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Systemic Fragility Analysis of the Cuban State: A 36-Month Predictive Outlook – Q4 2025

  • Overall Fragility Score: 9.2 / 10
  • Lifecycle Stage Assessment: CRISIS (High Risk of Transition to Collapse)

Key Drivers of Systemic Fragility

  • Acute Energy and Infrastructure Collapse: The near-terminal state of the national electrical grid (SEN) acts as the primary accelerant for both economic paralysis and mass social unrest.
  • Hyperinflation and Currency Annihilation: The complete loss of value of the Cuban Peso (CUP) in the informal market has destroyed state salaries, obliterated savings, and rendered the state’s economic planning irrelevant.
  • Erosion of Regime Legitimacy and Cohesion: The post-Castro leadership’s “charisma deficit” combined with collapsing state services has forced a reliance on repression, which is a brittle and unsustainable control mechanism.
  • Catastrophic Human Capital Flight: The historic and ongoing mass emigration is hollowing out the demographic core of the nation, crippling essential services and eliminating the possibility of near-term recovery.

36-Month Forecast Trajectory

The Cuban state system is on a sharply deteriorating trajectory. The confluence of acute economic, infrastructural, and social pressures has overwhelmed the regime’s coping mechanisms. Without significant external intervention or improbable internal reforms, the state will continue its slide toward the Collapse stage, with a high probability of experiencing one or more critical tipping point events within the 36-month forecast horizon.

State Fragility Dashboard

Domain/IndicatorCurrent Score (1-10)Trend (Δ)VolatilityWeighted Impact (%)Brief Rationale & Key Data Points
Infrastructure and Energy Crisis9↓High25%Near-collapse of the electrical grid; daily prolonged blackouts (18+ hours); at least five nationwide blackouts in under a year; critical dependency on unstable fuel imports. 1
Macroeconomic Failure & Inflation9↓High20%Hyperinflation in the informal market (USD trading at ~470 CUP); worthless state salaries; failed Tarea Ordenamiento monetary reform; GDP contracting 1.5% in 2025 (ECLAC). 3
Governance, Legitimacy, and Dissent8↓High20%Erosion of “revolutionary legitimacy”; increasing frequency of spontaneous protests driven by blackouts and food shortages; reliance on repression post-11J; over 1,066 political prisoners. 1
Human Capital Flight & Demographics8↓Medium15%Unprecedented emigration of ~10% of the population (2022-23), primarily working-age professionals, hollowing out the workforce and degrading essential services. 6
Social Contract Erosion9↓Medium10%Collapse of public services (healthcare, education); massive medicine shortages (>70%); state request for WFP food aid; stark inequality between dollar-access and peso-only populations. 8
Elite Cohesion & Military Role6↓Medium5%Public unity maintained, but military (GAESA) operates an opaque, dominant economic empire. Statistically anomalous deaths of high-ranking generals post-11J suggest internal stress. 10
External Patronage & Dependencies7↓High5%Venezuelan oil support is erratic and declining sharply. Russian and Chinese support is transactional and insufficient to stabilize the economy. High vulnerability to patron collapse. 12
OVERALL FRAGILITY SCORE9.2100%Assessed Lifecycle Stage: CRISIS

Detailed Domain Analysis

Module A: Economic Collapse and State Capacity

The Cuban economic model has entered a terminal phase of self-reinforcing decay. The state’s fundamental inability to generate or acquire sufficient hard currency has precipitated a cascade of failures across all sectors, from industrial production to the provision of the most basic goods and services. State actions intended to mitigate the crisis, most notably the Tarea Ordenamento, have proven catastrophic, accelerating the very collapse they were designed to prevent. The system is now characterized by a complete loss of monetary sovereignty, a paralyzed productive capacity, and a reliance on an infrastructure that is failing in real-time.

A.1 Macroeconomic Failure & Currency Crisis

The macroeconomic environment of Cuba is one of profound and accelerating failure. The state has lost control over the most fundamental levers of economic management, resulting in a currency crisis that has effectively destroyed the value of labor and savings for the majority of the population.

Current State: The Cuban economy is defined by hyperinflation and a near-total collapse of its national currency, the Cuban Peso (CUP). While official government statistics report annual inflation in the range of 30%, these figures are functionally meaningless.4 The true measure of the economy is the informal currency market, meticulously tracked by independent outlets like El Toque, which has become the de facto benchmark for nearly all private transactions. As of late 2025, the exchange rate has reached unprecedented levels, with one US dollar trading for approximately 468 CUP and one Euro for 525 CUP.3 This represents a near-complete annihilation of the peso’s value, rendering state-paid salaries and pensions, the primary source of income for millions, effectively worthless. An average pension, even after being doubled, translates to less than $10 per month at these rates, an amount insufficient to purchase basic necessities.15

The catastrophic 2021 monetary reform, the Tarea Ordenamiento (“Ordering Task”), was the primary catalyst for this inflationary spiral. Intended as a “big-bang” devaluation to unify Cuba’s dual-currency system and correct price distortions, the policy was implemented amidst a deep economic crisis and without accompanying structural reforms.16 The result was not order, but chaos. It vaporized the purchasing power of the populace, fueled widespread social discontent, and triggered the hyperinflationary cycle that continues to this day.17

The broader economy is in a state of protracted recession. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2024 remained more than 10% below its 2018 level, representing a lost decade of development.19 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects a further GDP contraction of 1.5% in 2025, followed by near-total stagnation (0.1% growth) in 2026. This performance places Cuba as the second-worst performing economy in the entire region, ahead of only the collapsed state of Haiti.4 In a clear sign of systemic breakdown, Cuban authorities have ceased providing reliable GDP estimates, admitting only to negative growth.19

