The contemporary small arms ammunition supply chain is a paradox of apparent domestic capacity masked by profound upstream fragility. While final assembly of cartridges for military and commercial markets largely occurs within the continental United States and allied nations, the foundational industrial inputs—energetic precursors, critical minerals, and precision tooling—are heavily concentrated in nations that present significant geopolitical risk, most notably the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. This report, conducted from the perspective of an industrial analyst, deconstructs the ammunition ecosystem to identify specific nodes of failure that threaten the continuity of supply during high-intensity conflict or protracted trade warfare.

Our analysis identifies three primary vectors of risk. First, the “Energetics Gap” reveals a critical over-reliance on Chinese-sourced cotton linters for the production of nitrocellulose, the primary ingredient in smokeless propellant. While wood pulp alternatives exist, they require complex requalification and processing infrastructure that is currently insufficient to meet surge demand. Second, the “Primer Crisis” is driven by a near-total dependency on Chinese mining and refining for antimony, a metalloid essential for lead hardening and primer ignition compounds. The recent imposition of export controls by Beijing in late 2024 has transformed this dependency from a theoretical risk into an active supply shock. Third, the “Machinery Bottleneck” highlights the vulnerability of the Western industrial base to a consolidated group of European Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for high-speed loading equipment, which in turn rely on globalized electronics supply chains vulnerable to disruption in the Asia-Pacific theater.

Compensating measures are currently being pursued with varying degrees of urgency. These include the “friend-shoring” of critical mineral processing to Australia and Canada, the recapitalization of the U.S. Army’s Organic Industrial Base (OIB) to integrate robotics and automation, and the exploration of material substitution through polymer-cased ammunition. However, a “Valley of Death” exists between the immediate onset of supply restrictions and the maturation of domestic alternatives, such as the Stibnite Gold Project in Idaho or the fully modernized Radford Army Ammunition Plant. This report argues that strategic resilience requires a shift from efficient, Just-in-Time global sourcing to a robust, redundant, and occasionally redundant sovereign capability, necessitating sustained capital investment and regulatory alignment.

1. Introduction: The Geopolitics of Kinetic Logistics

The capability to manufacture small arms ammunition at scale is often treated as a solved problem in Western defense planning. The ubiquity of the cartridge in civilian markets creates a false sense of security regarding industrial depth. In reality, the production of a single 5.56x45mm NATO round is the culmination of a complex, globalized chemical and metallurgical supply chain that has been hollowed out by decades of de-industrialization and cost-optimization. The prevailing logic of the post-Cold War era—the “Peace Dividend”—drove the upstream production of dirty, low-margin, and environmentally hazardous materials offshore, largely to China.

This outsourcing strategy was predicated on a stable, rules-based international order. The return of great power competition and the advent of industrial-scale attrition warfare in Ukraine have shattered this premise. The U.S. and its NATO allies now face a dual challenge: replenishing depleted stockpiles while simultaneously decoupling from the very adversaries they seek to deter. The “China Price,” once a mechanism for competitive procurement, is now recognized as a mechanism of strategic capture.

The scope of this report encompasses the entire lifecycle of the cartridge, from the extraction of raw ores to the synthesis of high explosives and the precision machining of the final assembly. By examining the flow of materials through the lens of supply chain risk management (SCRM), we reveal that the vulnerabilities are not distributed evenly but are clustered around specific “choke points”—single-source suppliers or geographic monopolies that can be leveraged for geopolitical gain. The analysis that follows details these risks and evaluates the feasibility of proposed compensating measures, ranging from the revitalization of domestic mining to the adoption of advanced polymer technologies.

2. The Energetics Chokepoint: Nitrocellulose and the Cotton Dependency

The propulsion of every projectile, from a 9mm pistol round to a 155mm artillery shell, depends on nitrocellulose (NC). Historically known as “guncotton,” this energetic polymer is produced by nitrating cellulose fibers with nitric and sulfuric acid. It is the fundamental building block of modern smokeless powder. The supply chain for weapons-grade NC is perhaps the most critical and underappreciated vulnerability in the ammunition sector.

