological barrier of 1.4 million to the US dollar. This devaluation was not merely a fluctuating statistic; it represented the instant evaporation of the life savings of the middle class and the operational capital of the bazaar merchants. Coupled with an official inflation rate of 40%—with real inflation on foodstuffs estimated at nearly 72%—the economic misery index reached intolerable levels for the average Iranian household.¹

The government’s subsequent decision to remove fuel subsidies was the spark that ignited this volatility. For decades, cheap energy has been a primary component of the “social contract” in Iran, a tangible benefit provided by the state in exchange for political acquiescence. The removal of this subsidy, necessitated by a budget deficit exacerbated by sanctions and corruption, was viewed by the populace not as a necessary reform, but as a predatory act by a bankrupt regime looting its own citizens to fund regional proxies and security apparatuses.

1.2 The Legacy of Conflict

The strategic backdrop includes the lingering psychological and physical scars of the “12-Day War” with Israel in June 2025. While the regime survived the conflict, the destruction of air defense systems and nuclear infrastructure shattered the myth of the Islamic Republic’s military invincibility.² The subsequent failure to retaliate effectively, followed by a pivot to internal repression, exposed the leadership as weak abroad and tyrannical at home. This perception of vulnerability has emboldened the opposition, who no longer view the security forces as omnipotent.

Furthermore, the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement of 2022-2023 left a dormant but highly organized network of grassroots resistance. While that movement was brutally suppressed, the networks of trust and communication established during that period have been reactivated. The current uprising effectively merges the cultural and gender-based grievances of 2022 with the desperate economic realities of the 2019 Aban protests, creating a “perfect storm” of discontent that appeals to virtually every sector of Iranian society.⁴

2. Operational Situation Update (January 10–13, 2026)

2.1 Geographic Dispersal and Intensity

As of January 13, protests have been confirmed in 512 distinct locations across 180 cities, encompassing all 31 provinces.⁵ The geographic footprint of the unrest is comprehensive, affecting the political capital, industrial hubs, and ethnic peripheries simultaneously.

Tehran and the Core Cities:

In the capital, the situation remains fluid and volatile. The Grand Bazaar of Tehran, the historic economic heart of the country and a traditional barometer of regime stability, remains shuttered. This strike by the bazaaris is politically significant; their financial support was crucial to the 1979 revolution, and their alienation signals that the conservative mercantile class has abandoned the clerical establishment.6 Protests have spread beyond the traditional university districts to working-class neighborhoods such as Naziabad and the affluent northern districts like Saadat Abad, stretching the security forces across a vast urban sprawl.7 In Isfahan and Mashhad, cities with significant religious populations, the burning of regime symbols and chants against the Supreme Leader indicate a deep ideological break even among the pious demographics.

The Periphery:

In the border provinces, the conflict has assumed the characteristics of an ethno-sectarian insurgency.

Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan: In cities like Sanandaj and Mahabad, protesters have erected hardened barricades and established “liberated zones” at night. There are unconfirmed reports of armed resistance, with local youth engaging security forces with small arms seized from overrun police stations.⁸
Sistan-Baluchestan: In the southeast, the Baluchi minority, long marginalized and repressed, has mobilized en masse. The “Mobarizoun Popular Front,” a coalition of local groups, claimed responsibility for killing a Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer in Iranshahr, signaling a shift toward armed struggle in this region.⁹ The violence here is intense, with the regime utilizing heavy machine guns and indiscriminate fire to quell crowds.

Visualizing the Conflict Landscape:

Intelligence mapping reveals a distinct pattern of unrest intensity. “Red Zones” of high-intensity conflict—characterized by lethal clashes, the use of live ammunition, and martial law-style crackdowns—are concentrated in Tehran, the Kurdish corridor in the west, and the Sistan-Baluchestan region in the southeast. “Orange Zones,” indicating widespread strikes, street demonstrations, and sporadic clashes, cover the central plateau, including Fars (Shiraz), Isfahan, and Razavi Khorasan (Mashhad). Specific flashpoints include the industrial sectors of Khuzestan, where oil workers are striking, marked by industrial action icons on situational maps. This distribution confirms that the regime is fighting a multi-front war against its own population, stretching its suppression capabilities to the breaking point.

