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Systemic Fragility Analysis of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: A 36-Month Predictive Outlook – Q4 2025

Report regenerated on 10/31/2025 6:00am

  • Overall Fragility Score: 8.1 / 10 (1=Stable, 10=Collapse)
  • Lifecycle Stage Assessment: CRISIS (Protracted) / COLLAPSE (Localized). The formal state apparatus, centered in Caracas, remains functional for political control and repression.1 However, core state functions—including the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, border control, and the provision of basic services—have effectively collapsed in significant portions of the national territory, which are now governed by non-state actors.2 The state has exited its prior “precarious equilibrium” and entered a new phase of extreme volatility following the regime’s theft of the July 2024 presidential election and the subsequent, ongoing military escalation with the United States.4
  • Key Drivers of Fragility (36-Month Horizon):
  1. US-Venezuela Military Escalation: The 2025 US designation of Venezuelan-linked cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) 7 and the declaration of a “noninternational armed conflict,” including lethal strikes, represents a qualitative shift from economic sanctions to active military coercion.5 This is the primary external driver of instability.
  2. Internal FANB Cohesion: Regime survival is contingent on the loyalty of the Armed Forces (FANB) high command. This loyalty, secured primarily through access to illicit rents 9, is now under direct military and economic assault by US counter-narcotics actions. The 2025 dismissal of five generals for “disloyalty” indicates existing, critical fractures.10
  3. Illicit Economy Dependence: The full reimposition of US oil sanctions 12 has deepened the state’s structural dependence on illicit revenue from gold mining and drug trafficking, accelerating state criminalization and the erosion of sovereignty.14
  4. Geopolitical Flashpoint (Essequibo): The high-tension territorial dispute with Guyana, evidenced by a March 2025 Venezuelan naval confrontation with an ExxonMobil vessel 16, remains a critical flashpoint for a miscalculation leading to a wider regional conflict.
  5. The “Humanitarian Cliff”: The confirmed cessation of World Food Programme (WFP) funding and operations after December 2025 17 will trigger an acute exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis, driving new migration waves and social unrest in Q1 2026.
  • Forecast Trajectory: High Volatility / Degrading. The 36-month horizon is characterized by a high-stakes confrontation between a regime consolidating a totalitarian “Communal State” via brutal repression 18 and an external US-led campaign of active military coercion.5 This dynamic makes an abrupt, violent political transition or state fragmentation highly plausible, while a negotiated settlement is no longer a realistic pathway.

4.2. State Fragility Dashboard

Domain/IndicatorCurrent Score (1-10)Trend (Δ)VolatilityWeighted Impact (%)Brief Rationale & Key Data Points
B: Political Consolidation40%
B.1. Regime Cohesion (FANB/PSUV)6↓High15%Civil-military alliance is functionally intact but brittle. Loyalty secured by illicit rents.9 Dismissal of 5 generals for disloyalty is a key indicator of fracture.10
B.1. Repression (SEBIN/DGCIM/FAES)9↓High10%Repression apparatus is highly effective, sophisticated, and escalating post-2024 election. Described by UN/IACHR as “state terrorism” and potential “crimes against humanity”.[1, 4, 18, 19]
B.2. Opposition Capacity7↓Extreme10%Opposition demonstrated mass mobilization (won 2024 election [20]). Now faces existential repression; leader (González) in exile.[21] Machado (2025 Nobel Prize winner) in hiding.22
B.2. Barbados Agreement10→Low5%Moribund. The 2024 electoral theft 23 and subsequent US sanctions snapback [12, 24] render the agreement defunct.
A: Petrostate Economy30%
A.1. Oil Production & Revenue7↑High10%Production ~888k bpd (OPEC, Apr 2025).25 Full US sanctions snapback 12 forces reliance on “ghost fleets” 26 and discounted sales to China.28
A.1. PDVSA Capacity9↓Med5%Structurally collapsed. Refinery capacity is minimal (~100k bpd gasoline).[29] Plagued by blackouts and decades of mismanagement.[8, 30, 31]
A.2. Illicit Revenue (Gold/Drugs)9↓High10%Essential for state/elite survival. Gold mining generates “vast riches”.32 Drug trafficking integrated with state actors (“Cartel of los Soles”).[7, 15, 33]
A.2. Macro (Inflation/Exchange)7↓High5%Post-hyperinflation stabilization is fracturing. Inflation rose to 172% (Apr 2025).34 Parallel exchange rate gap widened to 42% (Sep 2025) 35, signaling renewed instability.
D: Security & Geopolitics20%
D.1. State Fragmentation (NSAs)8↓High10%Significant loss of territorial control. Borders and Arco Minero governed by NSAs (ELN, FARC-diss, sindicatos) in collusion with FANB factions.[2, 3, 32, 36]
D.2. US Relations / Sanctions9↓Extreme5%Direct confrontation. US has declared “noninternational armed conflict” 5, deployed carrier group 5, and conducted lethal strikes.6 This is the primary external driver.
D.2. Geopolitical Alliances6↑Med5%Alliances (Russia, China, Iran) are transactional and deepening in response to US pressure.37 Provide sanctions-evasion techniques and military hardware.10
C: Humanitarian & Social10%
C.1. Humanitarian/Poverty9↓High5%Crisis is chronic. Encovi 2023 income poverty at 51.9%.39 WFP reports operations are unfunded post-Dec 2025 17, indicating a “cliff.”
C.2. Migration (R4V)9↓Med5%~7.9M global (UNHCR).40 Acts as a “safety valve” but also a brain drain. Post-2024 repression 41 and looming WFP cut will likely trigger a new wave.
OVERALL FRAGILITY SCORE8.1↓ (Degrading)High100%Assessed Lifecycle Stage: CRISIS (Protracted) / COLLAPSE (Localized)