2.1 The Cotton Linter Dominance and Chinese Leverage

The gold standard for munitions-grade nitrocellulose is derived from cotton linters—the short, fuzz-like fibers that remain on the cotton seed after the ginning process. Cotton linters possess a high degree of polymerization and a high alpha-cellulose content (>98%), making them ideal for the production of high-performance propellants with consistent burn rates and ballistic stability.¹

The vulnerability lies in the geography of cotton cultivation. China is the world’s largest producer of cotton and, crucially, the dominant processor of refined cotton linters for chemical applications. For decades, European propellant manufacturers—including industry giants like Rheinmetall (Germany), Eurenco (France), and Nitrichemie (Switzerland)—have relied on imports of Chinese cotton linters to feed their nitrocellulose plants.³ This reliance was driven by cost and availability, as the textile industries in the West declined.

The strategic risk materialized starkly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Open-source trade data and industry reports indicate that while Western manufacturers faced shortages of high-quality linters, Chinese exports of nitrocellulose to Russia surged. Russian imports of nitrocellulose from China more than doubled from 2022 to 2023, effectively sustaining the Russian war machine despite Western sanctions.¹ This divergence in supply availability suggests a deliberate strategy by Beijing to prioritize domestic and partner needs, effectively weaponizing the supply of a dual-use commodity. The “guncotton” that fuels Russian artillery is chemically identical to the material needed by NATO, creating a zero-sum competition for global feedstock.

2.2 Technical Nuance: The Wood Pulp Substitution Challenge

The primary compensating measure for the cotton linter vulnerability is the substitution of wood pulp as a feedstock. North America and Scandinavia possess vast forestry resources, making wood pulp a theoretically abundant alternative. However, the transition is not a simple logistical switch; it is a complex chemical engineering challenge.⁴

Wood fibers differ physically and chemically from cotton linters. They are generally shorter, possess lower crystallinity, and contain higher levels of impurities such as hemicellulose and lignin. To be suitable for munitions, wood pulp must undergo the Kraft or Sulfite pulping processes followed by intensive bleaching and refining to reach “chemical grade” purity (typically >95% alpha-cellulose).

Table 1: Technical and Supply Chain Comparison of Cellulose Feedstocks

Feature	Cotton Linters	Wood Pulp (Sulfite/Kraft)	Strategic Implications
Source	Byproduct of Cotton Ginning	Forestry / Paper Industry	Cotton: Harvest dependent; high climate risk; geographically concentrated in China/India.
Cellulose Purity	High (>98% Alpha)	Moderate (>95% after refining)	Wood: Requires additional refining steps, increasing energy cost and processing time.
Fiber Morphology	Long, tubular fibers	Short, flat fibers	Performance: Cotton offers better “wicking” of acid during nitration; wood pulp requires tailored acid mixes.
Supply Risk	Critical (Adversary Control)	Low (Domestic Abundance)	Mitigation: Wood pulp is the only viable path to sovereign resilience for NATO.

Recent research and industrial trials have focused on optimizing the nitration of wood pulp. Studies indicate that by controlling the morphology and using specific acid ratios (e.g., 1:3 nitric to sulfuric), wood pulp NC can achieve nitrogen content and stability comparable to cotton-based NC.⁵ The Radford Army Ammunition Plant (RFAAP) in Virginia, the primary source of propellants for the U.S. military, is actively qualifying wood-pulp-based nitrocellulose grades to Mil-DTL-244C standards.² This qualification process is rigorous and slow, requiring extensive ballistic testing to ensure that the new powder lots perform consistently across temperature extremes.

2.3 Structural Mitigation: Reshoring and Vertical Integration

To mitigate the risk of feedstock cutoff, the U.S. Army and its commercial partners are investing heavily in domestic production capabilities. The “Modernization of Industrial Facilities” program is channeling capital into aging plants like Radford (managed by BAE Systems) and Lake City (managed by Olin Winchester).

