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BRICS+: Assessing the Cohesion, Capabilities, and Challenge of a Reconfigured Global Bloc

This report assesses the strategic capabilities, internal cohesion, and geopolitical implications of the expanded BRICS+ group of nations. The analysis concludes that BRICS+ represents a significant, long-term systemic challenge to the U.S.-led international order. However, its potential to act as a unified, revisionist bloc is severely constrained by profound internal divisions and structural contradictions. It is best understood not as a monolithic anti-Western alliance, but as a heterogeneous coalition of convenience, leveraging its collective economic weight to pursue often divergent national interests under the shared banner of creating a multipolar world.

The bloc’s primary strengths are formidable and growing. Demographically and economically, BRICS+ now constitutes the center of gravity for global growth, commanding approximately 45% of the world’s population and a larger share of global GDP (in purchasing power parity terms) than the G7. Its strategic power is further magnified by its substantial control over global energy and critical mineral supply chains, positioning it as a gatekeeper of the resources essential for both the 20th-century industrial economy and the 21st-century green transition. Diplomatically, it has successfully branded itself as the preeminent voice of the “Global South,” attracting widespread interest from developing nations seeking alternatives to Western-led institutions.

Conversely, the bloc is plagued by critical weaknesses. The intractable strategic rivalry between its two largest members, China and India, represents a fundamental fault line that prevents deep political or security integration. This core tension is exacerbated by the vast economic and political heterogeneity among its members—a mix of democracies and autocracies, wealthy creditors and indebted nations—whose divergent interests frequently preclude consensus on contentious issues. The group’s intentionally informal, consensus-based structure, which lacks a binding charter or a central secretariat, provides necessary flexibility but simultaneously renders it incapable of decisive, unified action in a crisis.

The primary threat to U.S. interests is not military but systemic. It is most acute in the financial domain, where a concerted, albeit slow-moving, effort toward “de-dollarization” aims to create parallel payment systems and trade settlement in local currencies. The goal is less to replace the U.S. dollar than to insulate member economies from the reach of U.S. financial sanctions, thereby eroding the effectiveness of a key instrument of American foreign policy. Geopolitically, the bloc challenges U.S. primacy by creating alternative diplomatic forums, promoting a narrative of multipolarity that resonates across the Global South, and providing a “safe harbor” for states seeking to counter U.S. pressure.

In response, this report recommends that U.S. policy shift from a posture of broad confrontation, which has proven counterproductive in fostering BRICS+ unity, to a nuanced strategy of “competitive coopetition.” This strategy involves:

  1. Exploiting Internal Fissures: Treating the bloc not as a monolith but as a collection of individual actors, deepening strategic ties with members like India and Brazil whose interests often align with a rules-based order, thereby exacerbating internal divisions.
  2. Reinforcing the U.S.-led Financial Architecture: Proactively pursuing governance reforms at the IMF and World Bank to give emerging economies a greater voice, and scaling up high-quality, transparent development finance alternatives to outcompete the New Development Bank.
  3. Building Counter-Coalitions: Strengthening alliances with key democratic and market-oriented partners in the Global South to offer a more compelling alternative to the BRICS+ model of governance.
  4. Employing Targeted Economic Statecraft: Replacing blunt instruments like broad tariffs with precise, surgical measures designed to impose costs on specific adversarial actions, such as prohibiting dual participation in SWIFT and alternative payment systems, without alienating neutral parties.

Section 1: The Architecture of a Counter-Hegemonic Coalition

The BRICS+ grouping is not an accidental collection of emerging economies but a deliberate, albeit imperfect, political project designed to alter the global balance of power. Its evolution from a market-driven investment concept to a state-driven political forum reflects a calculated response to perceived inequities in the post-Cold War international order. Understanding its current architecture—its strategic purpose, expanded membership, and institutional ambitions—is essential to accurately assessing its capabilities and intentions.