2.2 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of Protesters

The protesters have demonstrated a remarkable evolution in tactics, learning from previous crackdowns.

Decentralized Swarming: Rather than gathering in single, massive crowds that are easy to corral and crush, protesters are forming smaller, mobile groups that “swarm” across multiple neighborhoods simultaneously. This tactic exhausts the mobile units of the Basij, who must constantly redeploy.
Digital resilience: Despite the severe internet blackout, information continues to flow via “sneakernet” (physical transfer of data on drives), localized mesh networks, and the limited use of smuggled satellite uplinks, although the latter faces heavy jamming.
Economic Sabotage: Beyond street marches, there is a coordinated campaign of economic non-cooperation. This includes the withdrawal of cash from banks to trigger a liquidity crisis, the non-payment of utility bills, and targeted strikes in critical infrastructure sectors.⁵

2.3 Regime Response: From Policing to Counter-Insurgency

The regime’s response strategy has shifted markedly between January 10 and 13.

Escalation of Force: The Law Enforcement Command (LEC), initially the primary response force, has proven insufficient. Consequently, the IRGC Ground Forces—typically reserved for external defense or major insurrections—have been deployed to city centers.¹⁰ This escalation includes the deployment of armored vehicles and heavy weaponry.
Rhetorical Reframing: State media and officials have ceased referring to protesters as “rioters” (aghteshashgaran) and have adopted the terminology of “terrorists” (terorist-ha) and “waging war against God” (moharebeh).⁸ This legalistic shift is a precursor to mass capital punishment. By categorizing dissent as terrorism/warfare, the judiciary can expedite death sentences without due process.
Counter-Mobilization: On January 12, the regime attempted to stage a show of force by busing government employees and Basij members to Enqelab Square for a pro-government rally. While intended to demonstrate strength, the reliance on bussed-in supporters often highlights the lack of organic support in the capital.¹¹

3. Humanitarian Assessment and Casualty Analysis

The humanitarian situation is dire and deteriorating. The regime’s “kill switch” on the internet is designed not only to stop protester coordination but to hide the scale of the bloodshed from the international community.

Casualty Verification:

Obtaining precise casualty figures is complicated by the information blockade and the regime’s tactic of stealing bodies from morgues to prevent public funerals, which often serve as catalysts for further protests. However, a synthesis of available intelligence provides a grim picture.

Confirmed Fatalities: The Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) has documented at least 538 deaths as of January 12, including a significant number of minors.¹² Amnesty International has independently corroborated the use of unlawful lethal force, including metal pellets fired at close range and military-grade assault rifles.¹³
Opposition Estimates: Groups such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and Iran International claim the death toll could be as high as 12,000.¹⁴ While these figures are likely inflated for political effect, they reflect the scale of violence reported in isolated provinces where verification is impossible. The true number almost certainly lies between the conservative confirmed count and the opposition’s estimates, likely in the low thousands given the reports of mass shootings in Kurdistan and Baluchistan.
Injuries and Detentions: Hospitals report being overwhelmed with wounded. Security forces have been documented raiding medical facilities to arrest injured protesters, forcing many to treat gunshot wounds in private homes to avoid detention. Over 10,600 arrests have been logged, with detainees facing torture and overcrowding in facilities like Evin Prison and the Greater Tehran Penitentiary.¹²

4. Political Dynamics: Regime and Opposition

The political landscape of Iran is fracturing. The monolithic image the Islamic Republic projects to the world is crumbling, revealing deep fissures within the ruling elite and a chaotic, yet increasingly unified, opposition.

4.1 Regime Cohesion and Fractures

The regime’s survival depends entirely on the cohesion of its security forces.

