Overall Fragility Score: 8.2 / 10 (Highly Fragile)

Lifecycle Stage Assessment: CRISIS

The Islamic Republic of Iran is assessed to be in a Crisis stage of state fragility. The foundational pillars of the state are critically compromised, and its capacity to withstand further shocks is minimal. Core state functions, particularly in the economic and public service domains, are severely impaired. The social contract that once existed between the clerical regime and the populace has been not merely broken, but replaced by a system of pure coercion, where political legitimacy rests almost exclusively on the state’s security apparatus. The regime faces compounding, cross-domain pressures that are locked in reinforcing feedback loops, threatening its medium-term viability and making state failure a plausible outcome within the 36-month forecast horizon.

The key drivers of this advanced state of fragility are interconnected and mutually exacerbating:

• Catastrophic Loss of Political Legitimacy: The regime’s authority is no longer derived from popular consent but is maintained through force. This is empirically demonstrated by historically low electoral turnouts in the 2024 parliamentary and presidential elections, with participation falling below 41%.¹ This quantitative rejection of the system is mirrored by the qualitative reality of recurring, nationwide anti-regime protests, such as the 2022-2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, which have evolved into a state of perpetual, cross-sectoral unrest targeting the regime’s core institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader’s financial conglomerates.³
• Structural Economic Collapse: The Iranian economy is characterized by systemic dysfunction and is incapable of providing for the basic well-being of its population. It is crippled by a combination of severe international sanctions, institutionalized corruption, and chronic hyperinflation, with the real rate estimated to exceed 40%.⁵ The national currency has experienced a near-total collapse on the open market, with the black market exchange rate exceeding 1,100,000 rials per U.S. dollar, a more than 25-fold deviation from the official rate.⁸ This economic decay is structurally embedded, with a parasitic “military-bonyad complex” dominated by the IRGC stifling all productive capacity and fueling the widespread popular anger that drives continuous social unrest.¹¹
• Accelerating Environmental Breakdown: An acute water crisis, driven by decades of catastrophic mismanagement and amplified by climate change, has transitioned from a long-term risk into an immediate national security threat. Plummeting water reservoir levels are actively threatening food security, displacing populations, and serving as a potent catalyst for violent, localized conflicts over resource access.¹³
• Elite Fracture Risk during Succession: The state’s increasing reliance on the IRGC for internal repression and external power projection places immense strain on the security apparatus. The impending succession of the aging and ailing Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, represents the single greatest point of political failure. This event is highly likely to trigger an intense and potentially violent power struggle among hardline factions, which could paralyze the state’s decision-making and fracture the security forces’ chain of command, creating a power vacuum.¹⁷

Forecast Trajectory: Rapidly Deteriorating. The confluence of these drivers creates multiple reinforcing feedback loops that are accelerating the state’s trajectory toward collapse. The probability of Iran transitioning to a ‘Collapse’ or ‘Post-Collapse/Recovery’ stage within the 36-month forecast horizon is assessed as high (40-50%).

4.2. State Fragility Dashboard

The following dashboard provides a quantitative and qualitative snapshot of Iran’s fragility indicators as of Q4 2025. Each score is based on a 1-10 scale, where 1 represents high resilience and 10 represents critical fragility.

