The character of ground warfare has undergone a fundamental and irreversible transformation. The proliferation of inexpensive, adaptable, and lethal Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly known as drones, has rendered the modern battlefield transparent to an unprecedented degree. This is not an incremental evolution; it is a revolution in military affairs with parallels to the introduction of the machine gun or the tank.¹ For the ground commander, the tactical implications are stark: traditional concepts of concealment are largely obsolete, and movement in the open is exceptionally dangerous.² The drone is no longer an ancillary intelligence or strike asset; it is a primary, persistent, and ubiquitous presence that dictates the tempo of operations and the very terms of survival.

This report provides an operational guide for the ground force commander navigating this hyper-lethal environment. It synthesizes official doctrine, strategic papers, and hard-won battlefield lessons from a range of global actors. The analysis incorporates doctrinal development within the United States ⁴ and the United Kingdom ⁶; the brutal, real-time tactical adaptations of Ukrainian and Russian forces ³; and the forward-looking, technologically ambitious warfighting concepts of the People’s Republic of China.¹² From this diverse body of intelligence, this document distills 20 actionable imperatives—10 affirmative duties and 10 critical prohibitions—designed to equip the modern commander for success.

The central thesis of this analysis is that victory and survival on the drone-saturated battlefield will be determined less by the possession of a single superior technology and more by the rigorous application of tactical discipline, the cultivation of relentless organizational adaptation, and a command climate that empowers leaders at the lowest echelons. The challenge is not merely to acquire new equipment, but to forge a new mindset.

Section I: The Commander’s Imperatives: 10 Things You MUST DO

This section details the proactive, essential measures a commander must implement to survive, fight, and win in a drone-contested environment. These are not optional tactics but foundational principles for modern ground combat.

1. Embrace Constant Dispersal and Concealment

The single most effective countermeasure against the drone threat is to deny the enemy a worthwhile target. In an environment where persistent aerial surveillance is the norm, the concentration of forces is an invitation to destruction. The lessons from the conflict in Ukraine are brutal and unambiguous: armor formations, logistics nodes, command posts, or any assembly of troops and equipment are magnets for attack by cheap, attritable, and precise UAS.³ Therefore, the commander’s first and most fundamental duty is the relentless enforcement of dispersal and concealment.

This principle is enshrined in developing Western doctrine. U.S. Army guidance emphasizes passive protection measures, particularly for units at the brigade level and below that may lack robust, active counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems capable of defeating larger, more sophisticated drones (Group 3 and above).⁴ The curriculum at the Joint Counter-Small UAS (C-sUAS) University, the U.S. military’s premier training center for this problem set, establishes passive measures like camouflage and dispersion as foundational skills for all service members, highlighting their universal importance.¹⁵ The battlefield has confirmed this doctrinal wisdom; the “all-seeing eye” of the drone means that any static, visible unit is a designated target, forcing a complete reconsideration of infantry and armor tactics.³

Adherence to this imperative has profound second- and third-order effects that a commander must anticipate and manage. Dispersal is not simply a physical act of spreading out vehicles and personnel; it is a significant challenge to command and control (C2) and logistics. A dispersed force is inherently more difficult to command. Traditional methods of visual command are impossible, line-of-sight radio communication is degraded, and the risk of units becoming isolated increases. The logistical burden also multiplies; resupplying ten small, concealed positions is an order of magnitude more complex and dangerous than resupplying a single, larger company location.

Consequently, the commander must adapt the unit’s entire operational architecture to support distributed operations. This requires heavy investment in resilient, redundant, and low-signature communication systems, such as mesh networks, which can maintain connectivity even when individual nodes are lost.¹⁶ More importantly, it demands a radical embrace of mission command. Junior leaders and non-commissioned officers must be ruthlessly trained and empowered to operate within the commander’s intent for extended periods with minimal communication. The logistical plan must be redesigned from the ground up, shifting from centralized distribution points to a more agile system of mobile, concealed caches and unpredictable, small-scale resupply runs.

2. Execute a Layered, Integrated Defense

There is no single “silver bullet” solution to the drone threat.¹⁷ The diversity of UAS—ranging from small, commercial quadcopters to large, military-grade systems, and from single scouts to autonomous swarms—precludes a one-size-fits-all defense. An effective C-UAS posture requires a “system-of-systems” approach that integrates and layers multiple capabilities to detect, track, identify, and defeat threats across this wide spectrum.¹⁸

This layered defense is a core concept in emerging U.S. and allied doctrine. It is a combined arms effort that integrates kinetic effects, such as machine guns, cannons, and missiles like the FIM-92 Stinger ¹⁹; non-kinetic effects, including electronic warfare (EW) jammers, GPS spoofers, high-powered microwaves, and directed energy weapons ²⁰; and the foundational passive measures of concealment and dispersion.⁴ The U.S. Marine Corps’ plan to field C-sUAS capabilities across the force in 2025 explicitly incorporates both kinetic and non-kinetic means that are designed to be lightweight and usable by any Marine, pushing this layered concept down to the lowest tactical levels.²¹ Similarly, the United Kingdom is investing in a range of homegrown defenses, including directed energy systems, to create multi-layered protection for critical assets.⁶ This approach is not merely best practice; it is a necessity for future survival, as the doctrinal concepts of adversaries like China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) explicitly envision the use of drone swarms designed to saturate and overwhelm any single-layer defense.¹²

Implementing a layered defense, however, creates a significant deconfliction challenge for the commander. The simultaneous employment of kinetic weapons, EW jammers, and friendly UAS in the same battlespace introduces a high risk of fratricide and mutual interference. An EW system intended to jam an enemy FPV drone could just as easily sever the control link to a friendly reconnaissance UAS. A gunner engaging a small, fast-moving enemy drone could inadvertently fire into the flight path of a friendly asset. This internal friction can paralyze a unit’s C-UAS efforts if not properly managed.

The commander must therefore establish and ruthlessly enforce clear, simple, and well-rehearsed procedures for airspace and electromagnetic spectrum management. This is a critical task for the Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) Cell within the command post, which becomes a vital node for integrating all C-UAS activities.²³ It requires a reliable common operational picture, enabled by networked systems like the Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD C2) system, to ensure all elements of the force can see and understand what is happening in the air and across the spectrum.¹⁵ The U.K.’s development of the SAPIENT common architecture, a standard designed to link disparate sensors and effectors, is a direct response to this complex integration challenge.⁷ Training for these deconfliction procedures must be as rigorous as training on the weapons systems themselves.