The state’s fiscal position is untenable. Cuba remains in a state of effective default on its external debt, which is estimated to be over 40% of GDP.20 While some breathing room has been achieved through opaque renegotiations—payments to Russia have been postponed to 2040 and a “supplementary period” was established with the Paris Club—these are temporary measures. The debt is fundamentally unsustainable for a country with virtually no hard currency inflows.20 The state possesses no significant accessible hard currency reserves; official data is not published, a major red flag for any national economy.22 This acute hard currency shortage is the direct result of the collapse of its primary revenue streams: tourism remains 60% below pre-pandemic levels, remittances are declining, and key exports like sugar and nickel have plummeted.19 This inability to pay for imports is the root cause of the crippling shortages of food, fuel, and medicine that define daily life.8 The government’s own characterization of the situation as a “war-time economy” is an admission of complete systemic failure.23

Trajectory (Δ): The macroeconomic trajectory is one of sharply accelerating decline. The informal exchange rate continues to depreciate daily, indicating that hyperinflation is not stabilizing but worsening. GDP is projected to continue contracting, and there are no identifiable factors that could reverse this trend in the short-to-medium term.

Volatility: Volatility is high. The informal exchange rate is subject to rapid fluctuations based on remittance flows, state interventions, and public confidence, which is non-existent.24 The absence of reliable official data and the opacity of government policy-making make the economic environment dangerously unpredictable.

Systemic Connection Analysis: The “Dollarization Trap”

The Cuban state is caught in a lethal “Dollarization Trap,” a vicious cycle where its own survival mechanisms accelerate the destruction of its monetary sovereignty. Desperate for hard currency, the state has aggressively expanded its network of retail stores that sell goods exclusively in foreign currency (or their digital equivalent, MLC). The number of these stores increased by a staggering 146% in just five months.3 This policy creates a starkly divided, two-tiered society, directly contradicting the core socialist ideology of equality.18

This trap functions as a powerful reinforcing feedback loop. The state, by hoarding all quality imported goods in its dollar-only stores, starves the peso economy of products. This forces citizens who need basic items to enter the informal market to buy dollars, often from those receiving remittances. This intense demand drives the informal exchange rate ever higher, which further devalues the peso. As the peso becomes worthless, the state is even more incentivized to conduct its business in dollars, perpetuating the cycle. The state has become the primary driver of the very dollarization that makes its own currency, and the salaries it pays, obsolete.24

This process represents more than a policy contradiction; it is a state of monetary surrender. A sovereign state’s currency is a fundamental tool of economic control and a symbol of its authority. By establishing a retail system that explicitly rejects its own currency, the Cuban state signals to its population that it has no confidence in the CUP’s future value. It has effectively outsourced its monetary policy to the informal market and the calculations of independent media like El Toque.14 The state is cannibalizing its own sovereignty to survive day-to-day, a classic symptom of a system in the CRISIS stage. The ideological damage is profound and likely irreversible: the regime cannot plausibly claim to be building a socialist future while its people must acquire the currency of its primary ideological adversary to buy food.

A.2. Infrastructure and Energy Crisis

The central, acute vulnerability of the Cuban state is the collapse of its national infrastructure, most critically the national electrical grid (SEN). This is not a problem of temporary shortages but a systemic, structural failure that is now the primary driver of both economic paralysis and social unrest.

Current State: The SEN is in a state of near-continuous collapse. The concept of reliable, 24-hour electricity has ceased to exist for most of the island’s population. Daily planned blackouts (apagones) are now the norm, frequently lasting 18 to 20 hours or more, even in the capital.1 The system’s fragility is such that it has experienced at least five total nationwide blackouts in less than a year, plunging the entire country into darkness for days at a time.2 These events are triggered by the failure of single components in a system with no redundancy or resilience.

The critical point of failure is the Antonio Guiteras Thermoelectric Power Plant. Built in 1988, this single unit is the “cornerstone” of the SEN and the country’s largest single generator.25 Its repeated, unforeseen breakdowns have been the direct cause of multiple nationwide blackouts.1 The plant is operating far beyond its intended service life and has not undergone major capital maintenance in 15 years, nearly double the recommended interval.26 A long-overdue, six-month shutdown for major repairs is scheduled for the end of 2025. While essential for any long-term hope of stability, this will remove its already degraded capacity from the grid entirely, guaranteeing a period of extreme and unprecedented energy deficits for the country.25

The crisis is compounded by a severe and unstable fuel supply. Cuba’s power plants run almost exclusively on imported oil.8 Shipments from Venezuela, its primary benefactor, have become dangerously erratic. In 2024, oil shipments fell by 42% compared to 2023, and January 2025 saw an all-time low of just 10,000 barrels per day—a fraction of the agreed-upon amount and insufficient to meet demand.12 Sporadic shipments from other allies like Russia provide temporary relief but are not a substitute for a consistent, subsidized supply.27 This chronic fuel shortage is a direct cause of the blackouts, forcing even the smaller, distributed generation plants offline.1

Trajectory (Δ): The trajectory of the energy infrastructure is one of accelerating decay. The grid becomes more unstable with each passing month as deferred maintenance accumulates. The impending six-month shutdown of the Guiteras plant guarantees that the situation will become significantly worse before it can possibly get better.

Volatility: Volatility is extremely high. The entire national grid can and does collapse without warning due to a single point of failure. Fuel shipments are unpredictable, subject to the political and economic fortunes of a volatile ally.