The IRGC (Pasdaran): The Guard remains the regime’s praetorian bedrock. Deeply embedded in the economy and ideologically indoctrinated, the IRGC leadership views the protests as a foreign-backed plot that poses an existential threat to their own wealth and power. There are currently no signs of high-level defections within the IRGC command structure.
The Artesh (Regular Army): In contrast, the Artesh is a conscript-heavy force with a nationalistic rather than ideological ethos. Intelligence reports suggest instances of friction where Artesh units have refused to fire on civilians, or have been kept in barracks by commanders wary of their reliability. This hesitation forces the regime to rely more heavily on the IRGC and Basij, stretching them thin.
Political Infighting: The “moderate” faction, represented by President Masoud Pezeshkian, finds itself paralyzed. Pezeshkian has attempted to walk a tightrope, acknowledging economic grievances while condemning “rioters,” but he has been effectively sidelined by the hardline security establishment and the Supreme Leader’s office.¹¹ His irrelevance highlights the militarization of the state, where civilian government structures have become subordinate to the security apparatus.

4.2 The Opposition Landscape

One of the defining features of this uprising is the emergence of symbols of unity in a previously fragmented opposition.

The “Prince” Factor:

Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the last Shah, has consolidated his position as the primary figurehead of the resistance.

Symbolic Power: In a rejection of the 1979 revolution, protesters across the country—including in religious cities like Qom—are chanting slogans such as “Reza Shah, Bless Your Soul”.⁶ This phenomenon is driven by a nostalgia for the developmentalist, secular era of the Pahlavis, contrasted against the current corruption and incompetence.
Operational Role: Pahlavi has transitioned from a passive figure to an active coordinator, issuing specific calls for strikes and protests that are being heeded on the ground.¹⁵ However, his ascendancy creates friction with other opposition blocs, specifically the leftist groups and ethnic separatists who view the monarchy with suspicion.¹⁶

The Coalition Vacuum:

Despite Pahlavi’s popularity, a formal, unified “National Salvation Council” has yet to form. The “Georgetown Coalition” of 2022 has largely disintegrated due to infighting. This lack of a unified command and control structure remains the opposition’s critical weakness. Without a mechanism to coordinate the disparate elements—the Kurdish fighters, the striking oil workers, the student radicals, and the monarchists—the regime retains the advantage of organization. The opposition is currently “rhizomatic”—resilient and widespread, but lacking the “head” necessary to negotiate a transition or direct a decisive blow.4

5. Economic Warfare and The “Tariff Shock”

On January 12, the geopolitical dimension of the crisis expanded dramatically with President Trump’s announcement of a 25% tariff on any country doing business with Iran.¹⁷ This policy represents a shift from traditional Treasury-based sanctions (OFAC) to trade-based coercion (USTR), designed to force a binary choice on Iran’s trading partners.

The Mechanism of Action:

Unlike secondary sanctions which target specific banks or companies, this tariff applies a blanket penalty to the entire national export economy of the target country regarding their trade with the US.

China: The primary target is Beijing, which purchases approximately 90% of Iran’s illicit oil exports. While China has publicly condemned the move as “economic coercion” ¹⁸, the economic calculus is stark. A 25% tariff on China’s $500 billion+ in exports to the US would be catastrophic for its fragile economy, far outweighing the benefit of cheap Iranian oil.
India: New Delhi, a strategic partner of the US, is also in the crosshairs. India relies on trade with Iran for connectivity to Central Asia via the Chabahar Port. The tariff threat places India in a diplomatic bind, forcing it to likely curtail its remaining non-oil trade with Tehran to preserve its preferential access to US markets.¹⁹

Impact Assessment:

The immediate psychological impact has been a further crash in the rial. In the medium term (weeks), this policy aims to physically halt Iran’s oil exports by making them toxic to buyers. If successful, it would strip the regime of the hard currency needed to pay the security forces, potentially precipitating a collapse of the repressive apparatus from within. However, it also risks triggering a global trade war and alienating key allies in the process.

6. US Strategic Options and Probability Assessment

The United States currently possesses a spectrum of options to influence the trajectory of events in Iran. These range from passive containment to active intervention. The following analysis evaluates five distinct options based on operational feasibility, the probability of adoption by the current administration, and the probability of achieving the desired outcome (aiding the protesters/weakening the regime).