3. Target the Brain, Not Just the Claw

The drone in the air is merely the claw of the enemy system; it is often an inexpensive and expendable asset. The true center of gravity—the brain—is the trained human operator and their Ground Control Station (GCS) on the ground. The most efficient and effective C-UAS strategy targets these critical vulnerabilities rather than focusing exclusively on shooting down aircraft.

This principle was a key lesson from the U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division during a major training exercise. Through deliberate analysis, the division staff identified the enemy’s GCSs as the critical capability enabling their entire indirect fire system. Consequently, the division commander declared that targeting and destroying these GCSs was the number one high-payoff targeting priority.⁴ This was achieved not by waiting for drones to appear overhead, but by proactively fusing intelligence from multiple sources—primarily EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) that could detect the electronic emissions of the GCS—to dynamically cue lethal fires onto the operators’ locations.⁴ The brutal realities of the war in Ukraine have validated this approach, with battlefield reports confirming that drone operators themselves have become high-value targets, as both sides have developed and refined techniques to trace control signals back to their source for immediate targeting.¹⁶ This has led U.S. forces to actively develop methods to identify, locate, and track enemy drone operators in real-time.²²

This focus on targeting the human elements of the UAS network is a double-edged sword. A thinking adversary will recognize this tactic and adopt it themselves. As friendly forces prioritize hunting enemy operators, the enemy will dedicate its own ISR assets and fires to finding and killing friendly UAS and C-UAS teams. The radio frequency (RF) signature from a GCS, a data link, or even a powerful C-UAS jammer becomes a homing beacon for enemy artillery. This dynamic transforms UAS/C-UAS personnel from technical support staff into direct combatants who are actively and lethally hunted.

The commander must therefore treat their own UAS and C-UAS teams as high-value assets that require deliberate protection. These teams cannot afford to be static. They must adopt “shoot and scoot” tactics, frequently relocating their operating positions to avoid being targeted after they emit. They must be masters of signature management, employing strict emission control (EMCON) protocols, physical camouflage, and thermal shielding. They may also require dedicated security elements to protect them from ground infiltration. The survivability of these teams is no longer a secondary concern; it is a critical component of the unit’s overall combat effectiveness and its ability to win the C-UAS fight.

4. Arm the Edge: Empower the Squad

The drone threat is not a high-level, strategic problem; it is an immediate, personal, and ubiquitous threat at the lowest tactical level. Centralized, high-echelon C-UAS assets, while important, are often too slow to respond and too few in number to protect every unit across a wide area. The only effective response is to push capability down to the tactical edge. Every squad must possess the organic equipment and training to defend itself and to conduct its own local drone operations.

This philosophy of arming the edge is a driving force behind current U.S. military modernization. The U.S. Army has set a clear goal: by the end of 2026, every squad will be equipped with unmanned systems, which are to be treated as a standard piece of individual equipment alongside the soldier’s rifle, radio, and night vision goggles.³ The U.S. Marine Corps is pursuing a parallel effort, fielding dismounted, MOS-agnostic C-UAS capabilities across the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) to provide an essential self-defense capability for individual units.²¹ This includes handheld systems like the “drone defender,” a man-portable jammer that can be used by small unit leaders.²⁴ This decentralization is a doctrinal necessity, as the U.S. Army acknowledges that dedicated air defense personnel are simply too few to cover the entire force, making C-UAS a combined arms effort that must be performed down to the lowest level.²³ This empowerment extends to offensive capabilities as well, with the establishment of the Marine Corps Attack Drone Team (MCADT) signaling a clear intent to push lethal FPV drone capabilities down to the small-unit level.²⁵

However, simply issuing new equipment to squads creates a massive training, maintenance, and cognitive burden on the individual soldier. A soldier who is already laden with a rifle, ammunition, body armor, water, and communications gear must now also carry, maintain, and proficiently operate a sophisticated drone or C-UAS jammer. In the heat of combat, that soldier must function not only as a rifleman but also as a drone pilot, a sensor analyst, and an EW operator. This introduces an immense cognitive load that can quickly become overwhelming.

The commander cannot solve this problem by just distributing equipment. They must fundamentally re-engineer their unit’s training plan. Training on these new systems must be continuous, realistic, and fully integrated into all collective tasks.¹⁵ The JCU model of dedicated operator and planner courses provides a template, but this must be replicated and sustained at the unit level.¹⁵ The commander must also be ruthless in identifying which soldiers have the aptitude for these complex technical tasks, potentially creating dedicated UAS/C-UAS roles within the squad while ensuring cross-training for redundancy. The very definition of what it means to be an infantryman is evolving, and the commander must lead their unit through that transformation.³

5. Master the Spectrum: Win the EW Fight

The vast majority of small UAS are critically dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum. They rely on RF links for command and control from the operator, for downlinking real-time video, and for receiving signals from global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) like GPS for navigation. A commander who can dominate this invisible battlespace possesses a powerful, non-kinetic means of neutralizing large numbers of enemy drones.

Electronic warfare is a primary C-UAS defeat mechanism, used to jam the vital links between a drone and its operator or to sever its connection to navigational satellites, causing it to lose its way, land, or crash.²⁰ The successful targeting of GCSs by the 25th Infantry Division was heavily reliant on the ability of EW and SIGINT assets to first detect the enemy’s electronic signatures, demonstrating that the spectrum is a source of both threat and opportunity.⁴ However, the spectrum is a fiercely contested domain. The offense-defense race is playing out in real-time. Adversaries are actively developing and fielding electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). Russia is improving its drones to be more resistant to jamming.²⁶ Ukrainian forces have found that their jammers are not always effective against the latest generations of Russian drones.²⁷ Furthermore, new technologies are emerging that bypass the RF spectrum entirely, such as fiber-optic tethered drones that are immune to traditional jamming techniques.¹⁰

This dynamic reality means that the EW battle is a constant “cat and mouse” game of measures and countermeasures. Simply activating a powerful, wide-area jammer is not a sustainable solution; it is merely an opening move. This action immediately broadcasts the jammer’s position to enemy SIGINT assets, turning the EW team into a priority target for artillery. Furthermore, indiscriminate jamming can cripple a unit’s own communications and friendly UAS operations.

The commander must therefore treat EW as a precision maneuver asset, not a static, impenetrable shield. EW systems must be employed surgically and sparingly, in tight coordination with other kinetic and non-kinetic effects, to achieve a specific tactical purpose. This requires EW systems that are not just powerful but also agile and programmable, capable of adapting to new enemy frequencies and waveforms identified in near real-time. This creates a critical feedback loop between intelligence elements—who analyze captured or downed enemy drones to understand their electronic components—and the EW operators on the front line who must program their systems to counter those specific threats. Winning the EW fight requires an integrated team of intelligence analysts, planners, and operators who can out-think and out-pace the adversary across the spectrum.