1.1 From Acronym to Alliance: A Deliberate Evolution

The bloc’s origin as the “BRIC” acronym, coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to highlight promising investment markets, is a historical footnote that belies its current geopolitical significance.1 The critical transformation began when political leaders, particularly in Russia, recognized the potential to forge a political grouping from this economic concept.4 The intellectual groundwork for a multipolar coalition can be traced back to Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov in the late 1990s, who envisioned a “strategic triangle” of Russia, India, and China to balance U.S. influence.4

This political ambition began to crystallize with the first meeting of BRIC foreign ministers on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2006, followed by the inaugural leaders’ summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009.1 The timing was not coincidental. The 2008 global financial crisis, which originated in the United States and Europe, severely damaged the credibility of Western economic stewardship and created what analysts have termed a “legitimacy crisis of the international financial order”.7 As Western economies faltered, the relative resilience and continued growth of the BRIC nations, particularly China and India, imbued them with a newfound confidence and a shared purpose.7 This crisis served as the primary catalyst, providing the political will and strategic opportunity for the BRIC countries to institutionalize their cooperation. They transitioned from an informal discussion forum to an action-oriented bloc with the explicit goal of reforming the global financial and political architecture to better reflect the rising weight of emerging powers.8

The group’s stated objectives, reiterated across numerous summit declarations, have consistently centered on advocating for a “more democratic and just multipolar world order” and demanding reforms of global governance institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Security Council.8 This is not merely aspirational rhetoric but a core strategic goal that provides the foundational ideological glue for its otherwise disparate members. The admission of South Africa in 2011, transforming BRIC into BRICS, was the first step in broadening its geographic and political representation, explicitly positioning the group as a champion for the broader developing world.1

1.2 The Logic of Expansion: Consolidating Resource Power and Geopolitical Reach

The 2024-2025 expansion was the most significant development in the bloc’s history, bringing in Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Indonesia as full members.2 While Argentina’s subsequent withdrawal under a new administration and Saudi Arabia’s initial hesitation underscore the complexities of consensus-based enlargement, the overall move represents a strategic consolidation of the bloc’s power.3 More than 40 countries have expressed interest in some form of affiliation, signaling the group’s growing international appeal.16

The expansion’s logic is best understood through two primary lenses: strategic resources and geopolitical influence.

First, the inclusion of major energy producers fundamentally transforms BRICS+ into a dominant energy bloc. By uniting some of the world’s largest oil and gas exporters (Russia, Iran, UAE, and potentially Saudi Arabia) with two of the world’s largest importers (China and India) within a single political forum, the group has created an unprecedented platform to coordinate on energy policy and potentially challenge the petrodollar system.9 This internalizes a significant portion of the global energy supply chain, creating opportunities for trade settlement in local currencies and insulating members from the volatility of Western-controlled markets.

Second, the expansion deepens the bloc’s geopolitical footprint across the Middle East and Africa, reinforcing its claim to be the authentic voice of the “Global South”.11 The addition of regional powers like Egypt, Iran, and Ethiopia enhances its diplomatic weight and extends its influence into critical geostrategic zones. To manage the high demand for affiliation, the bloc institutionalized a “partner country” category at the 2024 Kazan summit.7 This creates a tiered system of engagement, allowing BRICS+ to build a wider network of aligned states (including countries like Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam) without diluting the core decision-making process or importing new internal conflicts associated with full membership.2

1.3 Institutional Ambition: Building a Parallel Financial Universe

The most concrete manifestation of the bloc’s ambition to reshape global governance is its creation of a parallel financial architecture. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) at the 2014 Fortaleza summit marked the group’s transition from rhetoric to institution-building.6

The New Development Bank (NDB)

The NDB was established to “mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects” in member states and other emerging economies, explicitly to “complement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions”.22 With an authorized capital of $100 billion and a subscribed capital of over $52.7 billion, the NDB is a significant financial institution, though still much smaller than the World Bank.21 As of early 2025, its total assets stood at $33.5 billion, and it had approved over $32.8 billion in financing for more than 96 projects across sectors like clean energy, transport infrastructure, and water sanitation.21

The NDB’s true strategic innovation lies not in its scale but in its operating model. Its key value proposition is the provision of financing without the political conditionalities related to governance and economic policy that are often attached to loans from the IMF and World Bank.27 This approach directly addresses a long-standing grievance of many Global South nations. Furthermore, the NDB is increasingly focused on lending in the local currencies of its members, a direct effort to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar in development finance and insulate projects from exchange rate volatility.18 While the NDB’s balance sheet cannot replace that of the World Bank, its strategic significance lies in its ability to exert competitive pressure. By providing a viable, non-aligned alternative, it grants developing nations greater leverage in their negotiations with Bretton Woods institutions, forcing the existing order to be more responsive and thereby achieving a core BRICS objective of reform through competition.