Systemic Connection Analysis: The “Infrastructure Decay Loop”

The energy crisis is the clearest manifestation of a powerful reinforcing feedback loop. The lack of hard currency from the macroeconomic collapse (A.1) prevents the state from purchasing sufficient fuel and the necessary spare parts for its fleet of aging, Soviet-era thermoelectric plants.21 This forces the state to defer critical maintenance, leading to more frequent and catastrophic breakdowns.26 The resulting blackouts paralyze the remaining productive sectors of the economy (what little tourism is left, agriculture, small-scale industry), further reducing the state’s capacity to earn the hard currency needed for repairs and fuel. The state is then forced into expensive, short-term emergency measures, such as renting floating Turkish power plants, which consumes scarce dollars that could have been used for long-term investment in the grid, thus perpetuating and deepening the cycle of decay.12

The energy crisis has transcended being a mere economic or technical problem; it has become the central organizing principle of daily life and the primary driver of state delegitimization. It is the most probable trigger for a systemic, cascading collapse. Electricity is the foundational service upon which all other functions of a modern society depend: water pumping, food refrigeration and distribution, sanitation, healthcare, communications, and all forms of economic activity.1 The chronic nature of the blackouts has shifted public perception. The populace no longer sees the government as fixing a temporary problem; they see the government as the problem. The direct, causal link between prolonged blackouts and the eruption of large-scale, spontaneous social unrest is well-documented in Santiago de Cuba and other cities.1 The state’s complete and visible failure to provide this single, most essential service negates any residual legitimacy it might claim from historical achievements in healthcare or education. A revolutionary promise is meaningless to a family whose food has spoiled and whose water taps are dry for the third time in a month. The electrical grid is the system’s jugular. A prolonged, nationwide failure—a “Cero Generación” event lasting weeks—is the most plausible scenario for a cascade failure, leading to a breakdown of public health and order that could rapidly overwhelm the state’s repressive capacity.

Module B: Political Legitimacy and Regime Cohesion

The Cuban regime is confronting a dual crisis of legitimacy and cohesion. Externally, its social contract with the population has shattered, leading to a collapse of popular legitimacy. Internally, while projecting an image of monolithic unity, the system is subject to immense stresses that threaten to fracture the elite consensus that guarantees its survival. The regime’s response to the erosion of its authority has been to default to its last remaining tool: repression, a strategy that is both brittle and unsustainable.

B.1. Governance, Legitimacy, and Dissent

The foundations of the Cuban political system’s legitimacy have crumbled under the weight of economic failure and a generational transition of power. The regime’s authority, once rooted in revolutionary history and the provision of social welfare, now rests almost exclusively on the coercive power of the state.

Current State: The core of the legitimacy crisis lies in the generational transition of leadership. The handover of power from the “historic generation” of Fidel and Raúl Castro to a bureaucratic elite personified by President Miguel Díaz-Canel has coincided with the most profound economic crisis in decades.28 This has created a severe “charisma deficit.” Díaz-Canel, a lifelong party functionary born after the revolution, lacks the historical authority and personal connection to the revolutionary project that allowed the Castros to demand immense sacrifices from the population during previous periods of hardship, such as the “Special Period” of the 1990s.11 His legitimacy was predicated on a promise of competent management and continuity, both of which have failed spectacularly in the face of the current multi-domain crisis.28

This collapse of “performance legitimacy”—the ability of the state to deliver basic goods and services—has led to a fundamental shift in the nature of public dissent. Historically, opposition was the domain of a small, heavily monitored community of political dissidents. The current wave of protest, however, is spontaneous, geographically dispersed, and driven by basic subsistence needs: “luz y comida” (electricity and food).1 The protests of July 11, 2021 (11J), and the subsequent uprisings in March 2024 in Santiago de Cuba and other cities, were not organized by traditional opposition figures but were popular explosions of desperation and anger triggered directly by blackouts and food shortages.1

The state’s response to this new form of dissent has been systematic and severe repression. In the aftermath of 11J, the regime abandoned any pretense of tolerance and initiated a widespread crackdown. The number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience has surged to over 1,066, an eightfold increase since 2018, making Cuba the largest prison for political activists in Latin America.5 The state consistently frames all internal dissent as the product of external aggression, publicly blaming the US embargo for all economic failings and accusing Washington of fomenting unrest.1 This narrative, however, is losing its efficacy internally as the population experiences the consequences of domestic mismanagement on a daily basis.4 The leadership’s rhetoric has become increasingly militarized, with Díaz-Canel describing Cuba as “a country at war,” a framework that justifies treating its own citizens’ protests as acts of foreign hostility.31

Trajectory (Δ): The trajectory is one of decreasing legitimacy and increasing reliance on coercion. As the economic crisis deepens, the triggers for social unrest will become more frequent, likely leading to further crackdowns and a deepening of the repressive cycle.

Volatility: Volatility is high. Spontaneous protests can and do erupt with no warning, driven by unpredictable events like the failure of a power plant. The scale and intensity of the state’s response are also volatile, ranging from localized arrests to nationwide internet shutdowns.

Systemic Connection Analysis: The “Charisma Deficit and Repression Spiral”

The regime is trapped in a reinforcing spiral of its own making. As the state’s ability to provide for its citizens (performance legitimacy) evaporates due to the economic crisis (Module A), and its historical claim to authority (revolutionary legitimacy) wanes with the passing of the Castro generation, the leadership is left with only one viable instrument of control: the security apparatus. However, each act of repression—every arrest, every harsh prison sentence, every violent dispersal of protesters—fuels further domestic resentment and generates international condemnation.5 This international backlash, in turn, provides justification for the continuation and tightening of US sanctions, which further strangles the economy, deepens the performance legitimacy crisis, and necessitates even greater levels of repression to maintain control. The regime is in a feedback loop where its attempts to secure its power only succeed in deepening the systemic crisis and increasing the potential for a violent explosion.

The nature of protest has undergone a fundamental transformation, becoming acephalous (leaderless) and driven by raw subsistence needs. This evolution makes it both more resilient to traditional state repression and dangerously unpredictable. In the past, the Cuban security state (MININT) excelled at infiltrating, monitoring, and decapitating small, organized dissident groups. The protests of 11J and March 2024, however, were not organized by these groups but erupted spontaneously from a widespread and shared sense of desperation over blackouts and food shortages.1 The state can arrest hundreds of individuals, as it has done 5, but it cannot arrest the underlying conditions that fuel the protests. Because the triggers are now systemic and nationwide—a grid failure, a disruption in food imports—protests can ignite anywhere, at any time, without central coordination. The regime is no longer fighting a coherent “opposition”; it is fighting its own population’s survival instincts. This represents a far more volatile and perilous situation. A security apparatus designed to neutralize identifiable leaders may find itself overwhelmed by simultaneous, widespread, and leaderless uprisings across the island.