6. Move with Purpose and Deception

In the transparent battlespace created by persistent drone surveillance, all movement is detectable, and therefore all movement is exceptionally dangerous.² Logistics convoys, troop rotations, tactical advances, and even the evacuation of casualties have become prime targets. Survival and mission success now depend on the ability to move intelligently, using speed, terrain, environmental conditions, and deception to minimize the time spent exposed to the enemy’s unblinking eye.

The war in Ukraine provides a stark illustration of this new reality. The omnipresence of drones has made any form of movement so hazardous that wounded soldiers may wait for 12 hours or more for evacuation until the relative safety of darkness.² Russian FPV drones, including jam-resistant fiber-optic variants, are used to establish control over key logistics roads, making every resupply run a high-risk gamble that can lead to units being slowly strangled as they run out of vehicles, ammunition, fuel, and food.¹⁰ This has forced a fundamental rethinking of combined arms tactics. The U.S. Army is now reconsidering the traditional role of the tank as the spearhead of an assault; instead, it is exploring concepts where drones lead the initial assault to identify threats and clear pathways, allowing tanks to provide heavy firepower from more protected, static positions.³

This lethal environment forces a return to, and a technological evolution of, the classic arts of war: deception and operational security (OPSEC). The digital and thermal signature of a unit is now as important as its physical one. A simple observation of movement being easily detected and targeted leads to the first-order effect of units minimizing movement or accepting heavy casualties. This, in turn, forces tactical innovation. Units are compelled to move primarily at night, during periods of bad weather that can degrade enemy optics, or by using available terrain—such as dense forests or the complex clutter of urban areas—for concealment. But passive measures are not enough. Active deception becomes critical. This can include the use of decoy vehicles, the creation of false thermal signatures to mislead IR sensors, and the execution of feints to draw the enemy’s attention and munitions away from the true axis of advance.

The commander must make deception a core, integrated element of every operational plan. This extends beyond physical decoys to encompass strict electronic discipline, such as banning personal cell phones whose signals can be easily geolocated. It includes managing thermal signatures by minimizing vehicle engine run times and using specialized blankets. It demands varying the routes and schedules for all logistics and rotations to avoid the establishment of predictable patterns (see Prohibition #8). The S2 (intelligence) and S3 (operations) staffs must work in close collaboration to analyze the enemy’s ISR patterns and plan all movement to occur during perceived gaps in coverage. In the drone era, the ability to move without being destroyed is a direct function of a unit’s discipline and creativity.

7. Dominate the Air Littoral

A purely defensive and reactive C-UAS posture is a losing strategy. A commander cannot afford to wait for the enemy to act. To seize the initiative, friendly forces must dominate the low-altitude airspace—what can be termed the “air littoral”—with their own organic UAS assets. This means employing a unit’s own drones for aggressive counter-reconnaissance to find and destroy enemy drone teams, for screening friendly forces during movement, and for conducting offensive precision strikes.

This shift from a defensive to an offensive mindset is evident in the force development of the U.S. military. The U.S. Marine Corps’ creation of the MCADT is a deliberate move to “fight fire with fire.” By integrating armed FPV drones at the small-unit level, the Corps aims to dramatically enhance lethality and provide an organic, responsive strike capability that does not rely on calling for external air or artillery support.²⁵ This concept of “drone-enabled maneuver warfare” envisions a unit’s own drones acting as an “airborne hammer,” providing persistent and highly responsive close air support that allows ground forces to maintain shock, momentum, and tempo during an attack.¹ This is already a reality in Ukraine, where drone-on-drone combat has become commonplace, and both sides are developing specific tactics to hunt and destroy the other’s aerial systems.² The U.S. Army is experimenting with this concept through the creation of “strike companies” that have their own dedicated drone platoons designed to operate ahead of the main body, using their own UAS to scout, identify threats, and clear a path for advancing forces.³

Achieving dominance in the air littoral creates a new and complex requirement for a “combined arms” approach in the air, mirroring the long-established principles of combined arms on the ground. The battlespace becomes a congested, three-dimensional environment where friendly ISR drones, friendly attack drones, friendly C-UAS systems, enemy ISR drones, and enemy attack drones are all operating simultaneously.

The commander must orchestrate these disparate assets as a cohesive team. This requires a sophisticated command and control system and well-rehearsed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). A typical engagement might involve using a friendly ISR drone to find an enemy position, cueing a friendly attack drone to fix or destroy it, and employing friendly C-UAS assets (such as jammers or guns) to protect the entire operation from interference by enemy drones. This is no longer just a matter of a single soldier flying a single drone; it is the conduct of a fully integrated air-ground operation at the platoon and company level. The commander who masters this complex choreography will own the low-altitude battlespace and, by extension, will control the fight on the ground.

8. Train for the Real Threat

C-UAS is a complex and perishable skill set, and the threat is in a state of constant, rapid evolution. A unit cannot wait until it deploys to a combat zone to encounter and learn how to fight drones. The drone threat must be a persistent, adaptive, and integral component of every training event, from individual soldier drills to collective, force-on-force exercises.

The JCU provides a clear model for how to approach this training requirement, offering specialized, in-depth courses for UAS operators, staff planners, and personnel responsible for installation defense, all of which culminate in a realistic joint exercise.¹⁵ The U.S. Marine Corps reinforces these skills through dedicated, multi-week courses that teach Marines how to tactically employ C-UAS systems both offensively and defensively in a live-fire environment.²⁸ The necessity for such rigorous and continuous training is underscored by the battlefield adaptations observed in Ukraine. Russian forces are constantly evolving their tactics, flying their drones higher and faster to stay out of range of ground fire, using decoy drones to confuse air defenses, and improving their systems’ resistance to jamming.²⁶ This means that training must be conducted against an adversary that learns and adapts, not against a static, predictable target. To foster this rapid learning, allied nations like the U.K. are using competitive events, such as the Military Drone Crucible Championship, to rapidly build proficiency and refine TTPs in realistic, high-pressure scenarios.²⁵

Effective training requires more than just buying a few commercial drones for target practice. It requires a dedicated, well-resourced, and intellectually agile opposing force (OPFOR) that can accurately replicate the evolving threat. A training scenario where friendly drones always fly simple, predictable patterns and use the same unencrypted frequencies is worse than useless; it builds false confidence and ingrains bad habits that will get soldiers killed. The training environment must be challenging and unforgiving.