The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)

The CRA is a $100 billion framework of mutual financial support among BRICS central banks, designed to provide liquidity during balance of payments difficulties.21 The contribution structure is intentionally asymmetric, reflecting the economic weight of its members: China provides $41 billion, Brazil, India, and Russia contribute $18 billion each, and South Africa provides $5 billion.21

Although the CRA has never been activated, its existence serves a powerful symbolic and strategic purpose. It functions as a collective financial safety net, intended to deter currency speculation and provide a first line of defense against financial shocks, reducing the need to turn to the IMF in a crisis.21 It represents a foundational pillar of an alternative global financial architecture, signaling a collective commitment to financial self-sufficiency and providing a hedge against the perceived weaponization of Western-led financial rescue mechanisms.

Section 2: A Strategic Audit of BRICS+ Capabilities (Strengths)

The expanded BRICS+ bloc commands a formidable array of assets that make it a significant actor on the global stage. Its power is not merely symbolic; it is rooted in quantifiable demographic, economic, and resource-based strengths. These capabilities, even when not wielded by a perfectly cohesive group, collectively shift the global center of gravity and provide the foundation for its challenge to the existing international order.

2.1 The Demographic and Economic Engine: A Center of Global Gravity

The sheer scale of the BRICS+ countries is its most fundamental strength. Following its 2024-2025 expansion, the bloc now comprises approximately 45% of the world’s population, or over 3.5 billion people.16 This immense demographic weight translates into vast consumer markets, a deep labor pool, and significant long-term growth potential that cannot be ignored.

This demographic scale is matched by growing economic clout. While the G7 still leads in nominal GDP, a measure reflecting financial market depth, the more telling metric for real economic activity—Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)—reveals a historic shift. The BRICS+ share of global GDP (PPP) has already surpassed that of the G7. Projections for 2025 place the BRICS+ share at nearly 40%, compared to the G7’s 28.4%.30 This is not a future forecast but a present reality, indicating that the bulk of the world’s industrial production, manufacturing of goods, and provision of services now occurs within the BRICS+ nations.33 China alone accounts for over half of the bloc’s economic output and is the world’s top merchandise exporter, anchoring a shift in the center of global manufacturing gravity.4

The bloc’s role in international commerce is correspondingly large, accounting for approximately 21-24% of global exports.34 Critically, trade within the BRICS+ group is expanding at a faster rate than global trade, fostering the development of increasingly resilient, non-Western-centric supply chains.35 This growing intra-bloc trade reduces dependence on traditional markets in North America and Europe and enhances the group’s collective economic security.

Table 1: BRICS+ vs. G7: A Comparative Dashboard (2025 Projections)

MetricBRICS+G7Global Share (BRICS+)Global Share (G7)
Population~$3.7$ billion~$0.8$ billion~$45%~$10%
GDP (Nominal)~$30.8$ trillion~$51.1$ trillion~$27%~$44%
GDP (PPP)~$65$ trillion~$48$ trillion~$39%~$28%
Share of Global Exports~$5.5$ trillion~$6.7$ trillion~$24%~$29%
Military Expenditure~$0.48$ trillion~$1.20$ trillion~$19%~$49%

Note: Figures are estimates based on 2024-2025 data and projections. GDP figures are approximate based on combined member data. Population data is based on 2025 estimates. Trade and military spending shares reflect recent available data. Sources:.4

2.2 Dominance in Strategic Commodities: The Gatekeepers of the Global Economy

The expansion of BRICS+ has consolidated its position as a “resource superpower”.39 The bloc now exerts significant, and in some cases dominant, influence over the global supply of commodities that are essential for both the legacy energy system and the emerging green economy.