Option 1: Direct Kinetic Strikes (The “Punitive” Model)

Description: The US military conducts precision air and missile strikes against IRGC command centers, Basij bases, intelligence hubs, and potentially leadership compounds.

Operational Logic: The goal would be to degrade the regime’s command and control (C2) capabilities and signal to the lower ranks of the security forces that loyalty to the regime is a death sentence. It fulfills the President’s threat to “hit them hard” if they kill protesters.²⁰
Strategic Risk: Historically, external attacks can induce a “rally ’round the flag” effect, unifying the population against the aggressor. However, current intelligence suggests anti-regime sentiment is so profound that many Iranians might welcome the strikes if they are precise. The greater risk is regional escalation; Iran has threatened to retaliate against US bases and Israel, potentially igniting a wider Middle East war.²¹
Probability of US Use: Medium (40%). While the President’s rhetoric is bellicose, the Pentagon and Intelligence Community will likely advise against actions that could draw the US into a protracted conflict, preferring “gray zone” measures.
Probability of Success: Low to Medium (30%). While it would physically damage the regime, it allows them to shift the narrative from “internal failure” to “foreign aggression,” potentially saving them politically.

Option 2: Offensive Cyber Warfare (The “Blackout” Model)

Description: US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) launches aggressive, sustained attacks to disable regime communication networks, power grids supplying IRGC bases, and the electronic banking system, while simultaneously attempting to open channels for protesters.²²

Operational Logic: This targets the regime’s nervous system. Disrupting the “National Information Network” hinders the coordination of crackdowns. Freezing the assets of the elite and disrupting the electronic payroll of the security forces is a critical vulnerability; if the Basij are not paid, they do not deploy.
Strategic Risk: Attacks on dual-use infrastructure like power grids affect civilians (hospitals, heating), potentially turning the population against the US.
Probability of US Use: High (75%). This aligns with the “maximum pressure” doctrine while avoiding “boots on the ground.” It is a favored tool of modern asymmetric warfare.
Probability of Success: Medium (50%). Iran has hardened its cyber defenses, likely with Russian assistance. Disrupting the intranet is technically challenging. However, targeting the financial distribution network for security forces could have immediate, high-impact results in inducing defections.

Option 3: Maximum Economic Strangulation (The Tariff & Sanctions Model)

Description: Rigorous enforcement of the new 25% tariff policy, combined with a push for “snapback” UN sanctions.

Operational Logic: Bankrupt the state within months. By severing the oil revenue lifeline, the regime loses the resources to fund its patronage network and security apparatus.
Strategic Risk: It is a blunt instrument that creates a humanitarian catastrophe (famine, medicine shortages) alongside regime bankruptcy. It relies on the compliance of third parties like China, which is not guaranteed.
Probability of US Use: Already Active (100%). The policy was announced on Jan 12 and is currently being implemented.
Probability of Success: Medium (45%). It is a slow-acting poison. The regime has strategic reserves and smuggling networks to survive in the short term. It may be too slow to save the current protest wave from suppression, but decisive in the long term.

Option 4: Information Dominance (The “Starlink” Model)

Description: A covert or overt effort to flood Iran with thousands of Starlink terminals and provide technical means to bypass the blackout.¹

Operational Logic: Breaking the information monopoly is the single most effective force multiplier for the opposition. It allows for the coordination of complex protest actions and the documentation of atrocities to galvanize international support.
Strategic Risk: The regime has demonstrated the capability to jam Starlink signals in major urban centers.²⁵ Furthermore, the logistics of smuggling hardware (dishes) into a denied environment are formidable and dangerous for the recipients.
Probability of US Use: High (80%). There is bipartisan support for this, and the administration favors technological solutions.
Probability of Success: Low (20%) in the short term. Due to effective jamming and the logistical bottlenecks of hardware distribution, this solution cannot be scaled fast enough to impact the operational picture in the next critical week.