The commander must therefore invest in and empower a dedicated C-UAS OPFOR within their unit. This team’s primary mission should be to study the latest enemy TTPs from active conflicts and replicate them during training exercises. This “red team” should be equipped with a variety of “red air” drones, similar to those used by adversaries ¹⁵, and given the freedom to be aggressive, creative, and ruthless in “attacking” the unit during field exercises. The goal of the OPFOR should not be merely to validate the unit’s C-UAS plan, but to actively stress and break it, forcing leaders and soldiers to adapt under extreme pressure. Only through this process of repeated failure and adaptation in training can a unit build the resilience and tactical acumen required to defeat a thinking enemy in combat.

9. Accelerate the Adaptation Cycle

In the contemporary drone war, the offense-defense innovation race is not measured in years or months, but in weeks.³⁰ The traditional, top-down, and deliberate military processes for procurement and doctrine development are dangerously slow. A commander cannot afford to wait for a perfect solution to be handed down from a higher headquarters. They must foster a command climate that encourages and rewards rapid, bottom-up innovation, empowering the soldiers who are in direct contact with the threat to develop, refine, and share new TTPs in near real-time.

This need for speed is a recognized challenge for Western militaries. The U.S. Army acknowledges that it must be able to “iterate more quickly” and incorporate lessons learned from the field “at speed”.¹⁷ The conflict in Ukraine serves as a powerful example of this accelerated adaptation cycle in action, with both sides constantly deploying new drone types, modifying commercial systems for military use, and developing novel countermeasures in a dynamic technological duel.² The U.K.’s Defence Drone Strategy explicitly aims to break free from traditional acquisition methods, seeking to “unleash the ingenuity of our people” and “adapt at the pace of the threat”.³⁰ Indeed, analysis of Russian operations suggests that the decentralized and ad-hoc nature of many of their drone units, while chaotic, has been an advantage in the rapid evolution of combat techniques.³¹

Accelerating this adaptation cycle requires a fundamental shift in command philosophy, moving from a culture of centralized control to one of decentralized enablement and underwriting prudent risk. The best new ideas for defeating the latest enemy drone will not come from a laboratory or a high-level staff meeting; they will come from a creative sergeant or specialist at the squad level who figures out a new technique on the battlefield. A rigid, top-down command structure that punishes deviation from established doctrine will stifle this critical innovation. That sergeant needs a mechanism to share their discovery across the force immediately, not to write a formal after-action report that might be read six months later.

The commander must create both formal and informal mechanisms to capture and disseminate these tactical lessons at the speed of relevance. This could take the form of a secure, unit-wide chat room dedicated to UAS/C-UAS TTPs, a mandatory weekly hotwash on the topic, or the formal designation of a unit “innovation NCO” tasked with collecting and spreading best practices. The commander must also be willing to accept and underwrite the prudent risks associated with experimentation, allowing subordinates to try new TTPs within the established bounds of safety and the rules of engagement. This represents a significant cultural shift, one that values agility and rapid learning over rigid adherence to doctrine that may be months or even years out of date.

10. Manage All Signatures

Modern drones are not limited to simple daylight cameras. They are increasingly sophisticated sensor platforms equipped with a suite of technologies, including high-resolution electro-optical (EO) cameras, infrared (IR) or thermal imagers, and potentially signals intelligence (SIGINT) packages capable of detecting electronic emissions. Survival on this sensor-rich battlefield depends on a holistic and disciplined approach to signature management that addresses not just what can be seen, but what can be sensed across the entire electromagnetic spectrum.

The nature of the threat is multi-faceted. While drones often have a small radar cross-section, their distinctive acoustic signature—the high-pitched buzz of their motors—can give away their presence, especially when they operate in swarms.²⁰ The surgical precision of Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which have successfully targeted critical components like transformers, suggests the effective use of thermal imaging to identify which parts of the power grid are active and therefore most valuable to destroy.³² The constant effort by both sides in Ukraine to geolocate and target drone operators based on their control signals underscores the lethal danger of a unit’s own electronic emissions.¹⁶ U.S. forces train with a variety of C-UAS systems, such as the NightFighter S, which almost certainly incorporate thermal and IR detection capabilities to find threats day or night.²¹

This multi-spectrum threat demands a 24/7 commitment to signature management discipline that extends to every piece of equipment and every soldier’s actions. A single moment of laziness or a single unsecured device can compromise an entire unit’s position. This goes far beyond hanging traditional camouflage nets. A recently run vehicle engine or generator glows like a beacon to a thermal imager. A radio transmitting a routine report, or even a soldier’s personal cell phone searching for a signal, emits an electronic signature that can be detected and located. The sound of a generator or the flash of a headlamp at night can be enough to draw the attention of a loitering drone.

The commander must design and enforce a strict, multi-spectrum signature management plan (SIGMAN) as a standard operating procedure. This plan must include concrete actions such as minimizing vehicle and generator run times, employing thermal blankets to mask heat sources, enforcing strict EMCON procedures for all radiating equipment, physically shielding generators to dampen sound, and practicing meticulous light discipline. Most importantly, it requires training soldiers to constantly see their own position from the enemy’s perspective—to adopt a “red team” mindset and continuously ask, “What does my position look like, sound like, and smell like to the enemy’s sensors?” In the modern battlespace, this is not a secondary consideration; it is a primary survival skill.

Table 1: Summary of Commander’s Imperatives (Dos)

Imperative	Core Principle	Key Actions	Supporting Sources
1. Disperse & Conceal	Deny a worthwhile target.	Break up formations, master camouflage, use terrain.	4
2. Layered Defense	No single “silver bullet.”	Integrate kinetic, non-kinetic, and passive systems.	17
3. Target the Brain	Attack the system, not the asset.	Prioritize finding and destroying GCS and operators.	4
4. Arm the Edge	Fight ubiquity with ubiquity.	Equip and train every squad with organic UAS/C-UAS.	21
5. Master the Spectrum	Control the invisible battlespace.	Employ EW as a maneuver asset; anticipate countermeasures.	4
6. Move with Purpose	Assume all movement is seen.	Use night/weather, deception, speed, and OPSEC.	2
7. Dominate Air Littoral	The best defense is offense.	Use organic drones for counter-recon and attack.	1
8. Train for Real Threat	Fight as you train.	Integrate a persistent, adaptive drone OPFOR in all training.	15
9. Accelerate Adaptation	Out-learn the enemy.	Foster bottom-up innovation; rapidly share TTPs.	11
10. Manage All Signatures	Deny all forms of detection.	Minimize thermal, acoustic, electronic, and physical footprints.	20

Section II: The Commander’s Prohibitions: 10 Things You MUST NOT DO

This section details the common but catastrophic errors a commander must avoid. These prohibitions are the inverse of the imperatives; they represent the well-traveled paths to failure and destruction on the modern battlefield.