Domain/Indicator	Current Score (1-10)	Trend (Δ)	Volatility	Weighted Impact (%)	Brief Rationale & Key Data Points
A. Economic Resilience
Public Finances	8	↓	High	10%	Chronic deficits are monetized by printing money, fueling inflation. Gross government debt is projected to rise to 39.9% of GDP in 2025.5 The budget is heavily reliant on volatile oil revenue, often sold at a significant discount to China to circumvent sanctions.6
Economic Structure	9	↓	Med	15%	The economy is dominated by an unaccountable IRGC/bonyad complex, estimated to control over 50% of GDP, stifling private sector growth.11 Youth unemployment remains critically high at 22.75%.22 A severe brain drain of skilled labor further degrades productive capacity.24 Real GDP growth is near zero at a projected 0.3% for 2025.5
Household Financial Health	9	↓	High	15%	Real inflation is consistently above 40%, decimating savings and purchasing power.5 The black market rial has lost over 90% of its value, trading at more than 1,100,000 per USD.8 An estimated 80% of the population is at risk of falling below the poverty line.28
B. Political Legitimacy
Trust in Institutions	9	↓	High	25%	The historic low turnouts in the 2024 presidential (39.9% in the first round) and parliamentary (41%) elections signal a wholesale rejection of the system’s legitimacy by a majority of the population.1 Persistent, nationwide protests confirm this collapse of public trust.3
Rule of Law / Corruption	8	↔	Low	10%	The judiciary functions as a tool of political repression, with a surge in executions following protests.30 Corruption is not an anomaly but is institutionalized within the economic empires of the IRGC and bonyads, which operate with impunity.11
Security Apparatus Cohesion	7	↓	Med	10%	While the IRGC’s senior leadership remains loyal to the system, its forced pivot to internal repression against fellow citizens erodes morale. A high risk of fracture exists between the IRGC and the regular army (Artesh), and within the lower ranks of the Basij, particularly during a chaotic succession crisis.32
C. Social Cohesion
Public Service Delivery	8	↓	Med	5%	The healthcare system is severely degraded by sanctions, corruption, and a massive brain drain of medical professionals.34 The crumbling national water and power infrastructure leads to daily, prolonged blackouts, fueling widespread protests.13
Social Fragmentation	8	↑	High	5%	A deep and unbridgeable generational chasm separates the young, globally-aware populace from the isolated, dogmatic ruling elite.37 The regime’s violent repression in periphery provinces exacerbates long-standing ethnic tensions, fueling separatist sentiment among Kurds, Baloch, and Arabs.30
D. Environmental Security
Water & Food Security	9	↓	High	5%	The country faces an existential water crisis. Tehran’s main reservoirs are at just 13% capacity.14 The Karaj Dam’s water reserves have decreased by 75% year-over-year.13 Water-related protests are frequent, widespread, and increasingly violent, directly challenging state authority.15
OVERALL FRAGILITY SCORE	8.2			100%	Assessed Lifecycle Stage: CRISIS

4.3. Detailed Domain Analysis

Module A: Economic Resilience and State Capacity

The Iranian economy is in a state of structural collapse, characterized by stagflation, institutional decay, and the state’s near-total failure to provide for the basic well-being of its population. The combination of external pressure from international sanctions and deep-seated internal mismanagement has created a system incapable of recovery without fundamental political change.

The State of Structural Collapse

The economy’s vital signs point toward systemic failure. International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections for 2025 indicate a near-stagnant real GDP growth rate of just 0.3%, a dramatic slowdown from the previous year.5 The nominal GDP is expected to contract significantly, falling by $60 billion to $341 billion.5 This economic paralysis is compounded by chronic hyperinflation. While official forecasts place the average inflation rate at 43.3% for 2025 5, independent analyses and on-the-ground reporting suggest a real rate consistently exceeding 40-50%, with food inflation nearing 60%.6 This relentless price pressure has systematically destroyed household wealth and pushed a vast segment of the population into poverty.

The Currency Devaluation Spiral

The most visible symptom of this collapse is the state of the national currency, the rial. A massive chasm has opened between the official, state-mandated exchange rate of approximately 42,000 IRR per U.S. dollar and the free market (black market) rate.40 By late 2025, the black market rate had plummeted to over 1,100,000 IRR per U.S. dollar, reflecting a near-total loss of confidence in the currency and the Central Bank’s ability to manage it.8 This is not merely economic mismanagement; it is a deliberate system of political control and patronage. State-connected entities, primarily the IRGC and its affiliates, are granted privileged access to foreign currency at the subsidized official rate for imports. They can then engage in massive arbitrage by selling these goods on the domestic market at prices reflecting the free market rate. This dual-rate system functions as a massive wealth transfer mechanism, enriching the regime’s core constituencies while imposing the full cost of hyperinflation on the general population and the unsubmissive private sector. It is a core component of the regime’s political economy, reinforcing the power of the deep state at the direct expense of national economic health.

