Executive Summary

The reporting period ending February 06, 2026, represents a transformative week for the Russian Federation, characterized by the formal dissolution of the final pillars of the post-Cold War strategic architecture and a decisive pivot toward a permanent war economy. The headline event of this period is the official expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5, 2026, which has left the world’s two largest nuclear powers without verifiable constraints for the first time in over half a century.¹ While negotiators in Abu Dhabi attempted to facilitate a short-term “handshake” extension, the rejection of this proposal by the United States administration has signaled a new era of strategic volatility, with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declaring that Moscow is no longer bound by quantitative limits or data-sharing obligations.¹

The kinetic theater witnessed a significant escalation following the collapse of a brief “energy truce” mediated by the United States.⁴ On the night of February 2–3, Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and drone units launched the most devastating aerial assault of the year, deploying a strike package of 450 drones and 71 missiles.⁴ This operation, which targeted critical heat and power infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa, was timed to exploit a severe cold snap with temperatures dropping to .⁴ Concurrently, ground forces have continued their “grinding” attrition strategy, capturing the settlement of Degtyarne in Kharkiv Oblast and advancing near Dronivka and Kleban-Byk at high personnel costs.⁴

Domestically, the Kremlin has faced a crisis of internal cohesion following the attempted assassination of Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the first deputy head of the GRU, who was shot and critically wounded in Moscow on February 6.⁷ This attack, occurring while his superior, Admiral Igor Kostyukov, was engaged in trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, has ignited intense speculation regarding institutional infighting within the siloviki.⁸ To counter perceived internal and external threats, the State Duma has advanced legislation granting the FSB total control over communications and increasing personal income taxes for “foreign agents” to a punitive 30%.¹⁰ Economically, the Federation faces mounting fiscal pressure; January 2026 budget data reveals a deficit of 1.718 trillion rubles, nearly half of the annual target, driven by a 50% collapse in energy revenues and the rising costs of the military-industrial complex.¹³

Strategic Nuclear Stability and the Post-New START Era

The expiration of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5, 2026, marks the end of the last legally binding bilateral agreement limiting the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation.¹ This development is not merely a technical lapse but the culmination of a multi-year erosion of arms control norms that began with Russia’s formal suspension of the treaty in February 2023.¹ Moscow’s official stance, articulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, maintains that the suspension was a “compelled measure” in response to the “extremely hostile” policies of the previous Biden administration and the fundamental change in the security situation following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.¹

In the months leading up to the expiration, President Vladimir Putin had publicly proposed a one-year voluntary adherence to the treaty’s central quantitative limits.¹ However, as of February 6, the Kremlin has confirmed that no formal response was received from Washington, leading to a declaration that Russia now considers itself free to choose its next steps based on a thorough analysis of U.S. military policy.¹ The immediate consequence of the lapse is the cessation of all 18 annual on-site inspections and the “Type One” and “Type Two” monitoring of strategic delivery systems, which provided the United States with a vital window into Russian nuclear operations.²

New START Central Quantitative Limits (Expired Feb 5, 2026)	Agreed Limit	Russian Status (Estimated)
Deployed Strategic Warheads	1,550	1,550+
Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and Heavy Bombers	700	700+
Deployed and Non-Deployed Launchers	800	~800
Notification Procedures	Required	Suspended
On-Site Inspections	18 per year	Terminated

Sources: ²

The Russian military-technical response to the treaty’s end is expected to focus on the “uploading” of warheads onto existing delivery platforms. Russia is currently assessed as capable of rapidly increasing the number of warheads on its deployed ICBM and SLBM forces, a move that would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of deterrence.³ Particular concern surrounds the deployment of novel systems such as the Sarmat ICBM and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, as well as exotic platforms like the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater vehicle and the Burevestnik cruise missile.² These systems are explicitly designed to defeat the U.S. “Golden Dome” missile defense initiatives, which the Kremlin views as an attempt to undermine Russia’s second-strike capability.¹⁴