1. Don’t Neglect Passive Defenses

It is a fatal error to become mesmerized by high-technology solutions at the expense of foundational, low-tech survival skills. Over-reliance on active C-UAS systems—which can be jammed, spoofed, saturated, or may simply be unavailable—is a dangerous gamble. The most reliable, persistent, and effective first line of defense remains the rigorous application of passive measures: camouflage, concealment, dispersion, and hardening.

U.S. Army doctrine for units at the brigade level and below, which often have limited access to sophisticated active systems, explicitly prioritizes the diligent execution of these passive protection measures.⁴ The JCU curriculum reinforces this by beginning all instruction with the fundamentals of passive air defense, teaching them to every student regardless of their service or specialty.¹⁵ This doctrinal emphasis is a direct reflection of battlefield reality. In Ukraine, where advanced interceptor missiles are a scarce and precious resource, survival often depends on basic tactics like immediately displacing a firing position to avoid a counter-battery strike that has been cued by a drone.²⁹

A culture that neglects passive defenses is a critical vulnerability, often born from a peacetime mindset where convenience and efficiency are prioritized over the hard, tedious work of combat survival. In training environments that lack a realistic and persistent drone threat, units can develop disastrous habits. Digging fighting positions, properly camouflaging vehicles, and enforcing dispersal take time and energy. It is easier to park vehicles in a neat line or to set up a command post in an open, comfortable building. These habits, ingrained over time, become automatic responses that lead directly to casualties in a real conflict.

The commander must therefore act as the chief enforcer of passive defense standards. This is a leadership function that cannot be delegated. It means personally inspecting camouflage, timing dispersal drills to ensure they meet established standards, and making passive defense a key evaluated task in every single training exercise. The commander’s role is to break the unit’s peacetime habits and instill a combat mindset where every soldier understands that these seemingly “boring” tasks are, in fact, the essential actions that will keep them alive.

2. Don’t Concentrate Forces or Logistics

On a battlefield where a $400 drone can destroy a $10 million tank, the act of concentrating forces, vehicles, or supplies is tantamount to creating a sacrificial offering for the enemy.³ Any concentration presents a high-value, lucrative target that is exceptionally vulnerable to attack by cheap, numerous, and increasingly precise UAS. The cost-exchange ratio is so devastatingly unfavorable to the defender that it can lead to the rapid erosion of combat power.

This principle is validated by numerous observations from modern conflicts. The widespread destruction of Russian and Ukrainian armor by small FPV drones is a direct result of these high-value assets being identified while concentrated or in static positions.³ Russia’s strategy of launching massed attacks with dozens or even hundreds of Shahed-type drones is specifically designed to saturate air defenses and destroy large, critical targets like infrastructure nodes or troop assembly areas.⁹ Looking to future threats, the PLA’s doctrine for a potential invasion of Taiwan explicitly envisions a massive preparatory bombardment by missiles, rockets, and drones to create chaos and destroy concentrated defensive positions before an amphibious landing can commence.³³

The prohibition on concentration fundamentally breaks the traditional military models for massing combat power and establishing large, efficient logistical hubs like the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) of the counter-insurgency era. The classic military principle of “mass” can no longer be interpreted as the physical concentration of forces at a decisive point. Instead, it must be redefined as the synchronized application of effects (fires, EW, cyber) from widely dispersed locations. The large, centralized FOB is a relic of a bygone era of air supremacy; the new model is a distributed network of smaller, hardened, concealed, and mutually supporting patrol bases.

This requires a complete overhaul of operational planning. A commander can no longer plan to mass a battalion to conduct an attack in the traditional sense. Instead, the plan might call for the coordinated infiltration of multiple, dispersed companies that converge their fires and effects on the objective at a designated time. The logistics concept must shift from a “hub and spoke” model to one of distributed, mobile, and hidden caches of supplies. This new way of war demands a much higher level of planning complexity, staff proficiency, and trust in junior leaders.

3. Don’t Assume You Are Unseen

The single most dangerous assumption a commander or soldier can make on the modern battlefield is that they are unobserved. The default mindset must shift to one of constant, unending surveillance. Operating with a pre-drone mentality of assumed concealment is a direct path to ambush and destruction.

The U.S. military’s C-sUAS training institutions are working to instill this new mindset. The JCU explicitly teaches all students that they must “adopt the mindset that everything is being observed from multiple angles, and it’s realistically a transparent battlespace”.¹⁵ This is not hyperbole. The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that small, difficult-to-detect drones provide an unprecedented level of situational awareness, effectively eliminating traditional forms of concealment for any unit that is not actively and skillfully employing countermeasures.³ This persistent ISR presence is not limited to the front lines; Russian drone operators have been observed loitering over areas to target first responders and firefighters, demonstrating a willingness and ability to maintain surveillance deep within Ukrainian-held territory.²⁷

This state of constant observation has a profound and corrosive psychological impact on soldiers that commanders must not ignore. The cognitive load of knowing that you are perpetually in the enemy’s crosshairs is immense. It creates a constant, low-level stress that degrades sleep, accelerates fatigue, and can lead to either hyper-vigilant paranoia or a sense of fatalism, both of which impair sound tactical decision-making. This is not merely a side effect of drone warfare; for some adversaries, it is a deliberate objective. Russia’s massed drone attacks are understood to have a “grim psychological purpose” aimed at breaking the will to resist.⁹

The commander must address this psychological toll as a direct threat to the unit’s combat effectiveness. This requires active leadership. It means ensuring soldiers get proper rest and rotating units out of the most intensely surveilled sectors when possible. It means making mental health professionals and chaplains readily available and destigmatizing their use. Critically, it also means empowering soldiers. The most powerful antidote to the feeling of helplessness is a sense of agency. By providing soldiers with the tools and training to fight back—by equipping them with C-UAS jammers, specialized munitions, and their own drones—a commander can restore their sense of control over their environment. Acknowledging the stress and taking active steps to mitigate it, both psychologically and materially, is a critical leadership function in the drone era.

4. Don’t Ignore Rear Area Vulnerability

The range, persistence, and low cost of modern UAS have effectively erased the traditional distinction between the “front line” and the “secure rear area.” Logistics nodes, command posts, artillery positions, medical facilities, and maintenance collection points are no longer safe havens. They are high-value targets that are just as vulnerable to drone attack as a frontline trench, and they must be defended with the same level of seriousness.

