Analytics and Reports, Country Analytics

SITREP Venezuela – Week Ending February 06, 2026

Executive Summary

The reporting period ending February 06, 2026, marks the end of a pivotal first month following the United States military intervention, “Operation Absolute Resolve,” which radically altered the Venezuelan political landscape on January 3, 2026. The intelligence and national security environment of the past week is defined by a fragile stabilization of the interim government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, as it navigates the transition from kinetic conflict to a complex legislative and diplomatic restructuring.1 Central to the week’s developments was the National Assembly’s unanimous passage of the first reading of the “Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence” on February 5, a move that serves as a critical de-escalation signal to both domestic opposition and the Trump administration.3 This legislative progression occurs against a backdrop of continued releases of political prisoners, with confirmed figures reaching 383 individuals as of February 5, although at least 800 remain in custody according to human rights monitors.1

In the energy sector, the “sequenced restart” of Venezuela’s oil economy is gaining momentum through a series of legal overhauls and strategic licenses issued by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The implementation of General Licenses 46 and 47 has provided a pathway for “established U.S. entities” to resume oil lifting and logistics, while domestic reforms to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law have effectively dismantled the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) monopoly.6 However, the economic stability afforded by these reforms has yet to reach the general population. The official exchange rate of the bolívar continues to exhibit severe volatility, surging by nearly 10 units in a single day during the reporting period, which has further eroded the real value of the national minimum wage to below USD.8

Geopolitically, the February 3 summit between President Donald Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro at the White House signaled a significant diplomatic thawing in the region. The two leaders moved toward a pragmatic alignment on border security, counter-narcotics efforts, and the stabilization of Venezuela.10 Concurrently, the United Nations Security Council’s response remains muted, reflecting a cautious “wait-and-see” posture from major powers, including Russia and China, who have prioritized maintaining current levels of influence while formally condemning the U.S. intervention.12 Security indicators suggest that while large-scale military clashes have ceased, the persistence of “colectivos” and the “revolving door” of political arrests maintain a high level of social tension and humanitarian risk for the 7.9 million Venezuelans in need of assistance.14

Operational Backdrop and Security Environment

Review of Operation Absolute Resolve and Immediate Aftermath

The security situation during the first week of February 2026 is inextricably linked to the tactical outcomes of Operation Absolute Resolve. Executed in the early morning hours of January 3, the operation involved a highly coordinated strike by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), supported by maritime and air assets, targeting the command-and-control infrastructure of the Maduro administration.1 Satellite imagery analyzed during the reporting week confirms that the strikes were “surgical” rather than “shock and awe,” focusing on air defense suppression at La Carlota Air Base and the neutralization of Maduro’s personal security detail at Fuerte Tiuna.17

Casualty assessments updated as of February 6 indicate that the intervention resulted in approximately 75 deaths.17 The high proportion of Cuban security personnel among the fatalities—32 in total—highlights the depth of foreign military involvement in the previous regime’s defense architecture.1 The repatriation of these individuals on January 15 and the subsequent mass funeral in Havana underscored the geopolitical significance of their deaths, particularly Colonel Humberto Roca, a veteran of Castro-era security.1 The reporting period has seen a transition from active military engagement to an investigative phase, with the Venezuelan Attorney General’s Office still attempting to finalize the total count of military and civilian deaths.1

Casualty ClassificationEstimated Total (Feb 6 Update)Key Units/Locations AffectedSource
Venezuelan Military23 – 47Presidential Guard, Fuerte Tiuna1
Cuban Military/Security32Special Forces (Advisors), Caracas1
Civilians2Catia La Mar, El Hatillo1
U.S. Personnel (Injured)7SOF Teams1

FANB Internal Dynamics and the Preservation of State Order

The National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) have maintained a posture of institutional survival throughout the current reporting week. Following the capture of Maduro, the FANB high command, led by Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, made the strategic decision to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as acting president.1 This recognition was motivated by a desire to prevent a total institutional collapse and the potential for a “second wave” of U.S. strikes, which President Trump had explicitly threatened if the military interfered with the transition.2