The Parasitic Deep State Economy

At the heart of Iran’s economic dysfunction lies what can be described as the “military-bonyad complex”.11 This dense, informal network of enterprises controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and unaccountable parastatal foundations (bonyads) dominates the “commanding heights” of the economy, with some estimates suggesting it controls more than 50% of the country’s GDP.11 These entities operate across nearly every major sector, including oil, construction, engineering, manufacturing, and telecommunications, often bypassing formal regulations and public oversight.11 This structure is not just inefficient; it is predatory. It institutionalizes corruption, evades taxes, and uses its immense political power to crush private competition, thereby preventing any possibility of genuine economic growth. International sanctions, paradoxically, have strengthened this complex. As legitimate international trade is restricted, the IRGC’s control over smuggling networks and black market operations has allowed it to further consolidate its economic dominance.11

Impact on the Populace

The direct consequence of these policies is the mass immiseration of the Iranian people. The economic collapse has translated into a profound social crisis. The official unemployment rate is projected to rise to 9.5% in 2025, but this figure masks a much deeper problem of underemployment and a chronic youth unemployment rate of 22.75%.5 This lack of opportunity for a young and educated populace is a primary driver of social despair and anger. The systematic destruction of purchasing power has pushed a majority of the population toward destitution, with one regime-affiliated economist warning that 80% of Iranians are at risk of falling below the poverty line.28 This pervasive economic pain is the primary engine of popular discontent, fueling the continuous and widespread labor strikes and protests by retirees, teachers, oil workers, and other segments of society who directly challenge the regime’s authority.3

Module B: Political Legitimacy and Institutional Integrity

The political legitimacy of the Islamic Republic has collapsed. The foundational social contract of the 1979 revolution, which promised religious piety, social justice, and economic prosperity, is now viewed by a large majority of the population as comprehensively broken. The regime’s authority no longer rests on any claim to popular consent but is sustained solely by the coercive capacity of its security apparatus. This brittle foundation is now facing its most severe test: an impending leadership succession that threatens to fracture the coercive state itself.

The Annihilation of the Social contract

The regime’s inability to generate popular support is no longer a matter of interpretation but a quantifiable fact. The 2024 parliamentary elections saw a historic low voter turnout of just 41%, with only 5% of ballots cast in the capital, Tehran, being deemed valid.2 This was followed by an even more damning result in the 2024 presidential election, where first-round turnout fell to 39.9%, the lowest in the Islamic Republic’s history.1 These figures represent a nationwide, passive boycott—a clear and unambiguous rejection of the system’s “republican” pillar and its claims to representative governance. The state’s reliance on coerced participation in official rallies and its inability to mobilize genuine support underscore the deep chasm between the rulers and the ruled.

From “Woman, Life, Freedom” to Perpetual Protest

The nationwide “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising of 2022-2023 was a watershed moment, representing a fundamental, values-based rejection of the Islamic Republic’s core identity by a huge segment of the population, particularly youth and women.37 While the street protests were eventually suppressed through brutal violence, the underlying dissent has not been extinguished. Instead, it has metastasized into a state of perpetual, low-level insurgency. Protests are now a daily feature of Iranian life, with a constant stream of demonstrations by diverse groups—retirees, teachers, oil workers, bakers, and defrauded housing applicants—across the country.3 Crucially, the slogans at these protests have become increasingly radicalized, directly targeting the IRGC and the financial conglomerates, such as Setad Ejraiye Farman Emam (EIKO), that are under the direct control of the Supreme Leader, blaming them for the plunder of national wealth.3

The Succession Crisis: The Regime’s Single Point of Failure

The single greatest political tipping point facing the Islamic Republic is the impending succession of the 86-year-old Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is reportedly in poor health.18 His death will remove the ultimate arbiter of factional disputes and the central pillar of the regime’s power structure, likely triggering an intense and potentially violent power struggle among hardline factions. The process is opaque, but several key contenders have emerged, each representing a different power center within the regime’s deep state.