A key development is the expansion of General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS) Canada. The Valleyfield, Quebec facility is a Center of Excellence for propellant production and is the sole source for the M31A2 triple-base propellant used in U.S. 155mm modular artillery charges.⁶ The U.S. Army’s reliance on this Canadian facility underscores the integrated nature of the North American Defense Industrial Base (NTIB). To further reduce risk, the Army is funding the construction of a second source for ball powder at the Lake City Army Ammunition Plant and expanding propellant capacity at Radford.⁷

Furthermore, the Czechoslovak Group (CSG), a major European defense conglomerate, is aggressively expanding its vertical integration. By acquiring assets that produce their own nitrocellulose (such as plants in Serbia and Spain) and recently winning the contract to manage sections of the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant, CSG is positioning itself to insulate its supply chain from Asian spot markets.⁸ This “Western internal sourcing” model is a direct counter to the Chinese monopoly.

3. The Primer Crisis: Antimony and the Ignition Gap

If nitrocellulose is the muscle of the cartridge, the primer is the spark. The primer supply chain is arguably the most fragile component of the entire ammunition ecosystem due to a single-point failure risk: antimony.

3.1 The Strategic Stranglehold on Antimony

Antimony (Sb) is a metalloid that serves two indispensable functions in small arms ammunition:

1. Lead Hardening: It is alloyed with lead (typically 2-5%) to increase hardness, ensuring projectiles can engage rifling at high velocities without stripping and can penetrate intermediate barriers.
2. Ignition Fuel: Antimony trisulfide (Sb2S3) is the primary fuel in traditional lead styphnate priming mixtures. It determines the sensitivity and burn temperature of the primer, ensuring reliable ignition of the propellant charge.⁹

The global supply of antimony is dangerously concentrated. China accounts for approximately 48% of global mine production and controls nearly 60% of refining capacity. When combined with production from Russia (18%) and Tajikistan (which exports the majority of its ore to China for processing), over 75% of the global supply is controlled by adversary or non-aligned nations.¹¹

In August 2024, the PRC Ministry of Commerce announced strict export restrictions on antimony and related smelting technologies, ostensibly for national security reasons.¹¹ This move effectively weaponized the supply chain. Prices for antimony metal nearly doubled, reaching historic highs, and Western buyers faced immediate allocation constraints. This is a classic “gray zone” economic warfare tactic: restricting a critical input to degrade the adversary’s industrial readiness without firing a shot.

3.2 The Domestic Void: 24 Years of Zero Production

The United States has produced zero antimony from domestic mines since the closure of the Sunshine Mine in Idaho in 2001. The U.S. is 100% import-dependent, relying on China, Belgium (which re-processes imported ore), and India.⁹

The primary compensating measure is the Stibnite Gold Project in central Idaho, developed by Perpetua Resources. This site contains one of the largest antimony reserves outside of China. Recognizing its strategic importance, the Department of Defense (DOD) awarded Perpetua a $24.8 million grant under the Defense Production Act (DPA) to accelerate permitting, and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) has issued a letter of interest for up to $1.8 billion in financing.¹²

The “Valley of Death” Timeline: The critical risk is temporal. The Stibnite mine is not projected to begin commercial production until 2028, pending final Record of Decision (ROD) approvals expected in late 2024/early 2025.¹³ This creates a vulnerability gap of approximately four years (2024-2028) where the U.S. remains exposed to Chinese export chokes.

3.3 Interim Mitigation: Stockpiling and the “Green” Primer Dilemma

To bridge this gap, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has engaged in an aggressive stockpiling campaign. In 2025, the DLA initiated a $245 million acquisition program for antimony ingots, utilizing the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act.¹⁵ This moves the U.S. government from a passive observer to a market maker, securing physical material to insulate defense contractors from spot market volatility.

A secondary mitigation strategy is the shift toward “Lead-Free” or “Green” Primers. These formulations, such as those based on Diazodinitrophenol (DDNP), eliminate the need for lead styphnate and potentially antimony trisulfide. However, this solution introduces new risks:

1. Precursor Dependency: DDNP synthesis requires dinitrophenol. The global production of dinitrophenol and its precursors is also heavily concentrated in China.¹⁷ Shifting from lead/antimony to DDNP may simply trade a geological dependency for a chemical one.
2. Reliability Issues: Military testing of DDNP-based primers (e.g., Russian KVB-7E) has shown significant performance variances compared to lead styphnate. Issues include ignition delays (hangfires), high standard deviations in peak pressure (8.2-25.0% vs. 5-11% for lead), and poor performance in extreme cold.¹⁹
3. Shelf Life: Organic primers like DDNP historically suffer from degradation over time, a critical flaw for military ammunition that may be stockpiled for decades.