B.2. Elite Cohesion and the Military Role

The ultimate guarantor of the Cuban regime’s survival is the cohesion of its elite, particularly within the security and military apparatus. While this elite has historically presented a monolithic front, the unprecedented scale of the current crisis is introducing stresses that could lead to fractures. The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are not merely the state’s sword and shield; they are its single most powerful economic actor, creating a complex web of interests that may not always align with those of the civilian party leadership.

Current State: The dominant economic force in Cuba is the military-run conglomerate, Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA). This opaque holding company, controlled by the FAR, dominates all of the country’s key hard-currency sectors, including international tourism, foreign retail, remittances, and foreign trade.10 A rare leak of financial records revealed that GAESA’s hotel arm, Gaviota, holds assets valued in the billions of dollars, a stark contrast to the bankrupt state coffers of the civilian government.10 GAESA operates as a “state within a state,” with complete financial opacity and beyond the reach of government auditors, answering only to the highest levels of the military command, historically embodied by Raúl Castro.10 This makes the military not just the protector of the regime, but its primary economic beneficiary.

Publicly, the elite projects an image of unwavering unity. The leadership of the Communist Party (PCC), the FAR, and the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) consistently close ranks in public statements. President Díaz-Canel frequently emphasizes that “unity” is “task number one” for the revolution.32 The state regularly conducts large-scale strategic exercises, such as “Bastion 2024,” designed to reinforce the cohesion of all state organs under the military doctrine of a “War of the Entire People,” which ideologically fuses the state, the military, and the populace against a common external enemy.34

However, beneath this veneer of unity, there are significant indicators of internal stress. The most alarming of these was the series of unexplained deaths of a statistically anomalous number of high-ranking, active-duty, and retired generals in the months following the 11J protests in 2021, with another cluster of deaths occurring in September 2024.11 While no official explanation beyond natural causes has been offered, the timing and number of these deaths are highly suggestive of either a purge of disloyal elements or extreme stress fracturing the senior command. Furthermore, the decision to deploy elite FAR combat troops for internal repression for the first time in the revolution’s history after 11J indicates a system under a level of pressure that overwhelmed the traditional internal security forces of MININT.11

Trajectory (Δ): The trajectory is toward increasing internal stress. As the crisis worsens, the potential for divergence between the interests of the civilian government and the military-economic elite grows. While cohesion is currently maintained, it is a negative trend.

Volatility: Volatility is medium but with high-impact potential. While the security apparatus is disciplined and institutionalized, a tipping point event, such as a massive social uprising or the death of Raúl Castro, could trigger a rapid and unpredictable shift in loyalties.

The system’s critical, yet unobservable, vulnerability is the potential divergence of interests between the GAESA military-economic elite and the civilian PCC bureaucracy led by Díaz-Canel. These two pillars of the regime face the current crisis from fundamentally different positions. The PCC bureaucracy is responsible for managing the collapsing state, facing public anger daily, and its legitimacy is inextricably tied to the success of the (now-failed) socialist project.30 The GAESA elite, in contrast, has a primary interest that is far more pragmatic: the preservation and growth of its quasi-capitalist, dollarized economic empire.10 The profound economic crisis, driven by the failures of the state’s centrally planned, peso-based model, directly threatens the social stability upon which GAESA’s tourism and retail businesses depend for their profits.

A point could be reached where the military elite concludes that the PCC’s ideological rigidity and manifest economic incompetence represent a greater long-term threat to their core interests than a managed political transition. The loyalty of the FAR and MININT is not an abstract ideological commitment; it is contingent on the belief that the current political structure best serves their institutional and personal interests. If a massive social uprising threatens total chaos, the destruction of their economic assets, and the possibility of “people’s justice” against security officials, a “palace coup” or a collective refusal to repress the population becomes a plausible scenario. Such a move would not be a democratic revolution, but a self-preservation maneuver by the “deep state” to jettison the discredited civilian leadership, establish a transitional military junta, and negotiate a future that preserves their immense economic power. The unexplained deaths of senior generals may be a sign that this internal tension is already being managed through the most lethal means.11

Module C: Social Cohesion and Human Capital Flight

The Cuban social fabric is unraveling at an accelerating rate. This process is defined by two interconnected phenomena: a demographic catastrophe driven by the largest mass emigration in the nation’s history, and the terminal decay of the revolutionary social contract that once bound the state and its citizens. The result is a society that is becoming older, poorer, and increasingly hollowed out, with diminishing capacity for recovery.

C.1. Emigration and Demographics

Cuba is in the midst of a demographic collapse, driven by an exodus of its population that is unprecedented in scale and scope. This is not a managed migration but a hemorrhaging of the nation’s human capital that will have profound and lasting consequences for decades to come.

Current State: The sheer scale of the current emigration wave is historic. Between the start of 2022 and the end of 2023, over 1 million people left Cuba—a figure representing nearly 10% of the entire population.6 This single two-year wave surpasses the cumulative totals of previous major migration events like the Mariel boatlift and the 1990s rafter crisis combined.7 The outflow has been so immense that it has caused the island’s total population to fall to levels not seen since 1985.6 The flow continues unabated; in the first eight months of 2024 alone, the US Border Patrol recorded over 97,000 encounters with Cuban nationals, a figure that does not include those who migrate to other destinations.36

The demographic profile of those leaving is what makes this exodus a national catastrophe. The migration is disproportionately composed of the young, the educated, and the able-bodied. Of the more than one million people who left in 2022-2023, an estimated 800,000 were between the prime working ages of 15 and 59.6 This constitutes a catastrophic “brain drain” that is stripping the country of its professionals, skilled laborers, entrepreneurs, and its future demographic base.7 Entire cohorts of university students, doctors, engineers, and technicians are leaving, creating a vacuum that cannot be filled.

