SITREP Global – Week Ending February 06, 2026

Executive Summary

The global security environment for the week ending February 6, 2026, is characterized by a definitive pivot in the strategic architecture of the 21st century. The expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5, 2026, marks the formal end of bilateral nuclear arms control between the United States and the Russian Federation, ushering in an era of unconstrained tri-polar nuclear competition involving a rapidly expanding Chinese arsenal.1 This shift is codified in the unclassified 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which reorients the United States Department of War toward a posture of hemispheric dominance, homeland defense, and the “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative, while mandating a radical shift in burden-sharing that requires European and Asian allies to provide the primary conventional land defense against regional adversaries.3

In the Western Hemisphere, the aftermath of Operation Absolute Resolve continues to reshape the geopolitical landscape following the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, on January 3, 2026.5 The United States has initiated a complex financial and operational oversight mechanism for the Venezuelan oil sector, utilizing accounts in Qatar to manage petroleum revenues while seeking $100 billion in private sector investment to rebuild the nation’s energy infrastructure.7 This intervention has drawn severe condemnation from Moscow and Beijing, who characterize the move as a subversive blow to the post-World War II international order.9

The Middle East remains a theater of high-stakes diplomatic friction and internal instability. Indirect and direct negotiations in Muscat, Oman, between the United States and Iran have failed to yield a framework for de-escalation, as Tehran maintains rigid “red lines” regarding its uranium enrichment capabilities and regional proxy networks.11 Simultaneously, leaked documents from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reveal a deepening crisis of legitimacy within the Iranian regime amid violent suppression of nationwide protests.12

In the cyber domain, the revelation of the “Shadow Campaigns” conducted by TGR-STA-1030—an Asia-based state-aligned group—highlights a systemic compromise of global government infrastructure.13 The group has breached the systems of thirty-seven governments, utilizing a sophisticated Linux kernel rootkit to target finance, mining, and telecommunications sectors.14 This disclosure coincides with Norway’s annual threat assessment, which warns of the most serious security situation since 1945, identifying China’s “Salt Typhoon” campaign and Russian sabotage as primary threats to Arctic and energy security.16 Finally, the Sahel remains volatile following a large-scale Islamic State assault on Niamey’s international airport, further straining the relationship between the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and Western powers.17

Strategic Stability and the Post-Arms Control Era

The expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) on February 5, 2026, represents the final collapse of the bilateral arms control framework that has governed the strategic relationship between the world’s two largest nuclear powers for over fifteen years.1 The treaty, which limited both nations to 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, reached its legal limit for extension, having already been granted a one-time five-year extension in 2021.2 The cessation of these central limits removes the last legally binding restrictions on the nuclear forces of the United States and Russia, signaling a transition toward a more opaque and competitive strategic environment.

The U.S. Department of State, in a formal address to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, argued that the 2010 agreement had become increasingly detached from the 2026 security reality.2 The strategic rationale for the U.S. refusal to pursue a replacement bilateral treaty is rooted in the “breakout growth” of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which is expanding at a scale and pace not seen in over half a century.2 American intelligence assessments indicate that China is on a trajectory to achieve a level of nuclear capability that would create a tri-polar strategic dynamic, rendering any bilateral agreement with Russia alone “simply inappropriate” and potentially dangerous for U.S. security.2

Table 1: Comparative Nuclear Architecture and Treaties (Post-Feb 5, 2026)

Strategic ElementUnited StatesRussian FederationChina
Treaty StatusUnconstrained (New START Expired)Unconstrained (New START Expired)Never Constrained
Modernization FocusNuclear Triad Refurbishment & Sentinel ICBMNovel Systems (Skyfall, Poseidon, Sarmat)Massive Silo Construction & Warhead Expansion
Inspection RegimeTerminatedTerminatedNon-Existent
Novel ThreatsGolden Dome Space-Based DefenseNuclear ASAT & Hypersonic GlidersOpaque Yield-Producing Tests 2
Tactical NukesExpanding Theater Range ForcesMassive Unconstrained ArsenalGrowing Regional Stockpiles

The U.S. administration has specifically cited Russian non-compliance and the development of “novel” delivery systems—such as the Skyfall nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon transoceanic torpedo—as factors that necessitated the end of unilateral restraint.2 Furthermore, the disclosure that China conducted a yield-producing nuclear test as recently as June 22, 2020, which it allegedly sought to conceal, has reinforced the U.S. position that future arms control must be multilateral and subject to more rigorous verification standards.2