Contender	Current Role / Background	Power Base / Faction	Key Characteristics & Implications	Source Snippets
Mojtaba Khamenei	Son of Supreme Leader	IRGC, Intelligence, Financial Networks	Once considered a likely successor, he lacks an executive record and formal religious credentials. His appointment would signal a move toward a hereditary, military-backed system, destroying any remaining revolutionary credibility and likely provoking a massive public backlash.	17
Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i	Head of Judiciary	Judiciary, Intelligence, IRGC (Security Elite)	Widely seen as the “Security Candidate.” A hardliner known for his unwavering loyalty to the system and his central role in political repression. His ascension would signal a continuation of the current hardline trajectory and the further militarization of governance.	18
Mohsen Qomi	Senior Cleric	Khamenei’s Inner Circle (Ideologue)	The “Insider” candidate. He prioritizes doctrinal rigidity and quiet, behind-the-scenes influence. His selection would represent a less overtly militaristic but equally repressive form of continuity, favored by the clerical establishment.	18
Alireza Arafi	Senior Cleric	Clerical Establishment	A potential compromise candidate who could be selected if a power struggle between Mojtaba and Eje’i becomes too destructive for the regime to contain.	20

This succession is not merely a political event; it is the most likely catalyst for a security force fracture. The Supreme Leader is the ultimate commander-in-chief, and all senior military promotions require his personal approval, ensuring loyalty is directed toward him personally.³² Upon his death, this single point of unified command will vanish. Contenders like Mojtaba Khamenei and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i will vie for the loyalty of different factions within the IRGC, intelligence services, and judiciary.¹⁷ A contested succession will likely result in conflicting orders being issued down the chain of command. The moment the security forces receive contradictory directives from competing power centers is the moment the state’s coercive capacity could shatter, creating a power vacuum that protestors and ethnic insurgencies could exploit.

Security Apparatus: Cohesion Under Strain

The IRGC’s senior command remains the ideologically committed backbone of the regime.47 The state has spent decades creating a system of control based on intensive indoctrination, economic patronage, and pervasive surveillance to ensure the loyalty of its military elites.32 However, this system is showing signs of strain. The regular army, the Artesh, is considered less ideological, has been historically marginalized by the IRGC, and suffers from aging and poorly maintained equipment.33 More importantly, the regime’s forced pivot toward using the IRGC and its Basij militia for internal repression against fellow citizens erodes morale and risks creating fissures between the officer corps and the lower-ranking members and conscripts who face the same economic despair as the protestors they are ordered to suppress. The June 2025 war with Israel also exposed deep intelligence penetration of the security apparatus and has reportedly created visible criticism within the IRGC’s younger ranks, who question the leadership’s strategic competence.50

Module C: Social Cohesion and Human Development

Iranian society is dangerously fragmented along multiple fault lines, and the state’s capacity to deliver the basic services that might otherwise mitigate these tensions has severely eroded. This social decay provides daily, tangible proof of state failure, further undermining any remaining claims to competence and fueling popular anger.

The Generational and Ideological Chasm

The most significant social fracture is the unbridgeable gap between Iran’s young, educated, and globally-connected population and the aging, dogmatic clerical elite that rules the country. With over 35% of its population between the ages of 15 and 29, Iran is a young nation whose aspirations are fundamentally at odds with the regime’s ideology.38 The intergenerational bargain of the revolution—sacrificing social freedoms for economic advancement—has comprehensively failed. Today’s youth face bleak economic prospects, with high unemployment and a stagnant labor market, coupled with intense social repression, particularly regarding personal freedoms and women’s rights.37 This generational chasm was the primary engine of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests and represents a permanent source of opposition to the regime’s continued existence.