Trajectory (Δ): The trajectory is one of continued high-volume emigration. As long as the root causes—economic collapse and political repression—persist, the outflow will continue. The demographic profile of the country will continue to age rapidly as the youth population departs.

Volatility: Volatility is medium. While the overall trend is stable (high outflow), the volume can be affected by changes in US immigration policy or the policies of transit countries like Nicaragua, which waived visa requirements for Cubans in 2021, opening a key land route to the US.7

Systemic Connection Analysis: The “Brain Drain-Service Collapse Loop”

The demographic crisis is locked in a powerful, self-reinforcing death spiral with the collapse of state services. The unbearable economic conditions (Module A) and the suffocating lack of political and personal freedom (Module B) provide the initial impetus for the most capable and educated Cubans to emigrate.18 This exodus of doctors, nurses, engineers, and teachers directly eviscerates the public services—particularly healthcare and education—that were once the bedrock of the revolution’s legitimacy and a source of national pride.9 The visible degradation of these services—hospitals without doctors, pharmacies without medicine, schools without teachers—creates even more misery and hopelessness for the remaining population. This, in turn, provides a powerful new incentive for the next wave of skilled professionals to leave, thus accelerating the collapse of the system. Each doctor who leaves makes the healthcare system worse, prompting more doctors and their families to conclude they must also leave for a better future.

This dynamic has shifted the fundamental nature of Cuban emigration. It has evolved from being primarily a political act of “exile” to a pragmatic act of “economic rescue,” not only for the individual but also, paradoxically, for the state itself. While past migrations were often framed in ideological terms as people “fleeing communism,” the current wave is overwhelmingly driven by a simple, rational calculation: a state salary is unlivable, and there is no viable future on the island.7 The regime, while publicly decrying the exodus as a result of US policy, tacitly facilitates it. Mass departure serves as the system’s primary, and perhaps only, functioning pressure valve. It removes the most energetic, ambitious, and discontented segments of the population who would otherwise be the most likely to be on the streets protesting. Furthermore, each emigrant represents a potential future source of dollar remittances, the hard currency the state desperately needs to survive.3 In essence, the state is trading its future for its present. It is exporting its demographic core and its human capital to maintain short-term political stability and create a future revenue stream of remittances. This is the ultimate sign of a failed state: one that can only ensure its own survival by bleeding out its own population. The long-term consequence is a demographically hollowed-out, geriatric society with no internal capacity for recovery or reconstruction.

C.2. Social Contract Erosion and Inequality

The implicit social contract that has underpinned the Cuban state for over 60 years has been irrevocably broken. The foundational promise of the revolution—that the state would provide universal access to education, healthcare, and basic economic security in exchange for the population’s political loyalty and forfeiture of individual freedoms—is no longer being met. In its place, a new, deeply unequal society is emerging, driven by differential access to hard currency.

Current State: The pillars of the revolutionary social contract have crumbled. The healthcare system, once a flagship achievement, is in crisis. Pharmacies report that over 70% of necessary medicines are unavailable, and the system is plagued by the emigration of medical personnel and deteriorating facilities.8 The quality of public education is in decline, suffering from the same brain drain that affects the health sector.37 Most critically, the state can no longer guarantee basic food security. The subsidized food rationing system (la libreta) has partially collapsed, with the state unable to consistently provide staples like bread, milk, and rice.8 In a moment of profound symbolic failure, the Cuban government in early 2024 was forced to make its first-ever request for assistance from the UN World Food Programme to secure powdered milk for children under seven.8

Concurrent with the collapse of state provisions, a new and stark form of social inequality has emerged. The partial, chaotic dollarization of the economy has cleaved the population into two distinct classes. There is now a “dollarized Cuba,” composed of those with access to hard currency through family remittances from abroad or by owning or working for a new private enterprise (Mipyme). This group can access the growing number of dollar-only state stores or the private markets where goods are available, albeit at exorbitant prices. Then there is “peso Cuba,” the majority of the population, including state workers, professionals, and pensioners, who are entirely dependent on worthless CUP salaries and pensions.3 The chasm between these two worlds is immense. The respected Cuban economist Omar Everleny Pérez has calculated the monthly cost of a basic basket of goods and services for a single person at approximately 32,000 CUP. In contrast, the average state salary is around 4,648 CUP, and the minimum pension is even lower.39 This gap makes survival impossible for those without access to foreign currency.

The legalization of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (Mipymes) in 2021 has been a key driver of this new landscape.41 While these private businesses have filled some of the void left by the collapsed state sector by importing and selling goods, they also contribute to and make visible the new inequality.42 Because they must source their inventory abroad using dollars acquired on the informal market, their prices are indexed to the dollar, making their products unaffordable for the vast majority of the peso-earning population.40 They create visible islands of relative prosperity and consumption in a sea of mass deprivation.

Trajectory (Δ): The social contract will continue to erode as state services degrade further. Inequality will deepen as the gap between the dollarized and peso economies widens.

Volatility: Volatility is medium. The core trend of decay is stable, but social anger over inequality and scarcity can flare up unpredictably, as seen in various protests.

The rise of the Mipymes represents a “managed failure” of the state socialist model. The regime has been forced by its own incompetence to outsource basic retail and service provision to the private sector. However, it remains both unable and ideologically unwilling to create the conditions necessary for these businesses to become genuinely productive engines of growth. The state maintains its monopoly on wholesale trade and provides no reliable domestic supply chains, trapping the Mipymes in an import-arbitrage model. They are not primarily producers of new wealth but rather importers and resellers of foreign goods. Their business model, therefore, depends on and reinforces the high informal exchange rate, which further impoverishes the CUP-earning majority. The state tolerates them because they keep some goods on shelves, provide a tax base, and create a semblance of economic activity.42 Yet, their very existence deepens the social cleavages that fundamentally undermine the regime’s ideological claims of equality and social justice. This creates a dangerous social dynamic of visible wealth amidst widespread public squalor, a classic recipe for social unrest.