In the absence of a formal treaty, the United States is accelerating its nuclear modernization programs. This includes full funding for the sea-based leg of the triad via the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and the development of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).19 The 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) prohibits the Department of War from reducing the ICBM fleet below 400 or reducing the alert status of these forces, ensuring a high level of responsiveness in a post-treaty world.19

The 2026 National Defense Strategy: A Continental Reorientation

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), released by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth on January 23, 2026, marks the most significant shift in American military doctrine in four decades.3 The document formalizes a move away from the “global policeman” model of expeditionary warfare toward a “homeland-first” posture that prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, border security, and technological dominance.21 The NDS identifies China as the primary pacing threat in the Indo-Pacific but treats the security of the American homeland and the Western Hemisphere as the Department’s top mission.21

The Golden Dome for America

The center-of-gravity for the new strategy is the “Golden Dome for America” initiative. This program aims to establish a comprehensive, multi-layered missile defense shield designed to protect the U.S. homeland from ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile attacks.19 The strategy allocates approximately $175 billion for the development of this baseline capability, which integrates space-based sensors, terrestrial radars, and next-generation interceptors across the land, sea, and space domains.23

The Golden Dome represents a technical evolution from the previous Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. While GMD was focused on “limited” attacks from rogue states like North Korea, the Golden Dome is intended to provide a more robust defense capable of deterring peer adversaries.3 The FY26 NDAA authorizes the Missile Defense Agency to recapitalize aging range safety vessels and partner with the Department of Transportation to expand the infrastructure necessary for this initiative.19

Table 2: 2026 NDS Strategic Shift and Capability Priorities

CategoryPrior Strategy Focus2026 NDS Focus
Geographic PriorityEurope and Middle EastWestern Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific
Threat PerceptionClimate Change and Peer CompetitionHemispheric Security and “Warrior Ethos”
Force EmploymentLarge-scale Overseas PresenceBurden-Shifting and Ally Empowerment
Key TechnologyConventional Naval DominanceUncrewed Systems and Space-Based Defense
Industrial BaseGlobal Just-in-Time Supply ChainsSecure, Domestic U.S.-Based Manufacturing

Burden-Shifting and Ally Empowerment

A core pillar of the 2026 NDS is the concept of “burden-shifting,” particularly regarding the defense of Europe and the Korean Peninsula.3 The strategy explicitly states that European allies must take the lead on conventional land defense against Russia, with the United States providing high-end technological support—such as the Golden Dome umbrella—rather than massive troop deployments.4 This rebalancing is reflected in the administration’s demand that NATO members increase defense spending to 5 percent of their GDP, with 3.5 percent dedicated to core military capabilities.4

On the Korean Peninsula, the NDS suggests that U.S. forces currently stationed in South Korea might be better utilized elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific to address the China challenge.25 The strategy views North Korea primarily as a threat to Japan and South Korea, with U.S. interests focused on countering missile capabilities that can strike the American homeland.3 This approach signals a move toward a “resource-sustainable” posture that empowers local allies to defend themselves, exemplified by the administration’s praise of Israel as a “model ally” for its self-defense capabilities.25

Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Revitalization

The 2026 NDS places a heavy emphasis on the “industrialization” of the United States as a component of national security.22 The Department of War is reforming its acquisition policies to eliminate long-standing barriers for nontraditional and commercial suppliers.20 The strategy prioritizes contract awards for programs that bolster the domestic manufacturing of critical munitions, uncrewed aerial and maritime systems, and technologies that assist in countering drug trafficking and illegal immigration.26 The goal is to ensure a secure, end-to-end supply chain that can sustain a high-intensity conflict without reliance on adversarial nations for critical components.21

Hemispheric Security and the Venezuelan Transition

The Western Hemisphere has become the primary theater for the practical application of the new American defense posture. On January 3, 2026, more than 200 U.S. special operations forces executed Operation Absolute Resolve in Caracas, successfully capturing Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.5 The raid, which targeted the Fort Tiuna Military Complex and other key bunkers, resulted in the deaths of approximately 75 people, including 32 members of the Cuban special forces serving as Maduro’s personal guard.5

Maduro and Flores were transported to New York, where they were indicted on charges of narco-terrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation, and the possession of machine guns and destructive devices.6 Both pleaded not guilty in a Manhattan federal court on January 5, while the Venezuelan vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, denounced the operation as a “kidnapping” and an act of imperialist aggression.6