The intelligence community observes a significant shift in the FANB’s role from ideological vanguard to administrative custodian. During the week ending February 6, military personnel remained deployed at “strategic points,” including oil facilities and telecommunications hubs, under the terms of the State of External Commotion (Decree 5,200).18 However, the “Putinization” of the leadership—a term used by analysts to describe the consolidation of power within a small circle of hardline loyalists—suggests that internal dissent is being managed through pre-emptive purges and a heightened focus on surveillance.16 There is evidence that the chain of command remains fragile, with some units experiencing “administrative chaos” due to the removal of several top-tier commanders during the January 3 strikes.20

The Role of Colectivos and Urban Security

A critical security risk noted during the reporting week is the continued activity of “colectivos,” the pro-government paramilitary groups that functioned as Maduro’s street-level enforcers.14 Intelligence reports from Caracas and Maracaibo indicate that these groups are patrolling neighborhoods, setting up checkpoints, and searching the cell phones of motorists for evidence of support for the U.S. intervention or the “kidnapping” of Maduro.18

The Rodríguez administration has sent mixed signals regarding these groups. While the acting president has promised “peace” and a “new political moment,” the state has not taken tangible steps to disarm these paramilitary actors.20 This creates a bifurcated security environment where the formal military maintains the border and critical infrastructure, while non-state actors continue to manage social control through intimidation.16 Human rights organizations emphasize that as long as this “repression machinery” is not dismantled, the release of political prisoners remains a “revolving door” tactic rather than a genuine shift toward democratic governance.5

Political Transition and Governance Analysis

The Legitimacy of the Rodríguez Interim Government

The governance of Venezuela for the week ending February 6, 2026, rests on a delicate legal framework established by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) immediately following the capture of Nicolás Maduro. The Constitutional Chamber ordered Delcy Rodríguez to assume the interim presidency for an initial 90-day period, citing Article 234 of the Constitution to address the “forced absence” of the incumbent.2 Rodríguez has spent the reporting period reinforcing her executive authority through a series of decree-laws and high-profile legislative sessions, accompanied by her brother, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez.1

Analysts highlight a sophisticated “survival strategy” employed by the Rodríguez siblings. While publicly condemning Maduro’s capture as a “kidnapping” and declaring seven days of mourning for the “martyrs” of the January 3 strike, they have simultaneously moved to satisfy the Trump administration’s core demands regarding oil access and the release of political prisoners.1 This dual-track approach allows them to maintain the loyalty of the Chavista base while avoiding further military confrontation with the United States.23

The Amnesty Law: Legislative Mechanics and Political Implications

The most significant political development of the week was the National Assembly’s unanimous first-reading approval of the “Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence” on February 5.3 The law is designed to cover political offenses dating from 1999 to the present, representing a potential clemency for thousands of protesters, journalists, and opposition leaders who have been targeted by the state over the past quarter-century.4

The specifics of the law, as seen in drafts circulated by news agencies, include:

  • Immediate Clemency: Release of individuals jailed for political protests or critiquing public figures.25
  • Asset Restoration: The return of properties and assets seized from political opponents.4
  • Cancellation of International Measures: The lifting of Interpol “red notices” and other international warrants previously issued against exiled opposition figures.4
  • Exclusions: The law explicitly denies clemency to those convicted of murder, drug trafficking, corruption, or “serious human rights violations”.4

While the law has been welcomed with “cautious optimism” by rights groups like Foro Penal and PROVEA, concerns persist that the exclusion of certain crimes could be used to keep high-profile dissidents in jail under fabricated charges.27 The second and final debate for the law has yet to be scheduled, but Jorge Rodríguez has signaled that it will be taken up with “urgency”.3