In the energy sector, the inclusion of Iran and the UAE, alongside Russia and founding members Brazil and China, creates a formidable concentration of power. The expanded bloc now accounts for approximately 43.6% of global crude oil production.19 This gives the group—which includes the world’s largest producers and two of its largest consumers—unprecedented potential to coordinate energy policy and influence global prices, operating as a political counterpart to the economic function of OPEC+. Its control extends to other fossil fuels, with members producing 36% of the world’s natural gas and over 78% of its mineral coal.36

Even more strategically significant in the long term is the bloc’s dominance over critical minerals required for high-tech manufacturing and the clean energy transition. This concentration of resource control gives BRICS+ immense structural power over the global supply chains of the future. Members have already demonstrated a willingness to leverage this power through export restrictions, as China has done with rare earths and graphite, signaling the potential for coordinated action to achieve geopolitical objectives.19 This power is not just over raw materials, but also processing; China alone processes an estimated 90% of the world’s rare earth elements.40

Table 2: BRICS+ Control of Key Global Resources

Commodity/ResourceEstimated BRICS+ Share of Global Production/Reserves
Crude Oil Production~$43.6%
Natural Gas Production~$36%
Mineral Coal Production~$78.2%
Rare Earths (Reserves)~$72%
Manganese (Reserves)~$75%
Graphite (Reserves)~$50%
Nickel (Reserves)~$28%
Copper (Reserves)~$10%
Wheat Production~$42%
Rice Production~$52%
Soybean Production~$46%

Note: Figures are estimates based on the expanded BRICS+ membership. Percentages can vary slightly by year and data source. Sources:.4

2.3 The “Voice of the Global South”: A Diplomatic Counterweight

Beyond its material strengths, BRICS+ has successfully cultivated significant soft power by positioning itself as the primary political and diplomatic forum for the Global South.8 This appeal is rooted in a shared historical narrative—many members experienced European colonialism—and a common desire for a more equitable international order that is less dominated by the United States and its Western allies.3

The bloc offers a platform for countries to pursue “strategic autonomy,” allowing them to maintain productive relationships with a range of global powers without being forced into rigid, binding alliances.42 This message resonates deeply in an era of renewed great-power competition, particularly with nations wary of being caught in the crossfire of U.S.-China rivalry. For many developing countries, BRICS+ represents a “safe harbor” from U.S. diplomatic coercion and economic statecraft, providing an alternative path to development and international recognition.29

The high level of interest in joining the group is empirical evidence of this growing diplomatic magnetism. The fact that over 40 countries have formally applied or expressed a desire to join demonstrates that the BRICS+ vision of a multipolar world has a broad and receptive audience.16 This allows the bloc to act as a powerful diplomatic counterweight in multilateral institutions like the UN and the G20, where it can coordinate positions and amplify the collective voice of the developing world.20

The power of BRICS+ is therefore asymmetric when compared to the G7. Its dominance in production, population, and raw materials (reflected in its PPP GDP and resource control) directly challenges the G7’s long-standing dominance in finance and military power (reflected in nominal GDP and defense spending). The core geopolitical dynamic of the coming decades will be the contest between these two forms of power: the BRICS+ leverage over the physical economy versus the G7’s control over the financial and security architecture that governs it. This structural conflict is the fundamental driver behind initiatives like de-dollarization and the creation of the NDB.

Section 3: An Assessment of Inherent Vulnerabilities (Weaknesses)

Despite its formidable collective strengths, the BRICS+ bloc is fundamentally constrained by deep-seated internal contradictions and structural weaknesses. These fissures are not temporary disagreements but enduring features of the group’s composition that cap its potential to act as a coherent, unified global actor. Its aspirations are consistently checked by the divergent realities of its members.

3.1 The Sino-Indian Fault Line: The Rivalry at the Core

The single greatest impediment to BRICS+ cohesion is the intractable strategic rivalry between its two most populous members, China and India. This is not merely a bilateral issue but a structural flaw that permeates the entire bloc. The unresolved border dispute along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which escalated into the first deadly clashes in decades in 2020, is the most visible symptom of a much deeper competition for regional and global influence.45

This rivalry manifests in fundamentally competing visions for the purpose of BRICS itself. China, increasingly aligned with Russia, views the bloc as a key instrument in an explicitly anti-Western, revisionist project aimed at directly challenging U.S. hegemony and creating an alternative world order centered on Beijing.3 In contrast, India, often finding common cause with Brazil and South Africa, espouses a “non-Western, not anti-Western” stance.48 New Delhi sees BRICS as a vehicle to achieve a “multipolar” world, enhance its own “strategic autonomy,” and reform—not necessarily overturn—the existing global governance system to gain a more prominent seat at the table.3

This divergence is amplified by a stark power asymmetry. China’s economy is larger than that of all other ten BRICS+ members combined, fueling Indian and Brazilian fears that the bloc could devolve into a “pro-China alliance” or a mere instrument of Chinese foreign policy.49 India’s initial resistance to China’s push for rapid expansion, its insistence on establishing clear membership criteria, and its concurrent participation in the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) are all direct consequences of this deep-seated suspicion.49 This central rivalry ensures that on any critical geopolitical or security issue that requires deep trust, bloc-wide consensus is virtually unattainable.