The diplomatic fallout of the New START expiration was a central theme of a February 4 video call between Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.¹⁷ Both leaders noted the “negative consequences” of the treaty’s end, with Putin expressing respect for Beijing’s position that any future trilateral arms control deal must account for the rapid modernization of China’s own ICBM forces.³ This alignment suggests a deepening “axis of resistance” against Western strategic dominance, where Russia leverages its nuclear legacy to provide a shield for Chinese regional expansion while demanding that the nuclear arsenals of France and the United Kingdom also be brought into any successor framework.³

Tactical Military Assessment: The Winter 2026 Campaign

The military situation during the week ending February 6 was defined by a shift from the short-lived “energy truce” to a high-intensity aerial campaign designed to break Ukrainian civilian resilience.⁴ Following the January 23–24 trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, Russian forces briefly shifted their targeting from energy infrastructure to logistics and railroads.⁵ However, this moratorium ended abruptly on the night of February 2–3 with a strike package that was 1.5 times larger than previous engagements in 2026.⁴

The strike utilized a sophisticated mix of assets, including 300 Shahed drones and newer Gerbera and Italmas types launched from Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk.⁵ These were integrated with 32 Iskander-M and S-300 missiles to penetrate the dense air defenses of Kyiv and Kharkiv.⁵ The Ukrainian Air Force reported that while they intercepted 412 of the 450 drones, the sheer volume of ballistic and cruise missiles ensured that 27 locations were hit, causing cascading blackouts that affected not only Kyiv and Kharkiv but also Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, and Odesa oblasts.⁴ DTEK, Ukraine’s largest energy provider, described the attack as the most devastating of 2026, noting that the destruction of combined heat and power plants (CHPP) during weather constitutes a systematic attempt to weaponize the climate.⁴

Russian Aerial Strike Assets (Feb 2-3, 2026 Operation)	Quantity	Performance/Outcome
Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas Drones	450	412 Intercepted; Debris fell in 17 locations
Iskander-M / S-300 Ballistic Missiles	32	11 Intercepted; Multiple CHPP hits
Zirkon / Onyx Missiles	4	4 Intercepted (Claimed)
Kh-101 / Iskander-K Cruise Missiles	20	20 Intercepted (Claimed)
Kh-22 / Kh-32 Missiles	3	0 Intercepted

Sources: ⁴

On the ground, the Russian offensive remains a series of high-cost, low-yield engagements. For the week of January 27 to February 3, Russia gained approximately 29 square miles of territory, roughly the size of Manhattan.⁴ The primary tactical success was the occupation of Degtyarne in the Kharkiv Oblast, while additional advances were reported near Pryluky, Zelene, and the heights around Toretsk.⁴ This “grinding” pace—averaging 15 to 70 meters per day in the most active sectors—reflects a military that has prioritized attrition over maneuver.¹⁹ Casualty rates remain extreme; CSIS estimates that total Russian military losses reached 1.2 million by the end of 2025, with fatalities between 275,000 and 325,000.⁶ Despite these numbers, the Kremlin continues to reject Western estimates, with Spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisting that only Ministry of Defense figures are reliable.⁶

The deployment of North Korean personnel has evolved during this period. Intelligence reports from the week indicate that these troops have moved beyond “expendable infantry” roles.⁴ They are now integrated into specialized units operating surveillance drones, performing mine clearance, and manning North Korean-supplied artillery and MLRS systems in the Kursk and Donetsk sectors.⁴ This suggests a deeper level of operational integration that allows Russian commanders to preserve their remaining elite formations for offensive breakthroughs while utilizing North Korean personnel for high-risk technical and support roles.⁴

Intelligence and Internal Security: The Siloviki Crisis

The attempted assassination of Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev on February 6, 2026, has exposed deep fissures within the Russian security apparatus.⁷ Alekseyev, the first deputy head of the GRU, was shot multiple times in his Moscow apartment building by a gunman disguised as a food delivery courier.²⁰ Alekseyev is a pivotal figure in the GRU’s “active measures” and irregular warfare campaigns, having been sanctioned for his alleged role in the 2018 Salisbury Novichok attack and the hacking of the 2016 U.S. elections.²⁰ Furthermore, he was instrumental in negotiating the end of the 2023 Wagner Group mutiny, famously appearing in a video with Yevgeny Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don.⁸