Consequently, the U.S. Army remains hesitant to fully adopt green primers for combat ammunition, preferring to reserve them for training. This means the reliance on antimony for lethal munitions will persist for the foreseeable future, making the Stibnite project and DLA stockpiles the only viable near-term solutions.

4. Metallurgy and the Raw Material Base

The metallic components of the cartridge—the case (typically brass, a copper-zinc alloy) and the bullet jacket (copper)—are commodities subject to global market forces manipulated by Chinese industrial policy.

4.1 Smelting Capacity Caps and Market Manipulation

While copper and zinc ores are mined globally, the refining capacity is heavily centered in China. In 2024 and 2025, Chinese industry associations, driven by state directives, proposed “capacity caps” on copper and zinc smelters.²⁰ Ostensibly aimed at reducing carbon emissions and addressing overcapacity, these caps restrict the global supply of refined metal.

Because China processes over 50% of the world’s copper, a contraction in Chinese smelting output directly inflates global prices. For U.S. ammunition manufacturers operating on fixed-price government contracts (e.g., Lake City), a spike in copper and zinc prices erodes margins and can threaten the financial viability of the supply chain. Small and Medium Manufacturers (SMMs) in the defense base are particularly vulnerable to this volatility.²³

4.2 The Steel Case Ban and the Brass Surge

For decades, the U.S. civilian market acted as a shock absorber for the industry, consuming vast quantities of cheap, steel-cased ammunition imported from Russia (brands like Wolf, Tula, Barnaul). Following the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. government imposed a ban on Russian ammunition imports.²⁴

This ban removed roughly 30-40% of the commercial volume from the U.S. market. The unintended consequence was a massive surge in demand for domestic brass-cased ammunition to fill the void. This commercial demand competes directly with military requirements for brass strip and primer cups. Manufacturers like Winchester and Vista Outdoor have had to run facilities at 100% capacity just to meet commercial demand, leaving little surge capacity for military contingencies.

Compensating Measure: The expansion of facilities like CBC USA in Oklahoma is a direct response to this. CBC Global Ammunition (Brazil) is investing $300 million to build a fully vertically integrated plant in the U.S. capable of producing its own brass cases and primers.²⁶ This increases the aggregate North American capacity for brass production, reducing the “crowding out” effect of the civilian market.

5. The Machinery of Production: An Hidden Vulnerability

A critical but often invisible vulnerability lies in the capital equipment required to manufacture ammunition. The high-speed transfer presses, loading machines, and packaging lines are not commodities; they are specialized tools produced by a very small number of suppliers.

5.1 The European Oligopoly: Manurhin and Fritz Werner

The global standard for high-volume small arms ammunition machinery is defined by a few key European Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs):

• Manurhin (France): A legendary name in the industry, their machines are the backbone of many government arsenals, including Lake City.²⁸
• Fritz Werner (Germany): Another dominant player, providing complete turnkey plants for ammunition production.³⁰
• New Lachaussée (Belgium): Specializes in loading and assembly equipment.

While these are allied nations, the risk is twofold. First, the lead times for these machines can exceed 24-36 months. If the U.S. needs to rapidly expand capacity (e.g., for a Pacific conflict), it cannot simply buy machines “off the shelf.” Second, these modern machines are heavily automated, relying on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), servo motors, and advanced sensors.

5.2 The Electronics and Component Risk

The supply chain for industrial automation electronics is deeply entangled with China. A Manurhin press may be assembled in France, but its control systems likely contain capacitors, microchips, and rare earth magnets sourced from China.³¹ A supply chain interdiction at the component level could paralyze the production of the very machines needed to make ammunition.