3.2 Economic and Political Heterogeneity: A Coalition of Contradictions

The expansion in 2024 has amplified the group’s already vast internal diversity, creating a coalition of profound contradictions. The economic disparities are stark, undermining the potential for common policy. The bloc includes some of the world’s wealthiest nations on a per capita basis, such as the UAE (GDP per capita PPP of ~), and some of the poorest, like Ethiopia (GDP per capita PPP of ~).14 It contains major global creditors like China and nations struggling with high public debt, such as Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa, where public debt has approached or exceeded 90% of GDP.53 Members face vastly different domestic challenges, from China’s looming demographic crisis and real estate bubble to India’s massive informal labor market and South Africa’s chronic unemployment and infrastructure decay.54 These divergent economic realities make harmonizing fiscal, monetary, or trade policies exceptionally difficult.

The political divergence is equally pronounced. The group is a mixture of established, albeit stressed, democracies (India, Brazil, South Africa), consolidated one-party states (China), managed autocracies (Russia, Egypt, UAE), and a theocracy (Iran). This is not a trivial distinction; it leads to fundamentally different values and approaches to critical issues such as human rights, internet freedom, data governance, and the principles of international law. While research on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly indicates a degree of cohesion on broad development and economic issues, it also reveals that the BRICS countries are least cohesive on matters of international security and human rights, where their core national interests and political systems diverge most sharply.57 Furthermore, the expansion has imported new potential bilateral conflicts into the group’s internal dynamics, notably the historic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the ongoing dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River.13

3.3 The Cohesion Paradox: The Weakness of an Informal Structure

BRICS+ remains a fundamentally informal political grouping. It operates without a binding charter, a permanent secretariat to drive initiatives, or a centralized budget.1 Its primary operating principle is consensus, meaning all substantive decisions must be agreed upon by all members.8

This informality creates a “cohesion paradox.” On one hand, it is a necessary feature, not a bug. The loose, consensus-based structure is what allows such a diverse and internally competitive group to coexist. It provides the flexibility for members to cooperate on areas of clear mutual interest (such as funding infrastructure through the NDB) while avoiding direct confrontation on deeply divisive issues. For a country like India, the consensus rule acts as a crucial veto, preventing the bloc from being hijacked by a more radical Sino-Russian agenda that would compromise its strategic autonomy.48 The institutional weakness is, in effect, a precondition for the group’s continued existence.

On the other hand, this same structure severely limits the bloc’s capacity to act as a decisive and effective global actor, especially in response to fast-moving crises. The need for consensus among eleven countries with competing interests ensures that the group’s collective actions will almost always gravitate toward the lowest common denominator.60 This structural reality prevents BRICS+ from evolving into a true military or political alliance with the capacity for unified, binding action, in stark contrast to treaty-based organizations like NATO. The “spaghetti bowl” effect, where overlapping and sometimes competing subgroups and initiatives exist (such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum of India, Brazil, and South Africa), further complicates coordination and dilutes the bloc’s focus.62

Table 3: BRICS+ Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix

DomainAssessed StrengthCorresponding Weakness/Constraint
EconomicMassive share of global GDP (PPP), trade, and growth potential.Extreme internal economic disparities (GDP per capita, debt), trade imbalances, and the overwhelming structural dominance of China’s economy.
ResourcesSignificant to dominant control over strategic energy and critical mineral supply chains.Limited tangible intra-bloc cooperation on resource development and investment; nationalistic resource policies and competition often prevail over collective strategy.
Political/DiplomaticGrowing appeal as the “Voice of the Global South” and a platform for strategic autonomy.Divergent political systems (democracies vs. autocracies) and competing national interests prevent a unified foreign policy on contentious issues.
InstitutionalCreation of parallel financial institutions (New Development Bank, Contingent Reserve Arrangement).An informal, consensus-based structure (no charter) limits capacity for decisive action and enforces a lowest-common-denominator approach to policy.
SecurityDeepening Sino-Russian military axis and targeted trilateral exercises with members (e.g., South Africa, Iran).The intractable Sino-Indian rivalry and other bilateral tensions (e.g., Egypt-Ethiopia) make any form of bloc-wide security alliance or mutual defense pact impossible.