The Brain Drain-Decay Cycle in Action

The lack of economic and social opportunities, combined with pervasive political repression, has triggered a catastrophic brain drain of Iran’s human capital. A 2024 study indicates that the number of Iranian-born migrants has grown from approximately 500,000 before the 1979 revolution to 3.1 million, with the primary destinations being the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom.25 This exodus includes an estimated 110,000 Iranian-origin researchers working abroad, a group that represents a massive share of the nation’s scientific and technical capacity.25 The desire among expatriates to return to Iran has plummeted from over 90% in 1979 to less than 10% today, indicating a permanent loss of this talent.25 This flight of doctors, nurses, engineers, and academics directly correlates with the observable decay in public services, creating a vicious cycle where the degradation of quality of life reinforces the motivation for the remaining skilled individuals to emigrate.

Collapse of Public Services

The state’s capacity to deliver basic public services has severely eroded. The healthcare system is crumbling under the combined weight of international sanctions, which restrict access to critical medicines and advanced medical equipment, and the systemic decay caused by corruption and the brain drain of medical professionals.34 Reports indicate that even active primary healthcare service points often fall short of required standards, lacking essential staff and equipment, particularly in underserved and deprived regions like Sistan and Baluchestan.34 The most visible evidence of state failure for the average citizen is the collapse of national infrastructure. The country’s power and water grids are failing, leading to daily, prolonged blackouts that cripple industry, disrupt daily life, and serve as a constant flashpoint for protests.28

Ethnic Fault Lines as Accelerants

The regime’s centralized and repressive nature has long fueled tensions with Iran’s ethnic minorities, who are concentrated in the country’s periphery. The state’s brutal crackdown on protests in these regions—particularly in Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan, which saw some of the highest death tolls during the 2022 uprising—has intensified these grievances.30 The regime’s violence, combined with systemic economic and political discrimination, is actively fueling separatist sentiment. These well-established ethnic fault lines represent a major threat to national cohesion. In any scenario of state collapse or a chaotic succession crisis, these movements are highly likely to capitalize on the weakness at the center to assert local control, potentially leading to the violent fragmentation of the country.39

Module D: Environmental and Resource Security

Environmental stress, particularly the escalating water crisis, has transcended from a long-term risk to an immediate and existential threat to Iran’s national security. This crisis is not merely an unfortunate consequence of climate change; it is the direct result of decades of disastrous mismanagement and corruption. It now acts as a powerful threat multiplier, exacerbating economic hardship, fueling social instability, and creating new, violent conflict zones across the country.

The Water Crisis as an Existential Threat

The data on Iran’s water scarcity is stark and points to a systemic collapse of the country’s hydrological systems. As of 2025, Tehran’s five main reservoirs have plummeted to just 13% of their capacity, with the vital Lar dam holding only 1% of its potential volume.14 This is a nationwide phenomenon, with nineteen provinces experiencing significant drought and critical regions like Hormozgan and Sistan and Baluchestan reporting staggering decreases in average rainfall of 77% and 72%, respectively.14 The Karaj Dam, a key source of both water and electricity for Tehran, saw its water reserves decrease by 75% between September 2024 and September 2025, rendering it incapable of generating electricity.13 Former regime officials have warned that unchecked water shortages could eventually displace up to 70% of the population, or nearly 50 million people.16

A Crisis of Mismanagement

While climate change has contributed to reduced precipitation, the crisis is primarily man-made. It is the product of decades of unsustainable development policies characterized by the construction of thousands of dams and the unregulated depletion of groundwater aquifers for inefficient agricultural practices.14 This ecological destruction has been driven by state policy and has been exacerbated by corruption. The IRGC’s construction conglomerate, Khatam al-Anbiya, has been a key player in these projects, profiting from inflated state contracts for dam-building and river diversion projects that were often undertaken without proper environmental assessments or long-term planning.12 These projects have diverted water to politically connected industries and regions while devastating traditional agricultural areas and fragile ecosystems.12

Water as a Direct Driver of Kinetic Conflict

The most critical aspect of the water crisis is its role as a direct driver of violent conflict. Water scarcity is no longer a passive pressure; it is an active catalyst for unrest that directly challenges the state’s ability to maintain internal order. The 2021 “Uprising of the Thirsty” in the ethnically Arab province of Khuzestan, where security forces used live ammunition against protestors demanding water, was a harbinger of this trend.15 Since then, water-related protests have become frequent and have often turned violent in provinces like Isfahan, Hamedan, and Sistan and Baluchestan.16 These are not just demonstrations; they are often violent clashes between citizens and security forces over the most basic resource for survival.