4.3. Detailed Domain Analysis

Module A: The Petrostate Economy and Hybrid Adaptation

A.1. Oil Production, Sanctions, and State Revenue

The formal Venezuelan economy remains entirely dependent on a decaying petrostate apparatus. Oil production, while up from its absolute nadir, is structurally crippled and highly vulnerable to external shocks. Data opacity is a persistent challenge; as of April 2025, OPEC secondary sources reported production at 888,000 barrels per day (bpd), whereas the regime’s Ministry of Hydrocarbons claimed 1,051,000 bpd.25

This production level is not constrained by reserves—which are the world’s largest 42—but by the catastrophic decay of Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). The state oil company’s operational capacity is minimal. Decades of profound mismanagement, corruption, and human capital flight 8 have left its infrastructure in ruins. The country’s refining system, with a nameplate capacity near 2 million bpd, is largely offline.44 As of August 2025, only the Amuay, Cardón, and Puerto La Cruz refineries were partially operational, producing a mere 100,000 bpd of gasoline and 75,000 bpd of diesel—barely enough to cover national supply and subject to constant interruptions.29

This precarious situation is now compounded by the full reimposition of US sanctions. The brief sanctions relief provided by General License (GL) 44, part of the 2023 Barbados Agreement, is over. Following the regime’s failure to hold a competitive election in 2024, the US administration allowed GL 44 to expire, issuing a brief wind-down license (GL 44A) that ended on May 31, 2024.24 By March 2025, the new US administration had further accelerated this “snapback,” revoking licenses and giving companies a one-month window to close operations.12 As of late 2025, the “maximum pressure” sanctions regime is fully reinstated.13

This dynamic has triggered the “Sanctions-Evasion Spiral,” a reinforcing feedback loop that defines the regime’s economic adaptation.

  1. Pressure: US sanctions block PDVSA from formal Western markets, financial systems, and investment.47
  2. Adaptation: The regime responds by utilizing an “interwoven shadow fleet” 26 of “zombie tankers”.27 These vessels engage in deceptive practices, including ship-to-ship transfers, operating with false flags, and manipulating AIS signals to hide their activity.26
  3. Partners: This illicit trade is facilitated by opaque intermediaries and state-level partners. China remains the primary buyer of last resort for this sanctioned crude.13 Iran and Russia provide the logistical and diplomatic architecture for this evasion network.26
  4. Consequence: The regime survives, but at the cost of selling its oil at a significant discount.49 This deepens its integration with illicit global networks, reduces transparency to zero, and provides the US with fresh justification for continued sanctions against the regime and its enablers.47

This sanctions snapback is occurring in a global oil market that is far less favorable to Venezuela than in previous years. With OPEC+ unwinding production cuts, the market faces potential oversupply.28 Venezuela must now compete not only with Iranian and Russian sanctioned crude but for the same limited pool of “independent refiners” in China. This dynamic further depresses the net revenue per barrel, slashing state income and forcing an even greater reliance on the non-oil illicit economies detailed in Module A.2.