Mitigation: The U.S. Army is actively investing in the modernization of the Organic Industrial Base (OIB). The contract awarded to MSM Group (a subsidiary of CSG) to design and build a new artillery load/assemble/pack (LAP) facility at Iowa AAP specifically calls for “21st-century manufacturing technology” integrating robotics and automation.⁸ By mandating open-architecture control systems and potentially sourcing automation components from trusted partners (Japan, South Korea), the Army attempts to mitigate the risk of vendor lock-in and component obsolescence.

Additionally, the shortage of skilled labor—specifically tool and die makers—is a domestic vulnerability. The U.S. workforce for precision machining is aging, and the “institutional knowledge” required to maintain and operate vintage SCAMP (Small Caliber Ammunition Modernization Program) machinery is retiring.³⁴ Modernization with robotics helps reduce reliance on manual labor for dangerous tasks (like the tetrazene handling accident at Lake City ³⁶), but it increases reliance on software and electronics engineers.

6. Case Studies in Supply Chain Resilience and Risk

To understand how these dynamics play out in the real world, we examine four key industrial players and their role in the supply chain matrix.

6.1 Poongsan Corporation (South Korea): The Critical Ally

Poongsan is a linchpin in the global ammunition supply chain. It is not only South Korea’s primary ammunition manufacturer but also the world’s leading producer of coin blanks (controlling >50% of the global market).³⁷ This gives Poongsan immense leverage in the copper and brass strip market.

• Risk: While a staunch ally, Poongsan represents a geographic risk. In a conflict on the Korean peninsula, their capacity would be entirely consumed by domestic defense needs (ROK Army), cutting off exports to the U.S. (sold under the PMC brand).
• Compensating Measure: Poongsan operates a U.S. subsidiary, PMX Industries in Iowa, which produces copper and brass strip.³⁸ Ensuring PMX has sufficient raw material stockpiles (copper cathode/zinc) is critical to insulating U.S. production from Korean regional instability.

6.2 CBC Global Ammunition (Brazil/USA): Vertical Integration

CBC (Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos) creates resilience through scale and vertical integration.

• Strategy: Their new $300M Oklahoma facility is designed to produce everything in-house: cases, projectiles, primers, and propellant.²⁷
• Benefit: By on-shoring the production of primers and propellant, CBC reduces U.S. reliance on trans-oceanic shipments of hazardous materials. This facility acts as a strategic reserve of industrial capacity.

6.3 Czechoslovak Group (CSG): The Trans-Atlantic Bridge

CSG has rapidly become a major player in the U.S. market by acquiring Vista Outdoor’s ammunition division (Federal, CCI, Remington, Speer).

• Strategy: CSG brings European chemical expertise (nitrocellulose production) to the U.S. industrial base. Their involvement in modernizing the Iowa AAP ⁸ facilitates the transfer of advanced automation technology from their European subsidiaries to U.S. government-owned plants.
• Benefit: This diversifies the ownership and technical base of U.S. ammo production, reducing reliance on the traditional “Big Two” (Olin Winchester and General Dynamics).

6.4 True Velocity: Technological Leapfrogging

True Velocity represents a technological compensating measure: polymer-cased ammunition.

• Technology: By using a composite case, they eliminate the need for brass, removing copper and zinc smelting from the critical path for case production.⁴⁰
• Benefit: A polymer production cell has a much smaller footprint than a brass foundry and can be set up quickly. While the Army did not select their rifle for the NGSW program, the qualification of their ammo provides a strategic hedge. If brass supplies are interdicted, polymer offers a surge-capable alternative.

7. Regulatory Warfare and Market Distortions

Supply chain risks are not only physical; they are regulatory. The regulatory environment in Europe creates ripples that affect U.S. availability.

7.1 EU REACH and the Lead Ban

The European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) is aggressively pursuing restrictions on lead in ammunition under the REACH regulation. A ban on lead shot in wetlands is already in effect, and a total ban on lead in all ammunition is being debated.⁴²

• Impact: This forces European manufacturers (who supply components to the U.S.) to transition to lead-free designs. This disrupts established supply chains for lead wire and antimony.
• Risk: As European demand for “green” primers rises, it pulls limited supplies of alternative chemicals (like DDNP precursors) away from other markets. It also bifurcates the market: “Military” (Lead) vs. “Civilian” (Green), reducing the economies of scale that previously allowed militaries to ride the coattails of civilian production volume.