Operational Oversight of the Venezuelan Oil Sector

Following the capture of Maduro, President Trump announced that the United States would oversee the management of Venezuela’s oil sector until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” could be achieved.7 The Department of Energy is currently working with interim Venezuelan authorities and private industry to execute an energy deal intended to restore Venezuela as a “prosperous ally”.7

The administration has established a “U.S. Treasury blocked account” system to manage Venezuelan oil revenues.8 Under this mechanism, proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan crude settle in U.S.-controlled accounts at globally recognized banks to ensure the “legitimacy and integrity” of the distribution.7 In the short term, a payment mechanism has been established in Qatar to mitigate the risk of international creditors seizing assets.8

Table 3: Venezuelan Oil Revenue Management and Requirements

ComponentDetailStrategic Rationale
Initial Tranche30 – 50 million barrels marketed immediatelyRestore global supply and stabilize prices 7
Financial CustodianAccounts in Qatar (Short-term) / US Treasury (Long-term)Protect assets from $170B external debt claims 8
Disbursement PolicyUS Discretion (Audit required)Prevent corruption/misuse of funds (Iraq model avoidance)
Investment Goal$100 Billion (Private Sector)Rebuild dilapidated infrastructure/grid 8
Sanctions ReliefSelective rollbacks (General License 46)Enable transport and upgrading of heavy crude 7

The administration’s policy is also designed to impact regional allies of the Maduro regime. President Trump has signed an executive order authorizing tariffs on any country that provides oil to Cuba, declaring a national emergency in response to the Cuban energy crisis and its reliance on subsidized Venezuelan oil.29 This move is intended to accelerate the “fall” of the Cuban regime by severing its primary energy lifeline.29

The intervention has triggered a sharp divide within the international community. Russia and China, along with Iran, have condemned the operation as a “blatant violation” of international law and a “criminal operation” that undermines the rules-based system.9 The Security Council held an emergency meeting on January 5 to discuss the ouster of Maduro, with Russian state media asserting that the U.S. has ushered in the “law of the jungle”.9

Legal experts have raised significant concerns regarding the lawfulness of the raid, noting that capturing a sitting head of state on foreign soil constitutes an act of aggression under traditional interpretations of international law.28 However, the U.S. administration has justified the action as a law-enforcement mission undertaken through the president’s “inherent constitutional authority”.6 Domestic reactions have also been mixed; while the Venezuelan diaspora celebrated the removal of Maduro, some members of the U.S. Congress have criticized the administration’s dismissal of opposition leader María Corina Machado as lacking sufficient support to lead the country.6

Middle Eastern Dynamics: Muscat Talks and Internal Unrest

Diplomatic efforts to address the Iranian nuclear program and regional tensions reached a critical juncture on February 6, 2026, as high-level delegations from the United States and Iran convened in Muscat, Oman.11 The talks, facilitated by the Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were led by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, with the notable attendance of U.S. Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper.11

The Muscat Framework and “Red Lines”

The primary objective of the session was to establish a framework for future negotiations and create the “right conditions” for the resumption of diplomatic and technical talks.11 While Minister Araghchi described the atmosphere as a “good start,” reports from both sides indicate that significant disagreement remains on the core tenets of any potential deal.11 Iran continues to maintain several non-negotiable “red lines,” including its right to uranium enrichment, the retention of its ballistic missile program, and continued support for its “Axis of Resistance” proxies.11

The United States has signaled that it expects “tangible and significant concessions” regarding the nuclear program in the next round of talks, which is scheduled to occur in the coming days.11 A particular point of contention is the U.S. demand that Iran curb its energy exports to the People’s Republic of China.11 The complexity of these negotiations is amplified by the risk premiums currently embedded in global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz, through which 21% of global oil consumption transits, remains a primary chokepoint that amplifies price sensitivity to regional political developments.31

Table 4: Energy Market Indicators and Geopolitical Risk (Feb 1-6, 2026)

CommodityPrice (USD)Weekly Change (%)Risk Driver
Brent Crude$68.05+0.74%Muscat Negotiation Uncertainty 31
WTI Crude$63.55+0.41%US-Iran Diplomatic Volatility 31
Uranium (Spot)VariableHigh VolatilityCompliance/Oversight Concerns 32
US Dollar IndexTwo-week HighN/ASafe-haven Inflow during Crisis 33