The Investigative Committee has opened a criminal probe, but the political fallout is already evident.²² Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov immediately attributed the attack to the “Zelenskyy regime,” claiming it was a terrorist act designed to derail the Abu Dhabi peace talks.⁸ However, Western intelligence analysts and Russian opposition media suggest the motive may be domestic, linked to the general’s role in suppressing the Wagner uprising or the ongoing competition for control over the GRU’s lucrative African and Middle Eastern operations.⁸ The timing is particularly conspicuous, as Alekseyev’s superior, Admiral Kostyukov, was in the UAE at the time, leaving the GRU’s domestic command structure vulnerable.⁸

Internal Security Incidents (Military Leadership 2024-2026)	Target	Outcome
Feb 6, 2026 (Moscow)	Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev (GRU)	Shot multiple times; Coma/Critical
Dec 22, 2025 (Moscow)	Lt. Gen. Fanil Sarvarov (Army Training)	Killed by car bomb
Late 2024 (Moscow)	Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov (NBC Defense)	Killed by scooter explosion
Dec 2025 (Chernihiv)	Border Guard Executions	Senezh Spetsnaz linked to war crimes

Sources: ⁴

The Alekseyev shooting highlights what Andrei Soldatov and other experts describe as “incredible sloppiness” within the security services tasked with protecting the high command.⁹ This security failure occurs as the GRU is being formally integrated into the Ministry of Defense’s chain of command to streamline irregular warfare, combining military support with AI-driven disinformation to exploit security gaps in Mali, Libya, and Sudan.²³ The inability to secure the capital against targeted hits on top-tier intelligence officials suggests that either the FSB’s protective capabilities are degraded or that internal “cleansing” is taking place under the guise of Ukrainian sabotage.⁸

The Abu Dhabi Diplomatic Framework

The trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 4–5, 2026, represent the most significant diplomatic engagement since the early months of the war.⁴ Mediated by the United Arab Emirates and involving senior U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian Direct Investment Fund head Kirill Dmitriev, the talks were aimed at establishing a roadmap for de-escalation.⁴ While the meetings did not produce a breakthrough on territorial issues—Russia continues to demand the full surrender of Donetsk and Luhansk while Kyiv refuses any land-for-peace swap—they did yield “limited but concrete” humanitarian and military outcomes.⁴

The primary success was a 314-person prisoner exchange, the first in five months, which returned 157 soldiers to each side.⁴ Additionally, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) announced that General Alexus Grynkewich and General Valery Gerasimov had agreed to resume high-level military-to-military dialogue to avoid miscalculation and support de-escalation.⁴ This channel, suspended since late 2021, is intended to provide a “de-confliction” mechanism as both sides continue to work toward a lasting peace.⁴

Abu Dhabi Trilateral Talks – Strategic Outcomes	Result	Implications
Prisoner Exchange	157 for 157 (314 total)	Restores rare channel of trust
Military-to-Military Dialogue	Re-established	Direct Gerasimov-Grynkewich link
Territorial Sovereignty	Deadlock	Russia demands Donbas; Kyiv refuses
New START “Handshake”	Rejected by U.S. Administration	Strategic ambiguity post-Feb 5
Iranian Uranium Proposal	“On the table”	Russia offers to remove Iranian uranium

Sources: ⁴

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has remained publicly dismissive of Western security guarantees for Ukraine, labeling them “unacceptable” and stating that any foreign troop deployments would be legitimate targets.⁵ During a February 4 interview, Lavrov implied that Russia’s demand for “neutrality” is intended to transform Ukraine into a pro-Russian proxy state similar to Belarus.¹⁷ This sentiment is echoed by Kremlin officials who have exploited the lack of clarity from the 2025 Alaska Summit to claim that the U.S. had already agreed to end the war on Russian terms.⁵