Module D: External Environment and Geopolitics

Cuba’s systemic crisis is profoundly shaped and exacerbated by its external environment. The state’s historical dependence on foreign patrons has left it dangerously exposed following the decline of its most recent benefactor, Venezuela. Simultaneously, the unyielding pressure of United States policy acts as a systemic clamp, preventing any potential for economic adjustment or recovery. The island is also increasingly vulnerable to environmental shocks that its degraded economy is ill-equipped to handle.

D.1. External Patronage and Dependencies

The Cuban economic model has always been predicated on a dependent relationship with a powerful foreign benefactor. The successive decline of its patrons—from Spain to the United States (pre-1959), the Soviet Union, and now Venezuela—has serially exposed the model’s inherent unsustainability. The regime is now scrambling to find new sources of support, but its potential partners are proving to be transactional and unwilling to provide the kind of subsidized life support the island requires.

Current State: The political alliance with Venezuela remains rhetorically strong, with both regimes offering mutual support against perceived US aggression.43 However, the economic substance of this relationship has withered. Venezuelan economic support, primarily in the form of subsidized crude oil shipments, has become highly unreliable and has declined precipitously.45 The inconsistent and reduced flow of oil is a direct and primary contributor to Cuba’s crippling energy crisis and frequent blackouts.12

Russia has re-emerged as a key political ally, providing diplomatic support and some limited economic aid, including sporadic oil shipments and a generous postponement of debt payments until 2040.20 However, Moscow’s strategic and economic resources are overwhelmingly focused on its war in Ukraine. It lacks both the capacity and the political will to become a full-scale benefactor to Cuba on the Soviet model. The relationship is largely opportunistic and geopolitical, aimed at challenging US influence in the hemisphere at a low cost.

China represents Cuba’s most significant economic partner in terms of trade and potential investment, but the relationship is fundamentally transactional, not ideological or charitable. Beijing offers consistent political support, condemns the US embargo, and engages in bilateral cooperation in strategic areas like renewable energy, biotechnology, and digital infrastructure under the umbrella of its Belt and Road Initiative.13 Critically, however, China has refrained from providing the massive, unconditional financial bailouts or the large-scale, subsidized energy supplies that Cuba needs for its short-term survival. Chinese interests are commercial and strategic: securing access to markets and resources, and expanding its geopolitical footprint, not propping up a failing and unreformed socialist economy.13

Trajectory (Δ): The trajectory is one of diminishing reliable patronage. Venezuelan support will likely continue to decline. Russian and Chinese engagement will remain transactional and will not be sufficient to reverse Cuba’s economic collapse.

Volatility: Volatility is high. Cuba’s energy and economic stability are directly hostage to the political stability of the Maduro regime in Venezuela. A collapse in Caracas would have immediate and catastrophic consequences for Havana.

Systemic Connection Analysis: The “Patronage Trap”

The Cuban regime is caught in a classic “Patronage Trap.” Its economic model is structurally dependent on external subsidies to function.18 The precipitous decline of Venezuelan patronage has laid this vulnerability bare. The regime is now trapped in a desperate search for a new benefactor. However, its potential new patrons, Russia and China, are unwilling to provide the blank-check, ideologically motivated support that the Soviet Union once did. Their engagement is conditional and self-interested. This dependency forces Cuba into geopolitical alignments—such as its vocal support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—that further alienate Western nations, potential investors, and international financial institutions. This, in turn, deepens its economic isolation and reinforces its dependency on a small and unreliable circle of allies, completing a vicious cycle.

Cuba’s international relevance has fundamentally shifted. During the Cold War, it was a geopolitical asset for the Soviet Union, capable of projecting power and ideology in Latin America and Africa. Today, it has little to offer economically or militarily. Its primary strategic value to allies like Russia and China lies not in its strength, but in its weakness and its geographic proximity to the United States. It serves as a low-cost platform to distract and irritate Washington. Consequently, these patrons have a strategic interest in providing just enough support—an occasional oil tanker, a joint political statement, a modest investment—to prevent an immediate, uncontrolled collapse that could lead to a pro-US government. However, they have no strategic interest in financing the enormously expensive project of rebuilding the Cuban economy. The regime is, therefore, on a form of geopolitical life support, kept alive by patrons who have an interest in maintaining the patient’s heartbeat, but not in curing the underlying disease. No external savior is coming to rescue the Cuban economy.

D.2. US Policy and Climate Vulnerability

The external environment for Cuba is dominated by two unyielding forces: the suffocating and persistent pressure of United States policy, and its increasing vulnerability to climate-related shocks. While the internal failures of the Cuban model are the primary cause of its crisis, these external factors serve to eliminate any possibility of recovery and act as potential triggers for a more rapid collapse.

Current State: United States policy remains the single most influential external factor shaping Cuba’s reality. The Trump administration has restored and strengthened the comprehensive economic embargo, reversing the brief period of easing under the previous administration.47 This “maximum pressure” policy includes several key components. First, the re-designation of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT) severely restricts the country’s access to the international financial system, as global banks are unwilling to risk massive US penalties for processing transactions related to Cuba.49 Second, the full implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act allows US citizens to sue foreign companies that “traffic” in property confiscated by the revolution, a powerful deterrent to foreign investment.21 Third, strict restrictions on travel and remittances have been re-imposed, aiming to cut off the flow of hard currency to the Cuban state, particularly to the military-run conglomerate GAESA.47

Simultaneously, Cuba faces a growing threat from climate change. As a Caribbean island nation, it is highly vulnerable to the impacts of rising sea levels, more intense and frequent hurricanes, and prolonged droughts.52 Historically, Cuba has maintained a robust and effective civil defense system for disaster preparedness. However, its capacity to recover from major climate shocks has been severely degraded by the ongoing economic crisis.9 The state lacks the fuel for evacuation vehicles, the materials to rebuild damaged infrastructure, and the hard currency to import food and medicine in the aftermath of a disaster. A major hurricane making a direct hit on critical infrastructure—such as the already fragile Antonio Guiteras power plant, the port of Havana, or key agricultural regions—could deliver a catastrophic blow to the already crippled system.1

Trajectory (Δ): US policy is likely to remain restrictive in the current political climate. Climate vulnerability is a constantly increasing threat.