Internal Instability and Leaked Documents

The Iranian regime is also facing its most significant internal crisis in years. Nationwide protests have been met with an exceptionally violent crackdown that is estimated to have killed thousands of civilians.34 On February 2, 2026, leaked documents from the IRGC were released, exposing the command-and-control structure behind the suppression of these protests and detailing the regime’s “hidden suppression machine”.12

In response to these developments, the European Union has moved to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, while the U.S. has threatened direct military intervention unless a diplomatic off-ramp is established.12 Russia has attempted to mitigate the risk of regional war by offering to store Iran’s enriched weapons-grade uranium, though the success of this proposal depends on the outcome of subsequent rounds of negotiations in Oman.12

Global Cyber Espionage: The Shadow Campaigns

The global cyber threat landscape in February 2026 is dominated by the revelation of the “Shadow Campaigns” conducted by a state-aligned group tracked as TGR-STA-1030 (also known as UNC6619).13 A comprehensive report from Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 details a campaign of extraordinary scale, with at least 70 organizations in 37 countries compromised over the past year.14

TGR-STA-1030: Scope and Methodology

The group is assessed with high confidence to be operating out of Asia, likely China, based on linguistic indicators, regional tooling, and activity aligned with the GMT+8 time zone.14 The hackers have demonstrated exceptional speed and agility, often carrying out compromises within days of major geopolitical events.36 For instance, following the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro, the group targeted 140 Venezuelan government-owned IP addresses.15

A key technical finding is the group’s use of a previously undocumented Linux kernel rootkit named “ShadowGuard”.36 This rootkit intercepts system calls and hides specific process IDs (PIDs), enabling the attackers to remain invisible to standard monitoring and forensic tools.35

Table 5: TGR-STA-1030 Victimology and Target Profiles

Target CategorySpecific InstitutionsGeopolitical/Economic Focus
National Security5 National Law Enforcement/Border AgenciesImmigration & Internal Security Data 14
Finance & Trade3 Ministries of Finance; Australian TreasuryEconomic Partnerships & Trade Negotiations 13
Natural ResourcesBrazil & Bolivia Mining MinistriesRare Earth Mineral Supply Chains 13
LegislativeNational Parliament (Unnamed Country)Senior Elected Official Surveillance 14
TechnologyTelecommunications & Software (Notepad++)Supply Chain Interdiction & Data Theft 14

The campaign’s focus on mining entities in Latin America is particularly notable. In Bolivia, the group compromised entities tied to rare earth minerals during the 2025 presidential election.13 In Brazil, the breach of the Ministry of Mines and Energy occurred as the country emerged as a strategic alternative to Chinese rare earth supplies, following a $465 million investment in a Brazilian producer.13 These actions suggest that the group’s objectives are tightly aligned with China’s broader economic statecraft and the securing of critical mineral dominance.

Salt Typhoon and Northern European Security

In Northern Europe, Norway’s domestic security agency (PST) has confirmed that the Chinese state-sponsored campaign “Salt Typhoon” successfully compromised network devices in several Norwegian organizations.16 The disclosure, made in the 2026 annual threat assessment, describes Norway as facing its “most serious security situation since World War II”.16

While China represents the primary threat in the cyber domain, Russia is identified as the “principal overall threat” to Norwegian security.16 The PST warns that Russian intelligence is closely monitoring military targets and allied activities in the High North and the Arctic region, utilizing civilian vessels to map critical energy infrastructure for potential sabotage.16 The erosion of the post-Cold War international order is viewed by Oslo as a direct threat to the foundations of Norwegian security, exacerbated by rising tensions between the West and the China-Russia-Iran axis.40

Regional Volatility and Conflict Risks

As the first quarter of 2026 progresses, several regions are experiencing a significant deterioration in their security environment, with potential implications for global stability.