Political FigureStatus/Action (Reporting Week)Implication
Delcy RodríguezSigned oil industry overhaul; proposed Amnesty BillPositioning as a pragmatic partner for U.S..7
Jorge RodríguezLed National Assembly in first vote for Amnesty LawCentralizing legislative power to enact concessions.3
María Corina MachadoCalled for release of ALL prisoners; skeptical of reformMaintaining pressure for a full democratic transition.4
Andrés VelásquezRe-emerged from hiding; testing political spaceSignaling a slow return of visible opposition in Caracas.26
Tarek William SaabInvestigating fatalities; announced death of prisonerManaging the legal narrative of the transition.1

The Closing of El Helicoide: Symbolic De-escalation

On January 31, leading into the current reporting week, Delcy Rodríguez announced the shutdown of El Helicoide, the Caracas prison synonymous with systemic torture and human rights abuses.27 The decision to convert the facility into a cultural and sports center is a heavy-handed symbolic gesture intended to signal a break from the most repressive aspects of the Maduro era.27 However, human rights advocates point out that the officials accused of ordering the abuses at El Helicoide were present in the audience when the announcement was made, suggesting that the “machinery of repression” has shifted its location rather than its personnel.5

Economic and Energy Sector Analysis

Privatization and the Hydrocarbons Law Reform

The reporting period has seen the most significant structural change to the Venezuelan economy in over two decades. On January 29, the National Assembly approved a comprehensive reform of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law, which was subsequently signed by Acting President Rodríguez.6 This law effectively dismantles the state-centric “Chavista” model of oil production and seeks to lure back major U.S. and international energy firms.6

The new legal framework includes several revolutionary shifts:

  • Independent Operations: Private companies can now operate oil projects under new production-sharing models or as majority owners in joint ventures, allowing them to manage cash flows independently of PDVSA.7
  • Asset Management: Private producers are permitted to commercialize production, manage asset transfers, and engage in outsourcing arrangements without prior state interference.6
  • Dispute Resolution: For the first time, independent arbitration is permitted, removing the requirement that disputes be settled in Venezuelan courts—a major barrier to entry for Western firms wary of political interference.6
  • Royalty Adjustments: Extraction taxes have been modified, setting a royalty cap rate of , with the executive branch granted the flexibility to set percentages based on the capital investment needs and competitiveness of specific projects.7

The market response has been bullish. Shares of major U.S. oil companies, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips, moved higher in anticipation of renewed access to the world’s largest proven oil reserves.2 Chevron, which maintained a presence in Venezuela under restrictive licenses, saw its stock rise by over .2

U.S. Sanctions and the General License Framework

Following the passage of the new Hydrocarbons Law, the U.S. Treasury Department’s OFAC issued two general licenses that define the current trade parameters:

  1. General License 46 (GL 46): This license authorizes “established U.S. entities” (organized under U.S. law as of January 29, 2025) to engage in the lifting, exportation, transportation, and refining of Venezuelan-origin oil.6 A critical safeguard in GL 46 requires that all monetary payments to the Venezuelan government be made into the Foreign Government Deposit Funds (FGDF) at the U.S. Treasury, or other U.S.-controlled accounts, ensuring that the revenue is overseen by Washington.6
  2. General License 47 (GL 47): Issued on February 3, GL 47 authorizes the export, sale, and supply of U.S.-origin diluents (such as naphtha) to Venezuela.6 Because Venezuela’s oil is primarily “extra-heavy,” these diluents are physically necessary to reduce viscosity for pipeline transport and refining.6

These licenses represent a “selective rolling back” of sanctions designed to prioritize the revival of the oil sector while maintaining maximum pressure on other areas of the government, such as the mining and telecommunications sectors, which remain sanctioned.31

Currency Instability and Hyperinflationary Pressure

While the macro-economic outlook for the energy sector is improving, the micro-economic reality for Venezuelan citizens is deteriorating. The Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) announced a surge in the official exchange rate that has “economic alarms” ringing across the country.8 On January 7, the official rate jumped by bolívares in a single day—a devaluation—and as of early February, it has reached over bolívares per dollar.8

The implications for the population are severe. The national minimum wage, fixed at bolívares since March 2022, has lost nearly all its purchasing power. As of the week ending February 6, the monthly minimum wage converts to approximately USD.8 Hyperinflation, which had technically abated in previous years, is projected to return to triple digits as the state’s access to foreign currency remains limited despite the new oil deals.8