This dynamic creates a powerful “Water-Conflict Multiplier” effect. The crisis takes underlying economic grievances and ethnic tensions and ignites them. A farmer in Khuzestan who loses his livelihood because water is diverted to an IRGC-linked factory in a Persian-majority province does not just see an environmental problem; he sees a political, ethnic, and economic injustice perpetrated by a corrupt and hostile state. The regime’s response—violent repression rather than effective resource management—further inflames these grievances. The water crisis is thus fundamentally altering Iran’s internal security landscape. It is creating new, potent drivers of conflict that are localized, violent, and directly challenge the state’s ability to manage essential resources. It represents a primary pathway through which state fragility can transition into active, violent state failure.

4.4. Synthesis and Predictive Outlook

4.4.1. Critical Reinforcing Feedback Loops

The Iranian state is trapped in a series of self-perpetuating, negative feedback loops. These vicious cycles are not independent but are deeply interconnected, creating a powerful downward spiral that is accelerating the state’s trajectory toward a terminal crisis. The regime’s policy responses to each crisis only serve to worsen the others, leaving it with no viable path to stabilization.

• The Repression-Isolation Spiral: This loop begins with the regime’s core legitimacy crisis. Economic hardship and demands for social and political freedom lead to popular protests.³ The state, lacking any other tool of governance, responds with violent repression, mass arrests, and a surge in executions.³⁰ This brutality triggers new rounds of international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, such as the “snapback” of UN sanctions.⁶ The sanctions, in turn, deepen the economic crisis by crippling oil exports and access to global financial markets.⁶ This intensified economic pain further fuels popular anger and desperation, creating the conditions for the next, more intense, wave of protest. Each cycle leaves the regime more brutal, more isolated, and facing a more enraged populace.
• The Brain Drain-Decay Cycle: This cycle represents the hollowing out of the state’s human capital and functional capacity. The combination of a collapsing economy, lack of social and intellectual freedom, and pervasive political repression creates powerful incentives for educated and skilled professionals to emigrate.²⁵ This massive brain drain of doctors, nurses, engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs degrades the state’s capacity to manage complex systems, leading to a visible and accelerating decline in the quality of public services like healthcare, education, and infrastructure.³⁴ This decline in the quality of life and public services reinforces the motivation for the remaining skilled individuals to leave, accelerating the systemic decay. The state is losing the very people it needs to function, ensuring its continued decline.
• The Water-Conflict Multiplier: This loop demonstrates how environmental collapse directly fuels political and security crises. Decades of water mismanagement, often by corrupt, IRGC-linked entities, combined with the impacts of climate change, lead to acute resource scarcity in agricultural regions.¹² This scarcity destroys rural livelihoods, forcing internal migration to already over-stressed urban centers and triggering localized, often violent, protests over water rights.¹⁵ The state’s response is invariably repressive and ineffective, which serves to inflame pre-existing ethnic and provincial grievances. In this way, an environmental crisis is transformed into a potent political and security challenge that erodes national cohesion and directly threatens the state’s control over its territory.

4.4.2. Scenario Analysis (36-Month Horizon)

Scenario 1: State Collapse / Civil War (Reasonable Worst-Case, 40-50% Probability)

The death or incapacitation of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in late 2026 triggers a chaotic and public succession crisis. Hardline factions within the IRGC, the intelligence services, and the clerical establishment engage in an open and violent power struggle. Key contenders, such as Mojtaba Khamenei and Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i, issue conflicting orders to security units loyal to them, shattering the central chain of command. This period of elite fragmentation is perceived as a moment of critical weakness by the populace, sparking a nationwide uprising that dwarfs the 2022 protests in scale, intensity, and organization.