The Sahel: IS Assault on Niamey

On the night of January 28-29, 2026, Islamic State (IS) Sahel Province militants launched a high-profile, coordinated assault on the Diori Hamani International Airport and the adjacent Air Base 101 in Niamey, Niger.17 The attack involved over 30 gunmen using motorcycles, mortars, and armed drones to infiltrate one of the military regime’s most sensitive security sites.17

The facility hosts foreign troops, including Russian Africa Corps mercenaries and Italian forces, and reportedly serves as a storage site for stockpiles of uranium concentrate.41 While the attack was repelled, it resulted in the death of 20 assailants and the destruction of at least five military aircraft.18 In the aftermath, Nigerien President Gen. Abdourahamane Tiani accused the leaders of France, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire of sponsoring the attack—allegations that have heightened regional tensions and highlighted the growing insecurity in the central Sahel.41

South Asia: The Bangladesh Election Crisis

Bangladesh is approaching a landmark national election on February 12, 2026, amid extreme political violence and religious unrest.43 This marks the first general election since the country’s August 2024 “Monsoon Revolution,” but the interim government has struggled to protect human rights.45

Risk FactorCurrent AssessmentPotential Impact
Political ViolenceRising sharply since Dec 2025; Osman Hadi assassinationDisruption of polling and street rioting 44
Minority Rights51 incidents against Hindus; 10 killingsLarge-scale communal violence/refugee flows 45
Regional RelationsStrained with India; anti-Indian sentiment risingCross-border unrest affecting West Bengal 44
Political StructureEntrenched elites vs. New youth-led parties (NCP)Long-term instability if outcome is disputed 46

The assassination of youth activist Osman Hadi on December 12 and the subsequent targeting of the National Citizen Party (NCP) have put the country on edge.44 There is a significant risk that the election outcome will be disputed, potentially spiraling into a political crisis that would affect regional security, particularly concerning the “Siliguri Corridor” connecting India’s mainland to its northeastern states.34

Ethiopia and Northern Africa

In East Africa, the risk of a return to full-scale war in Northern Ethiopia has increased following clashes between the Tigray Defence Forces and federal troops.34 This development, combined with the expiration of the mandate for Haiti’s transitional government on February 7, suggests a widening vacuum of stability that criminal gangs and non-state actors are poised to exploit.34

Geoeconomic Statecraft and Emerging Technology

The week ending February 6 also saw significant developments in international economic cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies. At the United Nations, the Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) convened to review the Zero Draft of a new Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.47 The convention aims to build a more inclusive global tax system, specifically targeting the mobilization of resources for sustainable development in the Global South.47

India and the AI Impact Summit

India is preparing to host the fourth AI Impact Summit on February 19-20, 2026.1 This event marks a shift in global focus from purely governmental concerns about AI safety toward the practical implementation of technology in the Global South.1 India’s 2026–27 Union Budget, presented on February 1, 2026, further reflects this geoeconomic statecraft, treating expenditure as a tool of fiscal statecraft to navigate a world where supply chains are used as instruments of power.48

Table 6: Global Geopolitical Calendar – Q1 2026 Key Events

DateEventLocationSignificance
Feb 6-22Olympic Winter GamesMilano Cortina, ItalyMajor international sporting/security event 1
Feb 11-1539th African Union SummitAddis Ababa, EthiopiaContinental priorities on security & integration 1
Feb 12General ElectionsBangladeshPivotal moment for South Asian stability 1
Feb 13-17Munich Security ConferenceMunich, GermanyFocus on common European defense strategy 1
Feb 17Start of RamadanGlobalHistorical uptick in extremist activity 1

Strategic Forecast and Implications

The convergence of the New START expiration and the release of the 2026 NDS indicates that the United States is moving toward a “denial-based” deterrent posture that relies on technological supremacy rather than traditional arms control agreements. The Golden Dome initiative, while promising a new era of homeland defense, also necessitates a period of increased investment and industrial revitalization that will define American economic policy for the remainder of the decade.

The situation in Venezuela will likely remain the primary test of the administration’s hemispheric focus. The success of the “Qatar mechanism” for oil revenue will determine whether the U.S. can successfully stabilize the country without repeating the failures of the Iraq Oil-for-Food program. However, the presence of sophisticated cyber actors like TGR-STA-1030 suggests that the primary threat to this stability may come not from conventional military forces, but from the systemic exploitation of digital and resource-based vulnerabilities.

Finally, the upcoming Islamic holy month of Ramadan, beginning February 17, is expected to coincide with an uptick in extremist propaganda and attacks from Al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates, particularly in the Sahel and South Asia.1 National security agencies should remain at a heightened state of alert for hybrid tactics that combine physical sabotage with cyber espionage and influence operations designed to undermine democratic processes and critical infrastructure. The erosion of the post-war international order, as warned by Norwegian intelligence, is no longer a distant prospect but a current reality that requires a fundamental reassessment of national and collective resilience.


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