Macroeconomic Resilience and Fiscal Deterioration

The Russian economy is currently navigating a “precarious” position, as the wartime boom of 2023–2024 gives way to stagnation and fiscal distress.²⁶ Finance Ministry data for January 2026 revealed a deficit of 1.718 trillion rubles ($22.3 billion), which is nearly half of the government’s projected 3.8 trillion ruble deficit for the entire year.¹³ This fiscal gap is largely driven by a 50% year-on-year collapse in oil and gas revenues, which fell to a five-year low of 393 billion rubles in January.¹³

To mitigate these losses, the Kremlin has implemented a series of aggressive tax hikes. On January 1, the Value-Added Tax (VAT) was increased from 20% to 22%, and most tax exemptions for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were abolished.¹² This reform generated a 25% jump in VAT receipts in January, totaling 1.13 trillion rubles, but even this surge was insufficient to offset the decline in energy income.¹³ The IMF has downgraded Russia’s growth forecast for 2026 to just 0.8%, warning that the distortion of the economy by the defense sector is becoming “unsustainable”.²⁶

Russian Federation Economic Indicators (January 2026)	Value	Impact/Trend
Monthly Budget Deficit	1.718 Trillion Rubles	45% of annual target reached in 1 month
Oil and Gas Revenue	393 Billion Rubles	-50% YoY; Lowest since July 2020
VAT Revenue	1.13 Trillion Rubles	+25% following 22% rate hike
Interest Rate	16%	Aimed at curbing 6% inflation
GDP Growth (Forecast)	0.8%	Stagnation vs. 4.3% in 2024

Sources: ¹³

Russia is also aggressively pursuing import substitution and financial sovereignty. A decree signed by Putin mandates that by January 1, 2026, all military equipment and clothing must be produced by Russian organizations located within the territory of the Federation.²⁹ By 2027, this will extend to all materials, including fabrics and knitwear.²⁹ To maintain capital flow, the Kremlin is pushing for expanded mutual payments in national currencies and the creation of an independent payment infrastructure, particularly in its dealings with Brazil and India.³⁰ However, the Adani Group’s decision to ban Russian oil imports at 14 Indian ports and the new EU sanctions targeting the “shadow fleet” of 600 tankers suggest that Moscow’s ability to bypass the oil price cap is being significantly narrowed.²⁷

Internal Governance and the Legislative Iron Fist

The week ending February 6 saw the formalization of several repressive legislative measures designed to suppress dissent and mobilize the population for a prolonged conflict. The State Duma has moved to grant the FSB total control over communications shutdowns, while the personal income tax rate for those designated as “foreign agents” has been raised to 30%.¹⁰ This punitive tax regime, combined with the loss of all deductions and benefits, is intended to financially cripple activists and journalists both inside Russia and in exile.¹¹

New Repressive Legislation (Effective Q1 2026)	Measure	Strategic Objective
Communications Law	FSB power to shut down internet/mobile	Counter-drone telemetry; Prevent unrest
Tax Code Amendment	30% Tax on “Foreign Agents”	Financial attrition of political dissent
Conscription Decree	Year-round call-up (Jan 1 – Dec 31)	Continuous troop replenishment
FSB Pretrial Centers	FSB control of Lefortovo & others	Direct oversight of “Treason” suspects
Asset Freeze Law	Freeze accounts of those convicted in absentia	Retribution against exiles

Sources: ¹⁰

The transition to year-round conscription, effective January 1, 2026, allows the military to maintain a constant stream of 261,000 draftees for compulsory service.¹² This “creeping mobilization” is supported by a new digital registry that imposes automatic travel bans and property freezes on those who ignore summonses.¹² Furthermore, a December 2025 decree has authorized the use of reservists to protect “critical infrastructure” against drone attacks, granting them the legal status of active-duty servicemembers and allowing their deployment across at least 19 Russian regions.³³