Security forces, facing unclear leadership and suffering from internal fractures, are unable to mount a unified or effective response. In several key urban centers, elements of the regular army (Artesh) or disillusioned Basij units refuse to fire on civilians, stand down, or in some cases, side with protestors. Capitalizing on the chaos at the center, well-organized ethnic insurgencies in Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchestan seize territory and government buildings, declaring regional autonomy.³⁹ The central state effectively loses control over large parts of the country, leading to a de facto, multi-sided civil war between regime remnants, pro-democracy opposition forces, and ethnic separatist movements. This internal collapse creates a massive power vacuum, risking opportunistic military intervention from regional adversaries and transforming the crisis into a wider international conflict.³⁹

Scenario 2: Malignant Stability (Consolidated Military Rule, 30-40% Probability)

In this scenario, the succession crisis is resolved quickly and brutally, averting an immediate slide into civil war. The IRGC’s senior command, recognizing that a prolonged power struggle would lead to the collapse of the entire system, stages a de facto coup. They bypass the traditional clerical process of the Assembly of Experts and install a loyalist—most likely a figure like Mohseni-Eje’i or a senior IRGC commander—as either the new Supreme Leader or the head of a “Supreme Military Council.”

The regime would abandon all remaining pretense of a republic and transition into an overt military dictatorship. This move would trigger massive protests, which the newly consolidated military leadership would crush with extreme and overwhelming violence. While this would avert immediate state collapse, it would result in a highly isolated, heavily sanctioned, North Korea-style garrison state. The economy would continue its precipitous decline, social repression would intensify, and the state’s fragility would remain extremely high. However, the state’s coercive capacity would be temporarily consolidated under a single, unified military command, creating a “malignant stability” that could persist for some time before eventually succumbing to its internal contradictions. This outcome aligns with analyses that identify a full IRGC takeover as a plausible, albeit deeply worrying, scenario.³⁹

4.4.3. Concluding Assessment and Strategic Tipping Points

Concluding Assessment

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a brittle state sustained by coercion, not consent. Its trajectory is negative and accelerating across all key domains of state fragility. Its fundamental pillars of stability—economic viability, political legitimacy, social cohesion, and resource security—have eroded to a critical point. The regime is trapped in a series of vicious, reinforcing cycles that are pushing it inexorably toward a terminal crisis. Its capacity to absorb further shocks, particularly a leadership succession, a severe economic collapse, or a major external conflict, is minimal. The system’s survival now hinges entirely on the cohesion and loyalty of a security apparatus that is itself showing signs of strain.

The probability of the state transitioning to a ‘Collapse’ or ‘Post-Collapse/Recovery’ stage within the 36-month forecast horizon is assessed as high (40-50%).

Key Tipping Points

The following are identified as the most critical tipping points that could trigger this transition from the current ‘Crisis’ stage to a ‘Collapse’ stage:

• Political Tipping Point: The death of Supreme Leader Khamenei, initiating a succession crisis that results in a public, violent, and prolonged fracture among the regime’s security elite, leading to a paralysis of the state’s command and control functions.
• Security Tipping Point: A widespread, sustained, and coordinated refusal by a significant portion of the security forces (e.g., an Artesh division, multiple Basij provincial commands, or key police units) to carry out orders of mass repression against civilians during a nationwide uprising, or the defection of a key military unit to the opposition.
• Economic Tipping Point: A complete hyperinflationary currency collapse (e.g., the black market IRR/USD rate exceeding 2,000,000) leading to mass food shortages and a breakdown of distribution networks, OR a sustained, nationwide general strike by the transport and oil sectors that paralyzes the economy and severs the state’s last remaining economic lifelines.⁴⁴
• Geopolitical Tipping Point: A renewed, direct, and large-scale military conflict with Israel or the United States that successfully decapitates a significant portion of the new IRGC leadership and shatters the already fragile cohesion of the armed forces, presenting an insurmountable, multi-front challenge to the regime’s survival.⁵⁰

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