U.S. Army doctrine now recognizes this reality, noting that brigade commanders must allocate combat power specifically for C-UAS missions in their rear areas. This is because enemy drone teams often operate from temporary, well-concealed launch sites to conduct attacks, requiring active patrolling to find and neutralize them.⁴ The threat is not just theoretical. Russia routinely uses long-range, one-way attack drones like the Shahed-136 to strike critical infrastructure and military targets hundreds of kilometers behind the front lines.⁹ Furthermore, the threat is not just from the air. Infiltration tactics, as observed in Ukraine, can involve small groups of enemy soldiers, sometimes even single individuals, penetrating deep into a unit’s rear to ambush supply convoys or establish hidden drone observation posts.¹⁰

This multi-faceted threat to the rear area requires a tailored defensive approach. A high-end air defense system like a Patriot battery might be necessary to defend against a large, fast-moving drone, but it is completely useless against a small, commercial quadcopter launched by a two-man special forces team from a wood line two kilometers away. This local, low-altitude threat requires a different set of solutions, including point-defense systems like jammers and guns, as well as a robust ground security presence.

The commander must therefore implement a comprehensive rear area security plan that treats the drone threat as a primary concern. This plan must include active, aggressive patrolling with the specific mission of hunting and destroying enemy drone teams.⁴ It must also include the establishment of layered point defenses around critical assets like the command post, ammunition supply point, and aid station, using short-range C-UAS systems. Crucially, every soldier with a support role—from cooks and mechanics to clerks and medics—must now be trained in basic C-UAS detection and immediate action drills. In the drone war, they are on the front line.

5. Don’t Await a “Silver Bullet”

The belief that a single, perfect piece of technology will arrive to solve the drone problem is a dangerous and debilitating fallacy. The threat is too diverse in its technical characteristics and evolves far too quickly for any one system to be a panacea. Commanders who delay action while waiting for a future “silver bullet” solution are ceding the initiative to the enemy and putting their soldiers at risk. The only viable approach is to creatively and aggressively integrate the various, imperfect systems that are available now into a functional, layered defense.

This is a core lesson that has been learned through the U.S. military’s own C-UAS development efforts. As one expert noted, “there is no silver bullet for this particular threat”.¹⁷ The threat is characterized by its versatility, extremely low cost, and high producibility, which means an adversary can deploy thousands of systems, absorb high rates of attrition, and rapidly adapt their technology and tactics.¹⁷ U.S. Army doctrine itself is acknowledged as being insufficient to meet the full demands of the modern battlefield, which necessitates a focus on integrating available capabilities rather than waiting for future programs of record to deliver a perfect solution.⁴

The “good enough” solution that can be fielded today is infinitely better than the perfect solution that will be fielded two years from now, by which time the threat will have changed completely. This reality demands a fundamental shift in the institutional mindset regarding procurement and fielding. While a tactical commander does not control the larger acquisition process, they do control their unit’s culture and approach to problem-solving.

The commander must foster a culture of tactical innovation that focuses on getting the most out of the equipment the unit currently possesses. This might mean developing new TTPs to pair an older radar system with a newly fielded jammer. It could involve working with ammunition specialists to test new types of shotgun shells for engaging small drones. It could mean 3D-printing custom mounts to attach sensors to vehicles. The commander’s role is to encourage this creative integration and to provide clear, immediate, and unvarnished feedback up the chain of command about what works and what does not. This bottom-up feedback is what drives the iterative development process at the pace required to stay ahead of the threat.

6. Don’t Underestimate the Commercial Drone

It is a grave tactical error to dismiss commercially available, off-the-shelf (COTS) drones as mere toys. When modified for military purposes, these systems have proven to be exceptionally lethal, adaptable, and cost-effective weapons. They are not a peripheral nuisance; on battlefields like Ukraine, they have become a primary source of casualties and equipment loss.

Analysis shows that COTS hobbyist drones can provide an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability that rivals that of more sophisticated and expensive military variants, and they can be easily modified to carry and drop explosive munitions.³⁴ Their prevalence is so great that the JCU curriculum includes training on the identification of 24 different types of common COTS UAS.¹⁵ Both Russian and Ukrainian forces make extensive use of FPV racing drones, which are based on COTS components, as guided munitions to destroy high-value targets like tanks and artillery pieces.³ The global supply chain for these systems further complicates the problem; China controls a vast majority of the global commercial drone market, meaning the components for these improvised weapons are readily available to any state or non-state actor.³⁶

The proliferation of weaponized COTS drones blurs the line between military and civilian technology, creating significant challenges for target identification and the application of the rules of engagement (ROE). In a complex environment, how does a soldier on guard duty reliably distinguish between a harmless hobbyist’s drone, a news organization’s camera drone, and an enemy artillery-spotting drone before it is too late? Firing on a non-combatant drone in a stability or gray-zone operation could have immense strategic and political repercussions.

The commander must confront this ambiguity head-on. They must ensure that their soldiers are equipped with clear, simple, and understandable ROE for engaging drones. This requires training that focuses not just on how to shoot down a drone, but, more importantly, on when it is permissible and necessary to do so. This also highlights the need to invest in C-UAS systems that can do more than just detect a drone’s presence; they must help the operator identify the type of drone and, if possible, its likely intent before a lethal engagement decision is made. The JCU’s installation protection course, which specifically teaches leaders how to differentiate between genuine threats and benign hobbyist drones, is a direct institutional response to this complex problem.¹⁵

7. Don’t Isolate C-UAS as a Specialist Task

Given the pervasive, persistent, and personal nature of the drone threat, treating C-UAS as the exclusive responsibility of a small cadre of air defense artillery or EW specialists is a recipe for certain failure. The threat is too widespread and too numerous to be handled by specialists alone. Every soldier, every crew, and every leader must have a baseline proficiency in C-UAS principles and actions. It must be an all-arms, all-echelons responsibility.

This principle is a clear and urgent theme in U.S. military doctrine. The U.S. Army explicitly states that C-UAS “must be a combined arms effort that is performed down to the lowest level” and that “Soldiers across the force at every echelon… should be proficient in C-SUAS tasks”.²³ The U.S. Marine Corps’ C-UAS fielding strategy is built on the concept of making the new systems “military occupational specialty agnostic,” meaning they are designed to be used by any Marine, not just a specialist.²¹ The instructional philosophy at the JCU reflects this, with one instructor noting that their job is to teach “entry-level air defense doctrine” to everyone, because the drone threat is now everyone’s problem.¹⁵

However, the decision to make C-UAS an “all-arms” task has significant consequences for a commander’s training plan. Training time is a finite, zero-sum resource. The hours spent teaching an infantry squad how to identify different drone types, operate a jammer, and practice aerial gunnery are hours that are not being spent on rifle marksmanship, land navigation, breaching, or tactical combat casualty care.