Section 4: Threat Assessment: A Systemic Challenge to U.S. Primacy

The threat posed by the BRICS+ bloc to United States national interests is not primarily a conventional military one, but rather a long-term, systemic challenge aimed at eroding the foundational pillars of U.S. global power: its financial dominance, its diplomatic leadership, and the effectiveness of its economic statecraft. While the bloc’s internal fractures limit its ability to act as a unified adversary, its collective weight and targeted initiatives are actively reshaping the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape.

4.1 The Financial Challenge: De-Dollarization and Parallel Systems

The most potent and coordinated challenge from BRICS+ is directed at the central role of the U.S. dollar in the global financial system. This effort is driven by a shared desire among members to reduce their vulnerability to U.S. financial sanctions and what they perceive as the “weaponization” of the dollar.63 The unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia’s central bank following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine served as a powerful catalyst, demonstrating to other nations the profound risks of dependence on the Western-led financial infrastructure.63 The threat is not the imminent replacement of the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, but rather the construction of a parallel financial system large enough to render U.S. sanctions increasingly ineffective.

The mechanisms being pursued include:

  • Promotion of Local Currency Trade: Members are actively working to bypass the dollar in bilateral trade. This is most advanced in Russia-China energy trade, which is now largely settled in yuan and rubles, but also includes initiatives like India’s rupee-based trade experiments.64 The share of the Chinese renminbi in total intra-BRICS trade transactions has reportedly reached approximately 47%.4
  • Development of Alternative Payment Systems: China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is being promoted as a potential alternative to the SWIFT messaging network for international bank transfers.66 Concurrently, the bloc is exploring a unified payment platform, often referred to as “BRICS Pay” or the “BRICS Bridge,” to facilitate seamless cross-border transactions in members’ national currencies, potentially leveraging blockchain technology.63
  • Institutional Support: The New Development Bank is mandated to increase the share of its lending in local currencies, further reducing dollar dependency in development finance.18

Despite these efforts, the de-dollarization project faces formidable headwinds. The dollar’s dominance is entrenched, accounting for roughly 58% of global foreign exchange reserves and being on one side of nearly 90% of all foreign exchange trades.54 This is due to the unparalleled depth, liquidity, and perceived safety of U.S. financial markets, which no BRICS+ member can currently replicate.54 China’s own capital controls and the non-convertibility of its currency remain significant obstacles to the yuan’s emergence as a true global reserve currency.66 Therefore, the BRICS+ financial strategy should be understood as a long-term project to build “hedging options” and create financial insulation, rather than an attempt to dethrone the dollar overnight.69

4.2 The Geopolitical Challenge: A Fragmented but Assertive Bloc

Geopolitically, BRICS+ erodes U.S. influence by creating a high-profile and increasingly institutionalized diplomatic venue where major global issues are discussed without U.S. or Western participation. This normalizes a multipolar world where Washington is no longer the indispensable convener for every significant international conversation, thereby diminishing U.S. diplomatic centrality.20

The bloc’s most effective geopolitical tool is its successful positioning as the champion of the “global majority”.64 It actively promotes a narrative that contrasts its stated principles of equality, sovereignty, and mutual respect with what it portrays as a coercive and hegemonic Western approach.64 This narrative is highly resonant across the Global South, granting BRICS+ significant soft power and making it an attractive forum for developing nations seeking to amplify their voice on the world stage.8

This diplomatic appeal allows the bloc to function as a “safe harbor” for countries seeking to resist U.S. diplomatic or economic pressure. By offering alternative trade partners, sources of investment (via the NDB), and a platform of political legitimacy, BRICS+ undermines the efficacy of U.S. sanctions and other coercive measures against states like Russia and Iran.29 Aggressive U.S. policies, such as the broad application of tariffs, have proven to be a primary catalyst for BRICS+ cohesion, providing the shared external threat that helps its members overcome their internal differences and accelerates their anti-hegemonic agenda.65