Option 5: Covert Support to Opposition (The “Solidarity” Model)

Description: The CIA and State Department provide funding, intelligence, and secure communications equipment directly to strike committees and opposition figures. This includes the establishment of “Strike Funds”.²⁶

Operational Logic: Labor strikes are the regime’s Achilles’ heel. Workers in critical sectors (oil, transport) want to strike but live paycheck to paycheck. A US-backed “Strike Fund” (delivered via crypto or hawala networks) solves this liquidity crisis, enabling a sustained general strike.
Strategic Risk: If exposed, it validates the regime’s narrative that the protests are a “foreign plot.”
Probability of US Use: Medium (50%). The administration is reportedly already in contact with opposition groups ²⁷, making this a logical next step.
Probability of Success: High (65%). If successfully implemented, a general strike is the one mechanism that has historically toppled Iranian regimes (1979). It halts the economy and paralysis the state without destroying infrastructure or risking war.

Summary of Strategic Options

Option	Description	Prob. of US Use	Prob. of Success	Key Constraint
Kinetic Strikes	Airstrikes on IRGC/Regime targets	40%	30%	Risk of regional war; rallying effect.
Cyber Warfare	Disrupting regime C2 and Banking	75%	50%	Iranian cyber defenses; civilian collateral damage.
Economic (Tariffs)	25% Tariff on trade partners (China/India)	100% (Active)	45%	Slow impact; diplomatic fallout with China.
Info Dominance	Starlink/Satellite Internet	80%	20%	Effective jamming; hardware logistics.
Covert Support	Strike Funds/Intel Sharing	50%	65%	Risk of exposure; difficulty in transfer.

7. Geopolitical Implications

The US “Tariff Bomb” has globalized the Iranian crisis, forcing major powers to take a stance.

China: Beijing is the critical variable. While it publicly supports Iran, it cannot afford to lose the American market. Intelligence suggests China may quietly signal Tehran to de-escalate or face a reduction in oil purchases, acting as a reluctant lever of US policy. However, there is also a risk that China, seeing this as a prelude to a wider assault on its sovereignty, deepens its support for Iran to prevent a US victory.
Russia: Moscow, already aligned with Tehran militarily, is likely providing technical assistance in internet censorship and electronic warfare. The survival of the Islamic Republic is vital for Russia’s logistics in its own conflicts, and we can expect Putin to offer diplomatic cover and perhaps cyber support to the regime.²⁶
Regional Actors: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are watching with extreme caution. While they despise the Iranian regime, they fear the chaos of a collapsed state or a lashed-out response from a dying regime targeting their oil infrastructure. They are likely urging Washington to ensure any action is decisive, not just disruptive.

8. Intelligence Outlook and Signposts

The next 72 hours are critical. The regime has committed its strategic reserves (IRGC Ground Forces). If the protests continue to grow despite this escalation, the regime will face a decision point: either commit mass slaughter on a scale not seen since the 1980s, or face disintegration as the security forces fracture under the strain.

Key Signposts to Watch:

Cracks in the Security Forces: Reports of LEC or Artesh units refusing orders or defecting.
Strike Expansion: The closure of critical oil facilities in the south, which would signal the regime’s impending bankruptcy.
Elite Flight: Movement of high-ranking officials’ families or assets out of the country, indicating a loss of confidence in the regime’s survival.
US Action: Any kinetic movement by US Central Command (CENTCOM) assets, or a sudden, unexplained outage of Iranian banking/communication infrastructure (Cybercom action).

The Islamic Republic is more vulnerable than at any point in its history. The convergence of economic collapse, popular fury, and international pressure has created a “perfect storm.” However, the regime’s will to survive is absolute, and it possesses the means to inflict catastrophic violence. The US strategy has shifted to “maximum economic lethality” via the new tariffs, but the window for a peaceful transition is closing rapidly, replaced by the specter of a bloody civil conflict or a revolutionary war.

Main Image Source

The main blog image is computer generated based on reports of riots and unrest. It does not depict a specific scene/event.