The commander is therefore forced to make difficult decisions about training priorities. This requires a clear-eyed and realistic assessment of the most likely and most dangerous threats the unit will face in its specific operational environment. On a drone-saturated battlefield, proficiency in basic C-UAS immediate action drills may be more critical to a squad’s survival than advanced marksmanship skills. The commander must have the intellectual honesty to recognize this shift and the moral courage to adjust the unit’s training focus accordingly. They must be prepared to de-emphasize long-held, traditional training priorities to make room for these new, essential survival skills and be able to articulate the rationale for these hard choices to their soldiers and to higher headquarters.

8. Don’t Establish Predictable Patterns

A persistent enemy ISR capability, primarily enabled by drones, means that any routine or pattern in a unit’s behavior will be detected, analyzed, and lethally exploited. Predictability in any form—logistics schedules, patrol routes, guard post changes, command post locations—is a vulnerability that a thinking enemy will use to plan an ambush or a strike. In the drone era, randomness and unpredictability are essential components of operational security.

The battlefield provides stark examples of this principle. The “cat and mouse” game of air defense in Ukraine involves Russian forces using their drones to observe the locations of Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems when they fire; this forces the Ukrainian crews to immediately move to a new position to avoid being destroyed by a retaliatory strike.²⁹ The brutal Russian “double-tap” tactic, where a second munition is deliberately targeted on the location of a first explosion after a predictable interval, is designed to kill the first responders who predictably rush to the scene.²⁷ On a broader scale, the ability of drones to conduct long-duration surveillance allows an enemy to conduct detailed “pattern of life” analysis on a unit, identifying its routines, its dependencies, and its vulnerabilities, all in preparation for an attack at the most opportune moment.

Countering this type of intelligence-driven targeting requires a deliberate and planned effort to introduce randomness and deception into every aspect of a unit’s operations. Human organizations, especially military ones, naturally gravitate toward routines and standard operating procedures because they are efficient. Deliberately breaking these routines requires conscious effort and can often feel inefficient. For example, sending a resupply convoy at 0300 on a randomly selected Tuesday is less convenient for the staff and soldiers than sending it at 0800 every day, but it is infinitely more secure.

The commander must task their staff to build unpredictability into the very fabric of the operational plan. This becomes a critical, collaborative function for the S2 (intelligence) and S3 (operations) sections. The S2 should be tasked with analyzing the unit’s own operational patterns from the perspective of an enemy intelligence analyst, identifying potential vulnerabilities. The S3 must then design operations that deliberately vary timings, routes, methods, and force packages. This must also include the planning of active deception measures, such as feints and the use of decoys, designed to deliberately mislead enemy ISR and waste their resources. Randomness and unpredictability can no longer be an afterthought; they must be a core principle of the unit’s SOP.

9. Don’t Disregard the Psychological Toll

The unique characteristics of the drone threat—its persistence, its perceived omniscience, and the high-pitched, menacing buzz of its motors—create a significant and unique psychological burden on soldiers. The stress born from the feeling of being constantly watched, hunted, and helpless degrades morale, degrades performance, and can have lasting impacts on mental health. A commander who ignores this psychological dimension of the fight does so at their peril.

The immense stress of the air war is palpable in firsthand accounts from Ukraine, where soldiers describe the pressure of knowing that a single missed shot at an incoming drone could result in an explosion in a civilian area.²⁹ This burden of responsibility is heavy. Furthermore, it is clear that adversaries use drones with psychological intent. Russia’s massed drone attacks against Ukrainian cities are understood to have a “grim psychological purpose” aimed at demoralizing the population and breaking their will to resist aggression.⁹ This same logic applies with equal force to the soldiers on the front line. The creation of a “transparent battlespace,” where soldiers must assume they are always being observed, induces a state of hyper-vigilance that is mentally and physically exhausting over time.¹⁵

This psychological degradation is not just an unfortunate side effect of drone warfare; for a thinking adversary, it is a primary objective. A soldier who is mentally exhausted, sleep-deprived, and fatalistic is far more likely to make a tactical error. They may fail to properly camouflage their vehicle, neglect noise discipline, or take a shortcut in the open. The psychological attack is therefore a preparatory action designed to enable a more effective physical attack.

The commander must treat the mental and psychological resilience of their soldiers as a critical component of the unit’s C-UAS defense. This starts with leadership presence and open communication, acknowledging the unique stresses of this environment. It means ensuring soldiers get adequate rest and aggressively managing schedules to rotate units out of the most high-threat sectors. It requires making chaplains and mental health professionals easily accessible. Most importantly, it requires empowering soldiers. The most effective way to counter the feeling of helplessness that the drone threat is designed to create is to give soldiers the agency to fight back. Equipping a squad with an effective C-UAS jammer, specialized ammunition, or their own offensive drone transforms them from victims into active participants in their own defense. This sense of empowerment is a powerful psychological weapon.

10. Don’t Fixate on the Drone in Flight

Focusing all of a unit’s attention, resources, and tactical thinking on the destruction of the drone itself while it is in the air is a common but profound tactical error. This approach is often the least effective, most resource-intensive, and least sustainable way to counter the UAS threat. The more critical, more valuable, and often more vulnerable components of the enemy’s UAS capability are on the ground.

The U.S. Army’s 25th Infantry Division learned this lesson through experience. They found that engaging enemy drones in flight with surface-to-air missiles like the Stinger was a “largely reactionary activity that proved of limited effectiveness.” The core problem was that the enemy had enough cheap aerial platforms to easily absorb these losses and continue operations unabated.⁴ Their tactical breakthrough came when they shifted their focus from the air to the ground, identifying the enemy’s GCSs as the “critical vulnerability” in the entire system.⁴ This same lesson has been observed in Ukraine, where it is understood that the trained operators are a far more valuable and difficult-to-replace asset than the drones they fly, making them a high-priority target.¹⁶ The systemic nature of the threat is also apparent in PLA doctrine, which envisions the use of an integrated system of systems—missiles, rockets, and drones working in concert—to achieve its objectives. To defeat such a threat, one must attack the entire network, not just the individual endpoints.³³

This principle requires a fundamental shift in mindset, from a narrow air defense problem (killing aerial targets) to a broader, intelligence-driven counter-system targeting methodology. This shift has significant implications for resource allocation and intelligence collection. Instead of relying solely on air defense radars to detect incoming threats, the commander must prioritize the use of SIGINT and EW assets to detect the electronic emissions of the GCSs on the ground. Instead of relying on short-range guns, the commander needs responsive, long-range precision fires—such as guided artillery, rockets, or the unit’s own armed drones—to strike those ground targets once they are found. The intelligence collection effort must expand from simply tracking flight paths to a more complex task: identifying and mapping the human and logistical network that allows the enemy’s drone force to function.