DateOfficial Exchange Rate (VED/USD)Real Monthly Min. Wage (USD)Source
January 07, 2026321.038
January 27, 2026358.039
January 30, 2026366.399
February 02, 2026377.9935

Market intelligence reports emphasize that this is a “sequenced restart” rather than a broad-based boom.36 The stability of the currency is entirely dependent on whether the new oil-linked cash flows can be unlocked and redistributed before social discontent leads to further unrest.8

Foreign Affairs and Regional Diplomacy

The Trump-Petro Meeting: Pragmatism over Ideology

The February 3 meeting at the White House between Presidents Trump and Petro was the most significant diplomatic event for the region during the reporting week. Relations between the two leaders had hit an all-time low in 2025, with Trump revoking Petro’s visa and Petro publicly lambasting U.S. interventionism.11 However, the current situation in Venezuela has forced an “uneasy détente”.37

The meeting produced several pragmatic outcomes:

  • Counter-Narcotics Strategy: Petro shared names of “high-value targets” in the drug trade and expressed a willingness to cooperate on “joint Colombia-Venezuela military actions” against criminal groups, provided they have U.S. support.10
  • Energy Integration: The leaders discussed Colombia’s potential role in supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery by providing infrastructure for crude oil refining and the transport of energy.10
  • Border Stabilization: A shared commitment was made to re-establish full state control over the border areas to regulate migration and combat the ELN and Clan del Golfo.11
  • Personal Diplomacy: In a symbolic move that signaled the thaw, Petro left the White House with an autographed MAGA hat and a copy of The Art of the Deal.10

This shift is critical for the Rodríguez administration, as the stabilization of Venezuela depends heavily on the presence of a cooperative neighbor willing to manage the border and the return of refugees.11

Responses from Major Powers: China and Russia

The geopolitical posture of Russia and China during the reporting week remains a mixture of formal condemnation and strategic adaptation. At the UN, both countries supported Venezuela’s request for emergency meetings to discuss the “kidnapping” of Maduro, with Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia accusing the U.S. of turning back to an “era of lawlessness”.12

However, intelligence suggests that behind the scenes, both powers are prioritizing the preservation of their existing investments. A February 5 phone call between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin revealed a desire to “coordinate their approaches” regarding the situation in Venezuela and Cuba, with a focus on ensuring that cooperation with Caracas remains at the current level.13 China, which remains the main destination for most Venezuelan oil, has indicated that it “respects the arrangements made by the Venezuelan government in accordance with the country’s Constitution,” effectively recognizing the Rodríguez administration while formally demanding Maduro’s release.38

The Role of the United Nations and International Law

The international legal community has expressed deep concern over the “aggression” against Venezuela. Amnesty International and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) have highlighted that the January 3 strikes violated the UN Charter and the principle of sovereignty.18 The IACHR reported at least 75 deaths from the strikes and emphasized that “any process of democratic restoration must be carried out with full respect for international law”.18

Despite these calls for accountability, the UN Security Council’s response has been “muted”.12 After three open briefings in January, no formal resolution or follow-up meeting has been proposed as of February 6.12 This silence is interpreted by analysts as a sign that the international community is willing to tolerate the new status quo as long as it results in stability and the continued flow of oil.12

Humanitarian Assessment and Migration Flows

Status of the Humanitarian Crisis

The humanitarian outlook for the week ending February 6, 2026, is characterized by a “widening gap” between the needs of the population and the state’s ability to respond.15 UNICEF and other UN agencies report that 7.9 million people are in need of assistance, with critical gaps in health, food security, and water and sanitation.15

Key humanitarian indicators for 2026:

  • Food Insecurity: The cost of a basic food basket ($586) remains beyond the reach of most households, especially those reliant on local currency.15
  • Water Access: 5.2 million people lack access to safe water, a situation exacerbated by the fragile state of the electricity grid.41
  • Health: Maternal mortality remains at 227 per 100,000 live births, and the system is struggling with widespread malnutrition (11% wasting among children under 5).41
  • Child Protection: 1.9 million children are in need of protection services, including mental health support and protection from violence and exploitation.41