7.2 U.S. Import Restrictions

The Biden Administration’s ban on Russian ammunition imports ⁴⁴ was a necessary geopolitical move, but it removed a massive volume of supply.

• Impact: It forced U.S. consumers to buy domestic brass ammo, stripping capacity from the military industrial base.
• Compensating Measure: The only solution is the expansion of domestic capacity (like CBC USA and CSG) to backfill the lost Russian volume, a process that takes years.

8. Strategic Compensating Measures: A Summary

The mitigation of these risks requires a layered approach, combining immediate tactical fixes with long-term strategic investments.

Table 2: Risk-Mitigation Matrix

Risk Vector	Primary Threat	Compensating Measure (Short Term)	Compensating Measure (Long Term)
Nitrocellulose	Reliance on Chinese Cotton Linters	Stockpiling; Diversifying to Indian/Brazilian sources	Qualification of Wood Pulp NC (Radford AAP); Domestic production expansion
Antimony	Chinese Export Restrictions & Monopoly	DLA Strategic Stockpile ($245M); Recycling (Lead-acid batteries)	Stibnite Gold Project (Idaho) – Production start 2028
Primers	Reliance on Lead Styphnate / Antimony	Import of finished primers from allies (CBC, Poongsan)	Development of non-DDNP “Green” primers; Domestic vertical integration
Machinery	Reliance on European OEMs & Asian Electronics	Stockpiling spare parts; Extended life programs for SCAMP	Investment in open-architecture robotics; Revitalizing US Tool & Die sector
Brass/Copper	Chinese Smelting Capacity Caps	Hedging commodity futures; Recycling range brass	Adoption of Polymer Cased Ammunition (True Velocity)

9. Conclusion: The Path to Sovereign Capability

The U.S. small arms ammunition supply chain is currently in a “Valley of Death.” The old order of globalized, cost-efficient sourcing has collapsed under the weight of geopolitical competition, but the new order of resilient, sovereign production has not yet fully matured.

For the next 3-5 years (2025-2029), the system is vulnerable. The gap between the onset of Chinese antimony restrictions and the opening of the Stibnite mine is the period of maximum danger. During this window, the DLA’s stockpiling efforts and the “friend-shoring” of production to Australia and Canada are not just prudent—they are existential necessities.

The long-term outlook is more positive. The capitalization of the Organic Industrial Base, the entry of vertically integrated players like CBC and CSG, and the qualification of wood pulp nitrocellulose are structural fixes that will eventually harden the supply chain. However, these projects require sustained political will and funding. The “China Price” is gone. The cost of ammunition in the future will include a “Resilience Premium”—the cost of mining in Idaho, refining in Virginia, and building machines in Iowa. Paying this premium is the only way to ensure that when the trigger is pulled, the supply chain doesn’t fire a blank.

Data Appendix

Table 3: Key Supply Chain Node Status

Node	Criticality	Current Status	Risk Trend
Radford AAP (VA)	High (Propellant)	Modernization ongoing; Wood pulp qualification	Improving
Lake City AAP (MO)	Critical (Small Arms)	Operating at capacity; Labor/Safety risks	Stable
Valleyfield (Canada)	High (Artillery Propellant)	Sole source for M31A2; Capacity expansion	Stable
Stibnite Mine (ID)	Critical (Antimony)	Permitting phase; Production est. 2028	High (Temporal)
CBC USA (OK)	Moderate (Surge Capacity)	Under construction; Vertical integration	Improving

---

If you find this post useful, please share the link on Facebook, with your friends, etc. Your support is much appreciated and if you have any feedback, please email me at in**@*********ps.com. Please note that for links to other websites, we are only paid if there is an affiliate program such as Avantlink, Impact, Amazon and eBay and only if you purchase something. If you’d like to directly contribute towards our continued reporting, please visit our funding page.