A.2. Macroeconomic Stabilization and the Illicit Economy

The regime’s “authoritarian liberalization” strategy—a tacit embrace of market forces and dollarization that began around 2020 49—successfully ended the 2017-2019 hyperinflation.52 However, this fragile stabilization is now fracturing under renewed political and economic stress. Inflation, which had slowed, is accelerating, with annualized rates hitting 172% in April 2025.34 A critical indicator of instability, the gap between the official (BCV) and parallel exchange rates, widened to 42% by September 2025, driven by a surge in public spending and the state’s inability to supply sufficient US dollars to the market.35

Informal dollarization is the dominant economic reality 53, but it has created the “Inequality Trap,” or “Burbuja Effect” (Bubble Effect).

  1. Stabilization: The circulation of USD stabilizes consumption and prices for a minority of the population.
  2. Exclusion: This creates a stark, two-tier society. A “bubble” economy exists for those with access to dollars—primarily from illicit economies, private sector exports, or remittances.54 The vast majority, including public sector employees and pensioners, are paid in near-worthless Bolívares and remain excluded.55
  3. Humanitarian Impact: This bifurcation exacerbates the humanitarian crisis (Module C) for the excluded majority, even as macroeconomic indicators appear to improve.56
  4. Political Impact: The “burbuja” provides new, licit and illicit, patronage opportunities for regime elites, strengthening their cohesion and giving them a concrete economic model to protect (Module B).

As formal oil revenue becomes more constrained, illicit economies are no longer parallel to the state; they are integrated into its core survival mechanism.15

  • Illicit Gold: The regime has effectively ceded sovereignty over the vast Orinoco Mining Arc (Arco Minero) in Bolívar and Amazonas states.32 This territory, estimated to contain 140,000 hectares of illegal mining 32, is controlled by a hybrid mix of actors: co-opted FANB factions, Colombian guerrillas (ELN), FARC dissidents, and local criminal gangs (sindicatos).3 These groups generate “vast riches” 32 and pay “taxes” and kickbacks in gold to military and political elites.14 This gold is then laundered internationally, often via opaque networks to the UAE, Iran, and Turkey.14
  • Drug Trafficking: Venezuela remains a premier transit hub for cocaine. State-embedded actors, known as the “Cartel of los Soles” 7, provide safe harbor, logistics, and protection for ELN and FARC dissident groups trafficking cocaine to Central America, the US, and Europe.15

This reliance on illicit gold represents a deliberate, strategic trade-off: the regime exchanges formal territorial sovereignty for the illicit, high-value, and easily transportable revenue required for its survival.32 This is not state failure by accident; it is state failure by design as a survival strategy.

Module B: Political Consolidation and Authoritarian Control

B.1. Regime Cohesion and the Civil-Military Alliance

The central pillar of the Maduro regime is the civil-military alliance between the ruling PSUV party and the FANB high command.9 This alliance is not based on a shared Chavista ideology, which has long faded, but on a transactional, criminalized pact. This is a “Criminalized Governance Loop”:

  1. Decay: As formal oil revenues collapsed (Module A), the state lost its traditional patronage capacity.
  2. Adaptation: The regime substituted formal revenue with illicit rents from gold mining and drug trafficking.15
  3. Co-optation: Access to and control over these illicit rents were granted to the FANB high command and key PSUV figures, effectively purchasing their loyalty.9
  4. Consolidation: This process embeds criminal networks within the state apparatus. Political power and criminal enterprise become indistinguishable.
  5. Reinforcement: Any attempt at democratization, such as a free and fair election, now poses an existential economic threat to this ruling coalition. Reform would bring rule of law, transparency, and prosecution, threatening the illicit wealth that binds the regime together. Therefore, the regime must use its repressive apparatus to crush all democratic openings.9

This pact, while functional, is brittle. Following the July 2024 election, Maduro has conducted security shuffles to consolidate control.62 Critically, reports in 2025 indicate that at least five FANB generals were dismissed for “disloyalty,” allegedly for their unwillingness to participate in repression.10 This is the most significant public indicator of fractures within the military. To manage this, the regime increasingly relies on its most loyal—and most brutal—forces for domestic repression: the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), the colectivos (pro-government paramilitaries) 10, and the specialized intelligence services.