Socially, the Kremlin is struggling with the humanitarian fallout of the war within its own borders. The government has allocated 1.27 billion rubles to cover housing for 21,000 families displaced by the Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region.⁴ Reports from iStories indicate that missing-person cases in Kursk are now eight times the national average, highlighting the ongoing civilian cost of the conflict even as state media focuses on the “liberation” of Ukrainian territory.⁴ To maintain public morale, the “Year of Unity of the Peoples of Russia” was opened on February 5, emphasizing national cohesion while the state simultaneously scraps annual asset declarations for officials to hide wartime corruption.¹²

Geopolitical Alignments: The Axis of Resale

Faced with Western isolation, Russia is solidifying its alliances with pariah states and regional partners. On February 3, 2026, Sergei Shoigu signed a five-year military cooperation agreement with the Myanmar junta, ensuring that Russian-made jets and munitions continue to support the junta’s grip on power until 2030.³⁵ In return, analysts suggest Myanmar has become a link in the scheme to provide Russia with “dual-use” components from North Korea and China, circumventing sanctions via intermediaries.³⁶

The Kremlin’s regional influence has suffered setbacks, however, including the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro by U.S. forces in early 2026 and the collapse of the Assad regime in late 2024.³⁸ These events have forced Moscow into a “deal-making diplomacy” stance. In the Middle East, Putin has positioned himself as an intermediary between Iran and Israel, offering to facilitate the removal of uranium from Iran to appease Washington while seeking a role in President Trump’s “Board of Peace”.³⁸ This adaptive approach—providing minimal military support while maintaining diplomatic relevance—highlights the limits of Russia’s role as a security provider as the war in Ukraine drains its resources.³⁸

Hybrid Warfare and the Belarus-Kremlin Balloon Campaign

A notable escalation in “Grey Zone” activity occurred throughout the reporting week, characterized by the “Minsk-Kremlin Balloon Campaign”.³⁹ For three consecutive nights ending February 3, 2026, high-altitude balloons (HABs) launched from Belarus violated the sovereign airspace of Poland and Lithuania.³⁹ While the Kremlin has ostensibly linked these balloons to illicit cigarette smuggling, intelligence analysts categorize this as a “Phase Zero” offensive.³⁹

The technical execution of the campaign indicates a multi-domain operation. As NATO activated SIGINT assets and TRS-15 Odra radar systems to track these low-radar-cross-section targets, Russian GRU electronic intelligence units stationed in Brest and Grodno recorded the resultant activation latencies and frequency-hopping patterns.³⁹ This data is invaluable for the Russian Federation in preparing A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) envelopes for the Suwalki Gap.³⁹ The “cognitive objective” of the campaign is the normalization of airspace violations, lowering the detection threshold for more aggressive actions, such as loitering munitions or special operations infiltration disguised as civilian smuggling objects.³⁹

Conclusion and Future Outlook

The week ending February 6, 2026, illustrates a Russia that is increasingly isolated but remains highly dangerous. The expiration of New START and the subsequent shift to a policy of “military-technical measures” suggest that a new nuclear arms race is not only possible but likely underway. The massive aerial assault of February 2-3 confirms that the Kremlin will continue to target civilian infrastructure to achieve political ends, even as its ground forces achieve only marginal success.

Internally, the attempted assassination of General Alekseyev and the passage of draconian communication laws point toward a state that is deeply fearful of internal instability and information leakage. The fiscal data from January 2026 serves as a warning that Russia’s “defiance of economic gravity” is reaching its limit; the 50% drop in energy revenue is a structural threat that even a 22% VAT rate cannot fully resolve. In the coming weeks, the international community should anticipate a continued reliance on hybrid tactics like the HAB campaign and a further hardening of Russia’s stance in Abu Dhabi as the Kremlin gambles that its “grinding” strategy will eventually outlast Western support for Ukraine. The re-establishment of the military-to-military channel between Gerasimov and Grynkewich remains the only significant guardrail against an accidental escalation into a broader conflict.

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