The commander must personally drive this shift within their unit’s targeting process. They must ensure the S2 (intelligence) is focused on developing high-payoff targets related to the entire UAS ecosystem: known operator locations, likely launch and recovery sites, supply routes for drone components, and training facilities. They must then ensure that the “detect” and “deliver” functions of the targeting cycle are resourced and synchronized to prosecute these targets rapidly and effectively.⁴ By attacking the brain, the commander can paralyze the claw.

Table 2: Summary of Commander’s Prohibitions (Don’ts)

Prohibition	Core Rationale	Consequence of Failure	Supporting Sources
1. Don’t Neglect Passive	Tech fails; basics are reliable.	Easy detection and destruction.	4
2. Don’t Concentrate	Creates a lucrative target.	Catastrophic loss from cheap weapons.	3
3. Don’t Assume Unseen	The battlefield is transparent.	Compromise, surprise attack, psychological drain.	15
4. Don’t Ignore Rear	The front line is everywhere.	Loss of logistics, C2, and support assets.	4
5. Don’t Await “Silver Bullet”	The threat is diverse and evolving.	Ceding the initiative while waiting for a perfect solution.	17
6. Don’t Underestimate COTS	“Toys” are lethal weapons.	Underestimating threat, leading to surprise and loss.	3
7. Don’t Isolate C-UAS	The threat is an all-arms problem.	Overwhelming specialists, leaving units defenseless.	21
8. Don’t Be Predictable	The enemy is watching and learning.	Ambush and targeted destruction of forces/logistics.	27
9. Don’t Disregard Psyche	The threat is mental as well as physical.	Degraded morale, increased fatigue, tactical errors.	9
10. Don’t Fixate on Drone	The drone is the expendable claw.	Wasting resources on low-value targets, ignoring the brain.	4

Conclusion

The emergence of the drone as a dominant feature of the modern battlespace has irrevocably altered the character of ground combat. The analysis of doctrine and battlefield experience from the United States, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Russia, and China reveals a clear and consistent set of truths. The principles of constant dispersal, holistic signature management, and layered, integrated defense are no longer abstract doctrinal concepts; they are the fundamental imperatives for survival. The battlefield is transparent, the front line is everywhere, and the cost-exchange ratio of attritable drones versus high-value military hardware is punishingly asymmetric.

Victory in this new era will not belong to the force that possesses the single most exquisite piece of technology. Rather, it will be achieved by the force that is the most ruthlessly disciplined, the most relentlessly adaptive, and the most intellectually agile. The commander’s primary and most essential role is to forge and sustain a culture that embodies these traits. It is a culture where passive defenses are practiced with fanaticism, where bottom-up innovation is rewarded, and where every soldier is empowered and expected to contribute to the C-UAS fight. The ultimate challenge for the modern ground commander is to successfully integrate new technologies and novel tactics while simultaneously reinforcing the timeless principles of warfare—all under the constant, unblinking gaze of a persistent, intelligent, and lethal aerial threat.

Appendix: Methodology for Analysis and Recommendation Development

The findings and recommendations presented in this report were derived from a multi-phase analytical process designed to synthesize a wide range of open-source intelligence into a coherent and actionable guide for military commanders.

Phase 1: Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Collection and Thematic Grouping

The process began with the systematic collection and review of 69 distinct research snippets from English-language sources originating in or pertaining to the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Ukraine, and China. These sources included military journals, official government and defense department websites, congressional reports, academic analyses, and reputable news media. Each snippet was cataloged and tagged based on its primary content, allowing for aggregation into four core thematic groups:

1. U.S. & U.K. Doctrine and Strategy: Official publications, strategic documents, and analyses detailing the formal C-UAS approaches of Western militaries.
2. Russia-Ukraine Battlefield Lessons: Reports, analyses, and firsthand accounts detailing the tactical realities, innovations, and attrition of the ongoing drone war.
3. Adversary Doctrine (Russia & China): Official doctrinal documents and expert analyses of Russian and Chinese concepts for the employment of UAS in current and future conflicts, including the PLA’s concept of “intelligentized” warfare.
4. C-UAS Technology and Systems: Descriptions of specific kinetic and non-kinetic C-UAS technologies, training programs, and organizational structures.

Phase 2: Comparative Analysis and Insight Generation

The thematically grouped data was subjected to a comparative analysis to identify points of convergence, divergence, and tension between different sources. This cross-referencing was critical for validating observations and generating deeper, second- and third-order conclusions. For instance, the U.S. Army’s doctrinal emphasis on targeting the Ground Control Station ⁴ was directly corroborated by battlefield reports from Ukraine confirming that drone operators have become high-value targets for both sides.¹⁶ Similarly, the PLA’s theoretical focus on employing massive drone swarms in a future conflict ¹⁴ was contextualized by the practical application of massed, albeit less sophisticated, drone attacks by Russia in Ukraine ⁹, providing a clear vector for the future threat trajectory. This phase focused on moving beyond simple data extraction to understand the cascading effects and tactical implications of each primary observation.

Phase 3: Synthesis and Formulation of Recommendations

The validated findings and generated insights were then synthesized into a set of actionable, command-focused recommendations. Each recommendation was framed as a clear, concise imperative (“Do”) or prohibition (“Don’t”) to maximize its utility for a military leader. The final 20 recommendations were selected based on three primary criteria:

1. Recurrence: The principle appeared repeatedly across multiple, diverse sources.
2. Criticality: The principle was directly linked to decisive outcomes—either mission success or catastrophic failure—on the battlefield.
3. Applicability: The principle was directly relevant and actionable for a commander of ground troops at the tactical level.

Phase 4: Validation and Refinement

In the final phase, each of the 20 recommendations was substantiated with specific evidentiary support by linking it back to the relevant source snippets. The language of the report was meticulously refined to align with the designated persona of a senior military analyst and combat veteran, ensuring a tone of authority, clarity, and practical relevance for the intended professional military audience. The entire report was then structured to present the information in a logical, hierarchical manner, moving from broad principles to specific tactical implications.

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