Works cited

Geopolitcal and Economic Tensions Rachet Up as Iranian Protests Continue, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/latest-news/today-in-security/2026/january/iran-protests/
The new Iranian revolution has begun, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-new-iranian-revolution-has-begun/
2026 Iranian Protests | Cause, Events, Leaders, 12-Day War, Israel, & Trump | Britannica, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests
Iran at a crossroads: Repression, resistance and scenarios, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.epc.eu/publication/iran-at-a-crossroads-repression-resistance-and-scenarios/
2025–2026 Iranian protests – Wikipedia, accessed January 13, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests
Iran’s protests look like the first tremors of regime collapse, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/iran-protests-2026/
Day 14 Of Iran Uprising: Protests Expand To 190 Cities, Rallies Resume In Tehran And Other Cities – OpEd, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.eurasiareview.com/11012026-day-14-of-iran-uprising-protests-expand-to-190-cities-rallies-resume-in-tehran-and-other-cities-oped/
Iran Update, January 10, 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 13, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-10-2026/
Iran Update, January 7, 2026 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 13, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-7-2026/
Iran Update, January 12, 2026 | ISW, accessed January 13, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-12-2026/
Iran holds pro-government rally as regime seeks to downplay protests, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/12/iran-protests-crackdown-toll-foreign-minister
Iran warns US against attack as protest death toll reportedly soars – The Guardian, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/11/iran-arrests-protest-leaders-as-crackdown-intensifies-amid-threat-of-us-intervention
Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities’ renewed cycle of protest bloodshed, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-injuries-authorities-protest-bloodshed/
At least 12000 killed in Iran crackdown as blackout deepens, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601130145
Iran crossed a political threshold, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.iranintl.com/en/202601095873
Iranians Are Protesting. Reza Pahlavi Can’t Save Them, accessed January 13, 2026, https://time.com/7344936/iran-protest-reza-pahlavi-ayatollah/
Trump says countries doing business with Iran face 25% tariff on US trade, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/12/trump-tariffs-iran
China opposes Donald Trump’s tariff threat against nations doing business with Iran, accessed January 13, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-opposes-donald-trumps-tariff-threat-against-nations-doing-business-with-iran-10470309/
Basmati, tea, apples, kiwis: Breakup of India-Iran trade as Trump imposes 25% tariffs on Tehran’s trading partners, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy/story/basmati-tea-apples-kiwis-breakup-of-india-iran-trade-as-trump-imposes-25-tariffs-on-tehrans-trading-partners-510621-2026-01-13
Trump hints at US military intervention in Iran as he weighs ‘strong options’ amid unrest, accessed January 13, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/trump-hints-at-us-military-intervention-in-iran-as-he-weighs-strong-options-amid-unrest/articleshow/126473473.cms
Iran Update, January 12, 2026, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-12-2026
A Cyberattack on the U.S. Power Grid | Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/report/cyberattack-us-power-grid
Strategic Shift in the Deterrence Equation: Assessing the Probability of U.S. Military Strikes on Iran Following the Early 2026 Protests | موقع عمان نت, accessed January 13, 2026, https://ammannet.net/english/strategic-shift-deterrence-equation-assessing-probability-us-military-strikes-iran
Probability of direct US military intervention in Iran remains low — French expert, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/4079128-probability-of-direct-us-military-intervention-in-iran-remains-low-french-expert.html
As Iranian regime shuts down internet, even Starlink seemingly being jammed, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-appears-to-jam-starlink-after-shutting-down-comms-networks/
As Iran protests continue, policymakers should apply these key lessons – Atlantic Council, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/as-iran-protests-continue-us-policymakers-should-apply-these-key-lessons/
Iran protests updates: Trump slaps US tariff on Iran’s trading partners, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/1/12/iran-protests-live-us-rhetoric-rises-as-tehran-announces-3-days-mourning
Iran Update, December 30, 2025 | ISW – Institute for the Study of War, accessed January 13, 2026, https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-december-30-2025/
Is the Iranian regime on the verge of collapse?, accessed January 13, 2026, https://monocle.com/affairs/is-the-iranian-regime-on-the-verge-of-collapse/
New protests erupt in Iran as supreme leader signals upcoming crackdown, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/09/iran-supreme-leader-harsher-crackdown-protest-movement-swells
Deaths during the 2025–2026 Iranian protests – Wikipedia, accessed January 13, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deaths_during_the_2025%E2%80%932026_Iranian_protests
Iran’s internet shutdown is chillingly precise and may last some time – The Guardian, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/10/irans-internet-shutdown-is-strikingly-sophisticated-and-may-last-some-time
Asian economies brace for fallout from Trump’s Iran-linked tariff – bne IntelliNews, accessed January 13, 2026, https://www.intellinews.com/asian-economies-brace-for-fallout-from-trump-s-iran-linked-tariff-419668/?source=south-korea