The state’s repressive apparatus is highly effective and sophisticated. The UN Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) has described the intelligence services (SEBIN and DGCIM) as “well-coordinated and effective structures” implementing a high-level plan to repress dissent through crimes against humanity.1 The crackdown following the 2024 election was systematic, described by the IACHR as “state terrorism”.4 The regime is now moving to institutionalize this control permanently via a proposed 2026 constitutional reform to create a “Communal State”.4 This reform would legally dismantle Venezuela’s federal, representative democracy and replace it with a top-down system of communal councils controlled by the executive, codifying an anti-democratic, single-party system.19

B.2. Opposition Capacity and Political Landscape

The Venezuelan opposition is facing a profound paradox: it is simultaneously at the peak of its legitimacy and on the verge of political extinction.

The opposition’s unified (Plataforma Unitaria) campaign for the July 2024 presidential election achieved unprecedented popular mobilization. Credible, independent analyses of voting tallies show their candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, won the election by a landslide, with some estimates as high as 67% of the vote.7 The movement’s leader, María Corina Machado, who was arbitrarily barred from running, has achieved global recognition for her efforts, culminating in her being awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.22

However, this victory was the catalyst for the regime’s most brutal crackdown to date. The regime “stole” the election, claiming victory for Maduro.23 It then unleashed a wave of repression described as “state terrorism” 4, resulting in mass arrests, killings, and enforced disappearances.66 The opposition’s elected leader, Edmundo González, was forced to flee and seek asylum in Spain 20, while Machado remains in hiding.22

The political and electoral path is now definitively closed. The 2023 Barbados Agreement, which was intended to guarantee a competitive 2024 election 67, is defunct. The regime’s subsequent sham regional (May 2025) and municipal (July 2025) elections, which saw near-total voter abstention, were used merely to cement its control and purge any remaining opposition influence.23 The regime’s 2024 electoral victory revealed the true scale of the popular threat against it; it is now using all apparatuses of the state to permanently eliminate that threat before its 2026 “Communal State” reform.19

Module C: Humanitarian Emergency and Social Fabric

C.1. Humanitarian Crisis and Public Services

The humanitarian emergency is chronic, severe, and entrenched. The “burbuja” economy (Module A.2) has done nothing to alleviate the suffering of the majority. According to the 2023 National Survey of Living Conditions (Encovi) from Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), income poverty stood at 51.9%.39 The 2024 Encovi survey found that 56.5% of households live in multidimensional poverty.71 While this is a reduction from the 2021 peak, where 76.6% lived in extreme poverty 72, it represents a consolidation of catastrophic poverty, not a recovery.73

Food insecurity is a primary driver of this crisis. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that 40% of the population faces moderate to severe food insecurity.75 This is exacerbated by the collapse of public services. Access to safe drinking water, reliable electricity, and basic sanitation is severely limited.76 The healthcare system is defunct; the 2019 Global Health Security Index ranked Venezuela 176th out of 195, and conditions have since deteriorated.78 International humanitarian efforts are failing to fill this gap; UNICEF’s 2025 appeal, for example, remains 84% unfunded.79

A critical, date-specific tipping point is imminent. The WFP has already scaled down its operations in 2025 to just six critical states.17 More alarmingly, current funding only covers food assistance for 260,000 students through December 2025. As of July 2025, the WFP reported it has no funding available to sustain any operations from December 2025 onwards.17 This “Humanitarian Cliff” all but guarantees an acute spike in malnutrition and social unrest in the first quarter of 2026, as the state has no capacity or plan to assume this burden.

C.2. Migration Crisis and Demographics

The humanitarian crisis and political repression have fueled one of the world’s largest external displacement crises. As of May 2025, the R4V Platform reports 6.87 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean.80 UNHCR data from the same period cites a global figure of nearly 7.9 million.40

This mass migration functions as a critical “Safety Valve” balancing loop for the regime.