4.3 The Security Challenge: Nascent but Evolving Cooperation

It is crucial to assess that BRICS+ is not, and shows no sign of becoming, a collective security alliance akin to NATO. The deep-seated Sino-Indian rivalry, along with the divergent security interests of other members, makes any form of mutual defense pact a political impossibility.47

However, specific security alignments are deepening within the BRICS+ framework. The most significant of these is the strengthening military-to-military relationship between China and Russia.75 This “no limits” partnership, while bilateral in nature, is politically amplified within the BRICS context. Their joint military exercises are increasing in frequency, complexity, and geographic scope, moving from counter-terrorism drills to simulated joint operations in regional wars and expanding into contested maritime zones like the Sea of Japan and the Bering Sea.75 These exercises signal a clear alignment of security interests in countering U.S. power and provide the People’s Liberation Army with valuable operational experience.75

Furthermore, this axis is expanding to include other BRICS+ members in targeted trilateral and multilateral formats. The “Mosi” naval exercises involving Russia, China, and South Africa off the coast of Africa, and the “Maritime Security Belt” exercises with Russia, China, and new member Iran in the Gulf of Oman, demonstrate an expanding web of security cooperation that deliberately bypasses the U.S. and its traditional alliance structures.76 While not representing a unified BRICS+ military posture, these exercises enhance interoperability among key members and project a coordinated challenge to U.S. power projection in vital strategic regions.

Table 4: U.S. Threat Vector Analysis

Threat DomainThreat Vector (Specific BRICS+ Action)Impact on U.S. InterestsCurrent SeverityFuture Trajectory
FinancialPromotion of local currency trade & commodity pricing.Reduces global demand for USD; weakens efficacy of financial sanctions.MediumIncreasing
FinancialDevelopment of SWIFT alternatives (e.g., CIPS, BRICS Pay).Creates sanctions-proof payment channels for strategic trade, eroding U.S. economic leverage.Low-MediumIncreasing
FinancialNDB lending without political conditionality.Undermines U.S. influence in development finance via IMF/World Bank; offers alternative for sanctioned states.MediumIncreasing
GeopoliticalBloc expansion and creation of “partner” status.Normalizes a non-Western-led global governance structure; erodes U.S. diplomatic centrality.HighIncreasing
GeopoliticalUse of BRICS+ as a platform for the “Global South.”Challenges U.S. soft power and leadership narrative; creates a powerful diplomatic counter-bloc in multilateral forums.HighIncreasing
SecurityDeepening Sino-Russian strategic and military alignment.Creates a coordinated military counterweight to U.S. and allies in key theaters (Indo-Pacific, Europe).HighIncreasing
SecurityTrilateral exercises with U.S. adversaries (e.g., Iran, Russia).Enhances military interoperability and power projection of adversarial states in strategic chokepoints.MediumIncreasing

Section 5: Strategic Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In response to the systemic challenge posed by BRICS+, the United States must adopt a sophisticated and forward-looking strategy that moves beyond a reactive, confrontational posture. A policy framework built on broad opposition and punitive tariffs has proven counterproductive, inadvertently fostering greater unity within a bloc rife with internal contradictions.65 An effective U.S. strategy must be proactive and nuanced, designed to leverage American strengths while exploiting BRICS+ weaknesses. The overarching goal should be to manage the rise of this coalition through a policy of “competitive coopetition.”

5.1 Recalibrating U.S. Engagement: From Confrontation to “Competitive Coopetition”

The foundational error in past U.S. policy has been to treat BRICS+ as a monolithic entity.74 A more effective approach requires a differentiated strategy that recognizes the deep fissures within the group and tailors U.S. engagement accordingly.

  • Deepen the Strategic Partnership with India: India is the critical swing state and the primary counterweight to Chinese dominance within BRICS+. The U.S. should prioritize and accelerate security, intelligence, technology, and economic cooperation through bilateral channels and minilateral formats like the Quad. The strategic objective is not to force India to leave BRICS—an unrealistic goal that would undermine its principle of strategic autonomy—but to ensure that its calculus remains more aligned with a U.S.-backed vision of a free and open, rules-based multipolar order, rather than a Chinese-led, revisionist one.50
  • Cultivate Ties with Brazil and South Africa: As fellow democracies, Brazil and South Africa share U.S. interests in areas such as climate action, public health, and the rule of law. The U.S. should intensify diplomatic engagement and offer tangible benefits, including enhanced trade access, investment in their green transitions, and a greater voice in Western-led institutions. This provides these countries with viable alternatives and reduces their incentive to align with the more explicitly anti-Western agenda of the Russia-China axis.69
  • Isolate and Contain Revisionist Actors: For members like Russia and Iran, whose core strategic goals are fundamentally hostile to U.S. interests, a policy of containment and pressure should continue. The U.S. should work with allies to maintain and enforce targeted sanctions while clearly communicating that their inclusion in BRICS+ will not shield them from accountability for malign activities.