Volatility: US policy is subject to the volatility of American electoral cycles, but the hardline stance has broad political support. The timing and intensity of extreme weather events are inherently volatile and unpredictable.

While the internal contradictions of Cuba’s state-socialist model are the root cause of its failure, US policy acts as a powerful “systemic clamp,” preventing any possibility of adjustment, reform, or recovery. In a normal international environment, a country experiencing such a profound crisis might seek relief through various channels: emergency loans from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank, a surge in foreign direct investment to rebuild key sectors, or an expansion of tourism to generate hard currency. The comprehensive US embargo, and particularly the SSOT designation and the threat of Helms-Burton lawsuits, make all of these potential escape routes virtually impossible.21 This policy effectively locks Cuba into its downward spiral. It exacerbates the economic crisis, which in turn leads to greater social desperation and state repression. This repression is then cited by US policymakers as justification for maintaining and even tightening the embargo. This creates a powerful reinforcing loop that traps the island in a closed system with no exits, ensuring that internal pressures continue to build without any possibility of release. In this way, US policy makes a chaotic, uncontrolled collapse more, not less, likely.

Synthesis and Predictive Outlook

Analysis of Critical Feedback Loops and Cascade Dynamics

The Cuban state is currently caught in a series of powerful, reinforcing feedback loops that are driving the system toward a critical failure point. These are not separate crises but interconnected dynamics where the output of one crisis becomes the input for another, creating a cascade of accelerating decay. Three of these loops are most critical to understanding the state’s trajectory toward collapse.

1. The Energy-Social Unrest Cascade (The Primary Acute Threat):

This loop represents the most immediate and plausible pathway to a rapid, systemic breakdown. It begins with the chronic state of decay in the national energy infrastructure, a direct result of decades of underinvestment, a lack of hard currency for spare parts, and an unreliable supply of fuel (Module A.2). The initial condition is the predictable failure of a critical node in the system, most likely the Antonio Guiteras power plant. This event triggers the immediate impact: prolonged, multi-day, widespread blackouts across major population centers. The paralysis of the electrical grid instantly cascades into a societal crisis. Water pumping stations fail, cutting off access to potable water. Refrigeration ceases, leading to massive food spoilage for a population already facing severe food insecurity. Sanitation systems break down, creating a public health emergency. The unbearable degradation of basic living conditions acts as a powerful catalyst for the societal reaction: spontaneous, large-scale, and potentially violent protests erupt, driven not by political ideology but by pure desperation (Module B.1). The state’s initial response is repression through the forces of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT). However, the geographic spread and sheer intensity of the unrest could overwhelm their capacity. This forces the regime to a critical decision point: the deployment of the regular army (FAR) for mass internal repression. This is the ultimate political consequence and the potential tipping point. If the FAR is deployed and a significant portion of its units refuse the order to fire on civilians, the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force shatters. At that moment, the regime’s authority evaporates, and the state, as a coherent entity, collapses (Module B.2).

2. The Peso Collapse-Emigration-Service Collapse Spiral (The Chronic System-Killer):

This loop is a slower-burning but equally lethal process that is hollowing out the long-term viability of the Cuban nation. It starts with the catastrophic failure of the state’s monetary policy and the resulting hyperinflation that has annihilated the value of the Cuban Peso (Module A.1). This renders state-paid salaries and pensions functionally worthless. Faced with this economic reality, skilled professionals—doctors, engineers, teachers, technicians—conclude that there is no viable future for them or their families on the island and join the mass exodus (Module C.1). Their departure creates a devastating brain drain that hollows out the nation’s public and technical sectors. This leads to the visible collapse of essential services that were once pillars of the revolution’s legitimacy: hospitals operate without sufficient doctors and basic medicines, universities lack qualified professors, and the maintenance of critical infrastructure becomes impossible due to a shortage of engineers (Module C.2). This degradation of the quality of life destroys the last vestiges of the social contract and further delegitimizes the state in the eyes of the remaining population (Module B.1). This, in turn, provides a powerful new incentive for the next wave of professionals to leave, creating a continuous, self-reinforcing cycle of demographic and institutional decay. The state is left presiding over a population that is older, poorer, sicker, and less educated, with absolutely no internal human capital for future recovery.

3. The Legitimacy-Repression-Isolation Feedback Loop (The Political Trap):

This loop illustrates the political trap from which the current leadership cannot escape. The regime’s profound inability to deliver basic economic performance and provide essential services (Module A) fundamentally erodes its legitimacy with the population. The current leadership, lacking the historical and charismatic authority of the Castro generation, finds itself with only one remaining tool to maintain control in the face of growing discontent: overt repression by the state security apparatus (Module B.1). However, each act of repression—the mass arrests of protesters, the long prison sentences for dissenters, the violent crackdowns—generates widespread international condemnation and is documented by human rights organizations.5 This documented repression provides the political justification for the continuation and tightening of the US embargo and other international sanctions (Module D.2). This increased international isolation further strangles the Cuban economy by cutting off potential sources of tourism, investment, and finance. This, in turn, worsens the state’s economic performance, which further erodes its legitimacy, necessitating even greater levels of repression to control the increasingly desperate population. The regime is thus trapped in a downward spiral where the very actions it takes to secure its power only succeed in deepening its systemic crisis and accelerating its path toward collapse.