  1. Pressure: Economic collapse (Module A) and political repression (Module B) build intense domestic social pressure.41
  2. Release: Mass emigration acts as a release valve, exporting millions of disaffected citizens who would otherwise be a source of domestic protest and opposition. This reduces internal political pressure on the regime.83
  3. New Dependency: This diaspora generates a vital economic lifeline. Remittances, estimated by Ecoanalítica at ~$3 billion 84, are received by an estimated 29% of households.85 This “Diaspora Dependency” is a key pillar of the “burbuja” economy (Module A.2), stabilizing the unequal economic system.

The outflow continues to outpace the small number of returns 40, and the post-2024 crackdown has created a new wave of political exiles, in addition to economic ones.41 While this migration loop provides short-term stability for the regime, it has a devastating long-term corrosive effect: a profound human capital-flight (brain drain) that has hollowed out essential sectors like medicine, engineering, and education.77 This ensures that even if a political transition were to occur, the state’s capacity to recover would be crippled for a generation.

Module D: Security, Sovereignty, and Geopolitics

D.1. State Fragmentation and Non-State Actors

The Venezuelan state has lost the monopoly on the legitimate use of force over large swathes of its territory.3 This is not a uniform collapse, but a strategic fragmentation. Control is “managed” by a patchwork of non-state armed actors (NSAs) 2, including:

  • Colombian Guerrillas: The ELN and FARC dissident groups have safe harbor in border states like Apure and Zulia, where they control drug trafficking routes and illicit mining operations, often in direct collusion with local FANB garrisons.32
  • Sindicatos and Pranes: Domestic criminal gangs (sindicatos) that govern the gold mines of the Arco Minero through violence 36, and “pranes” (prison bosses) whose networks have evolved into transnational criminal organizations like the Tren de Aragua.88
  • Colectivos: Pro-government paramilitary groups that exercise social and territorial control in urban barrios, acting as a shock force for state repression.23

This dynamic has created the “Sovereignty Erosion Spiral”:

  1. Need: The regime needs revenue (Module A) and a loyal military (Module B).
  2. Trade-Off: It grants FANB factions and allied NSAs (like the ELN) de facto control over territory and its illicit resources (e.g., gold mines).32
  3. Erosion: This “outsourcing” of sovereignty is the payment method. The state effectively retreats, allowing NSAs to govern, tax, and dispense “justice”.87
  4. Reinforcement: This entrenches the criminal networks, making them indispensable to the regime’s financial survival and leading to an irreversible loss of statehood in these regions.15

Generalized violence indicators, such as the homicide rate, are misleading. While the regime claims a 90% drop 90 and the Venezuelan Violence Observatory (OVV) noted a 2023 violent death rate of 26.8 per 100,000 91 (down from historic highs), this does not signify improved security. This reduction is primarily driven by: (1) the mass migration of young men, including the criminal population 92; and (2) the consolidation of criminal monopolies. As dominant NSAs like the ELN establish full territorial control, “turf wars” decrease, leading to a more “stable” but fully criminalized environment.88

D.2. Geopolitics and International Relations

Geopolitics has become the dominant external factor, and the situation has shifted from “maximum pressure” via sanctions to active military confrontation.

US Relations: Following the 2024 election theft, the new US (Trump) administration has adopted a highly kinetic policy. It has deployed a naval carrier strike group to the Caribbean 5, authorized CIA covert operations 93, designated the state-linked “Cartel of los Soles” as an FTO 7, and declared a “noninternational armed conflict” against these groups.5 This policy includes lethal strikes on alleged drug trafficking vessels 5, representing a de facto state of limited warfare.

Extra-Hemispheric Alliances: The regime leverages this US hostility to deepen its transactional alliances with US rivals 37:

  • Russia: Provides diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and expertise in sanctions evasion.26
  • China: The primary financial lifeline and the main buyer of sanctioned oil, essential for regime cash flow.13
  • Iran: A key operational partner, providing technical expertise for “ghost fleet” oil smuggling 26 and transferring military hardware, including UAVs and missile boats.10

Regional Relations: The brief détente with the leftist governments of Colombia (Petro) and Brazil (Lula) 95 is fractured. The 2024 electoral fraud and subsequent repression were publicly criticized, and US pressure is forcing regional actors to choose sides.98