5.2 Reinforcing the U.S.-led Financial Architecture

The most effective long-term defense against the appeal of the NDB and the push for de-dollarization is to address the legitimate grievances that fuel their existence. The U.S. must lead a proactive effort to reform and strengthen the Bretton Woods system.

  • Champion Meaningful Institutional Reform: The U.S. should publicly and vigorously champion a redistribution of voting shares at the IMF and World Bank to give major emerging economies like India and Brazil a stake that is commensurate with their growing economic weight. Such a move would significantly diminish the appeal of creating parallel institutions by demonstrating that the existing system is capable of evolution and inclusivity.69
  • Offer a Superior Development Finance Proposition: The U.S., in coordination with G7 partners, must scale up, streamline, and better market its own development finance offerings through mechanisms like the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and regional initiatives. These projects must be faster to approve, more transparent in their terms, and focused on high-quality, sustainable infrastructure to present a clear and superior alternative to the often opaque and debt-heavy financing offered by Chinese state-led entities.33
  • Lead in Financial Innovation: To maintain the dollar’s primacy, the U.S. financial system must remain the most efficient, secure, and innovative in the world. This requires the U.S. to take a leading role in setting global standards for digital currencies, cross-border payment systems, and financial technology, ensuring that the next generation of global finance is built on a dollar-based foundation.

5.3 Building a Counter-Coalition of Like-Minded Partners

The U.S. cannot counter the diplomatic weight of BRICS+ alone. It must actively build and reinforce a network of allies and partners who share a commitment to a rules-based international order.

  • Revitalize the G7 and Expand its Outreach: The G7 should be reinforced as the core steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies. The U.S. should push for a more permanent and structured outreach format that regularly includes key non-BRICS democratic partners from the Global South, such as Mexico, Nigeria, and South Korea, effectively creating a “Democracies 10 (D10)” or similar grouping. This would offer an alternative vision of global governance based on shared values and mutual interests.67
  • Double Down on Minilateralism: The U.S. should continue to invest in flexible, issue-based coalitions. Formats like the Quad, AUKUS, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) are powerful tools for countering BRICS+ influence in specific domains (e.g., maritime security, infrastructure) and regions without requiring the rigid consensus of a formal alliance.13

5.4 Targeted Economic Statecraft

U.S. economic policy must become more surgical and strategic, abandoning blunt instruments that have proven counterproductive in favor of precise measures that impose costs on adversarial behavior without alienating neutral countries.

  • Abandon Broad, Unilateral Tariffs: The use of broad, punitive tariffs against entire blocs or countries has demonstrably failed, serving only to unify BRICS+ members and drive them toward closer cooperation.73 U.S. trade policy should pivot to negotiating high-standard bilateral and regional trade agreements with willing partners and using targeted, multilaterally-coordinated sanctions against specific entities for specific violations of international law or trade rules.
  • Impose Costs for Bypassing the System: In response to the development of alternative payment systems designed to evade sanctions, the U.S. should adopt a clear and narrowly defined policy of prohibiting dual participation. Any global financial institution that chooses to transact through a designated parallel system like CIPS for illicit purposes should risk losing its access to the U.S. dollar clearing system. This forces a clear choice and leverages the dollar’s enduring centrality, making the cost of circumvention prohibitively high for most major international banks.66
  • Compete on Strategic Supply Chains: Rather than simply attempting to block BRICS+ consolidation of resource control, the U.S. should accelerate its own “allied-shoring” and “friend-shoring” initiatives. This involves co-investing with allies and partners in the development of secure, transparent, and resilient supply chains for critical minerals, semiconductors, and other strategic goods, thereby reducing Western dependence on BRICS+ controlled resources.33

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