Scenario Modeling: A Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario (36-Month Horizon)

Title: “The Long Blackout”

This scenario models a plausible pathway to state collapse within the 36-month forecast horizon, triggered by the most acute vulnerability: the failure of the national electrical grid.

  • Phase 1 (Months 0-6): The Grind Down. The current trajectory of systemic decay continues and deepens. Daily blackouts become a near-permanent feature of life nationwide, averaging 18 or more hours per day. The informal exchange rate breaches the 600 CUP/USD psychological barrier, cementing the worthlessness of state salaries. Facing empty coffers, the government is forced to announce further cuts to the subsidized food basket, removing more items from la libreta. Small, sporadic protests continue to erupt in provincial towns in response to local conditions but are contained by targeted repression from MININT forces. The pace of emigration of anyone with the financial means or foreign connections to leave accelerates, further draining the country of skilled labor.
  • Phase 2 (Months 6-12): The Infrastructural Shock. The system suffers a catastrophic infrastructural shock. This could be a powerful hurricane making a direct hit on Matanzas province, but a more likely trigger is the final, cascading failure of the Antonio Guiteras power plant, which goes offline for an extended and indefinite period before its scheduled maintenance can even begin.25 This plunges at least 80% of the country, including most of Havana, into a “Cero Generación” event—a total blackout lasting for over a week. The immediate consequences are devastating. Municipal water systems fail. The communication network collapses. Hospitals, reliant on failing backup generators, are overwhelmed. The food distribution system, which depends on refrigeration and transport, halts completely.
  • Phase 3 (Months 12-18): The “Estallido Social”. The prolonged and nationwide nature of the blackout triggers a social explosion (Estallido Social) that dwarfs the 11J protests in scale, intensity, and geographic scope. Uprisings occur simultaneously in the major municipalities of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Holguín, Camagüey, and Santa Clara. These protests are leaderless, desperate, and increasingly violent, with widespread looting of state-run dollar stores and warehouses. Local MININT forces and police units are overwhelmed by the sheer number of people in the streets. In several provincial cities, security forces are witnessed standing down, refusing to confront the crowds, or are simply overrun.
  • Phase 4 (Months 18-24): The Fracture. Faced with a total loss of control in multiple provinces and the potential for the unrest in Havana to reach the Plaza de la Revolución, the civilian leadership under President Díaz-Canel orders the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) to deploy combat units to restore order by any means necessary. This is the ultimate tipping point. Key commanders within the FAR, particularly those with ties to the GAESA economic wing, see the civilian leadership as incompetent and the order as a suicidal directive to massacre their own people, which would make them international pariahs and destroy any hope of a future for their economic enterprises. A faction within the senior military command refuses the order. A high-level general, speaking from a military installation, appears on television to announce the formation of a “Transitional Council for National Salvation,” effectively sidelining Díaz-Canel and the PCC leadership. This is not a democratic revolution but an internal coup d’état, justified as a necessary step to prevent a full-blown civil war and total societal collapse. The regime fractures. The state, as a functioning, centralized entity under the absolute control of the Communist Party, has collapsed.

Concluding Assessment: Tipping Points and Collapse Probability

The Republic of Cuba is in a state of advanced systemic crisis. The reinforcing feedback loops of economic collapse, infrastructure decay, and human capital flight have overwhelmed the state’s balancing mechanisms. The regime’s increasing reliance on repression is a sign of profound weakness, not strength, and is unsustainable as a long-term governance strategy. The analysis identifies several critical tipping points that could trigger a rapid transition from the current CRISIS stage to the COLLAPSE stage.

  • Infrastructural Tipping Point: The complete, nationwide failure of the electrical grid (“Cero Generación”) for a period exceeding one week. This would lead to the paralysis of water, sanitation, and food distribution systems, likely triggering an uncontrollable social uprising. (High Likelihood)
  • Political/Security Tipping Point: A social uprising of a scale that forces the civilian leadership to order the deployment of the FAR for mass repression, leading to a fracture within the armed forces when a significant faction refuses to fire on the populace. (Medium Likelihood, but High Impact)
  • Geopolitical Tipping Point: The sudden and complete collapse of the Maduro regime in Venezuela, leading to an immediate and total cessation of all subsidized oil shipments to Cuba, which would trigger an acute and unmanageable energy crisis. (Low Likelihood within horizon, but High Impact)
  • Biological Tipping Point: The death or complete incapacitation of Raúl Castro (aged 94 in 2025). This event would remove the final symbol of “historic” revolutionary authority and the ultimate arbiter of elite disputes. His absence could unleash a latent power struggle between the civilian PCC bureaucracy and the GAESA military-economic elite, particularly during a moment of acute crisis.11 (High Likelihood within horizon)

Final Probability Assessment:

Given the high likelihood of a critical infrastructure failure within the forecast period, the increasing fragility of the social contract, and the presence of multiple, powerful, reinforcing feedback loops, this analysis concludes that there is a high probability (60-75%) of the Cuban state transitioning from the CRISIS stage to the COLLAPSE stage within the next 36 months. This collapse is most likely to manifest not as a protracted civil war, but as a rapid fracture of the ruling elite in the face of an uncontrollable popular uprising triggered by a catastrophic failure of essential state services.

Works Cited

  • Cubalex. (Various Dates). Monitoring of Political Prisoners in Cuba.
  • Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). (2025). Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2025.
  • El Toque. (2025). Informal Exchange Rate Data and Economic Analysis.
  • Human Rights Watch. (2025). World Report 2025: Cuba.
  • Pérez Villanueva, O. E. (Various Dates). Analysis of the Cuban Economy.
  • Unión Eléctrica (UNE). (Various Dates). Daily Reports on the National Electric System.
  • U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). (Various Dates). Monthly Enforcement Statistics.
  • Vidal, P. (Various Dates). Analysis of Cuban Monetary Policy and Macroeconomics.

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