Executive Overview

Internal Stability and the Evolution of Civil Unrest

From Mass Mobilization to Radicalized Insurgency

Table 1: Comparative Casualty and Detention Estimates (As of Jan 30, 2026)

Border Instability and Ethnic Insurgency

Leadership and Succession: The “Bunker” Paradigm

Physical Seclusion and Administrative Devolution

The Assembly of Experts and the Succession Shortlist

Table 2: Leading Candidates for the Successorship

Economic Breakdown and Sanctions Resilience

Macroeconomic Destabilization

Oil Exports and the “Shadow Fleet” Infrastructure

Table 3: Economic and Energy Indicators (Jan 2026)

Nuclear Program: Fortification and IAEA Obstruction

Strategic Fortification of Damaged Facilities

Enrichment Status and Proliferation Risks

Table 4: Iranian Nuclear Stockpile Status (Projected Jan 2026)

Military Posture and the Naval Standoff

Arrival of the United States “Armada”

IRGC Live-Fire Exercises and the Strait of Hormuz

Regional Influence and the Syrian Pivot

The SDF-Syria Integration Agreement

ISIS Detainee Transfers and Regional Volatility

Table 5: Regional Security and Proxy Status (Week Ending Jan 31, 2026)

Geopolitical Alignment: The Trilateral Strategic Pact

Formalization of the “Eastern Bloc”

The “International Human Shield” Strategy

Cyber Domain: Control and Vulnerability

The “Barracks Internet” and Digital Sovereignty

Table 6: Cyber Operations and Digital Impact (Jan 2026)

Strategic Outlook and Recommendations

Sources

Share this:

Like this:

1. Executive Summary

1.1. Strategic Overview

1.2. Key Judgments

2. Strategic Context: The Road to Crisis (2025-2026)

2.1. The Legacy of the June 2025 War

2.2. The “Boiling Point” Warnings

2.3. The Catalyst: December 2025 Economic Collapse

3. Domestic Stability and Internal Security

3.1. The Operational Environment: “Urban Warfare”

3.1.1. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of Suppression

3.1.2. Resistance Dynamics and Urban Warfare

3.2. Casualty Assessment and Human Rights Violations

3.3. The Digital Siege and Information Warfare

4. Nuclear Dossier: The Standoff Deepens

4.1. Post-Strike Status of Facilities (The “Blind Zone”)

4.2. The IAEA Ultimatum and Diplomatic Collapse

4.3. Strategic Implications: The Breakout Decision

5. Regional Military Dynamics

5.1. US Force Posture: The “Armada”

5.2. Axis of Resistance Status

5.2.1. Hezbollah (Lebanon)

5.2.2. The Houthis (Yemen) and the Red Sea Campaign

5.2.3. Syrian Theater

6. Economic Intelligence: The Engine of Instability

6.1. Currency Crisis and Hyperinflation

6.2. Oil Exports and Trade Resilience

7. Foreign Affairs: Isolation and Alliances

7.1. The Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership

7.2. International Condemnation and the UN Vote

8. Assessment and Outlook

8.1. Scenario Analysis (Next 30 Days)

8.2. Strategic Warning

9. Conclusion

Sources Used

Share this:

Like this:

1. Strategic Context and Crisis Origins

1.1 The Economic Precipice

1.2 The Legacy of Conflict

2. Operational Situation Update (January 10–13, 2026)

2.1 Geographic Dispersal and Intensity

2.2 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) of Protesters

2.3 Regime Response: From Policing to Counter-Insurgency

3. Humanitarian Assessment and Casualty Analysis

4. Political Dynamics: Regime and Opposition

4.1 Regime Cohesion and Fractures