Essequibo Dispute: This territorial dispute with Guyana is a critical geopolitical flashpoint.16 The regime uses it as a nationalist mobilization tool to distract from internal crises and rally the FANB against an “external enemy”.100 This has escalated beyond rhetoric. Following its 2023 referendum, the regime held symbolic elections for the Essequibo territory in May 2025.10 On March 1, 2025, a Venezuelan gunboat directly confronted an ExxonMobil-leased FPSO vessel inside Guyana’s Exclusive Economic Zone.16 With the US providing enhanced security cooperation to Guyana, the dispute has become a proxy conflict. The primary risk is a miscalculation by an emboldened Venezuelan commander, which could trigger a full-scale regional war.102

4.4. Synthesis and Predictive Outlook

Critical Feedback Loop Analysis

The Venezuelan state’s stability is governed by the interplay of three dominant feedback loops.

  1. The “Criminalized Governance Loop” (Reinforcing): As detailed in Module B, this is the regime’s core survival pact. The depletion of formal oil revenue (Module A) was replaced by granting illicit rents (gold, drugs) to the FANB/PSUV elite to secure loyalty.9 This makes state and crime indistinguishable.15 This loop “locks in” authoritarianism, as any move toward democratic reform (i.e., rule of law) now represents an existential economic threat to the ruling class, compelling them to repress all dissent, as seen in the 2024 election.9
  2. The “Unequal Stabilization Trap” (Balancing/Reinforcing): This loop (Module A/C) explains the “burbuja” economy. The regime’s “authoritarian liberalization” (informal dollarization) stabilizes inflation for a minority 53, but creates massive inequality.54 This unstable system is itself balanced by two sub-loops: (a) the Migration Safety Valve, which exports dissent 40, and (b) the Diaspora Dependency, where remittances (~$3B) 84 fund a small consumer class. This prevents total societal collapse but also blocks genuine recovery.
  3. The “Geopolitical Escalation Spiral” (Reinforcing): This is the new, dominant loop defining the 36-month horizon. It has broken the “precarious equilibrium” of the other two loops.
  • Action: The regime’s post-2024 domestic repression 4 triggers a hardline US response.
  • Reaction: The US initiates active military/covert operations against the “narco-terrorist” regime.5
  • Counter-Action: This US aggression provides the regime with a nationalist justification for more internal repression (branding all opponents as “traitors”) 101 and for seeking more material support (drones, boats, cash) from its allies (Russia, China, Iran).10
  • Reinforcement: The arrival of Iranian missile boats and Russian diplomatic cover confirms the US threat assessment, justifying the next round of US escalation. This spiral is highly volatile and risks a direct state-on-state conflict.9

Key Tipping Points (36-Month Horizon)

  1. Political/Military Tipping Point (High Likelihood): A significant fracture within the FANB. This will not be ideological but financial. The US “noninternational armed conflict” is a direct kinetic assault on the “Cartel of los Soles”.5 As this operation successfully interdicts the illicit rents that form the “glue” of the civil-military alliance, factions will likely fight over the remaining scraps or seek to negotiate their own exits. The 2025 dismissal of five generals 10 is a precursor to this event. This is the most probable, and most violent, path to regime collapse.
  2. Humanitarian Tipping Point (High Likelihood): The Q1 2026 “Humanitarian Cliff.” The confirmed cessation of WFP funding after December 2025 17 is a date-specific, high-confidence tipping point. It will cause an acute food security crisis, overwhelming local services and driving a new, desperate wave of migration and social unrest, which the regime will meet with lethal force.
  3. Political/Legal Tipping Point (Medium Likelihood): The 2026 “Communal State” constitutional reform.4 If the regime successfully passes this reform, it will legally codify the end of the Venezuelan republic and the start of a new, totalitarian model.19 This marks the point of no return for any negotiated settlement.
  4. Geopolitical Tipping Point (High Volatility): A miscalculation in the “gray zone.” This could manifest as (a) a Venezuelan naval commander, emboldened by nationalist rhetoric, attacking or seizing an ExxonMobil platform in the disputed Essequibo waters 16, or (b) a US strike on a “narco-terrorist” target (FTO) 7 that kills high-value Russian or Iranian “advisors” present in Venezuela.10 Given the aggressive rules of engagement on both sides 6, such a miscalculation is highly plausible.

Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario (36-Month Horizon)

Scenario: “The Fragmentation”

  • Phase 1 (Q1-Q2 2026): The Humanitarian Tipping Point arrives. The WFP aid cliff 17 triggers famine-like conditions in Zulia, Apure, and Amazonas. Mass protests, larger than in 2024, erupt. Simultaneously, the regime pushes its 2026 “Communal State” reform.19 Maduro uses the unrest as justification, blaming “US-backed saboteurs,” and deploys colectivos and the GNB in a brutal, large-scale crackdown.4
  • Phase 2 (Q3 2026): In response to the atrocities, the US “noninternational armed conflict” escalates.5 A US strike, likely a covert operation 93, targets a key “Cartel of los Soles” transshipment point on the coast. The strike is successful but results in collateral deaths: several high-ranking GNB officials and, critically, two Iranian IRGC advisors and a Cuban G2 agent.10
  • Phase 3 (Q4 2026): This triggers the Geopolitical Tipping Point. Iran and Russia declare the strike an act of war. The regime, seeking to demonstrate strength and using its Iranian-supplied missile boats 10, retaliates in the “gray zone.” It seizes a US-leased oil tanker in international waters, claiming it was violating the sovereignty of the “Essequibo” territory.16 This creates a de facto regional blockade and a global oil price spike.
  • Phase 4 (2027-2028): This act triggers the Political/Military Tipping Point. The US, now with a casus belli, responds with a full “regime change” operation 9, imposing a naval quarantine and launching decapitation strikes against Maduro and the “Cartel of los Soles” FTO leadership.5 The FANB shatters. The high command, seeing no exit, fights back. Regional commanders, whose illicit rents have evaporated, either flee, surrender, or attempt to “flip” and align with the US.
  • End-State (36-Months): Venezuela enters the “Collapse” stage (Stage 4). The central state ceases to function. Maduro is killed, captured, or in exile. However, there is no viable “Post-Collapse/Recovery” (Stage 5). Instead, the state has fragmented into warring factions. A new “interim government” may control parts of Caracas, but the territory is carved into fiefdoms: ELN/FARC-dissidents controlling the borders, sindicatos controlling the gold mines, and former FANB factions operating as independent warlords. The US is bogged down in a catastrophic, low-intensity conflict, and the humanitarian crisis becomes the worst in the Western Hemisphere’s modern history.

Concluding Stability Assessment

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is not a “failed state” in the traditional sense; it is a hybrid criminalized state that has perfected authoritarian adaptation by integrating illicit economies directly into its governance model.15 However, the “precarious equilibrium” this model afforded from 2020-2023 is over.

The regime’s decision to steal the July 2024 election 23 was a fatal miscalculation. It simultaneously destroyed the domestic “safety valve” of a political opposition 104 and triggered a qualitatively different US response: active, kinetic military coercion.5

The 36-month forecast is one of extreme fragility. The regime is caught in an inescapable trap: its primary survival mechanisms (political repression, illicit economy, and geopolitical alliances) are now the precise targets of US military and economic power. The system is no longer in a balancing loop; it is in a reinforcing feedback loop of escalation.

This analysis concludes there is a high probability (65-75%) of an abrupt, non-negotiated political transition or state fragmentation within the 36-month forecast horizon. This transition will not be peaceful. It will be a violent, chaotic fracture driven by the collision of the regime’s internal brittleness (the FANB loyalty-for-profit paradox 9) and the unprecedented, escalatory external military pressure.

4.5. Works Cited

  • Economic analysis and macroeconomic data (Ecoanalítica, Observatorio Venezolano de Finanzas (OVF))
  • Humanitarian data (Encovi (UCAB), UN OCHA, R4V Platform, World Food Programme (WFP))
  • Illicit economies and security analysis (Insight Crime, Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia (OVV), Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency (FACT) Coalition)
  • Oil production and sanctions data (OPEC secondary sources, US Treasury (OFAC), Energy Analytics Institute (EAI), Reuters)
  • Political, military, and geopolitical analysis (International Crisis Group (ICG), Human Rights Watch (HRW), Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), UN Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), Control Ciudadano, The Carter Center, CSIS)

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Sources Used

  1. Venezuela: new UN report details responsibilities for crimes against humanity to repress dissent and highlights situation in remotes mining areas | OHCHR, accessed October 31, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/venezuela-new-un-report-details-responsibilities-crimes-against-humanity
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