---

Sources Used

1. To counter China, the US must strengthen ammunition production …, accessed December 4, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/to-counter-china-the-us-must-strengthen-ammunition-production/
2. Nitrocellulose fiber comparative characterization – IMEMG, accessed December 4, 2025, https://imemg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/22224-Presentation-Lee-Goetz-Nitrocellulose-Fiber-comparison-FINAL-to-IM-EM.pdf
3. Running on empty: the chemical shortage undermining European defence, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.epc.eu/publication/running-on-empty-the-chemical-shortage-undermining-european-defence/
4. Study of Croscarmellose Sodium: Granular vs Fibrous and Cotton Linter vs Wood Pulp, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.pehelspecialities.com/post/study-of-croscarmellose-sodium-granular-vs-fibrous-and-cotton-linter-vs-wood-pulp
5. Selecting appropriate cellulose morphology to enhance the nitrogen content of nitrocellulose – ResearchGate, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383740463_Selecting_appropriate_cellulose_morphology_to_enhance_the_nitrogen_content_of_nitrocellulose
6. Canada under Contract to Supply the IDF with Artillery Propellant – Project Ploughshares, accessed December 4, 2025, https://ploughshares.ca/canada-under-contract-to-supply-the-idf-with-artillery-propellant/
7. New Army report details foreign reliance in energetics supply chain, timelines to bolster domestic production – | InsideDefense.com, accessed December 4, 2025, https://insidedefense.com/share/225757
8. CSG | MSM North America, Part of the CSG Group, Wins U.S. Army …, accessed December 4, 2025, https://czechoslovakgroup.com/en/news/msm-north-america-part-of-the-csg-group-wins-u-s-army-contract-to-build-the-most-advanced-ammunition-loading-facility-in-north-america
9. ANTIMONY – Geologica Resource Corp, accessed December 4, 2025, https://geologicaresource.com/antimony/
10. Antimony: Critical Military Metal Development & Supply Chain – Discovery Alert, accessed December 4, 2025, https://discoveryalert.com.au/antimony-critical-military-metal-defense-applications-2025/
11. China’s Antimony Export Restrictions: The Impact on U.S. National …, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-antimony-export-restrictions-impact-us-national-security
12. Streetwise: Idaho Gold Project Could Produce One-Third of Critical Antimony for US, accessed December 4, 2025, https://perpetuaresources.com/streetwise-idaho-gold-project-could-produce-one-third-of-critical-antimony-for-us/
13. U.S. Army opens future domestic source of antimony sulfide, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/288633/u_s_army_opens_future_domestic_source_of_antimony_sulfide
14. Stibnite Gold Project | Permitting Dashboard – Performance.gov, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.permits.performance.gov/permitting-project/fast-41-transparency-projects/stibnite-gold-project
15. Pentagon Critical Minerals Stockpile: National Security Strategy – Discovery Alert, accessed December 4, 2025, https://discoveryalert.com.au/pentagon-critical-minerals-stockpile-strategic-reserves-2025/
16. Q&A: US Antimony sees increased Sb demand for US | Latest Market News – Argus Media, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2756620-q-a-us-antimony-sees-increased-sb-demand-for-us
17. 2,4-Dicholorphenoxyacetic Acid From the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value – Federal Register, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/07/2025-05886/24-dicholorphenoxyacetic-acid-from-the-peoples-republic-of-china-final-affirmative-determination-of
18. U.S. Publishes AD, CVD Duties on 2,4-D Imports From India and China – AgWeb, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.agweb.com/markets/pro-farmer-analysis/u-s-publishes-ad-cvd-duties-2-4-d-imports-india-and-china
19. Surprising Results in Dept. of Defense Lead-Free Primer Tests …, accessed December 4, 2025, https://bulletin.accurateshooter.com/2011/10/surprising-results-in-dept-of-defense-lead-free-primer-tests/
20. China Eyes Capacity Caps for Copper Lead Zinc Smelters – Discovery Alert, accessed December 4, 2025, https://discoveryalert.com.au/china-capacity-caps-copper-lead-zinc-2025/
21. China’s industry association recommends capacity cap for copper, lead and zinc, accessed December 4, 2025, https://radiousa.com/2025/10/31/chinas-industry-association-recommends-capacity-cap-for-copper-lead-and-zinc/