Migration Dynamics and Border Pressure

The U.S. intervention and the subsequent “state of emergency” in Venezuela have created an “uneasy calm” at the border with Colombia.19 While the anticipated “massive exodus” has not yet materialized, migration agencies remain on high alert. Between January 1 and January 4, 6,117 entries into Colombia and 5,390 exits were recorded, reflecting a “pendular mobility” where citizens cross the border to access basic goods before returning to Venezuela.19

Colombia currently hosts approximately 2.8 million Venezuelan refugees, the largest portion of the 8 million who have fled since 2014.14 The Colombian government has established 17 centers across the country to help with food, healthcare, and reintegration, as they anticipate that up to 1.7 million more people could arrive if the situation in Venezuela does not stabilize.43

Humanitarian NeedPopulation AffectedFinancial Requirement (2026)Source
General Assistance7.9 Million Million15
Safe Water5.2 Million Million41
Health Assistance1.8 Million Million41
Nutrition1.3 Million Million41
Returnees in Need900,000 Million15

Environmental Factors and Agriculture

Crop production remains constrained by limited seed and input availability, making the country highly dependent on imports for grains and feed.36 While rainfall in December and early January replenished some soil moisture, the “erratic” nature of recent weather patterns and the lack of infrastructure investment mean that domestic harvests are unlikely to offset the food access constraints faced by poor households.44

Intelligence and Strategic Outlook

Institutional Fragility and Power Vacuums

The reporting week has clarified that the transition from Maduro to Rodríguez is an “administrative reshuffle” designed for survival rather than a systemic democratic opening. The “Machinery of Repression”—comprised of SEBIN, DGCIM, and the judicial system—remains fundamentally intact under the leadership of the Rodríguez siblings.16 This creates a high risk for the future, as any significant challenge to the Rodríguez administration could see a return to the brutal tactics of “Operation Knock Knock” (Operación Tun Tun) used by Maduro in late 2024.14

Intelligence analysts highlight that the “lack of a clear chain of command” within the FANB remains a critical vulnerability.20 While Padrino López has ensured initial compliance, the potential for internal power struggles among the ruling elite—particularly between hardliners and those seeking further engagement with the U.S.—cannot be discounted.16

The economic strategy of the interim government is a high-stakes gamble. By prioritizing the oil sector and the “animal spirits” of international investors, the administration is betting that it can generate enough hard currency to stabilize the currency and fund social programs before popular frustration boils over.8 However, the data for the week ending February 6 shows a widening disconnect between macro-economic reforms and micro-economic suffering.

If the “amnesty bill” fails to result in a genuine opening or if the devaluation of the bolívar continues at its current pace, the “uneasy calm” currently observed may be short-lived. The U.S. deployment of 30,000 Colombian troops to the border is a clear signal that the region is preparing for the possibility of renewed social unrest or a complete breakdown of state services.11

Concluding Strategic Recommendation

For the week ending February 6, 2026, the Venezuelan theater remains in a state of “unstable equilibrium.” The strategic priority for regional actors and international observers is the monitoring of the second vote on the Amnesty Law and the implementation of the new Hydrocarbons Law contracts. The success of these two measures will determine whether Venezuela can successfully navigate its “sequenced restart” or whether the removal of Maduro was merely the precursor to a more protracted and chaotic period of instability.

The intelligence and security posture should remain vigilant of:

  1. Colectivo Activity: Any escalation in paramilitary patrolling could signal a hardening of the state’s internal security position.
  2. Bolívar Stability: Continued rapid devaluation will increase the likelihood of spontaneous urban protests.
  3. Oil Revenue Transparency: The management of payments into the FGDF will be the primary indicator of U.S. leverage over the Rodríguez administration.
  4. Military Cohesion: Any significant changes in the FANB high command or signs of regional garrison dissent will indicate a weakening of the current governing coalition.

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