22. China’s top metals group calls for ceiling on copper capacity – MINING.COM, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.mining.com/web/chinas-top-metals-group-calls-for-ceiling-on-copper-capacity/
23. Aerospace/Defense Supply Chain Process Maturity and Raw Material Vulnerability, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.supplychainbrain.com/articles/41033-aerospace-defense-supply-chain-process-maturity-and-raw-material-vulnerability
24. As Russia Completes Transition to a Full War Economy, Treasury Takes Sweeping Aim at Foundational Financial Infrastructure and Access to Third Country Support, accessed December 4, 2025, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2404
25. The Implications Of Russian Ammo Import Ban – IN – Shooting Industry Magazine, accessed December 4, 2025, https://shootingindustry.com/industry-news/the-implications-of-russian-ammo-import-ban-in/
26. CBC Global Ammunition Selects Oklahoma for $300 Million Investment, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.okcommerce.gov/cbc-global-ammunition-selects-oklahoma-for-300-million-investment/
27. CBC announces production plant in the US – CBC Global Ammunition, accessed December 4, 2025, https://cbcglobal-ammunition.com/cbcusa/
28. Manufacture du Haut Rhin | Company – IWA OutdoorClassics, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.iwa.info/en/exhibitors/manufacture-du-haut-rhin-2484299
29. Machines & solutions for ammunition production, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.mhr-defense.com/
30. leading ammunition manufacturing technology – FRITZ WERNER Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.fritz-werner.com/about-us
31. PROTECTING CRITICAL SUPPLY CHAINS, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/supplychain/Risks_From_Foreign_Adversarial_Exposure.pdf
32. Unveiling the vulnerabilities: unpacking risks in the electronics supply chain | Kearney, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.kearney.com/service/operations-performance/article/unveiling-the-vulnerabilities-unpacking-risks-in-the-electronics-supply-chain
33. Army invests $635M in cutting-edge artillery ammunition production facility | Article, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.army.mil/article/287950/army_invests_635m_in_cutting_edge_artillery_ammunition_production_facility
34. What to Know About Global Supply Chain Risks for Precision Die-Cut Components, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.thrustin.com/blog/what-to-know-about-global-supply-chain-risks-for-precision-die-cut-components/
35. Tool and Die Shop Safety: Tips and Best Practices – JEELIX, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.jeelix.com/tool-and-die-shop-safety-tips-and-practices/
36. Replacing Spatulas With Robots At Army Ammo Plants – Breaking Defense, accessed December 4, 2025, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/replacing-spatulas-with-robots-at-army-ammo-plants/
37. How Does Poongsan Holdings Company Work? – Matrix BCG, accessed December 4, 2025, https://matrixbcg.com/blogs/how-it-works/poongsan
38. Affiliates – Poongsan Corporation, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.poongsan.co.kr/en/company/partner/overseas
39. CBC USA, accessed December 4, 2025, https://cbcdefense.com/cbcusa/
40. True Velocity Completes On-Time Shipment of Over 625K Rounds of Composite-Cased Ammo to US Army for NGSW – Frag Out! Magazine, accessed December 4, 2025, https://fragoutmag.com/true-velocity-completes-shipment-625k-rounds-of-composite-cased-68tvcm-us-army-ngsw/
41. True Velocity Sent Over A Half Million 6.8mm Rounds To Army – Athlon Outdoors, accessed December 4, 2025, https://athlonoutdoors.com/article/true-velocity-army-testing-shipment/
42. REACH restriction on lead in rimfire ammunition | E-003959/2025 | European Parliament, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003959_EN.html
43. Lead in Ammunition – Latest Developments – FACE | European Federation for Hunting and Conservation, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.face.eu/2025/10/lead-in-ammunition-latest-developments/
44. Russian Ammo Imports Halted, May Send Demand, Prices and Shortages to New Levels, accessed December 4, 2025, https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorial/russian-ammo-imports-banned-halted/424581